Doğan, SerhatKaragözoğlu, EminSağlam, ÇağrıKeskin, K.2024-03-112024-03-112023-05-2509318658https://hdl.handle.net/11693/114496We characterize the equilibrium effort function of a large Tullock contest game with heterogeneous agents under mild conditions on the contest success function and effort cost function. Later, writing the equilibrium total effort explicitly under a uniform type distribution, we identify the effort-maximizing large Tullock contest. It is shown that the contest designer needs to increase the curvature of the effective effort function, thereby encouraging high-type agents to exert even higher efforts, as the curvature of the effort cost function increases or the support of the type distribution gets narrower.enCC BYhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Asymmetric contestContest designEffort-maximizing contestsLarge gameTullock contestsArticle10.1007/s00712-023-00829-8