Governments vs States: decoding dual governance in the developing world

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ABSTRACT   *This article begins by questioning the transferability of Western conceptualisations of the 'state' to the developing world, particularly to those areas in which security concerns are extreme. It proposes that the complicated relationship between security and political liberalisation produces a reform–security dilemma, which in turn may result in dual-governance structures consisting of an autonomous 'state' bureaucracy and a relatively newer, political 'government'. The dynamics of such a duality are explored through a longitudinal comparison of two critical cases: Iran and Turkey. Both cases reveal evidence of the 'state' and 'government' as distinct bodies, emerging over time in response to conflicting pressures for security and liberalisation. While the Iranian case remains entrenched in a static duality with an advantaged 'state', the Turkish case provides optimism that, under certain conditions, an eventual subordination of the state to the political government can take place.*

States and governments have traditionally been conceptualised as more or less inseparable parts of a single whole, or, at least, as one being an integral part of the other. While scholars approach the concept of states in different ways,[1] a common underlying starting point is to combine or only minimally distinguish between the concepts of 'state' and 'government'. A strong example of such a conceptual overlap is the neo-realist view of the state as agent, in which statehood includes the governing individuals and institutions and their activities. A somewhat greater distinction is made by those who assign to the 'state' the broader meaning of the overall structure of political authority, while attributing actual agency to the 'governmental agents' that are 'embedded' in that state structure.[2] The difference between states and governments in the latter perspective has been summarised as one in which reference to governments implies a focus on the agents of governance, and reference to states implies a focus on the overall structure of governance.[3] Even such a teasing apart of the two concepts still leaves us with the understanding that the two are inextricably connected, if not just two ways of looking at the same overall political authority.

In some areas of the non-Western world, however, such overlapping conceptualisations of the 'state as government'[4], or of the state as

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bureaucratic structure including government actors, may be inadequate. In these countries 'state' and 'government' may not only represent distinct aspects of a single political authority, but two separate actors in national governance. This seems to occur when an existing state tradition precedes the introduction of more democratic 'government' actors and practices. Since a subordination of the existing 'state' establishment to a democratic 'government' often takes considerable time to consolidate, there may emerge a dual structure, in which the state appears (in varying degrees) as distinct and autonomous from the government. Under certain conditions this autonomous realm may develop into a fully functioning institutionalised 'inner state' within the larger and more visible overall political governance structure.

Following the path of scholarship that questions the transferability of certain Western conceptualisations (eg assumptions about the Weberian state) to non-Western contexts,[5] I explore in this article the dynamics and processes of such dual governance structures. First, I provide a conceptual discussion of the underlying sources of such duality, and then describe the process by which duality might emerge. This process is then explored in greater detail by comparing two critical cases of modern states which, arguably, have varying degrees of dual state structures—Turkey and Iran.

Conceptualising the duality

The duality of 'state' and 'government' described here corresponds roughly to the kind of governance structure referred to by various works on limited democracies,[6] as we see an unelected and often authoritarian state establishment, rather than transforming into a democratic 'government', instead dividing. The state establishment—based on, for example, a religious, aristocratic or military elite—adopts a lower visibility role, but maintains a powerful, underground existence. In other words, it becomes an inner state, shadowing the apparent or visible state constituted by the elected government.

Where exactly is this duality stemming from? In the traditional state-centric international system, a primary occupation has been with security. In order to curb security threats, the national forces of a state are kept centralised—although of course the degree to which this is true varies according to the acuteness of the threat. In order to achieve centralised and thus maximised power, a ruling elite must not only keep security issues and rhetoric prominent on the public agenda, but it must also seek to enhance the existing institutionalisation of the security establishment. Unchecked, such a securitisation process may lead to the creation of security-oriented nation states (see Figure 1).

The other end of the scale shows what occurs in an era of globalisation:[7] a multicentric world, in which resources, ideas, and individuals are mobilised, and new actors are empowered. These new actors produce demands for a sharing of national power and a consequent pressure for decentralisation. The implication of this process in terms of security can be labelled

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FIGURE 1. Conceptualising torn states.

