Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç2016-01-082016-01-082007http://hdl.handle.net/11693/14522Ankara : The Department of Economics, The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 2007.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2007.Includes bibliographical references leaves 37-39.I analyze limiting behavior of best-reply processes. I find that without inertia Nash Equilibria are not limit sets. Moreover, even for processes with inertia, Nash Equilibria are not stable. I argue that minimal CURB sets are reasonable candidates for limit sets if best-reply processes are indeterminate or Nash Equilibria satisfy evolutionary stability (Oechssler 1997). In such cases, limit sets necessarily contain a Nash Equilibrium. Otherwise limit sets may not be close to any Nash Equilibria unless they satisfy some support consistency condition.vi, 39 leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBest-Reply ProcessesMinimal CURB setsNash EquilibriaLimit SetsHB144 .A36 2007Game theory.Equilibrium (Economics)Thesis