BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES

FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE GULF CRISIS:
A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING
(1950 - 1991)

BY
ELİF YENEROĞLU

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BILKENT UNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER 1998

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES

FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE GULF CRISIS:
A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING
(1950-1991)

BY
ELIF YENEROGLU

Elif Yeneroglu

tarafından imzalanmıştır

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER 1998

Approved by the Institute of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree on Master of International Relations.

Prof. Dr. İlhan Akipek
Thesis Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree on Master of International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree on Master of International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

ABSTRACT

With the League of Nations' inability to maintain international peace and security the Allied Powers of the Second World War began to work on the creation of an international organization that would be more efficient and powerful in matters of international peace and security. Therefore, in 1945 the United Nations was established. The system envisaged in the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security bore some resemblance to the League of Nations system, but this time the authority to decide on matters of international peace and security was given to a smaller body, that is, the Security Council. However, the Korean War, which was the first case that the United Nations used its enforcement powers showed that the system of collective security as envisaged in the United Nations Charter would not work in the future because of the Cold War divide. In order to overcome the stalemate in the Security Council and fulfill its primary responsibility, that is, maintenance of international peace and security the United Nations conducted peacekeeping operations which were not envisioned in the United Nations Charter but rather was a response to the deadlock in the Security Council. During the Cold War, although the task of peacekeeping was limited to containing local or regional conflicts so as to prevent the escalation of them into major wars where the two superpowers would confront each other with the relaxation of Cold War tensions towards the end of the 1980s peacekeeping began to acquire new tasks and responsibilities. With the cooperation of the superpowers in the Security Council the United Nations, after forty years could again use its enforcement powers to revert Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Therefore, with the end of the Cold War the superpowers were again able to cooperate which opened the way for new peacekeeping operations with multidimensional tasks in order to end long-lasting conflicts.

ÖZET

Milletler Cemiyeti'nin dünya barışının ve güvenliğinin sağlanmasında başarısız olması sonucunda İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın müttefik devletleri dünya barışı ve güvenliği konularında daha etkili ve güçlü olabilecek bir uluslararası organizasyon yaratma çabası içine girdiler. Böylece 1945'te Birleşmiş Milletler kuruldu. Dünya barışı ve güvenliğinin sağlanması için Birleşmiş Milletler'in öngördüğü sistem Milletler Cemiyeti'nin sistemiyle benzerlik gösterse de bu defa uluslararası barış ve güvenliği igilendiren konularda karar verme yetkisi daha küçük bir merciye, Güvenlik Konseyi'ne verilmişti. Fakat Birleşmiş Milletler'in zorlayıcı önlemlere başvurduğu Kore Savaşı göstermiştir ki Birleşmiş Milletler'in Anayasasında öngörülen kollektif güvenlik sistemi Soğuk Savaş nedeniyle gelecekte işlemez olacaktır. Böylece, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyindeki çıkmazın üstesinden gelmek ve temel sorumluluğu olan uluslararası barış ve güvenliği sağlamak için barışı koruma harekatları düzenlemiştir. Barışı koruma harekatları Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasasında yer almamış Güvenlik Konseyindeki çıkmaza bir tepki olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Soğuk Savaş süresince barışı koruma harekatlarının görevi yerel veya bölgesel çatışmaların iki süper gücü karşı karşıya bırakacak şekilde büyümesine meydan vermemekle sınırlı olsa da 1980'lerin sonlarında Soğuk Savaş gerginliklerinin yumuşamasıyla birlikte barışı koruma harekatları yeni sorumluluklar üstlenmişlerdir. Güvenlik Konseyinde iki süper gücün işbirliği sayesinde kırk yıl sonra ilk defa zorlayıcı önlemler kullanılmış ve Irak'ın Kuveyt saldırısı geri püskürtülmüştür. Böylece, Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle birlikte iki süper güç tekrar işbirliği içine girmiştir ki bu da uzun süreden beri devam eden çatışmalara son vermek için çok boyutlu barış harekatlarının düzenlenmesini sağlamıştır.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE GULF CRISIS:
A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
(1950-1991)

INTRODUCTION:

In 1942, shortly after the United States had entered the Second World War, preparations began for the establishment of a new international organization to replace the League of Nations. The League, although failed to prevent the outbreak of another World War, was the first global attempt aimed at maintaining international peace and security. Taking lessons from the failure of this global organization, the Allied powers of the Second World War began to work on post-war arrangements for the establishment of the "United Nations" (UN) the name of which was devised by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt.[1] With the end of the Second World War the United Nations Charter officially came into existence on 24 October 1945.

