

NEGOTIATING DEVELOPMENT AMONG UNEQUALS:  
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,  
1960–1980

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by  
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Ankara  
June 2023

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Bilkent University 2023



To My Wife Hatice and My Daughters Leyla and Defne

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by

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ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1960 – 1980

By Arda Ozansoy

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.

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## ABSTRACT

NEGOTIATING DEVELOPMENT AMONG UNEQUALS: TURKEY AND THE  
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1960–1980

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June 2023

This dissertation analyzes the trajectory of the Association relationship between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey by examining previously unexamined primary sources and relevant theoretical literature. After providing an overview of the literature on the Association, Europe's trade policies, and development during the Cold War, it examines post-war international trade and the place of the EEC and Turkey in it. The dissertation draws primarily on EEC documents and suggests that the initial stages of Association were driven mostly by political factors, especially Turkey's geopolitical importance in the Cold War and efforts to keep parallelism with Greece. In later stages, however, the concessions provided to Turkey started to erode as similar concessions were provided not only to Greece but also to a number of developing countries. Worsening economic conditions in Turkey in the 1970s led Turkey to request more concessions from the EEC. While the EEC internally acknowledged that Turkey's requests were reasonable, it refrained from making meaningful concessions. This increasing divergence of positions led Turkey to suspend the Association not once but twice, first by a right-leaning and then by a left-leaning government. Disagreements over the economic foundations of the Association reveal that the Association had lost its attraction as support for Turkey's development, an idea that was originally proclaimed as its core objective. From a theoretical perspective, the dissertation suggests the Association provides an effective case to study how intergovernmental economic negotiations have overlapped with development politics.

Keywords: Association, Turkey, European Economic Community, development

## ÖZET

### EŞİT OLMAYANLAR ARASINDA KALKINMANIN MÜZAKARESİ: TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA EKONOMİK TOPLULUĞU, 1960–1980

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Bu tez, daha önce incelenmemiş birincil kaynakları ve ilgili teorik literatürü inceleyerek Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) ile Türkiye arasındaki Ortaklık ilişkisinin gidişatını analiz etmektedir. Tez, Ortaklık, Avrupa'nın ticaret politikalarına ve Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki gelişmeler hakkındaki literatüre genel bir bakış sağladıktan sonra, 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası uluslararası ticareti ve bu ticarete AET ile Türkiye'nin yerini incelemektedir. Tezde öncelikle AET belgelerinden yararlanılmakta ve Ortaklığın ilk aşamalarının, özellikle Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş'taki jeopolitik önemi ve müzakerelerdeki Yunanistan ile paralelliği sürdürme çabaları gibi siyasi faktörler tarafından yönlendirildiği öne sürülmektedir. Ancak daha sonraki aşamalarda, benzer tavizlerin sadece Yunanistan'a değil, aynı zamanda bazı gelişmekte olan ülkelere de verilmesiyle Türkiye'ye verilen tavizler aşınmaya başlamıştır. 1970'lerde Türkiye'de kötüleşen ekonomik koşullar, Türkiye'yi AET'den daha fazla taviz talep etmeye yöneltmiştir. AET kendi içinde Türkiye'nin taleplerinin makul olduğunu kabul etmiş olsa da, anlamlı tavizler vermekten kaçınmıştır. Giderek artan bu görüş ayrılığı, Türkiye'nin Ortaklığı önce sağ, sonra sol eğilimli bir hükümet tarafından iki kez askıya almasına yol açmıştır. Ortaklığın ekonomik temelleri üzerindeki anlaşmazlıklar, Ortaklığın başlangıçta temel hedef olarak ilan edilen Türkiye'nin kalkınmasına destek olma konusundaki çekiciliğini kaybettiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Teorik bir bakış açısından tez, hükümetler arası ekonomik müzakerelerin kalkınma politikalarıyla nasıl örtüştüğünü incelemek için Ortaklığın etkili bir örnek teşkil ettiğini öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortaklık, Türkiye, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu, Kalkınma

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
AASM	Associated African States and Madagascar
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
COREPER	Permanent Representatives Committee
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SPO	State Planning Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

### **Note on Terms**

All translations from French and Turkish are the author's unless otherwise indicated.

## INTRODUCTION

If someone claimed that cotton, tobacco, dried figs, raisins, and, finally, hazelnuts largely determined the fate of Turkey's first encounter with an increasingly integrated Europe after the Second World War, one could be forgiven for thinking this a far-fetched claim. However, agricultural products, which admittedly today have much less political and economic significance in the relationship between Turkey and European Union (EU), played a critical role in how the relationship was first established in the 1960s. Turkey then was mainly an agricultural economy, highly reliant on agricultural exports, as seen from the table below.

*Table 1: Turkish Economy in 1966<sup>1</sup>*

Population (in 1000)	32.901
Active Population	13.205
Population involved with agriculture, forestry, fisheries	9.841
GNP	82

<sup>1</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "RAPPORT PRELIMINAIRE DE LA COMMISSION AU CONSEIL AU SUJET DU PASSAGE DE LA PHASE PREPARATOIRE A LA PHASE TRANSITOIRE DE L'ACCORD D'ASSOCIATION AVEC LA TURQUIE (SEC(68) 1386 Final)" (197.1472 p19, 1968), 48.

Origin of gross national product at cost factors	
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	37
Main exported products (average 1963-1966) as a percentage of total exports	
Cotton	24,3
Tobacco	20,7
Fruits and Nuts	20,2
Main imported products (average 1965-1966); as a percentage of total imports	
Excluding capital goods and machinery means of transport	30,4
Exports/ Imports in US\$ per capita, 1966	14,9/21,8

More than a third of the active Turkish population at that time worked in agriculture and the majority of export revenue came from agricultural products. Therefore, it

was not surprising that Turkey's primary request to the European Economic Community (EEC) was related to its export of agricultural goods. The Turkish government wanted to quickly industrialize and transform the economy within the framework of an Association Agreement with the EEC. Due to their primary importance, agricultural products were the subjects of tedious and decades-long negotiations between Turkey and the EEC.

More than a technical question of prices and customs duties, trade issues raised the highly charged question of how a relationship between developing and developed partners should be arranged in order to achieve economic prosperity for both sides. In other words, Turkish-EEC trade was one case in a broader mid-twentieth century discussion of how the development of an underdeveloped trade partner could be boosted in a relationship between asymmetrical economies. To be clear, "development" and "underdevelopment" in this dissertation are used in a historical sense, in the sense that these were used in the 1950s and 1960s rather than in the sense that they are used in the social sciences today. The fundamental question of development as an international project hung over negotiations regarding the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC. Strikingly, the two sides failed to find a satisfactory answer. The Association was suspended twice by the Turkish governments at the end of 1970s.

The beginning of this process was full of optimism. The signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 was and is still regarded as a historical turning point by Turkish

commentators and politicians. Various individuals have argued that the Association was the culmination of the Turkish Republic's efforts towards Westernization, begun by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. *Hürriyet*, the Turkish newspaper with the largest circulation of the time, dated the beginning of the process to Ottoman reform and stated that the Association was the result of one hundred and fifty years of efforts exerted by Turkey towards Westernization.<sup>2</sup> From the EEC's perspective, while the Association did not carry such political importance, it underscored that the newly established EEC was increasing its attractiveness for third countries, particularly in economic terms.

After that auspicious beginning, over the course of the 1960s, the importance of the Association could have been expected to fade, since it was a technical instrument that might have been expected to hold little interest to the public at large. But, on the contrary, the Association Agreement started to be a topic of heated debates in the Turkish Parliament, newspapers, academic conferences, and even political demonstrations in the early 1970s. The political, economic, and cultural implications of the Association were at the forefront of controversies, making it a very popular topic.<sup>3</sup> Some advocated that it was an instrument for realizing the centuries-old policy of Westernization. Others labelled it as a ploy to subvert Turkey's political and economic independence.<sup>4</sup> Despite their polar-opposite attitudes to the

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<sup>2</sup> "Tarihi Anlaşma Ankara'da İmzalandı," *Hürriyet*, September 13, 1963.

<sup>3</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası* (Milliyet Yayınları, 1985), 170–71.

<sup>4</sup> Mehmet Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity Civilization: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 151.

Association, all involved agreed that it was a matter of paramount importance for Turkey's economic future. In other words, the Association was a foundational moment for the economy of Turkey, for some it was a step towards unprecedented development, for others it was a step towards economic dependence.

These assessments of the foundational importance of Association for Turkey were in many ways warranted. The Association included the possibility of Turkey becoming a full EEC member in the future and envisaged a Customs Union after 22 years. This was not only acknowledgment of the fact that Turkey's Westernization efforts had produced real convergence with Europe; it also reflected a further commitment to significant transformation of Turkish economy. Nevertheless, as the disagreements between Turkey and the EEC deepened, Turkey demanded a suspension of the Association firstly in 1976 and secondly in 1978. Even after 30 years, the collapse of the Association was put forward as a key reason why Turkey did not achieve full membership of the EU.<sup>5</sup>

How should one understand the contentious evolution of Turkish-EEC negotiations over an Association Agreement? Some analysts have preferred to examine the discursive competition over Turkish identity and the country's relation to the Western developed world.<sup>6</sup> Others have focused on the impact of Cold War rivalries

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<sup>5</sup> "Bülent Ecevit'ten AB Açıklaması - Son Dakika Haberler," accessed February 22, 2019, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/bulent-ecvitten-ab-aciklamasi-196968>.

<sup>6</sup> Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity Civilization: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*.

on the relationship between Turkey and the EEC.<sup>7</sup> Yet another group has examined domestic politics in Turkey and their impact on the negotiations.<sup>8</sup>

This dissertation begins with a less structural approach and examines the day-to-day negotiations over the Association as an attempt to understand in depth what the different positions of parties were, as well as how these positions became inconsistent and untenable over time leading to the suspension of the Association twice at the end of the 1970s. The rationale behind this approach is to comprehend why it took so many years for Turkey and the EEC to agree to disagree on the preferred path for Turkey's development. Rather than looking for an explanation in non-economic factors of identity and domestic politics, this dissertation puts the spotlight on the economic substance and the drama of the negotiations themselves. A broader approach to the negotiations would certainly be possible, and it would entail taking into greater account the positions of various members of the EEC as well as interest groups within the various countries that contributed to this story. For the most part, this dissertation examines bilateral negotiations between the EEC and Turkey. Somewhat ironically, beginning with an examination of day-to-day negotiation ultimately leads a conclusion about structural factors, but not the structural factors that have been emphasized in other works. The advantage of this dissertation's approach is that, when the longer course of bilateral negotiations is

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<sup>7</sup> Elena Calandri, "A Special Relationship under Strain: Turkey and the EEC, 1963–1976," *Journal of European Integration History* 15, no. 1 (2009): 57–76, <https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2009-1-57>.

<sup>8</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*.

placed in the context of EEC policy, it demonstrates the way that Turkish-EEC relations depended on a broad, international context.

The Association provides a fertile ground that could be examined by three different strands of literature. First and foremost, there is a handful of studies that examines directly the Association between 1960 and 1980, adopting a historical and journalistic approach to the topic. Second, there is expansive literature on European trade policies, which reflect different theoretical traditions' take on EU trade policies. While these theoretical approaches do not directly examine the Association with Turkey, their insights are applicable to the Turkey-EEC relationship. Last but not least, the historical literature on development during the Cold War, while it also does not touch upon directly on the Association itself, sheds light on the important aspects of development that also played a central role in the Association.

The negotiations over the Association suggest that a fundamental conflict of economic interests was present from the very beginning. Yet in the early years, when the EEC was not a global trading power and Turkey's comparative reference point was Greece, the EEC and Turkey regarded these fundamental issues as negotiable. The real problem emerged a decade later, when the broader international context upon which the Association was built had altered significantly. The EEC was now a global trading power and the comparative reference point for Turkey was less Greece than a number of other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. Turkey struggled unsuccessfully to preserve what had initially been imagined as a

privileged status. Turkish and EEC representatives were both cognizant of this situation, as demonstrated by the fact that they referred to expanded geographic context as the “Maghrebization” of the EEC’s foreign relations. Ultimately, neither party could find a commonality that would allow them to address this changed context. The worsening global economic situation and the enlargement of the EEC compounded and contributed to the downward trajectory of the Association. This dissertation situates the history of Turkish-EEC negotiations in a broader economic context to show that political conflict rested in very real economic issues.

From a theoretical perspective, the Association boiled down to a bilateral trade policy negotiation, in which the EEC’s and Turkey’s trade and development visions clashed. Liberal intergovernmentalism, with its focus on states’ relative power during negotiations, appears to have the most explanatory power regarding the Association. While the Cold War superpower competition concerns might have played a role before the Ankara Agreement was concluded, the negotiations demonstrate that the main issue debated was the concessions offered by the EEC, particularly regarding Turkey’s agriculture. The negotiations could be examined as a case where intergovernmental preference formation was transmitted to the negotiation table. Yet the decision to postpone addressing thorny issues of concession led ultimately to the suspension of the Association twice by Turkey. The Association also demonstrates that, more than a mere sense of economic interests, the Association agreement became strongly tied to debates about development in the domestic politics of

Turkey, which indicates that development politics was active in Turkey, as suggested by Cold War historians.

### **A. Literature Review**

The Association between Turkey and the EEC has only been directly examined by a limited number of studies. However, the Association itself is relevant to some of the issues that are examined by separate scholarly literatures. The following sections provide brief information about these separate literatures and their potential insights on the Association.

#### **a. Literature on the Association between Turkey and the EEC**

The existence of only a handful of publications devoted entirely to the Association implies that it constitutes merely a footnote in the long history of the relationship between the EEC—or, more broadly, an increasingly integrated Europe—and Turkey. As Mehmet Döşemeci aptly observes, “the rich history of Turkey-EU relations before the end of the Cold War” is often treated as only a “prelude.”<sup>9</sup> However, the handful of studies that do exist approach the Association from differing perspectives, and they offer varying insights and conclusions to this often-neglected period. This diversity suggests a complicated and important subject.

The majority of works on Turkey and the EEC share a common perspective: they approach the subject primarily in terms of a bilateral relationship. The books titled

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4. <sup>9</sup> Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity Civilization: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*,

*Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası* [Turkey's Common Market Adventure] and *Avrupa Yollarında Türkiye* [Turkey on the roads to Europe] are leading sources on the Association. The former written by a prominent Turkish journalist and the latter written by a Turkish diplomat involved in the negotiations, provide an extensive examination of the Association. They both come to similar conclusions that domestic political reasons hindered Turkey from following a coherent economic development plan in line with the Association.

Although Mehmet Döşemeci introduces a new theoretical approach, he too focuses on the Turkey-EEC relationship as part of a longer bilateral story of Turkey's relations with Europe. In his book, *Debating Turkish Modernity Civilization: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*, Döşemeci examines the relationship from a perspective focusing on the Westernization efforts of Turkey. He introduces a conceptual framework that reveals competing "civilizationalist" and "nationalist logics." The former refers to a logic which emphasizes Turkey's alignment with western civilization. The latter, on the other hand, focuses on Turkey's unique nationalist features and differences with the West. The civilizational logic, which was established by the Republican elite, steered the relationship with the EEC in the 1960s. This approach emphasized that Turkey is a European country and did not pay much attention to economic factors. On the other hand, nationalist discourse emphasized the antagonistic relationship between Turkey and the West, by relying on an essentialist reading of Turkish and European identities. This discourse

increased its popularity, especially in the last part of the 1970s, due to rising new radical right and left movements in the Turkish domestic scene. According to Döşemeci, this consolidation of civilizationist logic was caused by the politicization of bureaucracy which replaced pro-EEC technocrats with anti-EEC ones. He asserted “these developments coupled with the EEC’s own increasing reservations about Turkish membership, had effectively stalled any real progress on Turkish-EEC integration.”<sup>10</sup>

In a later article, Döşemeci stated that the debates about Westernization of Turkey was partly possible due to Détente, as it “drew Turkey’s focus away from the geo-strategic concerns of the Cold War and toward engagement with Europe.”<sup>11</sup>

However, his focus was again on the discursive aspects of the Association process, as it encouraged Turkish people and politicians to entertain different possibilities about the role of Turkey in world politics. In this context, political Islamists argued that the EEC represented the Christian civilization that was incompatible with Muslim Turkey. The advocates of this perspective proposed severing relations with the Christian West and focusing on the relationship with the Muslim East. The radical left, on the other hand, reached the same conclusion of rejecting the relationship with the West but on different grounds. For example, the Turkish Workers Party asserted

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<sup>10</sup> Döşemeci, 203.

<sup>11</sup> Mehmet Döşemeci, “Turkish Anti-Westernism: Restaging the Euro-Mediterranean World in the Era of Détente,” in *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, ed. Elena Calandri, Daniele Caviglia, and Antonio Varsori (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2016), 220.

that the Association would eradicate Turkish industry and agriculture due to its competitive power. The radical right regarded the Association as a continuation of the western colonization of Turkey and objected to it on the grounds that it was against the Turkish identity and culture. Despite these criticisms, Turkish mainstream decision-makers saw the EEC as an important step for Turkey's Westernization efforts and exerted effort for its realization.

Döşemeci's work is in line with other recent works that, although they do not address the Turkey-EEC relationship directly, situate discussions of Turkey's economic development in a historically specific political context. Begüm Adalet in her book *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, Nathan J. Citino in his book *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in U.S.–Arab Relations, 1945– 1967*, and Nicholas Danforth in his recent book *The Remaking of Republican Turkey* are all recent assessments of how Turkey's external economic relations were shaped by the politics of modernization theory. While these important books do not focus on the European dimension of these issues, they underline the politicized nature of economic exchange.

The Cold War unquestionably contributed to the politicization of this exchange, and other scholars focus on the way that Turkey's geopolitical position in the Atlantic alliance influenced Turkey-EEC negotiations. This perspective argues that the Association with Turkey proceeded because it was politically inconvenient for the EEC to decline Turkey's request for association, since Turkey was an important

member of the Western alliance. In other words, as Elena Calandri argues, Cold War concerns trumped economic ones in respect of Turkey's Association. According to Calandri, "The choice of the Association was critical, the Turks wanted to be a part of the EEC and the Six were sensitive to this and feared the resentment a refusal would create."<sup>12</sup> In a similar fashion, some also argued that declining Turkey's request would give the wrong signal to the rest of the world by demonstrating the EEC was a club of rich nations closed to aspirant third states.

The Association with Turkey has also been analyzed as a part of the EEC-USA interaction regarding the Mediterranean in the context of the Cold War. The US attempted to share the burdens stemming from economic aid to Southern European countries as a part of the "economic Cold War" with European countries contributed to the renewal of the EEC as an international economic actor present in the Mediterranean.<sup>13</sup> However, this did not mean that the approach of the US to the EEC's flourishing relationship with the Mediterranean countries did not have any tension. The US was initially against the Association between Greece, Turkey and the EEC. However, it consented to those relationships, albeit not with much enthusiasm. Again, Cold War politics rather than economics were an important factor. In the case of Turkey, the US agreed to the conclusion of the Association

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<sup>12</sup> Calandri, "A Special Relationship under Strain: Turkey and the EEC, 1963–1976," 60.

<sup>13</sup> Elena Calandri, "The United States, the EEC and the Mediterranean: Rivalry or Complementarity?," in *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, ed. Elena Calandri, Daniele Caviglia, and Antonio Varsori (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2016), 36.

Treaty with Turkey to address the tensions created by the Jupiter missiles deal. In Calandri's words, "the United States resorted to the EEC to strengthen a Mediterranean ally that it was sacrificing to the emerging détente logic." Therefore, according to Calandri, the association with Turkey largely benefitted from the onset of Détente.

Authors such as Döşemeci, who focused on domestic factors regarding the Association, examined it as a part of Turkey's Westernization efforts and saw its trajectory as largely determined by the discursive struggles that took place in Turkey. In other words, the Association provided an occasion for debating Turkey's identity and role in relation to the Western world. The main questions raised in the context was primarily whether the model presented by the EEC was compatible with the Turkish identity, politics, modernity, and economics. Some argued that, especially when the new political movements emerged at the beginning of 1970s, there was an inherent incompatibility with the EEC's model and Turkey's conditions and aspirations.<sup>14</sup> Others, particularly mainstream politicians and bureaucrats, stressed that a membership in the EEC, through the Association relationship, would entrench Turkey's position in the Western world, affirm its Western identity, and constitute a boost to Turkey's economy.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity Civilization: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*, 143–44.

<sup>15</sup> Döşemeci, 28.

The sources used to substantiate domestic lines of reasoning are usually the public utterances of political actors such as speeches. This tendency is visible in the work of İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, whose *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı* [Turkey and the European Community: Turkey's Approach to Europe in an Effort to Transcend the Nation State] focuses on the Association process and examines the relationship between Europe and Turkey. Their work is the most comprehensive on the subject and traces the relationship between Turkey and the EEC from its beginning to the end of 1990s. They virtually cover all available Turkish sources on the subject and offer an excellent example of the domestic perspective on the Association. Like the other works cited above, they treat the Turkey-EEC relationship largely in a bilateral framework.

One of the most recent studies on the Association was published by Kazuhiro Nose, who focused on initial phases of Association negotiations with Turkey. Nose argued that the rejection of the UK's membership application played a catalyst role for Turkey's association negotiations and pushed West Germany to support Turkey to restart the internal and external relations of the EEC after France's veto had cast doubts over the viability of the EEC. According to Nose, the EEC's relations with Turkey were not only influenced by a desire on the part of the EEC to preserve a parallelism between the negotiations of Greece and Turkey but also a wish to show

that the EEC's external relations were expanding despite France's veto regarding the UK's application for membership.<sup>16</sup>

The studies mentioned above do not have an openly theoretical approach and they do not attempt to advance a theoretical framework like realism or the concept of principal-agent. Their contribution to the literature is by offering a novel examination of the Association by using fresh perspectives and also previously unexamined sources. In the next section, the theoretical literature on EU's trade policies will be examined.

#### **b. Literature on the EU's Trade Policies and Its History**

Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have been the two main approaches to European integration. The former argued that newly established transnational actors would gain importance and be the main driving force behind the European integration,<sup>17</sup> while the latter emphasized that the process of integration was a result of the bargaining of member states, pointing out that supranational actors were created to optimize the bargaining between member states.<sup>18</sup> However, these approaches have not much examined the common external trade policy and even more so the

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<sup>16</sup> *External Policy of the European Economic Community during the Association Negotiations with Turkey (1959–63): Reconsidering the Origin of EU-Turkey Relations* (オオサカ ダイガク ダイガクイン コクサイ コウキョウ セイサク ケンキュウカ 大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科, 2020), 93–96, <http://hdl.handle.net/11094/77127>.

<sup>17</sup> Ernst B Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, vol. 1957, 1968, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315014920>.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 04 (1993): 473–524.

Association agreements.<sup>19</sup> The literature on EU's trade policy gained momentum especially after the end of the 1990s, when the EU became more and more competent on a wide array of issues, including but not limited to external trade.

The bureaucratic politics hypothesis or institutions approach to trade policy of the EU put forward that relevant EU bodies, such as the Council or the Commission, are autonomous to a certain extent from other actors in the policy-making and policy-implementation processes. The proponents of this perspective employ analytical frameworks such as principal-agent. The gist of these frameworks is that the agents, who have been authorized by the principals, have some degree of freedom to enact policies and hence are able to pursue autonomous policies.

According to the principal-agent framework, the reasons for principals to grant autonomy to agents are manifold: contributing to the credibility of the principals (namely the member states in the EU) in committing to the agreements, reduction of transaction costs, increased bargaining power, and relative autonomy from societal actors.<sup>20</sup> However, the delegation also causes concerns that agents could attempt to realize objectives other than those set by the principals. To prevent this phenomenon, referred to as the bureaucratic drifting, agency loss, slippage or shrinking, principals attempt to retain control over the agents by several tools such as

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<sup>19</sup> Gadi Heimann, "The EEC Commission and the Negotiations for a Trade Agreement with Israel, 1958–1964," *Journal of European Integration* 38, no. 7 (November 9, 2016): 776, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1193175>.

<sup>20</sup> Johan Adriaensen, *National Administrations in EU Trade Policy: Maintaining the Capacity to Control* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, n.d.), 38.

selection of agent, monitoring the definition of the mission of the agent, tracking the results of negotiations and approving or rejecting the negotiated agreements.<sup>21</sup> In the case of the EU, the application of principal-agent framework produced a body of scholarship, which focused on how differences between principals increase autonomy or how the established principal-agent institutional frameworks had varying results in terms of EU's effectiveness in negotiations.<sup>22</sup>

Regarding the reasons of granting autonomy to supranational actors, Sophie Meunier argues that European-level trade policy-making was insulated to ensure trade liberalization by keeping societal protectionist pressures distant.<sup>23</sup> In the case of the EEC, delegation to an intergovernmental organization could give agenda setting-power to the states and result in decision-making rules and information asymmetries in favor of the governments against the possible influence of non-state actors. Furthermore, governments could also blame the international institutional constraints in case they cannot approach favorably requests originating from their respective societies.

In the principal-agent framework, the relative autonomy of the Commission drew the attention of numerous scholars. Manfred Elsig for example argued that principal-agent framework explained why the EU steered towards a more bilateral

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<sup>21</sup> Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, "Principals, Agents, and the European Union's Foreign Economic Policies," *Journal of European Public Policy* 18, no. 3 (2011): 329, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551066>.

<sup>22</sup> Dür and Elsig, 335.

<sup>23</sup> Sophie Meunier, *Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

international trade negotiation stature by focusing on the autonomy of the Commission. According to him, the Commission used the institutional setting, such as having the agenda-setting power to create its autonomy. It was also able to ignore the signals from the principals due to the near impossibility of removing the Commissioner from its position, which is regarded as the “nuclear option”. In other words, the Commission, as the principal, was able to carry out trade policies in a relatively autonomous fashion.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, Markus Gastinger emphasized the Commission’s capacity to establish information asymmetry during the pre-negotiation phase and hence increase its autonomy in EU-India relations. However, the increased autonomy of the Commission was noticed by the member states and member states increased the supervision of the Commission.<sup>25</sup> Chad Damro also cautions against approaching the Commission as an agent with a high level of autonomy and who could slack, as it was under stricter control in trade negotiations compared to negotiations on regulatory issues.<sup>26</sup>

Another important benchmark used in the principal-agent framework has been the relationship between the heterogeneity among the principals. In this regard, Elsig stressed that the Eastern enlargement had a significant impact on the relationship

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<sup>24</sup> Manfred Elsig, “The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 943–44, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00754.x>.

<sup>25</sup> Markus Gastinger, “The Tables Have Turned on the European Commission: The Changing Nature of the Pre-Negotiation Phase in EU Bilateral Trade Agreements,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 23, no. 9 (2016): 2–3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1079233>.

<sup>26</sup> “EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A Cautionary Comparison,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 300, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00752.x>.

between principals and agents in the EU, as it increased the number and heterogeneity of the principals.<sup>27</sup> He argues that these developments might not directly lead to a decrease in the Commission's power but could amplify the effect of principals of larger countries with more resources at their disposal to influence the policy making. However, Eugénia Da Conceição demonstrates in her article that the Commission has more authority when multiple principles have differing expectations from the negotiation process, thereby leaving more discretionary space to the Commission.<sup>28</sup>

The literature also examines the role played by nation-states, particularly their preferences' intensity and their nature in determining the outcomes of negotiations. For example, Andrew Moravcsik, in his well-known article titled "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations," draws attention to the primacy of societal actors in determining state preferences and the policy interdependence between states in the international system. This perspective posits the international cooperation in three phases.<sup>29</sup> Firstly, states identify their preferences. Secondly, states start to negotiate with each other to realize their preferences as much as possible. Thirdly, states create and become members of international organizations to ensure that their preferences are realized given the international system is anarchic. Andrew

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<sup>27</sup> Manfred Elsig, "European Union Trade Policy after Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and Informal Decision-Making," *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 6 (September 2010): 794, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2010.486975>.

<sup>28</sup> Eugénia Da Conceição, "Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics: WHO CONTROLS WHOM?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 4 (August 12, 2010): 1108–10, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02086.x>.

<sup>29</sup> Moravcsik Andrew and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism," in *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65–71.

Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfenning underline that, in the first stage, preferences vary according to the issues and that there is not a rule for determining preferences across the issues. In some issues such as agriculture, economic interests dominate the decision making, but in defense policy non-economic concerns are the driving forces behind decisions. In the second stage, liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes asymmetrical interdependence which refers to uneven distributions of outcomes of international agreements. The outcomes of negotiations are largely determined by the relative power of negotiating states. In comparison to neofunctionalist theory, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that ideational entrepreneurs' impact on negotiations is limited and states' preference carry the day in interstate negotiations. Regarding the third stage of creating international organizations, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses that international organizations such as the EU reduce transaction costs, ensure coordination and compliance, monitor possible cases of defection, and take standard-setting decisions. However, this perspective does not argue that existence of supranational institutions explains why states comply with states commit to EU rules. Liberal intergovernmentalism underlines that domestic commitment mechanisms remove issues from domestic politics and therefore lead to compliance with EU level norms.

In a similar vein, Alan S. Milward argues that the European integration was the result of interstate bargaining in which ideas and ideals played a minor role. According to his perspective, European countries chose the path of European integration, not

because of ideational perspectives but because it was the most optimal course of action for protecting their autonomy. The supranational structure of the EEC was necessary to remove some existing policy-barriers and did not mean a loss of sovereignty for the nation-states. On the contrary, according to Milward, European integration was a way for national elites to sustain their influence in the national contexts by establishing national welfare, thereby increasing loyalty of citizens to the states. Therefore, the nation-states' power did not diminish, but was preserved, rescuing the nation state, which was the title of Milward's most seminal book on explaining European integration.<sup>30</sup>

According to this perspective, the externalities created by preferences of most dominant actors given in a state create the need for negotiations. If dominant pressure groups in a given society favor imports or exports, it is expected that the state of that society will advocate a correspondent policy on trade negotiations. Similarly, some scholars argue that the preferences of most mobilized become the policy-decision in trading negotiations.<sup>31</sup> Others argue that preferences, protectionist, and pro-liberalization groups compete with each other to advocate for their respective interests. For example, Andreas Dür argues that economic interest groups largely influenced the

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<sup>30</sup> Jan van der Harst, "When History Meets Theory: Alan Milward's Contribution to Explaining European Integration," in *Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change* (Routledge, 2012), 367–68.

<sup>31</sup> Dirk De Bièvre and Andreas Dur, "Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and American Trade Policy," *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 10 (2005): 1271–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005277578>.

position of the EU in the Doha Development Agenda and the Kennedy Round.<sup>32</sup> However, these interests depend also on whether the negotiated issues are reciprocal or not and on the size of the economy's partner.<sup>33</sup> Some issues are non-reciprocal such as anti-dumping duties, which do not lead to mobilization of interest groups. Furthermore, if there is an asymmetry between the scale of negotiating partners, the interest of pressure groups would be less.

The literature points out that trade negotiations aim at creating trade liberalization. The bargaining leverage of a negotiating party is usually attributed to economically powerful party, the strength of preferences, and other factors such as the matter in question and the character of negotiators. Scholars focusing on the power dimension of trade negotiations emphasize that the distribution of security and economic capabilities confer higher leverage on negotiations. As Albert Hirschman indicated in his book titled "The National Power and The Structure of Foreign Trade", the increase in one country's market size allows that country to open or close its market as it wishes, hence providing more economic leverage in trade negotiations with other countries which do not have such market sizes.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Andreas Dür, "Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy-Making," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10, no. 1 (February 2008): 27–45, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2007.00316.x>.

<sup>33</sup> Alasdair R. Young and John Peterson, *Parochial Global Europe: 21st Century Trade Politics*, *Parochial Global Europe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 27–29.

<sup>34</sup> Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, Expanded ed, *Politics of the International Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

Realist scholars maintain that the EU's trade policies are better understood by scrutinizing the EU's competition vis-à-vis great powers. Hubert Zimmermann examines the negotiations on Russia and China's entrance to the World Trade Organization and concludes that "geo-strategic and mercantilist interests, pushed particularly by the Commission," had priority.<sup>35</sup> According to him, the Council and the Commission resemble classical executive bodies and they are relatively immune to societal influences. In a similar fashion, Katharina L. Meissenier argues that the EU is in competition with other great powers and EU's trade policies aim at securing advantageous positions in the markets of third countries. According to this perspective, the association agreements, free trade agreements, and other types of trade agreements concluded by the EU are all instruments to achieve greater European economic security.<sup>36</sup>

Regarding the trade and development nexus in the EU's external policies, the concept of differentiation carries a particular importance. This concept refers to the EU's attempts to modify its external actions to ensure they align with the development needs of its partners. Stephen Woolcock enumerates several factors in the formulation of EU policies towards developing countries: the normative framework for the relationship between trade and aid in aiding development, the balance between offensive and

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<sup>35</sup> Hubert Zimmermann, "Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China's and Russia's WTO Accession," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 4 (2007): 828, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00749.x>.

<sup>36</sup> Katharina L. Meissenier, *Commercial Realism and EU Trade Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 21–22.

defensive industries in the EU's domestic scene, the institutional framework for reaching decisions and policies of other developed countries.<sup>37</sup> He emphasizes that the examination of preferential trade agreements should be conducted in a case-by-case basis, however, he points out that similar trade agreements concluded by the USA or Japan relatively plays a more important role compared to norms such as human rights and sustainable development for larger developing countries.<sup>38</sup> For least-developed countries, a more development-based policy is prioritized, for stronger emerging markets a more reciprocity-based approach is adopted by the EU.

The role of norms in the implementation of EU's trade and development nexus also drew scholarly attention. These debates usually take place in relation to the literature about whether EU's policies are in line with the implications of "Normative Power Europe," which implies that the EU is a unique actor that acts with normative concerns and advocates global justice, development and human rights.<sup>39</sup> In this context, Patrick Holden puts the spotlight on the tensions between the discourse of the EU and its actions, claiming that the pro-poor agenda put forward was not fully supported by the policy actions.<sup>40</sup> In a similar fashion, Maurizio Carbone examines the EU's attempts to untie aid from trade, which means decoupling aid to countries from conditions

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<sup>37</sup> "Differentiation within Reciprocity: The European Union Approach to Preferential Trade Agreements," *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 1 (2014): 36–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.881603>.

<sup>38</sup> Woolcock, 45.

<sup>39</sup> Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353>.

<sup>40</sup> "Tensions in the Discourse and: Practice of the European Union's Aid for Trade," *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 1 (2014): 91, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.881607>.

imposed on the recipient country for purchasing goods and services from the donor country. He indicates that, despite promises to the contrary, the EU failed at its promises of untying aid from such conditions partially due to some donors' belief that such provisions boost their exports.<sup>41</sup>

The increase of preferential trade agreements after the 1950s also produced a scholarly literature on the impact of the agreements' design on state behavior.<sup>42</sup> According to this literature, it is possible to categorize trade agreement on their depth (the level of constraints on the state behavior such as low level of imposable tariffs), scope (the issues addressed by the agreement), membership (number of parties to the agreement), rigidity (the flexibility allowed to parties for potential violations of obligations stemming from the agreement), and institutionalization (whether the agreement foresees establishment of bureaucracies and dispute settlement procedures).

A notable exception to the general neglect of the negotiation of Association agreements concluded by the EEC is the work of William Zartman, titled "The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong," which was published in 1971.<sup>43</sup> While this book does not advance particular theoretical insights on the negotiations, it constitutes the single

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<sup>41</sup> "Much Ado about Nothing? The European Union and the Global Politics of Untying Aid," *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 1 (2014): 104,112, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.882572>.

<sup>42</sup> Leslie Johns and Lauren Peritz, "The Design of Trade Agreements," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*, ed. Lisa L. Martin (Oxford University Press, 2015), 0, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199981755.013.7>.

<sup>43</sup> I. William Zartman, *Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confronts the Strong*: (Princeton University Press, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400871933>.

work on the Association agreements concluded during those years. Zartman, rather than focusing on the EEC's external policy or developmental goals of African countries, which he portrays as in weak condition compared to the EEC in the negotiation table, examines the mechanisms of negotiations. The fundamental question he tries to answer is "How can the weak confront the strong and get something out of them, given the power imbalance," and he uses the EEC negotiations with African countries as a case study to answer this question.<sup>44</sup>

It is also possible to treat the EU's association agreements as a subset of the EU's foreign policy and approach it accordingly.<sup>45</sup> In the literature concerning the EU's foreign policy, the term coherence is used to examine synergy between the efforts of the EU to achieve its objectives within and across fields. Scholars also introduced different types of coherence in EU's foreign policy. For example, horizontal policy coherence refers to the consistence of policy outcomes across different fields of EU foreign policy and decision-making levels of the EU. Vertical policy coherence, on the other hand, identifies the alignment of policy coherence between policy outcomes of the EU and member states. While narrative policy coherence corresponds to the harmony between the rhetoric and policy output, strategic policy coherence means the consistent application of strategic values to different policy fields. Lastly, the external

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<sup>44</sup> Zartman, 5.

<sup>45</sup> Daniel Schade, *EU IN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: Challenges to Complex Policy Coordination*, Routledge Advances in European Politics (Place of publication not identified: ROUTLEDGE, 2019), 15–16, <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2278893>.

policy coherence is about the consistency EU foreign policy in different international fora such as NATO, the OSCE.

Daniel Schade, in his book on negotiation on EU association agreements, adopts a bureaucratic politics approach and argues that individual institutional actors such as directorate generals in the Commission have considerable weight in influencing policy outputs.<sup>46</sup> The clout of such actors increase when there is a significant restructuring in the organization of the EU actors like the establishment of European External Action Service. Schade also points out that, if an actor was involved from the onset to the last stages of the negotiation, that actor would be more likely to have more divergent preferences with other actors due to policy inertia. This inertia, which supports the continuation of previous preferences, plays a more heightened role in protracted negotiations.<sup>47</sup>

The international political economy literature on the EU's trade policies usually focuses exclusively on developments after the 1990s. While they offer theoretically and empirically valuable insights regarding EU's trade policies and the role of different institutions therein, they do not examine the Association relationship *per se*. The concentration of studies on recent developments is understandable, since the EU had substantially transformed after the 1990s and its institutions and their weight in the international trade became more pronounced.

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<sup>46</sup> Schade, 217.

<sup>47</sup> Schade, 219.

Regarding the time period of this dissertation, the Commission between the 1960–1980 was certainly not as autonomous as the Commission of the 2000s. This crucial difference makes it practically impossible to apply a principal-agent approach to the Association. While the realist approach with its focus on superpower competition could be useful in examining the initial stages of the negotiations regarding the Association, the role of norms outlined in the literature seem to have significantly limited explanatory power. Liberal intergovernmentalism, with its focus on domestic preference formation and the impact of relative size of economies in negotiations, has the most potential to offer insights about the EEC-Turkey Association.

### **c. Literature on Turkish Economy and Development between 1960 and 1980**

The emergence of economic development as an international priority in the second half of the twentieth century was a product of multifaceted dynamics, ranging from decolonization to the Cold War to the newly established post-World War II economic order.<sup>48</sup> The internationalization of the economic development of particularly underdeveloped regions of the world would lead to initiatives such as the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries and Harry Truman’s Point Four Program of international aid. These initiatives would be followed by national and international programs and

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<sup>48</sup> Amanda Kay McVety, “Wealth and Nations: The Origins of International Development Assistance,” in *The Development Century: A Global History*, ed. STEPHEN J. MACEKURA and EREZ MANELA (Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2018), 22. McVety, 22.

policies larger in scope dedicated to improving the economic condition of countries. Referring to the inception of such machineries in international affairs as a “revolution,” Amanda Kay McVety underlines that the Cold War coupled with decolonization led to development assistance being more “expansive and politically charged.”<sup>49</sup>

David C. Engerman indicates that development as a notion of advancing economies had predated the Cold War and draws attention to its use by elites of developing countries for domestic interests. He underlines that the politicizing of development emerged after colonial powers lost their grip over their colonies and paved the way for post-colonial states to negotiate with multiple donors of aid to promote their interests in domestic and international politics.<sup>50</sup> According to Engerman, this context led to a phenomenon that he calls “developmental politics,” in which actors in recipient nations used development aid to strengthen their positions in domestic debates, sometimes at the cost of governing capacity of their own states in delivering assistance to their citizens.<sup>51</sup>

Sara Lorenzini, in a similar fashion to Engerman, links aid and development in the Cold War and argues that donors and recipients used the aid to advance their national and international purposes.<sup>52</sup> According to her, the recipients in the postcolonial

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<sup>49</sup> McVety, “Wealth and Nations: The Origins of International Development Assistance,” 38. McVety, 38.

<sup>50</sup> “Development Politics and the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 1 (January 2017): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw043>.

<sup>51</sup> Engerman, 19.

<sup>52</sup> *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton University Press, 2019), 7.

states used threats to manipulate donors from the East or the West while placing the development at the center of their national plans. She notes that the EEC “rarely shows up in the economic histories of the Cold War” and argues that the internal discussions within the EEC about how to establish a program of aid to the Third World offers insights about the EEC’s eventual transformation to a competitor to the other superpowers in delivering aid. Lorenzini regards the Lomé Convention, which was concluded between the EEC and ACP countries, as a historical turning point, as it abolished the reverse preferences and introduced the system called STABEX, a mechanism for protecting primary commodities which were vital to economies of many ACP countries.<sup>53</sup>

The linkage between trade and development acquired special importance after the Second World War.<sup>54</sup> The reasoning behind this trend was that most developing countries, which were at the time commodity exporters, observed they were subject to volatility of prices for their commodities and judged that an industrialized economy would better provide economic prosperity to their citizens. This understanding led many countries to pursue a policy of replacing imported goods with goods produced domestically. This type of policy, called import-substitution

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<sup>53</sup> 146.

<sup>54</sup> Mark Manger and Kenneth C. Shadlen, “Trade and Development,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*, ed. Lisa L. Martin (Oxford University Press, 2015), 476, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199981755.013.28>.

industrialization, firstly aimed at producing basic goods and then advanced capital goods.

While trade was not necessarily at the heart of early development projects, recent works on the impact of the modernization theory have demonstrated how thoroughly development politics suffused postwar diplomatic negotiations. Begüm Adalet, in her book *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, focuses on the realization of modernization theory in Turkey, which was regarded as “an early laboratory of development.”<sup>55</sup> Adalet approaches modernization attempts in Turkey as an example of the post-war social scientific imaginary, and she shows how the Menderes Government heeded the advice of American advisers. Noting that modernization theory was universal in its scope, Adalet also underlines that “travelers embroiled in the weaving of modernization theory” such as diplomats and businessmen needed local passage points which made the application of modernization theory a process of negotiation with the local intermediaries.<sup>56</sup> Adalet’s work on the knowledge practices surrounding the implementation of modernization theory in Turkey in the 1950s underlines the importance of development as a topic that captured the attention of American and Turkish policy-makers, social scientists, and practitioners.

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<sup>55</sup> Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (California: Stanford University Press, 2018), 6. Adalet, 6.

<sup>56</sup> Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, 11.

Nathan J. Citino, in his book *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in U.S.–Arab Relations, 1945–1967*, also demonstrates how Turkey’s foreign relations became embedded in a broader framework of development politics. He shows how assumptions generated from Ottoman and Turkish experience shaped contention between Americans and Arabs over the notions of how societies develop. Citino scrutinizes the efforts of Americans to modernize the Middle East, which required an exchange with the history and elites of the region in the context of the decolonization and the Cold War.<sup>57</sup> His book overlaps with the work of Adalet, as they both assess how the universal development project formulated in the US was translated into local contexts. These studies focus on modernization theory and its US advocates, and they both underline the importance of development as a central site of contention that motivated international and national actors.

Turkey’s negotiations with the EEC, which picked up at the end of the period that Citino and Adalet focus on, grew out of the earlier politics. And, to understand how Turkey’s politics interacted with broader development politics, we must have some sense of Turkish particularity.

The Global South attached significant importance to development after the Second World War, which became an increasingly internationalized subject as decolonization accelerated. But, of course, developmental issues dominated the

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<sup>57</sup> Nathan J Citino, *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in U.S.–Arab Relations, 1945–1967* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 5.

agendas of countries facing the supremacy of Western countries long before the Second World War or the Cold War. Because the Ottoman Empire retained formal sovereignty, the Ottoman government was able to enact policies designed to catch up with advanced Western technology and economy. Cyrus Schayegh has pointed to the way that Ottoman policies anticipated the development politics of the twentieth century.<sup>58</sup>

Turkish development politics took another, inward-looking turn, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when the subsequent formation of a nation-state brought about significant transformations of Turkish political and economic structures.<sup>59</sup> The new Kemalist leadership abolished sultanate and caliphate, and, after the Great Depression, began pursuing state-led industrialization to expedite economic growth. In the period following the Second World War, at that moment when US foreign policy was increasingly shaped by modernization theory, Turkey witnessed an increasing tension between the Kemalist establishment and rising Islamist elites representing the large-scale landowners, merchants, and industrialists. Yet the statist gained ground and had the chance to implement their plans to steer Turkey to a more statist economy. The tension culminated in a military coup in 1960, which put into

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<sup>58</sup> Cyrus Schayegh, “Imperial and Transnational Developmentalisms: Middle Eastern Interplays, 1880s–1960s,” in *The Development Century: A Global History*, ed. STEPHEN J. MACEKURA and EREZ MANELA (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 61–83. Schayegh.

