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New Approaches to the Hamidian Massacres, 1894–7

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Over three years in the mid-1890s (1894–7), tens of thousands of Ottoman-Armenians were murdered in pogroms often known as the Hamidian massacres. Despite the importance of this episode, until the late 1990s these massacres received very little scholarly attention in Ottoman, Kurdish, and even Armenian studies. Within mainstream Ottoman history, the history of "minorities" was often divorced from the history of the Ottoman state. Treatment of the subject of violence against Armenians was usually left to students of Armenian history. Within Armenian Studies, accounts of the Hamidian massacres tended to downplay the multiethnic nature of the Ottoman eastern provinces and considered the massacres as a part of Armenian national history, often teleologically linked to the genocide of the First World War.

Over the past twenty years, several studies on massacres in Diyarbekir, Constantinople, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Bitlis, Harput, and Sasun have illuminated many local aspects of the broader pattern of massacres. Efforts are also underway to bring these studies together to understand the geographic scope, intensity, and spread of the Hamidian violence. Building on this scholarship, this article will seek to make two interconnected contributions. First and foremost, the goal will be to examine some basic questions about the violence. Who carried out this violence? How centrally organized was the violence? Was the violence the result of efforts of Great Powers to intervene? How responsible was Abdülhamid II? Was any of the violence a result of efforts to suppress rebellion? What were the range of responses to the violence among the Muslim population of the Empire? And finally, how many people lost their lives in the violence? Second, this article will examine how recent research into the Hamidian violence has challenged many of the myths that continue to be perpetrated by scholars working across Ottoman, Armenian, and Kurdish studies. While this new scholarship on the massacres has challenged these earlier assumptions, it has also raised new questions.

Some Background, Preliminary Characterization, and Periodization

Armenians in the nineteenth century were scattered over a large area from their traditional homeland in the eastern Ottoman provinces and the adjacent parts of Persia and Russia to a far-flung diaspora throughout the world. The Tanzimat period in the mid-nineteenth century saw an economic boom and sociopolitical emancipation of the empire's urbane Armenian communities, which evoked

feelings of envy and distrust among Muslims. The end of the sanguinary Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–8 intensified tensions as the Patriarch tried in vain to urge foreign powers to grant special status to Armenian-inhabited areas analogous to Lebanon or Bulgaria. These efforts eventually led to no more than an assurance by the powers at the Congress of Berlin that administrative reforms of the Armenians would be carried out. Britain, fearing further Russian expansion in the Ottoman territories, cast itself as a guarantor of these reforms. This official internationalization of the Armenian question weighed heavily on Armenian-Ottoman government relations. The Russo-Ottoman War was not only a traumatic experience for Armenians. The loss of a sizeable part of the territories in the Balkans and the influx of millions of Muslim refugees into Anatolia was a shock to the Ottoman state and the Muslim community, which profoundly affected the character of Sultan Abdülhamid's rule (Chapter 8 in this volume). More than his predecessors of the Tanzimat period, the sultan focused on the (now-enlarged) Muslim majority to ensure the empire's future. Armenians were distrusted in this context. In the second half of the 1880s, as a result of local resistance impulses, but especially under the influence of the political situation in Russia, an Armenian revolutionary movement sprouted, Ottoman-Armenian relations deteriorated rapidly. The revolutionaries' message was too radical for most Armenians. They gained influence mainly through Ottoman overreaction and sympathy for the Armenian cause among the humanitarian-minded part of the European public, especially in Britain. No analysis of the Armenian question as it developed in the 1890s is complete without an appraisal of the enormous regional differences between urbane and rural Armenians and the lack of state influence in many of the more remote regions in the eastern provinces. Poor peasants, facing all kinds of oppression by landlords, and inadequately protected by the state, were important recruits for the revolutionary parties.

The Hamidian regime evolved into a repressive police state, which developed various mechanisms to maintain control over the population (Chapter 8). These policies were increasingly linked to the Armenian question and the regime's great fear that Armenians, following the lead of Balkan Christians and supported by foreign Christian powers, were seeking independence. In 1891 the creation of the Hamidiye cavalry strengthened the government's ties with Kurds and other tribal Muslim groups in the eastern provinces.[1]

The events known as Armenian or Hamidian massacres consist of a multitude of small and large incidents, which differed in character and were interconnected in specific ways. The episode began with state violence in the remote mountainous region of Sasun, south of Muş, in 1894, where an Armenian-Kurdish conflict and the refusal of Armenian peasants to pay taxes and remittances to the state and to Kurdish tribes was seen by the state as a dangerous rebellion. Although some of the Sasuntsis were organized and stimulated by representatives of the Armenian revolutionary Hunchakian party, this was essentially a local conflict.[2] The "Sasun revolt" was put down in an extraordinarily bloody fashion. The alarming reports that trickled into America and Europe ushered in an entirely new phase of the Armenian question. Under pressure from public outrage, the British forced the Ottoman government to conduct a public inquiry into the events in Sasun, to which Britain, France and Russia sent observers. Again Britain, invoking the Berlin Treaty and the Cyprus Convention, took the initiative for a new plan for administrative reforms to benefit the Armenian population. Unproductive negotiations on these reforms continued throughout the summer.

The second phase of anti-Armenian violence was preceded by two Armenian initiatives: the Babıali demonstration, on September 30, 1895, in Constantinople, organized by the Huntchakian

and four days later an attack on two high-ranking Ottoman officials in the port city of Trabzon later claimed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF).[3] In both cases, pogroms by Muslims and Ottoman security forces followed, costing the lives of hundreds of Ottoman Armenian civilians. After the Ottoman government, under the increasing pressure of the Great Powers on October 17 promulgated the reforms, an even much larger wave of anti-Armenian violence erupted, affecting almost all parts of the eastern provinces. In this second wave of violence, which peaked in November 1895, but continued until the beginning of 1896, almost no Armenian quarter or village was spared. These were almost always attacks by Muslims on Armenians. During this period, only the uprising by the Armenians of Zeytun, an almost exclusively Armenian mountain town in Cilicia, can be classified as an instance of Armenian revolt.

