Browsing by Author "Koray, Semih"

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
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    Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
    (Springer Verlag, 2018) Dede, Yasemin; Koray, Semih
    We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game v, we associate a strategic coalition formation game with (v, ω) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with (v, ω). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported.
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    Implementation via rights structures
    (Academic Press, 2018) Koray, Semih; Yildiz, K.
    Implementation of socially desirable alternatives can be thought of as a way to design power distribution in a society such that the equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen at each preference profile. In this paper, we introduce a new institutional framework for implementation, which takes power distribution in a society as its point of departure. We use the notion of a rights structure, introduced by Sertel (2001), to formalize the power distribution in a society. We formulate and characterize implementability via rights structures under different specifications, which require having well-defined convergence dynamics and being consistent with farsighted behavior. We identify how implementation via rights structures is related to implementation via mechanisms. In the presence of at least three agents, we find the class of rights structures, implementability via which is equivalent to Nash and strong Nash implementability. We also introduce a strategic counterpart of implementation via rights structures in terms of deviation-constrained mechanisms.
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    Introduction
    (Springer, 2003) Koray, Semih; Sertel, M. R.; Sertel, M. R.; Koray, Semih
    A main feature that distinguishes the human species from others on earth can perhaps be best summarized as its ability to design. Other attributes distinguishing humans from other living beings can be regarded as derivatives of being a “designer”. The most tangible form of the designs achieved by mankind so far is that of tools, tools created in order to achieve some objective which precedes the existence of the tool. This notion of design applies to the most primitive as well as the most advanced tools, such as we see in modern production processes based on the so-called information technologies. Although design pertaining to tool-making in this sense is as old as mankind itself, its conscious application in the social and economic sphere is very modern, and a systematic treatment of social and economic design on a scientific basis is even more recent. Social and economic institutions have in many important cases evolved by spontaneous processes based on trial and error. Until the last century conscious social design was confined to certain modifications of already existing institutions. The creation of new institutions so as to achieve a socially targeted objective is very novel and yet awaits future societies to be put into practice with full strength.
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    Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
    (Springer, 2022-12) Koray, Semih; Sertel, M.
    Delegation games are studied in the context of a symmetric linear Cournotic duopoly where redelegation is permissible. In the absence of extraneous delegation costs, the following results are demonstrated: (1)Each principal has an incentive to redelegate, increasing the length of his delegation chain.(2)As the length of the delegation chain grows beyond bound, (i)total output at the (Cournot) equilibrium on the industry floor converges in monotonically increasing fashion to the socially efficient one, and(ii)the maximand delegated by each primal delegator converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the (true) profit function. As a consequence it is suggested that in a linear duopoly context socially efficient and truthful outcomes can be arbitrarily closely approximated by the use of Pretend-but-Perform Mechanisms of order sufficiently large. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
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    Obituary: Murat R. Sertel
    (Springer-Verlag, 2003) Koray, Semih
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    Special Issue in Memory of Murat R. Sertel
    (Springer-Verlag, 2006) Koray, Semih; Yıldız, M.; Koray, Semih; Yıldız, M.