<sup>59</sup> Şevket Pamuk, “Political Economy of Turkey since the End of World War II,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics*, ed. Murat Güneş Tezcür (Oxford University Press, 2020), 14–15. Pamuk, 14–15.

effect a new constitution establishing new institutions such as the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Constitutional Court. The SPO was directed to steer the import-substitution industrialization in Turkey. This bureaucratic organization was initially designed to be an autonomous body that would determine the priorities and steps for the industrialization of Turkey. However, as the civilians' power increased after the mid-1960s, the SPO lost its authority over the Turkish economy, leading to the increased influence of the private sector, which focused more on consumer goods.

The SPO was responsible for five-year development plans, which aimed at achieving the highest rate of growth and to achieve social justice. The first plan covered the years 1963–1967 and focused on the reorganization of state economic enterprises and the tax reform.<sup>60</sup> Given state economic enterprises were active in the capital-intensive fields such as mining, energy, and petrochemicals, the SPO argued that it should manage all public investments to ensure that state-run entities worked in coordination to achieve the highest growth rate for Turkey. Concerning the tax reform, the SPO suggested that more taxation of larger landowners to realize land reform which would result in utilization of idle land. However, these suggestions received backlash from industrialists, right-leaning political elites, and traditional bureaucracy. The opposition to the SPO's plans succeeded in removing the

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<sup>60</sup> Ümit Akçay and Oktar Türel, "Import-Substituting Industrialization Strategy and Planning Experience in Turkey, 1960–1980," in *Political Economy of Development in Turkey: 1838 – Present*, ed. Emre Özçelik and Yonca Özdemir, *The Political Economy of the Middle East* (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 177–82, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7318-4\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7318-4_6).

aforementioned suggestions. The resulting development policies focused on encouraging industrialism with incentives and tax rebates.

By the late 1970s, Turkey's imports had adopted the structure visible in the table below. Turkey imported machinery—one the country's main imports—primarily from Europe.

*Table 2: Main Turkish Imports in Million Dollars*

<b>Products</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1978</b>
<b>Crude Oil</b>	718.1	1002.5	1151.6	1043.5
<b>Petroleum Products</b>	88.1	104.1	284	351.7
<b>Chemicals</b>	578.8	651.6	767.4	759.1
<b>Rubber and Plastic Products</b>	152.5	182.8	266.3	154
<b>Iron and Steel Products</b>	679.3	545.7	689.7	408.4
<b>Machinery</b>	984.2	1069.8	1060.3	761.4
<b>Electrical Machinery</b>	272.7	274.2	291	217.2

<b>Motor Vehicle Parts</b>	332.2	517.8	572.8	377.7
<b>Other imports</b>	732	644.6	610.8	406.2
<b>Imports with Waiver (Goods brought back by returning Turkish workers)</b>	98.2	135.5	102.4	119.8
<b>Total</b>	4738.6	5128.6	5796.3	4599

Turkey's exports were mainly agricultural products and textile products, as shown in the table below.

*Table 3: Turkish Exports by Commodity*<sup>61</sup>

<b>In Million Dollars</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1974</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1978</b>

<sup>61</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662," n.d., 186. "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662," 186.

<b>Agricultural Goods</b>	832	851.9	792.6	1254.6	1041.4	1542.7
<b>Cotton</b>	305.8	244.0	230.3	438.1	213.6	352.9
<b>Tobacco</b>	132.9	204.5	183.2	251.3	175.8	225.3
<b>Hazelnuts</b>	121.7	173.2	154.1	203.8	251	338.9
<b>Raisins</b>	58.2	53.9	45.5	52.6	75.0	99.7
<b>Dried figs</b>	16.1	17.2	18.9	20.6	25.2	30.9
<b>Cereals</b>	24.6	0.1	0.8	37.9	80.8	217
<b>Industrial Goods</b>	428.7	592.1	502.9	595.8	585.8	621.3
<b>Processed products related to agriculture</b>	159.5	145.0	128.6	98.4	135.9	110.2
<b>Textile</b>	109.4	147.0	132.5	285.3	259.8	309.1
<b>Petroleum products</b>	48.90	85.89	36.05	16.2	-	-
<b>Leather goods</b>	45.16	73.90	64.88	59.9	52	40.1
<b>Minerals</b>	56.5	88.3	105.6	110.0	125.9	124.1
<b>Total</b>	1317	1532,2	1401.1	1960.2	1753	2288.2

When the exports and imports of Turkey are examined by region, the EEC ranks first, pointing to the intensive economic relationship between the two parts of the Association.

Table 4: Turkish Exports By Region<sup>62</sup>

In million dollars	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978	
	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent
<b>EEC</b>	61 1.6	46. 4	713 .3	46. 8	61 5.1	43. 9	958 .5	48. 9	86 8	49. 5	109 0.1	47. 6
<b>COM ECON in Europe</b>	10 1.5	7.7	145 .5	9.5	12 2.3	8.7	166 .7	8.5	17 4.3	9.9	324 .1	14. 2
<b>USA</b>	13 0.8	9.9	144 .2	9.4	14 7.1	10. 5	191 .4	9.8	12 1.8	6.9	153 .2	6.7
<b>EFTA</b>	15 5.8	11. 8	154 .4	10. 1	16 9.7	12. 1	259 .6	13. 2	18 0.1	10. 3	194 .4	8.5
<b>RCD</b>	17. 5	1.3	17. 3	1.1	38. 2	2.7	35. 5	1.8	50. 8	2.9	52. 7	2.3
<b>ARAB Countries<sup>63</sup></b>	16 1.8	12. 3	207 .7	13. 6	19 7.6	14. 1	212 .4	10. 8	18 5.0	10. 6	302 .9	13. 2
<b>Japan</b>	16. 6	1.3	18. 1	1.2	28. 7	2.0	35. 6	1.8	36. 5	2.1	36	1.5

<sup>62</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662," 188. "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662," 188.

<sup>63</sup> Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia

<b>Others</b>	12 1.4	9.2	127 .7	8.3	82. 3	5.9	100 .7	5.1	13 6.5	7.8	134 .8	6.9
<b>Total</b>	13 17	100	153 2.2	100	14 01	100	195 9.8	100	17 53	100	228 8	100

Table 5: Turkey-EEC External Trade<sup>64</sup>

<b>Years</b>	<b>Export to EEC (Million \$)</b>	<b>Share of Export to EEC in Total Export</b>	<b>Import from EEC (Million \$)</b>	<b>Share of Import from EEC in Total Import (percent)</b>	<b>Trade with EEC (Million \$)</b>	<b>Share of Trade with EEC in Total Trade (percent)</b>
<b>1967</b>	234.1	44.82	33.7	48.74	567.8	47.05
<b>1968</b>	225.5	45.44	373.9	51.46	618.5	49.09
<b>1969</b>	266.7	49.69	393	49.05	659.7	49.31
<b>1970</b>	294.4	50.04	426.9	45.06	721.4	46.91
<b>1971</b>	329.4	48.69	581.5	49.67	910.9	49.31
<b>1972</b>	428.0	48.37	851	54.47	1279.1	52.26
<b>1973</b>	652.1	49.51	1160.9	55.65	1813.1	53.27
<b>1974</b>	761	49.67	1747.6	46.26	2508.6	47.25
<b>1975</b>	644.6	46.01	2377.9	50.18	3022.5	49.23

<sup>64</sup> Başbakanlık Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye*, 1991, 154. Başbakanlık Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 154.

<b>1976</b>	1016.5	51.86	2411.4	47.02	3.428	48.36
<b>1977</b>	836.5	51.15	2558.9	44.15	3455.7	45.77
<b>1978</b>	1272.2	49.26	1930.7	41.98	3057.9	44.40
<b>1979</b>	1131.5	50.4	1941.8	38.30	3.073.3	41.93
<b>1980</b>	1.299.7	44.66	2360.3	29.84	3660	33,83

Despite the political differences between the SPO and their private sector-focused opponents, the statistical information above suggests that the structure of the economic relationship with the EEC did not change fundamentally between the 1960s and 1980s. This economic relationship consisted of Turkey exporting agricultural goods and textiles to the EEC and paying heavily for industrial products in return.

In the same way that Turkey's trade structure remained stable, the country remained significantly tied to the patterns of state-led industrial development that had begun in the late Ottoman period and taken off after the Great Depression. As much as Menderes championed the free market, the Turkish economy remained significantly statist in the 1950s. And, in contrast with postcolonial nationalism that had regional dimensions, like Nasser's pan-Arabism or Nkrumah's pan-Africanism, the Turkish government's statism remained insular throughout the 1950s. Thus, when the Association Agreement with the EEC was negotiated in the late 1950s, it entailed a significant break with existing practice of insular statism prevalent in the region.

Yet, however independent Turkish politicians were in their postwar ambitions, their politics were increasingly tied to those of their neighbors. After all, development was also on the top of the agenda of newly decolonized states.<sup>65</sup> Postcolonial leaders wanted to quickly achieve economic growth to make up for their losses during the colonial era. For this growth, industrialization was a key policy target, since industrialization would protect the national economies from fluctuations in commodity prices, on which the economies of the postcolonial states were highly dependent. In their pursuit of economic development, the newly sovereign decolonized countries therefore had to devise new international arrangements with the former metropolises to realize their development plans. Therefore, Turkey and decolonizing states had the similar objective of achieving quick industrialization, albeit with highly different histories and connections to the West.

The EEC's inception coincided with a strong desire for development on the part of Turkey and other developing countries. But Turkey, on account of not being a former colony of European powers and also being a NATO member, was on a different footing compared to other countries developing countries from the Global South. Akin to Greece, Turkey was of the opinion that a strong relationship with the EEC

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<sup>65</sup> Corinna R Unger, *International Development: A Postwar History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 81. Unger, 81.

could accelerate its economic development through receiving improved preferences particularly in respect of the goods it exported.<sup>66</sup>

Scholars have examined the EEC's growing influence as a trading bloc and its role in international trade policies. In this context, Francine McKenzie argued that the European Steel and Coal Community and the EEC's establishment clashed with GATT's mandate of advocating multilateralism. The phased removal of tariffs among EEC member states, the introduction of CAP, and the extension of privileges to former colonies of French all contravened with GATT. However, despite the objections of other countries, the US supported the European initiatives on geo-political motives such as furthering peace and stability in Europe. While the European Steel and Coal Community received a waiver from the GATT, the EEC was not subject to such a procedure. EEC's emerging CAP also implied a heightened level of agricultural protectionism that would hamper the multilateral trade. Yet, GATT's efforts to scrutinize CAP remained ineffective, as the US and the EEC did not support such initiatives, both of which applied protectionist measures in the field of agriculture.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskı Oran (İletişim Yayınları, 2011), 814.

<sup>67</sup> Francine McKenzie, "The GATT—EEC Collision: The Challenge of Regional Trade Blocs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950–67," *The International History Review* 32, no. 2 (2010): 238.

McKenzie underlines that agriculture revealed GATT's shortcomings and its paramount importance for the US and EEC's decision-makers.

Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome stipulated that the objective of the common agricultural policy was "to increase agricultural productivity, to ensure a fair standard of living of the agricultural, to stabilize markets, to provide certainty of food supplies and to ensure supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices."<sup>68</sup> To realize these objectives, the EU designated target prices for each agricultural product. The agricultural products imported from the non-EU countries to the EU would be subject to variable levies, which meant that imports could not be cheaper than domestic products with target prices. Furthermore, if the market price of a given product would fall below a designated price, the products would be purchased to ensure that the price rises again to the designated products. Ultimately, this would lead to an overproduction of butter, wine, beef, and other products. While some products were stored or destroyed, others would be exported with prices supported by export subsidies. This policy not only led to an increase in domestic prices for agricultural products but also disrupted the world agricultural prices. However, the reform of this policy would not be materialized until the 1990s.

Turkey's economic development was one of the central topics covered by the Association. The literature on developmental politics during the Cold War as well as

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<sup>68</sup> PAOLA CONCONI, "The EU's Common Commercial Policy and Regional/Global Regulation," in *The European Union and Global Governance* (Routledge, 2009), 161.

modernization gives important insights about the pivotal role of development during the Cold War. Turkey's economic planning to induce an accelerated development also overlapped with a domestic scene where developmental politics was one of the most important issues where the Association's role was increasing between 1960–1980. While the literatures on these topics do not directly examine the Association, their insights could be used to further elucidate this special relationship between Turkey and the EEC.

### **B. Approach**

It is without doubt that how the Association process was shaped by Turkish identity and the Cold War are topics worth examining. However, the Association has often been subsumed into the broader processes of the Cold War and Westernization, and the actual bargaining process has been deprioritized as a topic of research. A result is that the current research has difficulties in explaining the downward trajectory of the Association. Are we to assume that the abrupt termination was because there was a softening in Cold War rivalries or the discursive struggle in Turkey had been won by anti-EEC proponents? While these approaches have merit in offering insights about Turkey's initial and subsequent relationship with the Community, they should be complemented with analyses focusing on Turkey's economy. After all, the Association was first and foremost an instrument for expediting Turkey's economic development. Article 2 of the agreement establishing the Association stipulated that:

The aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while

taking full account of *the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.* (italics mine)<sup>69</sup>

Therefore, it is of utmost importance to formulate an analysis based on the notion of development, which was at the heart of the relationship between the EEC and Turkey, in the form of an Association. However, the vital question was how this development was going to be realized in the context of the Cold War rivalry, the intensifying dispute over the role of the developed countries in the development of other countries and the increasing commitments of the EEC to third countries other than Turkey. In this regard, the negotiations between Turkey and the EEC provide an opportunity to understand how Turkey's development was negotiated in the context of these international factors.

To make matters worse, the EEC's increasing world trade power status and its increasing agreements with third countries had a solely negative impact for the Association with Turkey. While the EEC was initially hesitant to conclude an Association agreement with Turkey due to the concerns of member states regarding their own agricultural sectors, the increase of similar agreements with other third countries such as the one with Greece only retrenched this hesitancy. Increasing concessions offered by the EEC to increasing number of countries meant a less conducive climate for offering concessions to Turkey. In other words, the EEC's

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<sup>69</sup> "Ankara Agreement," 1963.

enlargement and expansion of commercial influence was detrimental to the Association with Turkey.

Last but not least, the Association, after its signature in its 1963 and particularly after the Additional Protocol, achieved a life of its own and became relatively divorced from political factors, including Turkey's domestic situation and the Cold War concerns, as the primary sources regarding the negotiations demonstrate that references to those political factors became scarce. While it is true that Cold War rivalries contributed to the launch of the Association by underscoring Turkey's geopolitical significance and getting approval of the US, their impact faded away after the first stage. Regarding Turkey's domestic situation, there was a high level of consistency in Turkey's position in the negotiations, which seems not to have been affected by the quickly changing Turkish governments.

Previously unexamined archival sources provide the opportunity to trace Turkish and EEC negotiations and renegotiations of vital topics of economic development in an international environment in which trade between the Global North and South became an increasingly charged topic. While the current literature successfully sheds light on the domestic reverberations of the Association and the influence of the Cold War concerns on it, the examination of the negotiations over it reveal that the trade issues lay at the heart of the Association and the increasingly unsolvable tension over them led to failing of the Association. The global discussions over an equitable trade relationship between Europe and the rest of the world only contributed to the demise

of the Association, attenuating the gravity of the in-built tension present from the outset.

In the first years of the Association, the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union as well as some Middle Eastern countries were also expanding, however the comprehensive obligations assumed by Turkey in the framework of the Association laid out in very clear terms that Turkey was committing itself to an unparalleled deep economic relationship with the EEC. Turkey declared that it was going to assume a number of obligations to become a part of the Customs Union and eventually a member of the EEC.

Turkey was not the only country facing such important decisions in terms of its economic development. While Turkey was not undergoing decolonization, it was competing with other developing countries for access to the markets of the EEC to achieve development. While the EEC was a fledgling international organization when it received the association application by Turkey in 1957, it became a world trading power in the 1960s with an increasing web of trade and development agreements with third countries other than Turkey. To put it in concrete terms, Turkish tobacco and other agricultural products such as raisins and grapes were not the only products that were of interest to the EEC. As a world trading power, the EEC needed to decide which agricultural product deserved more concessions at the expense of others.

The balance of compromises in the Association could not be divorced from the intense negotiations on international trade in the 1960s and 1970s. As Giuliano Garavani has shown in his seminal book, the developing countries successfully shifted the global discourse on development from aid to trade.<sup>70</sup> The Global South's repeated attempts to reconfigure global economy in favorable terms for their commodity-based economies led to a multitude of international trade negotiations. The fundamental issue taken up in these negotiations was how to address the development needs of the Global South through trade. While Turkey was not a card-carrying member of the trend to which Garavani referred to as the "unionization of the Third World," Turkey's demands in essence were very similar: a reconfiguration of the economic relationship with the West to boost its development.

The Association, therefore, was a part of the politicized negotiations over trade in the 1960s and 1970s in the context of Europe's attempts to reconfigure its trade links with its former colonies and semi-colonies. Turkey's relationship with the EEC, while initially considered from a political angle and in comparison to Greece in the 1960s, subsequently became hinged on the concessions provided to current and anticipated Turkish agricultural products. In the internal correspondence concerning negotiations, the EEC refused these requests on the grounds that it would create a

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<sup>70</sup> Giuliano Garavani, "After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986," 2012, 30.

detrimental economic impact on the EEC and counter-proposed concessions for products which Turkey exported in negligible volumes.

The negotiations between the EEC and Turkey demonstrate that the terms of the Association regarding agricultural products were creating tension even during the initial rounds. That is probably why Turkey had a much more protracted negotiation process compared to Greece. These tensions could be accommodated thanks to the weight of political factors, such as the historical rivalry between Turkey and Greece and the Cold War logic, over economic considerations like the difficulty of long-term transformation of the Turkish economy and the EEC's acceptance of agricultural products.

The late 1960s and the 1970s, on the other hand, were a much more difficult international economic climate and Turkish domestic landscape to negotiate this in-built tension within the Association. While the instrumental ambiguity in the preparatory stage was useful in the initial years, it was not enough to keep the lid in subsequent years on the boiling economic disagreements which were revealed with the transition period and subsequently suspension decisions by the Turkish government. As the comparative reference point switched from Greece to Maghreb countries and the Cold War concerns lost their primary importance in the context of Turkey and the EEC relationship, Turkey could not proceed anymore with the Association as business as usual.

Often, the reason for disagreements over the functioning of the Association is usually attributed to Turkey. Various scholars argue that Turkey was responsible for the issues faced by the Association due to political and economic instability.<sup>71</sup> The decades between 1960 and 1980 were indeed tumultuous for Turkey, and negotiations over the Association agreement were inevitably affected by these instabilities. The difficulties in determining a consistent negotiating position towards the EEC coupled with an increasing domestic polarization and worsening economic situation certainly exacerbated the already tenuous position of Turkish governments and bureaucracy in their negotiations with the EEC.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, this common argument has a solid basis and is well-documented in the literature.

This common argument, however, does not pay much attention to the deep-seated divergence in the positions of Turkey and the EEC throughout the negotiations. The divergences became acute particularly in terms of concessions to Turkish agricultural products by the EEC. While Turkey requested further concessions for its agricultural products, which accounted for a notable portion of its economy, the EEC was of the opinion that the concessions provided to Turkey were adequate. The Association, as an institution of international economic cooperation, entailed a set of ambitious promises by both parties. It took nearly two decades to reveal the unworkable aspects of the Association, which became apparent during the protracted negotiation process.

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<sup>71</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*.

<sup>72</sup> İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), 164.

There were agreements and numerous protocols signed by both parties spanning a period of nearly 20 years, but the two sides did not arrive at a joint answer to the question of how the Association agreement could help Turkey achieve development.

In one sense, Turkey did bear more of a burden: whereas trade with Turkey was not particularly important for the EEC, trade with the EEC was extremely important for Turkey. This imbalance in terms of trade volumes would be a permanent characteristic of the relationship. As result of this imbalance, the stakes were much higher for Turkey. That is why Turkey regularly requested further concessions in the agricultural field and more flexibility regarding the realization of tariff demobilization foresaw in the Association. However, the EEC did not respond positively to such requests.

A reconsideration of the Association, not as a historical footnote but as a foundational moment for Turkey's development, has the potential to provide novel insights on the multi-faceted nature of the Turkey-Europe relationship. First and foremost, treatment of this historical period as solely a prelude ignores its foundational importance not only for Turkey but also for the future of Turkey-Europe relations. The Association laid the foundations of what would become the longest bid for membership to the European project. It is no surprise that the Turkish membership to the Customs Union was realized in 1995, a date foreseen by the Association. In other words, the path of the Turkey-Europe relationship was set by the Association. Secondly, it also neglects the historical reality of the paramount

importance given to the Association by contemporary Turkish political and economic actors. In other words, the Association was in no way a historical footnote for the Turkey-Europe relationship in the 1970s. On the contrary, it was regarded as a momentous event for Turkey. Both parties to the Association gave much thought over how the newly forming bilateral relationship should proceed. For Turkey, the Association entailed massive economic commitments to transform the economy so that it could compete with its European competitors. The EEC, on the other hand, had to situate the Association within its broader external policy, which was undergoing a serious reconsideration particularly after the 1973 expansion. Thirdly, the question of how Turkey's development was treated in the context of the Association remains largely unanswered in the literature. The negotiation over the Association provides fruitful sources for understanding how, why, and when Turkey and the EEC converged and diverged on the development of Turkish economy.

The dissertation therefore could be considered as a narrative reconstruction of the negotiations to provide insights about Turkey's and EEC's calculus regarding the Association from its inception to its suspension. Relying on previously unexamined EEC sources, the dissertation firstly fills out a gap in the relevant literature regarding how the negotiations took place. Secondly, it examines the Association from the lens of recent theoretical discussions. While there have not been any studies that treated directly the Association in a theoretical fashion, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate the literatures on trade policies of the EU as well the literature on

development during the Cold War could also be applied to the Association. Last but not least, the dissertation also puts the focus on evolving international trade regime and context on the spotlight to demonstrate its impact on the Association.

To recapitulate, the dissertation aims at firstly filling a gap in the source base regarding the EEC-Turkey Association mainly by benefitting from primary EEC sources. Secondly, the filling out of this gap not only elucidates the Turkish and European assessments of the EEC regarding the Association, but also contributes to a possible reinterpretation of often-neglected historical episode. Thirdly, drawing from three relevant but separate literatures, the dissertation suggests that Association could be interpreted as an old-fashioned inter-governmental bargaining on specific commercial issues rather than a concerted effort to integrate Turkey to the supranational architecture established by the EEC during an intensification of developmental politics in the Turkish domestic political landscape.

### **C. Sources**

The dissertation relies heavily on EEC sources, supplanted by Turkish sources to provide a perspective on the domestic scene in Turkey. The reason for this overreliance on the EEC sources is to complement the overabundance of examinations based on Turkish sources. Döşemeci, Tekeli, Ilkin and Birand have presented multi-faceted analysis of the Association by relying on Turkish sources and examining them again would not lead to an original contribution to the literature, but a reiteration of the present literature on the topic. Oral histories of EEC officials

relevant to the Association were examined, but none of them had information regarding the Association.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, the dissertation firstly provides an overview of EEC's increasing external trade relations and then focuses on the negotiations between Turkey and the EEC. The overview of the EEC's external trade relations could be considered as an unnecessarily long context, but, after examining the present literature and its individual focus on Turkey, a need to focus on the importance of trade and development in the framework of burgeoning agreements between the Global South and the EEC was seen as essential.

The decision to focus on the previously unexamined primary sources of the EEC led to a dissertation which relied almost exclusively on a particular group of sources. However, this unbalanced examination of sources was decided in the context of an overabundance of examination of Turkish sources in the limited literature regarding the Association. Nearly all books on the Association refer to the same pages of Birand's book to examine EEC's internal deliberations. This book, which was published in 1985, continues to be the primary reference for representing the EEC's position in the negotiations. Therefore, the dissertation's oversized use of EEC's sources was done to fill this gap in the literature. Another important shortcoming in the literature on the Association was the EEC's increasing role in international trade.

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<sup>73</sup> Oral histories of Claude Cheysson, Commissioner for overseas development; P. Duchateau, Directorate F Relations with northern, central and southern European countries, Roy Denman, Director-General External Relations were available at the European University Institute and examined. They did not touch upon the Association with Turkey. None of the Turkish officials had oral histories. The only memoir written by an official that took part in the negotiations was examined in the literature review section.

This topic is usually neglected in the literature, as the focus had been on the Turkish side of negotiations.

For the Turkish public's discussions, which includes political parties and other societal actors like unions and business groups, Tekeli and İlkin examine nearly all sources. The scope of their book also emphasizes that they were able to obtain documents due to their special relationships. This explains why they were able to obtain and examine internal correspondence of Turkish government, even draft reports. That is why this dissertation provides only a brief summary of the Turkish side, on which additional information could easily be found in aforementioned sources, and preferred to focus much more, perhaps disproportionately on the EEC.

This deliberate choosing of primary sources from predominantly a single actor, namely the EEC, could be considered as a shortcoming of this dissertation. Views from other sources, such as trade unions and press as well as archives from member states of the EEC could be used to enrich the analysis regarding the association. However, given practical difficulties of reaching the archives of EEC member states as well as the existence of comprehensive analysis of the positions of Turkish actors in the literature, it was assessed that the dissertation would fill out a gap in the literature, even by solely examining a particular group of primary sources. Therefore, a narrative reconstruction of the Association from previously unexamined gives insights about EEC's perception of Turkey and Turkey's place in its growing

external trade engagements as well as Turkey's approach to the negotiations with the EEC.

The majority of primary sources examined were obtained from the European Council archives and Emile Noel's personal archives in the European University Institute. To my knowledge, the literature on Turkey-EEC relations has not examined these sources. They offer an effective avenue to understand why the Association proceeded the way it did. Its examination, spanning 20 years have shown that there was a notable divergence on the conception of development between Turkey and the EEC. Therefore, this dissertation's main original contribution to this neglected historical episode is to show by using hitherto unexamined primary sources the inception and development of this divergence and its impact on the Association relationship.

#### **D. Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is divided into five chapters:

Chapter 1 provides the general context on postwar international trade and the EEC's place in that system, without which the Turkey-EEC relationship cannot be understood. The first section provides information about the post-World War 2 global economy and the increasing role of the EEC therein, while examining the Turkish economy's development trajectory. The EEC, in its agreements with third parties—first Greece and Turkey, but then a host of other countries—made similar concessions to partners what were called at the time “developing countries”. This

plethora of agreements with third countries, one of which was Turkey, had a pivotal focus on development.

The second section of chapter 1 examines the evolution of the EEC's association agreement with Greece. The payoff from this analysis is that it provides a benchmark for Turkey-EEC negotiations and shows how much easier the process was in Greek-EEC negotiations. The third and fourth sections examine the EEC's relationship with developing countries and regional groupings that came to affect Turkish-EEC trade. The fourth section focuses particularly on the countries that would become the ACP bloc which coalesced during this period and won concessions from the EEC. The fifth section then turns to the EEC's relations with a group that negotiators referred to as "the Mediterranean countries." This group was relevant to Turkey because its exports overlapped with Turkey's own. This section argues that the EEC developed a regional policy spontaneously, without ever thinking systematically what it meant to institutionalize relationships with partners who had conflicting interests. The chapter ends with Turkey and describes the structural framework that characterized Turkey-EEC negotiations.

The remaining chapters turn to a chronological account of EEC-Turkish negotiations. The second chapter, which is limited to the exploratory talks, establishes that there was little to no economic logic driving the first initiatives. Both Turkey and the EEC were driven by political reasons, the former the fear of losing out to Greece and the latter the need to placate a Cold War ally. The third chapter argues that, already at

the high water mark when the Ankara Agreement was signed, the EEC was beginning to consider a “non-associate” role for Turkey. In other words, the difficulty of convergence led the EEC to consider ways to establish an institutionalized partnership with Turkey without planning for an association. This is why the conclusion of an association agreement with Turkey took considerable time. However, Turkey and the EEC preferred to sign an Association agreement by prioritizing political factors such as Turkey’s geo-political importance in the Cold War and postponing difficult economic issues. The fourth chapter turns to the negotiations over an “Additional Protocol” which would govern the transition stage of the Association. The EEC was questioning whether Turkey could successfully carry out the obligations that would stem from the transition. Despite these doubts, Turkey and the EEC again reached agreement, by making optimistic economic forecasts with the help of political factors, maybe for the last time. Furthermore, by this point, the concessions won by other developing countries was rendering meaningless the EEC’s earlier preferential treatment of Turkey.

The final chapter turns to the 1970s, when Turkey and the EEC engaged in open recriminations and the Turkish government decided to suspend the Association Agreement. Rather than the product of a particular political party’s demands or the maximalist demands of one side, this story appears as the logical culmination of the earlier chapters. From the very beginning, both sides had agreed that the Association Agreement was intended to facilitate Turkey’s economic development. Yet over the

course of twenty years, the two sides had not even agreed upon a joint rhetorical commitment to a common development strategy, let alone a compromise of interests that would help them to pursue one. Everyone was aware that the EEC offered few advantages in the area that Turkey cared most about—agricultural exports—but that individual members’ interests prevented the EEC from making further concessions in this sphere. Instead, the EEC offered benefits for industrial exports, of which Turkey had few. As economic crisis in the 1970s set in, the Association Agreement was revealed as the institutional anomaly that it was. With many African and Asian states having won trading benefits similar to Turkey’s and EEC membership out of the question, the Association Agreement offered Turkey no visible path to development.

## CHAPTER 1: TURKEY, THE EEC AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

### A. Overview

The EEC's legal basis for having association relationship with non-member countries was stipulated in various sections of the Rome Treaty.<sup>74</sup> Firstly, the commercial policy was regulated in articles 110-116 of the Treaty. Article 110 stated that the EEC would "contribute to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international exchanges and the lowering of customs barriers." The other articles in the section included directives on how the Community would achieve common policy regarding external trade and the decision-making procedure for common external trade. It was also noted that in procedural terms the Council should authorize the Commission to launch tariff negotiations with third countries.

The second part of the Rome Treaty on external trade relationship was Articles 131-136. This set of articles governed the relationship between the EEC and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. According to these articles, the EEC's objective regarding these countries was intended to encourage the economic and social development of the countries. Finally, Article 238 was the legal basis for establishing association relationship with countries such Greece and Turkey. This article read that

The Community may conclude with a third country, a union of States or an international organization agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures. Such

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<sup>74</sup> "Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community," n.d., accessed August 10, 2020.

agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote and after consulting the Assembly.

This article gave the EEC the authority to conclude association agreements with third countries, without specifying the negotiation process as in Articles 131-136. The involvement of the European Parliament alluded also to the more encompassing nature of these association agreements compared to other modes of external relationship. In other words, the association agreements concluded in the context of Article 238 were envisaged to include more political aspects than solely focus on external commercial relationships as envisaged by other sections of the Rome Treaty focusing on the external conduct of the Community. The consultation did not involve a veto power, but solely a report presenting the opinion of Assembly on the external relations.

Based on this legal framework, the EEC negotiated a set of agreements whose list is provided in Table 6. This broader structure of trade engagements is usually placed on the back burner of current examinations of the Turkey-EEC relationship in the literature. This issue, however, merits a closer and more comprehensive analysis, as the EEC reached its decisions concerning Turkey not on a bilateral basis but via a regional and global perspective.

In 1957, the EEC accounted for 23 percent of world trade. In the following years, the EEC recorded high growth rates. By 1968, the EEC's imports were equal to those of the US, the UK and Japan combined. The sheer weight of the EEC could also be demonstrated by the percent of exports of countries going to the EEC. In 1963, 21

percent of the UK's exports, 37 percent of Greece's, 33 percent of Turkey's, 17 percent of the US', and 44 percent of Argentina's exports were going to the EEC.<sup>75</sup> Such a notable weight in international trade naturally brought about an intensification of its multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. These negotiations required the EEC to ascertain its position concerning how to project its trading power via which instruments.

The trajectory of the Association relationships could not be, therefore, divorced from the emerging world trade power of the EEC. As Lucia Coppola has argued, the 1960s marked the emergence of the EEC as a world trading power.<sup>76</sup> However, the emergence and the subsequent projection of this power was not confined to GATT negotiations which was examined by Coppola. The association agreements with third countries determined how this power was going to be projected against countries with less trading power. While an important component of this developing policy of the EEC was devoted to the relationship between European countries and their former colonies, the negotiations with Turkey and Greece were also placed on the agenda of the Community just two years after its inception.

Understanding the emergence and consolidation of the EEC economic power firstly necessitates a comprehension of the international economic order established after

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<sup>75</sup> Stanley Henig, *External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements* (London: Chatham House: PEP, 1971), 5.

<sup>76</sup> Lucia Coppolaro, *The Making of a World Trading Power The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963–67)* (Surrey; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing limited, 2013), 2.

the Second World War. The world trade system after the Second World War had been largely governed by the GATT. The GATT was based on the principles of most-favored nation treatment, non-discrimination, and reciprocity of concessions.<sup>77</sup> This principle of non-discrimination, enshrined in the first article of the GATT, stipulated in essence that the advantages accorded to a country should be extended to all other contracting parties of the GATT.<sup>78</sup> A waiver was required from the GATT to make an exception to this principle. The issue of discriminatory versus non-discriminatory measures within the GATT system was going to be a negotiation topic between the EEC and Turkey during the formulation of the Association. If there was to be a discriminatory measure in the agreement, the GATT could approve if such discriminatory measures were established with the objective of a customs union. However, if non-discriminatory measures were preferred, the GATT was not involved as the measures affected every country. Article XXIV of GATT stipulates for member states to establish a customs union or free trade agreement amongst themselves, the trade concerned should be substantial, the common external tariff that would be applied should not exceed the average external tariff preceding the free

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<sup>77</sup> Harry Stordel, "Trade Cooperation: Preferences in the Lomé Convention, The Generalized System of Preferences and the World Trade System," in *The Lomé Convention and Anew International Economic Order*, ed. Frans A. M. Alting Von Geausau (Tilburg: A.W Sijthoff International Publishing Company B.V, 1977), 77.

<sup>78</sup> Richard Pomfret, *MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A Study of Discrimination in Trade* (New York: The Macmillan Press, 1986), 2.

trade agreement and the customs union and finally the agreement should be completed within a reasonable length of time.<sup>79</sup>

The GATT was established in 1947 to prevent a return to the 1930s where protectionist tendencies stifled trade between the countries.<sup>80</sup> The objective of the GATT was to reduce obstacles hindering trade, particularly tariffs, and decrease the deployment of trade restrictive measures such as quotas. The post-Second World War international trade regime was governed by GATT, whose underlying principle was the most-favored nation. The most-favored nation principle stated the tariff treatment to preferred partners would be accorded all signatories to GATT.<sup>81</sup> The increasing weight of the EEC in world trade was an important factor in the negotiations over the GATT, which were held in the form of rounds. In the first Dillon round (1960-1961), the common external tariff of the EEC became topic of negotiations. GATT stipulated that the common external tariff should not be higher than the average tariff of six members. To ensure a deviation from this rule, EEC had to present compensatory concessions on other fields. However, these negotiations did not cover agriculture, which would become the priority topic in the next round, namely the Kennedy Round (1964-1967). The issue of tariffs over agricultural products, as the EEC's CAP and the US's

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<sup>79</sup> T Mesut Eren, "TÜRKİYE İLE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ARASINDAKİ GÜMRÜK BİRLİĞİ'NİN GATT'İN XXIV. MADDESİNE YKIRILIĞI VE OLASI SONUÇLARI," *MARMARA AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI DERGİSİ* 29, no. 1 (2021): 123.

<sup>80</sup> CONCONI, "The EU's Common Commercial Policy and Regional/Global Regulation," 166.

<sup>81</sup> John H. Barton et al., *The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO, The Evolution of the Trade Regime* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 39, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837892>.

interventionist policies were disrupting the prices of agricultural products were placed on the top of agenda. However, the negotiations could not achieve the intended results on the agricultural field, as the EEC had difficulties in implementing the CAP and presenting a negotiation position to the US. The third round, namely the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), whose venue was strategically chosen to represent the rising Asian economies at the time, included not only the developed countries, but also developing countries. The issue of agricultural tariffs was again on the top of the agenda, yet the USA and the EEC failed to reach agreement on it. Due to this stalemate, in 1977 the parties agreed to not negotiate the issues where no agreement was on the horizon, and this enabled the negotiations to proceed. The next round would take place in Uruguay (1986-1994) and constitute the most comprehensive agreement on multilateral trade, covering for the first-time trade in services and intellectual property.

There was a natural tension between the economic groupings such as the EEC and the most-favored treatment which applied to every country, at least in theory.

Furthermore, the significant disparity between developing and developed countries also gave an impetus to the reconsideration of the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity. The questioning of reciprocity would be more emphasized when the EEC was concluding agreements with African countries, whose development level was significantly below the EEC member states. While the issue of reciprocity was an integral part of the negotiations between the EEC and African countries, further

concessions towards these and other third countries would create the impression in Turkey that its concessions were losing its relative impact.<sup>82</sup>

The establishment of the EEC itself and then the introduction of generalized preferences for developing countries were both major exceptions to the non-discrimination principle. Nevertheless, these divergences were accepted by most GATT members.<sup>83</sup> Regarding the former divergence, the US regarded the establishment of the EEC as a step to increase European cohesion. Concerning the latter divergence, unilateral preferences towards the developing countries were accepted by the US in 1968, after an initial rejection in 1964. Most of the developed countries established general preferences to assist the developing countries in their economic development. These two major exceptions withstanding, there was a general tendency to respect the principle of non-discrimination up until the 1970s.

Another parallel and noteworthy development was the consolidation of slowly emerging hierarchy of preferences constructed by the EEC. The preferences accorded to the third countries by the EEC has been described as a pyramid of privilege.<sup>84</sup> The top of the pyramid was allocated to the European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). African Caribbean Pacific countries which were signatories of the Lomé Convention were followed by the Mediterranean

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<sup>82</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 847.

<sup>83</sup> Pomfret, *MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A Study of Discrimination in Trade*, 6.

<sup>84</sup> Ben Atkinson, "Trade Policy and Preferences," in *The European Union and Developing Countries: The Challenges of Globalization*, ed. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 305–6.

countries in terms of the preferential treatment. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) offered less favorable conditions compared to the Lomé Treaty, but it covered the highest number of countries. A lower preferential treatment was offered to the countries which were members of the GATT and were not covered by these regimes. The establishment of this pyramid of hierarchies carried utmost importance for Turkey, as it meant concessions given to it would be relatively losing its impact. In other words, more concessions accorded to other countries meant less concessions for Turkey in relative terms, since Turkey and other developing countries competed in similar agricultural products. As Turkey was mainly an agricultural country, which was in competition with other developing agricultural countries, the gradual establishment of this pyramid of hierarchies and its eventual consolidation in the 1970s was going to attract Turkey's intensifying criticism.

The EEC's scheme of generalized preferences was introduced in favor of all developing countries in 1971. This scheme was established following agreement in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the establishment of generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory system of preferences by the developing countries in favor of developing countries to increase exports to promote industrialization, and rates of economic growth. The UNCTAD I in 1964 and the UNCTAD II in 1968 laid the foundations for later schemes that aimed at increasing export earnings, industrialization and economic growth rate of

developing countries.<sup>85</sup> While the first rounds of UNCTAD were successful in bringing about a change in the international community's approach to trade and development particularly by creating an awareness about the demands of the developing countries, developed countries preferred GATT and other international forums instead of UNCTAD.<sup>86</sup> They were largely successful in ensuring GATT remained the dominant place of negotiation regarding trade and development issues. UNCTAD's most important contribution was regarding the establishment of the GPS scheme which was confined to limited preferential customs treatment and did not extend to non-tariff barriers. This scheme was also limited compared to the Lomé Convention in terms of absence of stabilization of earnings from exports of primary commodities, industrial and technical co-operation.<sup>87</sup> In other words, preferential treatment was not extended to primary commodities. Concerning textiles, there were also serious limitations. Last but not least, the GSP offered only a partial tariff cut to processed agricultural products.

The GSP was an outcome of the UNCTAD Conference in 1964. Raul Prebisch, then UNCTAD Secretary-General suggested the creation of a single trade regime in which developed countries would receive particular exports of developing countries free of duty. An important feature of this trade regime was the absence of reciprocity

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<sup>85</sup> S. Javed Maswood, "The G77 and UNCTAD," in *Trade, Development and Globalization* (Routledge, 2013), 57.

<sup>86</sup> Maswood, 62.

<sup>87</sup> Stordel, "Trade Cooperation: Preferences in the Lomé Convention, The Generalized System of Preferences and the World Trade System," 66.

clauses.<sup>88</sup> Turkey wanted to be included in the GSP, particularly during the signature of Complementary Protocol at the beginning of 1970s. Turkey was arguing that the concessions offered by the Association were going to be eroded due to the GSP and therefore wanted to be included in it. While the EEC acknowledged that Turkey was accurate in its observation that the GSP was going to erode the effectiveness of Association during the negotiations for the complementary protocol, it did not accept Turkey's request to be included in the GSP.<sup>89</sup>

Another important development regarding the relationship between the EEC and rest of the world was the UK's accession in 1973. British membership in the EEC transformed the EEC's relationship with India and Southeast Asia. Asian countries, particularly, India and Pakistan significantly benefitted from the GSP beginning in 1971. Some Asian countries also requested the inclusion of additional products in the GSP. The EEC used the GSP to address the problems arising from Commonwealth Preferences System and harmonization of Britain with Common Customs Tariff in 1977.<sup>90</sup> In other words, the enlargement of the Association brought complications to the hierarchy among the countries receiving preferential treatment.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Atkinson, "Trade Policy and Preferences," 312–13.

<sup>89</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, 159.

<sup>90</sup> Ellen Frey Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lome Convention and Its Impact* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 210.

<sup>91</sup> David Robertson, "The Community's Mediterranean Policy in a World Context," in *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, ed. A. Shlaim and G. Yannopoulos (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 342.

For Turkey, the enlargement of the EEC was going to be detrimental for its own Association agreement since the inclusion of new members widened the trade deficit between the enlarged EEC and Turkey. To make matters worse, the UK would use its EEC membership to put pressure on Turkey to decrease cotton exports to the EEC.<sup>92</sup> This would be a source of serious tension between Turkey and the EEC in the 1970s, which led to the questioning of the Association as an instrument boosting Turkey's economic performance.<sup>93</sup>

The rising preponderance of the EEC in the international trade scene could be inferred from the agreements concerning the international trade of textiles. The low-skill and labor-intensive sectors, among which textiles was a leading one, has been a key industry for achieving development, particularly by developing countries.<sup>94</sup> The US and the EEC were prominent actors in the regulation of international textile trade. The voluntary export restraint agreement concluded by Japan in 1955 regarding its textile trade with the US could be regarded as one of the first significant regulations after the Second World War. However, as these bilateral restraints needed to be in compliance with the GATT, the Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles in 1961 was put in place. This scheme received a waiver from the GATT, since the duration of the arrangement was solely one year. This limited arrangement was replaced with

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<sup>92</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, 250.

<sup>93</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 850.

<sup>94</sup> Marc Lemaitre, "EU Textiles Policy and Developing Countries," in *The European Union and Developing Countries: The Challenges of Globalization*, ed. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 322–23.

the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, which lasted until 1974. This arrangement covered all textile products, which had a minimum cotton content of 50 percent.

These short and long-term arrangements led the exporting countries to evade these restrictive arrangements by concentrating on the production of textile by using synthetic fibers and wool.<sup>95</sup> The developed countries, particularly the US and the EEC, exerted efforts for formulating an agreement that covered all textile products. These efforts culminated in the first Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles which is more commonly known as the Multi Fiber Agreement in 1974. The first articles of the EEC envisaged a more favorable environment for least developed countries (LDC). The article aimed at progressive liberalization of world trade and development of LDCs and achieved a substantial increase in their export earnings from textile products.

The second Multi Fiber Agreement was concluded in 1977 in a mounting protectionist environment in the developed countries.<sup>96</sup> The advances in textile production technology led to a quick increase in export capacities of developing countries. This led to unemployment in the EEC's textile sector, pushing the EEC to adopt a tougher protectionist stance. The renewal of the Multi Fiber Agreement brought about a significant change regarding the definition of market disruption. The

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<sup>95</sup> Lemaitre, 324.

<sup>96</sup> Lemaitre, 325–26.

novel concept of “cumulative market disruption” was introduced, which meant that for imposing restrictions it was sufficient to demonstrate that “global imports” from low-cost countries led to market disruption.

Turkey and the EEC were to have serious disagreements over the textile issue at the second half of the 1970s.<sup>97</sup> Turkey’s insistence on increased textile exports to the EEC would lead to the implementation of safeguard clauses against Turkey at the request of the UK. This issue would contribute to the increasing perception in Turkey that the Association was not contributing to the development of Turkish economy.

As negotiations over the international trade of textiles demonstrate, due to its sheer production and trading power, the EEC was one of the constituent members of international trading since its inception. Its establishment was preceded and followed by important negotiations on how to situate this newly emergent trading power in the context of GATT and previous trade regimes. The table below indicates the high number of external trade agreements concluded by the EEC between the years 1960-1980. This series of negotiations suggest that the EEC, as an international trading power, consolidated itself and arranged its trading relationship with third countries.