The Security Council was to be the decision-making organ of the UN. Composed of five permanent members with the veto power and ten non-permanent members[2] Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to determine 'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' and to decide on what measures to take. A Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members of the Security Council would stand ready to advise and assist.

The concept of collective security seemed quite well on paper, however, when intended to put into practice the members of the UN faced one great obstacle that could not be predicted during and right after the war. Drafters of the UN Charter "assumed a general and equal interest in the preservation of the *status quo post bellum*. Change would be possible, but only by general consent. The post-war world was conceived, in fact, in somewhat static terms."[3] However, the post-war world order was going to be far more different than the drafters of the Charter had expected. The coming years were signaling the beginning of a new era, that is, the Cold War where the world would be divided into two ideologically rival blocs, between democracy and communism. Such a great power disunity reflected itself well enough in the UN Security Council and soon the Organization became deadlocked speaking in terms of executing its primary mission; the maintenance of international peace and security. Either the United States or the Soviet Union blocked any action against their own spheres of influence. Such a deadlock in the Security Council was first overcome in 1950 with the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' during the Korean War the details of which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Shortly after the Korean War the 'improvised'[4] response to the Suez crisis of 1956 lay the foundations of a new role for the UN not envisioned in the Charter; conducting 'peacekeeping' operations. The term 'peacekeeping' was not mentioned in the UN Charter. Rather, it was an innovation, which is sometimes referred to as Chapter six and a half. By peacekeeping we mean

> ... an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent

and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under Article 42.[5]

Being the first peacekeeping operation, United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), provided the precedent for dealing with similar crises in the future. Constrained by the Cold War imperatives hence not being able to fulfill its primary purpose the new role for the UN turned out to be isolating local conflicts and not allowing them to become battlefields where the two power blocs would confront each other.

During the Cold War this was the mechanism that the UN would resort to for resolving conflicts. This mechanism worked out quite well, at least successful enough not to allow the local conflicts to escalate thus preventing another World War, the consequences of which would be far more ruinous than the previous ones given the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons that both sides acquired; enough to destroy the whole world.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the Cold War period, which seemed to last forever, had ended with the collapse of the communist ideology signaling the beginning of a new era in the international political system. The long lasting confrontation of the two superpowers, which was the main obstacle to the execution of the UN's primary mission, was replaced by a cooperative mood in the Security Council. With the absence of Cold War struggles the Security Council could now assume more responsibility and function more effectively in matters of peace as intended to do so given the prevailing consensus among the Great Powers in the Security Council.

This master's thesis is, therefore, aims to provide a descriptive and analytic historical approach to the United Nations peacekeeping operations during the period between the Korean War and the Gulf crisis of 1990. Within this period, because of the ideological rivalry between the Western and the Eastern blocs, the Security Council could not utilize its enforcement powers for the settlement of international disputes. The Council resorted to enforcement only in 1950, during the Korean War, where it was able to authorize enforcement action against North Korea because of the absence of the Soviet delegate in the Council. Then for 40 years the Security Council was not able to use its enforcement powers, that is, until the Gulf crisis of 1990. Thus, the inability of the Security Council to function as intended to do so gave birth to a new concept for the settlement of international disputes: peacekeeping.

The point of departure for this thesis, therefore, will be the analysis the post-World War II international circumstances and events which led to the emergence of peacekeeping. Thus, the first chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the concept of collective security envisaged in the UN Charter and the Korean War which showed that the this system would not work in a bipolar world.

The second chapter is an analysis of UN peacekeeping in the Cold War era and encompasses two UN peacekeeping operations, which are the cornerstones in terms of the evolution of UN peacekeeping. While the first one demonstrates the success of the UN to overcome international crises under such a rigid international system the second one demonstrates the limitations of this innovation called "peacekeeping". The first

case is the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) which is the first force level peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. Established during the Suez crisis of 1956 UNEF I is the first UN operation in which the principles of peacekeeping had been laid down. The second operation is the United Nations Operation in the Congo (1961), which was one of the most controversial operations that the UN had embarked upon; so controversial that after the Congo operation the UN did not establish another peacekeeping operation in Africa until 1989 (in Namibia).