'desecuritisation', a term not implying an automatic minimising of security issues, but a lowering of the primary status of security over all else, and a reconsidering of security as one of several major needs to be satisfied by national governance. Achieving this involves increasing the transparency of and civilian control over the determining of threats and the implementing of national security policies. States that seem to be successfully managing this process can be identified as globalised states, such as those of Western Europe and North America.

Many states seem to fall somewhere in between these two worlds and are thus forced to balance contradicting patterns of power, possibly leading to a bifurcation of the state structure and, in the extreme, to a torn state, in which we are likely to find a dual understanding of 'state' and 'government'. The contradiction emerges for various reasons. First, a need for change towards a more democratic form of state–society relations now appears generally inevitable and unavoidable. Second, the capacity of security apparatuses to use external threat calculations for domestic securitisation has shrunk as large security apparatuses seem to have lost their definitive mission, and both their own societies and Western liberal democracies look unfavourably on large governance roles for security apparatuses. The strong state, therefore, is feeling not only systematic pressure from the external and internal environment to downsize and share some of its power, but is also facing a society that is more actively demanding a share from the centralised power structure.

What does a centralised state structure do to respond to such power demands? Ideally it would gradually adapt to a decentralised power structure, perhaps taking on a supervisory role in the transition process. However, most developing world state-security apparatuses are not practised in adapting because of their inherent tendency to overreact to frightening

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situations of instability. Rather than decentralise and downsize, the strong state structure tries to further maximise and centralise the power configuration at the national level. It is difficult to find an example of an old-world state structure initially ready for such rapid adaptation and transformation. This is especially true because this new threat demands an immediate securing of the conflictive transformation process in order to avoid dangerous domestic instability. There is not sufficient time, therefore, for the nation-state as a whole to produce a new, sophisticated functioning power structure to meet this new security dilemma.

Thus, security vs reform becomes the primary impasse faced by the national governance structure. The state is pressured by power diffusion dynamics that can not be dismissed, yet there remains the need to preserve, if not maximise its power at a time of (over)perceived insecurities. The question remains: how does such duality build up and evolve over time? The following sections of this article explore the reform/security dilemma in detail in the Turkish and Iranian cases. By highlighting key stages in the clash between pressures for security and political globalisation, both accounts attempt to reveal how a duality in governance emerged, how it has developed over time, and what it implies for the future of such dual state structures.

The Turkish case

Origins of a security–reform pendulum

In the Turkish case the roots of a clash between reform and security go back to the strategic choice first made by the Ottoman elite in the 19th century to commit the country to modernisation. Adaptation of this national policy became the second major force—next to the traditional one of guaranteeing territorial security—of the Turkish political *modus vivendi*. There were three early characteristics of interaction between these two forces. First, with the Ottoman Empire in a state of territorial contraction, the elite who were in favour of liberal reforms justified their liberalisation agenda by claiming it would better protect the state from various security threats. Security was thus seen as the end, while modernisation was the means. Second, there was a fear among the elite of uncontrolled devolution of power. This security-based cautiousness towards liberalisation was often connected to a concern that political reform would empower ordinary citizens, of whom the elite held an inherent mistrust. Third, the very ruling elite that assumed the mission of promoting liberalising reforms was, ironically, the same group responsible for protecting the country's national security. When the two elements clashed, the elite's role as the state's professional security guardian prevailed, spelling at least a temporary end to liberalisation. These three characteristics were the starting points in the emergence of a structural pendulum between security and liberalisation. For the most part the security of the state enjoyed a clear primacy over the liberalisation side of the pendulum, resulting in a kind of 'reserved' westernisation that often fundamentally contradicted liberalising ideals.

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The relatively peaceful mid-1920s saw an increasing push among some in the ruling elite for further liberalisation, most notably two attempts to introduce multiparty politics. In the face of internal security issues, however, such as Kurdish rebellions in the east and the rise of violent opposition to the secular reforms, the more security-minded elite opposed the efforts, arguing that excessive democratic reforms would endanger the regime and the very state itself. Throughout the subsequent securitisation process, the attempts failed. If society was not yet ready to be trusted with democracy, desires for world-standard democratic values would have to be postponed in the name of protecting regime insecurity.

