Sever, Murat2016-01-082016-01-081994http://hdl.handle.net/11693/18387Ankara : Department of Economics and Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Bilkent Univ., 1994.Thesis(Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1994.Includes bibliographical references leaves 34.This stud\^ provides three exanpdes in whicli llie ownership structure of productive assets affects efhciency oF the economic outcome. We show how the incompleteness of contracts and the s])ecificit y of investments cause inefficient l^ehaviours and reductions in the efficient level of relation-specific investment because of the individuals' o])])ortunisti(' behaviour. We show the importance of ownershi]) on l^ehaviours of agents and their investment decisions l)y affecting the distribution of residual rights over assets and so the distribution of tlie sur])lus from investments. VVV' observe the effects of monitoring on the l)ehaviour of individuals in dilfeient types of ownership patterns.36 leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEfficiencyincomplete contractsrelation-specific investmentintegrationnon-integrationindis])ensabilityprinci])al-agent relatioiislii|)asymmetric informationmonitoringliierarchypartnershi])HB701 .S48 1994Property.Right of property--Economic aspects.Right of ownership.Investments.Thesis