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<sup>97</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa’ya Türkiye’nin Yaklaşımı*, 247.

Table 6: Agreements of EEC with developing countries

Countries	Name of the Agreement	Year
<b>ACP Countries</b>		
AASM	Yaoundé Convention	1964
East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania)	Arusha Agreement	1969
Nigeria	Lagos Agreement	1966
ACP	Lomé Convention	1980
<b>Mediterranean Countries</b>		
Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria)	Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement	1977
Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia)	Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement	1976
Israel	Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement	1975
Yugoslavia	Preferential Trade and Cooperation Agreement	1980
Greece	Association Agreement	1961
Turkey	Association agreement	1963
Malta	Association agreement	1971

Cyprus	Association agreement	1973
<b>South Asia</b>		
Bangladesh	Non-preferential Commercial Cooperation Agreements	1976
India	Non-preferential Commercial Cooperation Agreements	1974
Pakistan	Non-preferential Commercial Cooperation Agreements	1976
Sri Lanka	Non-preferential Commercial Cooperation Agreements	1975
<b>Asia</b>		
ASEAN- Indonesia		1979
ASEAN- Malaysia		1979
ASEAN- the Philippines		1979
ASEAN- Singapore		1979
ASEAN- Thailand		1979
<b>Latin America</b>		

Argentina		1972
Brazil		1974
Mexico		1976
Uruguay		1975
<b>Other Countries</b>		
Other LDCs	GSP (except Taiwan)	1971
China	Non-Preferential Trade Agreement	1979
Romania	Non-Preferential Trade Agreement	1980

However, the emergence of the EEC's trading power and its application vis-à-vis different countries produced complications as the similar concessions lost their relative value in the eyes of recipient countries. As these agreements contained concessions on same or similar products to different countries, this created a set of problems of consistency of the agreements with each other and extant international trade agreements. As David Robertson aptly observed:

the system of multiple discrimination that the Community has evolved was a disjointed and inharmonious policy, in which little attention has been given to

internal consistency or compatibility with international commitments embodied in the GATT.<sup>98</sup>

Understanding Turkey's place in the web of agreements developed by the EEC requires an understanding of their development and implications, as one not cannot totally comprehend the Association with Turkey without understanding other agreements that have a bearing on the agreements with Turkey. Therefore, in the next sections, the EEC's external trade policy towards third countries, starting with the Association with Greece as it is the first of its kind, will be examined in order to provide background before delving into the negotiations between Turkey and the EEC.

#### **B. Greece**

The Association agreement with Greece carried a particular importance for the EEC's external trade policy because it was the first bilateral agreement with a third country. It also carried a special importance for Turkey, as Greece and Turkey had a historic political and economic rivalry. The economic rivalry was particularly acute in agricultural products and tobacco, for which Turkey and Greece had to compete in exporting them to the EEC market. Greece's closer links with the EEC meant that Turkey could face a disadvantageous situation in terms of facilitated access to the EEC market. However, Turkey's concerns were not limited to the economic advantages that Greece could gain from an Association with the EEC. Turkey also

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<sup>98</sup> Robertson, "The Community's Mediterranean Policy in a World Context," 343.

worried that if Greece became a member of the EEC, it could utilize the EEC in its competitive relationship with Turkey.

According to Stanley Henig, a prominent researcher in the external relations of the EEC, “the EEC proceeded to give Greece terms which were so favorable that it would be unable to grant them to others and which actually infringed its own autonomy.”<sup>99</sup> Despite the talks of parallelism between Greece and Turkey, parallelism meaning the negotiations for a potential Associate status of Turkey and Greece within the EEC in a similar stage, concerning their relationship with the EEC, the Community “avoided repeating the same mistake” partly thanks to the political upheaval in Turkey in 1960 which put its relationship with the EEC two years behind Greece.

The negotiations between Greece and the EEC lasted two years. In November 1961, the Association agreement known as the Athens Agreement came into force.<sup>100</sup> The Athens Agreement foresaw establishment of free trade in twelve years with ten tariff reductions of 10 percent. The Protocol Six of the Athens Agreement provided exceptional advantages by offering immediate intra-Community treatment to Greece. In contrast, imports from the EEC to Greece were subject to a twenty-two-year

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<sup>99</sup> Henig, *External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements*, 29.

<sup>100</sup> S. Iacovos Tsalicoglou, *Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece to the European Community* (Suffolk: Ipswich Book, 1995), 9–11.

timetable. Furthermore, unilateral right to new tariffs to protect nascent industries were recognized for Greece.<sup>101</sup>

For Greece, the concessions of the EEC concerning tobacco were of major importance. Greece's demands were the establishment of internal free trade with an increased external tariff towards third countries.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, Greece requested purchase guarantees for its tobacco from French and Italian state monopolies. For raisins, Greece's second largest export, the concessions provided by the EEC were also favorable. Additionally, a tariff quota was established for wine. Citrus, grapes, and peaches were included in the general liberal regime subject to a unilateral safeguard clause at the disposal of the EEC. Greece also requested veto rights over future changes in common external tariff concerning tobacco, raisins, figs, honey, olives, colophony, turpentine essence, and sponges. After negotiations, the agreed Protocol 10 stipulated that Greece should approve beforehand the correspondence of tariff quotas amounting to more than 15 percent of imports of raisins, olives, colophony or turpentine essence, and more than 22,000 tons of tobacco.<sup>103</sup> The protocol gave also Greece the right to veto the changes in tariffs of these products more than 20 percent. This right of veto given to Greece in the framework of the

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<sup>101</sup> Henig, *External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements*, 88–89.

<sup>102</sup> Henig, 80–82.

<sup>103</sup> “Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Greece (9 July 1961),” 1961, 33–34, [https://www.cvce.eu/obj/agreement\\_establishing\\_an\\_association\\_between\\_the\\_european\\_economic\\_community\\_and\\_greece\\_9\\_july\\_1961-en-ea36b530-f7ee-46f3-a26b-5dc4ea1a5508.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/agreement_establishing_an_association_between_the_european_economic_community_and_greece_9_july_1961-en-ea36b530-f7ee-46f3-a26b-5dc4ea1a5508.html).

Athens agreement would be problematic for Turkey's requests for concessions in respect of tobacco.

The Athens Agreement ensured that Greek industrial products could access the EEC market without any quantitative restrictions as of July 1968, without any tariffs as of November 1968.<sup>104</sup> Greek agricultural products could reach the EEC market without tariffs and quantitative restrictions as of 1970. The duties imposed by Greece were brought closer to the common tariff of the EEC as foreseen by the Athens Agreement.

The association with Greece was the first of its kind. The vagueness surrounding the definition of the Association provided a leeway for negotiators on both sides to act in a flexible manner.<sup>105</sup> After the conclusion of the Athens Agreement, the EEC would receive British, Irish, and Danish applications, followed by association requests for Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria. This meant that the new influx of applications would decrease the priority of the Turkish association agreement, since the EEC had to focus on the negotiations which carried more importance and also prioritize concessions that could be given to aspirant associate states.<sup>106</sup> The application of the UK, due to its highly technical nature, would consume a notable portion of the

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<sup>104</sup> Alexander J. Kondonassis, "Greece," in *Mediterranean Europe and the Common Market: Studies of Economic Growth and Integration*, ed. Eric N. Baklanoff (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1976), 75.

<sup>105</sup> Tsalicoglou, *Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece to the European Community*, 139.

<sup>106</sup> Sena Ceylanoğlu, "At the Origins of Different Relationships. The Conclusion of the Association Agreements of Greece and Turkey with the European Economic Community," *Summer Institute Working Papers Institut Für Interkulturelle Und International Studien*, 2000, 20.

EEC's time and resources allocated to external relations. These factors were not present during the negotiations with Greece. The EEC's relations with the developing world were not very expansive when Turkey and Greece applied to the EEC, however it would drastically grow in the coming decades and have a more impact on the policies concerning the present Associate members.

The Association with Greece and subsequently Turkey was the first of its kind for the EEC, but they were going to be considered more and more in the context of the EEC's external trade relations with the developing countries. This issue will be examined in the next section.

### **C. EEC vis-à-vis the developing world**

The key policy of the EEC towards developing world was establishing associations with developing countries of concern. According to Enzo R. Grilli, the EEC associationism had clear roots in European colonialism.<sup>107</sup> Only one of the five founding members of the EEC, Germany, did not have colonial connections. The other four members, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy, all had small or large colonial relationships. France, the leading member state in terms of its colonial possessions, had colonies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Enzo R. Grilli, *The European Community and the Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1.

<sup>108</sup> Grilli, 7.

The historical and colonial background of the relations between the newly established EEC and developing countries manifested itself in the Rome Treaty. The fourth part of the Treaty was titled “Association of The Overseas Countries and Territories.” Article 131 stipulated that “member states agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.”<sup>109</sup> Article 132 clarified the content of the Association to be established with non-European countries. According to this article, member states should apply the treatment, which they apply to each other pursuant to the Rome treaty, to the associated countries. Furthermore, the member states should contribute to the progressive development of these countries and territories.

The EEC’s association policy was much more convenient for developing countries, since the EEC, as an organization, did not try to cover political affairs such as defense and foreign policy. However, rendering the Association of the Dependencies policy a part of Rome Treaty required particularly France to negotiate with other members of the EEC which did not have similar levels of colonial possessions and legacy.<sup>110</sup> This issue was of the utmost importance for France which “would not have joined the EEC if it had not got its way regarding the dependencies.”<sup>111</sup> The French policy to associate its former colonial possessions was opposed by Germany

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<sup>109</sup> “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.”

<sup>110</sup> Marjorie Lister, *The European Community and the Developing World : : The Role of the Lome Convention* (Avebury, 1988), 15.

<sup>111</sup> Lister, 15.

and the Netherlands, both of whom judged that preferential treatments for those territories would hurt their exports. However, their opposition was overcome by France, which turned this association to a condition for its signature of the Rome Treaty.<sup>112</sup>

France's imperial outlook had a notable impact on the EEC's policy with the developing countries. France implemented its own version of association policy towards its African colonial possessions. This association policy became the bedrock of the French Union and subsequently the French Community, which regulated the relationship between France and its overseas departments and territories. While it was short-lived, it became the historical precedent for the EEC's development policy.<sup>113</sup>

Within the EEC, the issue of how to approach the developing countries elicited different responses from different countries.<sup>114</sup> West Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom proposed to establish a general system, encompassing all developing countries. Indeed, West Germany and the Netherlands argued that the associations should be compatible with a GSP to be created by the EEC. In a similar vein, United Kingdom asserted that the EEC should prefer a global approach, instead of a regional approach to the developing countries. On the other hand, France,

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<sup>112</sup> Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lome Convention and Its Impact*, 14.

<sup>113</sup> Lister, *The European Community and the Developing World: The Role of the Lome Convention*, 3–4.

<sup>114</sup> Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lome Convention and Its Impact*, 21.

Belgium, and Italy favored a regional approach. According to them, the prior commitments to associated and possible associable countries should be maintained while safeguarding the commitments to the Maghreb countries.

However, it would be a far-fetched argument to claim all external trade policies of the EEC towards developing countries were based on a colonial background. The EEC differentiated its external trade towards developing countries according to political and economic power of the country concerned. Therefore, a differentiated examination of the external trade policy of the EEC towards developing countries is necessary. The policy towards the African and Caribbean countries will be examined in the next section, as this group of countries covered the highest number of countries.

#### **D. African States and Madagascar (AASM) and ACP countries**

Decolonization gained impetus in the beginning of the 1960s and had also an important impact on the relationship between African countries and the EEC. The newly independent countries rejected previous agreement reminiscent of the colonial era. Furthermore, decolonization encouraged the African states to form a united group against European countries. These two developments played important role in the negotiation and finally conclusion of the Yaoundé conventions.<sup>115</sup> In this context,

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<sup>115</sup> Rafael Lima Sakr, "FROM COLONIALISM to REGIONALISM: The YAOUNDE CONVENTIONS (1963-1974)," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2021): 455, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589321000014>.

the Yaoundé Conventions marked a renewal of the North-South relationship on a new footing between newly sovereign African and European states.

The negotiations with ACP countries occupied an important role in the reconfiguration of the North-South relationship after decolonization. It also constituted an important part of the EEC's external trade policy. The concessions given to the ACP countries, particularly in the context of Lomé convention, were not available for non-ACP countries. This was due to the fact that most of the ACP countries were among the least developed countries. Furthermore, most of them had special relationships with members of the EEC due to their colonial history.

Turkey was not comparable to the ACP countries in terms of its economic magnitude. However, the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions formed an integral part of the EEC's external trade policy. More concessions given to the ACP countries implied fewer concessions given to non-ACP countries. This situation was going to be more acute especially after the conclusion of the Lomé Convention, which provided significant advantages to the ACP countries.

The negotiations between the EEC and Turkey, particularly after the 1970s, demonstrate that the EEC regarded the concessions provided to other third countries as a reason why further concessions to Turkey could not be provided. Turkey on the other hand regarded the intensification of the relationship between other developing countries and the EEC as further evidence of the EEC's unwillingness to attach the necessary importance to the Association with Turkey.

The regulations concerning Association with African countries were set out in Article 131- 136 of the Rome Treaty and annexed special protocols. The Association was to last five years, after which it could be renewed or renegotiated. Yet as the associated countries in Africa gained independence in the beginning of the 1960s, the Association as formulated in the Rome Treaty could not be accepted by newly independent countries which desired legal equality with the EEC. This new situation led to the conclusion of Yaoundé Convention in 1964. The countries involved were Burundi, the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Congolese Republic, the Republic of Dahomey, the Republic of Ivory Coast, Madagascar, the Republic of Mali, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, and the Republics of Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and the Upper Volta. This grouping of states was known as AASM.

Based on a similar understanding, in 1963, the EEC issued a declaration which invited African countries having similar economic structures to those of the Yaoundé Associates to request negotiations with the EEC for an association agreement.<sup>116</sup>

Another association agreement was signed between Nigeria and the EEC in 1966. This agreement, called the Lagos agreement, did not enter into force due to the Nigerian civil war. A similar association agreement was concluded with the East

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<sup>116</sup> Werner Feld, *The European Common Market and the World* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 127.

African states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.<sup>117</sup> This agreement, known as the Arusha agreement, entered into force in 1969.

While the Yaoundé I Convention had similar provisions to the ones originally foreseen by the Rome Treaty, it differed by ensuring institutional parity between the European and African parties. Furthermore, the custom duties for a number of tropical products significant to the African countries were removed. In addition, the non-discriminatory tariff treatments were accelerated. Last but not least, the EEC committed to take the interests of associated countries into consideration when formulating common agricultural policy. Yet it is worth noting that Yaoundé I Convention included provisions for ensuring reciprocity between parties to the Convention. This meant that AASM countries committed themselves to gradually reduce their tariffs within four years. The Yaoundé II was signed in 1969, extending the original convention without notable changes.<sup>118</sup>

While the Yaoundé Conventions provided a new basis for the North-South interaction after decolonization, several developments pushed for a new convention in the 1970s.<sup>119</sup> Firstly, the Conventions were criticized for not increasing AAMS' share in the EEC market. Secondly, some claimed that the Yaoundé regime was neo-

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<sup>117</sup> CVCE, "The Yaoundé Convention," n.d., <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/dd10d6bf-e14d-40b5-9ee6-37f978c87a01/c303f9ae-1356-4fd2-ad61-b650f07f10ec>.

<sup>118</sup> Ismael Musah Montana, "The Lomé Convention from Inception to the Dynamics of the Post-Cold War, 1957-1990s," *African and Asian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2003): 80, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156920903763835670>.

<sup>119</sup> Lima Sakr, "FROM COLONIALISM to REGIONALISM: The YAOUNDÉ CONVENTIONS (1963-1974)," 451.

imperialist. Thirdly, the UK's membership in the EEC necessitated including 20 developing states in the Yaoundé regime. Compounded by increasing demands to reform international trade regimes in favor of developing countries as exemplified by the New International Economic Order and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, the AAMS countries pushed for a new trade regime between the EEC and African countries. This led to the negotiation and finally the conclusion of the Lomé Convention in 1975, which replaced Yaoundé Convention and Arusha Agreements.

The enlargement of the EEC had a significant impact on the EEC's association policy, since the UK's relations with Commonwealth developing countries had repercussions for the EEC. First of all, the Commonwealth African countries were strongly dependent on the British market for their export products. Secondly, the EEC did not want to lose its position in the markets of Commonwealth countries. Thirdly, maintaining different preferences would be incompatible with the Rome Treaty.<sup>120</sup> In response to these challenges, the EEC offered to extend association to independent Commonwealth developing countries in Africa, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the Caribbean under protocol 22 of the accession treaty with Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland. While initially the AASM was not pleased to share the EEC market with new countries, they accepted to join the Commonwealth

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<sup>120</sup> C. Dodoo and R. Kuster, "Lomé and Further," in *The Lomé Convention and Anew International Economic Order*, ed. Frans A.M Alting von Geusau (A.W Sijthoff International Publishing Company B.V, 1977), 27–28.

countries to negotiate the enlargement of the Association. This led to negotiations to be conducted in a bloc-to-bloc manner.

The bloc representing 44 developing countries was comprised of three separate groupings to negotiate with the EEC after the expiration of the Yaoundé II Convention. The first group was formed of the parties to the Arusha and Yaoundé Conventions. The second group was composed of the Caribbean countries. The last and third group was the Pacific countries, which were organized under the South Pacific Economic Community. The necessity to negotiate with the EEC as a single-bloc pushed these countries to be represented by one spokesmen instead of three. Therefore, in October 1973, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group was formed to carry out negotiations with the EEC marking “the first time in history of economic relations had bound themselves to negotiate collectively with the EEC.”<sup>121</sup>

John Ravenhill coined the term “collective clientelism” to refer to why ACP countries accepted the Lomé Convention. He argues that the ACP countries collaborated with each other to “exploit the special ties to a more powerful state or group of states.”<sup>122</sup> Cognizant of their structural economic weakness, ACP countries realized that “it pays to have a patron.”<sup>123</sup> This particular relationship ensured that ACP countries could partially keep their special economic relationships with the

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<sup>121</sup> Dodoo and Kuster, 34.

<sup>122</sup> John Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 22.

<sup>123</sup> Ravenhill, 24.

former colonial powers to be insured against the volatility in international markets. Furthermore, a privileged entry to the European market was also provided. Last but not least, ACP countries could use their strength in numbers as an advantage in the negotiations. The EEC member states, on the other hand, preserved their “*noblesse oblige*” towards their former colonial possessions and continued to safeguard and further their economic interests and presence there.

While the term “collective clientelism” would be useful in explaining the relationship between the EEC and ACP countries, it does not have much use in the case of Turkey, as Turkey did not have a colonial relationship with the EEC member states. Furthermore, the economic development of Turkey was higher than ACP countries, which had lower levels of developments compared to Turkey, including a number of LDCs.

ACP countries were provided with concessions pertaining to core agricultural products such as sugar and beef.<sup>124</sup> The sugar trade between ACP countries and the EEC was a good illustration of ACP’s relative advantage compared to other countries with whom the EEC had concluded agreements. While the preferential treatment afforded to the Maghreb and Mashreq covered more goods than the GSP, they did not cover core agricultural products, which were protected by variable levies. The EEC made a commitment to purchase annually a considerable amount of sugar at

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<sup>124</sup> Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lome Convention and Its Impact*, 184–85.

guaranteed prices to domestic EEC producer prices. In 1977-79, the EEC was forced to dispose of its 25 percent of its own sugar production to the already weak world sugar market. The non-ACP countries trading in sugar were the main losers of this special relationship between ACP countries and the EEC.

In the negotiations, the ACP countries firstly demanded that goods originating in ACP countries, such as agricultural, semi-agricultural, manufactured, and semi-manufactured products, whether they are covered by Common Agricultural Policy or not, should be imported to the EEC without custom duties levies and other charges having equivalent effect and also free from any quantitative restrictions. The EEC, in response, offered an improved special regime compared to Yaoundé and Arusha conventions. In the framework of these conventions, the treatments of the imports from the associated states did not differ when compared to the imports of third countries. However, if substantial economic interests pertaining to particular products were established for one or more associated states, a possibility of a more favorable treatment would be entertained by the EEC. In contrast, the Lomé Convention provided several advantages to the ACP countries vis-à-vis third countries. Levy-reductions were envisaged for core agricultural products originating from ACP countries. In addition, special measures were introduced to allow ACP countries to export a certain amount of beef and veal to the EEC. Furthermore, the import of tobacco and meat originating from the ACP countries were exempt from

the measures that could be adopted by the EEC to safeguard its own domestic production.<sup>125</sup>

Another demand of the ACP countries was regarding the non-tariff barriers. The ACP countries argued that the removal of non-tariff barriers such as quota or quantitative restrictions, regulations, levies and other measures were essential for a meaningful access to the EEC market. While the EEC argued that such measures were not harmonized in the Community level, it offered a consultative mechanism for addressing this issue in Articles 5 and 6 of the Lomé Convention.<sup>126</sup>

The introduction of STABEX (Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation, French acronym for a scheme to stabilize export earnings of ACP countries) in the framework of Lomé Convention rendered the already advantageous ACP countries stronger in the access to the EEC market. STABEX, which was referred to as the main pillar of the Lomé Convention, aimed at transferring resources to the commodity producers whose revenues had decreased. Furthermore, this transfer would also alleviate the balance of payments issues that could be faced by countries due to a decline in such revenues.<sup>127</sup> The governments of ACP countries often used

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<sup>125</sup> Dodoo and Kuster, "Lomé and Further," 38–39.

<sup>126</sup> Dodoo and Kuster, 45.

<sup>127</sup> Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations*, 99–

the revenues generated from STABEX to increase the production of relevant products.<sup>128</sup>

The EEC estimated that the total imports from the ACP countries amounted to 7.6 billion dollars, and only 13.4 percent of these imports consisted of products coming under the common agricultural policy. 94.2 percent of these agricultural products, of which 22.3 percent was sugar, was exempt from duties. The remaining 5.8 percent would receive more favorable treatment compared to the treatment received by the third countries through reduced customs tariffs or reduced levies.<sup>129</sup>

The Lomé Convention's impact on trade between the EEC and non-ACP countries was not crystal clear. Frey-Wouters has asserted that in the long-term an "essential conflict" between ACP and non-ACP countries remained.<sup>130</sup> This conflict was especially acute for countries which lost their share of the EEC market to ACP countries. For example, while the foodstuff imports to the EEC remained at similar levels between 1970 and 1980, there was an increase in the ACP's exports to the EEC. This implies that non-ACP countries lost their share of the EEC market to ACP countries. However, the Lomé Convention did not hinder granting of concessions to Mediterranean countries. The preferential agreements reflected a multitude of factors

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<sup>128</sup> Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lomé Convention and Its Impact*, 186.

<sup>129</sup> Stordel, "Trade Cooperation: Preferences in the Lomé Convention, The Generalized System of Preferences and the World Trade System," 65.

<sup>130</sup> Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lomé Convention and Its Impact*, 184.

in the EEC decision-making, including but not limited to colonial legacy or military-strategic considerations.<sup>131</sup>

The Mediterranean countries, after the ACP countries, constituted the primary group of countries with which Turkey was compared. The Mediterranean policy of the EEC would also be the topic of Community-wide discussions in the 1970s to change the country-specific external trade policy to a broader global one.

### **E. Mediterranean Countries**

The EEC's Mediterranean policy, in its first years of emergence, could be described as a general bilateral policy. The first five agreements with non-members were with Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel and Lebanon. Most of these countries could be characterized as Mediterranean.<sup>132</sup> While these countries differed in their economic development and political ties with the Community, all of the agreements were concluded according to Article 111 on trade agreements or Article 238 on associations. While Greece and Turkey had association agreements with a possible membership goal, Israel, and Lebanon had agreements addressing trade issues.<sup>133</sup> The EEC, due to the particular relationship between Greece and Turkey and its political ramifications, exerted efforts to keep the negotiations between these two countries on similar tracks, albeit without much success. One could also have a

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<sup>131</sup> Wouters, 212.

<sup>132</sup> Stanley Henig, "Mediterranean Policy in the Context of the External Relations of the European Community: 1958-73," in *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, ed. Avi Shlaim and G.N. Yannopoulos (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 310.

<sup>133</sup> Henig, 312-14.

broader conception of the Mediterranean and include Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Malta, Southern Italy and Spain under a grouping called Mediterranean Europe.<sup>134</sup> Regardless of its definition, EEC's policy towards the Mediterranean occupied an important place on its agenda. While it is possible to categorize Greece and Turkey under the group of Mediterranean countries, they were distinguished from other Mediterranean countries, as they were the countries that first started the Association agreement. Furthermore, their agreements were not only much more comprehensive compared to other agreements but also included the idea of progress towards a customs union and eventual membership to the EEC.

The community policy concerning the Mediterranean was shaped by "continuing bilateral requests from Mediterranean countries, domestic producer interests in member states, broad political consideration as well as piece of lingering national foreign policies, and the rules of GATT."<sup>135</sup> In other words, the Community policy towards the Mediterranean lacked a coherent program at the beginning and therefore was more based on the initiatives of third parties to the EEC. Therefore, one could agree with David Robertson's observation that the EEC's relations with Mediterranean countries "evolved somewhat absent-mindedly over the period 1962-1972."<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Eric N. Baklanoff, *Mediterranean Europe and the Common Market: Studies of Economic Growth and Integration*, ed. Eric N. Baklanoff (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1976).

<sup>135</sup> Henig, "Mediterranean Policy in the Context of the External Relations of the European Community: 1958-73," 316.

<sup>136</sup> Robertson, "The Community's Mediterranean Policy in a World Context," 329.

The early 1970s witnessed the emergence of a more consistent set of trade agreements in the Mediterranean. In 1972, the EEC decided that it will conclude trade agreements with any country bordering the Mediterranean to transform its prior piecemeal approach to a global one. This strategy was reflected in the subsequent agreements concluded with Mediterranean countries. In 1976, agreements with Maghreb countries were signed. In 1977, agreements with the Mashreq countries were concluded which were following with an agreement with Lebanon in 1977. A treaty with Israel was signed in 1975. Amongst Mediterranean countries only Greece received better terms.<sup>137</sup>

The Mediterranean policy of the EEC is described as the Community's first foreign policy because it incorporated economic, commercial, development, and non-military security actions into a well-defined policy.<sup>138</sup> After 1957, non-member Mediterranean countries started to negotiate with the EEC to conclude trade agreements.<sup>139</sup> These negotiations led to "a patchwork" of unrelated agreements on trade with most Mediterranean countries, but not all of them. However, the EEC formulated "a self-styled" foreign policy particularly in the mid-1970s. The previous agreements concluded were negotiated in the framework of this approach. The oil crisis in 1973 also pushed the unwilling EEC members to adopt a more lenient

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<sup>137</sup> Henig, *External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements*, 53.

<sup>138</sup> Roy Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale* (London: Adamantine, 1989), 117.

<sup>139</sup> Ginsberg, 120–21.

approach towards the Mediterranean countries. The EEC offered two forms of agreement to the countries in the Mediterranean. First, it offered association agreements including customs union and eventual membership (such as the ones offered to Malta, Cyprus, Turkey and Greece). However, Greece and Turkey differed from the later association agreements with Malta and Cyprus, and they were more linked to each other due to political reasons and to the fact that they were the first of such association agreements. Second, the EEC offered cooperation accords, which included preferential tariffs and various types of aid. However, Ginsberg argues that the EEC “overextended itself with promises of all sorts of assistance to the Basin states.” As the EEC faced slumping economic growth and surplus labor, the EEC’s generosity towards the Mediterranean countries waned. Moreover, the rising number of states that benefitted from Lomé Convention and the EEC’s GSP has also eroded the benefits received by the Mediterranean countries.<sup>140</sup>

According to A. Shlaim and G.N. Yannopoulos, the “apparently random and almost absent-minded manner” in which the EEC’s policy towards Mediterranean evolved was striking.<sup>141</sup> The policy developed as a result of the requests originating from neighboring countries and lacked an overall concept. The authors explain this conduct by an absence of a clear legal foundation in the Rome Treaty for addressing such agreements. They also refer to the fact that the common economic policies were

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<sup>140</sup> Ginsberg, 126.

<sup>141</sup> A. Shlaim and G.N. Yannopoulos, “Introduction,” in *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, ed. A. Shlaim and A. Yannopoulos (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 2.

being formed when such requests were received by the EEC for the first time, thus rendering the EEC ineffective in addressing such requests in a streamlined fashion. These issues gained urgency when the EEC was expanding to the Nine, requiring formerly concluded agreements to be extended to the new members.

In response to addressing the incoherent structure of the agreements vis-à-vis Mediterranean countries, the “Global Mediterranean Policy” was formulated in 1971-2. When this policy was announced, association agreements between the EC and Greece (1961), Turkey (1963), Morocco (1967), Tunisia (1967), Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972) had already been concluded. Furthermore, there were free trade agreements with Spain (1970) and Portugal (1972). This policy led to the conclusion of free trade agreements Israel (1975), cooperation agreements with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia in 1976) and Yugoslavia in 1980. The Association agreements of Turkey and Greece were different from the other agreements concluded with Mediterranean countries, as they were comprehensive and included a possible membership and customs union as an end goal. The GSP which entered into force in 1971 and applied to all developing countries, included more restrictive features concerning cotton textiles and clothing.<sup>142</sup> The EC has removed tariffs on imports of textiles and clothing for most of these countries.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> GUIDO ASHOFF, “The Textile Policy of the European Community towards the Mediterranean Countries: Effects and Future Options,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 22, no. 1 (1983): 17–18, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1983.tb00876.x>.

<sup>143</sup> ASHOFF, 21.

Enlargement exacerbated the concerns of the Mediterranean countries regarding a potential worsening term of trade with the EEC since trade barriers of the new members concerning agricultural imports were considerably lower than those of the Community. Such a rise in tariffs not only would harm economic progress in the region but would also have a negative impact on consumer welfare in Mediterranean countries. In this regard, while the aim of the Mediterranean countries was to expand their access to the Community market for their agricultural products, the concessions they received were quite small.<sup>144</sup> This meant that the Mediterranean countries individually were worse off due to the common commercial policy of the Community. The EEC needed to strike a balance between meeting global import stability and ensuring that its preferential obligations were honored. In this context, the EEC convinced all Mediterranean countries except Turkey to accept voluntary limitation of import of sensitive products, particularly products related to cotton.<sup>145</sup> Turkey did not accept informal self-limitation agreements. The EEC decided to fix internal limits and apply safeguard clauses when these limits were exceeded.<sup>146</sup> The reasons for this measure was that the United Kingdom was adamantly protesting that Turkish cotton exports to the UK were harming its economy. This situation did not

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<sup>144</sup> Robertson, "The Community's Mediterranean Policy in a World Context," 332.

<sup>145</sup> GUIDO ASHOFF, "The Textile Policy of the European Community towards the Mediterranean Countries: Effects and Future Options," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 22, no. 1 (1983): 21, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1983.tb00876.x>.

<sup>146</sup> ASHOFF, "The Textile Policy of the European Community towards the Mediterranean Countries: Effects and Future Options," 1983, 22.

exist in the same severity for other countries exporting similar products to the UK.

This constituted the first time the EEC applied such measures to Turkey.<sup>147</sup>

The Maghreb and Mashreq agreements were formulated in the context of Lomé agreement. The relevant countries advocated a treatment similar to the Lomé Treaty. However, the agreed agreement fell short of the Lomé Treaty. Regarding trade provisions, the treaties stipulated that there would be free access to the EEC markets withstanding some exceptions. For example, refined petroleum products, phosphatic fertilizers, cotton yarn, and woven fabrics of cotton were subject to ceilings.

The impact of the increasing agreements with the Mediterranean for Turkey was of major importance. As a result of this expansion, Turkey was going to lose its privileged Associate status. The differentiated treatment of various third countries by the EEC led to a competition within the countries receiving preferential treatment by the EEC.<sup>148</sup> Moreover, the approach of the EEC ran counter to the strengthening world trend towards according most-favored nation treatment to all developing nations.<sup>149</sup> In the initial stage, there was only Turkey and Greece. However, in the 1970s a high number of countries, whose economies were similar to Turkey's, started to have agreements with the EEC. While these agreements did not envisage a customs union, they had very similar concessions given to Turkey by the EEC.

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<sup>147</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, 260.

<sup>148</sup> Wouters, *The European Community and the Third World: The Lomé Convention and Its Impact*, 264–65.

<sup>149</sup> Wouters, 265.

Turkey would raise this issue repeatedly in the negotiations, as will be seen in the fourth chapter. The EEC would find Turkey's position reasonable but would not approve Turkey's requests for further concessions.

#### **F. Turkey**

The combination of encompassing political and economic objectives in the Ankara Agreement, which established the Association between the EEC and Turkey, signaled that the Association agreement was not a mere trade agreement. The preamble of the agreement openly stated that efforts exerted by the EEC to improve the standards of living by the EEC would facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date, making it clear that the objective of the Association was not only economic relations but also Turkey's membership in future. The main focus of the agreement, nevertheless, was the economic development of Turkey, as clearly stated in the article 2 of the Agreement:

The aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people.<sup>150</sup>

To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, three stages were envisaged by the Agreement: preparatory, transitional and final. The agreement foresaw that the Turkish economy would be strengthened during the preparatory stage of five years with the help of unilateral concessions from the EEC. In addition, a 175 million

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<sup>150</sup> "Ankara Agreement."

dollar financial aid was sent to Turkey to boost its economic development in line with the Agreement. After the preparatory stage, the Association Council set up by the agreement would decide whether the transitional period would start or not. An important distinction between the Greek and Turkish association agreement was the presence of the preparatory stage and the modalities of the progression to the transition stage. In the Greek case, there was no preparatory stage. Furthermore, there was also no decision-making process between the stages for Greece, the transition between the first and second stage was automatic. Therefore, it could be stated that the agreement with Turkey was more hesitant in terms of going forward with the stages of the association.

After the end of the preparatory stage, an additional protocol would need to be agreed by the parties to proceed to the transition phase. The protocol would ascertain the modalities related to progressive establishment of the customs union and also harmonization of economic policies. This stage was to be followed by a final stage, during which the customs union and closer coordination of economic policies would be established. It is also worth noting that Article 10 of the Ankara Agreement stipulated that the Customs Union included

- the prohibition between Member States of the Community and Turkey of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, quantitative restrictions, and all other measures having

equivalent effect which are designed to protect national production in a manner contrary to the objectives of this Agreement;

- the adoption by Turkey of the Common Customs Tariff of the Community in its trade with third countries, and an approximation to the other Community rules on external trade.

Under the heading of other economic provisions, the Agreement also declared that the parties would make efforts to progressively secure freedom of movement for workers.

The Association Agreement also set up new institutions to govern the relationship between the EEC and Turkey. The central body for steering the Association was the Council of Association composed of the representatives of the Turkish Government and the EEC. The Council was going to decide with unanimity. The equal representation of both the parties underlined the principle of equal parity in the Association. The Presidency of the Council was also going to rotate between the parties every six months.

The Council of Association was authorized to reach binding decisions pertaining to the Association relationship. The parties were expected to implement these decisions. The Council was also expected to review the functioning of the Association.

Concerning the preparatory stage, the Council was the body that would decide whether it was appropriate to proceed to the transitional stage as well as the content of the additional protocol. The Council was also given the tasks of taking necessary

actions for addressing disputes within the Association. Regarding dispute-settlement, the Council could either settle the dispute itself or refer it to the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

Another noteworthy institution set up by the Association was the mixed Parliamentary committee composed of members designated by the Turkish Parliament and the European Parliament. Both parliamentary bodies were given 18 seats in the Parliamentary Committee. This committee not only facilitated the cooperation between the respective parliaments but also was tasked to observe the functioning of the Association.

The internal decision-making process for coming up with positions in the Council of Association for both parties were different as their nature were drastically different. Turkey, as a nation-state, had a relatively straight-forward procedure, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was responsible for representing Turkey in the negotiations. However, as the economic component of the Association started to gain more importance, the SPO and other actors working in external trade relations of Turkey attempted to influence the position presented by Turkish MFA in the negotiations with the EEC. As the political actors grew more doubtful of the economic benefits of the Association particularly after the 1970s, political actors also had a huge influence in the position of Turkey in these negotiations. While in the initial stages of the relationship the MFA was the principal and sometimes sole actor

in drawing up the position of Turkey, in the following decades numerous political and economic actors had a more impactful say in the relationship with the EEC.

The internal decision-making process for the EEC usually followed a process between the Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), and the Commission. The Council and the COREPER were representatives of the member states. While the former was composed of government representatives and had the decision-making power for the most issues, the latter was responsible for preparing the work necessary for the meetings of the Council. The Commission was appointed by member governments but had own its decision-making power and were tasked with ensuring the Rome Treaty and other relevant measures were implemented.<sup>151</sup> Practically this meant that firstly, the Council would instruct the COREPER to study an aspect of the relationship with Turkey. COREPER, then, would present its work to the Council, which subsequently reached a decision, postponed the decision, or referred the topic back to COREPER. COREPER also formed specialized committees to study specific questions such as the relationship with third countries. As a general rule in the EEC, the government appointed representatives in the Council, COREPER and the smaller specialized Committees received information and instructions from their governments and negotiated with other representatives to reach a common position. Sometimes this process took more

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<sup>151</sup> CVC.EU, “The EEC Institutions,” 2022, <https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/93127df5-111b-45a9-b448-82f2dff9bc14>.

than envisaged and in the case of Association with Turkey, there were several cases where the COREPER was instructed to study an aspect of the Association with Turkey several times, pointing out to the complexity of the relationship.

The Commission, carrying out the negotiations with Turkey was also an integral part of the Association. The Council gave the Commission the mandate for the negotiations, but the Commission informed the Council on Turkey's position in the negotiations. Furthermore, the Commission assessed what Turkey was proposing in the negotiations and assessed what could be the offer and counter-offers of the EEC to Turkey. Their work was of key importance for the Council and COREPER, as the Commission reported on negotiations with Turkey to them and carried out research on the different aspects of the Association and presented it to COREPER and the Council when necessary.

The reports of the negotiations demonstrated that the Commission usually found Turkey's protests over the erosion of the benefits of the Association reasonable and proposed giving further concessions to Turkey. While the proposal of giving Turkey further concessions were usually not approved by COREPER, the Commission's observations carry importance for demonstrating that Turkey's requests were not without objective foundation and were not results of Turkey's frequently changing political landscape.

In respect of the EEC member states' positions, it would not be invalid to state that West Germany was usually in favor of expediting Turkey's application process and proposing more generous offers to Turkey. Italy's persistent objection, on the other hand, was one of the primary reasons why the initial signature of Ankara Agreement was delayed. The UK, with its membership in 1973, became one of the members which advocated a harsher position against the exports of Turkey's agricultural exports to the EEC. Other delegations were observed to have changing positions on the Association with Turkey depending on the topic.

The important dates in the relationship between the EEC and Turkey are presented below for providing a historical overview.

*Table 7: Important Dates Regarding Association Between Turkey and EEC*

March 25, 1957	EEC and EURATOM treaties were signed by France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg.
June 8, 1959	Greece applied for Association with the EEC.
July 31, 1959	Turkey applied for Association with the EEC.
September 11, 1959	EEC accepted the applications of Greece and Turkey.
March 1-2, 1960	The EEC accepted to start official negotiations with Greece.
July 9, 1961	The Association Agreement with Greece was signed.
November 1, 1962	The Association Agreement with Greece entered into force.
September 12, 1963	The Association Agreement with Turkey was signed.
December 1, 1964	The Association Agreement with Turkey entered into force.

December 9, 1968	Negotiations on the Additional Protocol started.
December 23, 1970	The Additional Protocol was signed.
July 5, 22 1971	Additional Protocol was accepted at the Turkish Parliament and Senate.
January 22, 1972	The accession treaties with Denmark, Ireland and the UK were signed.
January 1, 1973	The Additional Protocol entered into force. The first reduction in customs and consolidated liberalization list was applied.
June 30, 1973	The Complementary Protocol was signed.
June 12, 1975	Greece applied for full membership to the EEC.
January 1, 1976	The second reduction in customs and consolidated liberalization list was applied.
July 27, 1976	Negotiations for full membership with Greece started.
October 4-11, 1978	Turkey announced the suspension of obligations due to its 4 <sup>th</sup> 5-year development plan.
May 28, 1979	Greece became a full member to the EEC.

## CHAPTER 2: FROM EXPLORATORY TO FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS: LOSS OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE

The negotiations preceding the Ankara Agreement demonstrate that the Association between Turkey and the EEC were marked by tension and disagreement over the fundamental issues. This tension not only delayed the signature of the Ankara agreement itself but also foreshadowed the turbulent future of the Association. The disagreements stemmed from the disconnect between how Turkey and the EEC projected the ideal conditions for the economic development and international trade of Turkey. For the former, concessions from the EEC were seen as essential; while the latter emphasized that Turkey's inward-looking and agricultural economy was not adequate to compete with the European economies and additional concessions could harm the internal balance of the EEC. Turkey and the EEC could not solve these economic disagreements and reached an accommodation that postponed the solution of these thorny issues to the transition period. Political reasons, particularly the geo-political importance of Turkey, pushed Turkey and the EEC to achieve this accommodation; however, they were not going to be enough in solving the economic difficulties, which would intensify in the coming decade. The reason why Turkey and the EEC could not surmount their divergences was their difference perspective on the Association.

To understand the significance of these negotiations, we must keep in mind that the geographic frame of reference for the Association with Turkey was Greece during these initial stages. The EEC, in its internal correspondence, repeatedly compared Turkey with Greece, putting them in the same basket of countries apart from other Mediterranean and third countries when examining the external commercial relations of the EEC. The EEC also was paying utmost attention to keep a balance between Turkey and Greece in the negotiations so as not to upset the political relations with countries that played an important role in the Western alliance in the context of the Cold War.<sup>152</sup> The phrase ‘parallelism’ was used to draw attention to the EEC’s desire to keep the applications both of Greece and Turkey on a similar level to refrain from creating the impression that the EEC favored one country over the other. While these factors in favor of Turkey were present up until the signing of the Additional Protocol in 1970, the negotiations records suggest that their role became negligible in the coming decade, underlining the increasing importance of economic issues in the negotiations.

The negotiations confirm the argument in the literature that Turkish application to the EEC was more based on a reaction to the Greek application rather than an organic demand for a closer relationship with the EEC.<sup>153</sup> Turkey’s requests aimed for maximum concessions, which were called maximalist by the EEC, and imprecise

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<sup>152</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Extraits Des Procès-Verbaux de La Session Du Committee Des Permanentes Represantes (r/746/F59)” (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1 p.96, 1959).

<sup>153</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*, 66.

requests for broader agricultural concessions and institutional privileges. These requests not only protracted the negotiation but also gave the impression to the EEC that Turkey was hesitating to assume real obligations in the way that Greece did. The fragile situation of Turkish economy also strengthened this perspective, leading the EEC to question whether Turkey could realize the obligations it assumed if it overcame its hesitation. This situation created an ambiguity over the content and form of the Association with Turkey, whose solution would require another round of protracted formal negotiations after the exploratory ones.

The negotiations also suggest that political factors were an essential factor that would ensure the negotiations between the EEC and Turkey moved forward in the initial stages of negotiations. Given the question marks created by Turkey's economy and its maximalist requests, the political factors could be said to be the engine that drove the negotiations. The geopolitical importance of Turkey was the political reason why the EEC could not give a negative reply to Turkey's requests for being treated equally with Greece. Cognizant of these political reasons, the EEC, tried to preserve a sense of equality between Greece and Turkey in terms of Association negotiations.<sup>154</sup> However, this attempt would be short-lived, as the gap between Greece and Turkey would widen in Greece's favor and it would be impossible to preserve parallelism between these countries.

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<sup>154</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA REUNION RESTREINTE DU COMITE DES REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTS, TENUE A BRUXELLES LEE 7/8 SEPTEMBRE 1959" (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1.pdf page 68, 1959).

Turkey faced serious economic challenges before applying to the EEC for association. Turkey's economic situation had deteriorated particularly after 1953 under the Menderes government. The increase in imports led to a worsening trade balance and was compounded by the decrease of the US aid to Turkey. In 1958, despite its reluctance, the Menderes government made a devaluation, increasing the exchange rate of the Lira to Dollar from 2.8 to 9 in the framework of its cooperation with the IMF. In return, Turkey received a 250 million dollar loan and a postponement of 600 million dollars of external debt. However, Menderes refrained from cutting public budget and decreasing borrowing, which led to spiraling economic turmoil in the country.<sup>155</sup>

The Menderes Government was concerned about whether a relationship with the EEC would increase the already high levels of dependence on foreign capital. Such an outcome could also intensify the criticism of the domestic opposition regarding the government's poor record on economic affairs. In contrast, there was the possibility that facilitated access to the EEC market could increase Turkey's exports, hence increasing foreign currency reserves. Free movement of Turkish workers in the EEC and their remittances would also contribute to Turkey's economy.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), 479.

<sup>156</sup> Hakan Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Eu Membership?* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 56.