The summer and fall of 1896 saw a renewal of violence. A bloody conflict between Muslims and Armenians erupted in Van (June 1896). After an occupation of the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople by militants of the Dashnak party, Armenians in the capital were again attacked. This second massacre was much worse than the one the year before.[4] The final incidents took place in 1897, which are much less known than the preceding ones, one of the reasons most historians use 1896 as the final year. When analyzing events, it is important to distinguish between these three phases to avoid confusing generalization.[5]

A Short Introduction to the Historiography

Few events in the late nineteenth century aroused as much interest in Western public opinion as the Armenian crisis of 1894–7. The impetus for this came largely from the Anglo-Saxon world. Public opinion in the main imperial global power of the period, the British Empire, had long been deeply interested in the fate of the Armenians. This concern was especially prevalent among Liberal Party circles, where a specific kind of humanitarian response for the benefit of oppressed Christian peoples was cultivated. In keeping the Armenian issue on the agenda, a relatively small group of British diaspora Armenians played an extraordinarily large role. In the United States, as well as in Britain, missionaries were also an important conduit of information about the condition of Armenians. Since the 1850s there had been a strong presence of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), which not only played an important role in the development of education and a Western orientation of Armenian communities, but also helped to place the situation of Armenians in the American public eye. A similar process also took place less intensively in France, at the hands of Catholic missionary organizations. Other European countries lagged far behind in both interest and knowledge about the Armenian issue.[6]

The first shocking details of the Sasun massacre aroused unprecedented public interest in Britain and the United States. For nearly three years, the fate of the Armenians constantly furnished headlines. Among the stream of publications were accounts that would retain a lasting impact.[7] Interestingly, however, one of the most influential works came from a country where the discourse was largely pro-Ottoman: Germany. A book by the pastor Johannes Lepsius, *Armenien und Europa. Ein Anklageschrift wider die christlichen Grossmächte*, became one of the most widely cited works on the massacres.[8]

Despite the great energy that some European circles put into relief activities for the affected Armenians, after 1896 the interest in the episode of the general public gradually waned. In fact, the catastrophe of the First World War and the Armenian genocide largely obliterated knowledge about the violence of 1894–7. It is no exaggeration to say that by the 1920–30s the episode was almost forgotten by most outside of the Armenian community. The Armenian question as a whole was largely buried after the Treaty of Lausanne, which defined the borders of the Turkish Republic. Within Armenian diaspora communities authors of the expanding "houshamadyan" genre (memorial books focusing on regions) continued to record details of the 1894–7 massacres, but these were not integrated in general historiography, not even by Armenian historians. Historical works of this period discuss the misfortunes of the Armenians in extremely brief, standardized, and simplified descriptions.[9] It was not until the 1970s, under the influence of an Armenian movement for recognition of the genocide, that interest in the Armenian question resumed. However, the authors who devoted themselves to the subject, mostly for a general audience, largely reverted to the images created in the nineteenth century.[10] Critical approaches emerged only in the last two decades. Recently published case studies relating to specific massacres or aspects of them have contributed significantly to increasing our knowledge. The complexity and diversity of local conditions and events, which was so absent from older schematic treatment, was highlighted, enabled by the vast arsenal of sources available for the study of the events. For, whatever complex issues surround the mass killings, there is certainly no shortage of sources. Especially since the availability of many Ottoman sources, we have at our disposal an enormous arsenal of primary sources from various countries, most of which have yet to be explored.[11]

The Supposed Main Role of the Hamidiye—or Who Carried Out the Violence?

There is a widespread idea in historiography, both in popular and professional works, and even among students of Kurdish history, that the Hamidiye cavalry regiments, established in 1891, were the main perpetrators of the massacres. This is part of a general view, often only implicitly indicated, that the mass killings were carried out by Ottoman state forces. Occasionally one even finds for the Hamidian mass murders the name "Hamidiye massacres."[12] At the time, it was widely assumed that violence featured the same sort of "başıbozuk" (irregular soldier) culpability that had occurred in Ottoman Bulgaria in the 1870s. The Hamidiye became even more associated with the violence in the early 1980s. Robert Melson, a scholar of comparative genocide, emphasized their role in the massacres.[13]

The Sasun massacre in particular has often been assumed to have been the work of Hamidiye. Careful investigation of Ottoman and British documents, however, shows that although the sultan himself ordered the participation of Hamidiye troops, they were withdrawn at the last moment and soon returned to their home bases.[14] Nor can any significant Hamidiye participation be found in the great wave of mass killings of the autumn of 1895. Unlike the year before in Sasun, no deployment was officially ordered. To the extent they had a role, it was in the countryside. Several tribes enrolled in the Hamidiye participated in widespread looting of Armenian villages—apparently on the same basis as other Kurdish tribes, namely taking advantage of chaos of the moment.[15] The June 1896 conflict in Van, which began in the city but soon spread to all parts of

the province, was the only one in which Hamidiye played a prominent part. This was strongly connected to the role of the Armenian revolutionary movement in the area, which was in fact engaged in a blood feud with several of the Kurdish Hamidiye tribes in charge of border control. Thousands of Armenian revolutionaries fleeing the city on their way to Iran were ambushed by Hamidiye forces and perished almost to the last man.[16]

But who was responsible for the massacres? Research into the perpetrators is still in its infancy. It requires careful examination of sources for as many different locations as possible, recognizing that situations may have differed from town to town and region to region. The violent suppression of Sasun insurgency was certainly the work of regular army units aided by nomadic Kurds. Several sources indicate that the latter were more interested in material gain.[17] Recent research on the violence in 1895 points especially to the variety of perpetrators, both state forces and civilians. A detailed examination of 29 urban massacres in 1895–97 counts at least 20 cases of army involvement (of which 6 of army reserves), 10 by police, and 2 by Hamidiye. In 25 cases a role of urban Muslims could be identified, in 14 cases (tribal) Kurds participated, in 4 cases Muslim migrants (*muhacir),* in 8 Circassians, and in 3 Lazes.[18] The relatively strong participation of Muslim migrants and Circassians is striking. Correspondingly, one of the Hamidiye regiments that participated most actively in anti-Armenian violence was one of the few non-Kurdish units, the 40th Terekeme/ Karapapak regiment in Sivas, far from the border with Russia and Iran, where most of the regiments were located.[19] As Muslim immigrants had suffered from Russian expansion and Christian aspirations like no others, it was no wonder they were more troubled by the Armenian question than other population groups, which made them attractive to the state as fighting force.

