Doğan, SerhatKeskin, K.Sağlam, Çağrı2021-02-192021-02-1920201058-6407http://hdl.handle.net/11693/75496We consider a network of heterogeneous agents where each edge represents a two‐player contest between the respective nodes. In these bilateral contests, agents compete over an endogenous prize jointly produced using their own contest efforts. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium total effort for every agent. Our model has insightful results regarding the network type, that is, depending on whether the network is bipartite or nonbipartite. Finally, considering the sum of all expected utilities as an efficiency notion, we investigate the optimal network structure.EnglishEfficiencyEndogenous prizeJoint productionNetworksOptimal networkTullock contestsArticle10.1111/jems.12343