Koray, S.Unel, B.2016-02-082016-02-0820030176-1714http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24473Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial.EnglishSocial choiceChoice functionChoice ruleSocial choice functionSocial choice ruleArticle10.1007/s0035502001951432-217X