The world order is increasingly being reshaped along the lines of the classical system of balance of power and concomitant spheres of influence. While the merits of this are debatable, it is indisputable that no clear \textit{modus vivendi} has been established in international relations. During the euphoria connected with the collapse of communist systems, expectations ran high. Some even welcomed ‘the end of history’: liberalism had triumphed. But subsequent events indicated that liberalism had only begun to penetrate societies where it had previously been repressed. Meanwhile, history has reasserted itself with a vengeance, and the question of how to manage international security remains open.

A comprehensive definition of post-Cold War security has emerged. Conceptually, it comprises defense, human rights and democracy, and economic development. Hence, the trend in Turkey, like in other Western countries, has been to look for solutions to conflicts through the Council of Europe, the United Nations, NATO and the CSCE. At the regional level, one component of Turkish foreign policy has become interdependence through economic cooperation, reflected in the Turkish promotion of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project, and its participation in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) with Iran and Pakistan since 1988 (later joined by the Turkic republics of Central Asia).

This policy continues though expectations of the ability of other international institutions to resolve conflict have been somewhat disappointed. For example, there is no consensus at the operational level, to direct international action toward the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But if there has to be a justification for the \textit{raison d'ètre} of these institutions, and if they are not to be judged by history as being paper tigers (as was the League of Nations) interlocking institutions need to exert as much influence as they
can, and must avoid becoming entangled in their own bureaucracies. This may be easier said than done, especially if there is no political consensus or political will by the member states. In fact, the institutions should not be judged too harshly; their failures are to be ascribed, at least in part, to the politicians of member governments.

The Turkish posture towards international institutions and security may be analyzed at least from four perspectives:

- the European security linkage;
- its efforts to balance its Atlantic and European links;
- its objective of furthering democratization while struggling against the terrorist activities of the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party);
- its regional security concerns, (which brings the issue right back to the European security linkage).

This chapter will analyze these four perspectives within the framework of multilateralism and/or the national approach in foreign and security policy, the various ‘interlocking’ institutions, and the enhancement of regional security through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative.

**Collective Security / National Security**

Turkey has practised both a multilateral and a national foreign and security policy. Throughout the history of the Republic, it has had a collective security approach on its North and West axes (e.g. the Balkan Pact of 1934, the Montreaux Convention of 1936, and the accession to NATO in 1952). In regard to its northern security, Turkey did not settle for either the Truman Doctrine or bilateral relations with the US. Nothing short of becoming a member of NATO sufficed. There were other reasons for wanting NATO membership, such as Turkey’s European vocation, a desire for a strong institutional link with the West, and the fact that Greece had become a member (in that order). But the driving motive behind this desire was Turkey’s adherence to multilateral security arrangements on its north-west axis.

Turkey’s policies toward East and South, on the other hand, have been based on bilateral relations. The only exception to that was the Sadabad Pact of 1937 between Turkey, Iran and Iraq for the purpose of collective security against rebellious Kurdish tribes. The major reason for this unilateral approach to the East and South
may be that Turkey did not perceive a military threat from those directions. Secondly, it did not wish to get involved in Middle Eastern quarrels; it clearly does not have an obsessive historical interest in the area. Therefore, if and when Turkey got involved in a Middle Eastern crisis, it was only indirectly. When it allowed the use of the Incirlik Base by the coalition against Iraq in 1991, it was an exception. While the debate still continues in the country as to whether this policy was in the best interest of Turkey, the majority supports the decision for joint action with the allies. The aftermath, and the repercussions on Turkey’s national interest are another matter, but this issue will be taken up in a subsequent section on regional security and European security links.

Adopting a purely national approach to foreign and security policy has never been popular with Turkish policy makers. In 1979, when the leader of the then Republican People’s Party, Bulent Ecevit, suggested a new national security policy, the proposal was not upheld: those academics and journalists who supported Ecevit’s idea simply reflected the residual disappointment with the multilateral approaches which followed the infamous Johnson letter of 1964 (in which US President Lyndon Johnson wrote to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu that if Turkey took unilateral action in Cyprus and thereby provoked Soviet aggression, NATO would not be obligated to defend Turkey), the US arms embargo (following the 1974 Turkish military action in Cyprus), and pressure throughout the 1970s to limit cultivation of hashish. But the direction of Turkish foreign policy did not change.

