Pasin, Pelin2016-01-082016-01-082001http://hdl.handle.net/11693/14853Ankara : The Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 2001.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2001.Includes bibliographical references leaves 21.In the first part of this study majority voting rule for two alternatives and continuum agents is characterized. As in the finite agent case, symmetry among agents, neutrality between alternatives and positive responsiveness characterize majority voting rule. In the second part, the relation between T-monotonicity and the group which acts as the oligarchy in an oligarchic social choice rule, is analyzed. It is shown that the minimal coalition for which the social choice rule is monotonic constitutes the oligarchy.vi, 21 leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSocial ChoiceOligarchyMonotonicityMajority VotingHB846.8 .P37 2001Social choice--Mathematical models.Voting--Mathematical models.Bureaucracy.Authoritarianism.Oligarchy.Political sociology.Thesis