Ottoman governance and justice in the pre-modern era: “ehl-i örf” and “isnad”

Abstract

This dissertation examines the mechanisms of justice in the provincial administration of the Ottoman Empire during the pre-modern period, particularly from the late 16th to the 18th century. It focuses on the relationship between state officials known as the ehli örf and the tax-paying population, the reʿâya, under changing fiscal conditions. At the center of the study are cases of false accusations (isnad and töhmet) directed by the ehli örf against the reʿâya as a means of compensating for their declining revenues. During this period, shaped by the dissolution of the timar system, inflation, and population growth, provincial administrators who held both fiscal and administrative powers began to use these powers as a means to generate supplementary income. Through an analysis of archival sources, the dissertation investigates how these officials resorted to practices such as fabricating charges or making accusations that were difficult to disprove, thereby legitimizing additional monetary demands. The main argument of the dissertation is that the practices of isnad and töhmet, frequently described in documents with the term zulm (oppression or injustice), represent not merely moral corruption but also a structural response to the economic pressures of the period. Due to inflation and the depreciation of currency, the real incomes of state officials such as the subaşı (local military official) and muhtesib (market inspector) declined. When the tax revenues they received in return for their services became inadequate, they increasingly turned to fine revenues (cerime) to make up for the decline. In this context, the fabrication of crimes or directing allegations difficult to disprove became a practical tool for legitimizing additional demands. In response to complaints from the reʿâya, the Ottoman state developed various mechanisms to restore justice and establish financial stability in provincial governance. Initially, the state prohibited these practices as unlawful innovations (bidʿat). When this proved insufficient, the state sought to curb arbitrariness in taxation by promoting the maktuʿ system, in which tax amounts were fixed through negotiation with local communities. Ultimately, the state institutionalized imdadiyye levies, providing provincial officials with a regular and predictable source of income while simultaneously preventing arbitrary exactions from the reʿâya. Within this framework, this dissertation interprets the 17th and 18th centuries as a period of flexible, negotiated adaptation, in which the Ottoman state sought to reconcile its ideal of maintaining the "circle of justice" (daire-i adalet) with the practical fiscal necessities of a changing economic order.