Turkey has never advocated a primarily national approach in foreign and security policies even under the most adverse circumstances, and it is not likely to do so in the future. This cannot be accounted for by dependency theory; the pillar of Turkish foreign policy has been firmly anchored in the international system and international law.

While the major political parties agree with the traditional foreign policy approach, the radical (ultra-nationalist) right and left call for a nationalized foreign and security policy. The pro-Islamic Welfare Party proposes an Islamic defense pact. Some members of this party go further, proposing the abolition of Turkish currency and the adoption of Saudi currency, and the establishment of an Islamic Common Market. The rhetoric of all three radical groups claims there are conspiracy theories against Turkey, presumably
Criss concocted by the West and Israel. But because Islam is not a coherent force, particularly not in Turkey, this stance cannot be taken seriously.

Since 1989, Turkey has been focusing more on international institutions such as the UN, CSCE, WEU, and CE, but not at the expense of NATO. The Atlantic link is of crucial importance for Turkey, because European institutions alone cannot solve conflicts and their collective leadership is not leading to consensus, at least for the time being; NATO is still the most experienced and comprehensive security institution and consistently the most tangible institutional link that ties Turkey to the West.

Turkish strategists and decision-makers seem to be intensely disappointed with UN performance in Somalia. General Cevik Bir, who served as the Turkish Commander of the UN forces there, argues that without a decision-making mechanism such as that of NATO, UN military missions are doomed. In the absence of political and military strategies, disarming the belligerent parties was not entirely successful.²

General Bir’s assessment is reminiscent of Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin’s proposal at the UN General Assembly at the end of September 1993, that the UN Security Council needs restructuring. This would mean enlarging the Security Council membership with semi-permanent seats. The membership could rotate among certain states based on geographical location, economic potential and a record of contribution to international security. It is not clear how this proposition is assessed, but the fact remains that the UN should be restructured to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War era.

Although Turkey recognizes the importance of the CSCE, policy makers see two major deficiencies with the organization. First, decision making is by consensus. Secondly, and perhaps more serious, CSCE decisions are not binding. In this sense, the CSCE remains a mere instrument of good-will, but its psychological impact should not be underestimated. The test case is the recent CSCE decision that the Russian Federation should not play a unilateral peacekeeping role in the Caucasus. Russian officials, however, reiterate that, while Russia would not insist on a unilateral peace-keeping mission in the Caucasus, it was not averse to taking part in such a mission if requested. This remains to be seen, for Azerbaijan already rejected a Russian-only force.
In addition, it is quite premature to consider the WEU as an instrument of enforcement for the CSCE or the EU. Turkey would have preferred a stronger role for the WEU so that there would be a balance between the Atlantic link and Europe, but this is not yet the case.

European and Atlantic Links

Since 1947, Turkey has identified the West with NATO, and NATO with the US. The role of the US was not diminished after the events of 1989, and it seemed that Turkish foreign policy was more balanced between Western Europe and the US. By December 1993, however, Turkish perception was that Western Europe was treating it like a second class partner by denying it full membership in the WEU. In fact a serious imbalance was introduced when the WEU granted Greece full membership in order to pursue political harmony within the EU, but gave Turkey only associate member status. Article 5 of the WEU treaty reads that an attack against one of its members will be treated as an attack against all. Turkey had already announced that if Greece extended its territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean, Turkey would regard it as *casus belli*. Given Papandreaux’s hardline against Turkey, there is an increasing risk in this regard—a risk that concerns not only Turkey, but Western Europe as well. The CSCE guarantees, in the absence of an enforcement mechanism, remain far from convincing as far as Turkish policy-makers are concerned.

Turkey had applied for full membership in WEU in 1987 at about the same time as it applied to the EC. It did not wish to be left out of a European security system because full integration within Europe would not be possible, without it. At the time, a debate developed within the WEU: on the one hand, France and Germany argued for the establishment of a Eurocorps, and for making the WEU the security arm of the EC; on the other hand, Britain and Italy argued that the WEU should become the European security pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, NATO membership would be an automatic criterion for membership in the WEU. In the former case, Turkey would have been left out of the European security system. Therefore, President Turgut Özal, who spoke at the 1991 WEU Assembly, supported the latter position.
Ozal’s basic premise was that NATO members were being artificially divided between those who belonged to EC and those who did not. This division placed Turkey in a situation whereby it shared the responsibility for European security, but did not have a voice in the new European architecture to which it belonged.