From pendulum to bifurcation: a grand compromise

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s the security of the regime and state held primacy in the continuing pendulum between security and liberalisation. At the end of World War II, however, the Turkish state elite opted once again for multiparty politics. In an effort to establish a deeper integration with the West and therefore a greater sense of security, the state elite realised that a fuller embracing of Western political values and identities would be required. By emphasising democracy, the Turkish elite could satisfy the urge to become a part of the 'safe' West, but also help to speed up and secure its own modernisation project. The result was the establishment in 1946 of the Democratic Party (DP).

Subsequent fear of the Democratic Party's goal to change the unbalanced power situation between itself and the rest of the political system, then a kind of embedded body of the state and the single party elite, led to the 1960 military coup. What followed would have long-term implications for the maintenance of an 'optimal' balance between reform and security. In the wake of the 1960 coup, two main positions emerged among the military on how the nation should be administered: that of the 'gradualists', who preferred a quick return to political rule, albeit under a serious level of control by the statist elite and the army; and that of the 'absolutists', generally the younger officer class, who felt that the army should stay in power in order to speed up social and political transformations in the country. Interestingly, neither the absolutists nor the gradualists were against further political transformation, but they differed over how quickly that transformation would be managed. Ultimately, the absolutists' ideas were threatening to both the gradualist military leadership and, obviously, the political leaders, and served to force the rest of the politico-military actors to come together in a consensus.

Two executions, two syndromes

With the signing of a compromise protocol in which the politicians agreed to support the presidency of the former coup leader, a kind of power sharing among the gradualist state elite was established. Multiparty politics would be allowed to continue, but security demands would permit the imposition of

certain restrictions on the political realm. Lack of obedience to this compromise by the political elite was virtually unthinkable. The vivid image of the hanged DP leaders, including the former prime minister, Adnan Menderes, served as a haunting reminder—a kind of *Menderes Syndrome*—for what could occur if people and their actions were construed as risky, and thus served as ammunition for the absolutist elements inside the military to gain strength. These absolutist radical elements within the military then received a lesson of their own when, in 1962, a second coup attempt by absolutist forces was quashed, and its leaders, Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gürcan were hanged. The resulting *Aydemir Syndrome* would help maintain the hierarchical unity of the military and thus reduce the fear of coup threats by renegade military elements. Together, the two syndromes constituted the boundaries of the Turkish state's power structure.

The compromise also marked the next stage in the progression from pendulum to an outright bifurcation in the state system. With security demands providing the legitimisation for statist elements, and liberalising demands supporting the maintenance of a multiparty system, the need to find a manageable way to govern under these simultaneous pressures resulted in a compromise between two realms—a 'hard' realm of security-minded elements and a political 'soft' realm. The compromise also signalled an acceptance of the idea that the democratic transformation could only be effectively and safely controlled by allowing the creation and consolidation of untouchable power centres, in other words, by a strong, autonomous inner state led by the Turkish military.

Consolidation and institutionalization of reform security

Over the next two decades, with the overall insecurity of the Cold War, internal clashes between the left and right, secularists and Islamists, and an increasingly violent Kurdish separatist movement in the southeast, the autonomy of the hard realm became increasingly institutionalised, from the passing of laws giving the military powers over its own personnel, education and financial resources, to the establishing of distinct military and civilian courts, and the introduction and expansion of the National Security Council (NSC). The 1982 Constitution served to consolidate many of these security-based changes, and marked the peak period in the evolution of an established bifurcation in the Turkish state structure, in which the inner state, while maintaining some interaction with the government or 'apparent' state (most dramatically through the platform of the NSC) was now virtually autonomous from government oversight and control.

The dual state structure reflected the Turkish national need to secure a gradual reform process from the risks of liberalisation. So long as the security demands—eg the Cold War, conflict with Greece and Iran, the Cyprus issue, and domestic struggles with Kurdish separatists and Islamists—clearly seemed to outweigh those for the ideologically appealing but less urgent demands of liberalisation, the Turkish dual state structure would remain.

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The Iranian case

Early years and the constitutional government

Despite obvious stark contrasts between Iran and Turkey, similarities can be found, such as their not having been colonised, their being remnants of two large empires, and their having long experience with nationhood.[8] A similarity can even be seen in terms of their engagement with political liberalisation—certainly in the sense of its longevity, and to some extent in terms of how it has occurred as part of a pendulum, swinging between attempts at reform and subsequent returns to autocratic rule.

