Ünver, Mustafa Utku2016-01-082016-01-081995http://hdl.handle.net/11693/17668Ankara : Department of Economics and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 1995.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1995.Includes bibliographical references leaves 22.We consider the impact of delegation in a Cournotic duopoly with differentiated goods upon the firms’ profit maximization behavior. In an oligopoly, delegation in each firm can be modeled through a specific non-cooperative game. Delegation games in a differentiated goods market with affine demand are studied within the Cournot competition concept where redelegation is permitted in a symmetric duopoly. The following results are demonstrated: The maximand delegated by each primary delegator, i.e. owner of each firm, converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the true profit function in the absence of delegation costs, and total industry output at the Cournot equilibrium converges in monotonically increasing fashion to some output level. Welfare changes due to redelegation are also considered.vi, 31 leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDelegationEfficiencyTheory of FirmRegulationNon-cooperative GamesNon-cooperative GamesCournot CompetitionBertrand CompetitionDuopolyDifferentiated GoodsPrincipal-Agent GamesNash EquilibriumHD50 .U58 1995Delegation of authority.Oligopolies.Oligopolies--Mathematical models.Competition--Mathematical models.Equilibrium(Economics).Industrial management.Thesis