Pastine, I.2016-02-082016-02-0820020022-1996http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24688This paper demonstrates that the implications of first-generation speculative attack models do not hold if there is a rational, forward-looking policy maker. The policy maker will be able to avoid predictable speculative attacks by introducing uncertainty into the decisions of speculators. This changes the sudden attack into a prolonged period of increasing speculation and uncertainty. In addition, the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical foundation for a useful empirical methodology. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.EnglishNominal anchorOptimizing BOP crisesSpeculative attacksExchange rateModelMonetary policyPolicy makingArticle10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00134-91873-0353