Turkey accepted this situation because it could not afford to stay out of the system altogether. Secondly, it realized that EC and WEU membership went together, and decided to treat its associate status as a step toward full membership. Finally, the WEU association reiterates the transatlantic link that Turkey is so keen on maintaining. The Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey clearly states that ‘the association of these three countries represents a significant step in the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and thus of the transatlantic link itself.\(^3\)

By November 1993, WEU Secretary General Willem van Eekelen assured Turkish journalists that ‘the WEU without Turkey is out of the question. Besides, there is not a significant difference between full and associate membership in the WEU.\(^4\)’ The subject had come up in connection with the East European countries’ application to EU (European Union, which entered into force on 1 November 1993) and upon the question of their simultaneous acceptance to the WEU as associate members. Just one week after Van Eekelen’s statement, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, made headway in convincing his Western European colleagues that associate members, could also potentially contribute forces to the Eurocorps.\(^5\)

In January of 1994, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his British colleague, Douglas Hurd, visited Turkey, mainly to discuss regional security. As reported by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Ozdem Sanberk, both Germany and Britain committed themselves to search for ways to accommodate Turkey as a full member in WEU though it does not have the same status in EU.\(^5\)

As for possible NATO enlargement Turkey may object, because it would imply getting directly involved with problems in Eastern Europe. Thus, Turkey now finds itself exactly in the same situation as those countries which had objected to Turkey’s entry to NATO, and for the same reasons. Turkey will probably not be averse to
new NATO missions in that region as long as they are on an *ad hoc* basis, but if NATO were to become a permanent military tool of the UN or CSCE, it may be incompatible with Turkish national interest. If NATO were routinely assigned to act according to UN Security Council decisions, Turkey would not welcome such a development, because, once again, it would not be a part of the decision-making process.⁷

In addition to NATO, the Council of Europe (CE) is perhaps the only other institution to which Turkey pays close attention. Turkey has been a member of the CE since 1949. Between May 7 and November 1992, Turkey assumed the interim leadership of CE. The most significant activity that Turkey undertook then was to begin a dialogue between CE and CIS, by visiting the five Central Asian Republics with the CE’s Secretary General Lalumière, and by hosting a number of meetings in Istanbul on transition to democracy.⁸

**Current Issues of Security**

While there is a myriad of concerns in managing post-Cold War transitions at the geographical core of Europe, stability in Europe cannot be divorced from regional security concerns. There are a number of potential threats to security and economic stability:

- loss of prestige and credibility of international institutions as a result of their mismanagement of the Bosnian tragedy;
- the disruption of the land transit route through Turkey;
- disruption of Middle Eastern oil flows;
- growing radicalism, promoting anti-Western culture;
- spread of fundamentalist terrorism;
- proliferation of armaments, and especially the danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East;
- overt rightist extremism in Russia and with its assertiveness about keeping its ‘near abroad’ under its sphere of influence.

In the early 1990s, Turkey has faced three main security questions: Has Turkey become strategically marginalized, now that its full membership in EU is postponed indefinitely? Would and/or should Turkey not be concentrating solely on the Middle East and Central Asia? Would more visible Islamic lifestyles affect Turkish foreign policy, and if so, how? According to Ian Lesser, Europeans
now see Turkey’s strategic importance largely with respect to the Middle East, and this has made its integration into European security arrangements more difficult. As a result of the Gulf War and Turkey’s cooperation with the coalition Europe has begun to see Turkey as a barrier rather than as a bridge.\(^9\)

Turkey perceives itself as a frontier country, which means that the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus are of immediate concern both for its security and for that of Europe. A second area of potential threat is the Middle-East.

Turkey’s concern with the Balkans stems partly from its Ottoman cultural heritage, the existence of ethnic Turks in the region, and the presence of Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds (e.g. the Slavic Bosnian Muslims). It also has strategic concerns as the Balkan airspace and land routes are the major transit links between Turkey and Central Europe. Given that the Yugoslav crises have already disrupted a major geographical linkage to Europe, Turkey has pursued an unusually active diplomacy in all international fora, but especially through the CSCE, to impose preventive measures for potential clashes in Macedonia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak. In addition, in 1993, the Turkish Eximbank extended credits amounting to US $125 million to Romania, US $50 million to Bulgaria, and US $15 million to Albania. A US $2.5 billion highway construction project from Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria-Turkey proposed by the latter will soon be discussed at a meeting of Ministers of Construction and Development of the four countries.\(^{10}\)

It appears that Turkey can establish a constructive relationship with all but two Balkan countries, namely Greece and Serbia. The Greek fixation with a ‘Turkish threat’ serves solely domestic consumption purposes, and may well be short-sighted. Turkey is likely to continue its traditional policy of inviting Greece to all its North and Western initiatives (for example Greece was invited to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), even though it is not a Black Sea littoral state).