Iran's first experimentations with some liberalising reforms began in the mid-19th century, when Prime Minister Taqi Khan implemented political reforms to curb nepotism and corruption, and to reduce the power of the Shah's mother. Although his efforts did somewhat improve efficiency, Taqi Khan's increasing power was also seen as threatening by the Shah, who had the prime minister assassinated. Reform efforts were then kept well stifled by the extreme autocratic ruling style of Shah Naser al-Din in the second half of the 1800s.

The first truly significant period of Iranian liberalism came about with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, when reformist groups, led by an unusual alliance of the traditional middle class *bazaaris* (merchants) and the clergy,[9] forced the Shah to accept their demands for a constitution limiting the Shah's powers and a parliament to conduct daily affairs. The experiment with constitutional monarchy was, however, fairly short-lived. Following Muzaffar al-Din's death in early 1907, Muhammed Ali Shah strongly resisted efforts to further restrict his powers, in particular, legislation reducing his control over the army and budget. Playing on the inherent divisions between the religious and secular members of parliament, the Shah was able to keep the two struggling against each other, and maintain his own hold on power. His replacing—without parliamentary approval—of the liberal prime minister with an arch-conservative, Amin al-Soltan Atabak-I Azam, made it clear that the Shah was not going to play along with the idea of reigning within the confines of a constitutional monarchy, and was set upon a return to full rule.

Interference by international forces further complicated the constitutionalists' efforts at managing the country's affairs. Although they did not necessarily directly support the Shah, the two most involved international powers, Russia and Great Britain, did find that some results of constitutional rule in Iran, such as the growing strength and independence of regions in northern Iran and their potential to spread radical ideas beyond Iran's borders, were not necessarily in the two great powers' best interests. Rather than continue in their conflictive efforts to gain complete influence over Iran, Russia and Great Britain agreed in 1907 to divide the country into two spheres of influence, with Russia taking the north, and Britain the south. Over the next few tumultuous years, factionalism in Iran between ethnic and linguistic groups, religious and secular forces, and reformists and non-reformists, combined with the meddling of the international powers, crippled the workings of the constitutional government. The constitutional era ended

in 1911, when the parliament failed to agree to an ultimatum delivered by the Russians regarding the engaging of foreign advisors, and was shut down by the prime minister and regent.[10]

Similar in some ways to Turkish experiences with securitisation as a means of unifying various groups against overly rapid opening up, the experience of the Constitutional government, and its failure to overcome internal divisions or to secure the country against outside influence, combined with the period of chaos and disruption that followed its demise, no doubt played a significant role in preparing many people in Iran to be more accepting of a strong dictatorial figure to run the country. Such a figure emerged in Reza Khan.

Reza Khan

Left to the control of Great Britain and a young, incompetent Shah during the years of World War I, Iran was primed and ready for Reza Khan, who seized power in 1923 and was crowned Shah in 1925. Although often compared with Ataturk because of his military background and his programme of imposed rapid modernisation and Westernisation, Reza Shah differed from his contemporary in crucial ways. Key among these was his standing domestically. While Ataturk brought Turkey together under the mantle of having saved the nation from partition, Reza Shah unified Iran through violent repression of his competitors, and thus lacked the other's legitimacy. What they both went on to do with their power also differed dramatically, with Ataturk striving to install and rule according to a system of laws, and Reza Shah maintaining his use of arbitrary powers to rule as a dictator. Reza Shah's 16-year reign came to end in 1941 when, having wooed the Germans as a potential ally against the USSR, the complexities of World War II led to the reinvasion of Iran by the British and Russians, and Reza's forced abdication.