The beginning of Turkey's relationship with the EEC overlapped with the domestic political turmoil in Turkey. After the mid-1950s, the tension between Prime Minister Menderes and opposition leader İsmet İnönü concerning domestic political developments was going to increase. As political and economic affairs deteriorated, the military intervened with the result being the hanging of Menderes during the 1960 military coup. Nevertheless, the application for associate status in the newly established EEC was not a topic of contention between the government and opposition parties. A closer relationship with the EEC was regarded as a natural trajectory of the Westernization efforts and hence there was not a noteworthy disagreement over it. The general impression in Turkish public was that the closer links with the EEC would expedite Turkey's development.<sup>157</sup>

The Menderes government's thinking was expedited by Greece's application to the EEC for association on 15 July 1959. This action of Greece was going to tilt the internal balance of the Menderes government towards an urgent application to the EEC. This application was going to be realized in only 16 days. The EEC accepted the applications of Greece and Turkey and started the negotiations with both countries on 11 September 1959.

Turkey's fundamental concern in respect to the Greek application was that Greece could have a better access to markets that both Turkey and Greece exported to in large amounts. For example, Turkey and Greece exported respectively around 14

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<sup>157</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*, 172.

million and 4 million dollars' worth of fresh fruit, 14 million dollars and 38 million dollars' worth of crude tobacco, and 8 million and 10 million dollars' worth of dried fruit to the EEC.<sup>158</sup> The EEC was expecting competition between Greece and Turkey for exporting to the EEC. Another factor was that the popular belief that the possible advantages that could be accrued by Greece could be to the detriment of Turkey due to dispute over Cyprus as well as the historical rivalry between both countries.<sup>159</sup>

While some commentators focused on the economic impact of the association, others affirmed the political importance of the Association by regarding it as an important milestone in Turkey's Westernization attempts.<sup>160</sup>

Turkey's request for an association with the EEC entailed intensive and extensive negotiations within the EEC. While the negotiations with Greece were relatively smooth, the negotiations with Turkey became protracted. The decision to proceed from exploratory to formal negotiations demonstrated the Association with Turkey was not going to resemble the Association with Greece either in content or in form. The EEC approached Turkey differently, as Turkey had more economic and political difficulties when compared to Greece.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Extraits des Procès-Verbaux de La Session Du Conseil de La CEE 11.09.1959 et Des Réunions Restreintes Du Coreper Dos 24. 09.1959 et 0110.1959 et de Note d'information Des Travaux Parlementaires de La Commission Des Affaires Politiques" (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1 p.89, 1959), 89.

<sup>159</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 815.

<sup>160</sup> Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity Civilization: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*, 51.

<sup>161</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*, 76–77.

On 1 October 1959, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, Mehmet Cevad Açıkalin sent a letter to the President of the Council, declaring Turkey's request to become an associate member of the Community. In this letter, the Ambassador emphasized that the Community and Turkey were intricately linked. He emphasized that a large share of Turkey's imports and exports were related to the members of the Community, hence Turkey's exclusion from the Community would not only hinder Turkey's economic development but would also have negative repercussions for Europe. This three-page letter of application for associate membership for the most part focused on the close economic links between Turkey and the EEC. However, it also stressed that Turkey's destiny was irrevocably related to that of the EEC.<sup>162</sup> In response to Turkey's request for an associate membership, the Council Secretariat circulated the response forwarded to the Greek government's demand for the same membership. It was clear that the Community was evaluating both applications in comparison to each other.<sup>163</sup>

The COREPER evaluated Turkey's application on its meeting on 7-8 September 1959.<sup>164</sup> It emphasized that the political aspect of the associate membership could only be addressed at the ministerial level of the Council. There was a general

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<sup>162</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Association de La Turquie à La Communauté Economique Européenne" (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1.pdf p.1, 1959).

<sup>163</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Note Introductive Complémentaire" (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1.pdf p59, 1959).

<sup>164</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA REUNION RESTREINTE DU COMITE DES REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTS, TENUE A BRUXELLES LEE 7/8 SEPTEMBRE 1959."

agreement on providing the same response given to Greece also to Turkey. However, it was also noted that the discrepancy between the negotiations with Greece and with Turkey should be minimized as soon as possible to reach a general perspective on these issues as well as to prevent an impression that the Turkish application not being treated on the same footing with the Greek application. These remarks suggest that even from the first moment Turkey's application was received, a notion of parallelism between Greece and Turkey was endorsed by COREPER.

The Council provided an information note on 8 September 1959 to provide a background for the negotiation with Turkey.<sup>165</sup> The note stated that Turkey's share in the foreign trade of the EEC was relatively negligible, that Turkey accounted for around 1 percent of the EEC's exports and less than 1 percent of its imports. The note also stated that the EEC was highly important for Turkey, since the EEC played a key role in its economy as a source for its imports and a destination for its exports.

The note continued to provide fundamental information about Turkey's economy. The future increase in Turkey's population was given as a reason for the Government of Turkey to pursue policies to evaluate quality of life for its citizens. The note also stressed that agriculture played an important role in Turkey's economy. According to the note, Turkish economy was characterized by a high level of external debt.

Concerning consequences of the Turkish association, the note stressed that some

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<sup>165</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Quelques Réflexions Sur Le Problème de L'association de La Turquie Au Marché Commun" (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1 p.71, 1959).

issues of competition could arise. For example, tobacco, fresh fruit, dried fruit, cotton, and barley could cause competition for some sectors of the member states. Regarding the political implications of Turkey's association, the EEC would not only strengthen Turkey's links to the Western world but also benefit from some developing sectors of the Turkish economy. The note estimated that Turkey's increasing economic strength would mean more exports to Turkey from EEC members.

In the same note, concerning the problems related to the Association of Turkey, the first item examined was the competition between Greece and Turkey in some sectors. It was estimated that in some sectors the competition could double between them. However, it was also underlined that the Community's consumption was also in a phase of "expansion," which could benefit from this competition. The second item was the USA's reaction to the Association. It was noted that American tobacco could face serious competition from Greece and Turkey, but it was surmised that the USA was more interested in the political stability of the Mediterranean.

The Association of Turkey was debated at the Council meeting on 11 September 1959.<sup>166</sup> President of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein argued that the case of Turkey was certainly more complicated than the Greece due to its larger economy. However, he also recalled that the Rome Treaty had stipulated that the Community

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<sup>166</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Extraits des Procès-Verbaux de La Session Du Conseil de La CEE 11.09.1959 et Des Réunions Restreintes Du Coreper Dos 24. 09.1959 et 0110.1959 et de Note d'information Des Travaux Parlementaires de La Commission Des Affaires Politiques."

had an “open character” and the treaty invited all third countries for association. In this context, he argued that it would not be appropriate to refuse a country which made a request for association. As the EEC was establishing itself at the international arena, it did want to give an image of being a group closed to aspirant states. Furthermore, there were already also strong political and military links between Turkey and the EEC. Therefore, Hallstein argued that the Commission should commence exploratory talks with Turkey. At the end of the discussions, the Council agreed that explanatory talks between Turkey and the EEC should be opened. It was also underlined that these talks would be strictly of an exploratory nature.

The exploratory talks that took place in September 1959 gave a general impression of Turkey’s approach to the Association.<sup>167</sup> The first observation presented by the Commission was that Turkey’s proposals were less precise and less advanced than those presented by Greece. According to the Commission, this situation could be explained by the fact that Turkey was in the process of preparing a development plan. Furthermore, the Turkish Delegation was not able to take position on the substantial issues of the Associations without further instructions from Ankara.

In the first round of exploratory talks, the Turkish Delegation repeated several times that the agreement offered to Turkey should be “analogous” to that of Greece, particularly in the agricultural sector. However, the Commission noted that Turkey

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<sup>167</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Extraits Des Procès-Verbaux de La Session Du Committee Des Permanentes Representantes (r/746/F59).”

was inclined to accept fewer obligations than Greece. The Commission strongly underlined that the Association with Greece and Turkey had also a very important political dimension. Therefore, it was advised that the economic aspects of these negotiations should not be the sole focus. The political importance of Turkey was going to be an important factor supporting Turkey's association process.

Concerning the content of the Association, it was argued that Turkey desired full membership in the Community but that Turkey's desire for membership was more distant than and was less willingly put forward. While Turkey wished to become a full member of the Customs Union, it wished it in a less restrictive and less precise fashion than what Greece proposed. In this context, Turkey's proposals envisaged a preparatory phase of 12 to 15 years, during which Turkey would reduce its tariffs against the EEC in two stages. The EEC, on the other hand, would start its tariff reductions in the first 12 years. Concerning a common external tariff, the Turkish Delegation argued that tariffs composed an important component of fiscal revenues and the Turkish government was therefore hesitant to reduce its tariffs. Moreover, the Turkish Delegation did not have a precise plan for harmonization with external common external tariffs, which were very low compared to the Turkish tariffs in general.

In response to Turkey's imprecise proposals, the Commission Delegation marked that Turkey could be asked to further reduce its tariffs, which would strengthen its economy. The Commission also indicated that it was not feasible for the Community

to undertake a full reduction in tariffs, while Turkey completes the requirements of the Customs Union in 24 years. Such an agreement meant that Turkey's obligations would be disproportionately low compared to those of EEC's. The response of the Turkish Delegation was to declare that it should receive further instructions from Ankara.

Turkish Delegation also presented a list of agricultural products, for which Turkey requested an easier access to the Community market. However, the Community also found this list to be inadequately studied as it contained not solely products Turkey were exporting to the EEC, but the products it planned to export to the EEC in future according to its development plan. The pattern of requesting concessions for products which Turkey did not produce would be an integral part of Turkey's negotiation position in the Association. This was due to Turkey's belief that Turkey would achieve production in future years. As will be seen in the next sections, such an overall transformation of Turkey's productive capabilities did not materialize. The Commission requested a more precise plan before the next round of talks.

The vague nature of Turkey's proposals concerning financial matters also made the Commission request a more precise set of proposals for the next round. Concerning Turkey's request to have voting rights in the framework of institutional ties, the Commission replied that there was a difference between association and accession. Turkey's requests had again a maximalist posture. The Turkish Delegation then insisted on having an observer status in the Council. After having received an oral

statement on these explanatory talks, the Council decided that a full documentation on the issues pertaining to the Association of Turkey and Greece sought be provided.

The said note stated that the Association would be characterized by a Customs Union with the ultimate aim of Turkish accession to the Community.<sup>168</sup> Turkey wished to be included in all institutions of the EEC to have a say in the decisions of the Community influencing its economy. Concerning the circulation of merchandise, Turkey promised to take all necessary measures to align its external tariffs with those of the EEC after the preparatory period. Turkey also requested that the EEC extend tariff reductions as well as increase in quotas applied to members to Turkey after the entering into force of the Association agreement. Turkey also promised to decrease its tariffs against the EEC members in two stages, while wishing to preserve a right to increase tariffs regarding specific sectors to ensure a smooth implementation of its development plan.

As a follow-up to the previous correspondence, a note on the association negotiations was circulated to the Member States on 7 October 1959, which firstly summarized the exchange of views on the state of exploratory talks with Greece and Turkey.<sup>169</sup>

The first aspect examined was whether the preparatory period would be in contradiction with the GATT obligations. Some raised doubts whether a transitional

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<sup>168</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Considérations d’ordre Général Sur l’association de La Turquie a La CEE” (/HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1 p.108, 1959).

<sup>169</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Préparation Des Délibérations Du Conseil Au Sujet de l’état Des Conversations Exploratoires Entre La Commission et Les Gouvernements Grec et Turc” (HICA.H.CM2.1963.841.1 p.117, 1959).

period would attract criticism within the GATT. The second aspect was about the circulation of products. The Commission had not received a list of products for which the prospective associate country requested the abolition of tariffs from neither Greece nor Turkey. However, Turkey's progression to customs union after the initial preparatory phase was markedly flexible compared to Greece. Concerning agricultural products, while Greece requested reduction in tariffs related only to its traditional products, Turkey demanded a long list of products, which it was currently producing and it planned to produce in future.

In response to requests of the Council for a document synthesizing exploratory talks with both prospective associate countries, the Commission presented a document comparing and contrasting the state of talks between Greece and Turkey. In this document, it was noted that the nature of the agreement between Greece and Turkey was identical, namely to establish a customs union and finally accession to the Community. Both countries also requested a participation to the decision-making bodies of the Community. In response to these requests, the Commission indicated that there was a distinction between association and accession. It was also stated that Turkey's demands were much more vocal compared to Greece.

Concerning the circulation of products, the Commission again noted that the proposals of Turkey had a much more pronounced restrictive character, since Turkey did not propose any measure of aligning with common external tariff during the preparatory period. Turkey justified this situation in reference to its fiscal revenues

generated by the tariffs. Regarding the regime tariff regime to be applied by Greece and Turkey to the EEC, the Commission observed that the engagements of both countries were not substantial. The Commission added also that the preparatory phase should not be seen as a holiday. The Commission was strictly against a preservation of tariffs during the preparatory phase, since it would weaken the dynamism of the economies of associate countries and render more difficult the subsequent tariff reductions. Turkey again presented a more restrictive offer concerning tariff reductions, as its plan did not contain neither a reduction in high tariffs nor a timetable for reducing tariffs.

Greece had accepted in principle that the customs union would be extended to the agricultural products. Turkey, on the other hand, did not have a clear position on this matter. It is striking that Turkey did not present a clear position on the central issue that lay at the heart of the negotiations. Concerning participation to the politics of common agriculture, Greece declared that it would like to participate to the decision-making process of the CAP, whose negative consequences would be accepted by Greece. Turkey did not again have a clear position on this issue. Concerning a regime for particular agricultural products, Greece requested that its tobacco and cotton products would be covered under special arrangements to ensure that they could reach the Community market in higher volumes. Turkey, on the other hand, requested supplementary guarantees such as long-term contracts with the Community to ensure that its agricultural exports reach the Community market. More

importantly, Turkey asked the Community not to import from third countries products similar to those that it was importing from Turkey, unless the imports from Turkey to the Community did not cover Community's needs. In response to Turkey's requests, the Community noted that Turkey's demands had not been studied in a detailed fashion, implying that they lacked the necessary details to proceed in the negotiations, and asked for a more detailed request in the upcoming talks. The Turkish side's demands requesting the maximum concessions possible gave the impression to the EEC that Turkey did not study the possible arrangements with the EEC in a detailed fashion.

The state of negotiations between prospective associate countries was discussed during the Council meeting on 13-14 October 1959.<sup>170</sup> The political implications of both these negotiations were acknowledged by the Council and it was emphasized that the negotiations should be finalized as soon as possible. The Commissioner for External Relations, Jean Rey, drew attention to the differences between Greek and Turkish delegations. The former had seriously studied the implications of the association process, while the latter had only a general approach to the concrete issues pertaining to the Association. This observation seems to be correct, as Turkish side's proposals were notably broad and did not include details that would be expected from proposals to be considered during a negotiation over a possible

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<sup>170</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Extrait Du Process-Verbal De La Reunion Restreinte Du Conseil de La CEE, Tenue Lors de Sa Session Des 13/14 Octobre 1959" (1963.842 p1, 1959).

Custom Union. Furthermore, the proposals of Greece were specific and provided a solid ground for progress on the negotiations. Moreover, in line with the observation above, according to Rey:

Conversations remained on a more general level and this is explained, above all, it seems, by the fact that the Turkish Government, as soon as it learned that steps had been taken by Greece to the Community, considered it essential to start immediately similar approaches.<sup>171</sup>

Commissioner Rey also underlined that Turkey had been insistent on devising an institutional scenario in which it could participate effectively in the Community decision-making bodies, whose decisions would have a bearing on the Association. However, as this would practically entail granting Turkey membership in the EEC, the Commission's answer was to suggest that the formal decision-making bodies for the association were the organs of the Association. Furthermore, Rey also stated that the Turkish side's proposal did not bring any obligations for itself during the preparatory period, while it would benefit from all the concessions from the Community. This was problematic for the equilibrium of the obligations assumed by the Community. The equilibrium was going to be an important issue for the EEC, since it meant that the obligations assumed by both parties were proportionate and balanced. The EEC, at this stage, considered that if Turkey did not assume any substantial obligations during the first phase the agreement would be disproportionately favorable for Turkey.

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<sup>171</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 9.

The parallelism between the negotiations between Greece and Turkey was going to decrease, since the Commission indicated that there were no developments in the negotiations with Turkey at the Council meeting on 23-24 November 1959.<sup>172</sup>

During this Council meeting, it was also decided that the negotiations could start with Greece, whereas solely exploratory talks with Turkey would continue with Turkey.

The second round of exploratory talks was carried out on 2-4 December 1959. These talks were reported to the COREPER by the Commission on 9 December 1959.<sup>173</sup> In these talks, Turkish Delegation preserved its original proposals, in which the tariff reductions to be implemented by Turkey were markedly slow. The Commission stated that these proposals were unlikely to be accepted by the Community, since they were too unbalanced. In response, the Turkish delegation put forward a working hypothesis which envisaged a grace period of one year, during which neither party did anything. The justification for this grace period was that Turkey was in the process of revising its tariffs. Moreover, it was impossible for Turkey to offer a better treatment in terms of quotas to Community members than members of Organization for European Economic Co-operation. This round of talks was finalized

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<sup>172</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA REUNION RESTREINTE DU COMITE DES REPRESENTANTS PERMANENTS, TENUE A BRUXELLES LE 23/24 Novembre 1959" (1963.842 p81, 1959).

<sup>173</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Aide-Memoire Au Sujet de l'exposé Sur l'état Des Conversations Exploratoires Avec La Turquie Fait Par La Représentant de La Commission Au Cours de La 78ème Réunion Du Comité Des Représentants Permanente Tenue a Bruxelles, Le 9 Decembre 1959" (1963.842 p 87, n.d.).

without setting a date for the third round of talks, but Turkish side voiced its wish to continue talks.

The introduction of this grace period broke the parallelism between the negotiations between Greece and Turkey, but the Council also attempted to preserve links between the negotiations.<sup>174</sup> In its meeting on 1 February 1960, the Council stated that the procedure for negotiations with Greece would be followed in identical fashion in respect to Turkey. Yet the Dutch representative stated that the Commission should clearly transmit to the Turkish Delegation that the provisions of the Greek Association agreement would not constitute a precedent for the Turkish Association agreement.

The Commission presented a note on the negotiations with Turkey to inform the Council on 4 March 1960.<sup>175</sup> While it was noted that the parallelism between negotiation with Greece and Turkey was to be preserved, the divergence between the two countries started to widen. The Commission drew attention to this fact by stating:

Hellenic delegation had oriented itself towards a regime inspired from the Treaty of Rome. The Turkish delegation, to whom a similar regime had been suggested as one of the modalities, had clearly stated that it was not possible

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<sup>174</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA REUNION RESTREINTE DU COMITE DES REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTS, TENUE A BRUXELLES LE 23/24 Novembre 1959."

<sup>175</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "NOTE SUR L'OUVERTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS AVEC LA TURQUIE FOUR LA CONCLUSION D'UN ACCORD D'ASSOCIATION" (1963.843 p.20, 1960).

for Turkey pursue such a course of action, and had retained its initial proposals based on an extended transition period.<sup>176</sup>

According to the Commission, such a difference between Greece and Turkey in respect of the modalities of the Association should not be surprising. Turkey, with its larger population of 25 million people and more advanced industry could seem to have the identical economic problems with Greece, but their scales were different. To make matters worse, the fragility of Turkish economy continued despite stabilization programs. The vulnerability of the Turkish economy continued after the crisis of 1958. Last but not least, Turkey lacked a general program of investment. The Commission noted that there was overproduction in some sectors, while other sectors experienced underproduction.

The issue of decreasing parallelism between negotiations was again discussed at the Council meeting on 22 March 1960.<sup>177</sup> The German Delegation drew attention to Turkey's concerns over the loss of the respect to parallelism. The Commission representative stated that while negotiations with Greece based on a scheme approved by the Council was about to commence, the exploratory talks with Turkey were not formally concluded. The Commission submitted a draft association agreement with Turkey to address Turkey's concerns. The French delegation also pointed out the need for a following a similar procedure applied to Greece. The

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<sup>176</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "NOTE SUR L'OUVERTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS AVEC LA TURQUIE POUR LA CONCLUSION D'UN ACCORD D'ASSOCIATION," 1960.

<sup>177</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA 9<sup>e</sup>me REUNION DU COMITE DES REPRESENTANTS PERMANENTES, Tenue à Bruxelles, Le 22 Mars 1960" (1960.843 p.62, 1960).

Belgian delegation, on the other hand, considered whether it was possible to attain a genuine association agreement with Turkey. The Italian Delegation argued that it would be premature to signal to the Turkish government that there would be a discrepancy between the Turkish and Greek association agreements. The Dutch Delegation also drew attention to Turkey's concerns over the discrepancy, stating that there was a high degree of similarity between the situation of Greece and Turkey, which was an important member of NATO. Ultimately, the representatives of Italy, Belgium, and the Commission indicated that concluding the negotiations between Greece and Turkey at the same time would mean delaying the negotiations with Greece. The issue of decreasing parallelism between Greece and Turkey was again addressed in a meeting of COREPER. In this meeting, the Committee decided to establish a group of experts<sup>178</sup> to study the possible opening of negotiations with Turkey for an association agreement.<sup>179</sup>

The group of experts prepared an *aide-memoire* on the Association negotiations between Turkey and the Community.<sup>180</sup> The Commission disagreed with the suggestion of the most of experts to orient Turkey towards an agreement similar to

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<sup>178</sup> The name of experts were not listed in the mandate. To find out the name of experts, I contacted the archives of the European Council through the e-mail archives.centrales@consilium.europa.eu. The response dated 20 March 2023 indicated that according to their experience the archives of the member states would probably have the names of the experts, not the European Council's archive.

<sup>179</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA 100<sup>ème</sup> REUNION DU COMITE DES REPRESENTANTS PERMENANTES, Tenue à Bruxelles, Le 7 Avril 1960" (1963 843 p66, 1960).

<sup>180</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "AIDE - MEMOIRE Sur La Réuion Du Groupe d'Experts Chargé d'examiner Le Schéma d'accord d'association" (1963 843 p70, 1960).

that of Greece. According to the Commission, it would be difficult to adopt such a course of action due to the internal economic situation of Turkey. The Commission also questioned whether it would be in the interests of the Community to orient Turkey towards committing to obligations that it certainly would not be able to fulfil. The experts then suggested that the Council should be provided with two alternative scenarios for Turkish association agreement: an agreement similar to that of Greece and an agreement that foresaw longer deadlines for realizing the Association.

Concerning the inclusion of provisions to the draft association agreement with Turkey, there were similar disagreements between the Commission and some experts. While some experts suggested that that it was not necessary to determine the conditions prior to the Associations, the Commission stated that it was necessary to deal with draft specific measures for the Association.

The state of exploratory talks and ensuing internal negotiations of the Community were examined by the Commission to provide background information to the Council for the final decision to open the negotiations for an Association agreement or to continue with exploratory talks with Turkey.<sup>181</sup> It took nearly six months for the Community to reach this stage at its decision-making process.

In this document, the Commission noted that the draft Association agreement for Turkey was significantly different to that of Greece, since the Commission reached

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<sup>181</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Association de La Turquie a Communauté" (1963.844 p.1, 1960).

the impression that Turkey was willing to assume fewer obligations compared to Greece during the exploratory talks. The Commission proposed opening negotiations with Turkey instead of resuming the exploratory talks from a political point of view. The Commission noted while the last round of exploratory talks with Turkey was carried out six months ago, continuing exploratory talks would allow Turkey to raise serious objections, as the Turkish delegation continued to repeat parallelism between the Turkish and Greek negotiations should be preserved. Finally, the Commission asked for instructions of the Council on a decision to propose an agreement similar to that of Greece or an agreement envisaging a longer and a more flexible timetable.

In the Council negotiations over the above document, the Turkish government's insistence over the parallelism was again discussed.<sup>182</sup> The West German delegation argued that the negotiations with Turkey should be opened as soon as possible. But the delegation also indicated that there were considerable differences between the Greek and Turkish economies. According to the West German Delegation, it would not be appropriate to follow an identical route to that of Greece. The Commission, on the other hand, indicated that it should be given a strict mandate to ensure that both Association agreements are as similar to each other as possible. All other delegations emphasized the political importance of the Association of Turkey but failed to agree on the type of agreement to be negotiated with the Turkish government. Therefore,

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<sup>182</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Le 11 et 12 Mai 1960." (1963 844 p8, 1960).

the Council decided to open the negotiations with the Turkish Government for an association agreement and to instruct the Commission to carry out consultations with the Turkish government to find an Association agreement that would be agreeable to both sides. The Turkish side welcomed this decision, however there were no meaningful press reports on this transition from exploratory negotiations to the formal ones. The Turkish press and public were unsurprisingly more focused on the aftermath of 12 May 1960 military coup.<sup>183</sup>

The exploratory negotiations demonstrate that the EEC and Turkey had serious divergences about the content and timelines of a possible Association relationship. Yet the decision to prolong exploratory negotiations would be harmful for the political relationship between Turkey and the EEC, and hence the EEC decided to proceed to formal negotiations with Turkey. These negotiations would reveal that the divergences within the EEC would take much more time in comparison to Greece, which would complete its Association negotiations much earlier.

From a theoretical perspective, this period could give the impression of an anomaly as there was not much public deliberation within the Turkish public regarding Association. The position of the Turkish government was determined by a number of bureaucrats in the MFA and Trade Ministry, without much input from the business groups or other societal actors. Within the EEC, the Council was also determining the position of the EEC, leaving not much autonomy to the Commission. The

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<sup>183</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*, 88.

developmental politics was not also visible in the Turkish politics, as Association was still a topic that was discussed exclusively by a group of bureaucrats and policy-makers behind closed doors. The politicization of Association was still yet to take place. The exploratory nature of the negotiation could partly explain why the public did not have an impact on the negotiations, as the talks were solely of preparatory nature.

However, the EEC's internal correspondence demonstrate that EEC had doubts over Turkey's capacity to assume obligations that would stem from a potential Association agreement. While the Turkish side was requesting to be treated similar to Greece, it was also not approaching favorably to the idea of assuming comparable obligations. This dilemma would need to be addressed in the next stage of the negotiations.

### CHAPTER 3: OPENING OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY: WHAT TYPE OF AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

The formal negotiations between the EEC and Turkey indicate that the EEC seriously entertained rejecting the very idea of an association agreement with Turkey. The EEC's concern was that, even if Turkey was willing to assume obligations, its economy was not strong enough to carry out those obligations. After realizing that Turkey would not accept a cooperation agreement without a customs union, the EEC then took considerable time to prepare an agreement that would be mutually acceptable to Turkey. It is worth noting that the EEC was willing to give "all appeasements" to make this agreement work, but there were serious concerns regarding Turkey's economic capacity and the sharing of obligations among EEC member states.<sup>184</sup>

The negotiations would take considerable time to determine what type of agreement was going to be signed with Turkey. The economic capacity of Turkey was seriously questioned, and the requests of Turkey were regarded as signals that Turkey was not going to commit itself to the Association. The implications of the Association regarding the GATT were also given particular attention by the EEC. However, this topic would not be raised again in the later stages of the Association, as the

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<sup>184</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Modalités Possibles d'une Association de La Turquie a La Communauté" (1963 847 p9, 1961), 9.

Association was going to receive approval from GATT. Last but not least, Greece was pressuring the EEC to take a harsher stance on Turkey.

The opening of negotiations with Turkey, planned for 7 June 1960, was delayed due to military coup that took place on 27 May 1960. While there was an ambiguity over whether the new government would desire an association with the EEC, the new government's program dissipated those concerns. The program underlined that negotiations to determine the obligations for the Association would continue.<sup>185</sup>

The first negotiations between Turkey and the EEC started on 14 October and lasted until 21 October. In these negotiations, the Turkish Delegation altered its previous position of demanding a more flexible Association agreement compared to Greece. This time Turkey requested a similar Association agreement to that of Greece and planned for an Association that would commence in 1962. While there were differences between Turkey's original and second proposal, Turkey demanded a special regime characterized by decreasing tariffs and quota demobilizations for certain products whose exportation represented a particularly important figure (tobacco, raisins, and hazelnuts). However, the Commission stated that Association could not be extended to the agricultural products unless Turkey promised to harmonize itself with the Community's agricultural policy. The Commission also

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<sup>185</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 825.

stated that the Turkish proposals were again imprecise, and the proposals should be clarified so that the Commission could inform the Council.<sup>186</sup>

The ongoing Greek negotiations were also influencing the direction of the negotiations with Turkey. According to the Commission,

The difficulties of the negotiations with Greece highlighted all the complications of a customs union to be concluded with a developing country, as well as the difficulty of realizing the common agricultural policy.<sup>187</sup>

The Commission also noted the economic situation of Turkey was worse than originally estimated, adding that the association of overseas states was currently under discussion. Based on these points, the Commission suggested the reconsideration of the very bases of the envisaged agreement with Turkey before going any further. These deliberations demonstrate that the impact of the ongoing negotiations with Greece and other third countries was negative for Turkey's negotiations. Separately, the Commission's underlining of complications of the negotiations with Greece demonstrates the high level of difficulties faced by the negotiations with Turkey. The negotiations between the ECC and both countries started around the same time, but the negotiations with Greece were concluded while the negotiations with Turkey was still ongoing.

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<sup>186</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Association CEE—TURQUIE Demande Turque Visant à La Convocation d'un Conseil d'Association Au Niveau Ministériel (Envisagé Pour Le 14 Décembre)," 1971.

<sup>187</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "ASSOCIATION DE LA TURQUIE A LA COMMUNAUTE (Communication de La Commission Au Conseil)" (1963 845 p6, 1961).

Turkey requested that the EEC offer identical treatment of its products and the products of Greece. According to the Commission, the Turkish economy had not acquired the stability and could not address its ongoing economic difficulties, hence the fragility of Turkish economy had to be taken into account. The economic crisis that Turkey experienced at the end of the 1950s was also an important factor. In this context, the Commission suggested that an association with Turkey should be established by ensuring that the obligations assumed by Turkey could be fulfilled by Turkey and that a new equilibrium should not be disadvantageous to the EEC itself, which might set a harmful precedent in substance for future associate countries. The Commission also argued for special precautions such as a preparatory period during which Turkey would not assume obligations, if a similar agreement with Greece was to be adopted for the negotiations with Turkey. Such a period would ensure that Turkey would address its economic difficulties and did not assume obligations that would be impossible to fulfil.

At this point, a major change occurred in the Turkey-EEC negotiations. According to the Commission, there was an alternative for Turkish Association that did not entail a customs union. The Commission underlined that different agreements could be devised for third countries. Such association agreements could be appropriate for countries for which integration with the Community's economy was not realistic. These types of agreements could be regarded as more of an assistance agreement. However, as the consent of the GATT was required for granting particular tariff

concessions, the advantages of a limited associated agreement would be limited. This approach, offering Turkey a “lighter” agreement would be seriously entertained by the EEC due to the fragility of Turkish economy.

For Turkey’s main items of export—cotton (25 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC), cereals (18,8 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC) nuts (17 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC), tobacco (11 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC) and dry grapes (5 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC) and metal minerals (4,9 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC)—the Commission suggested various alternatives to Turkey such as bilateral agreements, assistance for harvesting cereals, and quotas similar to Greece. Turkey would, on the other hand, implement a standstill clause towards the EEC. According to the Commission, the Community could choose the above agreement, which was more flexible than that of Greece and which required few concessions from the Community. However, because Greece would be in the Customs Union, Turkey’s demands for being on equal footing with Greece in respect of the goods Greece and Turkey were competing to export to the EEC would not be met. Therefore, presenting for a “lighter” agreement would mean rejecting Turkey’s constant request to be on equal footing with Greece.

These options were discussed in the Council meeting on 20 and 21 March 1961.<sup>188</sup>

During these discussions, all delegations affirmed the political importance of the

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<sup>188</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Les 20/21 Mars 1961” (1963 845 p53, 1961).

negotiations with Turkey, not only for Turkey but also for the broader relationship between the Community and developing countries. It was evident that Turkey was not in a position to assume the obligations set out in the agreement with Greece. However, there was no consensus in the Council concerning which type of Association agreement was appropriate for Turkey. The Dutch and German Delegations pointed out that the proposal of removing the Customs Union from the agreement should come from Turkey, not from the EEC. In addition, some delegations doubted whether it was possible to establish a regime without a customs union, since it would not be attractive due to GATT technicalities. Yet a light version of the Association had political and economic technicalities that made it less attractive for Turkey. On the political front, it meant that Turkey would be behind Greece and in economic terms it meant that would be receiving insignificant economic concessions.

After the exchange of views, Hallstein stated that the Commission had arrived at the conclusion that the Turkish economy was effectively different from the Greek one. The Commission also questioned whether the Greek association agreement was a template for all future association agreements. Based on these reasons, Hallstein suggested that the talks with Turkish authorities continue on political grounds without the participation of experts. During these talks, the Commission would transmit the concerns of the Community regarding the Association with Turkey.

After such a discussion, it was estimated that the next round of talks would provide an occasion for an exchange of views of both parties concerning the Association.

The Commission held talks on 20-21 March 1961 with the Turkish Delegation, which presented concrete proposals, despite acknowledging that the talks would be of general character. These concrete proposals suggested a tariff reduction for 65 percent of imports originating from the EEC to Turkey 12 years after the agreement had entered into force. For 19 percent of imports, the reduction would take place in 22 years. For the remaining 15 percent of imports, a mixed regime of reduction of tariffs would be in place that could be subject to change in accordance with the needs of Turkey's newly emerging industries. Furthermore, Turkey would like to have a unilateral right to increase tariffs or suspend the reductions. The harmonization of Turkish customs with those of the Community would also take place in 12 and 22 years. The elimination of quotas would also be finalized in 22 years, while Turkey would preserve the right to unilaterally adopt safeguard measures in case of balance of payments difficulties. In exchange for these obligations, Turkey proposed that the EEC reduce by 50 percent tariffs applied to its traditional export products (dry grapes, dried fruits, nuts, and tobacco). Turkey's decision to make concrete proposals for this round of negotiations was largely due to fact that the negotiations with Greece were near conclusion.<sup>189</sup> This situation again underlined that the pace and

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<sup>189</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 827.

content of Turkey's negotiations were significantly influenced by the negotiations with Greece.

After an initial assessment of Turkey's proposal, the Commission noted that the proposals were weak and coupled with a unilateral safeguard clause by Turkey.

Furthermore, the Commission noted that Turkey's economic and financial situation would not allow for such substantial obligations. The Commission then put forward the idea of an association without a customs union. The Turkish Delegation in response stated that they were open to other solutions, which were left unspecified, that would prevent discrimination against Turkish products in favor of Greek products in the Community market.

These negotiations also constituted an occasion for exploring the contents of the Association agreement. Both sides argued that the Association would include a preparatory period during which Turkey would strengthen its internal situation with assistance from the Community. The institutions of the Association would be established immediately to institute a permanent dialogue between both parties.

While sixty percent of the exports of Turkey to the EEC were not the objects of quotas or tariffs, for some products there were quotas determined through bilateral agreements. Turkey requested supplemental measures for tobacco, dry grapes, dry figs, and nuts, all of which were products for which Turkey was in competition with Greece. In this context, Turkey proposed quotas for these products during the negotiations. Turkey also requested quotas for additional products: the fishes called

“palamut” and “torik,” lentils, oranges, lemons, grapefruits, and peaches. The Commission noted that such concessions would be a tough sell within the framework of the GATT, whose members were supporting the Turkish stabilization program.

The Council debated the situation of ongoing negotiations with Turkey on 2-3 May 1961. In these discussions, it was recalled that it would be premature to continue negotiations with Turkey before negotiations with Greece were concluded. The Council concluded that it was not in a position to give its final decision concerning the association negotiations with Turkey. However, some members of the Council elaborated whether a scenario without the Customs Union existed taking into account the requirements of the GATT. At the end of the meeting, COREPER was tasked to study the question of the association with Turkey in a more detailed fashion. This decision meant that the talks with Turkey were going to be postponed and the talks with Greece prioritized.

During its meeting on 24 and 25 July 1961, the Council again debated association negotiations with Turkey.<sup>190</sup> The delegations made similar remarks about the ongoing negotiations, drawing attention to the political importance of them while underlining that it might not be feasible for Turkey to implement a similar agreement to that of Greece. The Commissioner for External Relations, Rey, emphasized that the decision had to be taken at the level of Council, since all the technical details had

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<sup>190</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Les 24-25 Julliet 1961.” (1963 846 p177, 1961).

been examined sufficiently by the COREPER and the Commission. Therefore, it was up to the Council to decide the orientation of the negotiations. Hallstein stated that the Council should dissipate all the doubts concerning the Community's reluctance in the negotiations with Turkey in the Turkish public opinion. However, the Council again decided that the COREPER should study alternative routes for association with Turkey. It could be inferred from these deliberations that, while Turkey's political importance was a factor taken into account by the EEC, there remained concerns regarding Turkey's capacity to assume obligations. The primary concern, Turkey's economic capacity to assume the obligations, which was raised in the previous round of negotiations, continued to be on the top of the EEC's agenda.

On 30 August 1961, the Turkish representation to the EEC sent a letter and aide-memoire to the COREPER providing information on its work concerning Turkish association.<sup>191</sup> While the President of COREPER noted that the letter should have been sent to the Commission which was responsible for the negotiations, he transmitted the letter to the Commission. In this letter and aide-memoire, the Turkish government stated that:

Considering its place and his important role in the Western family and its heavy share of responsibility within NATO, the need for Turkey's accession to the EEC, which at the same time constitutes the beginning of European political integration, is recognized incontestably by all the members of the Community.

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<sup>191</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Note De Transmission" (1961 846 p191, 1961).

The Turkish government also stressed that leaving Turkey outside the Community would have grave consequences. In this context, the Turkish government was ready to provide necessary information and wished that the Commission was given a mandate to conclude the negotiations with Turkey as soon as possible.

The COREPER again presented a note on the negotiation with Turkey and noted the impossibility of reaching conclusions about the negotiations.<sup>192</sup> All delegations within the COREPER and the Commission underlined the political importance attached to the negotiations with Turkey and the necessity to provide Turkey “all appeasements on the will of the Community to reach an agreement.”<sup>193</sup> As Turkey was not in a position to fulfil the obligations assumed by Greece, the Association with Turkey agreement ought to be more flexible. In this context, formulating a framework agreement that consisted of a preparatory phase and a secondary phase would be more appropriate.

The member state delegations and the Commission agreed on adopting sufficient measures to allow Turkey to overcome its economic difficulties during the preparatory phase. These measures encouraged Turkey to proceed to the second phase without being too excessive to the point of being disadvantageous for the Community. Concerning commercial policy, these measures included granting quotas for a certain number of essential products. The key quotas requested by

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<sup>192</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Modalités Possibles d’une Association de La Turquie a La Communauté.”

<sup>193</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 3.

Turkey were as following: 15.000 tons for tobacco, 30.000 tons for raisins, 17.000 tons for dried figs and 30.000 for hazelnuts. Some delegations argued that there should be safeguard clauses to prevent the adverse impact of such quotas on the EEC market.<sup>194</sup> While some delegations drew attention to the problem of such measures with the GATT, others suggested that these measures could be accepted as preparatory measures for the customs union and as such be accepted by the GATT. Regarding the financial measures, the delegations deliberated whether it was appropriate to determine a fixed amount of financial assistance as in the case of Greece or determine the financial assistance on a case-by-case basis. It was then decided that it was premature to reach a decision in this matter.

There was also a divergence of opinions regarding the inclusion of the customs union as an objective of the Association. While some argued that there was no need to include the customs union as an integral component of the Association, others suggested that the concessions accorded could be problematic within the GATT framework without an objective of the customs union. It is worth recalling that to receive GATT's approval for discriminatory measures, the objective of realizing Customs Union had to be included in the agreement.

The transition from preparatory phase to the second phase elicited different views from the delegations. The West German Delegation stated that this transition should

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<sup>194</sup> Tefik Saraçođlu, *Türkiye Avrupa Topluluđu Ortaklıđı*, Akbank Ekonomi Yayınları (Akbank, 1992), 92.

be automatic to ensure that the agreement could be easily presented to the GATT. Furthermore, they added that the automatic transition could also act as a guarantee against Turkey's possible prolongation of the Association. The French, Italian delegations and the Commission stated that both parties should have the right to decide when to proceed to the second state of the Association. The Dutch Delegation proposed a modality including a term for the transition as well as granting the Parties the right to decide when to proceed to the second phase. The debate about the modality of the transition reflected the member states' preferences regarding the pace of Association and their involvement in determining the pace.

After these deliberations, three alternatives for the Turkish Association agreement, were presented to the Council.<sup>195</sup> The first alternative was an agreement which included a preparatory and a second phase with the final objective of the customs union. The transition from the preparatory phase to the second phase would be automatic. The second alternative consisted of only defining the preparatory period without ascertaining the modality of the second period. The third alternative was similar to the first alternative except according the right to parties to decide when to proceed to the second phase. The German Delegation supported the first alternative, the French Delegation supported the second alternative, and the Benelux Delegations supported the third alternative. The Italian Delegation abstained.

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<sup>195</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Négotations Avec La Turquie" (1963 847 p45, 1961).

The alternatives were discussed during the Council meeting in September 1961.<sup>196</sup> The German representative argued that the negotiations should be expedited for political and economic reasons. He stated that Turkey was an integral part of the western defense system and constituted a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Taking into account the fact that the negotiations started two years ago, he stressed that they should not be delayed any more. While some member countries could have been concerned about the internal situation of Turkey, he argued that the negotiations should commence in three or four weeks. The French representative stated that all decisions concerning Turkey should be postponed for the time being. While agreeing that the negotiations had a notable political importance, the French representative insisted that the Council could take a decision after the elections in Turkey (which would take place in October 1961). The other delegations also indicated that, due to uncertainties about Turkey's domestic politics, decisions concerning the negotiations should be taken at the next meeting. In response, the Western German delegation expressed its support for the third alternative to ensure the continuance of the negotiations with Turkey. In the end of the meeting, the Council decided to instruct the COREPER to work on the second and third alternatives. The difference between the second and third agreements was the method for proceeding to the transition phase. In the former, the EEC refrained from defining the transition phase, while in

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<sup>196</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Les 20/21 Mars 1961."

the latter the contents of the transition phase were determined and proceeding to the second stage was left to the mutual consent of the parties to the Association.

Concerning the negotiations with Turkey, the Commission proposed a compromise between the second and third alternatives.<sup>197</sup> According to the Commission, Turkey could first sign an agreement of cooperation with the Community for a limited duration. This cooperation agreement would include financial assistance to Turkey. The commercial measures aimed at addressing the difficulties of Turkey due to the application of the Greek Association agreement. The Commission reminded that tobacco, dry grapes and dry figs constituted 20 to 25 percent of the exports of both Greece and Turkey to the Community. The Commission stated that, for commercial measures to be effective for Turkey, any agreement would be discriminatory against others. Such measures would contravene GATT principles unless they were adopted under the framework of a customs union.

The Council again discussed the absence of unanimity regarding the negotiations with Turkey.<sup>198</sup> The German representative noted that the concerns of the Turkish government were increasing day by day and that delays in responding to the Turkish government risked dramatic consequences for a pro-Western regime. He also stressed that it was possible to proceed to negotiations with Turkey, as the term

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<sup>197</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Association De La Turquie A La Communaute" (1963 847 p170, 1961).

<sup>198</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Les 13-14 Novembre 1961" (1963 848 p72, 1961).

association covered various scenarios that could be interpreted as a customs union in the future. The representative finally emphasized that all representatives should put pressure on their national authorities because the negotiations with Turkey were politically important. It is once again seen that West Germany had been a staunch advocate of Turkey in the negotiations.

The French representative argued that the concessions offered to Turkey would cover 80 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC, making in highly advantageous for Turkey. Commissioner Rey disagreed with this remark. According to him, when the demands of the Turkish delegation were considered, the situation was not so bright. Rey then proceeded to demonstrate the obstacles preventing the Community from negotiating with Turkey. The French monopoly, which was tasked with buying Turkish tobacco, was not committing itself to buy tobacco from Turkey. Italy was against granting quotas for nuts from Turkey. France and Italy were against granting quotas for dry figs.

After these remarks, the President invited France and Italy to make efforts to reach a compromise in the commercial field. The Italian representative stated that Italy was already having difficulties in addressing the requests related to Greek tobacco. To make matters worse, the US was making demands within the GATT framework. He also added that the commitment to buy Turkish products was not planned. But he stated that he would report these discussions to his government.

The representative of France argued that the dried figs were also being imported from Algeria to France, and therefore it was difficult for France to offer quotas to Turkey. But France did not oppose other countries granting quotas to Turkey. The German representative stated that the Turkish demands could be met with a minor effort from the member states.

The Italian representative, then argued that it was not possible for his government to ascertain its position regarding the negotiations with Turkey. In response to this remark, the President stated that the concerns of Italian delegation should be taken into account and the issue should be discussed at the next Council meeting.