Of course, the question is how with such a variety of perpetrators, generations of authors could be so sure of a leading role of the Hamidiye. It seems that already during the confrontation in Sasun Armenian correspondents, whether affiliated with the Huntchakian or not, were spreading this idea. Curiously, this was in the context of a narrative of heroic resistance by the Armenians of Sasun against the Kurds, which has been forgotten over time. Through Russian-Armenian newspapers, it also reached the West.[20] Furthermore, certain incidents, for example the one in Van, received greater attention than the others. Among later historians, simply uncritical repetition plays a role and a logic imposed on historical reality, derived from the idea that the Hamidiye was established primarily to oppress "the" Armenians. Moreover, as with so many aspects of the massacres, there is simply a lack of detailed research. Janet Klein, the first historian to write a critical study of the regiments, was also the first to indicate on a map where the Hamidiye were located.[21] It was recently determined that most of the Hamidiye were *not* stationed near Armenian population concentrations.[22]

Bugles and Other Patterns, or How Centrally Organized was the Violence?

The central theme of the traditional Armenian-Western narrative is that the mass killings were premeditated. In the case of Sasun, there is no doubt that the military action to suppress the uprising was planned. The sultan's, preserved, harsh instructions for confronting the rebellion were followed by a campaign in which all villagers were considered rebels.[23] In the months after

the incidents, a blame game broke out between administrators and the military over killings of unarmed civilians.[24]

Contemporaries also believed that the violence in 1895 was planned. They pointed to all sorts of regularities and patterns. Violence was believed to have started identically in different places, certain groups would have been particularly targeted or spared, Armenians would have been systematically disarmed beforehand and Muslims armed, rural people were invited to the cities before the massacres, the authorities would have done everything in their power to suppress news of the events, to erase traces of the violence as quickly as possible, and punished Armenians, not Muslims, after the disturbances.[25] No other element came to symbolize so pronouncedly the image of the massacres as smoothly organized Ottoman government action than the bugle call. Lepsius wrote that "The massacres were begun and closed with the sound of a trumpet or some other signal."[26] This contention was repeated by many authors after him.[27] Only recently, Morris and Ze'evi returned to the theme, in declaring that the bugle call was the hallmark of the organization in the bloody work of "troops and mobs."[28]

As with other hotly debated and controversial topics, a systematic investigation offers the best option for testing the claims. Of thirty-three urban massacres in 1894–97 examined, references to bugle calls were found in only twelve cases. Although this result by itself calls into question the generality of the phenomenon, examination of the specific circumstances shows that the meaning of the bugle call was in no way the same in all instances. In most cases it was a sign for the beginning or end of military action, in some cases for the suppression of Muslim violence. The bugle call as a standardized sign for the beginning and end of the massacres is therefore essentially a myth. Johannes Lepsius, from whose work the popularization of the phenomenon largely derived, probably based it primarily on his findings in regard to the horrific second massacre of Urfa (28–29 December 1895), which in regard to premeditation and ferocity was in a class of its own.[29]

The keywords for the discussion of organization in traditional literature are *generalization* and *extrapolation* of specific phenomena. Many of the early authors, including Lepsius, on whom later historians so strongly relied, were not trained researchers, nor were all focused on unraveling the truth. They were driven by outrage at the violence against the Armenians; their writings were usually political pamphlets intended to denounce these crimes and call for action by European states.

The conclusion would be unjustified that there was no premeditation and organization in the mass killings of 1895. However, this looked different than many authors suspected. In particular, the role of local Muslim elites in organizing the violence has recently been emphasized.[30] Local governors had the choice of going along with it or resisting it (see later in this chapter). Local notables apparently felt strongly threatened by (perceived) Armenian political aspirations and felt aggrieved. They were not necessarily in opposition to the sultan, although this did occur. The most notorious example was Diyarbekir, where the main organizers of the violence were a clique of local notables belonging to the nascent Young Turkish opposition.[31]

The Intervention of the Great Powers, or How the Supposed Panacea of Reforms Became the Nucleus of the Problem

The reform plan in favor of the Armenians of Great Britain, France, and Russia, proposed after the Sasun massacre, was not only a reaction to anti-Armenian violence; it became a reason for

much more aggression. "Reforms" were a loaded term in the late Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat period was characterized by administrative reforms, using Western concepts and models to change Ottoman legislation and bureaucracy (see Chapter 1). Beginning in the 1830s, all sorts of reforms were actively promoted by foreign powers, especially Great Britain, which viewed them as a means of protecting the Ottoman Empire from further Russian expansion. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman ruling elite largely viewed this as positive. Among the ordinary Muslim people, reforms were viewed unfavorably from the beginning, because they were primarily associated with the emancipation of Christians. In the east, in addition, the reforms came along with centralization tendencies of the Ottoman government that curbed local power centers such as the Kurdish principalities.

Already in the first years of Sultan Abdülhamid's reign, the attitude of the Ottoman government changed. The sultan was not opposed to reforms in principle, but he and his advisers wanted to keep control of the government himself and were strongly opposed to initiatives imposed by the powers. This is part of the explanation for the sultan's strong opposition to attempts by Great Britain to implement reforms in favor of Armenians agreed upon at the Berlin Congress. In light of the reluctance of the Ottoman government, and reservations of other great powers, this effort had been largely abandoned by the 1880s.