The transitional period

The years 1941 to 1953 were marked by turmoil but also by relative political pluralism, as indicated by the declaring of autonomous provincial governments, the emergence of multiple political parties and workers' unions, a revitalisation of the press, and the election of Prime Minister Mosaddeq.[11] Mosaddeq sought to install a strong centralised regime, but one that would ensure free elections and basic freedoms of thought and action. Unfortunately, as before, factionalism between different classes, religious and secular groups, communists and non-communists, ran deep. As Mosaddeq lost control of his supporting groups in the National Front coalition, he became increasingly autocratic in his rule, ultimately closing down the *majlis*, declaring that the will of the people was enough for him to rule by. In a paralleling of securitised speech often applied in the Turkish case, Mosaddeq's moves of "appeal[ing] to the masses" were viewed as "leading the country toward anarchy",[12] the obvious implication being that a

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stronger, less democratic rule would avert such a risk. Ultimately the combined forces of internal fragmentation and instability (in large part a result of the unresolved oil crisis[13]) and external intervention, this time in the form of a CIA and British intelligence-sponsored coup attempt, brought the demise of the elected government, and the installing of a military dictatorship under Mohammad Reza Shah.

Mohammad Reza Shah

The next era of the Iranian pendulum between relative political freedom and autocratic rule saw the increasingly militarised and repressive years of the late 1950s, when the officially sponsored Nationalist and Peoples' parties provided a façade of democracy, but the founding of the Shah's secret police (SAVAK) and the limiting or destruction of trade unions, student organisations, political parties and associations, and the parliament, were evidence of a consolidation of the Shah's power—if not on paper, at least in practice.

A brief reform period was initiated in 1960 at the insistence of the Americans,[14] who feared that lack of development would bring about more Third World revolutions. The newly installed prime minister, Ali Amini, favoured political reforms, and by relying on authoritarian measures of his own (such as dissolving the *majlis* and ruling by decree) he did succeed in exiling the head of SAVAK, launching an anti-corruption campaign in the justice ministry, and an ambitious land reform programme to bring greater ownership to the peasants. Although Amini's government fell in just over a year, the Shah then incorporated at least some of the government's reforms into what he would call his 'White Revolution'. Primary changes of this 'revolution' were some continued elements of the land reform efforts, and the establishment of a programme to spread literacy and health care throughout the country. Such social and economic reforms were not accompanied by political liberalisation, however,[15] but rather by a crackdown on political opposition, including press closures and the exiling, imprisonment or killing of anti-regime figures. Indeed, the following decade would be much less one of opening up than one of further consolidation of the Shah's powers.

From 1963 to 1973 the Shah bolstered his position through careful manipulation of the country's finances. He increased spending on the military and SAVAK, allowing for more effective repression of his opponents, and he purchased support directly by building up foundations and securing the livelihoods of the middle and upper classes—thus ensuring various constituents' loyalty to him. Such practices were not only inadequate for a population desiring more fundamental freedoms, they also became less feasible as the country's economic troubles grew throughout the 1970s.[16]

In an effort to save his regime—and arguably in response yet again to pressure from a newly elected administration in Washington[17]—the Shah launched a new programme of political liberalisation in 1977. While he did use this opportunity to free some political prisoners and to allow some voices of dissent to be heard, as in the early 1960s, he failed to make any substantive

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changes in the political system—eg refusing to allow alternative political parties to emerge. Such limited measures were met with tremendous suspicion, mass societal discontent—from the *bazaari*s, to the urban poor, to the new lower-middle class and, of course, to the clergy—and eventually, sufficient pressure on the Shah to force him to appoint a premier and leave the country.

The Islamic Revolution

In a radical example of regime change, the 1979 revolution was itself an attempt to break away from the extreme authoritarianism that had developed in Iran under the Shah. Described as having had a 'democratic veneer' and as being a possible 'harbinger of the struggle to reconcile democracy and Islam in the Middle East', the revolution did initially bring together different groups in an effort to gain a greater say in controlling their lives.[18] Of course, as is the risk particularly in revolutionary regime changes, the most organised segments in a context of chaos, in this case the ultra-conservative clergy, were able to take control of the momentum and introduce their own kind of authoritarianism. With much having been written on the Khomenei years, or the 'First Republic'[19] of the revolution, it is important to note here that the decade marked a rapid return to autocratic rule after the first couple of years of political plurality. By 1984 Iran was essentially back to being a one-party state, and human rights and democracy fell victim to the new regime's desire not only to consolidate its tentative domestic grip on power but also to cope with the external demands of the war with Iraq, economic sanctions, and falling oil prices.