Concerns about further concessions to Turkey were considered in a follow-up meeting. The commercial concessions to Turkey had to be about tobacco, raisins, nuts, and figs, since these products formed 38 percent of Turkish exports to the Six.<sup>199</sup> Granting concessions on these products could lead to complications on three fronts. First, as Turkey was the largest supplier for nuts and figs, granting concessions to them would not be in contradiction with the rules of the GATT. These rules stipulated that the reduction in tariffs must be extended to all members, with the only exceptions being the establishment of a customs union or a free trade area. Therefore, general concessions towards tobacco and raisins would be beneficial for third countries not affiliated with the EEC and would certainly have adverse effects

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<sup>199</sup> Henig, *External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements*, 30.

towards Greece and the Community. Second, the EEC accepted limits on its rights to establish tariff reductions or tariff quotas for these products as a part of the Treaty of Athens. Third, Italy was not in favor of extending concessions in tobacco to Greece and Turkey and other third countries. These conditions rendered the customs union between Turkey and the EEC as an optimal solution, so that a waiver from the GATT would not be desired under article 25 or the Treaty of GATT.

The decision of the Community concerning the Association negotiations with Turkey could not be reached until 15 May 1961 due to disagreements over the concessions to be given to Turkey and the financial aid dimension of the Association. COREPER discussed possible discriminatory and non-discriminatory concessions in May 1962.<sup>200</sup> However, there was again disagreement over which type of concessions ought to be given to primary export products of Turkey. There were also disagreements over whether the relationship with Turkey could be referred to as an association agreement, if it did not create reciprocal obligations between Turkey and the Community.

In a turning point for the negotiations between the EEC and Turkey, the Italian representative, whose government had been objecting to the concessions towards Turkey concerning nuts and dried figs, stated that:

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<sup>200</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES VERBAL DE LA REUNION RESTREINTE TENUE A L OCCASION DE LA 6<sup>e</sup>me SESSION DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E. à BRUXELLES LES 14 ET 15 MAI 1962" (1965 851 p60, 1962).

under his personal responsibility and in the hope known, during the evaluation of the negotiation, the position, currently very firm, of the Italian Government, can soften to consent that the Commission may, without taking no definitive commitment, start to inquire about Turkish demands for these two products.<sup>201</sup>

After nearly two years of negotiation, this was the first relaxation of the Italian government's objection to Turkish government's requests for concessions. Even this relaxation was done without commitment and on a personal capacity of the representative. After this statement, it was possible to resume the negotiations with Turkey concerning the commercial aspect of the Association.

The resumption of negotiations with Turkey took place on 23 and 24 July 1962. The Turkish Delegation was disappointed in the offers of the Community, and, after the negotiations, Turkey transmitted its concerns to member states of the Community.<sup>202</sup> In these negotiations, the Turkish side offered an agreement envisaging a customs union. However, when the Commission offered an agreement of cooperation without a customs union, the Turkish delegation responded that it was impossible, since Turkey desired the highest level of integration with Europe. In addition, the planning of the Turkish economy required a certainty that could be only realized with a perspective of a customs union with the Community. More importantly, the offers of the Community were not enough, since the concessions were notably limited. After these negotiations, the Commission drew attention to the deteriorating economic

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<sup>201</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 69.

<sup>202</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Les 2,3 et 4 Julliet 1962" (1963 851 p199, 1962).

situation of Turkey and the necessity of international aid. In this context, the Commission inquired whether it would be appropriate to provide assistance to Turkey and not commit itself to an agreement with Turkey. Furthermore, for raisins and tobacco, which were in direct competition with Greek products, the Community could not establish quotas without the consent of Greece. In this context, the Commission stated that:

Thus, with regard to these two products, on the tariff plan and non-discriminatory nothing can be granted to Turkey in the immediate future, and for the future we cannot give formal assurance<sup>203</sup>

To escape this impasse, the Commission offered technical assistance for Turkish producers of these products, which would not contradict the Community's obligations and would not be costly. As seen from the negotiations above, the Commission was seriously concerned about Turkey's capacity to assume obligations that would stem from the Association.

The Commission also argued that discriminatory measures outside a possible customs union with Turkey were not feasible and were extremely limited. The non-discriminatory measures, on the other hand, would only apply to nuts and dried figs, and they would not cover tobacco and raisins due to the Association with Greece. According to the Commission, "Such a narrow result will create deep disappointment on the Turkish side and may cause political reactions." The Commission then stated

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<sup>203</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Association de La Turquie a La Communaute (I (COM) 62 150)" (1963 851 p217, 1962), 10.

that a deal resembling the Greek Association agreement, including retaining the objective of a customs union, could be offered to Turkey. The Commission also offered a second alternative, which was less costly for the Community. This second alternative, which again included the objective of customs union with Turkey, would include only non-discriminatory measures. But achieving customs union would not be conditioned by a timetable. The Commission deemed the second alternative more realistic, since it satisfied the wishes of all member states. The Commission stated that while it did not meet the concrete demands of Turkey, it provided support to Turkey in psychological and political terms.

The response of the COREPER was based on the report prepared by the Committee of Association with Third Countries.<sup>204</sup> This report introduced a third alternative that aimed at strengthening the relationship between Turkey and member states and assisting at the development of the Turkish economy. Customs union was only a component of the instruments deployed for achieving those aims, among other ones such as commercial measures and financial aid. This report summarized all these proposals in a table which is presented below:

*Table 8: Alternatives for Association agreement with Turkey*

	1 <sup>st</sup> alternative	2 <sup>nd</sup> alternative	3 <sup>rd</sup> alternative

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<sup>204</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Projet de Rapport Du Comité ‘Association Pays Tiers’ Au Comité Des Représentants Permanents” (1963 852 p14, 1962).

Objective of the preparatory phase	Customs Union with a program and a calendar	Customs Union without a program and a calendar	Strengthening of Turkish economy and relationship between the EEC and Turkey
Proceeding to the second stage	When the preparatory phase ends , the Council of the Association could decide that it is appropriate to proceed to the second stage and establish the Custom Union in accordance	When conditions are met, a program and a calendar for proceeding to the Customs Union could be prepared.	When preparatory phase ends (5 to 7 years), the previous measures could be strengthened or proceed to the Customs Union if conditions permit

	with the calendar and the program		
Commercial aspects of the preparatory phases	Discriminative measures	Non- discriminatory measures for nuts and dried figs and technical assistance	To be defined

A fourth alternative was proposed by the Presidency of COREPER, which tried to find a compromise. This fourth alternative envisaged that the Council of the Association would decide at the end of the preparatory phase to proceed with one of the following alternatives: creation of a custom union, a free exchange zone, or consolidation of the regime foreseen for the preparatory period.<sup>205</sup> The entertainment of different possibilities of Association suggests the high level of doubt present in the EEC decision-makers regarding Turkey's capacity to carry out the requirements of a fully-fledged customs union.

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<sup>205</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Rapport Du Coreper Au Conseil Sur Le Cadre Général et Contenu Commercial de l'accord Envisagé Établi Conformément Au Mandat Confié Par Le Second Lors de Sa Session Des 02.03.1962" (1962 852 p45, 1962), 11,12.

During the discussions of the alternatives, Rey was asked to clarify whether transition from the preparatory phase to the second phase would be automatic or based on the decisions of the Community according to the second alternative.<sup>206</sup> He responded that it would be up to the Community to decide whether transition to the second stage takes place or not. The President also stated that the Council of Association could also decide to resume the measures adopted during the preparatory period or envisage new measures. Another important distinction between the first and second alternatives was their agreeability within the GATT system. The former could be easily accepted by the GATT framework, while the second could be realized by an understanding on the part of the GATT. Rey also recalled the association agreement with Greece which had difficulties with the GATT over receiving a waiver even without having a preparatory period. It was even questioned whether there was a difference between the first and second alternatives concerning the challenges awaiting them in the GATT.<sup>207</sup>

The issues surrounding dried figs and nuts were continuing as the reservations put in place by the French and Italian delegation were still in place. While Italy signaled that it could soften its position, there was not a formal removal of the reservations. In

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<sup>206</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Luxembourg, Bruxelles, Les 23,24,26 et 28 Julliet 1961." (1963 852 p 125, 1962).

<sup>207</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 96.

this context, it was stated that the President took a heavy personal responsibility to authorize the Commission to negotiate on the two products.<sup>208</sup>

As a result of these discussions, the Council reached the following conclusions.

Firstly, the association agreement with Turkey would be based on Article 238 of the Rome Treaty, envisaging a customs union. The institutional provisions of this agreement would resemble the Association agreement with Greece. This accord was going to include a preparatory phase, during which the Community would examine the economic situation of Turkey and decide whether the conditions for proceeding to the customs union through setting up a calendar and program to that end. The content of the preparatory period would be determined by the Council as well as during the exploratory talks with Turkey.<sup>209</sup> This was a positive result for the negotiations between Turkey and the EEC, as it represented the culmination of years-long negotiations to a solid outcome, which would pave the way for a concrete agreement between the parties.

The Turkish Delegation expressed its satisfaction concerning the position of the Community towards establishing a formal association agreement with the aim of customs union during the meeting on 8-12 October 1962.<sup>210</sup> The Turkish Delegation

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<sup>208</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 103.

<sup>209</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Extrait Note Du 27 Juillet 1962 (R/593/1/62) Concernant La Mise En Oeuvre Des Décisions Priée Par Le Conseil C.E.E. Lors de Sa Eeseion Les 23/24 Juillet 1962" (1963 852 p164, 1962).

<sup>210</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "ASSOCIATION DE LA TURQQIE A LA COMMUNAUTE (Communication de La Commission Au Conseil)/S/06704/62 Final" (1963 853 p24, 1962).

was, however, disappointed regarding the absence of discriminatory measures during the preparatory period. Furthermore, the Turkish side refused even the possibility of resorting to non-discriminatory measures, since non-discriminatory measures would not be of assistance to maintaining export of traditional goods and to the diversification of exported goods. Concerning the framework of the agreement, the Turkish side also argued that the agreement should create a customs union instead of inclining towards it, thus rendering the presentation of the agreement easier to the GATT.

The Secretariat of COREPER was instructed to write a document summarizing the developments concerning the association with Turkey.<sup>211</sup> This document stated that there were three alternatives for the Association with Turkey: The Association could tend towards, involve, or be founded on a customs union between Turkey and the EEC. The Turkish delegation was in favor of the association being founded on a customs union. There were diverging opinions on how to proceed from preparatory phase to the transition phase during which the customs union would be implemented. Some delegations proposed inserting some principles to the association treaty, according to which it would be decided whether the transition should take place or not. Other delegations and the Commission were against this idea, since this could imply a degree of automatism. The mechanisms for proceeding to the transition

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<sup>211</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Cadre Général et Contenu Commercial de l’Accord d’Association, Envisagé Avec La Turquie (S/635/62 (IMT 20))” (1963 854 p2, 1962).

phase could be either carried out by a decision of the Council of Association or a conference composed by the member states, the Community on one side and Turkey on the other. There was no unanimity over which type of mechanism was appropriate or whether the decision to proceed to the transitory phase should require ratification by the member states. Turkey also requested a similar provision found in the agreement with Greece, which stipulated consultations when an enlargement takes place or upon the conclusion of a new agreement establishing association.

Concerning the commercial aspect of the association agreement, it was noted that the raisins constituted half of Greece's exports towards the Community. As Turkey's exports of raisins doubled between 1958 and 1961, it was suggested that non-discriminatory measures could be applied to raisins. Such measures could be accepted by Greece, and they would also apply to Iran, which exported grapes to the Community as well. It is again worth noting that there was an ongoing debate about the fundamentals of the Agreement.

In November 1962, after deliberations, the COREPER reached new conclusions regarding the Association with Turkey.<sup>212</sup> In this meeting, the Association was divided into three phases. The first phase, named the preparatory phase, would be defined according to an annex to the Association agreement. A transition phase would include the gradual establishment of a customs union. The last phase would be

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<sup>212</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Cadre Général et Contenu Commercial de l'Accord d'Association Envisagé Avec La Turquie (S/639/62 (NT 21))" (1963 854 p27, 1962).

the establishment of a customs union regime. The preparatory phase was to last 6.5 years. The Council of Association could examine the possibility of proceeding to the transition phase 5 years after the Association agreement had entered into force.

Regarding the quotas, it was stated, “Turkish products could not, in any event, benefit from a more favorable level than the corresponding Greek products.”<sup>213</sup>

There was again no consultation mechanism foreseen in the case of enlargement of the Association and new association agreements. The comparison of Greece with Turkey in respect of their access to the EEC was a constant exercise on the part of the EEC and Turkey.

The Council approved the conclusions reached by the COREPER. It also decided that the negotiations with Turkey be concluded in spring 1963 and the agreement enter into force as soon as possible due to political importance of the matter.<sup>214</sup> The German representative tried to expedite this timetable, but all delegations and the Commission argued that it would be seriously difficult to expedite the timetable. In this meeting devoted to the financial aspect, the Council reached decisions on the modalities of the financial aid to Turkey. One of these modalities was that the scale of the aid should not be inferior to the aid to Greece.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 6.

<sup>214</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Bruxelles, Les 3,4 ET 5 DECEMBRE 1962” (1963 854 p95, 1962).

<sup>215</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Conclusions Auxquelles Est Parvenu Le Conseil Au Cours de Sa 90e Session Des 17/18 et 18 Decembre 1962 En Ce Qui Concerne l’aspect Financier de l’Accord d’Association Envisagé Avec La Turquie S/688/62” (1963 854 p179, 1962).

The next round of negotiations between Turkey and the EEC took place in January 1963. These negotiations were first examined in the Committee of Association with Third Countries, which was established to address issues pertaining the countries with which the EEC did not have a special relationship. The committee prepared a document detailing the convergences and divergences between Turkey and the EEC on the substantive points of the Association agreement.<sup>216</sup> Turkey introduced the 22-year duration for preparatory and transition phase. This 22-year period was requested due to political reasons to portray the preparatory phase as a stage for the realization of the customs union and to enable planning for Turkish economy. The request was deemed contradictory to the Community's wish to render the Council of Association an independent decision-making body unrestrained by timetables.

The Turkish Delegation made the case for general principles to be applied during the transitory phase to fix objectives for the Turkish economy and for improving the presentation of the agreement to the GATT. The Committee believed such principles could be entertained only after the Council of Association deemed it possible that Turkey had the capacity to enter into a customs union. Concerning the institutional provisions of the Association agreement, Turkey requested an identical treatment on safeguard clauses, consultations, joint actions and the possibility of Turkish

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<sup>216</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Délibérations Du Comité 'Associations Pays Tiers' Au Sujet Des Résultats Des Conversations Entre La Délégation de La Commission et La La Délégation de La Turquie Qui Se Sont Déroulées Du 14 Au LE Jan\_vier 1963 à Bruxelles (S/91/63 (Nt 1))" (1963 855, 1963).

membership in the future. The Committee stated that there was not an instruction on these issues at that stage.

Turkey also made comprehensive requests for procedural rights during the preparatory period. For example, the Turkish delegation requested

- veto rights concerning the opening of quotas for the benefit of third countries concerning tobacco and raisins'
- veto rights on the common agricultural policy concerning tobacco until the end of the second stage of the Treaty of Rome;
- periodic examination of the economic Turkish economic situation.

The Committee decided to decline all these requests as a whole.

The Commission's evaluation of the negotiations with Turkey included a provision-by-provision compilation of differences between Turkey and the EEC. This document was similar to the document prepared by the Committee of Association with Third Countries. The Commission noted that the Turkish Delegation strongly insisted that the transition from preparatory to transitory stage should commence one year earlier.<sup>217</sup> The Turkish Delegation also requested discriminatory measures for ten products and an additional mechanism for increasing advantages offered to Turkey.

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<sup>217</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Résultats de La Phase Le Négociations Qui s'est Déroulée Du 14 Au 18 Janvier 1963 (Doc. Com. I/S/0207/63)" (1963 855 p44, 1963), 58.

Turkey's requests for including principles for the transition between the first and the second stages of the association were separately examined by the Commission.<sup>218</sup>

The Commission noted that the inclusion of principles could be accepted as long as the principles were not considered restrictive and did not cover the competence of the Council of Association.

The next round of negotiations with the Turkish delegation took place in March 1963.<sup>219</sup> While there was an agreement between the delegations concerning the draft agreement, there were still divergences concerning substantial issues. The Turkish Delegation again strongly insisted that the Council of Association periodically examine the results of the Association during the preparatory period. According to the Commission, "the Turkish side's permanent concern was to flesh out the preparatory period to give it the densest content possible."<sup>220</sup> The EEC was concerned that the Turkish side could use this mechanism to permanently debate to Association to revise it.

For the last phase of the negotiations, the Commission drew attention to the outstanding issues in the negotiations. According to the Commission, the major issue would be ascertaining the number of products for which concessions would be

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<sup>218</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Note Concernant Les Dispositions à Inclure Éventuellement Dans l'Accord Avec La Turquie Sous Un Titre 'Principes de La Période de Transition'" (1963 855 154, 1963).

<sup>219</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "COMPTE RENDU SOMMAIRE Des Conversations Entre Délégation de La Commission et La Délégation de La Turquie (12 - 15 Mars 1963) ' et Projet d'accord'" (858 5, 1963).

<sup>220</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 6.

accorded to Turkey.<sup>221</sup> The Commission suggested eliminating tariff quotas, which had no practical impact on Turkey but could act as a precedent for other countries. The issue of periodic examinations was again raised. The Commission stated that, for the purpose of compromise, it could be accepted that an exchange of views could be carried out instead of periodic examinations during the preparatory period.

In March 1963, as the Turkey-EEC negotiations were coming to end, the Greek Permanent Representation to the Community informed the Community of their deep concerns concerning the Association with Turkey.<sup>222</sup> The Greek Representative drew attention to products that were going to receive concessions within the framework of the Association and carried utmost importance for the Greek economy. Greece asked to present its views on this issue before the negotiations with Turkey were finalized.

In April 1963, the COREPER was finalizing its work on the negotiations with Turkey.<sup>223</sup> Italy maintained its reservations against adopting discriminatory measures against nuts and dry figs, while other delegations were agreement in adopting these measures. The Italian Delegation objected to increasing quotas for Turkey and a significant increase in imports to the Community of the products in question from third countries, including Greece. Concerning periodic examinations, the suggestion

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<sup>221</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Propositions Pour Une Phase Finale de Négociations" (1963 859 p14, 1963).

<sup>222</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Letter" (859 129, 1963).

<sup>223</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Conclusions Auxquelles a Abouti Le Comité Des Représentants Permanents En Ce Qui Concerne l'état Actuel de La Négociation Avec La Turquie" (859 p70, 1963).

of including the possibility of exchange of views during the preparatory period was accepted by the COREPER.

As negotiations with Turkey proceeded, Greece stepped up its efforts to draw attention to the possible disadvantages that Association with Turkey could bring to the Association with Greece. In this context, the Greek Delegation argued that Turkey would receive similar advantages to those of Greece and this situation would have an adverse impact on Greek public opinion.<sup>224</sup> Greece, in addition, requested that the Community should adopt measures to address the distorted balance in favor of Greece. In concrete terms, Greece should be involved in the negotiations for quotas concerning tobacco, the quota for raisins should not in any case exceed 18,000 tons. Concerning financial assistance, the Greek Delegation stated that assistance should not give the impression that Greece was being penalized to the benefit of a country that had not participated in the Second World War and hence had not suffered comparable destruction.

Greece also asked to be involved in the negotiations with Turkey.<sup>225</sup> Greece justified its request by making a reference to article 64 of the Athens Agreement. This article stipulated that:

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<sup>224</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Préparation à La 3ème Session Du Conseil d'Association C.E.E. - GleECE : Consultations Sur Les Négociations En Cours Avec La Turquie (S/303/63 (NG 42))" (859 p151, 1963).

<sup>225</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Consultations Entre La Communauté et La Grèce Au Sujet Des Négociations En Cours Avec La Turquie et l'Iran" (859 pğ61, 1963).

In the case of an accession or association agreement with the Community, it must be fully observed account of the mutual interests defined by this Agreement; adequate consultations will take place at this effect. In the case of an association, the adjustment of relations between Greece and the associated country may be the subject of an agreement after consultation of the Community.<sup>226</sup>

The Community responded that, while Greece could be consulted on concrete issues that could arise from the Association with Turkey, this provision did not permit Greece to be involved in the negotiations determining the general framework of the Association agreement. The Community also rejected Greece's claim that the Association with Turkey would harm the Association with Greece. According to the Council Secretariat, "The system of tariff quotas retained in favor of Turkey is less favorable than the tariff demobilization system from which Greece benefits".<sup>227</sup> The Secretariat explained that Turkey would not benefit from tariff demobilization, nor would it benefit from global quotas. Instead, it would benefit from a national quota system that did not permit transfer between national quotas when a national quota was filled. Furthermore, the advantages offered to Greece concerning tobacco were notably higher when compared to Turkey. Turkey was not going to benefit from

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<sup>226</sup> "Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Greece," 1961, [https://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/1039c1de-c68c-43a2-a45a-66aef48c5c6f#ea36b530-f7ee-46f3-a26b-5dc4ea1a5508\\_en&overlay](https://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/1039c1de-c68c-43a2-a45a-66aef48c5c6f#ea36b530-f7ee-46f3-a26b-5dc4ea1a5508_en&overlay).

<sup>227</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Consultations Entre La Communauté et La Grèce Au Sujet Des Négociations En Cours Avec La Turquie et L'Iran," 8.

commitments by monopolies to purchase Greek tobacco. For example, Italy guaranteed the purchase of 2.8 million dollars of tobacco from Greece. A similar commitment in respect to Turkey was not provided. The Secretariat concluded that the Association with Turkey did not harm the Association with Greece.

Greek authorities did not accept the explanations put forward by the Community. In another letter, dated 8 May 1963, the Greek representative stated that the quotas granted to Turkey were excessive and the draft provisions of the Association agreement with Ankara would hinder the objectives of the Athens Agreement.<sup>228</sup> But the Greek demands did not elicit positive responses from the EEC.

The financial aspect of the Association Agreement with Turkey was still unresolved.

This issue was taken up again during the Council meeting in April 1963.<sup>229</sup>

Considerable progress on this issue was achieved when the EEC's Ministers of Finance reached an agreement on the modalities and the amount of financial assistance. The financial assistance was planned to be 125 million dollars for five years. The German Delegation insisted on increasing the amount of financial assistance, as the amount appeared to be low when compared to the assistance delivered to Greece and African countries. According to the German representative, Turkey's position in the Western defense alliance needed to be acknowledged. Yet

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<sup>228</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Greek Permanent Representation to the EEC/ Letter" (862 p 4, 1963).

<sup>229</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SESSION RESTREINTE DU CONSEIL DE LA C.E.E., Tenue à Bruxelles, Les 1-2 Avril 1963 (r/295/63)" (860 p26, 1963).

the Six failed to reach an agreement on the final amount of the assistance during this meeting.

During the Council meeting in May 1963, the amount of financial assistance to Turkey was again negotiated.<sup>230</sup> The German Representative argued that the amount of 150 million dollars was notably low when compared to Greece, which had one-third the population of Turkey and received 125 million dollars for five years. In addition, the German representative claimed that Turkey might not accept such an amount and thus the negotiations might fail. In response to the remarks of the German representative, the French representative proposed 175 million dollars. The Italian representative objected since the share of Italy would exceed the maximum amount that Italy could assume. Finally, the German representative accepted a lower amount of assistance by the Netherlands, which reduced the amount of assistance of Italy. After years of negotiations, the amount of financial assistance to Turkey was determined.

In the Turkish domestic scene, the ratification of the Ankara Agreement was supported virtually by all political parties and was not subject to a serious parliamentary objection.<sup>231</sup> It is noteworthy that there was no substantial debate or objection to ratification. Then-Foreign Minister Kemal Satır indicated that the agreement presented more favorable terms to Turkey and needed to be quickly

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<sup>230</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Extrait Du Procès-Verbal Concernant La 101ème Session Du Conseil de La CEE" (862 p6, 1963).

<sup>231</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 14.01.1964," n.d.

ratified. The speakers on behalf of CHP emphasized that the agreement was a historical decision for Turkey, which committed itself to improve its economic structure to be on equal footing with European countries. The speakers argued that Turkey needed to use the preparatory period to ensure that Turkey would successfully realize its commitments for the entirety of the Association. The New Turkey Party (a conservative-liberal party which attempted to fill the gap left by the closed Democrat Party) Representative Fahrettin Kerim Gökay and representative of Justice Party Erol Yılmaz Akçal also supported the ratification. Coşkun Kırca from the CHP, speaking on the party's behalf, drew attention to the pitfalls of a quick integration with the EEC, predicting that it would lead to a widening trade deficit with the EEC.<sup>232</sup> Among five speakers, he was the only one that addressed possible negative ramifications of the Association on Turkish economy.

The application to EEC for Association status did not receive significant attention in the press. Some major newspapers did not even report it.<sup>233</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, a left-leaning newspaper, did publish some negative views of the Association. The newspaper underlined that Turkish industry would be rendered defenseless against European competition. According to Esat Tekeli, Turkey should refrain from hastily applying to the EEC and trying to match Greece. He also questioned whether Turkish

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<sup>232</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 14.01.1964," 87.

<sup>233</sup> Kaan Gaytancıoğlu, "TÜRKİYE'NİN AVRUPA EKONOMİK TOPLULUĞU'NA ÜYELİK BAŞVURUSU'NUN BASINA YANSIMALARI," *Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi* 8, no. 2 (2009): 62.

enterprises could compete with those of Germany, France, and Italy, and he suggested that this process should have been debated in Parliament.<sup>234</sup>

The press reported more on the ceremonial aspects of the Ankara Agreement than the substantial issues pertaining to the Association. In the daily *Akşam*, the Deputy Prime minister underlined that the long-term impact of the Ankara Agreement would be positive on the Turkish economy, ensuring that the Turkish exports were treated equally in the Common Market.<sup>235</sup> In *Cumhuriyet*, the Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin emphasized that the Common Market was first and foremost a question of common mentality. According to him, it was only natural that Turkey wanted to be a member of this organization, as it wanted all countries to live in peace and prosperity.<sup>236</sup> *Cumhuriyet* also indicated that the President of the Chamber of Commerce and the President of the Textile Federation Bahir Ersoy indicated that they were not of the opinion that the Association would have a negative impact on the Turkish economy.<sup>237</sup> The daily *Hürriyet* indicated that Prime Minister İsmet İnönü stated that the Association was a natural and logical result of the relationship between the West and Turkey.<sup>238</sup> In the daily *Vatan*, Vehbi Koç, a prominent entrepreneur and the founder of Koç Conglomerate, stated that entry to the Common

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<sup>234</sup> Esat Tekeli, "Son Günlerin Olaylarına Bakış," *Cumhuriyet*1, August 29, 1959.

<sup>235</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, *Ankara Antlaşmasının İmzalanması Sırasında Basınımızdan Bazı Özetler* (İstanbul: Mayataş Matbaalık ve Neşriyat, 1973), 5.

<sup>236</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, *Ankara Antlaşmasının İmzalanması Sırasında Basınımızdan Bazı Özetler* (İstanbul: Mayataş Matbaalık ve Neşriyat, 1973).

<sup>237</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı.

<sup>238</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı.

Market would encourage the development of the Turkish economy. According to Koç, the loans provided by the EEC and the companies that would be established by European entrepreneurs would help Turkey to develop export capacity and tourism.

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The negotiations within the EEC demonstrate that Turkey's geopolitical importance was never questioned, but this importance did not guarantee a smooth acceptance of Turkey's requests to be treated on equal footing with Greece. Italy's reservations, which even drew the attention of other delegations, had nothing to do with Turkey's commitment to Western values or Turkey's economic or political instability. The records of negotiations suggest the issue solely stemmed from Italy's economic concerns.

On a more fundamental level, these negotiations demonstrate that the mere idea of an Association with Turkey, similar to that of Greece, was debated intensively within the EEC. It took a notable time period for delegations to reach agreement on the issue of whether an association agreement with Turkey was desirable. The idea whether a more basic cooperation agreement with Turkey would be more appropriate was seriously entertained. The capacity of Turkey's economy to fulfil obligations stemming from the Association was questioned by the EEC. It is highly possible that the political importance attached to Turkey was the main reason why Turkey was

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<sup>239</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı.

offered an agreement with membership prospect despite its economic and political issues.

Throughout, the possible response of the US and the limitations of GATT hovered over the association negotiations with Turkey. The post-World War II economic order required a customs union to justify discriminatory measures, which was by definition present in the Customs Union envisaged by the Ankara Agreement. The GATT's waiver was required to proceed with the agreement. However, despite its potential impact on the materialization of the designs of the agreements, it did not play an important role in the negotiations. After GATT's approval was taken in 1964, this topic did not surface again in the negotiations.<sup>240</sup>

Last but not least, Greece started to use its status as the first Associate to pressure the EEC to decrease the concessions given to Turkey before the signature of the Association agreement. While this pressure was not yet significant, this development foreshadowed Greece's and other associates' impact on the Association with Turkey.

From a theoretical perspective, the negotiations preceding the Ankara Agreement demonstrate that there was neither autonomous supranational body nor were idea entrepreneurs. While there was a consensus on Turkey's pivotal role in the Cold War superpower competition, its role was not a crucial topic that came up during the negotiations. Rather the crucial topic was the distribution of costs and benefits of

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<sup>240</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, 205.

Association and how to manage the interdependency that would result from it. The Association still was not a topic that drew the attention of public. Therefore, it would be accurate to say that it still did not become a part of developmental politics, probably because the Association was not going to impose obligations to Turkey in the initial years and it still continued to be an exclusive topic for bureaucrats. However, the Association's distance from the public was going to dramatically decrease in the coming years, as it would be blamed for derailing Turkey's development.

## CHAPTER 4: TRANSITION PHASE: ASSOCIATION WITH TURKEY—ONE OF MANY

The negotiations preceding the transition phase highlight the concerns of the EEC regarding the Turkish economy's ability to assume the obligations after the preparatory period. The Commission, due to these concerns, put forward two scenarios, namely the minimum and maximum hypothesis, to ensure that Turkey's relative economic weakness could be accommodated when it started to fulfill the obligations that would stem from the Association. While there were serious doubts whether Turkey could actually realize its promises, the transition to the second phase of the Association was necessary for political and psychological reasons. This once again strongly suggested that the primary driving force behind the Association was political rather than economic considerations.

The negotiation of the Additional Protocol, the legal instrument which would regulate the transition period, also showed underlying divergences about development between the EEC and Turkey. According to the former, the removal of tariffs and restrictions would expedite Turkey's development, while the latter advocated further concessions on its agricultural exports, which formed the backbone of its economy. After back and forth over these divergences, Turkey and the EEC succeeded in a compromise, which would be a short-lived one.

The negotiations over the Additional Protocol also demonstrate that the EEC's increasing trade relationship between other countries had an adverse impact on the

Association. Turkey's demands for further concessions were assessed negatively by the EEC, as the EEC was strengthening its cooperation with the Maghreb countries and Spain. The EEC was also aware that the generalized preferences system was going to erode the weight of concessions accorded to Turkey. The negotiations clearly show that the Association with Turkey was now being compared not only with that of Greece but also with those of the Maghreb countries and other countries with which the EEC was forming trade relationships similar to that of Turkey.

It is striking that, while the signature of the Ankara agreement received scant media attention, the Additional Protocol and the future of Association became controversial topics in the Turkish press and Parliament. This trend would intensify as the obligations that stemmed from the Additional Protocol promised to have a crucial bearing on Turkey's development policies in stark contrast to the preparatory period during which Turkey did not have any obligations.

The 1960 Constitution paved the way for establishment of the SPO, which prepared five-year plans for coordinating the development of all sectors of the Turkish economy. The SPO published the first plan in 1963. The first plan covered the year 1963 — 1967. The Association did not garner much attention in the first development plans. There was a one-year gap between the approval of the 1<sup>st</sup> 5-Year Plan and the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement. However, the plan gave the impression that the Ankara Agreement would not have any impact on the planning of the Turkish economy, as there was no concrete assessment of the relationship

between the obligations stemming from the Association and the planning of Turkish economy. There was just a very abstract reference to the EEC, stating that the impact of the EEC to the Turkish economy would be closely followed.<sup>241</sup> While the EEC was intensifying its relationship with the Mediterranean, particularly the Maghreb countries, the 2<sup>nd</sup> 5-Year Plan also only briefly mentioned the Association. The plan stated that Association agreement was gaining importance, and it underscored that Turkey should strengthen its economy to finish the preparatory stage in time.<sup>242</sup>

Another important development regarding the economic relationship between the EEC and Turkey was sending Turkish workers to EEC member states. The rights and situation of these workers would become a permanent topic in the upcoming negotiations between the EEC and Turkey.<sup>243</sup> Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement stipulated the articles of the Treaty of Rome concerning the free movement of workers would be utilized progressively for establishing freedom of movement for workers between the EEC and Turkey. The Additional Protocol's Article 36 would be the first concrete steps towards regulating this process. Said article indicated free movement of workers should be secured by progressive stages between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year following the Association Agreement, that is to say between December 1976 and December 1986. This issue was going to have an increasing importance throughout the negotiations, as the number of migrant workers

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<sup>241</sup> State Planning Organization, "1. 5 Yıllık Kalkınma Planı," 1963.

<sup>242</sup> State Planning Organization, "2. 5 Senelik Kalkınma Planı," 1967, 123.

<sup>243</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 838.

to the West Germany in particular and the EEC in general was going to increase dramatically in the coming years.

From a theoretical perspective, the negotiations of Additional Protocol suggest that developmental politics regarding the Association had fully formed, and the Protocol's contents became a public concern. While the previous negotiations were carried out in an isolated manner and the public was not much interested in the progress of negotiations, the negotiations and contents of Additional Protocol became fully politicized. Regarding EU trade theories, factors outlined by liberal intergovernmentalism become more visible, while factors emphasized by realism and supranationalism seemed not to be playing a key role in the negotiations. In fact, negotiations examined below rarely made reference to Cold War concerns or normative issues. The topics negotiated were now fully technical and related to the distribution of possible outcomes of the transition phases which would be governed by the Additional Protocol.

The Demirel government, which came to power in 1965, aimed at proceeding to the transition phase. The Demirel government's primary reason for proceeding to the transition phase was political, since they wanted credit for taking the relationship with the EEC to the next level. Furthermore, the Turkish MFA also advocated transitioning to the second stage in the Association relationship. According to this perspective, as the fundamental institutions were in place and functioning smoothly, there was no need to wait for a couple of years. A more conservative approach

compared to the MFA, represented by the SPO, argued that Turkey should first reach the economic level of the EEC before proceeding to the transition stage.<sup>244</sup>

The EEC, on the other hand, had its own internal problems, which put the Turkish association on the backburner. Firstly, the obstructionism of De Gaulle within the EEC and his veto of the UK's membership placed the EEC in a challenging situation.<sup>245</sup> At the same time, the EEC was also intensifying its relationship with the Mediterranean countries, particularly Morocco and Algeria, which had a bearing on the pace of Turkey's association. Previously, there was only Greece that could be compared with Turkey. Now there were other countries with similar economies, whose relationship with the EEC had to be taken into account.

In February 1968, the Turkish Permanent Representation to the EEC formally raised the topic of proceeding to the transition phase of the Association. Upon reception of this message, the Commission prepared a preliminary report on the matter and submitted it to the Council.<sup>246</sup> The report emphasized that the transition process implied that Turkey could assume obligations for achieving customs union with the EEC in 12 years. The Commission underlined that the negotiations for the protocol that would regulate the transition should not impose obligations on the Turkish economy which might increase its risks of experiencing a balance of payments crisis

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<sup>244</sup> Erhan and Arat, 839.

<sup>245</sup> Erhan and Arat, 842.

<sup>246</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "RAPPORT PRELIMINAIRE DE LA COMMISSION AU CONSEIL AU SUJET DU PASSAGE DE LA PHASE PREPARATOIRE A LA PHASE TRANSITOIRE DE L'ACCORD D'ASSOCIATION AVEC LA TURQUIE (SEC(68) 1386 Final)."

and contribute to the Turkish economy so that it became less dependent on external aid. The Commission also noted that the Turkish economy's progress since 1963 was remarkable, however this situation "was not an adequate response" to whether the Turkish economy could proceed to the transition phase.<sup>247</sup>

The Commission, during its examination of the Turkish economy, drew attention to the high level of tariffs against imports. The high level of protection accorded to enterprises, according to the Commission, led to non-competitive products. While acknowledging that the Turkish authorities were trying to address this question by revising the tariffs, the Commission noted that the eradication of tariffs would be an important undertaking for the state budget, which received an important source of revenue from the tariffs.

Concerning the quantitative restrictions, the Commission highlighted that Turkey's 2<sup>nd</sup> Five-Year Plan foresaw the continuation of the system and the introduction of further quotas when there might be a need to protect new products until they become competitive. As the transition stage would require a cancellation of these quotas, Turkey could only carry out this liberalization process gradually and not in a quick fashion in favor of the EEC due to its already weak currency reserves.

The importance of increasing exports of the Turkish economy in the international arena was emphasized by the Commission. According to the Commission, a strong

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<sup>247</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 4.

Turkish industrial base in manufacturing goods was indispensable for opening the Turkish economy to the competitive power of the EEC. Taking into account the modest figures of Turkish exports to the EEC, the Commission underlined that a gradual sector-specific approach could be viable. On the agricultural front, the Commission predicted that the agricultural produce of Turkey could be exported to the EEC in increasing quantities, but without a reciprocal competitiveness from the EEC. The Commission also examined the workforce in Turkey, observing that the recent immigration of workers to the EEC contributed to the Turkish economy.

The Commission was, nevertheless, cognizant of Article 12 of the Association agreement which foresaw a gradual freedom of movement for workers, indicated that the EEC could take further measures to that effect. However, the content and scope of such measures remained unclear and were going to be the topic of further negotiations. The Commission suggested only in abstract terms that the workers of associate countries could get a second priority after the workers of the Community. The Commission also underlined that such a priority could not be given only to Turkey, as there were other countries with which the EEC concluded similar agreements. If such measures could not be implemented, the Commission offered other alternatives such as transfer of insurances, which could continue to be a source of assistance to Turkish economy, even in modest terms.

The Commission refrained from definitely concluding whether a prolongation of the preparatory period or the commencement of the transition period was more

appropriate. Before receiving the official views of the Turkish side, the Commission suggested that, based on common interest, the EEC should make efforts to conclude the preparatory stage as soon as possible.

Regarding the content of protocol which would regulate the transition phase, the Commission suggested three general principles. Firstly, the protocol should emphasize reciprocity and balance in the Association relationship, since the preparatory stage of the Association did not bring any obligations for Turkey. The Commission underlined that the EEC was cognizant of different levels of development of its partners and therefore did not ask for a strict reciprocity from them. Secondly, the Commission noted that the timeline as well as the exceptions to the timeline of the transition should be determined to ensure a timely and orderly shift to the customs union. Thirdly, the Commission emphasized that the transition stage should include arrangement for the harmonization of agricultural policies of Turkey with that of the EEC as the Customs Union envisaged free circulation of agricultural products.

After presenting its principles, the Commission firstly suggested a “minimum hypothesis.” This minimal approach was based on a prudent prediction of the trajectory of the Turkish economy. Within this perspective, the EEC would be inclined to accept a flexible reduction of tariffs and quantitative restrictions, hence a slow timetable for liberalization. After a period of flexible restrictions, the Turkish authorities would then proceed to a quicker paced liberalization. The EEC then

would reciprocate with Turkey. During this stage, the EEC could assist the Turkish economy with a number of schemes such as differentiated prices for its agricultural products. For products important to the Turkish economy, such as raisins and figs, Turkey could benefit from intra-community quotas during these flexible years of the transition phase. In return, Turkey would give commercial concessions to the products originating from the EEC.

The Commission also suggested a “maximum hypothesis,” according to which Turkish authorities would receive similar treatment to that of the Association with Greece. The EEC planned that, after the transition period, it’s the intra-Community regime would be extended to Greece. The Commission underlined that this arrangement was particular for Greece and in no way should be evaluated as a precedent for other association agreements. If Turkey wanted to undertake more demanding obligations found in the Association with Greece, the EEC could not stand insensitive to that demand and could formulate a relationship accordingly.

In its preliminary report, the Commission examined the Turkish economy. According to the Commission’s analysis, the stabilization program launched in 1958 was a result of the increasing external debt, which was a result of the increased gap between the external and internal prices of commodities. This was a result of the policy of the government, which resulted in the expansion of activities of state enterprises which provided goods and services below the market price. Due to rising external debt, the manufacturers found it more and more difficult to purchase

machinery from abroad, making the increase in production very slow. In these circumstances, the stabilization program that was launched in August 1958 and implemented by the post-1960 government removed the distorted price mechanism and addressed the losses incurred by the state enterprises, making them function according to their own revenues. The most important policy change was pegging the Turkish lira to the dollar at a rate of one to nine for all imports and exports. As a result of these policies, the price mechanism started to function more accurately. Turkey also received external aid from the IMF, the United States, and the EEC. The Commission noted that this program was productive and that Turkey introduced its first five-year plan in 1963 to achieve a more sustained growth.

According to the Commission, the first five-year plan was effective and the years it covered (1963-1967) witnessed a yearly growth rate of 6.7 percent, below the plan's forecast of 7 percent but above the average of 5 percent of the 1950s.<sup>248</sup> The agricultural field, forming the 37 percent the GNP, was directly related to 68 percent of the population, with 23 million people living in rural areas. While the agricultural targets fixed by the development plan were not met, the targets for cotton, tobacco, and oil consumption exceeded the targets. Regarding the workforce, the Commission drew attention to the permanent presence of surplus labor. Taking into account the fact that 70 percent of the workforce worked in the agricultural field, the seasonal change in the workforce was dramatic. For example, from July to August there was a

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<sup>248</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 31.

need for 9.2 million agricultural workers while in December there was a need for only 2.3 million workers. The emigration from Turkey to the EEC relieved some pressure from the workforce and led to remittances being sent to Turkey from abroad.

The Commission also scrutinized the export structure of Turkey. While there was a regular increase in the volume of export, from 368 million dollars in 1963 to 490 million dollars in 1966, the type of goods exported had not changed. Agricultural products amounted to 80 percent of the goods exported, of which the following five were the leading ones: cotton, tobacco, nuts, dried figs, and raisins (60 percent of the total). While Turkey also exported copper and petroleum products, the Commission noted the absence of manufactured products. Furthermore, the volume of imports was also increasing from 572 in 1965 to 718 million dollars in 1966. Between the entry into force of the Ankara Agreement in 1964 and 1966, the exports of Turkey to the EEC increased by 24 percent while the rest of the world's exports increased by 17 percent. On the other hand, imports originating from the EEC rose by 53 percent, while imports originating from the rest of the world increased only by 25 percent. As a result of these developments, Turkey's balance of Turkey increased from 108 million dollars in 1965 to 228 million dollars in 1966. The commercial balance was also in favor of the EEC by 6 million dollars in 1965, and this figure climbed to 65 million dollars in 1966. The trend of increasing trade deficit between the EEC and

Turkey would intensify in the coming years and become a recurrent concern raised by Turkey.

The Commission concluded the examination of the Turkish economy by indicating that the results of the 1<sup>st</sup> five-year plan were encouraging and led to a growth higher than average. But the Commission underlined that the industrial sector was weak due to high levels of protection, and this prevented it from being competitive in the international arena. The priority given to the public sector in the framework of the plan was also suggested as a factor contributing scarcely to the growth of Turkish economy.

The Commission's preliminary report was transmitted to the Committee on Association with Third Countries, a committee that worked on the topic of association agreements that were negotiated with the third countries, before being discussed by COREPER.<sup>249</sup> The Committee on Association with Third Countries unanimously agreed with the Commission on proceeding to the transition stage. The Committee stated that, "while economic arguments advocated the prolongation of the preparatory stage, the political and psychological reasons" made a shift to the transition stage appropriate.<sup>250</sup> In this vein, the Committee also emphasized the importance of the reciprocal and balanced character of the transition stage. It was

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<sup>249</sup> The mandate and composition of the Commission could not be found. The Archives of the European Council could not also find it.

<sup>250</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Passage de La Phase Préparatoire à La Phase Transitoire de l'Accord d'Association Avec La Turquie S/555/61 (NT 24)" (1473.p3, 1968), 11.

also recalled that, during the preparatory stage, the Community accorded concessions to 85 percent of exports of Turkey to the EEC, while Turkey had offered very limited concessions. In this regard, most of the delegations in the Committee suggested Turkey should focus more on the quantitative restrictions while taking into account challenges such as the deficit in the balance of payments.

The Committee suggested that the EEC could offer supplementary concessions in the industrial sector by including Turkey in the intra-community regime with the exception of textiles and with a few safeguard clauses. Doubts were raised over this idea, as offering this concession contradicted the logic of negotiation tactics. Some also asked whether Turkey would be able to benefit from such a concession, as its exports were not diversified. Concerning supplementary concessions on agriculture, the Committee entertained the idea of removing quantitative restrictions and tariffs for certain products Turkey exported to the EEC.

The Committee also decided that the “hypothesis minimum” could be taken as a reference point and be assessed as the negotiations with the Turkish Delegation unfolded. It also underlined that the negotiations should not be delayed as this could cause further complications regarding the realization and ratification of the additional protocol that would lead to transition stage.

