The optimal structure of incentives in the principal–agent problem under the smooth ambiguity model

Öztürk, Fatih2018-08-012018-08-012018-072018-072018-07-31http://hdl.handle.net/11693/47703Cataloged from PDF version of article.Thesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2018.Includes bibliographical references (leave 43).We study a principal-agent problem where we model the uncertainty regarding the relationship between the level of effort and the monetary outcome using the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al., 2005). We provide comparative statics on the optimal wage scheme when the agent has constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA) preferences. Our main result implies that whether the optimal wage scheme should be higher-powered or lower-powered depends on an intuitive measure of ambiguity.viii, 46 leaves : graphics ; 30 cm.Englishinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAmbiguity AversionIncentivesMoral HazardOptimal ContractThe optimal structure of incentives in the principal–agent problem under the smooth ambiguity modelPürüzsüz muğlaklık modeli altında asıl-vekil problemindeki tesviklerin optimal yapısıThesisB158746