Woods, J.2018-04-122018-04-1220160039-7857http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36900I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be the most natural minimal way of distinguishing content and form and suggest further problems arising for this route. © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.EnglishAssertion/denialCut/transitivityLogical consequenceLogical formRestallArticle10.1007/s11229-015-0797-y