The Committee touched upon the issue of workforce. While the Turkish side raised the situation of Turkish workers in the EEC, the delegations stressed the limited options they had in this regard. The delegations were inclined to reject the

Commission's proposal to grant second priority to Turkish workers.<sup>251</sup> While some delegations stated that the current arrangements were satisfactory for the situation of Turkish workers, other delegations indicated they could consider improved access of Turkish workers to social security systems. After these deliberations, the Committee decided that it would be premature to address the question of the Turkish workforce in the EEC. COREPER deliberated on the issues mentioned above and suggested to the Council that it would be premature to decide on the specifics of the transitional stage. In its meeting in July 1968, without much discussion, the Council decided that it would be appropriate to plan for proceeding to the transition stage of the Association with Turkey and instructed the Commission to prepare a detailed study of the possible transition phase.<sup>252</sup>

In the second report on the transition stage with Turkey, the Commission observed that the Turkish economy's trajectory was positive and that the Turkish authorities were attaching utmost importance to the international competitiveness of newly established enterprises. The Commission added that reform and planning initiatives bolstered Turkish economy's growth. Given the fragile standing of the Turkish economic actors, both in the agricultural and industrial sectors, the Commission suggested that during the first years of the transition stage, preferably up until 1973 (which would be the first year of the 3<sup>rd</sup> five-year plan), a prudent approach ought to

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<sup>251</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 21.

<sup>252</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA 45 SESSION DU CONSEIL (R2110/268)" (1970 1473 P. 186, 1968).

be pursued.<sup>253</sup> The Commission emphasized that a concrete framework for the transition stage would be “a stimulant” for the Turkish economy.

The Commission then examined the modalities of the transition stage. According to the Commission, the tariffs should be removed in 12 years. For products whose transition would require longer periods, this period could last 22 years. Products whose tariffs would be removed in 12 or 22 years would be determined by Turkey and could be changed by Turkey if they pertained to fledgling industries and provided that their volume did not exceed 15 percent of imports from the EEC. Measures having an impact on tariffs would also need to be removed in due course, including municipality, stamp duty, and taxes on production.<sup>254</sup> The common external tariff would also need to be applied in 12 years, except for the products whose liberalization would take place in 22 years. To support Turkey’s steps at the beginning of the transitional stage, the Commission suggested that the EEC lower Community tariffs by 50 percent. The remaining tariffs would be lowered at a later point when Turkey assumed its obligations, probably after the announcement of 3<sup>rd</sup> five-year plan. According to the Commission, Turkey was also expected to remove subsidies to export companies at the same pace of removal of the duties applied to Turkish products by the EEC.

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<sup>253</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “DEUXIEME RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION AU CONSEIL Au Sujet Du Passage de La Phase Préparatoire à La Phase Transitoire de l’accord d’association Avec La Turquie (Sec (68) 3173 Final)” (1970 1473 p193, 1968), 5.

<sup>254</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 7.

With respect to the quantitative restrictions, the Commission stated that they played an immensely important role for developing countries that regularly faced balance of payments crises. The Commission argued that this policy shielded domestic enterprises from international competition, thus making them less productive than their competitors. According to the Commission, “Thereby the Turkish economy has largely lost touch with the realities of the global economy.”<sup>255</sup> The Commission predicted that Turkey could only liberalize 40 percent of imports in the beginning of the transition phase. Turkey was expected to remove quantitative restrictions, which were composed of bans on, export licenses, and the register of exports in 12 or 22 years.

Concerning preferences for agricultural products, the Commission argued that a preferential list including agricultural products could be established to support Turkish agriculture and further ensure the harmonization of Turkish agricultural policies with that of the EEC.<sup>256</sup> When determining these preferences, the Commission underlined that they needed to be in line with those accorded to Tunisia, Morocco, and Spain for similar products. In this framework, the Commission proposed concessions in different forms for various vegetables, fresh grapes, fresh fish, vine, raw tobacco, dried figs, raisins, and nuts. In return for these concessions,

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<sup>255</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 13.

<sup>256</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 20.

Turkey was expected to provide concessions for a number of products such as live animals.

On the issue of labor mobility, the Commission stated that 22 years would be the maximum period for the introduction of freedom of movement. To achieve this objective, the Commission argued that Turkey should be guaranteed, during the transition stage, the abolition of all forms of discrimination based on nationality between Turkish workers and workers who are citizens of member states in respect of their compensation and condition of work.<sup>257</sup>

The Commission concluded by stating that, although the trajectory of the Turkish economy was positive, the reforms undertaken by the Turkish authorities would not yield immediate results. The Commission insisted that the transition stage would slowly contribute to the modernization of Turkish economy. Yet, given the current circumstances of the Turkish economy, the Commission favored a prudent approach.<sup>258</sup> The EEC would start for industrial products a reduction of tariffs up to 60 percent at the beginning of the transition phase, while Turkey would start introducing substantial concessions after 1973, the year when the 3<sup>rd</sup> five-year plan was going to be announced. For quantitative restrictions, the EEC would again accord the intra-community treatment to Turkey at the beginning of the transition,

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<sup>257</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 25.

<sup>258</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 34.

while Turkey was expected to reach a liberalization rate of 35 percent at the same stage due to its fragility of economy.

The Committee on Association with Third Countries examined the second report of the Commission and reached the following observations for presenting to the COREPER. After recalling that the preparatory period was supposed to end in December 1969 and pointing out that both parties had reached an agreement in October 1967 to start negotiations for proceeding to the transition phase, the Committee explored the two hypotheses that had been presented by the Commission. The Committee agreed with the Commission's call for a prudent approach, in other words endorsing the hypothesis minimum, due to the level of development of Turkish economy.<sup>259</sup> The Committee underlined that a degree of flexibility should be shown to Turkey as its economy was undergoing significant changes. Furthermore, the Committee argued that in respect to agricultural goods, the free movement of agricultural goods would require harmonization of Turkish agricultural policy with that of the EEC, and that it was therefore not possible at this stage. The Committee favored a more ad-hoc approach to agricultural products. Due to these factors, the Committee indicated that the concrete details of the Additional Protocol could be determined by the Council of Association in future.

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<sup>259</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Projet de Rapport Du Comité "Associations Pays Tiers" Au Comité Des Représentants Permanents Concernant l'état Des Travaux (S/1003/68 (NT 31))" (1474 p. 239, 1968), 7.

The Committee on Association with Third Countries and the Commission agreed that a prudent approach towards Turkey would be more appropriate given the country's challenging economic conditions. However, they refrained from taking concrete positions on the quotas of agricultural products, which were highly important for EEC member states. This led them to defer this critical topic to the consideration of the Council.

In trying out the details of the transition stage, the Committee agreed with the proposals of the Commission while pointing out that the Additional Protocol should be reciprocal and balanced. In the negotiations, the German delegation favored a more generous approach to Turkey in line with its established policy of supporting strengthened relations with Turkey, while others supported the position of the Commission. All delegations pointed to the necessity of safeguard clauses, in case Turkish agricultural exports to the EEC increased rapidly. The Italian Delegation was against the removal of quantitative restrictions for sensitive products.<sup>260</sup> The agricultural chapter of the negotiations was examined more in-depth by the Committee on Association with Third Countries, as there were a number of points raised in relation to the concessions for agricultural exports from Turkey to the

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<sup>260</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 27.

EEC.<sup>261</sup> There was unanimity in opposing providing concessions to sugar and canned fruit exports from Turkey, as “Turkey had an interest in exporting them.”

As the first round of negotiations took place in December 1968, the Committee’s preparations took more concrete forms. In the negotiations, the Turkish side argued that the demobilization of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the field of agriculture should not be linked to a determined timetable, as a fixed timetable would not be in line with the flexibility required by Turkey’s development plans. The Committee, while noting that demobilization was essential for the eventual establishment of the Customs Union, argued that the EEC could accept Turkey’s demands in the industrial sector to strengthen its bargaining position in the agricultural sector.<sup>262</sup> In this vein, it was proposed that the Additional Protocol could include a timetable for demobilization, which could be subject to change with the approval of the Council of Association. Furthermore, the timetable could be modified as long as the customs union was established in 22 years.

The Turkish side argued that the EEC’s offers in the industrial sector were not enough. While the EEC offered an initial reduction of tariffs by 60 percent, followed by two reductions of 20 percent after 3 and 6 years, Turkey requested an immediate inclusion to the intra-community system for industrial products. The Delegations

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<sup>261</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Passage de La Phase Préparatoire à La Phase Transitoire de l’Accord d’Association Avec La Turquie : - Volet Agricole (3/1019/68 (NT 33))” (1970 1474 p330, 1968), 1.

<sup>262</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes (S/414/69 (NT 22), “Principaux Problèmes Qui Se Posent En Ce Qui Concerne Le Contenu Possible de La Phase Transitoire” (1970 1476 p3, 1969), 4.

again suggested the offer could be revised to ensure a better position for the EEC in the other aspects of the protocol, therefore ensuring the balance of the relationship. It was noted that further concessions on the industrial field would yield only a psychological impact on the Turkish economy.<sup>263</sup> These deliberations demonstrate that the EEC was hesitant to offer concessions on the agricultural products that mattered most to Turkey. Instead, the EEC offered concessions on industrial products, which would have only a “psychological” impact.

In respect to agricultural products, the Committee underlined the difference in the position of both parties regarding the concrete steps to be taken at the beginning of the transition phase. The Committee summarized the approach of the Turkish Delegation by observing, “The Turkish delegation would like the Community to take into account not only the current level of its trade, but also its production and export prospects.” The Turkish side’s requests pertained not only to current agricultural products but also to future progress. In response, the Committee stated that false hopes should not be given to Turkey.<sup>264</sup> The Committee noted that if the requests of the Turkish side were met, Turkey would be in a better position compared to the member states, as Turkey would be enjoying the advantages of being a member state without being subject to the obligations stemming from being a member state (such as financial dues). In this context, the Committee suggested taking into account the

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<sup>263</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes (S/414/69 (NT 22), 10.

<sup>264</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes (S/414/69 (NT 22), 14.

fact that unilateral concessions were granted to Turkey during the preparatory phase, which covered all products of Turkey, and the offer of the Community in the additional protocol negotiations included a number of advantages for Turkey. In this context, the Committee indicated to COREPER that the EEC was not in a condition to fully demobilize in the agricultural sector, and suggested that, in the next round of negotiations, COREPER instruct Turkey that there was no need for rigid demobilization in the agricultural sector. The Committee was thus softening the industrial demobilization scheme for a more rigid approach in the agricultural sector.

The situation of Turkish workers was another issue where there was disagreement between Turkey and the EEC. Turkey requested a preferential regime for its citizens in Europe, while the EEC stressed that what it could offer on this field was very limited. The idea of further concessions and increased economic growth in Turkey as key to creating a downward trend in Turkish migration to the EEC was never raised. On the contrary, the worsening economic conditions in Turkey as well as in Europe deepened concerns about a possible influx of guest workers to Europe. This led to a situation where the negotiations did not focus on the freedom of movement per se, but on the secondary issues such as training programs. The requests of Turkish side were according second priority to Turkish workers in access to the employment in the EEC, equal treatment in social security from the beginning of the transition phase, and training programs. The Committee indicated that none of the requests of Turkish side had been adequately examined by member states and argued that the

free movement of workers ought to be evaluated in conjunction with the freedom to establish enterprise and freedom to provide services.

The Committee concluded that, while the Turkish side requested considerable concessions in the field of agriculture and workforce, the EEC was not in a position to improve the terms of the negotiations for these topics. It was only in the field of industry that there was room for improvement. The EEC could insist on an accelerated demobilization of the tariffs imposed on investment goods and primary materials imported from the EEC to Turkey.

The Committee also noted the Turkish side was drawing attention to the negative impact of the EEC's possible introduction of generalized system of preferences for developing countries as the Association system and this system was inherently linked to each other.<sup>265</sup> While the EEC delegation stressed that these two instruments were not linked to each other, the Committee plainly stated:

It is a *fact* that the granting of generalized preferences can lead in practice—and for the duration of these preferences—to a *reduction or elimination of the preferential margin granted to Turkey* within the framework of the Association and may even lead to treatment of Turkey less favorable than that accorded to other third countries (in the event that Turkey would not be eligible for these preferences). [emphasis mine]<sup>266</sup>

The Commission, in its communication on the negotiations with Turkey to the Council, reiterated its position on the reduction of tariffs firstly by 60 percent and subsequently all of them in 6 years. The Commission underlined that such a position

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<sup>265</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes (S/414/69 (NT 22), 25.

<sup>266</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes (S/414/69 (NT 22), 26.

would not only encourage Turkey to soften its position on the issues of agriculture and workforce but also constitute merely a psychological impact as Turkish industry would not be able to produce an important group of industrial products in the near future.<sup>267</sup> According to the Commission, the Turkish side's reluctance to link demobilization of tariffs to a specific deadline and a group of products could be addressed by giving the Council of Association the power to examine the trajectory of the Association periodically. The Commission was of the opinion that making the Council of Association the decision-making body for determining the pace of the demobilization of tariffs would be adequate to address Turkey's concerns. Therefore, a list of products whose tariffs would be demobilized in the transition could be annexed to the protocol.

The Commission noted that Turkey's demands that Turkish workers in the EEC be accorded a second priority could not be met and stated that the free circulation of workers would not be in effect until 1976, 12 years after the signing of Ankara Agreement. Germany was the first destination for Turkish workers. The number of Turkish people in Germany rose from 2.700 in 1960 to 1.077.100 in 1975.<sup>268</sup> The Commission argued that some steps could be taken for Turkish workers, as the workers played a positive role in decreasing unemployment in Turkey and

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<sup>267</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "COMMUNICATION DE LA COMMISSION AU CONSEIL CONCERNANT L'ETAT LES NEGOCIATIONS AVEC LA TURQUIE SUR LE PAfISAOf A LA PHASE TRANSITOIRE DE L'ACCORD D'ANKARA (SEC(69) 1601 Final)" (1970 1476 p64, 1969), 3.

<sup>268</sup> Av Hakan Yildirimoglu, "ULUSLARARASI EMEK GÖÇÜ 'Almanya'ya Türk Emek Göçü,'" n.d., 7.

contributed to the balance of payments through the remittances they sent.<sup>269</sup> The most important step that could be taken on this matter was addressing the social security premiums of Turkish workers preferably through a multilateral arrangement instead of bilateral agreements. After examining different issues pertaining to the negotiation, the Commission observed:

The concessions which the Community is offering Turkey in the area of trade in industrial products have, at least for the next few years, a psychological rather than an economic value. Indeed, *they cover less than 10 percent of Turkey's total exports towards the Community*. Moreover, the possibilities available to the Community to meet Turkish desiderata in the fields of agriculture and labor are very limited. The Community's negotiating position would therefore be improved if it could find other means by which the achievement of the objectives of the transition phase could be realized.<sup>270</sup> [emphasis mine]

The Commission's solution to the inadequacy of the concessions was offering technical assistance to Turkey. According to the Commission, the technical assistance could be used to consult engineers on investment projects in Turkey, to help Turkish enterprises to find new and more global ways of commercialization, and to improve the agricultural and tourism infrastructure.

The Commission concluded its communication by stating that the EEC should revise its position due to three factors: generalized preferences envisaged in favor of developing countries, agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, review of the ad hoc

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<sup>269</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "COMMUNICATION DE LA COMMISSION AU CONSEIL CONCERNANT L'ÉTAT DES NEGOCIATIONS AVEC LA TURQUIE SUR LE PAÏSAOÏ A LA PHASE TRANSITOIRE DE L'ACCORD D'ANKARA (SEC(69) 1601 Final)," 10.

<sup>270</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 17.

regime in the agricultural sector after only 3 years instead of one year. The Commission again underlined that a substantial amelioration of the offer of the Community in the industrial field could be used to decrease pressure on Turkey for acquiring additional concessions in agriculture and workforce. While this trade-off was going to be proposed by the EEC, it was far from meeting Turkey's demands regarding the agricultural and workforce fields, which it deemed critical to its economy's development needs. This divergence on the central trade-off of the Ankara Agreement was going to be a reason put forward by the Turkish side to suspend the Association.

In the negotiations at the Council level, the President indicated that the Community would not be able to change its position on the issues of agricultural concessions and workforce. The Dutch Representative indicated that, while his government looked favorably on the Association with Turkey, it was impossible to give Turkey further concessions on agriculture or second priority for Turkish workers. He added that the Turkish view that the associate status conferred Turkey a special status was unacceptable.<sup>271</sup> The Italian Representative stressed that there was neither a legal basis nor a general justification for improving the terms presented to Turkey. He stated that the concessions given to Morocco and Tunisia created domestic problems for his government and that it was impossible for his government to consent to

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<sup>271</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT DU PROCES-VERBAL DE LA 68<sup>SE</sup>SSION DU CONSEIL (706/69)" (1476 p188, 1969), 101.

change the global regime for Mediterranean products. The other delegations raised similar points, emphasizing that Turkey should not expect that the EEC would soften its position on agriculture and workforce issues. The Council decided to convey to the Turkish delegation that the EEC would not change its position.

Upon receiving the 22-year list from Turkey, the Commission examined the list and observed that the Turkish authorities' approach in devising the list had been fundamentally different from the approach of Greece.<sup>272</sup> The Commission attributed this difference to the level of development, as the GDP per person was 350 dollars in Turkey in comparison with 810 in Greece. In examining the list, the Commission indicated that the Turkish authorities decided to put products they deemed necessary for the industrialization of their country. According to the Commission, the Turkish authorities desired protection of the products in 22-year list that would "enable them to adapt to international competition in the long term."

The Council Secretariat prepared a summary of the ongoing negotiations in October 1969. This summary is useful for examining the evolution of the negotiation between the EEC and Turkey.

- While Turkey accepted 12 and 22 year lists for demobilization, the EEC requested an accelerated list of 8 years, which included investment

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<sup>272</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Entretiens Avec Les Experts Turcs Sur La Composition de La List Edi e de 22 Ans Soumise Par La Délégation Turque SEC (69) 1972" (1970 1476 1, 1969), 9.

goods and primary materials that Turkey needed. The Turkish side responded by saying that it would consider the 8-year list, if its demands in agriculture and workforce issues were addressed;

- The EEC offered demobilization of tariffs, excluding some textile products, firstly by 60 percent and subsequently by 20 percent in 3-6 years. The Turkish side requested the application of intra-community regime as soon as the transition period begins;

- As the Turkish side accorded much importance to its agricultural exports to the EEC, there was a disagreement within the EEC about the concessions regarding those exports. The EEC could not agree on concessions regarding cotton, which Turkey exported to the EEC in increasing volumes. The Belgian Delegation in particular objected to a general regime of demobilization without quantitative restrictions. Instead, it offered a demobilization and removal of the quantitative restrictions in 12 years;

- The Turkish side accepted a calendar of demobilization for the first 8 years of the transition period, while the EEC requested a calendar of demobilization for all the 12 years of the transition.

It is worth noting that the EEC complained about the lack of responses from the Turkish Delegation and therefore planned to ask some issues to them in writing. The negotiation team stated that:

They had to adopt this working method with a view to speeding up the negotiations, experience having shown that it appears otherwise difficult to give concrete expression to the negotiations with the Turkish delegation.<sup>273</sup>

The failure of the Turkish side to come up with a coherent negotiation position was caused by the in-fighting between different two state agencies which advocated different developmental visions. The first state agency was the MFA, which had been the dominant actor in control of the relations with the EEC since its inception in 1959. However, the SPO's influence in the relationship with the EEC had started to increase with the growing weight of import-substitution in Turkish economy. From the second half of the 1960s, the SPO became more vocal in opposing the progression of the Association. The SPO argued that Turkey should initiate the transition process not with the intention of expediting its industrialization, but before its industrialization has reached to a point where it could compete with the EEC.<sup>274</sup>

The SPO published numerous reports making the case that further steps of the Association should wait until Turkey's economy reached a certain level of robustness.<sup>275</sup> However, its attempts to influence policy-making in concrete terms and clash with the MFA started when the negotiations for specifying the terms of Additional Protocol were launched. This clash created a situation where instructions from the headquarters of the MFA were not sent to the Turkish representation in

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<sup>273</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Etablissement Du Protocole Additionnel : Exposé Sommaire Le l'état Des Negociations (Problèmes Principaux) S/1030/69" (1477 p84, 1969), 7.

<sup>274</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, 62.

<sup>275</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, 67.

Brussels for negotiation. While this discrepancy between these agencies was going to protract the negotiations for two years, Turkey came up with a concrete negotiations position and tried to convince the EEC to increase the concessions, albeit with not much success.<sup>276</sup>

With respect to agricultural issues, Turkey changed its position of requesting intra-community treatment from the onset of the transition phase to requesting more concessions for a high number of agricultural products. After receiving the list of additional products for which Turkey requested further concessions, EEC representatives commented “the list includes a very wide range of products including besides, a significant number that are currently not exported to the Community” and concluded that “The Community delegation considered that such list could hardly be taken into consideration, but that, on the contrary, it would be appropriate to examine in what extent it would still be possible to improve the offers of the Community.”<sup>277</sup> After examining further possible concessions, the Committee on Association with Third Countries decided that there was not a possibility of much further concessions. Furthermore, the Dutch Representative proposed to ask for further concessions from Turkey in the agricultural field, but other delegations opposed this proposal as these proposals would only benefit a group of exporters in the EEC and would inevitably lead to an increase in Turkey’s demands. Concerning the workforce, the EEC

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<sup>276</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, 92.

<sup>277</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Etablissement Du Protocole Additionnel : Exposé Sommaire Le l’état Des Negociations (Problèmes Principaux) S/1030/69,” 9.

considered proposing to Turkey the gradual realization of freedom of movement 12 to 22 years after the Ankara agreement and non-discrimination of Turkish workers in respect of compensation, geographical mobility, and social security.

Regarding the 8-year accelerated list, the Commission reported that Turkey provided the following response to the EEC in November 1969. Firstly, the Turkish side stated that it could consider the list, if a global balance in the protocol was achieved by the EEC's favorable approach to Turkish demands regarding agriculture and labor.

Secondly, the 8-year list provided by the EEC not only covered two-thirds of the 22-year list prepared by Turkey, but also 30 percent of the imports to Turkey from the EEC.<sup>278</sup> The Turkish side emphasized that, if the objective of the additional protocol were to encourage the industrialization of Turkey, a list prepared with that objective would be more appropriate. The Turkish representatives also added that "In case the goal is to encourage Community investment in Turkey, the establishment of another appropriate mechanism would be economically more expedient." According to the Turkish side, "total exports from Turkey to the Community will never reach these levels given that, in the industrial field, the value of Turkish exports is less than one third of those of the Community."

The Council started to deliberate on the final deal reached by both negotiation teams in 1969. The President of the Council, at the beginning of the negotiations on the

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<sup>278</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Position de La Délégation Turque Au Sujet Du Rythme de Démobilisation Tarifaire Accéléré et de La Liste Des Produits Que La Communauté Souhaite Voir Soumis à Ce Rythme (Doc. CEE-TR 63/69)" (1970 1478, 1969).

Additional Protocol, proposed to increase the demobilization of tariffs of the EEC for industrial products to 100 percent to contribute to the proceeding of the negotiations, during which the questions of whether an 8-year list would be part of the protocol and what was the content of 12 and 22-year lists were still not answered adequately.<sup>279</sup> The Dutch Representative, summarized the objective of the negotiations by stating that

taking into account the considerable gap between the developed economy of both parties, but which, at the same time, should contribute to a rapid and harmonious evolution of Turkey's economy going hand in hand with an improvement in the standard of living in this country, it is obvious that in the reciprocal concessions of the two parties, there will also be a big difference

According to the Dutch Representative, Turkey's offers were inadequate.

Another issue deliberated during the Council meeting was the conversation between the Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Çağlayangil and the President of the Council Joseph Luns. In this conversation, the Turkish Minister stated that they were deeply disappointed by the fact that they did not receive concessions on unprocessed olives, pointing out that Spain had a quota of 900,000 tons while Turkey only had a quota of 25,000 tons. Çağlayangil proposed holding another ministerial meeting in the coming months to discuss outstanding issues. In the ensuing debates about Çağlayangil's remarks, the EEC member state delegations agreed that it would be beneficial for Turkey to close the negotiations. While the proposed deal could be revised in minor

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<sup>279</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "EXTRAIT d u PROJET de PROCES - VERBAL de La Réunion Tenue à (Bruxelles, Les 8 et 9 Décembre 1969)" (1478 p160, 1969), 25.

terms in the future, it would be unrealistic to expect notable changes as the EEC concluded its agreements with other countries and reached an internal agreement on the deal that would be offered to Turkey.<sup>280</sup> In subsequent negotiations, Luns opined that, given the fact that Morocco and Tunisia benefited from a tariff reduction of 80 percent for citrus fruits, he inquired whether it was possible to go from 40 percent to 50 percent discount for Turkish citrus fruits. He proposed to the Council the abolition of 2.5 percent tariffs on nuts in the first three years of the transition period and granting Turkish crude olive oil the same treatment given Tunisia and Morocco. The Italian Representative stated that the comparison of Morocco and Tunisia would be inaccurate, as they did not receive financial assistance from the EEC. The Council did not elaborate further additional concessions to Turkey.

After rounds of negotiations, the last outstanding issues in the additional protocol were the following three points.<sup>281</sup> Firstly, the EEC withdrew its demands of an accelerated list of 8 years and offered the total removal of duties for Turkey's industrial products on the 22-year list. Secondly, while Turkey favored a flexible timetable for demobilization, the EEC wanted a specific timetable for demobilization. The EEC insisted on its position that the establishment of the customs union became moot without a timetable. Due to Turkey's demand for flexibility, the EEC proposed giving the Council of Association power to depart from

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<sup>280</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 35.

<sup>281</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Préparation de La 13ème Session Du Conseil d'Association CEE -Turquie (22 Juillet 1970 - LOheures) (S/663/70 (NT 8))" (1479 p67, 1970).

the timeline if Turkey's economic conditions warranted it. Thirdly, there were disagreements over the treatment of cotton, knotted rugs, tobacco, vines, citrus, and petroleum products. Turkey demanded the removal of quantitative restrictions for its tobacco products. While five delegations accepted this request, Italy rejected it because Turkey did not exhaust the current quota and Italy produced the same type of tobacco that Turkey attempted to export. The Italian Delegation was inclined to accept Turkey's request, if a safeguard clause for that type of tobacco was introduced.

It was at this point that Turkish public opposition to the association agreement with the EEC became significant. Despite all the disagreements, a compromise for the Additional Protocol was reached between the EEC and Turkey in November 1970. Public discussion in Turkey was limited due to the military intervention in March 1971. Unlike the low level of press attention on the entry and negotiation of Association agreement, the additional protocol had received much more attention from the press and political parties. For example, on 28 November 1969, *Cumhuriyet* argued that the transition period was like a warrant of execution. According to the left-leaning opposition, the SPO was against the launch of the transition period, as the conditions of the transition period would hinder Turkey's industrialization efforts. *Cumhuriyet* reported that Turkish diplomats asserted that the launch of the

Association was inevitable for political reasons.<sup>282</sup> While the opposing views to the Association were not effective for the time being and did not result in a concrete change in the negotiations, their dominance in the future years would lead to suspension of the Association.

*Cumhuriyet* also reported that the signature of additional protocol was protested by several groups such as leftist Federation of Social Democracy Associations in İzmir. On a separate note, the government increased tariffs just before signing the additional protocol. During the signature ceremony of the Protocol, *Cumhuriyet* stated that the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil indicated that Turkey could not be proud of an industry that could not be improved in 22 years.<sup>283</sup>

Prof. Dr. Gülten Kazgan, an academic studying the Association, argued that Turkey had not carried out the necessary preparations for proceeding to the transition period. She believed the reduction of tariffs would lead to an increase in imports from the EEC, which would result in an imbalance of Turkey's external trade relations. Kazgan underlined that it was difficult to understand why Turkey was desiring to proceed to the transition period given the economy's dismal outlook. Kazgan concluded that it would be wrong to shout "West Germany is exploiting Turkey"

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<sup>282</sup> "İdam Fermanı," *Cumhuriyet*, n.d., <https://egazete.cumhuriyet.com.tr/oku/192/1969-11-28/0>.

<sup>283</sup> "Çağlayangil'in Demeci," *Cumhuriyet*, n.d., <https://egazete.cumhuriyet.com.tr/oku/192/1970-11-24/0>.

after Turkey itself did not take necessary measures during the preparatory period and pressed for proceeding to the transition period.<sup>284</sup>

*Cumhuriyet* ran the headline “The Common Market took decisions against Turkey” on June 21, 1973. The newspaper reported that the Agricultural Ministers of the EEC finally reached a decision concerning reduced tariffs to be accorded to the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries. *Cumhuriyet* underlined that the concessions for those countries would be higher than the ones accorded to Turkey.<sup>285</sup>

In a special interview to the *Cumhuriyet*, the Turkish Chair of Mixed Parliamentary Commission Justice Party Member Kamran İnan indicated that “our partners see Turkey as a third country.”<sup>286</sup> İnan opined that, given the Association agreement which foresaw an eventual membership of Turkey to the EEC, the EEC should Turkey differently. İnan also drew attention to the political turmoil in Turkey, suggesting that the Turkish government neglected the family of Western nations. He underlined that these political decisions should not be hindered by bureaucratic infighting occurring between the SPO and the MFA.

The increasing opposition to the Additional Protocol would also be a topic raised when President of Commission Ortoili visited Turkey. *Cumhuriyet* reported that experts criticized the additional protocol, arguing that it removed opportunities for

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<sup>284</sup> Prof.Dr. Gülten Kazgan, “Imbalance of Balance of Payments,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 30, 1969.

<sup>285</sup> “Ortak Pazar Türkiye Aleyhine Karar Aldı,” *Cumhuriyet*, 1973.

<sup>286</sup> Umit Gürtuna, “Ortak Pazar Türkiyeyi Kendi Dışında Görüyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, 1974.

Turkey's development. The common points experts raised were that the additional protocol and the five-year development plan were in contradiction with each other, and the additional protocol was stifling Turkey's industrialization and development. *Cumhuriyet* reported that Ecevit was going to transmit Turkey's complaints stemming from the Additional Protocol.<sup>287</sup>

As a response from the EEC to these claims, the Vice-President of the Commission, Carla Scarascia Mugnezza indicated that, if Turkey succumbed to pessimism, full membership would be impossible for Turkey. Mugnezza stated that the worsening trade imbalance between the EEC and Turkey was due to the devaluation of the Turkish lira. He added that the UK's stance concerning textiles was comprehensible since there was unemployment in its textile sector.<sup>288</sup>

The Chamber of Mechanical Engineers heavily criticized the Association in 1970. In the publication titled "The Common Market and Turkey" the Chamber underlined that the process of Association of Turkey had been carried out in a faulty fashion from the outset. It argued that the Turkey did not carry out the necessary preparatory work required for the Association, and this resulted in the fact that Turkey was not ready to enter the Common Market. The Chamber noted that the Additional Protocol was not balanced, and no meaningful concession was given to Turkey. For example,

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<sup>287</sup> Hasan Cemal, "Ecevit'in Toplatıya Çağırıldığı Uzmanlar Katma Protokolü Eleştirdiler," *Cumhuriyet*1, April 26, 1974.

<sup>288</sup> "AET BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI 'TÜRKİYE KARAMSARLIĞA KAPILIRSA ORTAK PAZAR'A TAM ÜYE OLAMAZ,'" *Cumhuriyet*, April 5, 1975.

the quotas imposed on Turkey prevented Turkey's exports and Turkey was treated worse than North African countries. It also argued that foreign capital would come to Turkey and capture Turkey's all resources. The Chamber concluded that accession of Turkey to the Common Market posed a threat to Turkey's economic, cultural and political existence.<sup>289</sup>

There were differences among the approaches adopted by different Chambers of Commerce.<sup>290</sup> Some advocated that the obligations that Turkey would arise due to the Additional Protocol would have adverse consequences, while some others indicated it would increase the competition of Turkish enterprises and enable them to acquire new capacities that would enable them to compete with their European competitors. For example, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce believed Turkish enterprises could withstand the increased competition from Europe. On the contrary, the Eskişehir Chamber of Commerce argued that an integration with the EEC would harm the Turkish economy, as Turkey lacked the capital to establish companies that could compete with the EEC companies. According to the Chamber, the Additional Protocol should have been signed before the Turkish industry was developed, not with the aim of developing the Turkish industry.

Scarscia-Mugnuzza highlighted that the Mediterranean policy of the EEC did not have any impact on Turkey-EEC relations during a seminar marking the 10<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>289</sup> Makine Mühendisleri Odası, "Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye," 1970, 250–54.

<sup>290</sup> Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, 103–5.

anniversary of the Association between Turkey and the EEC. He drew attention to the fact that only Turkey and Greece had membership as a prospect.<sup>291</sup> He indicated that, while Turkey's exports increased to 350 million dollars by 150 percent between 1946 and 1972, the imports from the EEC to Turkey increased by 300 percent to 650 million dollars. Scarscia-Mugnuzza underlined that this was not atypical for a quickly developing country like Turkey, which needed machinery.

Hasan Işık, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, responded to the criticisms that Turkey had entered the Association with the EEC without formal examination of its advantages and disadvantages. He indicated that Western and Eastern countries had been forming their own groupings after the Second World War and that Turkey had not wanted to pursue a policy of solitude. The choice between the EEC and EFTA for Turkey was relatively clear, as Turkey had a stronger economic connection with EEC countries and the EEC had a more lasting structure compared to EFTA, which was established as a response to EEC. According to Işık, Turkey, not having the economic development requisite for a full membership, but also desiring the full membership in future chose the Association as the avenue for its relationship with the EEC.<sup>292</sup> He also underlined that the Association of Turkey with the EEC was fundamentally of a political nature.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, "Türkiye-AET Ortaklığının 10. Yılı," 1973, 11.

<sup>292</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, 26.

<sup>293</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, 45.

The protests over the Additional Protocol were brought to the attention of parliament when Necmettin Erbakan submitted his motion of no confidence regarding the government in May 1970.<sup>294</sup> Erbakan emphasized that Turkey was not ready to proceed to the transition period and that the Common Market was not in line with Turkey's interests. CHP representative Muammer Erten emphasized that the CHP at the time of the signature of Ankara agreement had put checks and balances to the agreement to ensure that Turkey could protect its interests. He insisted that blaming CHP for problems stemming from the Association was inaccurate. He attributed responsibility to the incumbent Justice Party, since it had not taken any necessary measures during the preparatory period. As Turkey was not prepared to proceed to the transition period, he suggested that the government should have extended the preparatory period by another six years. He also criticized the EEC as it proposed subjecting cotton yarn and raw clothing, which were the two items which Turkey could export to the EEC. Drawing attention to the fact that EEC's exports were almost completely industrial products and concessions were given to the EEC for industrial exports to Turkey, he underlined that Turkey should have received agricultural concessions as it was its main area of export to the EEC. Yet the EEC had not approached this proposition favorably. He concluded by indicating that the Turkish industry could not survive the European competition and the trade deficit would increase if the additional protocol was signed. Representative of the

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<sup>294</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 15.05.1970," n.d., 750.

Republican Reliance Party Mehmet Nebil Oktay indicated that, while the Ankara agreement included provisions favorable to Turkey's development plans, the Justice Party government and Turkish private sector did not take necessary measures to boost Turkey's development.

In response to the above allegations, Justice Party Representative Cahit Karakaş emphasized that Erbakan was not against the additional protocol but the substance of the Association agreement itself, namely a robust relationship between the West and Turkey, instead preferring an Association with the East. Karakaş pointed out that trade between Regional Cooperation for Development countries accounted for only 1 percent of Turkish trade.<sup>295</sup> In a similar fashion, Treasury Minister Mesut Erez indicated that the EEC provided concessions for Turkish agricultural products.

Debate concerning Necmettin Erbakan's motion of no confidence regarding the government continued in October 1970.<sup>296</sup> Erbakan insisted that the Government was refraining from providing information to the Parliament about the negotiations concerning the Additional protocol. He claimed that a union with the EEC contradicted Turkey's political character and interests. He also alleged that the government, without taking necessary preparatory measures, adopted a stance of entering the transition period whatever the cost. He added that the protocol concerning the additional protocol was hidden from the public and presented as a fait

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<sup>295</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 15.05.1970," 766.

<sup>296</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 11.12.1970," n.d.

accompli. He argued that the Association would turn Turkey into a colony, as it was going to be forced to compete with economies which were stronger and more competitive. Erbakan voiced his argument that the EEC was built by Zionists to ensure that every nation around the globe worked for their capital. The Association with Turkey was based on the desire of Zionists to subdue Muslims. Turkey, in his opinion, was going to be the servant of Europeans and Zionists. Concerning the economic ramifications of the Additional Protocol, he argued that nascent industries in Turkey would be decimated.<sup>297</sup> These views did not elicit much response from the public and public institutions alike, hence they did not have an impact on the negotiation process. However, they heralded a more anti-Association sentiment consolidating in the Turkish public perception regarding the Association.

In response, CHP representative Şinasi Özdenoğlu emphasized that CHP accorded importance to the Westernization of Turkey, an objective laid down by Atatürk.<sup>298</sup> He underlined, however, that the obligations assumed by Turkey in the Additional protocol were not balanced. He blamed the government for the poor economic situation Turkey found itself in and argued that Turkey was not prepared to proceed to the transition period. He criticized the concessions given to other third countries by the EEC and argued that the Association did not confer a privileged situation to Turkey.

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<sup>297</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 11.12.1970," 255.

<sup>298</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 11.12.1970," 265.

The parliamentary debate on the ratification of additional protocol sheds further light on the different criticisms regarding the Association. CHP representative Kemal Demir indicated that the Additional Protocol could harm the developing Turkish economy and aggravate the discrepancy between the European and Turkish economies.<sup>299</sup> According to him, Turkey did not take necessary measures to ensure that Turkey exported more than 3-4 traditional agricultural products and Turkey could not establish an industry that could compete with its European counterparts. Based on these reasons, CHP advocated an extension of the preparatory period. He also drew attention to the unbalanced character of the additional protocol as the Protocol did not introduce further agricultural concessions for Turkey in the exchange of concessions granted to Turkey by the EEC.

In response to the criticisms, Aydın Yalçın from Justice Party defended the Turkish economy's dynamism during the preparatory period and sought to demonstrate that Turkey was ready for proceeding to the next stage within the Association.

Concerning the concessions, he indicated that Turkey was receiving concessions well in advance, while assuming obligations for the next 12 and 22 years.<sup>300</sup> He added that Turkish industrialists were in favor of the additional protocol. He emphasized that the reduction in protectionist measures would benefit the Turkish economy by making it more competitive and hence more successful at exporting goods to foreign

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<sup>299</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 01.07.1971," n.d., 116.

<sup>300</sup> "Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 02.07.1971," n.d., 164.

markets. He gave Greece's and Italy's economic success as an example of progress after they intensified their relationship with the EEC.

The negotiations over the transition protocol highlight that the EEC was not willing to accord concessions for agricultural products, which were Turkey's main export products to the EEC. The EEC, instead, entertained the possibility of giving more concessions on industrial products to Turkey, even though these goods were insignificant in Turkish trade with the EEC. The negotiations suggest that concessions given to other third countries by the EEC were becoming a justification for not giving additional concessions to Turkey.

Turkey lobbied for concessions by arguing that its agricultural products accounted for most of its economy. Turkey's repeated attempts did not elicit positive responses from the EEC. This situation raised concern that the Additional Protocol might not be appropriate for Turkey's economy, given that the preparatory period had not resulted in a transformation of the Turkish economy. To make matters worse, the additional protocol was not bringing about reductions of tariffs levied against the EEC by Turkey, which would boost imports and reduction of fiscal revenues in Turkey. While these concerns were voiced more vocally in the Turkish domestic scene, the additional protocol was accepted by the Turkish government.

In theoretical terms, the negotiations over the Additional Protocol demonstrate that geopolitical concerns subsided, and they turned primarily into a debate about the economic trade-offs that would arise from a transition protocol. The Turkish side, as

a result of its dominant agricultural sector requested agricultural concessions, while the EEC offered industrial concessions, which did not carry much importance in the Turkish economy. There was again no evidence of reference to European norms or increased autonomy of the Commission or geopolitical concerns. The future distribution of economic outcomes of the Additional Protocol and its possible ramifications to Turkey's development and EEC's economy were the central negotiation topics.

An important distinction of the negotiation on the Additional Protocol compared to the previous rounds of negotiations was that the issue was now becoming politicized not only in state agencies like the MFA and the SPO, but also in the general public. This situation resonates well with the concept of developmental politics, which refers to politicization of development by internal and external actors. Only the signature ceremony of Ankara Agreement's was reported by the media, however the Additional Protocol became the topic of numerous media pieces as well as assessment of business and labor groups.

## CHAPTER 5: DOWNFALL OF THE ASSOCIATION

The late 1970s witnessed increasing conflict over the Association in Turkish politics. As more ultra-nationalist and ultraconservative as well as socialist actors started to gain ground, their opposition to the Association became more visible and effective. The struggle over the fate of the Association led to a growing schism between the MFA and the SPO. This schism became so acute that Turkey's negotiating position was leaked in the Official Gazette.<sup>301</sup> Civil servants accused each other of a myopic perspective and difficulty in understanding how Turkey would achieve development. Yet the changes were not limited to the Turkish domestic political landscape.

The preceding waves of decolonization as well as the expansion of the EEC exacerbated the tension over economic terms of the Association. The worsening economic conditions across the globe had an adverse impact on the already fragile balance of the Association. All these factors rendered it impossible to manage the tensions of the Association and led to the suspension decisions of the Turkish side. In other words, it was not the bilateral relationship or the actions of one particular side that determined the trajectory of the Association. Instead, the association trajectory was largely shaped by the global trend of decolonization, which had a huge impact on the terms of international trade. The geographical reference point for the Association with Turkey was no more solely Greece, but the entire developing

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<sup>301</sup> Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası*, 241.

world. To make matters worse for Turkey, the UK's membership in the EEC had serious adverse impact on the Association, as the UK demanded serious measures against Turkish exports to the EEC.

All the factors outlined above, whether national or global, resulted in the fact that the initial balance established by the Ankara Agreement became untenable in the 1970s. The built-in economic tension in the Association could no longer be accommodated by political factors and therefore the Turkish side's request for revision of the terms of the Association grew stronger. The EEC, despite being cognizant that the terms of the Association were no longer as advantageous for Turkey, did not approach favorably Turkey's requests. The EEC was no longer the fledgling international organization of the 1960s and had now become a world trading power, and it had an extensive trading relationship with the entire developing world. Due to divergences on the perspective of the Association, Turkish governments of opposite political persuasions resorted to the suspension of the Association.

The change in international context also overlapped with the increasing weight of economic considerations in the Association. While Turkey and the EEC initially emphasized the political aspects of the Association and shared the belief that it would serve the economic interests of all concerned, a decade later these beliefs were not enough to sustain the Association. Development politics, as seen from the increasing protests from Turkish societal actors to the terms of the Association, made it more and more difficult to defend the Association in the Turkish domestic scene. The

economic concerns of Turkish economic groups as well as a general concern regarding Turkey's development particularly in terms of its capacity to address its widening trade deficit with the EEC was also going to be a factor that had adverse impact on the negotiations.

**A. Disruption of Balance after the Expansion: Negotiations over a Complementary Protocol**

The enlargement of the EEC brought about the need for a complementary protocol to the Association. The aim of the complementary protocol was to expand the current arrangements to the new EEC members. The negotiations preceding the signature of a complementary protocol demonstrate that the main issue debated was the balance of the Association. Turkey was arguing that the balance of the Association was going to be disrupted at the expense of Turkey after the expansion of the EEC. To “rebalance,” Turkey requested various concessions from the EEC. The EEC, now as a consolidated trade power, had to manage its global (generalized trade preferences), regional (Mediterranean policy) and bilateral (only with Turkey) policies. The EEC's increasing trade power was becoming a cause for concern for Turkey, as it was increasing the EEC's commitments to other countries and thereby reducing EEC's leeway in according concessions for “balancing” the Association with Turkey.

The negotiations over the complementary protocol once again demonstrate that Turkey and the EEC had a disagreement over the impact of the Association on Turkey's development. The Turkish side repeatedly indicated that the expansion

would be detrimental for Turkey's economy. Yet the EEC insisted that the Association was mutually beneficial and did not require a revision. Enlargement of the Association worsened Turkey's concerns, and therefore Turkey requested a revision of the agreement and related terms.

The EEC's internal negotiations concerning the complementary protocol demonstrate that Turkey's concerns about rebalancing were not without justification. The main problem faced by the EEC was whether to address the imbalance and how to address it without causing further balancing issues in the other commitments of the EEC.

Turkey's requests were not looked at favorably by the EEC, as more concessions to Turkey could disrupt other internal and external balances established by the EEC.

During negotiations over the complementary protocol, it is worth noting that the Commission was in favor of granting Turkey more concessions on a number of fields, but various Member States disapproved such a course of action. This difference between the Commission and Member States reveals that Turkey's requests did not lack justification and stemmed from genuine imbalances in the Association. For example, France did not desire to even accept there was an imbalance, questioning the very existence of such a problem in the Association.<sup>302</sup>

This divergence on the advantages and disadvantages of the Association for Turkey

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<sup>302</sup> Conseil d'Association, "PROCES-VERBAL de La 17<sup>e</sup>me Session Du CONSEIL L'ASSOCIATION C.E.E. - TURQUIE" (CEE-TR 62 f/71 fin, 1972), 144.

would cause serious concerns on the part of Turkey, which would later seriously disrupt the functioning of the Association.

