On the possibility of ex-ante constrained maximization

buir.supervisorWigley, Simon
dc.contributor.authorEroğlu, Çağın Tan
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-20T05:55:30Z
dc.date.available2026-01-20T05:55:30Z
dc.date.copyright2026-01
dc.date.issued2026-01
dc.date.submitted2026-01-15
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 49-55).
dc.description.abstractThe problem of collective action has intuitive solutions that do not thoroughly capture the individual moral motivation of cooperating towards long-term collective goals. David Gauthier’s theory of constrained maximization presents a plausible moral account that can be incorporated into this debate. To bridge this gap, I propose ex ante constrained maximization as a rational strategy for acting first towards the production of public goods, where the necessary conditions are satisfied by the absence of a centralized resource allocation scheme. I further present ex post constrained maximization as a rational strategy and a normative contractarian obligation to sustain long-term and larger-scale cooperative outcomes.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Çağın Tan Eroğlu
dc.format.extentxii, 55 leaves : illustrations ; 30 cm.
dc.identifier.itemidB123679
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11693/117789
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCollective action
dc.subjectContractarianism
dc.subjectDavid Gauthier
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectPublic goods
dc.titleOn the possibility of ex-ante constrained maximization
dc.title.alternativeSözleşme öncesi kısıtlanmış maksimizasyonun olanağı üzerine
dc.typeThesis
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorBilkent University
thesis.degree.levelMaster's
thesis.degree.nameMA (Master of Arts)

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