Bölek, Sena2021-02-082021-02-082021-012021-012021-02-03http://hdl.handle.net/11693/55027Cataloged from PDF version of article.Thesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Philosophy, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2021.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 37-42).Crispin Wright, in Truth and Objectivity, introduces his anti-realist paradigm, arguing that discourse about morality can be truth-apt without holding a realist stance. There, he formulates the criterion of Cognitive Command against realism by claiming that moral realism is defensible if and only if it is a priori that any moral disagreement between realists and anti-realists involves a cognitive shortcoming. In this thesis, the methodology I adopt to defend realism is to uphold Wittgenstein’s claims about certainty against Wright’s criterion of Cognitive Command. In so doing, I argue that the disagreement between realists and anti-realists is a kind of deep disagreement over basic moral certainties, which cannot be rationally resolvable. I then investigate the possibility of basic certainties in metadiscourse by referring to the claims about the existence of moral facts in contemporary metaethics. Taken together, I show that the criterion of Cognitive Command works neither in first-order normative discourse nor in second-order discourse about normativity.v, 42 leaves ; 30 cm.Englishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCertaintyCognitive commandDisagreementMoral factsRealismThesisB150725