The negotiations also suggest that political factors were removed to a large extent from the negotiations during this stage of the relationship. By this point, the impact of the Cold War and geopolitical factors were no longer raised during the negotiations and Turkey only put forward arguments of an economic nature. While political factors were an important factor previously in the negotiations, now they seem to be removed from the negotiations, indicating that an important positive push factor in favor of Turkey was no longer present in the negotiation scene. While political factors such as Turkey's strong connections to the Europe, they were not enough to address the concrete disagreements over concessions and tariffs. From a theoretical perspective, this implied a disagreement over the distributional outcomes of the Association, which suggested there was a serious disconnect between the preferences of Turkey and the EEC.

On 13 October 1971, the Ad Hoc Group on Contractual Obligations, which examined the evolving contractual obligations of the EEC, delivered its report on "Preferential Agreements with the Mediterranean basis countries."<sup>303</sup> This report mainly touched upon on how enlargement would have an impact on the contractual obligations of the EEC towards the Mediterranean countries. According to the

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<sup>303</sup> I could not find the mandate and the composition of this Group. The Archives of the European Council could not find The Committee on Association with Third Countries as per our correspondence on 20 March 2023.

Commission, these issues ought to be dealt with before the agreements on enlargements were put into effect, namely on 11 January 1973. The report also indicated that the mixed agreements concluded with Turkey and Greece merited a special treatment, since the relevant agreements needed to be ratified at the time of the enlargement. The report openly stated that Greece did not need much rebalancing after enlargement except with the arrangements concerning wine. The problem of balancing was acute in the case of Turkey. The report stated that this balancing could be carried out in the framework of “comprehensive solutions designated for the Mediterranean basin.”<sup>304</sup> The report also suggested that the negotiations with Turkey could be limited to the adaptation of tariffs, financial assistance, and, if need be, an examination of some agricultural products outside the overall approach towards the Mediterranean. The EEC’s internal correspondence demonstrates that the Association with Turkey could be rebalanced, meaning that Turkey could be afforded improved terms due to changing circumstances such as the worsening economic conditions and the concessions offered to other similar third countries. Concerning the topic of balancing the agreements after the enlargement, the report noted that the delegations of different member states expressed different opinions. While some pointed to the difficulty of defining what is balanced and what is not balanced, others suggested that the contracting member states should not have a false

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<sup>304</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, “Accords Préférentiels Avec Les Pays Du Bassin de La Méditerranée” (T/513 f/71, 1971), 4.

expectation of concessions due to enlargement. These delegations also pointed out that such concessions, particularly in the field of agriculture, could have a negative impact on the internal balance of the EEC. The Italian delegation argued that the Commission should reconsider its position concerning agriculture. Other delegations indicated that it was important to keep the existing trade relationships with the Mediterranean countries as well as new member states.<sup>305</sup> Examining these views, the Group decided that even the idea of balancing put forward by the Commission was debatable.

The impact of the enlargement on the Association relationship of the EEC was the object of a previous Commission report completed on 20 September 1971. This report firstly examined the common issues faced by the Mediterranean countries due to enlargement of the EEC. The report underlined that the transitional mechanisms and necessary arrangements sought to be decided before the enlargement.<sup>306</sup> The report also drew attention to the negative economic consequences of enlargement on the association agreements. According to the Commission, “the concerns and the problems raised do not lack foundation.”<sup>307</sup> For horticultural products and their derivatives, while the candidate countries did not have high tariffs, the EEC had higher tariffs. Therefore, the harmonization of these tariffs to those of the EEC would

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<sup>305</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 11.

<sup>306</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, “Rapport de La Commission Au Conseil Sur Les Contacts Avec Les Pays Co-Contractants Dans Le Bassin Méditerranéen Au Sujet Des Problèmes Posés Par l’élargissement” (SEC(71) 2963 final, 1971), 5.

<sup>307</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 6.

be detrimental for the agricultural products. The Commission also acknowledged that these agricultural products were essential for the development of the countries concerned. The Commission also pointed out that the geographical extension of Yaoundé will make a dent on the commercial position of the Mediterranean countries. Based on these findings, the Commission argued that it was necessary to seek solutions for both the industrial and agricultural fields while respecting the interests of the Community to prevent from the enlargement having “grave consequences for the co-contracting countries.”<sup>308</sup>

According to the Commission, the case of agricultural products was “more delicate.” To rebalance the existing agreements, new preferences ought to be accorded to the products that were not covered by the agreements that were in force. These new preferences might not be agreed by the Community members, since they were regulated by particular mechanisms that permitted the smooth functioning of the Committee such as conditional preferences and export prices. The Commission considered that every agreement and every country concerned should be treated individually.<sup>309</sup> It is again worth noting that the Commission still argued that the case was for rebalancing Association agreements was warranted, particularly for Mediterranean countries.

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<sup>308</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 6.

<sup>309</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 7.

In the second part of the report, the input from delegations concerned were examined. The Commission explicitly indicated that:

In the event that Turkey does not benefit from the share of the candidate countries of the generalized preferences, the application of the stopper rule provided for by these countries to take over the Community's contractual obligations would have the consequence that Turkey would not be treated as well as other developing countries throughout the transition period set in the accession treaty<sup>310</sup>

With regard to the possible negative ramification of the enlargement to the Association with Turkey, the Commission proposed the following:

Taking into account the low level of development of Turkey, the Commissioner considers that it would be appropriate, in such a case, to provide by way of derogation for the stopper rule that the candidate countries in the industrial sector, will grant Turkey to exceed it from the departure, as provided for in the additional protocol and that, in the agricultural sector, they will apply a system at least as favorable as that of generalized preferences.<sup>311</sup>

The Commission's suggestion practically meant that the concessions to Turkey should at least be equal to the ones offered by the GSP. However, this was not going to be accepted by the Member States in the subsequent stages of the negotiations.

The Turkish Delegation argued that the extension of the preferences in the Additional Protocol to new members should be carried out in the same pace the new members assume their obligations stemming from their community membership. The Commission noted that this would result in Turkey reducing its duties to industrial products originating from the new member states by 1-2 percent.<sup>312</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 11.

<sup>311</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 11.

<sup>312</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 12.

The other consequences of an enlargement of the EEC drew ire of the Turkish side as well. The Turkish delegation explained why the enlargement would have a negative impact on its trade relationship with the EEC.<sup>313</sup> According to the Turkish Delegation to the EEC, the existing arrangements covered 95 percent of trade with the EEC, while they would cover only 65 percent with the new members. Furthermore, the trade deficit with the four new members was much higher when compared to the deficit with the Six. For example, export-to-import ratio of trade between Turkey and the Six was 78 percent in 1969, while it would be 37 percent with new member states. The Turkish Delegation also pointed out that the initial duty of the United Kingdom was low compared to generalized preferences, particularly in respect of fresh grapes, dried fruits, and hazelnuts. In response to the points raised by the Turkish Delegation, the Commission noted that the concerns of the Turkish Delegation were not without foundation and “for this reason, certain measures should be provided in favor of Turkey to restore the balance of the reciprocal concessions fixed in the additional protocol.”<sup>314</sup> The Commission was once more acknowledging Turkey’s unfavorable condition after enlargement.

The Commission, in reference to the impact of the enlargement on the associated countries, indicated that all relevant countries except Greece strongly emphasized that there had been a deterioration of the balance of their agreements due to

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<sup>313</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 13.

<sup>314</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 13.

enlargement of the Community. The Commission noted that the countries put forward three arguments for why such a deterioration takes place.<sup>315</sup> First, before enlargements, the countries had equal access to the markets of candidate countries with the Community. After enlargement, their access to those markets would be hindered by the relatively high community duties, particularly for agricultural products which carried a significant importance for the countries concerned. The countries also indicated that they lost numerous advantages due to the establishment of generalized preferences, which put them in a similar position in terms of access to the Community market with the third countries with which they were in direct competition. This loss would be exacerbated if non-candidate countries of the European Free Trade Association were given a preferential trade regime including agricultural products. If such a trade regime was also offered to the countries in the Middle East and Africa as well as members of the Commonwealth, which would eventually accede to a new Yaoundé Convention. Secondly, the relevant countries argued that their trade with four new members differed with the current members of the EEC. When the current agreements with the EEC were extended to the new members, the losses incurred would be much more than the advantages. Thirdly, covering agricultural products under a conditional preference would also cause adverse impact on the equilibrium of the current arrangements, since the markets of

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<sup>315</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 44–46.

the new members of the Community had weaker prices compared to the current members.

The report prepared by the Ad Hoc Group on Contractual Obligations, titled “Preferential Agreements with the Mediterranean Countries” and dated 13 October 1971, examined the balance of the agreements.<sup>316</sup> The report stated that certain delegations believed every agreement the result of the particular relationship between the EEC and that country. These delegations stated that giving false hopes to contracting countries was undesirable, since concessions, particularly in the agricultural field, could risk the inner balance within the EEC. The Italian delegation voiced its request that the impact on Italian agriculture be specifically taken into account.

An aide-memoire prepared by Secretariat of the Council focused only on the Association agreements with Greece and Turkey. Concerning Turkey, it noted that new members would apply the preferences planned in the Association Agreements, but the preferences regime in no case would be more favorable compared to the treatment offered by new member states to current member states. In the case of Turkey, such a treatment would lead Turkey to be offered a less favorable treatment in the markets of new member states when compared to the treatment offered to the

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<sup>316</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, “Accords Préférentiels Avec Les Pays Du Bassin de La Méditerranée” (T/513/71, 1971), 10–11.

developing countries during the whole transition period.<sup>317</sup> It also noted that other countries faced similar issues, and that it was difficult to take these into consideration during the enlargement of the Community.

The aide-memoire presented by permanent Turkish Delegation to the EEC demonstrated that Turkey was well aware of the negative repercussions of the enlargement. Firstly, the Turkish Delegation indicated that there would be a clear deterioration of the trade deficit. The export to import ratio would decrease from 76 percent for the Six to 65 percent for the Ten in 1969. Secondly, the number of Turkish industrial products receiving advantageous tariffs would decrease after the Additional Protocol. Thirdly, the agricultural exports of Turkey would receive less preferential treatment after the enlargement. The percent of agricultural products receiving preferential treatment set out in the additional protocol would decrease from 93.5 percent to 65.2 when the new candidate countries were taken into account.<sup>318</sup>

Turkey's request to hold a ministerial level Association Council was directly related to the issue of rebalancing the agreements after the enlargement.<sup>319</sup> The Turkish authorities desired that the necessary arrangements address the enlargement of the

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<sup>317</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Accords d' Association Avec La Grèce et La Turquie" (Aide-mémoire du Secrétariat, 1971), 3–4.

<sup>318</sup> Conseil d'Association, "Conséquences de l'élargissement Sur l'Association C.E.E - Turquie" (CEE-TR 54/71, 1971), 44.

<sup>319</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Association CEE—TURQUIE Demande Turque Visant à La Convocation d'un Conseil d'Association Au Niveau Ministériel (Envisagé Pour Le 14 Décembre)."

Association to be formulated in conjunction with the measures to deal with the disrupted balance of the Association agreement. The EEC was strictly of the opinion that the Association Council should only examine the transitional measures necessary due to the enlargement. Issues related to the balance of the Association agreement were to be addressed in relation to the other agreements concluded with other Mediterranean countries. It was also explicitly stated that the relationship with Greece did not have a balancing problem.

It was also evident that the Council did not treat the issue of rebalancing as an issue on which there was consensus. The French word for rebalancing was put in quotation marks to emphasize that it was contested. The response of the COREPER President also used the phrases “the problems called the ‘rebalancing’ to indicate that he did not necessarily agree on the existence of rebalancing issues, probably with Turkey who raised the issue.<sup>320</sup> The COREPER indicated that it was not possible to include these issues in the context of the negotiations on Complementary Protocol, since there was a tight schedule to follow for ensuring that enlargement was carried out in a timely fashion. Secondly, the Committee stated that the issue of rebalancing should be examined in a global fashion without divorcing the Association with Turkey from other preferential agreements.

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<sup>320</sup> Conseil d'Association, “PROCES-VERBAL de La 17<sup>ème</sup> Session Du CONSEIL L'ASSOCIATION C.E.E. - TURQUIE,” 144.

The issue of rebalancing surfaced again when Turkey brought this issue up during the Association Council on 3 December 1971. In an internal correspondence, the COREPER, while noting the challenges faced by the Turkish government in the domestic scene, stated that the signature of the Complementary Protocol should proceed as foreseen due to the tight calendar of enlargement. Furthermore, the COREPER noted that the issue of “rebalancing” (quotes in the original) should be examined at a later date, but only according to the terms of the Ankara Agreement.<sup>321</sup>

These issues were brought up on 10 December 1971 by Osman Olcay, Foreign Minister of Turkey, during the Council of the Association.<sup>322</sup> The verbatim records of the Council of the Association demonstrate that the Turkish side voiced its concerns regarding the negative repercussions of the enlargement to the Association between Turkey and the EEC. According to the Turkish authorities, the two main negative repercussions would be the increasing trade deficit between the enlarged EEC and Turkey and the decreasing tariff advantages of Turkish agricultural and industrial exports to the EEC. These negative impacts would jeopardize the Turkish economy’s take-off, which was also an objective of the Association itself. The focus on Turkish economy progressing in the framework of the Association suggest the pivotal role of modernization of Turkish economy in the eyes of Turkish policy-makers. The Turkish Foreign Minister argued that, while a global approach of the

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<sup>321</sup> Conseil d’Association, “Prise En Considération Des Intérêts de La Turquie En Relation Avec l’élargissement de La Communauté” (S/1113 f/71 (NT 77) sp, 1971), 3.

<sup>322</sup> Conseil d’Association, “Proces-Verbal de La 15’eme Session Du Conseil D’Association CEE-Turquie” (CEE-TR 23/71 fin, 1971), 6–7.

EEC to the Mediterranean was understandable, this approach did not necessarily need to be a uniform one. The distinctiveness of the Association between Turkey and the EEC was clear, since Turkey had a membership path to the EEC, while other associate countries did not have such a pathway. In response, the President of the EEC stated that these issues would be addressed in a manner respecting the terms of the Association with Turkey.<sup>323</sup>

The Council reached a decision on 30 December 1971 regarding the mandate to be given to the Commission concerning the negotiation with Turkey. This decision stated that the new members should not be treated more favorably than the current ones. Turkey was expected to harmonize the customs applied to new members with the customs applied to current members of the EEC.<sup>324</sup> There was no reference to rebalancing, which was a topic of recurrent discussion between the EEC and Turkey. The absence of this topic was a result of EEC's decision to not heed Turkey's concerns over the decreasing advantages of the Association, which indeed previewed the collapse.

The Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EEC continued to voice its concerns stemming from the enlargement of the EEC. According to an *aide-memoire* dated 19 April 1972,

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<sup>323</sup> Conseil d'Association, 15–16.

<sup>324</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Décision Du Conseil et Des Représentants Des Gouvernements Des Etats Membres Réunis Au Sein Du Conseil Pour l'ouverture de Négociations, En Vue d'adapter En Raison de l'élargissement, l'Accord d'Association Avec La Turquie." (1/12/72 (NT 1), 1972), 2.

“additional obligation to open up its market to new highly industrialized members of the enlarged Community, vis-à-vis which its trade balance will show a deficit liable to further reduce the resources necessary for industrial investments, is at the root of Turkey’s concerns.”<sup>325</sup>

Based on this understanding, the aide-memoire suggested modifications to the complementary protocol. These modifications aimed at safeguarding the industries of Turkey as foreseen by the development plans. These modifications were accompanied by a draft general clause of flexibility. According to this clause, the Council of Association, cognizant of the development needs of Turkey in line with its development plan, sought to deploy measures where applicable to support the industrialization of Turkey.<sup>326</sup>

The views expressed in this aide-memoire and Turkey’s previous concerns regarding the enlargement of the EEC were examined by the Commission on 5 May 1972. In these preliminary notes, the Commission acknowledged that Turkey had been voicing its concerns for a long time and the Community’s response was to give Turkey the assurances that the solution should be sought in the Ankara Agreement’s own merits. The Commission indicated straightforward that the complementary concessions should be accorded to Turkey. The Commission also indicated that the

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<sup>325</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, “Aide-Mémoire de La Délégation Permanente de Turquie Au Sujet Des Négociations Relatives à l’adaptation de l’Accord d’Association Q.E.E. - Turquie à La Communauté Élargie” (S/372/72 (NT 11), 1972), 3.

<sup>326</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 6.

solution should not harm the agreements concluded with other Mediterranean countries.<sup>327</sup>

After summarizing Turkey's repeated concerns regarding the negative repercussions of the enlargement of the EEC to Turkey, the Commission stated:

it appeared that Turkey, due to the peculiarities of the structure of its trade with the new Member States, will not be of benefit, in the short term, significantly from the enlargement of the Community.

In this context, the Commission argued that, while the reduction of tariffs in the industrial sector towards current members would have a stimulating effect towards developing Turkey's exports, this situation would necessitate important modifications in the structure of Turkey's economy.<sup>328</sup> The Commission subsequently proposed that complementary concessions be accorded to Turkey. According to the Commission, it was important to distinguish between products towards which concessions could not be accorded due to Community's market conditions and products towards which concessions could be accorded to bolster Turkey's exports. The Commission was again supporting giving further concessions to Turkey, as its economy was going to be adversely impacted by the enlargement. Turkey's proposals on easing the terms of the Association were considered on 24 May 1972. Turkey's proposals were deemed unacceptable, since they allowed Turkey to unilaterally question the essential components of the customs union:

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<sup>327</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Conséquences Économiques de l'élargissement de La Communauté Sur l'Association Avec La Turquie" (SEC (72) 1584, 1972), 2.

<sup>328</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 3–4.

namely the reduction of tariffs and quotas.<sup>329</sup> According to the Council, Turkey adhered to these terms when accepting the Additional Protocol, which included provisions addressing Turkey's concerns towards its industry. Turkey's proposals elicited different responses from different delegations. While the French Delegation expressed general reservations about the proposals, the German and Belgian delegations stressed that a solution should be sought.

According to a Council report dated 13 May 1972, Turkey's proposal of introducing restrictions in the framework of complementary protocol did not have a judicial basis. Moreover, most of the delegations were "perplexed, even reserved" when the issue of inserting such a clause to the protocol was raised.<sup>330</sup> Concerning the general clause for flexibility, five delegations indicated that they were favorable to such a clause due to political and presentation reasons. The French Delegation opposed such a clause, since it modified the substance and the structure of the Protocol.<sup>331</sup>

Regarding the complementary measures demanded by Turkey concerning agricultural products, the Council pointed to the difficulties of adopting such measures due to ratification of the legal instruments for the enlargement. The Council suggested that the Association Council should examine possible measures in the future.<sup>332</sup> The COREPER indicated its agreement with the general clause of

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<sup>329</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Adaptation de l'Accord En Raison de l'élargissement de La Communauté" (S/466/72 (NT 15), 1972), 3–5.

<sup>330</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Adaptation de Accord C.E.E. - Turquie En Raison de l'élargissement" (1/88/72 (NT 3), 1972), 2.

<sup>331</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 3.

<sup>332</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 4.

flexibility on its report 1 June 1972.<sup>333</sup> The agricultural issues raised by Turkey became the topic of an additional provision to be inserted to the complementary protocol. This provision stipulated nothing more than that there would be examinations of the topics in question.<sup>334</sup> These negotiations demonstrate that Turkey's requests for further flexibility in the conditions set out by the Additional Protocol were found inappropriate by the EEC. The EEC was not, however, objecting to the insertion of a general clause that did not have any tangible significance for the Association.

After these exchanges, the Commission submitted a report on the condition of negotiations regarding the complementary protocol with Turkey. This report noted that Turkey associated the transitional measures with the agricultural and industrial progress of its economy. Turkey drew attention to the following points. Firstly, the preferences in the additional protocol, if Turkey was not included in the generalized preferences, would lead to a discrimination against Turkey when compared with other developing countries. Secondly, the implementation of the consolidated liberalization list towards the Ten would cause Turkey to incur additional costs. Thirdly, the quotas offered by the new members was in fact not usable due to their

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<sup>333</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 3.

<sup>334</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Obligations Contractuelles - Adaptation de l'Accord C.E.E. - Turquie En Raison de l'élargissement" (1/91/72 (NT 4), 1972), 6.

low amounts. Lastly, new restrictions by the new members contradicted the spirit of the Association.<sup>335</sup>

The Commission, in response to concerns of Turkey, considered

that the concerns expressed by the Turkish delegation about the consequences which the non-application of the generalized preferences with regard to Turkey would have for Turkish exports on the markets of the acceding states *are fully justified*.<sup>336</sup> [emphasis mine]

The Commission reminded the Council to treat Turkey's requests favorably. Yet the United Kingdom opposed a scenario in which Turkey did not treat new members as it treated older members. Regarding Turkey's request to apply additional tariffs to various imports to protect its industry, the Commission stated that it was impossible to accept such an autonomous application of tariffs by Turkey. The Commission proposed introducing a similar clause to that of Treaty of Athens, which authorized Greece to introduce quantitative restrictions during the transitional phase. The Commission also indicated that a joint declaration should put emphasis on the Association's role in supporting Turkey's economic development.

The Commission's declaration was as follows:

The Association Council may also decide that the prerogatives accorded to Turkey in paragraph 3 may include, instead of an increase or the introduction of duties, the possibility of reintroducing quotas on the condition that the quota fixed is not less than 60 percent of the imports of the product in question from the Community during the year previous. The value of imports

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<sup>335</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Communication de La Commission Au Conseil Sur l'état Des Négociations Avec La Turquie En Vue de La Conclusion d'un Protocole Complémentaire Permettant d'assurer l'extension de l'Association à La Communauté Élargie" (S/762/72 (NT 35), 1972), 2.

<sup>336</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 5.

from the Community during 1967 of the products affected by these contingent measures must be set off against the total value of imports referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph. The Association Council sets the modalities for these measures and the conditions for their elimination.<sup>337</sup>

The Complementary Protocol had also been the topic of a report dated 27 September 1972. In this report, the Council transmitted the discussions held by the Committee on Associations with Third Countries.<sup>338</sup> It was noteworthy that, among the new members, only the British Delegation expressed a position regarding the concerns of Turkey. This report summarized the positions of various delegations to the concerns. Regarding Turkey's request to establish quantitative restrictions in the industrial sector, the aforementioned proposal of the Commission was treated favorably by the members of the Committee on Association with Third Countries. Regarding the general clause on flexibility, the Committee reached an agreement on the text above. But regarding Turkey's request to be included in the generalized preferences, there was a disagreement. The German, Belgian and Luxembourg Delegations were in favor of including Turkey to the list, while French Delegation indicated that there was no real economic effect to the Turkish economy if Turkey was to be included in the list since the Association offered more advantageous conditions to Turkey, except on textile products. The issue of including Turkey in the generalized

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<sup>337</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 9.

<sup>338</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Négociation d'Un Protocole Complémentaire C.E.E. - Turquie En Raison de l'Élargissement" (T/401/72 (NT), 1972), 1–6.

preference list did not reach a final conclusion, since this issue was to be decided during the Council meeting on 9/10 October 1972.<sup>339</sup>

Turkey's requests were also considered by the Committee on Associations with Third Countries, with particular focus on four points: complementary measures in the field of agriculture, re-establishment of quantitative restrictions in the industrial field, a general clause of flexibility, and the inclusion of Turkey as a beneficiary of the generalized preferences.<sup>340</sup> While the Committee stated that the last point concerning generalized preferences was not covered by its mandate, it argued that Turkey's requests could be addressed to a large extent. Concerning the quantitative restrictions, the delegations could not reach an agreement concerning its duration. Some delegations agreed with the Commission's proposal that the duration of restrictions should be 12 years, while others argued the duration should be 5 years. The Committee of Representatives finally stated that duration of 5 years should be proposed to Turkey but noted that, to the extent that this would allow to conclude negotiations on all issues still pending, a period of twelve years could be accepted.<sup>341</sup>

It is worth noting that the negotiations with Turkey were considered under the grouping "relations with the countries of Mediterranean basin." This grouping dealt

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<sup>339</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Négociation d'Un Protocole Complémentaire C.E.E. - Turquie En Raison de l'Élargissement 2" (S/816/72 (NT 42), 1972), 6.

<sup>340</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Communication de La Commission Au Conseil Sur l'état Des Négociations Avec La Turquie En Vue de La Conclusion d'un Protocole Complémentaire Permettant d'assurer l'extension de l'Association à La Communauté Élargie."

<sup>341</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Adoption Par Le Conseil de Nouvelles Directives Pour La Poursuite de La Négociation d'un Protocole Complémentaire En Raison de l'Élargissement (S/855/72 (NT 43))" (HICA.H.CM2.1977.612.6 page 62, 1972).

with the negotiations with Greece, Libya, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia, Malta, Spain, and Israel. While the negotiations with Turkey were examined with Greece as a distinct sub-group, all the countries mentioned were considered under the category of relations with the Mediterranean.<sup>342</sup>

In a further note, the Commission communicated the state of negotiations with Turkey on the complementary protocol to the Council.<sup>343</sup> In this communication, the Commission noted that Turkey reiterated its request to benefit from the start of the enlargement of the Community, from generalized preferences or, failing that, from any other measure amounting to the same treatment as other developing countries. While accepting the increased quotas of cotton threads and other fabrics of cotton, Turkey made the following two requests:

- Adoption of a periodic review clause in the framework of the Association Council concerning the provisions of Annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. This protocol pertained to the progressive removal of duties in the Common Customs Tariff with respect to products imported from Turkey. The Turkish Delegation argued that the United Kingdom's membership would cause harm during the subsequent two years and the

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<sup>342</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Relations Avec Les Pays Du Bassin Méditerranéen (R/2881/72)" (HICA.H.CM2.1977.612.7 p.24, n.d.), 1-2.

<sup>343</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, "Communication de La Commission Au Conseil Sur l'état Des négociations Avec La Turquie En Vue de La Conclusion d'un Protocole Complémentaire Permettant d'assurer l'extension de l'Association à La Communauté Élargie" (HICA. H.CM2 1977. 612.7 p78, 1972).

first examination should commence when the quantitative restrictions were removed;

- The common management of the Community tariffs with the possibility of utilizing the non-utilized quotas. The Turkish delegation also desired that Turkey be able to apply different quotas to new members.

The Turkish delegation expressed its approval to the complementary measures in the agricultural sector but proposed a list of important additional measures. Firstly, Turkey demanded the period during which the Association Council would have the possibility of authorizing Turkey to reintroduce quantitative restrictions be extended from 5 to 12 years. Secondly, Turkey requested the option to reintroduce quantitative restrictions without authorization from the Association Council within the limits of 10 percent of its imports from the Community in 1967. On the other hand, Turkey renounced the possibility of modifying the list of products subject to the 22-year regime for 10 years and without any limit, in favor of all products in the chemical, mechanical and metal processing sectors. Turkey accepted the declaration of intent relating to the industrialization of Turkey with a slight modification.

The EEC assessed these requests and reached the observation that there were important points of disagreement between the two delegations despite the compromise efforts made by the Community. Turkey's requests were ambitious given that it wanted to introduce quantitative limits without any restrictions to the 22-

year list. These efforts demonstrated that Turkey regarded the negotiations for the Complementary Protocol as an opportunity for revising the Additional Protocol.

The Commission further detailed the points of disagreements between Turkey and the EEC. Concerning the adaptation of the consolidated liberalization list, the Commission suggested abandoning the Community's request to modify the basis for calculating this list, starting from imports from the "Nine" in 1967. According to the Commission, such a modification could lead to the need to call into question the composition of the release list already notified by Turkey, which would prove to be a very delicate operation. Concerning the adaptation of tariff quotas, the Commission noted that Turkey's requests for community management of contingents to be opened to new member states was its preferred solution, but this solution was not accepted. The Commission also noted that a review clause of the provisions of Annex 2 of the Additional Protocol with a view to improving the concessions granted to Turkey would constitute a modification of this Protocol. According to the Commission, such a measure could not be justified by the enlargement of the Community, given that the quotas chargeable to the new Member States were established on the same bases as for the "Six" and that the goods exported to the "Three" outside these quotas would benefit from the general reduction provided for in Annex 2. While Turkey attempted to transform negotiations over the complementary protocol to a general revision of the terms of the Association, the EEC did not approach positively to such a request and opted to focus solely on the technicalities that would arise from the enlargement.

Regarding Turkey's requests for flexibility in the industrial sector, the Commission acknowledged that the Turkish government had made efforts in this area to move closer to the Community position but that they remained insufficient. While the duration of Turkish Delegation's request for a right to reintroduce, unilaterally, without authorization from the Council of Association, was decreased from ten to five years, the Commission was of the opinion that such a concession to Turkey would decrease the impact of the consolidated list. In response to Turkey's request, the Commission proposed increasing the period during which the Association Council could authorize Turkey to reintroduce quantitative restrictions. Concerning generalized preferences, the Commission drew attention to the negative consequences that not including Turkey in the generalized system of preferences would have for Turkish exports on the market of new member states.

The Committee on Associations with Third Countries examined the above proposals of the Commission on 23 January 1973.<sup>344</sup> Concerning the consolidated list, most of the delegations agreed to follow up on the Turkish request not to modify after the extension of the Association to the three new member States but to extend to the list as notified by Turkey on the date of the signing of the Additional Protocol in November 1970 (which therefore corresponded to 35 of the Turkish private imports in 1967 from the six member states). The British and Irish delegations stressed that

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<sup>344</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Questions Restant Ouvertes Dans Le Cadre Des Négociations En Vue de l'établissement d' Un Protocole Complémentaire à l' Accord d' Ankara, En Raison de l' Élargissement" (HICA H CM2 1977 612.7 P119, 1973).

the relationship of their economies with the Turkish economy differed significantly from the relationship of Turkish economy with the Six.

The Committee observed that in 1970 Turkey was completely free to choose the products to appear on the list, provided that the import volume covered by these products correspond to 35 percent of private imports into Turkey in 1967. The Committee assumed that Turkey selected products causing it the least concern.

Under these conditions it was clear that, even if the Committee forced Turkey to add one or the other product on the list, following the extension of the Association to the three new Member States it should not be expected that products freely chosen to correspond necessarily to those whose export to Turkey was of interest to the three new member states. The Committee noted that it was evident that, by extending the list to the three new Member States, the volume of Turkish imports falling below this list would grow in absolute value. The Committee underlined those issues relating to the elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports posed very delicate problems in developing countries, and that Turkey should not be forced to make changes to the 1970 liberalization list.

The Committee rejected unanimously Turkey's request to return unused amounts of the quotas opened by the new members in textiles and petroleum products, since the Six and the Three would be applying different customs to the Turkish products. The Committee also rejected a general revision clause of Annex 2. The Committee recommended to the COREPER to follow the proposal of the Commission and not to

respond favorably to the Turkish demand for an increase in tariff quotas for petroleum products. It was found that this Turkish demand was motivated by the recent favorable development of its exports of petroleum products to some Member States of the original Community and therefore had no link with enlargement. The Committee rejected Turkey's requests for unilateral revision of terms of the Association but found that the length of time during which the Association Council could authorize Turkey to revise the list would be extended to 12 years.

The Committee noted that, before the application of the generalized preferences to the developing countries referred to as the "77" Group, Turkey had asked to be included in this system. Turkey's proposal demonstrated that Turkey believed the concessions already given to it were eroding and hoping to improve them by treating the same as with the Group 77. This proposal also suggests that Turkey was willing to accept to be regarded as a developing country, not an associate country as Greece. The Community had, for various reasons, not complied with this request but had taken measures concerning textiles and certain agricultural products. This ensured that the concessions granted to Turkey in the framework of the Association did not remain below the preferences generalized, so that Turkey, an associate country, would not be discriminated against compared to the countries of the Group of "77" on the EEC market. The Committee acknowledged that Turkey's goods would be discriminated against countries benefiting from generalized preferences in the markets of the three new members. The Committee was cognizant of the fact that

Turkey regarded this issue as a key issue that should be resolved before Ankara was able to sign the Complementary Protocol with the enlarged Community. In this context, the Committee asked the relevant agencies of the Community to find out whether a gap would exist—from the entry into force of the regime of the Complementary Protocol and until the end of the transition period of the enlargement—between the regime that the three would apply to Turkey within the framework of the gradual resumption of the Ankara Agreement and that of the generalized preferences which could not be met by autonomous measures.

The Committee recalled that Turkey had, in an earlier stage of the negotiations, asked for extensive concessions in the agricultural field by claiming that, after enlargement, it was going to lose market share in the new Member States. The Committee inquired whether it was possible for the Turkish government to submit for approval to Parliament the complementary protocol without having certain guarantees as to the content of the agricultural concessions envisaged by the Community. In this meeting, the agencies of the Commission informed the Committee that they would soon be submitting concrete proposals for the first agricultural review to be held according to the Article 35 of the Additional Protocol, taking into account the global Mediterranean policy.

The Committee also provided information on the previous work carried out to determine what other concessions could be granted to Turkey in the field of agriculture. The "Contractual Obligations" Working Group considered "turlu" (a

processed vegetable product) to be the only typically Turkish product that could be taken into consideration.

As seen from the above decisions of the Committee, most of Turkey's requests were rejected while acknowledging that Turkey was worse off compared to other developing countries after the enlargement of the Community. Turkey was once again going to request concessions from the EEC in the context of complementary protocol negotiations.

Turkey indicated on 29 January 1973 that it would sign a complementary agreement if its requests concerning the generalized tariff list were adequately addressed by the Community. This question was taken up by the Committee on Association with Third Countries.<sup>345</sup> In the relevant committee meeting, the UK supported the inclusion of Turkey among the beneficiaries of generalized preferences and opposed granting Turkey autonomous measures. The Danish and Irish delegations objected that, if Turkey's request was accepted, the Community would be faced with similar demands from a considerable number of other countries also wanting to benefit from generalized preferences, pointing out to the intensifying interest overreaching to the EEC market. This issue was transmitted to the COREPER for a final decision.

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<sup>345</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, "Questions Restant Ouvertes Dans Le Cadre Des Négociations En Vue de l'établissement d'un Protocole Complémentaire à l'Accord d'Ankara, En Raison de l'élargissement (Docs S/86/73 (NT 3) et S/1094/72 (NT 48))" (HICA.H.CM2.1977.612.8.pdf p3, 1973).

Another important issue was a response to Turkey's demands in the agricultural sector. Turkey requested a detailed work program by the Community concerning its demands and commitments on the content of further concessions before the signature of the complementary protocol. While it became evident that the previously agreed dates on the efforts concerning the reexamination of the agricultural sector could not be met, the Committee reached the conclusion that it was not possible to present commitments to Turkey before the signature of the complementary protocol arguing that:

Turkey would be assessed on the merits of its own Association, it is undeniable that, on the products of the Mediterranean, the solutions to be developed for the Turkey can only be specified in the light of the work carried out as part of the approach within the framework of global approach.

The Committee sought to convene to the Turkish delegation that the Community would work to finalize specific proposals relating to certain typically Turkish products and that they actively pursue its work on other Turkish agricultural demands. The typically Turkish products were beet seeds, malt, dehydrated bulbs, vetches, and "turlu." The Committee concluded its deliberations by stating that it was up to the

Committee of Permanent Representatives to decide whether, in view of the link thus established by the Turkish delegation with the possibility for it to sign the Complementary Protocol, it would be advisable to further improve somewhat the current position of the Turkish delegation

In February 1972, the EEC had two outstanding issues that needed a decision to be adopted at the Council level: the re-examination clause in the Annex and the

generalized preferences about which the Permanent Representatives Committee deliberated on 2 February 1973.<sup>346</sup> For the former issue, Turkey argued that a re-examination was necessary because the UK was going to maintain quantitative restrictions on imports of certain cotton textiles from Turkey. Eight delegations and the Commission opposed this request because Annex 2 referred to various products sensitive to the Community. They proposed that the UK could increase the quotas after two years according to the Additional Protocol. The COREPER suggested that it should be decided on the Council level, since Turkey attached “cardinal importance” to the generalized benefits.

The Council instructed the COREPER on 5 February 1973 to examine these issues.<sup>347</sup> The UK stated that it was not in a position to offer additional quotas.<sup>348</sup> Turkey would find this response inadequate, and so it was proposed that a declaration could be made to address Turkey’s concerns. While the Commission proposed a general declaration, the British Delegation proposed a more limited version suggesting the general trend of Turkish cotton textile imports to the EEC should be examined when the quantitative restrictions of the United Kingdom expired. On the issue of generalized preferences, instead of including Turkey in the generalized preferences

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<sup>346</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Questions Remaining Open in the Framework of the Negotiations for the Drawing up of an Supplementary Protocol to the Ankara Agreement Due to the Enlargement of the Community” (HICA.H.HCM2. 1977.612.8 p.42, 1973).

<sup>347</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “EXTRAIT DE LA NOTE /RELEVÉ DES DECISIONS PRISES PAR LE CONSEIL” (GICA.H. HCM2. 1977.612.8 P.54, 1973).

<sup>348</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Projet de Rapport Au Comité Des Représentants Permanents Sur Les Deux Points Non Encore Réglés Dans Le Cadre de La Mise Au Point Des Directives à Arrêter Par Le Conseil Pour La Phase Finale Des Négociations Pour"le Protocole Complémentaire C.E.E. Élargie” (HICA. H. HCM2. 1977. 612.8 p.55, n.d.).

list, the possibility of introduction of autonomous measures by new member states to Turkey was considered. However, such a course of action required a detailed analysis before and after the Complementary Protocol entered into force.

It was also underlined that, in 1973, Turkey was not being discriminated vis-à-vis Group 77. Yet after the complementary protocol would be put into effect between 1974 and 1977, the inclusion of the textiles to the generalized preferences was going to “evidently” become a significant issue.<sup>349</sup> In this context, the Six acknowledged that the Association was a regime less favorable than the generalized preferences and took autonomous measures to rectify this situation, such as increasing the quotas in cotton threads and decreasing tariffs applied to cotton fabrics. The UK delegation strictly opposed granting Turkey a tariff exemption. The idea of increasing quotas for Turkish cotton thread was not even entertained. It was advised that some practical measures to address Turkey’s concerns should be evaluated. It is worth noting that the EEC was again acknowledging that Turkey’s concerns were justified and could be addressed, but such measures did not materialize due to a lack of consensus among member states, particularly due to UK’s objection.

After deliberations, the COREPER sent its final suggestions regarding the two remaining issues to the Council.<sup>350</sup> The committee decided that it was not possible to

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<sup>349</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 4.

<sup>350</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, “Points Non Encore Régés Dans Le Cadre de La Mise Au Point Des Directives à Arrêter Par Le Conseil Pour La Phase Finale Des Négociations Pour Le Protocole Complémentaire C.E.E. Élargie - Turquie” (1977. 612.8 page 90, 1973).

accept Turkey's requests to establish a general review clause of Annex no 2 of the Additional Protocol. To address the Turkish public's and Parliament's concerns, the following declaration was considered:

At the end of 1974, the Association Council will examine the consequences for export development Turkish transitional measures provided for in Article 12 paragraph 2 of the Complementary Protocol.<sup>351</sup>

Concerning the second issue—inclusion of Turkey in the generalized preferences list—the Committee reminded that seven delegations, among which there were three new members, were in favor of including Turkey in the generalized preferences list. Concerning the discrimination against Turkey as result of the enlargement of the Community, the Commission considered that “it would be difficult to accept Turkey, an associated country with a low level of development, is treated less well than the beneficiary countries of generalized preferences.”<sup>352</sup> Based on this reasoning, the Commission suggested the possible adoption of autonomous measures to ensure that Turkey's concerns were addressed. Regarding the request for agricultural concessions, the Commission underlined that this issue was not part of the negotiations and should be raised in the context of the Council of Association meetings. Finally, the Commission also noted that the negotiations for the complementary protocol was reaching its endpoint.

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<sup>351</sup> Conseil des Communautés Européennes, 2.

<sup>352</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, “Transmission Au Conseil” (Htca h cm2 1977.612.9 p5, 1973), 3.

Turkey submitted a declaration to put emphasis on agricultural concessions during the negotiations. This declaration called on the Community to proceed to a rebalancing of the Association after the enlargement of the Community. While this declaration indicated that a satisfactory solution of Turkey's agricultural problems was necessary for the conclusion of the complementary agreement, the Commission argued that this topic was not related to the negotiations pertaining to the expansion of the Community. The Commission explicitly stated that it could give not any assurances concerning this issue except bringing the Turkish declaration to the attention of the Council.<sup>353</sup>

In the meantime, the UK was considering how its relationship with Turkey would develop after its membership to the EEC. The British Department of Trade and Industry stated that the "Turks appear to stand to lose rather than gain from the accession of new applicants, because the Community's agricultural tariff is in general higher than ours and often the preferential rate is higher than the rate we charge at present."<sup>354</sup>

One of the controversial issues for both parties of the Association would be Turkish exports of cotton yarn to the UK. This issue would be brought before the Community institution in 1974. In 1974, the UK Delegation in the EEC was instructed to raise the topic of increasing imports of cotton yarn from Turkey and Greece to the UK in

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<sup>353</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, 2.

<sup>354</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, "Effect on British Aid to Turkey of EEC Membership (9/1613)," 1972, 67.

COREPER. The focus was on imports originating from Turkey, as the imported amount was considerably higher. The UK called on the other EEC members to initiate safeguard clauses for Turkey's cotton yarn imports to the EEC.<sup>355</sup> The reason for UK's strong protests was the layoffs and closing in the British cotton industry due to cheap cotton imports from Turkey.<sup>356</sup>

The UK was also concerned by the free movement of Turkish workers to the EEC. In 1974, the UK contacted other member states to learn their posture on the possible free movement of Turkish workers in the EEC. The French indicated that they regarded the free movement of Turkish workers as a measure that could be put off indefinitely.<sup>357</sup> The Danish authorities were also not distinctly worried about the free movement of Turkish workers, as there was unemployment in Denmark and the procedure could take 10 years.<sup>358</sup> The Luxembourg authorities, in a similar fashion, were not worried about an influx of Turkish workers. Italy was also not concerned about Turkish workers, as it was undergoing economic difficulties and was itself exporting Italian workers to the EEC.<sup>359</sup> The Dutch authorities expected that the number of Turkish migrants would be manageable.<sup>360</sup> The German authorities, however, were highly concerned about the free movement of Turkish workers, given

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<sup>355</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, "Commerical Relations Between UK and Turkey (FCO 9/2120)," 1974, 10.

<sup>356</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, 18.

<sup>357</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office (9/2121), "EEC and Turkey," 1974, 13.

<sup>358</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office (9/2121), 8.

<sup>359</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office (9/2121), 17.

<sup>360</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office (9/2121), 22.

the high level of disparity between the development of member states of EEC and Turkey. Given that Germany approved the freedom of movement in Turkey as part of the additional protocol, the German authorities were thinking that they would apply effective controls to the exercise of this freedom.<sup>361</sup>

The internal negotiations of the EEC summarized above demonstrate that Turkey tried to bring the balance of the association to the top of its demands from the EEC. Turkey's arguments were found justified by Commission officials, leading them to argue that additional concessions would be appropriate for Turkey. Yet such a course of action was not accepted by all the member states and the UK. The issues of generalized preferences, Turkey's relative position in the EEC's Mediterranean policy, as well as the expansion of the EEC, were all factors that contributed to EEC's final policy of declining most of Turkey's requests.

As seen from the internal negotiations of the EEC, Turkey's domestic instability was not on the top of the agenda of the Commission or the Council. The debate concerning the complementary protocol was strictly about the economic implications of the EEC's expansion and Turkey's declining advantages from an expanded EEC. While the EEC was going through one of its most important expansions and accepting the UK as a member, Turkey was learning that this expansion meant a less favorable external economic environment for itself. To make matters worse, the

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<sup>361</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office (9/2121), 25.

UK's focus on its trade with Turkey in respect to textiles became a heated topic because the UK was concerned about increasing textile imports from Turkey.

In theoretical terms, the negotiations were bilateral and of strictly economic issues, and again they confirm the absence of supranational and realist factors in the negotiations. Turkey was trying to improve its relative position with the Association, just before the enlargement which it deemed as harmful to already worsening economic terms of the Association. However, Turkey was not in a position to induce change on the part of the EEC, as the EEC was in the process of the enlargement and had to situate Turkey in its engagements with other countries such as the G77 and Mediterranean countries.

The start of the 1970s was a time of transformation for the EEC. It increased its members from "6" and became the "9". It also underwent an institutional transformation to deal with the increased membership and economic turmoil related to Richard Nixon's decision to abandon dollar-gold parity in 1971 and the OPEC oil crisis. The increasing commitments and capacity of the EEC meant fewer concessions for Turkey.

### **B. Suspension Decisions and Failed Revitalization Attempts**

The signature of the Additional Protocol transformed the Association from a preparatory stage where Turkey had no obligations to the transition stage where Turkey had numerous obligations. While the nature of the Association was significantly changing, the EEC and Turkey also underwent a serious transformation.

