Fatollahi, AlirezaMcCullagh, M.2024-03-192024-03-192023-08-030045-5091https://hdl.handle.net/11693/114921The “No Miracle Argument” for scientific realism contends that the only plausible explanation for the predictive success of scientific theories is their truthlikeness, but doesn’t specify what ‘truthlikeness’ means. I argue that if we understand ‘truthlikeness’ in terms of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, the resulting realist thesis (RKL) is a plausible explanation for science’s success. Still, RKL probably falls short of the realist’s ideal. I argue, however, that the strongest version of realism that the argument can plausibly establish is RKL. The realist needs another argument for establishing a stronger realist thesis.EnglishScientific realismNo Miracle ArgumentAkaike information criterionModel selectionArticle10.1017/can.2023.211911-0820