Özgüler, A. BülentYıldız, Aykut2016-02-082016-02-082012-091474-6670http://hdl.handle.net/11693/28111Conference Name: 3rd IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems, 2012Date of Conference: 14-15 September 2012The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.EnglishDynamic gameForagingGame theoryNash equilibriumSwarmSwarming behaviorSwarming behavior as Nash equilibriumConference Paper10.3182/20120914-2-US-4030.00046