The EEC was becoming a global economic power and an economic center in the 1970s. The growing prowess of the EEC in the global economic relationship made more countries willing to conclude agreements with the EEC for improved access to its market. With the accession of the UK, the EEC's reach was extended to the countries where the UK, as an ex-colonial power, had historical political and economic relations. The UK's special relationship with its former colonies also influenced how the EEC formulated its association agreements with existing and future associates. The application of Greece, and subsequently Portugal and Spain, also had an impact on the approach of the EEC to the associate relationships.

Turkey's desire to proceed to the transition phase was based on political and economic factors.<sup>362</sup> Firstly, Turkey considered that the economic benefits accrued through the preparatory phase would continue in the subsequent stages such as more access to the EEC markets and a broader freedom of movement for Turkish workers in the EEC. On the political front, Turkey expected that the imbalance between the Athens and Ankara agreements could be restored, since there was a military takeover in Greece. In addition, Turkey expected to get support from the EEC in the context of the crisis in Cyprus and believed proceeding to the transition phase would be more beneficial, since the EEC was receiving applications from UK, Denmark and Norway. In order to get more concessions from the EEC, Turkey applied to the EEC

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<sup>362</sup> Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Eu Membership?*, 64.

two years before it was planned.<sup>363</sup> In this context, Turkey and the EEC started the negotiations concerning the Additional Protocol in 1968. These negotiations lasted until 1973 and the Additional Protocol entered into force on 1 January 1973.

The Additional Protocol required both parties to progressively establish a customs union.<sup>364</sup> Turkey's obligations to reduce tariffs were scheduled according to two lists. The first list included products for which Turkey would achieve competitiveness in 12 years, the second list covered products for which Turkey would achieve competitiveness in 22 years. These two lists determined the products whose tariffs would be removed. In addition, Turkey was expected to remove quotas in accordance with a liberalization plan and harmonize its tariffs with common customs tariff. The EEC on the other hand was to abolish customs duties and charges and all quantitative restrictions on imports from Turkey with the exceptions of oil products above a fixed quota and some particular textile products.

During the first three years after the Additional Protocol, the parties took the planned steps in relation to reducing tariffs.<sup>365</sup> The EEC removed tariffs on industrial products originating from Turkey and granted the preferential zero tariff on products which accounted for 33 percent of Turkey's exports. The EEC also decided to approve Second and Third Financial Protocol for supporting the development of

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<sup>363</sup> Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer, *Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017), 24.

<sup>364</sup> Council of the European Communities, "EEC-TURKEY ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOLS AND OTHER BASIC TEXTS," 1992, 21.

<sup>365</sup> Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Eu Membership?*, 66.

Turkish economy. Turkey, on the other hand, reduced tariffs by 10 percent for the 12-year list and by 5 percent for the 22-year list. In 1976, however, the problems related to the Association started to become pronounced in the negotiations between the parties as well as in Turkish public opinion.

The emergence of the Mediterranean region as a political and economically pivotal region for the EEC had repercussions for the Association between Turkey and the EEC. The war in 1973 between the Arab countries and Israel, and the subsequent increase in oil prices, rendered the political stability in the Mediterranean critical for the EEC's own economic security. Given the high dependency of the Mediterranean countries on the EEC, the cooperation agreements with those countries were of mutual interest for both parties. Taking into account the enlargement of the EEC and applications for membership to the EEC as well the increasing importance of agreements with the Mediterranean countries, the association relationship with Turkey became one of many agreements with third countries.

The impact of the deepening relationship between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries had a negative impact on the association between Turkey and the EEC. These agreements provided preferential arrangements, among which the most important ones were the progressive cancellation of restrictions for agricultural trade, textiles, as well as facilitation of migration to the EEC. This meant that these arrangements gave advantages to related countries at the expense of Turkey.

Domestic developments in Turkey also had an impact on the Association relationship. The military's political intervention and the subsequent political and economic hardships increased in the 1970s. On the economic front, between 1973 and 1977 the exports increased from 1.3 to 1.7 billion dollars, while imports rose from 1.3 to 5.7 billion dollars. Between 1975 and 1977, the trade deficit climbed to 4 billion dollars while external debt reached 10 billion dollars. In 1978, inflation was near 52 percent and there were shortages of basic goods. Turkey defaulted in its payments in February 1977 and started to reschedule its debt payments.<sup>366</sup> After the agreement between the IMF and Turkey in 1979, there was a significant devaluation of Turkish lira.

The Turkish military's intervention in politics in 1971 coincided with the public discussion of the Additional Protocol. The remainder of the 1970s were governed by a series of unstable and weak coalition governments. Between 1973 and 1980, there were five changes of government in Turkey. The Turkish domestic scene also witnessed the emergence of new national political parties that were deeply opposed to the Association. For example, the impact of ultraconservative National Salvation Party was crucial for the trajectory of the Association, as it was present in the coalition government as the partner of Justice Party. This change in the political scene had an adverse impact on the public perception of the Association.

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<sup>366</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662," 102.

The Additional Protocol brought the Association to the forefront in public discussions, as the obligations stemming from it captured the attention of state agencies, corporations, as well a large segment of the Turkish public. The fundamental tension was located between the contradictions of said obligations with the economic policies of Turkey. Turkey at that time was following an economic policy of import-substitution, which was reliant on the presence of high tariff barriers for domestic producers. The SPO established after the 1960 coup was a key agency in Turkish economics because it provided the 5-year development plans. After the 1970s, it became more vocal in objecting to the Association agreement and became a staunch supporter of the revision of Additional Protocol. The key objection of the SPO was that the Association was an obstacle hindering Turkey from achieving development and industrialization. According to the SPO, the Association liberalized the nascent industries of Turkish industry, depriving them of a realistic chance to compete with their European competitors.

The dispute between the SPO and the MFA increased as the problems relative to the Association increased. *Cumhuriyet* reported that the MFA found the requests of SPO for additional concessions from the EEC adventurist.<sup>367</sup> The MFA deemed the requests of the revision of the Additional Agreement as amateurish and argued that they lacked evidence. The MFA also added the reports of SPO would not have any real political impact and would be confined to theoretical and academic circles.

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<sup>367</sup> "Ekonomi," *Cumhuriyet*, April 18, 1975.

*Cumhuriyet* reported that the free circulation of Turkish workers seemed impossible, examining a report of the European Parliament. The European Parliament's role in the negotiations with Turkey were minimal, and this reference constituted one of the few references to it.

*Cumhuriyet* reported that the EEC countries, particularly France with its special economic interests in the Mediterranean region, were using the Cyprus issue as an excuse to not give additional concessions to Turkey. According to *Cumhuriyet*, France attempted and succeeded in preventing additional concessions to Turkey so that its products competed better compared to Turkey. *Cumhuriyet* also reported that the UK was the leader among the EEC countries which supported anti-Turkey resolutions in the EEC in the context of Cyprus problem.<sup>368</sup>

Prime Minister Demirel underlined that Turkey lost its advantageous position in the EEC market to a large extent due to the EEC's increasing relationship with third countries. Demirel emphasized that the EEC's advantageous position was increasing while Turkey's position in the EEC market was decreasing.<sup>369</sup>

Besim Ustunel, a prominent voice in EEC affairs and CHP Senator candidate at the time, claimed that an "EEC Embargo is coming after the US one."<sup>370</sup> Ustunel stated that the EEC was on the side of Greece in the Cyprus issue and was not even willing

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<sup>368</sup> "Türkiye-AET," *Cumhuriyet*, September 16, 1975.

<sup>369</sup> "Başbakan Demirel: AET Türkiye'de Güçlenirken, Türkiye'nin AET'deki Avantajı Büyük Ölçüde Kayboluyor.," *Cumhuriyet*, September 19, 1975.

<sup>370</sup> "USTUNEL: Amerikan Ambargosundan Sonra Ortak Pazar Ambargosu Geliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, September 26, 1975.

to discuss Turkey's moderate requests, such as concessions on agricultural products and the free circulation of Turkish workers. Ustunel also suggested that the EEC was getting bolder in response Turkey's requests, since Turkey's trade deficit was increasing with the EEC. Referring to the pro-EEC voices in Turkish bureaucracy as the fans of the EEC, Ustunel advocated for a rapid industrialization of Turkey which would enable Turkey to pursue an independent foreign policy.

The special report of the SPO concerning the Association relationship was revealing in terms of the negative sentiment felt towards the relationship between Turkey and the EEC. The report emphasized that development was the highest priority for decision-makers in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic. The ambiguity stemming from the obligations arising from the Additional Protocol jeopardized the achievement of this priority. According to the report, Turkey would not be able to carry out said obligations and the obligations were in contradiction to the developmental objectives laid out in the fourth development program.<sup>371</sup> While the report explained the difficulties Turkey would face from implementing the Additional Protocol, a large portion of it was devoted to examining alternatives to the association as well as suggestions for improving the terms of the Association. The report concluded that the Additional Protocol entailed grave dangers for the Turkish economy; there was a need for fundamental revision of the Association whether

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<sup>371</sup> State Planning Organization, "AVRUPA EKONOMİK TOPLULUĞU ÖZEL İHTİSAS KOMİSYONU RAPORU," 1976.

through changing the Association or pursuing alternatives to the Association, such as concluding trade and cooperation agreements.

The most important reason for the discontent stemming from the Association was the erosion of benefits granted to Turkey from the EEC. Turkey compared its situation to the Mediterranean countries, which gradually started to receive more and more concessions from the EEC. This situation led to what Turkish policy-makers referred to as “Maghrebization” of the Association. The second most important reason for the opposition to the Association was the increasing imbalance between the EEC and Turkey in terms of trade. Turkey’s exports to the EEC grew 257 percent 1963-1976, while imports from the Community to Turkey grew by 742 percent in the same period.<sup>372</sup> The worsening deficit of balance of payments due to decrease in remittances from Turkish workers abroad, four-fold increase in petroleum products as well as increase in the prices of imported goods also pushed domestic actors to question the viability of the Association.

The sustained questioning of costs and benefits of the Association suggested that the public was now perceptive to what the Association entailed compared to the initial stages of the relationship. In this stage, the Association was now fully a part of Turkish politics as well as its development politics. The Association’s purportedly negative impact to Turkey’s development was a criticism frequently raised. This

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<sup>372</sup> Commission des Communautés Européennes, “Europe Information/ TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,” 1978, 6.

situation was also compounded by the EEC's granting of further concessions to other third countries, which eroded the benefits of the Association.

In theoretical terms, the distribution of outcomes of the Association no longer acceptable to the Turkish public. This would create frictions in the management of interdependence between Turkey and the EEC. Furthermore, developmental politics was now more present in Turkey in full force. Association was no more an abstract technical issue that would be addressed by anonymous experts. It now became an important theme in Turkish politics.

The concept of Maghrebization was used to refer to the eroding impacts of the Association. On 3 October 1975, the Turkish Ambassador to the EEC, Tevfik Saraçoğlu, stressed that it was difficult to comprehend why Turkey did not receive preferential treatment in comparison to other countries, such as Maghreb countries in respect of agricultural products. The response of the EEC was to state that "issue of agricultural goods was a delicate topic within the EEC."<sup>373</sup> Walter Wallerstein, President of the EEC Commission in December 1975 indicated to Saracoglu that no additional advantages concerning Turkish agricultural products were considered. He also stated that the Commission could open the issue of agricultural concessions without ensuring such an examination would be positive for Turkey. In a message, the President eloquently summarized the approach of the EEC to Turkey:

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<sup>373</sup> "Travaux Du Conseil d'association Avec La Turquie/EN-1666" (Florence: Historical Archives of the European Union, n.d.), 13.

I think the presentation [dossier to COREPER] should include concessions for certain products which Turkey does not export or nearly does not export. Regarding concessions which were offered to Mediterranean countries, but not to Turkey, it is necessary to... explain specific historical or other justifications of that particular treatment.<sup>374</sup>

The Turkish Ambassador, in his meeting in October 1975 with Emile Noel, then Secretary-General of the Commission, stressed that rejecting Turkey's requests in respect to agricultural products could lead to a cancellation of Turkey's efforts in the context of the Association agreement. He also added that the disagreements with the EEC could deteriorate if Turkey's requests concerning Turkish workers were also rejected. Noel observed that Turkey's demands ought to be taken seriously.<sup>375</sup>

The meeting with Turkish MFA and EEC Bureau of Information in Ankara was important for transmitting the idea of suspension of the Association to the European side.<sup>376</sup> In this meeting, the Turkish representatives indicated that the worsening of the economic situation rendered the revision of the Additional Protocol essential. In this regard, the Turkish side emphasized that, after the crisis in 1973, a new economic context had emerged, and a revision of the additional protocol was necessary to allow Turkey to develop its economy. This revision could consist of agricultural and industrial concessions, the reinforcement of safeguard measures, and economic and commercial cooperation. The Turkish representatives also added that it

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<sup>374</sup> "Travaux Du Conseil d'association Avec La Turquie/EN-1666," 13.

<sup>375</sup> "Association de La Turquie: Notes Adressées Par EN à M. de Kergorlay de La DGI, Chargé de Négocier l'élargissement Méditerranéen-EN/251" (Florence: Historical Archives of the European Union, 1975), 11–13.

<sup>376</sup> "Travaux Du Conseil d'association Avec La Turquie/EN-1654" (Florence: Historical Archives of the European Union, n.d.), 80–84.

was impossible for Turkey to adhere to the 12-year timetable, and this situation led some Turkish public servants and politicians to conclude that the Turkish economy should be freed from these restraints. To that end, some proposed that the products in the 12-year list should be included in the 22 year-list and Turkey should pursue a freer approach to achieve its customs union objective with the EEC in 1995. The report noted that this was the first time a total revision of the additional protocol was suggested, which was not in line with the previous remarks of the Turkish Ambassador.

The Turkish ambassador regularly raised agricultural issues. In January 1976, the Ambassador protested the discrimination of Turkish agricultural products and stated that the topic had become politicized in Turkey, and that it was an “absolute necessity to do something serious about the discrimination of which Turkey was a victim.”<sup>377</sup> He emphasized that, without a formal solution of the agricultural affairs, it was not possible for the relationship between the EEC and Turkey to proceed. He drew attention to the urgency of addressing this issue before the entry of Greece to the EEC. In a similar vein, the EEC’s Information Bureau in Ankara warned that application of safeguard clauses to the Turkish exports of cotton to the EEC would have serious negative impact to the Association.<sup>378</sup> Neither the statement of the Ambassador nor that of the Information Bureau elicited a positive response. Greece

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<sup>377</sup> “Travaux Du Conseil d’association Avec La Turquie/EN-1666,” 131.

<sup>378</sup> “Travaux Du Conseil d’association Avec La Turquie/EN-1654,” 244.

became a member of the EEC without the solution of agricultural issues for Turkey and the safeguard clauses were applied to Turkey.

In December 1976, Turkey decided to unilaterally suspend its obligations from the additional protocol. The main obligations it suspended were the ten percent reductions in 12-year lists and harmonization with EEC's Common Customs Tariff for one year. The EEC tried to prevent the deterioration in the relationship by providing minor concessions on a number of agricultural products, a guarantee on the conditions of Turkish workers in Europe, and a credit worth 380 million dollars.<sup>379</sup>

The negative climate against the Association stretched beyond Turkish government circles. The Economic Development Foundation, which was established by Turkish business to further the relationship between the EEC and Turkey, suggested the merging of 12-year and 22-year lists.<sup>380</sup> A conference prepared by this foundation was a venue for Turkish businesses to express their disappointment and frustration with the Association relationship. The Turkish business was of the opinion that Turkey was not treated fairly by the EEC, as more and more concessions were accorded to other Mediterranean countries. Most of the businesses argued that the objectives set by the 12-year list were not realistic and could not be achieved. The conference concluded that there was a pressing need for total revision of the Additional Protocol. A senior CHP politician, who was considered to be a ministerial

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<sup>379</sup> Erhan and Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," 850.

<sup>380</sup> "Travaux Du Conseil d'association Avec La Turquie/EN-1654," 145.

candidate, argued that the additional protocol was detrimental for Turkish industrialization and its non-revision would lead to the collapse of the Association. Turkey transmitted its complaints to the UK as well. Concerning Turkish claims that the preferences offered to Turkey were worse than other Mediterranean countries, the UK's response was to emphasize that Turkey received a better regime compared to other countries.<sup>381</sup> For further concessions, the UK was going to underline that a full review of concessions was going to be launched, while pointing out that the previous concessions were the result of a difficult negotiation within the EEC. The UK emphasized that 100,000 people had lost their jobs in the textile industry in the UK alone and the Community had to take some measures to address this trend.<sup>382</sup> In response to Turkey's criticisms of quotas on Turkish cotton yarn, the UK insisted that those measures were necessary for preventing disruption of the UK's hard-spinning textile industry. Regarding textiles, the FCO underlined that the EEC as a whole was worried about the imports of Turkish textiles.

It is worth noting that the FCO stated:

As part of an overall policy to bring some order and coherence into a rather disorganized policy vis-a-vis the other Mediterranean states, the Community has recently negotiated a number of preferential agreements with other Mediterranean states. The conclusion of these agreements has inevitably given rise to the feeling in Turkey that her privileged position has been eroded. *This is undoubtedly true.*<sup>383</sup> [emphasis mine]

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<sup>381</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, "Commerical Relations Between UK and Turkey (FCO 9/2120)," 40–41.

<sup>382</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, 42.

<sup>383</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, 44.

The FCO added that Turkey's attempts to diversify its trade with other countries would probably fail "given the firmly established nature of its trade links with the Community." The FCO also drew attention to the rising anxiety of Turkey due to Greek membership application for membership of the EEC.

The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Frank Judd, visited Ankara in 1977, and had a meeting with Çağlayangil, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>384</sup> Çağlayangil, in his meeting with Judd, stated that the EEC regarded Turkey as alien to it and the EEC had disrupted the balance of the Association by giving concessions to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. In reference to these challenges, Turkey considered ending the Association agreement and seeking a better deal outside it. Çağlayangil further argued that the trade deficit between the EEC and Turkey had been between 200 and 300 million dollars, and that in 1976 it had reached 2 billion dollars. Judd responded by stating that he thought Turkey was given a better deal compared to other countries.

On 30 June 1977, the UK Embassy in Ankara indicated that they repeatedly stressed a lenient approach to Turkey was appropriate given that Turkey was undergoing a serious economic crisis and measures limiting Turkey's export capacities would only worsen this situation. Stricter measures concerning Turkey's exports to the EEC would embolden those who emphasized that Turkey should look for alternatives to

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<sup>384</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, "Turkey and the EEC WST 022/598/1," 1977, 55–56.

the West.<sup>385</sup> A background note from the FCO underlined, "it is evident that the Community's relations with Turkey will continue to cause problems throughout 1977."<sup>386</sup>

The Ecevit Government, established in January 1978, shared the above-mentioned concerns regarding the Association. The government approved the 4<sup>th</sup> 5-Year Development Plan, which stated in no uncertain terms that the Additional Protocol in particular and the Association in general were harmful for the Turkish economy. According to the plan, Turkey delivered its promises and decreased its tariffs against the EEC in 1976 amid a balance of payments crisis. Turkey was not in a condition to harmonize with the Common External Tariff and other obligations. To make matters worse, the EEC adopted protectionist measures through safeguard measures which made it more difficult for Turkey to export to the EEC. Last but not least, the EEC did not realize its promises towards the Turkish workers. The EEC accorded concessions to Maghreb countries, eroding the possible benefits Turkey would accrue from the Association. The plan's conclusion was clear: while the EEC strengthened its position in the Turkish market, Turkey's role in the EEC market was decreased.<sup>387</sup> Ecevit's statement echoed the SPO plan. Ecevit stressed that the Association prevented Turkey from pursuing policies in line with its economic

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<sup>385</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, 96.

<sup>386</sup> Foreign Commonwealth Office, 174.

<sup>387</sup> "4. 5. Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1979-1983)," n.d., 69, accessed April 4, 2019.

interests and that he would not let Turkey to be crushed as a result of the relationship.

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Ecevit's Brussels visit in 1978 provided an occasion to exchange views on the trajectory of the Association. The President of the EEC was advised to emphasize that the EEC would not permit Greece to bring its dispute with Turkey to the EEC and that a new life should be given to the Association. Therefore, the EEC decision-makers were aware of the negative trajectory of the Association and were open to learning the position of the Turkish side. The President was also advised to underline that there was a general concern that Turkey was getting distant from the EEC due to its grievances on Turkish workers, textiles, and agricultural products.<sup>389</sup>

The briefing prepared for the EEC President laid out in clear terms why the Association between Turkey and the EEC was undergoing a crisis.<sup>390</sup> After the 1973 economic crisis, the EEC's decision not to address Turkey's requests for a more accommodating approach towards its agricultural exports contributed to the already worsening economic situation of Turkey. This negative situation was compounded by the fact that the free movement of Turkish workers was not going to take place in foreseeable future, which was a promise given by the EEC as a part of the previous arrangements. The EEC's decision to grant more concessions to other Mediterranean

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<sup>388</sup> İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz, "Koalisyon Hükümetleri , Hükümet Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri," 2015, 5422.

<sup>389</sup> "Visite de B. Ecevit, Premier Ministre Turc, Au Président Roy Jenkins Le 25/05/EN-1664" (Florence: Historical Archives of the European Union, n.d.), 2.

<sup>390</sup> "Visite de B. Ecevit, Premier Ministre Turc, Au Président Roy Jenkins Le 25/05/EN-1664," 30–32.

countries that exported similar agricultural products to the EEC also caused resentment in Turkey. And Turkey considered the amount of financial aid to be low. Given these outstanding issues at the background, the EEC planned to use the visit of Ecevit for exploring the future of the Association.

Ecevit had a clear message in his meeting with Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission. He stated that Turkey was undergoing a serious economic crisis and that this crisis could lead Turkey to change its general political orientation. At this important conjuncture, Ecevit emphasized that it was up to Turkey's Western friends to increase their assistance. He also drew attention to the negative impact of the concessions given to the Mediterranean countries. These concessions had the potential to devalue the Association with Turkey. He added that the EEC did not deliver its promise for the freedom of movement of Turkish workers. This negative situation was exacerbated by the restrictive attitude of the EEC towards Turkish exports. Jenkins asked how Turkey proposed to address these grievances. Ecevit replied by stating that proposals would be transmitted by the end of September. At the end of the meeting, President Jenkins stated that "it was up to the Turks to make the next move." The next move by the Turks would be to declare the second unilateral suspension of the Additional protocol.<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> "Visite de B. Ecevit, Premier Ministre Turc, Au Président Roy Jenkins Le 25/05/EN-1664," 78–81.

Hasan Cemal, a columnist in *Cumhuriyet* argued that the Association agreement was “a document of idiocy.” According to him, even if the ECC gave additional concessions, the trade deficit between the EEC and Turkey would not close, as the concessions would only lead to additional trade in the amount of 100- 150 million dollars at a time when the trade deficit was 3 billion dollars. He underlined that the EEC made it clear in diplomatic terms that there would be no free circulation of Turkish workers among the EEC countries. In response to this imbalanced relationship, he advocated that Turkey suspend its obligations.<sup>392</sup> T. Güngör Uras, a prominent economist, argued that Turkey was giving more to the EEC than it was receiving. He asserted that Turkey was fulfilling its obligations at the expense of suffering economic hardship and giving up its industrialization.<sup>393</sup>

The Industry and Technology Minister from the National Salvation Party stated that “Turkey should sever its relationship with EEC if it does not receive concessions in industrial and agricultural products.”<sup>394</sup> In a similar vein, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of National Salvation Party and Deputy Prime Minister, argued that “Turkey was not trying to enter to the EEC to become a servant.”<sup>395</sup> The National Salvation Party was advocating bilateral trade agreements instead of the Association agreement with the EEC. Erbakan added that there was a real necessity to revise the Ankara

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<sup>392</sup> Hasan Cemal, “Ortak Pazar Neyin Peşinde,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 13, 1976.

<sup>393</sup> T. Güngör Uras, “AET’ye Yeni Ödünler,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 19, 1976.

<sup>394</sup> “MSP’li Bakan Doğru: Türkiye’ye Sınai ve Tarım Ürünlerinde Taviz Tanınmazsa Türkiye AET İle Bağlarını Koparmalı,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 1976.

<sup>395</sup> “AP İle MSP Ortak Pazar İçin Anlaşmaya Varamadı. Erbakan: AET’ye Uşak Olalım Diye Girmiyoruz Dedi,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1976.

Agreement, as the last four years had not been in Turkey's favor. Due to the disagreement between the National Salvation Party and the Justice Party on issues related to the Association, the Association Council was postponed to a later date.<sup>396</sup>

The Association Council meeting was held in December 1976, but its results did not satisfy either the Justice Party or the National Salvation Party. While there were minor concessions regarding the free circulation of Turkish workers and some agricultural products, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil indicated that they were inadequate. The National Salvation Party's Deputy Chair argued that these concessions were against Turkey: the EEC was not meeting any of Turkey's demands, while Turkey was fulfilling its obligations stemming from the Association.<sup>397</sup>

The Turkish MFA advocated a more comprehensive change in the relationship between Turkey and the EEC.<sup>398</sup> The Ministry emphasized that development required more exports, but the Association brought about obligations on Turkey which made development more difficult. It also emphasized that there was an imbalance between the obligations and advantages of the Association for Turkey. The Ministry proposed a new model that would acknowledge Turkey as a developing country or include a bilateral trade agreement that gave Turkey the authority to place restrictions on

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<sup>396</sup> "AP İle MSP, Ortak Pazar Konusunda Anlaşamayınca Ortaklık Konseyi Belirsiz Bir Tarihe Ertelendi.," *Cumhuriyet*, October 15, 1976.

<sup>397</sup> "Türkiye-AET Ortaklık Konseyi Toplantısında Sağlanan Ödünleri MSP de Çağlayangil de Yetersiz Buluyor," *Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1976.

<sup>398</sup> Ahmet Tan, "Dışişlerinde Hazırlanan Bir Raporda AET İle İlişki Modelinin Değişmesi İstendi," *Cumhuriyet*, July 25, 1977, <https://egazete.cumhuriyet.com.tr/oku/192/1978-07-25/0>.

imports. According to the press, the change in the model would be a boost to Turkey's development.

The suspension decision transmitted by the Ecevit Government in October 1978 to the EEC was substantially more expansive than the previous suspension decision.<sup>399</sup> Turkey emphasized that, given the dire economic situation, it was impossible for Turkey to achieve the objectives set out in the Additional Protocol. The balance of trade between Turkey and the EEC was in a continuous trend of deterioration and this contributed to a balance of payments crisis in Turkey. To address these issues, Turkey needed to implement the Fourth Five-Year Development plan, which necessitated a certain room of maneuver, particularly in relation to the obligations stemming from the Additional Protocol. In this context, the suspension of some obligations was necessary for Turkish authorities to “give a sound orientation to [their] economy and reassess the impact of the second enlargement.” The Turkish authorities emphasized that this suspension would not “constitute a freezing of the association, on the contrary it will inaugurate a new era by revitalization.”<sup>400</sup> The Turkish side also emphasized that the enlargement would certainly have a negative impact on the Association and necessitate a complete revision of the Additional Protocol. While Turkey unilaterally suspended its obligations, the EEC was expected to continue fulfilling its obligations, for example by not applying any quantitative

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<sup>399</sup> “Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1657” (Florence: Historical Archives of the European Union, n.d.), 173–75.

<sup>400</sup> “Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662,” 33.

restriction to Turkey's industrial exports to the EEC. Turkey, in addition, requested that all concessions provided to third countries should be extended to it, a preferential margin for Turkish products be applied, and, finally, that non-tariff restrictions be removed at once or according to a timetable. Concerning the rights of Turkish workers, the Turkish side reiterated that their right of movement should be recognized and that their social security arrangements, such as transfer of insurance premiums, be duly taken. Last but not least, Turkey requested 8.1 billion dollars for realizing its development aims as set out in the Fourth 5-Year plan.

Referring to the suspension request as the "freezing" of the Association, the Commission assessed that the reasons for such a request were three-fold:

- To pause the construction of the Customs Union;
- To revise the additional protocol so that Turkey could reintroduce some tariffs or quantitative restrictions;
- To increase their liberty to apply measures concerning third countries, particularly developing countries.

The Turkish side expressed their concerns regarding the erosion of agricultural benefits. They were "surprised" by the application of safeguard clauses against Turkey at the request of the UK on 800 tons of cotton yarn. The EEC response to the Turkish demands emphasized that an improvement regarding the agricultural products was unlikely due to Italy's certain objection and that the figure 8 of billion

dollars was unrealistic. The EEC also asked Turkey to determine to which third countries it wanted more freedom with.<sup>401</sup>

As the EEC was evaluating Turkey's demands, the Commission stated that it was clear that "in no way is Turkey treated by the Community as a privileged partner."<sup>402</sup>

The Commission's statement echoed Turkey's grievances regarding the deterioration of advantages accorded to it by the EEC. For the EEC, addressing Turkey's demands concerning the freedom of movement of workers was impossible, as the member states had 6 million unemployed in their countries. The EEC professed that:

the additional concessions granted to Turkey under the last review were minimal; Turkey generally has legal treatment equal to Maghreb countries, most often this treatment is less favorable for: citrus fruits, fruit juices, olive oil, wines.

The Commission's first assessment of Turkey's suspension decision was positive.

The Commission stated that the EEC could accept Turkey's request for suspension.<sup>403</sup> Concerning Turkey's requests concerning Turkish workers in Europe, the Commission proposed the removal of discrimination against Turkish workers' access to vocational training. Regarding financial assistance, the Commission stated that it was not possible for the EEC to provide the 15 million dollars that Turkey requested, but the EEC could play an active role in the global efforts to help Turkey improve its economic situation. The Commission understood the gravity of Turkey's economic hardship. The Commission noted that the industrial production was low, as

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<sup>401</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1657," 204–6.

<sup>402</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1657," 235.

<sup>403</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1662," 18.

the imports for industrial production could not be purchased due to lack of foreign currency. Inflation was 70 percent and external debt was near 14 billion dollars. To address issues within the Association, the Commission proposed a demobilization of tariffs, but this proposal did not seem to have effectiveness from an economic perspective due to the fact that Turkey exported only four products, raisins, figs, nuts, and tobacco. The Commission emphasized:

Turkey does not have the means either to develop its exports or to diversify its production, and given its deficient structures, the possibilities of reconverting its agriculture are, at this stage, and for many years to come, non-existent. It has no chance of real development in this sector before the end of the transition period (1995) where it will be, necessary to finalize the agreement and achieve full customs union.<sup>404</sup>

The Commission pointed out that, from a political perspective, such concessions would be immensely important for Turkey, as Turkey attached importance to them and would like to receive those concessions before an eventual membership of Greece in the EEC. Instead of further concessions, the EEC considered further sanctions against Turkey in the textile sphere. In a note to the President in January 1979, it was emphasized that the textile sector was the object of serious disagreement between Turkey and the EEC. Dialogue with Turkey could not even be launched.<sup>405</sup> To make matters worse, Turkey's textile exports to the EEC were increasing, and Turkey was indicating that a talk on textiles could only take place within the context of a global negotiation of the Association relationship. As such negotiations lasted

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<sup>404</sup> "Relations Politiques et Commerciales Avec La Turquie: Généralités/EN-1657," 232.

<sup>405</sup> "Relations Avec La Turquie: Notes Échangées Entre Emile Noël et La DGI, Notamment P. Duchateau/EN-1257" (Florence: Historical Archives of the European Union, n.d.), 35.

months or even years, they were not suitable for the question of increasing textiles exports to the EEC from Turkey, which warranted a quicker solution.

While the member states were increasingly vocal about the problems created by Turkey's increasing exports to the EEC, the Commission underlined the need to bring Turkey back to the level of the Mediterranean partners who benefited from concessions. The Commission noted that, while the Turkish side pointed out the harmful effects of the enlargement of the EEC, the primary obstacle between the EEC and Turkey would be the accession of Greece. The Commission stressed that the EEC should provide concessions on the agricultural sector to demonstrate its will for revitalizing the Association relationship.<sup>406</sup>

Before the Council meeting in February 1979, the UK reiterated its request on the transmission of an official notification to Turkey on cotton yarn quotas. The Commission tried to avert this notification by proposing to raise the topic during the Committee of Association meeting in January. In this meeting, the Turkish side reiterated its position of merging the textile discussions, which included the situation of cotton yarn, with the negotiations on the Association as a whole. The Commission underlined that, as the textiles made up nearly of 50 percent of Turkish exports to the EEC and 30 percent of all exports, the textile industry was virtually the only sector that mattered in terms of Turkish exports to the EEC.<sup>407</sup> The Turkish side, also

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<sup>406</sup> "Relations Avec La Turquie: Notes Échangées Entre Emile Noël et La DGI, Notamment P. Duchateau/EN-1257," 42.

<sup>407</sup> "Relations Avec La Turquie: Notes Échangées Entre Emile Noël et La DGI, Notamment P. Duchateau/EN-1257," 48.

cognizant of the fact that the EEC did not fulfil its promises stemming from the Additional Protocol, most importantly its promise on the free movement of Turkish workers, insisted that the textile issue be addressed. The Commission was trying not to submit an official notification to Turkey while addressing the UK's concerns over increasing cotton yarn exports, but it advocated communicating with the Turkish authorities over the unacceptable quantities of exports, which stayed short of an official notification that might derail the Association altogether.

In the COREPER meeting in March 1979, the relationship with Turkey was extensively debated. Concerning the agricultural issues, it was pointed out that a substantial revision of the Additional Protocol was impossible, as the relationship with the Mediterranean countries was being re-examined and the accession process of several countries was underway.<sup>408</sup> It was also noted that the free movement of workers was not possible to realize due to the internal situation in the EEC.

Moreover, the financial assistance required by Turkey exceeded the capacity of the EEC. The Turkish request for suspending its obligations from the Additional Protocol, however, was received favorably as it did not entail significant economic implications for the EEC.

The Commission, in order to revitalize the association relationship, emphasized the specificity of the Association with Turkey. This was conceived in response to the

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<sup>408</sup> "Relations Avec La Turquie: Notes Échangées Entre Emile Noël et La DGI, Notamment P. Duchateau/EN-1257," 99.

Turkish criticism that the Association was being “Maghrebized.” According to the Commission, while some member states resisted concessions to Turkey on agricultural product and labor mobility, an increase of financial assistance to Turkey to a figure of 700 million combined with the acceptance of the “freezing” of the Association would open a path for the revitalization of the Association.

This revitalization, nevertheless, was not to be realized. The EEC stated that the dossier on Turkey was “blocked, meaning there was no possibility of progress in the important topics such as agricultural concessions and tariffs.”<sup>409</sup> The Turkish side was resolute in its position that the EEC’s offers were inadequate. The Commission emphasized that the EEC had to act quickly, as the political instability in the country was deepening. The Commission again emphasized that the EEC sought to aid Turkey through a rapid and unilateral financial aid with the motivation that this would be the first concrete gesture that the EEC could offer to Turkey. Other than this gesture, the Commission’s proposed a detailed negotiation at the expert level within the EEC to determine another concession to Turkey. This was to be a signal to Turkey that the EEC was taking steps to show solidarity with Turkey at a moment when it was experiencing serious economic hardship.

While the suspension request of Turkey was deemed acceptable by the EEC, the remaining measures aimed at improving Turkey’s economic situation were refused

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<sup>409</sup> “Relations Avec La Turquie: Notes Échangées Entre Emile Noël et La DGI, Notamment P. Duchateau/EN-1257,” 184.

by the EEC.<sup>410</sup> These measures were Turkey's previous requests for further concessions on agricultural products. The deteriorating relationships resulted in the delaying of the realization of Turkish obligations in 1979.<sup>411</sup>

The Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün again criticized the EEC for not addressing Turkey's concerns and hesitating from reviving the Association. According to him, the EEC was far from even providing a basis for a renewal of the negotiations.<sup>412</sup> He underlined that he was not threatening the EEC, but solely underlining the disappointment and deep concerns about a viable future of the Association. He also added that Greece should be prevented from bringing its bilateral disputes with Greece to the EEC.

The suspension and failed revitalization of the Association demonstrate that the long-standing problems, particularly Turkey's requests for further agricultural concessions and the worsening economic situation of Turkey, were not addressed and reached a point where the Association did not have much support among the Turkish politicians and the Turkish public. The EEC sources demonstrate that most of Turkey's concerns were found justified by the EEC itself. The negative repercussions of the Association for the Turkish economy meant that the Association was not serving its fundamental purpose for Turkey: boosting the development of the Turkish

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<sup>410</sup> "AET Türkiye'nin Rahatlatıcı Ekonomik Önlemlerini Reddedti," *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1978, <https://egazete.cumhuriyet.com.tr/oku/192/1978-10-14/0>.

<sup>411</sup> "Türkiye'nin AET'ye 1979 Yılına İlişkin Yükümleri Yine Ertelendi," *Cumhuriyet*, December 29, 1979.

<sup>412</sup> "Ökçün: AET'nin Türkiye Tavrı Endişe Vericidir.," *Cumhuriyet*, April 10, 1979.

economy. While the Association by its nature also was an instrument to ensure benefit to the EEC economies, Turkey regarded that the exchange of benefits and costs were not reasonable. The suspension and botched revitalization of the Association attempts could be regarded as a result of failure of the Association in its declared purpose of aiding Turkey in its development with an increased integration with the economies of the EEC.

From a theoretical angle, the suspension decisions could be seen as the inability of the Association to find a common position between the EEC and Turkey regarding the distribution of outcomes of economic relationship between them. The presence of issues that would lead to friction among the EEC and Turkey were well-known in advance, but the increasing power of the EEC as well as the changing reference point for Turkey rendered the relationship more difficult to manage. This situation was compounded by the intensifying development politics in Turkey, which led political actors to question the Association's benefits to Turkey. The EEC was aware of Turkey's objections to the Association and even found them reasonable but did not approach Turkey's requests favorably. The negotiations demonstrate that the EEC, despite acknowledging Turkey's objections, did not see a reason to provide further meaningful concessions to Turkey and therefore redistribute the outcomes of the Association, which resulted in the suspension of the Association by Turkey twice.

## CONCLUSION

The head of the Economic Development Foundation, Orhun Dikmen, stated the following when he was delivering the opening remarks for a seminar in 1971 on the relationship between the EEC and Turkey:

The 1963's six-membered EEC, which only had association agreements with two European countries (Turkey and Greece), except for the special agreements made former colonies, is very different from today's EEC, which has nine members and has established various economic and commercial relations with 95 countries.<sup>413</sup>

He inquired whether there was any way to explore stemming the tide in the Association in favor of Turkey, despite the calls for Turkey to withdraw from the Association. The framework of the Association established in 1963 was no longer satisfactory in the eyes of numerous Turkish actors. According to a sentiment whose popularity was increasing, the Association was no longer a project for Turkey to reach to the level of European economies with the final objective of becoming a member of the EEC, but a hindrance for Turkey to achieve industrialization and its own economic objectives.

The initial negotiations preceding the signature of the Ankara Agreement demonstrate that initially political importance of Turkey in the context of the Cold War trumped economic concerns on whether Turkey could really assume the obligations that would stem from the Association. This situation led to a formation of

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<sup>413</sup> İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, *Türkiye-AET İlişkileri* (İstanbul: İKV, 1977), 4.

a preparatory period in which Turkey would not assume any obligations, while the EEC provided some concessions. The protracted and intense negotiations signaled that there were some fundamental divergences on how economic development would be realized in Turkey, the central issue of the Association. The geopolitical concerns linked to the Cold War and the desire of the EEC to have a balanced approach vis-à-vis two historical rivals, Turkey and Greece, made it difficult for the EEC offer Turkey anything short of a proper Association agreement. While the Ankara Agreement was not what Turkey preferred as demonstrated in the exploratory negotiations, the EEC seriously elaborated whether it was viable to propose even an Association agreement to Turkey instead of a simpler cooperation and trade agreement.

Turkey's request for current and anticipated agricultural exports as well as its unwillingness to assume obligations for the Association, unlike Greece, led the EEC to view Turkey's positions as lacking specificity. The attempts of the EEC to retain parallelism between Turkey and the EEC, as well as to seek out the optimal conditions of the Associations for the particular situation of Turkey, took considerable time to proceed to the formal negotiations. The formal negotiations for the Ankara agreement continued to be focused on the stages of the Association as well as the concessions to Turkey. After a series of back and forth between the EEC and Turkey as well as within the EEC, the Ankara agreement was signed in 1963.

Turkey's request for proceeding to the transition stage was also based on political reasons, not on economic ones. The EEC viewed Turkey's economy as fragile but could not refuse Turkey's request due to political and psychological reasons. The EEC was also not keen on providing agricultural concessions to Turkey. Instead, it proposed concessions on industrial products, which had a minor role in Turkish economy. Moreover, the deepening relationship between the EEC and other third countries started to have an impact on the negotiations. This indicated that the comparative reference point for Turkey was no longer Greece alone, but also other third countries. Finally, the Additional Protocol regulating the shift to the transitional period was signed, which brought about notable economic obligations for Turkey.

The global economic downturn and the expansion of the EEC's external commercial links, coupled with the political instability in Turkey, exacerbated the impacts of the tensions present in the Association from the outset. Turkey started to view the EEC as a hindrance to its economic development, while the EEC did not warm to Turkey's request for further concessions as it now had to manage its relationship with a plethora of third countries. To make matters worse, the UK's membership to the EEC complicated the fragile Association, as the UK was going to call for stricter measures against Turkey's increasing textile exports. Turkey's repeated requests for further concessions were refused at worst or met with insignificant counterproposals at best. The shift from Greece as the sole comparative reference point to Turkey to the Maghreb and developing countries also had an adverse impact on the

Association, as Turkey had the impression that it was sidelined at the expense of other countries. These factors resulted in two suspension decisions, which pointed to the gravity of Turkish decision-makers' dissatisfaction.

The trajectory of the Association was fundamentally shaped by the divergence of views on development that was present from the signature of the Ankara Agreement. The primary sources examined in this dissertation demonstrate that the negotiations preceding the Ankara Agreement were rife with disagreements that could only be solved by postponing their solution to later stages. This framework was not adequate to carry the Association to the end of the 1970s, as global economic woes compounded with the politicization of terms of international trade as well as the enlargement of the EEC rendered it impossible for the relationship between the EEC and Turkey continue. As Orhun Dikmen accurately observed, the EEC in the 1970s was not the EEC of the 1960s.

The case of Association between Turkey and the EEC demonstrates that the politicized nature of international trade negotiations was the main factor that explains why the Association did not proceed as it supposed to. While the political factors overshadowed the economic issues initially, the unsatisfactory terms of trade and the inadequate concessions for Turkey largely determined the trajectory of the Association, compounded with the increasing commitments of the EEC to other countries at the expense of Turkey.

The preceding detailed examinations to the negotiations, which for the most part focused on a single perspective, were used to reconstruct the negotiation between the EEC and Turkey regarding the Association between 1960 — 1980. This reconstruction aimed to prove novel information regarding the increasing EEC role in international trade, its approach to economic tradeoffs vis-à-vis Turkey, and Turkey's stance on the negotiations. While providing information about the negotiations, the reconstruction was also used as a case to apply relevant theoretical approaches to the topics related to the Association. While the Association was never directly examined by the recent historical and theoretical studies on the EEC and the Cold War, a reconsideration of it was used to present a fresh perspective on the issues of development and the EEC's trade negotiations.

From a theoretical perspective, the dissertation suggests EEC-Turkey Association could be characterized as a case of intergovernmental negotiation which was laborious particularly in terms of specific agricultural commodities. There was not much reference to neither norms nor superpower politics in these negotiations. While it might be true that Turkey's Westernization narrative and geopolitical importance during the Cold War played a role in the initial stages of the negotiations, they were rarely referenced during the later stages, strongly indicating they lost their relative importance in the Association. The increasing deadlock in the negotiations over trade issues also confirms this observation, as normative and geopolitical concerns were not the key factor which moved forward or stalled the Association.

This dissertation attempted to recount the negotiation of the Association by using previously unexamined primary sources, and it also attempted to shed light on negotiations between unequal partners took place. The double analysis of the Association, firstly as a reconstruction of the negotiations and secondly as a case study for relevant literatures, will hopefully demonstrate that this relatively neglected period and topic has to potential to provide ample resources for further examination of topics like development and negotiation, which were crucial at the time of Association and still are today.

## NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliographic sources used for this dissertation were mostly retrieved from the Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU), and the European Council's archive using the CASE (Central Archives Search Engine). HAEU does not have all its records scanned, however Emile Noel's private collection is scanned, and it provides an important avenue for exploring the relationship between the EEC and Turkey. To find the scanned documents, the search engine of HAEU should be used by selecting electronic file as the type of archival materials. This search shows the available sources, which are available, in pdf. On the other hand, search in CASE results in numerous scanned primary sources. For using CASE, search entries should be submitted in French such as "turquie, cee-turquie". However, when using CASE, it is important to take note of the suffixes and years of the folders, as those data could be used to widen search in Council Document search tab of CASE. It is also worth noting that the researcher needs to examine separately all results of the search entry, and, if possible, take note of the suffixes of documents of interest to later search them in the search engine, as every different document could be used to lead to a new folder on the research topic.

On a separate note, both archives respond quickly to general inquiry e-mails from researchers. When asked, the archivists at the CASE also promptly sent scanned documents that were unavailable through the search engine.

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