Keskin, K.Sağlam, Çağrı2018-04-122018-04-1220181024-2694http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36463We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of winning). This paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict. © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis GroupEnglishContestEndogenous rewardTerritorial conflictWarArticle10.1080/10242694.2017.13272971476-8267