Uyar, Damla2022-08-082022-08-082022-052022-052022-05-30http://hdl.handle.net/11693/110393Cataloged from PDF version of article.Thesis (Master's): Bilkent University, Department of Philosophy, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2022.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-52).Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDA) are widely used in moral philosophy literature, and have been used as a skeptical challenge to moral realism. Whether such an evolutionary debunking argument can also apply to scientific realism, on the other hand, is not a hotly debated topic. Such a challenge is posed by Christophe de Ray, in his article “An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism” (2022). De Ray argues that scientific realism engages in abductive reasoning, which relies on the metaphysical intuition that facts generally have explanations for their obtaining. In light of the evolutionary theory, however, he claims that the reliance on this metaphysical intuition is unjustified—putting scientific realism in the position of undermining itself in the face of a Darwinian Dilemma. To assess whether such an EDA can target different versions of scientific realism, I am examining these three realist positions: Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR), Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), and Entity Realism. Against de Ray, I argue that although the two versions of structural realism (ESR and OSR) are the targets of EDA against scientific realism, there is at least one version of scientific realism, Entity Realism, that does not become such a target.vii, 52 leaves ; 30 cm.Englishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEvolutionary debunking argumentEpistemic structural realismOntic structural realismEntity realismThesisB161049