The reform plan presented by Great Britain, France, and Russia after the Sasun massacre was based on the idea that a greater share of Armenians in governance (through, among other things, governing councils with Armenian participation, and Christian assistant governors at every provincial level) could take the wind out of the sails of the Armenian revolutionary movement and thereby "solve" the Armenian question. The Sultan opposed what he considered unauthorized and dangerous interference. To keep matters in his own hands, Abdülhamid initiated a "reform" plan of his own, which the powers ignored. It is important to note that "reform" meant vastly different things to different actors. While many non-State actors sought reforms based on the autonomous district of Lebanon, in the minds of Hamidian bureaucrats, reforms were a means of expanding military and political control.

Given these different understandings of what "reforms" entailed it is not surprising that negotiations dragged on for months. Nothing was known about the content of reforms demanded by the powers, so among the population, Armenians and Muslims alike, fantasies about what they entailed ran rampant. In the summer of 1895, expectations were so high that Armenians were thought to have been promised autonomy, a prospect that caused tremendous unrest and anxiety among Muslims in the eastern provinces. This disquiet was strongly religiously colored. Governance by Armenians would involve the overthrow of a God-given order; the revolt that was assumed allowed the killing of Armenians. The term "non-official domestic jihad" was used for this movement.[32] When the reforms were announced in late October (and again with no clear public announcement of their content) they became the main cause of outbreaks of anti-Armenian violence. It is arguable that the Hamidian regime, which derived its position of power from opposition to Western wishes, feared losing face with the Muslim majority and therefore remained silent on the pressure for reforms. Against growing agitation among Muslims, it did nothing. The tantalizing question of whether this may have been covertly desired remains essentially unanswered. Recent research indicates that there could be a connection with the agitation of the (Muslim) Young Turkish opposition against the sultan that was increasing during the same time. It cannot be ruled out that there was a tendency in Yıldız to use the Armenian issue to distract the Muslim's public's attention.[33]

By mid-November 1895, the chaos was so great and the situation so threatening that even a friendly power like Germany issued dire warnings to the Sultan, which seems to have had some effect. In response, harsher instructions than before were issued to local authorities to curb the violence. The second Constantinople massacre in 1896 again caused unanimity among the Great Powers and sharp threats, this time even from Russia, which, concerned about aspirations of Armenians on its own territory, generally pursued—largely secretly—a pro-Ottoman course. With the exception of the successful mediation in the Zeytun conflict, in general the actions of the Powers were powerless. Mutual distrust and concern for further weakening of the empire, and thus the prospect of Pan-European conflict was stronger than impulses to intervene for the benefit of the Armenians. Britain's aspirations in particular were deeply distrusted by the other Powers. Despite the enormous economic problems caused by the mass killings, Abdülhamid's regime seems to have emerged strengthened from the period. The new cabinet appointed at the height of the crisis included some of the longest-serving ministers in Ottoman history. The situation enabled the sultan to deal with the very last ministers, who were more positive about British politics. Sultan Abdülhamid seems to have understood that even during the severest of crises the European powers could be played off against each other and kept in balance.

The Secret Hand of Yıldız, or How Responsible Was Abdülhamid II for the Violence?

As he strayed from the Tanzimat reforms applauded in the west and resisted Western influence in the empire, Sultan Abdülhamid already had a bad image before the 1890s, especially in Britain. The mass murders definitely gave him the darkest of reputations, with epithets such as "The Great Assassin" and "le Sultan Rouge." Many contemporary observers—consuls, missionaries, and journalists—believed that the sultan had a hand in the massacres. This idea of the personal role of Abdülhamid II in inciting and organizing violence is an axiom that simply pervades the traditional literature on the 1894–7 mass killings. Research has hardly been done on it; it has simply been repeated for decades. One gets the sense that an unthinking, prejudiced, view of Eastern absolutism plays a role; hence the oft-repeated argument that it simply cannot be otherwise that that the Sultan had a role in it.[34] Robert Melson, one of the few who delved into the issue directly, argued that evidence for Sultanic culpability was "not conclusive but suggestive."[35] In their recent contribution, Morris and Ze'evi seem convinced that there were orders for mass murder, but their evidence for this claim is taken out of context and unconvincing.[36]

Sultan Abdülhamid's role in suppressing the Sasun uprising is a subject we now know more about. Driven by fear of Western intervention and fueled by exaggerated reports of thousands of insurgents, the Sultan ordered that his forces should "destroy and leave a legacy of terror."[37] Internal military reports report artillery shelling of villages in which apparently all residents were considered rebels. It seems that the sultan later deeply regretted his decisions.[38] A rumor quickly spread in the empire, both among Armenians and Muslims, that there was an order (firman) for mass murder from the sultan. This notion played a major role in causing the pogroms of 1895 and was contradicted by officials far too late.[39]

The later mass violence is much more poorly researched. The chances that the Palace had a hand in the violence are greatest in Constantinople, although both mass killings that took place

there have not been sufficiently investigated and much remains unclear.[40] Although we know very little about Abdülhamid's personal ideas, what is certain is that after Sasun, the Palace was convinced that it was facing a dangerous Armenian uprising.[41] After the Babıali demonstration, strict orders were repeatedly issued for vigilance against Armenian actions. This belief in an Armenian uprising was never revised and was, it seems, strongly nurtured by close advisors of the sultan and encouraged by the reluctance of local officials to report on Muslim violence. Detailed examination of communications between provincial governors and the center shows that there was indeed a willingness among the former to quell any disturbances. But they lacked clear instructions, and in practice drew the conclusion that it was wiser to do nothing about Muslim aggression. More than cases of active encouragement of violence by local officials, they kept their distance. This gave rise of to a concept of "permission" for massacre, that became known among the Muslim population. To show the Palace that the situation had "normalized," after the massacres large numbers of Armenians, especially notables, were arrested in many places. Signed statements (*mazbatas)* were required of them that they had caused the disturbances.

