Per, Emre2016-01-082016-01-082008http://hdl.handle.net/11693/14656Ankara : The Department of Economics of Bilkent University, 2008.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2008.Includes bibliographical references leaves 39-40.In this thesis, we use covers as an extension of networks. The cover notion is almost the same as the conference structure that is proposed by Myerson. However, we extend several notions pertaining to networks to covers in different ways, reflecting the differences in our points of departure. In this framework, we extend the result of Jackson and Wollinsky(1996) to covers which provides a characterization of the Shapley-Myerson allocation rule in terms of component balancedness and equal bargaining power in networks.vii, 40 leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNetworks, Covers,Shapley-Myerson Allocation RuleEqual Bargaining PowerComponent BalancednessHB135 .P47 2008Economics, Mathematical.Game theory.Thesis