Karagözoğlu, EminSağlam, Hüseyin ÇağrıTuran, A. R.2022-02-212022-02-212021-01-060304-4068http://hdl.handle.net/11693/77538We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, show that it is unique, and provide closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies and values. In stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all-pay auction CSF, players exert positive efforts until the very last battle in this equilibrium. We deliver a set of empirically appealing results on effort dynamics.EnglishContestsDiscouragement effectLottery contest success functionPerseveranceStochastic gamesTug-of-warArticle10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.1024691873-1538