The situation during the great wave of mass killings in the fall of 1895 was to a considerable degree chaotic. Riots spread through the area like bushfire; events in one town affected those in others. The extreme degree of censorship and impediments to communication stimulated the wildest rumors about the situation to circulate and no one was able to separate truth from fantasy. The Hamidian regime was known for its extreme degree of information gathering and centralism. Under normal circumstances, the smallest detail was reported to Constantinople and the sultan's permission was required for even minor decisions. This system seems to have failed especially at the height of the crisis in 1895. It was local balances of power and other dynamics, rather than the sultan or the central government, that determined the course of events.

Although among the perpetrators, locally, there did exist intentions of mass murder, there is no indication in documents that this was desired by the state. In this connection, the activities of the special commissions sent to the eastern provinces in November 1895 are very instructive. Among the many sources available is a diary of one of the sultan's envoys, Sadettin Pasha. While not deviating from the official line that the events were an Armenian uprising, the official preached reconciliation everywhere; stressing that use of force was a prerogative of the state, the pasha criticized the Muslims for taking matters into their own hands. Remarkably, Sadettin Pasha did not deny that under certain circumstances a mass murder of Armenians was justified, but the time for it had to be given by the state.[42]

Armenian Rebellion?

With the strict media control and censorship of the Abdülhamid period, there was hardly any public expression of opinion about the events. All correspondence about the incidents ended up in closed, inaccessible state archives. In the early Turkish republican period, the episode was completely forgotten. Starting in the 1970s, when a response was needed to the renewed interest in the genocide and its prehistory in the West, the Hamidian image of the Armenian uprising made a comeback. In Turkish official historiography ("Resmi tarih"), two lines can be identified. One was initiated by the former intelligence officer Esat Uras, whose book *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni meselesi* became more or less the handbook of official historiography on the Armenian

question. Uras treats the years 1894–7 so minimally that it is clear he preferred not to talk about them. From his scant info, however, it is clear that the author regarded the events as an uprising.[43] In 1970, the Islamist author Mehmed Hocaoğlu published a collection of Ottoman documents, including the reports collected by Abdülhamid's Minister of Police Nazım Pasha, which provided much more detail to prove Armenian rebellion. After the opening of the Ottoman archives, Hocaoğlu's line became dominant. The years 1894–7 are now no longer taboo in official Turkish historiography but are treated strictly as Armenian rebellion. If Muslim violence is discussed at all, it is as a reaction.[44]

In fact, thus, the view of events prevalent in Turkey today is directly inspired by the Hamidian image of a general revolt against the state from more than a century ago. That in the system of government of Sultan Abdülhamid II any resistance on the part of minorities was seen as "revolt" against the state is overlooked. From the Ottoman perspective, after the events in Sasun, the Babıali demonstration as well as the attack in Trabzon, were important episodes of Armenian rebellion. Viewed objectively, there were few elements in the 1894–7 crisis that can be referred to as rebellion. The main instance is the revolt of Zeytun, like Sasun sparked by a small but influential group of militants of the Huntchakian party. The fighting between the Armenians of Zeytun and Muslims from the surrounding area and Ottoman troops cost the lives of thousands and prompted an extensive mobilization of reserve troops that fueled great hatred among Muslims and was a major additional stimulus for anti-Armenian violence in the wider area.

A deeper understanding of the Ottoman perception of a general Armenian uprising requires a historical context. First, there was a perception of European-Armenian cooperation that strongly resembled earlier instances of Western intervention. There was a widespread fear that the reforms would usher in Armenian rule. It was thought that armed revolutionaries would take the lead in doing so. After the adoption of the reforms in 1895, Armenian armed action was expected and feared. This was an atmosphere in which the smallest incident could provoke violent Muslim action, and in which this action could be described as a reaction to Armenian rebellion. Thus, the Armenian uprising was largely a product of anxious imagination. In the Ottoman and Turkish descriptions, there is great focus on the trigger of massacres: that is, the "provocation" of the Muslims by a supposed Armenian initiative.

The fact is, however, that more research is needed on the revolutionaries' part in the situation, beyond the standard treatment. Recent research has shown that manifestations of Armenian political protest took place in some cities during the summer and early fall of 1895 that have been completely unexplored in both Turkish and Armenian-Western historiography, such as shop closings and mass protests.[45] It cannot be ruled out that revolutionaries encouraged these initiatives, and in this sense historians of the Armenian revolutionary movement may have overlooked important circumstances. While these undoubtedly contributed to panic in official and Muslim circles, none of these actions was again serious enough to justify a label of a general Armenian uprising.

The Myth of Muslim Unity Against the Armenians

The historian Burcin Gerçek showed that during the Armenian Genocide, many Muslims risked their lives to rescue their Armenian neighbors. Muslims of all walks of life, at the risk of their

own lives, took Armenians into protection and refused to go along with the official discourse of Armenians as enemies of the state. Among them were officials, who refused to carry out government orders for deportation.[46] The same phenomenon can be observed in the events of 1894–7, which is almost completely overlooked in traditional Armenian-Western and Turkish historiography. There are several examples where governors or other provincial officials opposed elements among the Muslim population who advocated violence against Armenians and prevented disturbances.[47] Muslim religious figures frequently intervened in violence against Armenians. In Adıyaman, for instance it was the *kadı* (Muslim judge) who intervened to stop anti-Armenian violence of an angry mob.[48]

Even among local Muslim notables, the most prominent group in organizing the violence, in many places there were individuals who actually ruled against the violence and protected Armenians. Reasons could be as varied as the motivation for violence. Just as advocates of violence defended it on religious grounds, opponents sometimes did as well. Furthermore, all sorts of practical considerations, friendships or protégé ties to Armenians played a role.[49]