When Hashemi Rafsanjani became president after the 1989 death of Ayatollah Khomenei, he introduced some liberalising measures—an era of 'reconstruction'—primarily economic reforms, the opening of some diplomatic ties with the West, and the loosening of certain social restrictions. While these reforms failed to address any significant political issues, they did all serve to make the outside world again accessible to Iranians, via satellite dishes, computers, videos and textbooks—a point that gains importance when we consider the unavoidable demand for reform, and the subsequent security dilemma facing the regime. A significant part of the changes was the dynamism experienced by the press during the first two years of Rafsanjani's presidency in particular. Granted, many of the various reform-minded journals and newspapers launched in the 1990s were closed or threatened with closure,[20] but they can still be seen as having prepared the groundwork for gradual moves towards even greater liberalisation.[21] The most dramatic example of this came about in what has come to be called the 'Iranian Spring' of May 1997, when fair elections led to the victory of the reformist President, Mohammed Khatami, and later the elections of 2000, when nearly 75 per cent of those elected to the parliament were reformist-minded candidates.

Predictably perhaps, the pendulum swung back strongly after this liberalising period, with a crackdown on reformists that included the disqualifying of more than 3000 reformist-minded candidates from the 2004

elections and all but eight of the more than 1000 candidates for the 2005 presidential elections. The crackdown also included repressive measures against anti-regime demonstrators. All of this, not to mention the subsequent election and rule of President Ahmadinejad, has left most current Western analyses of Iranian domestic politics fairly pessimistic. The most critical observers have seen these moves as evidence that the Iranian regime is unified and tyrannical,[22] others have focused on the consolidation of the conservative leadership,[23] and that leadership's rejection of reform.[24] Still others blame the reformists for having 'lost steam'.[25] Rather than assume the death of reform in Iran, however, it is important to consider the current phase in Iranian politics in light of the previous century of political process, and therefore to try and understand who the 'conservatives' and 'reformists' are.

Delineating the realms

The oft-noted divide in the Iranian state is most generally described as existing between 'reformists,' corresponding to the 'soft realm', and the 'traditional right' or 'conservatives' of a 'hard realm'.[26] As was seen in the Turkish case, these two broad realms are often differentiated by their being made up of accountable (with the soft realm being accountable to the public) and unaccountable (hard realm) power sources. Given the degree of institutionalisation of the entities of these two realms, it is reasonable to characterise those unaccountable sources of power as constituting Iran's 'inner state' and the accountable ones as an 'apparent state'.

The strongest power authority in the Iranian political system, representing the core of the inner state, is the ruling jurisprudent or Supreme Leader (*vali-ye faqih*). Also within the inner state is the Council of Guardians (*Shoray-e Negahban*), which determines whether parliamentary laws are compatible with Islamic law and thus has effective veto power over all legislation, and the Council of Experts (*Shoray-e Khebregan*), which is responsible for choosing the Supreme Leader from among its ranks. The inner state also includes parts of the judiciary that are independent from executive power and are under the Supreme Leader's control, and certain key parts of the military and the intelligence structure, such as the protection institution (*heraset makami*), which maintains intelligence bureaus throughout the government to ensure that government activity remains in line with Islamist principles. Finally, there is the Expediency Council (*majma-e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nazam*), which advises the Supreme Leader and makes final decisions in the case of a disagreement between the parliament and the Council of Guardians. The Expediency Council is interpreted by some as holding *de facto* power over the other leading power authorities—except for the Supreme Leader. Although the 1979 Constitution includes certain guarantees for improving the rights of the political (soft) realm, the evidence of the degree of power held by unaccountable parts of the state reveals the inner state's rapid progress in institutionalisation and consolidation, filling in gaps that the soft realm might otherwise have occupied.

On the other side of the political picture the soft realm is made up of the apparent state—the president and the parliament—as well as of those groups outside the state apparatus, such as student organisations, dissident clerics, intellectuals and journalists, as well as opposition forces outside the country. According to the constitution, the position of the presidency is second in command to the Supreme Leader but in reality this depends on the relationship between the two figures. If the president is seen as being in opposition to the supreme leader, his position is weakened considerably.

Conclusion

This article has described the origins of a reform/security dilemma which, in some parts of the world, may lead to a dual governance structure. Such duality does not generally exist in Western nations, and is thus often ignored or misinterpreted in the scholarly literature and policy formulations.