Although Turkish policy-makers are well aware that Serbia is too important to ignore, mending fences seems to be contingent upon a just peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A second impediment to establishing better relations with Serbia is the diplomatic opposition of Greece, Serbia, and Russia to lifting the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims. That Western countries support this stance is
completely unwarranted, especially since Serbia has continued to import oil, food and even weapons from Greece, Russia, and Romania.\textsuperscript{11}

It would be naïve to expect Bosnian Serbs to stop at the borders of Croatia once they achieve their objective in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey is actively promoting an alliance between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and is trying to convince its Western allies to do the same, mainly within the framework of international institutions.\textsuperscript{12}

Turkey is also trying to promote confidence-building between the Albanians and Macedonians, especially by involving both in the same institutions. Nevertheless, the complexity of the Balkan situation and current trends do not point to an immediate solution: on the one hand, states which try to contribute to peace and stability in the Balkans by using international organizations and by proposing projects of regional cooperation are often viewed by their rivals as attempting to extend their sphere of political influence; on the other hand, the byproduct of policies aimed at cooperation may be the integration of an arc of instability into a peaceful framework of international relations.\textsuperscript{13}

Based on the principle that interdependence promotes security, in 1990 Turkey initiated a project on regional cooperation called the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which currently comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine. This is not meant to be an alternative to the existing institutions of Europe, but has been conceived and developed as an integral part of Europe's new architecture, and is considered as an instrument directed to the European and world economy.\textsuperscript{14} In the past, trade relationships between member states were not only bilateral, but state-controlled. The BSEC intends to transform them into multilateral trade relations based on private sector initiatives.

The application and acceptance of Greece, an EU member, to the BSEC, is indicative of the fact that this project is complementary to other European institutions, the goal being the diversification of economic and trade relations. Greece will probably assume the interim chairmanship of BSEC. Furthermore, Salonica has been designated as the headquarters of the Black Sea Investment and Trade Bank. Two points of contention remain: in the early 1990s, Turkey lifted visa requirements for Greek citizens, but reciprocity on this matter is still not achieved. And, the current
Greek government at times seems to support Kurdish terrorism. Nevertheless, the BSEC serves as yet another forum for dialogue between the two.

The BSEC also serves a similar function with Armenia although there are two major problems upon which constrains this relationship. One is the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and the second one is the existence of PKK terrorists on Armenian soil.

The most promising relationship within the framework of regional economic cooperation has developed between the Russian Federation and Turkey. The total volume of trade between them jumped to US$ 1.3 billion in 1989 and to US$ 1.8 billion last year (1990) after a steady level of about only US$ 600 million for years.¹⁵

As Oral Sander argues, a common feature of Russia and Turkey is that their Europeanness has been questioned (if not sometimes totally rejected) by the European countries both geographically, historically, and culturally. The ‘Europeanness’ of the two countries was somewhat reluctantly acknowledged for brief periods only when their armed services were needed to avert military threats.¹⁶ However, in the post-Cold War era, both countries have been trying to redefine their respective identities. Turkey is definitely committed to a European identity, and would only welcome Russia if the latter succeeded in adopting and maintaining a similar identity and using its influence in the Balkans, Northern Black Sea and in the Caucasus as a factor of stability.

European and Regional Security Linkages

In 1990, Ian Lesser wrote that ‘Turkish observers are almost unique in the Alliance in stressing the continuing Soviet threat to their territory [and that] the prevailing Turkish view of CFE [the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty] is distinctly conservative.’¹⁷ In 1994, Turkey is no longer unique with regard to its concern about the resurgence of power politics in Russia, which profoundly affects its so-called ‘near abroad’ (i.e. the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union). Though it was an exaggeration both in 1990 and today to expect a direct threat to Turkish territory from Russia, Moscow’s heavy-handed approach towards Eastern
European countries that have expressed a desire to join NATO, and its coercive actions to establish spheres of influence in Soviet successor states, do seem to imply a resurgence of power politics for spheres of influence—and in a worst-case scenario, renewed Russian expansionism. Many were pleased that Turkey and Russia no longer shared borders and had acquired buffer states between them; however, this turned into much disappointment when Russia behaved in a way that reminded the regional countries that it was still a great power and intended to remain one. This disappointment was greatest among those who thought that the demise of the communist systems would lead to total independence from Russia, ironically at a time where interdependence was on the rise elsewhere in the world.