300,000 Victims or the Standardization of the Death Toll

During the mass killings, as the violence continued, diplomats, journalists, and other observers ventured estimates of the number of dead. For Sasun, numbers between ten thousand and twenty thousand were often cited.[50] Estimates by contemporaries, during the great wave of mass killings in the fall of 1895 range from twenty-five thousand to eighty thousand.[51] Johannes Lepsius, in 1897, was the first to present a count of figures for individual massacres and concluded that a total of 88,243 Armenians (rounded to 100,000) lost their lives.[52] Many of Lepsius' figures were higher than those given in his main source, a table of events and losses prepared by the embassies of the signatories of the Berlin Treaty in Constantinople.[53] In the same year that Lepsius published his famous book, a total number of 300,000 victims started to appear in some publications, a number that has remained popular ever since in popular representations of the massacres. Who came up with this number is unclear. An obscure Belgian journalist, in a book that never became widely known, published a breakdown of the 300,000 number. To reach this number, he further increased Lepsius' figures and performed some fanciful calculations of rural casualty numbers.[54]

During the mass killings, the Ottoman government from time to time came out with communiques about the number of victims, which were disseminated through news agencies and embassies and thus also ended up in the European press. Statements about a total death toll were not made. Only with the opening of the Ottoman archives did it turn out that there were records of the number of victims for almost every incident. According to these data, there were fewer Armenian victims than in the Armenian/Western statements. Numbers of Muslim deaths were also given (often completely ignored in Western Armenian works). Several historians have pointed out that the ratio of Armenian to Muslim casualties in Ottoman sources was as uneven as in Western sources, a clear indication that the Ottoman authorities accepted that there was much more Muslim violence and revealing massacre.[55] Total casualty estimates based on Ottoman figures were only made by some modern representatives of the "resmi tarih." They conclude that between ten thousand and twenty thousand Armenians died as a result of the violence.[56] Ottoman

figures appear to be based on body counts. However, there are indications that these are more reliable for Muslims than for Armenians.[57]

Since Lepsius, there have been no further attempts to analyze the victim issue. Authors seem to have completely resigned themselves to the assumption that the number of victims can no longer be ascertained and give only very rough estimates. In recent decades, most estimates are between 100,000 and 200,000. The figure of 300,000 is rarely mentioned in critical literature, but remains common in popular works. Since high casualty numbers are the backbone of the narrative of unprecedented mass violence and questioning those might play into the official Turkish denialism, most authors treat the issue surprisingly lightheartedly. In many cases, no justification or source reference is even given for the estimates.

Based on a precise examination of Armenian, Ottoman, and British sources, historian Tigran Martirosyan recently concluded that the Sasun massacre most likely claimed the lives of about two thousand Armenians.[58] Jelle Verheij tried to arrive at a new estimate for the victims in 1895–6 by adding up figures of individual incidents. For the thirty-eight major urban massacres in the eastern provinces, Verheij arrives at a total of 14,000–27,000 victims.[59] The impact of the widespread rural riots is less easy to estimate. For the more than eight hundred rural accidents he was able to survey, the author arrived at an estimate of 7,000–10,000. Supplemented with preliminary estimates of casualties in Sasun, Constantinople, in Van in 1896 and in the Zeytun uprising, casualties ranged between 33,000 and 74,000.[60] Significantly, this tallies with some of the contemporary estimates.

Several authors estimated that large numbers of Armenians died of starvation and deprivation *after* the violence and incorporated these into their casualty estimates.[61] The main wave of violence in 1895 came at the worst possible time, shortly before the onset of the harsh Anatolian winter. No research has been done on this subject, nor do primary sources provide much hard data. One exception is a report by the Armenian Church regarding the situation in Harput sancak, one of the hardest-hit regions. Up to March 1896, 1,014 are said to have died of starvation and cold, a number that gives some impression of the possible scale of the phenomenon in other provinces.[62] The mass killings prompted an unprecedented outburst of humanitarian aid impulses. The many initiatives by mission organizations, foreign powers, and the Ottoman state certainly made a difference in sparing lives. Of course, the extent of violence should not be measured only in terms of fatalities. Women and girls were victims of widespread gender-based violence.[63] Huge material damage was inflicted on Armenians, with looting and land grabbing resulting in a massive transfer of wealth. Research into the extent of this phenomenon is still in its infancy.

Epilogue

Although certain indicators of the severity of events, such as the death toll, need revision, there is no doubt that the massacres of 1894–7 were in many ways a very serious crisis. Few subjects have been treated so ideologically. Traditional historiography of the events has been strongly determined by adherents of either the traditional Armenian-Western theory of state organization of the mass killings or the Turkish official denialist theory of an "Armenian uprising." In this sense, from the beginning, the subject was closely linked to a discussion of the legitimacy of

Ottoman rule, the rights of Armenians and the "Eastern Question" in general. Although in the critical reflections of recent years many axioms have already been denounced and debunked, in terms of detailed examination of the events a huge amount of catching up remains to be done.

Notes

1 The most important monograph on the Hamidiye is Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire. Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). For a general consideration of Hamidian politics in the eastern provinces, Stephen Duguid's article "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9(2) (1973): 139–56, is still useful, although some of the author's conclusions are now outdated.

2 Owen Miller on Sasun: "Sasun 1894: Mountains, Missionaries and Massacres at the End of the Ottoman Empire," PhD diss., Columbia University, 2015; "'Back to the Homeland' (Tebi Yergir): Or, how Peasants became Revolutionaries in Muş," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 4(2) (November 2017): 287–308; and "Rethinking the Violence in the Sasun Mountains (1893–1894)," *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines* 10 (2018): 97–123.

3 Troshak (the party organ of the ARF) 19 (15.12.1895) p.7

4 Ethem Eldem, "26 Ağustos 1896 'Banka Vakası' ve 1896 'Ermeni olayları'," in *İmparatorluğun çöküş döneminde Osmanlı Ermenileri. Bilimsel Sorumluluk ve Demokrasi sorunları*, Fahri Aral, ed. (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2011), 125–52; Sinan Dinçer, "The Armenian Massacre in Istanbul (1896)," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geschiedenis* 10(4) (2013): 20–45.

