Yıldırım, Hüseyin2016-01-082016-01-081995http://hdl.handle.net/11693/17669Ankara : Department of Economics and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 1995.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1995.Includes bibliographical references leaves leaf 22The impact of delegation in a firm has been observed by many modern authors. Vickers(1985), Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987) considered the problem as part of positive economic theory whereas Koray and Sertel(1989) treated it as a regulation problem. We examine a similar problem for a duopolistic dilTerentiated good market with Bertrand competition and lengthen the delegation chain to 5 managers. Our findings show that the firms’ profits are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a positive incentive to redelegate for each firm. Our natural conjecture is that, in the limit, firms reach collusion non-cooperatively.vi, [31] leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDelegationRegulationNon-cooperative gamesBertrand competitionCournot competitionProduct diiferentiationPrincipalAgent gamesEfficiencyHD50 .Y55 1995Delegation of authority.Oligopolies.Competition.Cooperation.Industrial management.Industrial efficiency.Thesis