This attitude was compounded by zealous Turkish politicians who talked about 'a Turkic world from the Adriatic to the Wall of China'. While their visions stemmed partly from rejection by Europe, it also had much to do with the fact that their generation had grown up without any knowledge or information about Russian/Soviet or Central Asian history, let alone Marxism. This criticism is not meant to belittle the relationships that have been established between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. For example, that the Central Asians Turkic republics accepted the use of the Latin script is a major leap forward. Politically speaking, however, the Russian factor has reasserted itself and Turkey has had to focus on Russia once again.

If politics is the art of the possible, then the tacit agreement between the West and Russia that Moscow would leave the Baltic states and Eastern Europe alone in exchange for a relatively free hand in the Caucasus and Central Asia, was a possible solution. But, fine-tuning of these positions is in order: the West is in search of a political piano-tuner in Russia. An interesting precedent in this respect might be set in Georgia. The Russian Ambassador to Turkey has announced that since Georgia does not have regular armed forces yet, Russian soldiers, on Georgian payroll, would be protecting Georgia's borders. This may look like a purely professional and mutually beneficial arrangement: it will finance otherwise unemployed Russian soldiers whom Moscow finds difficult to maintain on payroll, and end Georgian President Eduard Shvartnadze’s pain in trying to keep the country intact. But it also keeps Georgia in the Russian political orbit.
That the Georgian leader had no choice is not a secret. Clearly, this is an interim solution. Questions remain, however, as to whether the Russian military would ever leave if Georgia feels that there is no need for them, or whether Georgia will be allowed to build up its own forces. Or will the ‘near abroad’ serve as a source of unemployment insurance for the Russians in the foreseeable future? If the price of handing over one country’s security to another prevents parochial nationalism and subsequent civil wars, is it not worth paying? After all, it would appear that Russian military regulars as mercenaries in the Caucasus might be more successful than the performance of international organizations elsewhere in the world.

Azerbaijan is a somewhat different case, because Aliyev enjoys a stronger position than Shevardnaze does, thanks both to recent Azerbaijani military successes vis-à-vis Armenia and to the country’s oil wealth. The brutal intervention of the Soviet army in January 1990 in Baku was perceived in Turkey as retaliation against the Azerbaijans for ethnic violence (some Armenian residents had been killed by unemployed Azerbaijani mobs who had been exiled from Erevan the year before). But very little attention, if any, was paid by Turkish media or scholars to the fact that in addition to ethnic violence, some Azerbaijans had attacked the border between Iran and the Soviet Union the same month (the Soviet Union was formally disbanded at the end of 1991), and destroyed border fences.

Perhaps the Red Army and KGB had overreacted to the situation. But what seems clear is that attention should not be focussed only on ethnic violence; Azerbaijani agitation on the Iranian border should also be taken into account. This incident alone could have involved the Soviet Union in an armed conflict at a time when it could ill afford it. No one in Turkey paid attention to the Russian dimension of this drama. A similar threat involving Turkey and Iran was fortunately averted with Aliyev’s accession to power, and as a result of the changes in the Turkish political scene since 1990. Although he was labeled as Moscow’s man in many quarters, Aliyev has been seeking international support to keep Russian soldiers out of Azerbaijan as would-be peacekeepers. While Turkey does not necessarily need to participate in a UN peace-keeping mission in the region, it will support Aliyev in all international fora.

While the connection of these problems with European security
may seem tenuous, the linkage is in fact two-fold: the smooth transportation of Caucasian and Central Asian oil and natural gas flow to Europe through Turkey and/or the Russian Federation, depends on peaceful local conditions; this, in turn, obliges international institutions, especially the CSCE, through its ‘Minsk Conference’, to pursue more active diplomacy with respect to conflict resolution in the region.

In February 1994 Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev announced plans for the establishment of 5 military bases in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with 23,000 soldiers. This followed Russia’s request that CFE be amended to allow increased levels of arms in the Caucasus. According to Chernichev, the Russian Ambassador to Ankara, behind this request was made to ensure the prevention of the ‘Lebanonization’ of the Caucasus. This policy may work in the case of Georgia, but Azerbaijan is a test case of Russian intentions in regard to international organizations.