5 The most comprehensive description of the mass killings is in Jelle Verheij, "Armenian Massacres of the Hamidian Period, 1894–1897," unpublished PhD diss., Amsterdam University, 2022. This work replaces the previous publications of this author, "'Les Frères de Terre et d'Eau': sur le rôle des Kurdes dans les massacres arméniens de 1894–1896," in *Islam des Kurdes* (special issue of *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam*, Paris: INALCO, 1998), 225–76, and "Die Armenischen Massaker von 1894–1896. Anatomie und Hintergründe einer Krise," in *Die armenische Frage und die Schweiz (1896–1923)*, Hans-Lukas Kieser, ed. (Zurich: Chronos, 1999), 69–132. A good concise discussion of key issues can be found in Edip Gölbaşı,'s PhD thesis "The Anti-Armenian Riots of 1895-1897" (Simon Fraser University, 2018). A summary in Turkish from the same author is: "1895–1896 Katliamları: Doğu Vilayetlerinde Cemaatler Arası 'Şiddet İklimi' ve Ermeni Karşıtı Ayaklanmalar," in *1915. Siyaset*, *Techir ve Soykırım*, Oktay Özel and Fikret Adanır, eds. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 140–63. Important case studies of the incidents in specific towns are Ümit Kurt, "Reform and Violence in the Hamidian Era: The Political Context of the 1895 Armenian Massacres in Aintab," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 32(3) (Winter 2018): 404–23; Mehmet Polatel, "The Armenian Massacre of 1895 in Bitlis Town," *Kurdish Studies* 9(1) (2021): 59–76, Jelle Verheij, "Diyarbekir and the Armenian Crisis of 1895," in *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870–1915*, Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij, eds. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 85–145 and of the same author, "The Year of the Firman: The 1895 massacres," in Hizan and Şirvan (Bitlis Vilayet), *Études arméniennes contemporaines* 10 (2018): 125–59.

6 On the American and European responses to the crisis: Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "'Down in Turkey, Far Away': Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany," *The Journal of Modern History* 79(1) (2007): 80–111; Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide. Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2016), 31–58; Joanne Laycock, *Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); Ann Marie Wilson, "In the Name of God, Civilization and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian massacres of the 1890s," *Le Mouvement Social* 227 (April–June 2009): 27–44; Stéphanie Prévost, "L'Opinion Publique Brittanique et la Question Arménienne' (1889–1896)," *Études arméniennes contemporaines* 8 (2016): 51–90; Davide Rodogno *Against Massacre. Humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman Empire*

1815–1914 (New Jersey/Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2012), 185–211; Karine V. Walther, "The United States and the Armenian Massacres, 1894–1896," in *Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921* (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 241–70; Michelle Tusan, *The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide. Humanitarianism and Imperial Politics from Gladstone to Churchill* (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017).

7 For a review of publications on the mass killings of 1894–7 until 2000, see George N. Shirinian, "The Armenian Massacres of 1894–1897: A bibliography", *The Armenian Review* 47 (2001): 113–64.

8 In this article the English translation of Lepsius' work *Armenia and Europe. An Indictment*, J. Rendel Harris, ed. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897) is referred to.

9 Some examples: Jacques de Morgan, *History of the Armenian People, from the Remotest Times to the Present Day* (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1918), 294–5; K.J. Basmadjian, *Histoire Moderne des Arméniens Depuis la Chute du Royaume Jusqu'au Traité de Sèvres (1375–1920)*, New revised and augmented ed. (Paris: J. Gamber, 1922), 142–3; Frédéric Macler, *La Nation Arménienne. Son Passé, Ses Malheurs* (Paris: Fischbacher, 1924), 45; André N. Mandelstam, *La Société des Nations et les Puissances devant le Problème Arménien* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1926), 36; Simon Vratzian, *Armenia and the Armenian Question* (Boston: Hairenik, 1943), 15. For a later version of this minimalistic format see for example: Gérard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *1915, le Génocide des Arméniens*, New augmented ed. (Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 2006), 29.

10 Examples: Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens. Histoire d'un génocide* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1977), 91–129; Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia. The Survival of a Nation*, Revised ed. (London: Routledge, 1990), 136–76.

11 For a discussion of the primary sources for the 1894–97 massacres see Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 39–47.

12 For example David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance*, *Protectors: Muslim-Christian relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006), 41–2. This term has recently become more common: the article in the Turkish version of Wikipedia is called "Hamidiye katliamları" (*katliam* = massacre), probably as the result of a wrong translation of "Hamidian."

13 "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894–1896," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24(3) (1982): 487, 491. See also Chapter 9.

14 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,*183–190; Owen Miller, "Sasun 1894", 165.

15 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,* 454–9.

16 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,* 298–300.

17 Rebecca Morris, "A Critical Examination of the Sassoun Commission of Inquiry Report," *The Armenian Review* 47 (2001): 90; Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,* 189.

18 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,* 450–1.

19 Ibid., 271, 459–64.

20 Ibid., 163, 186.

21 Klein, *The Margins of Empire*, 285.

22 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,* 129.

23 Jelle Verheij, "'Les Frères," 243; Verheij, "Armenian Massacres"*,* 174–7.

24 Polatel, "The Complete Ruin of a District: The Sasun Massacre of 1894", in *The Ottoman East in the Nineteenth Century: Societies, Identities, and Politics*, Ali Sipahi, Dzovinar Derderian and Yaşar Tolga Cora, eds. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 193; Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 177–9.

25 See Johannes Lepsius' "indictment" (Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe*, 58–61 (translation of *Armenien und Europa. Eine Anklageschrift* (Berlin-Westend: W. Faber & Co., 1897); all references are to the English translation).