The third chapter is dedicated to the analysis of UN peacekeeping operations between 1988 and 1991. The change in the Soviet Union's approach to the UN peacekeeping relaxed the tensions in the Security Council and led to the establishment of new peacekeeping operations which put an end to long lasting conflicts in different regions of the world. In addition to that, beyond its traditional tasks the UN peacekeeping began to take new responsibilities that distinguished it from the operations that had been conducted in Cold War era which also began to include peacemaking as well. Thus, the third chapter analyzes five peacekeeping operations that had been conducted until the Gulf crisis and demonstrates the changing nature of UN peacekeeping and how it can produce successful outcomes with the cooperation of the superpowers in the Security Council. The last section of chapter three is dedicated to the analysis of the Gulf Crisis in which the Security Council was able to apply, after 40 years, enforcement measures against Iraq given the unprecedented cooperation among the members of the Council. Although not a peacekeeping operation the Gulf crisis is worth mentioning because just like the Korean War signaled the beginning of the Cold

War period the Gulf crisis marked the end of it. Having been relived from the power struggles of the Cold War period the Security Council could now reassume its responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER 1: The Failure of the Collective Security System

1. Structuring a Collective Security System:

While preparing a mechanism for dealing with matters of international peace and security the point of departure for the drafters of the UN Charter was the League of Nations experience. Thus, although the League proved unsuccessful in its quest to preserve the peace the experiences provided lessons later about how to structure a collective security system.[6] One of the most important handicaps of the League was its inability to act collectively in international crises. Unanimity among all members was required for action, but members could refuse to take part in League-sponsored activities and leave if they chose.[7] Such an irresponsible approach to international peace and security issues destroyed the very basic premise of the collective security system on which the League's mechanism was founded upon. Adopting a universalistic approach the theory of collective security requires the commitment of the entire world community to a system in which all states agree to take common action to overcome international violence and end the threat to peace.[8] In other words the security of one is the concern of all, and each state agrees to join in a collective response to aggression.[9] The League, however, proved to be incompetent in putting theory into practice because it lacked the authority and an effective mechanism of persuasion to impose its decisions upon the members. Subsequent developments, such as the incapability of reversing Japanese aggression against Manchuria and Italian aggression

against Ethiopia, further contributed to the deterioration of the League's authority leaving it totally powerless with the outbreak of the Second World War.

Bearing the lessons of the League experience in mind, the drafters of the UN Charter worked on a more efficient and powerful collective security mechanism with effective enforcement measures. Besides a body involving all members of the organization a smaller body would be established which would be responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The successful cooperation of the Allied powers during the Second World War led to the belief that the most effective way to ensure international peace and security was to have the great powers working together to combat aggression.[10] Therefore this smaller body would be composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and France which were the victorious and the most powerful states at the end of the Second World War. The UN Charter refers to this body as the Security Council the functions and powers of which are outlined in chapter V. The five great powers of the Security Council are permanent members having the power to veto decisions.

> The permanent members' veto powers ensure that on important questions they agree, or at least abstain. It was recognized that no enforcement action could take place against one of the great powers of the international system without creating a major war-the very thing that the United Nations had been established to prevent. By preventing action against a permanent member, the veto saved the organization from wrecking itself in destructive operations against its most powerful members. Enforcement actions [could] only be taken with great-power cooperation.[11]

By virtue of article 25 all states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Thus, through the Security Council with mandatory enforcement

powers one of the main weaknesses of the League, absence of collective action, would be overcome.

The mechanism for dealing with issues concerning international peace and security has been laid down in chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Under article 34 the Security Council is authorized to "investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" and recommend solutions to the dispute. Through Chapter VII the Security Council is entitled to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain international peace and security" and take necessary measures, including military operations, to restore international peace and security.

2. The Military Staff Committee:

If the Security Council was to conduct military operations it was to have military forces at its disposal. Under article 43 of the UN Charter the member states undertake the responsibility for providing "armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage" through special agreements with the Security Council. Plans for the application of armed force [would] be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (article 46). The Military Staff Committee

would consist of the chiefs of staffs of the permanent members of the Security Council and would be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council (article 47, par. 3). Between 1946 and 1948 the Military Staff Committee worked on the composition, organization and number of military forces.