While the focus in this article has been on understandings of the 'state', the analysis is very much affected by understandings of an equally complex concept: security. It is ultimately differing understandings of security in the developing world that contribute in some cases to the emergence of a dual state structure. Much of the developing world remains located geopolitically in anarchic regions, and continues to be unsettled and fragmented politically at the domestic level. Consequently, security maintains a primary position, and provides justification for power holders, be they armies (as in the Turkish case), religious sects (the Iranian mullahs), or ideological party elites (the secret service and President Putin in Russia), to try to maintain unaccountable power centres to preserve their status. Their authority becomes threatened by increasing global pressure for political liberalisation. Since political change is often widely considered as potentially destabilising, such power centres may become perceived and periodically utilised as a safety net against tumultuous democratic transformations and may eventually become embedded in the core segments of the state tradition in that country. Once such a tradition exists, adding in the powerful force of global liberalisation pressure may lead to a state–government duality. In contrast to general Western perceptions, the inner states of such dualities may not simply be power-grabbing authoritarians, but rather structures that have been promoted by both the elite *and* societal desire for safe change. It is important not to ignore the sociological and political origins of these authoritative state formations, as they may help explain such apparent anomalies as societal support for Iran's mullahs, the popularity of President Putin, or the continued ranking by Turkish society of the army as the country's most 'trusted' institution.

What do we see when we look in detail at the Turkish and Iranian cases? In the Iranian case the country remains within the understanding of security-oriented state duality. Although there is abundant evidence of a pendulum between security and reform, the overall trend has yet to shift significantly towards a reform-based transformation. One might therefore conclude that the country is permanently trapped in a duality of resilient state and impotent

government, and that, as long as the country's real (or perceived) security concerns remain strong, the dilemma will remain unresolved. The Turkish case, however, provides some optimism that such a governance structure can progress. Turkey is on the verge of moving beyond duality; becoming something more closely reflecting Western ideas of the converged 'state', that is, a state subordinated to a government—though one which will probably always place a greater emphasis on security than is generally expected in Western liberal democracies. The difference between the two cases seems to lie in the nature of their inner states and their isolation or engagement with the West. With its long history of contact with Western practices and ideas, the Turkish inner state has become increasingly convinced of the inevitability and need for political liberalisation. An inner state thus convinced may take on new roles within this transformation period. As the provider of security, Turkish inner state has seen its role become one of guarding the change process itself. Inner states committed to change may no longer constitute only obstacles to reform and progress, but may play a role in resolving the reform/security dilemma.

In addition to pointing out the existence of a state–government duality, it was also noted that, because of Western scholarship's common combined understanding of 'state' and 'government', subsequent analysis of states in which the duality exists is likely to ignore or misinterpret its characteristics or causes. Without recognising the dual state structure's past and underlying purposes, Western scholarship may label such political entities as unsuccessful attempts to match a Western standard of the liberal democratic state. A more in-depth look at the back-and-forth patterns of reform and security in these states, and the gradual process of change that occurs within them, indicates, however, that duality should not be superficially identified as simply underdevelopment or failure to achieve an end. Rather, it should be recognised as a natural reaction to deal with a reform/security dilemma in countries where the stability of the transformation is the most important problem facing the ruling elite. Even though duality appears authoritarian and undemocratic, it can be better assessed if recognised as a reaction to the need for safe transformation.

Unfortunately initial misinterpretations may further lead to flawed policy. It is not possible to say that the West has produced effective formulas for dealing with the dilemma of securing safe reform processes. Democratic aid tends to concentrate solely on budding democratic entities and civil society, which may provoke harsher reactions from inner state structures. The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan point to the limitations of international intervention to impose liberal reform in insecure environments. Recognising dual state structures and their underlying security needs suggests the need at least to consider working with those entities best positioned to help cope with security problems.

Western policy scholars and practitioners may be better off if they stop thinking that they have to carry the 'burden' of coming up with Western policies to diagnose and treat problems of the non-Western world. The 'illness' of dual state political structures may very well be showing how such

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countries are producing their own solutions. If the Turkish case of duality ends with relative success, then one could argue that non-Western political products need not only present problems, but may also suggest solutions; in this case, to the broad problem of safe political change.

Notes

1 For example, J Scott, *Seeing like a State*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
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