26 Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe*, 59

27 Odysseus (Sir Charles Eliot), *Turkey in Europe* (London, Edward Arnold, 1900), 451–2; F. Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East* (London, Duffield, 1928), 289; Arshag Ohannes Sarkissian, "Concert Diplomacy and the Armenians, 1890–1897," in *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography*

in Honour of G.P Gooch (London, Longmans & Green, 1961), 74; Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens. Histoire d'un Génocide* (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1977), 114.

28 Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide. Turkey's Destruction of its Christian Minorities 1894–1924* (Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2019), 113.

29 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 530–2, 799–800.

30 Kurt, "Reform and Violence", 412–13; Polatel, "The Armenian Massacre," 59–76.

31 Verheij,"Diyarbekir", 124–9.

32 Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Public Violence in Turkey from the Nineteenth Century," in *Collective and State Violence in Turkey*, Stephan Astourian aand Raymond Kévorkian, eds. (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2021), 490

33 Unpublished article by Owen Miller and Ümit Kurt.

34 See Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 481–93 for a discussion.

35 Melson, "*A Theoretical Inquiry"*, 507.

36 Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 71–3.

37 Miller, "*Sasun 1894*,*"* 2; Polatel, "*The Complete Ruin"*, 186; Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 176.

38 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 175–6.

39 Ibid., 174

40 On the issue of Sultan Abdülhamid's involvement in Constantinople massacre of 1896, see Edhem Eldem, "26 Ağustos 1896", 149.

41 No ego documents of the sultan are known. The so-called diaries of Sultan Abdülhamid circulating in many editions and considered a serious historical source by some historians were not written by him. Ali Birinci, "Sultan Abdülhamid'in hâtıra defteri meselesi," *Dîvân İlmî Araştırmalar* 19(2) (2005): 177–94.

42 Memoirs of Sadettin Pasha: *Sadettin Paşa'nın anıları. Ermeni-Kürt olayları (Van, 1896)*, Sami Önal, ed. (İstanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), 34–5.

43 Esat Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni meselesi (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1976), 355, discussed in Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 11–12.

44 Mehmed Hocaoğlu, *Arşiv Vesikalarıyla Tarihte Ermeni Mezâlimi ve Ermeniler* (İstanbul: And Dağıtım, 1976). The originals of Nazım Pasha's document collection were published later (Hüseyin Nâzım Paşa. *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi* (Ankara, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1994).

45 Jelle Verheij, "Diyarbekir", 102–3; Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 208–13, 220, 337–9.

46 Burçin Gerçek, *Akıntıya karşı. Ermeni soykırımında emirlere karşı gelenler, kurtaranlar, direnenler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2016).

47 Among others in Haleb, Muş, Pasur (Kulp), Giresun, Ordu, Tirebolu, Adana, Tarsus, Amasya, Erbaa, Kalecik, and Ankara. Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 508.

48 National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 424/187 p. 80.

49 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 478–80.

50 Frederick Davis Greene, *The Armenian Crisis in Turkey. The Massacre of 1894, its Antecedents and Significance* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1895), 24; Hopkins, J. Castell, *The Sword of Islam or Suffering Armenia* (Brantford/ Toronto, 1896), 320. A British lawyer of Armenian rights, MacColl, even came to an estimate of fifty thousand. *The Sultan and the Powers* (London, etc.: Longmans, Green & Co. 1896), 228.

51 E.J. Dillon, "Armenia. An appeal," *Contemporary Review* 69 (1896): 14; Edwin Munsell Bliss, *Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities* (New York: Hibbard & Young, 1896), 553; James Wilson Pierce, *Story of Turkey and Armenia* (Baltimore: R.H. Woodward, 1896), 486; G. Godet, *Les souffrances de l'Arménie,* 2nd ed. (Neuchatel: Attinger Frères, 1896), 48.

52 Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe*, 18, 28, 140; 330.

53 This table, available in official British and French publications, the *Blue Books* and *Livres Jaunes*, was also published in F. Charmetant, *Martyrologe Arménien* (Paris, Bureau des Oeuvres d'Orient [no year]) and Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe*, 280–319. It is one of the most influential sources on the

massacres but hastily composed and containing a large number of factual errors. Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 5–6, 32, 435–6.

54 Emile Antoine, *Appel aux armes. Les Massacres d'Arménie* (Bruxelles: Société Belge de Librairie, 1897), 72–90.

55 Selim Deringil, "The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed: Mass Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1897," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51(2) (2009): 351; Eldem, "26 Ağustos 1896 'Banka Vakası' ve 1896 'Ermeni olayları'," 143–4; Edip Gölbaşı, "The Official Conceptualization of the anti-Armenian Riots of 1895–1897: Bureaucratic Terminology, Official Ottoman Narrative, and Discourses of Revolutionary Provocation," *Études Armeniennes Contemporaines* 10 (2018): 45.

56 Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian file* (London/Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1985), 161; Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians* (London/Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1987), 172.

57 For example, a detailed Ottoman count, specified per neighborhood, is available for Diyarbekir (Ottoman Archives, Y.PRK.UM. 55–97, discussed in Oktay Bozan, *Diyarbekir Vilayetinde Ermeniler ve Ermeni olayları (1878–1920)* (Konya: Çizgi, 2013), 165–80. This list contains the names of all those killed from the Muslim and smaller Christian communities, but does not give Armenian Gregorian casualties. Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 384.

58 Tigran Martirosyan, "The 1894 Sasun Massacre: Revisiting the Number of Victims," *Études Arméniennes contemporaines* 14 (2022): conclusions.

59 Verheij, "Armenian Massacres", 433–4.

60 Ibid., 446.

61 A contemporary, archaeologist William Ramsay, even surmised that in addition to 200,000 victims from the violence, three times as many people died of starvation and deprivation. Willam Mitchell Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey During Twelve Year's Wanderings* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 156–7.

62 National Archives United Kingdom, FO424/186 p.273.

63 Ayşenur Korkmaz, "The Hamidian Massacres: Gendered Violence, Biopolitics and National Honour," in *Collective and State Violence in Turkey*, Stephan Astourian and Raymond H. Kévorkian, eds. (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2021), 97–121.