Though Turkey would also like to ensure that there will not be a Lebanonization of the Caucasus, it does not want to see the CFE agreement changed in favor of Russia, and it made its opposition clear in September 1993. Two main reasons may account for this: increased force levels in the Caucasus will give Russia the potential for intervention in the Middle East; the change in the CFE agreement proposed by Russia would result in a remarkable disequilibrium in favor of Russian forces on the Turkish border and the re-establishment of Cold-War conditions.

In light of this resurgent Russian military power on its borders, Turkey acted through the CSCE. At the foreign ministers meeting in Rome in early December 1993, Turkey was active in forestalling Russia’s efforts at getting an endorsement from the organization for its unilateral peacekeeping. Moscow had been pushing hard to get CSCE backing for its drive for world authorization and financing of its role as peacekeeper in conflicts in former Soviet Republics from Moldova to Tajikistan.

This attempt by Moscow to have an international organization legitimate its actions is significant, though it appears that it will not succeed either in this case or in its attempts to change CFE force levels. Should Moscow go ahead with its unilateral interventions in its former republics, it will do so without international endorsement. Thus, the psychological impact of the CSCE on a country that seeks acceptance into the international community should not be
underestimated, despite its inability to enforce compliance. The choice depends on the challenger; the reward is acceptance within the international society.

In sum, it is up to the international institutions to prevent, mediate, coerce, or deter, depending on the situation. The question is why is the West walking on a tight rope trying to accommodate Russia within the international system in the absence of political burdensharing by that country.

The north-west axis of Turkey is not the only security linkage with Europe. Its south-east axis is also of concern in the international arena. Perhaps the first threat is that of nuclear proliferation. Although Syria and Iran have accepted IAEA safeguards as NPT signatories, they may well follow Iraq’s model of covert proliferation. In view of the recent Middle East peace process, this potential threat from Syria may be diminishing, but that from Iran is not likely to decline.

The second threat comes from the ambiguous position of Iraq, with its potential for upsetting the regional balance of power. The second Gulf crisis resulted in the creation of a semi-autonomous Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. Turkey’s policy towards the issue is seemingly paradoxical. While it supports the territorial integrity of Iraq, it also hosts the forces of the United Nations Operation Provide Comfort to deter Saddam Hussein from further retaliation against Iraqi Kurds. An independent Kurdish State in Iraq is not in Turkey’s interest; this is not because it would serve as a model for its Kurds, but because it would alter the regional balance of power. Such a landlocked Kurdish state would be dependent on Turkey economically. Iran cannot be expected to tolerate a Kurdish state under Turkish influence. An Iranian supported Hezbollah faction clashes with the Iraqi Kurdish factions as well as with the PKK located there. Civil war conditions already exist in the autonomous state and would in all likelihood erupt into a large-scale one if independence is granted. This is another case in which international institutions cannot afford to become captive to the notion of capricious self-determination.

In sum, the evolving system of interlocking institutions in Europe has a formidable dual task: on the one hand, it must ensure security in the continent; on the other it must manage potential challenges from the periphery. It is in this regard that regional balances of power assume importance. By helping maintain such
balances interlocking institutions may be the only remedy against the reemergence and consolidation of new and old spheres of influence.

Notes


4. Quoted in 'BAB Turkiyesiz Dusunulemez', (Turkey is a Partner of the Western European Union) Cumhuriyet 26 November 1993.


6. 'BAB'a Tam Uyelik Gundemde,' (Full Membership in the Western European Union is on the Agenda), Cumhuriyet, 21 January 1994.

7. I am indebted to Professors Ali Karaosmanoglu (Bilkent University), Oral Sander (Ankara University), Sukru Gurel (Ankara University), Yuksel Inan (Gazi University) as well as to a number of members of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Treasury Department for their contributions to the discussion.

8. See 'Türkiye - Avrupa Konseyi İlişkileri', (Turkey's Relations with the Council of Europe), courtesy of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993.
9. Lesser, Ian: 'Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War.' In Lesser, Ian (Ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.100-132.


12. Author’s discussion with Dr. Hasan Unal, February 1994, Bilkent University.


17. Lesser, Ian: *Southern Region Perspectives on Security and International Affairs*, a Rand Note (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1990), p.33.


