Güner, Serdar S.Lonergan, S. C.2019-04-262019-04-2619999789401058322http://hdl.handle.net/11693/50964Chapter 21This chapter investigates possible alliances between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in their dispute over water in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. A noncooperative game in extensive form models Turkish-Syrian interactions related to water and terrorism. Iraq is modeled as a dummy player having no choice in the game but benefiting from Turkish-Syrian concessions. A Turkish-Syrian alliance cannot target Iraq, as the latter has no means of reducing the water volume upstream. The equilibria of the game explain the current state of the conflict by providing two different rationales. A unique equilibrium stipulates the conditions for a Turkish- Syrian cooperation. Turkish-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi alliances are found to be formed to balance threats in the basin.EnglishWater issueNoncooperative gameWater allianceWater conflictDummy playerBook Chapter10.1007/978-94-011-4219-9_2110.1007/978-94-011-4219-99789401142199