Gheorghe, ElizaTokatlı, Fatihİplikçi, Murat2025-02-202025-02-202024-10-160026-3206https://hdl.handle.net/11693/116531This article discusses the shift in Turkey's nuclear alliance with the United States from client to junior partner. Ankara sought to bring the Turkish economy and military forces in line with those of its patron to signal its loyalty. But power asymmetries made it so that Washington became Ankara's lifeline. From the 1950s until the mid-1960s, American policymakers applied a top-down style of alliance management, making important decisions without consulting Ankara. But the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the nature of this relationship, as Turkey became better able to stand on its own feet. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, the Americans had to consult and coordinate with Ankara. Also, Turkey could reject key American proposals involving nuclear weapons, such as the creation of a Multilateral Force for NATO, and even create some ambiguity about its nuclear intentions to signal its loss of faith in the American security guarantee.EnglishCC BY 4.0 Deed (Attribution 4.0 International)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Nuclear weaponAlliancesCold WarUnited StatesTurkeySoviet UnionArticle10.1080/00263206.2024.24103571743-7881