Öztürk, Zeliha Emel2016-01-082016-01-082011http://hdl.handle.net/11693/15203Ankara : The Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2011.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2011.Includes bibliographical references leaves 27-28.In this thesis study, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the well-known Condorcet and Plurality rules via consistency axioms when the alternative set is endogeneous, namely hereditariness and cloning-proofness. Cloningproofness is the requirement that the social choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives, whereas hereditariness requires insensitivity to withdrawal of alternatives.vi, 31 leavesEnglishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSocial Choice TheoryCloning-ProofnessHereditarinessPlurality RuleCondorcet RuleAxiomatic CharacterizationHB846.8 .O98 2011Social choice--Mathematical models.Game theory.Economic policy.Thesis