Pınar, Mustafa Çelebi2019-02-212019-02-2120181862-4472http://hdl.handle.net/11693/50523A contracting game under asymmetric information specific to two-echelon supply chain coordination between a retailer of unknown type and a supplier is studied. When the parameter which is private information to the retailer (holding cost) is known up to an interval of uncertainty, a uniform discrete approximation for retailer types leads to closed-form solutions where the joint (coordinated) optimal order quantity for a modified holding cost plays a major role. Furthermore, the closed-form solutions result in increasing information rent for higher types under easy-to-verify conditions involving strict lower limits on the total holding costs of retailer and supplier and the difference between uncoordinated optimal costs of consecutive retailer types.EnglishConvex optimizationIncentivesPrincipal-agent problemTwo-echelon supply chain coordinationArticle10.1007/s11590-018-1243-0