> In August 1948 the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee formally advised the Security Council that the Military Staff Committee had reached a stalemate........[and] agreement on further action on a draft form of agreement could not be reached before the Military Staff Committee 'had received instructions from the Security Council concerning the divergences noted on some of the General Principles.'[12]

By 1946 mutual mistrust between the Soviet Union and the United States had already begun to build up each being apprehensive of the other's motives and since 1948 the Security Council never returned to the Article 43 agreements. Thus, no agreement was reached with any of the members of the UN and the Military Staff Committee was never operationalized. Consequently, the Military Staff Committee became "the first victim of the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union."[13]

3. The Korean War and the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution':

Although being an operation not mandated by the UN Security Council the Korean War of 1950 deserves careful analysis because of its radical consequences. Before analyzing the consequences some background information would be useful.

When the Second World War had came to an end Korea was divided into two, with Soviet forces occupying the North and US forces, the South. After the Second World War the UN efforts to bring about a unified Korea and hold nation-wide elections failed due to the refusal of the Soviets and the communist government of North Korea to cooperate. Therefore, the elections were held only in South Korea (1948) and the General Assembly established the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to assist Korea in unification of the country. North Korea, however, continued to defy cooperation and in June 1950 the North Korean forces attacked the South.

Acting under Chapter VII the Security Council passed a resolution stating that the North Korean aggression constituted a breach of peace. Lacking formal agreements with states that are needed to materialize the Military Staff Committee a further Security Council resolution was passed "call[ing] for the establishment of a unified command under the United States command to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."[14] While these resolutions were passed the Soviet delegate, however, was absent in protest of "Taiwan's occupation of the 'Chinese' seat on the council in spite of the victory by the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong."[15]As soon as the Soviets returned to the Security Council the Council was paralyzed and no further action regarding the Korean operation was possible. The deadlock in the Security Council was overcome through the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' which was passed with the initiatives of the Western powers (3 November 1950). The resolution states:

> If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the

11

peace, of act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.[16]

The General Assembly required further that all members of the UN hold armed forces ready for action, even if not formally called upon by the Security Council.[17]

The 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' represents a turning point in the history of the UN in that it demonstrates how the Cold War structure impeded the execution of the Security Council's primary task. Thus, the General Assembly had to assume responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, the resolution further contributed to the deepening of the East-West divide. While the Soviet Union argued that the resolution was contrary to the Charter principles, that international security was to be maintained through great power consensus, the supporters of the resolution, that is the West, argued that the Security Council's "formal responsibility for maintaining peace was 'primary' but not 'exclusive'."[18]

The Korean affair itself, on the other hand, involves some crucial facts that need to be emphasized. First of all, although conducted under Chapter VII, the Korean operation was not a UN operation. It was rather an American operation conducted under the UN flag. Thus, the operation was not a practice of the provisions of Chapter VII, nor it was a collective action. The contributors to the operation were voluntary with the United States being by far the largest contributor. The reason for voluntary contribution of troops and logistics was due to the fact that the agreements that were

to be concluded between the states and the Military Staff Committee as indicated in Article 43 of the UN Charter were not concluded at all since the Committee came to be a superficial body because of the Cold War divide.

The Korean affair had some profound consequences that influenced the structuring of future security operations as well. First and foremost, it became clear that under the prevailing international system it would not be possible for the Security Council to implement the provisions of Chapter VII. The enforcement action during the Korean case was possible only because the Soviet delegate was absent in the Security Council, and the Soviets would never allow the same thing happen again. The continuance of the operation was maintained through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which implicated that the General Assembly would assume more responsibility in matters of international peace and security than the Security Council from then on. How much power could the General Assembly exert through this resolution, however, needs a close look at the subsequent crises. The General Assembly proved to be unsuccessful against the Soviet action in Hungary in 1956, but was fairly successful during the Suez crisis in the same year. Thus, the Uniting for Peace Resolution would assure success only when there is great power cooperation, or one of them is indifferent to the situation.

Chapter 2: Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era

1. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping:

1.1 The Birth of Peacekeeping, The Suez Crisis (1956):

Established after the Suez crisis of 1956 the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) is the first force-level peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. In the previous years two other peacekeeping missions were established, but it was not until UNEF I that the term 'peacekeeping' was used.[19]

The crisis began when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956 and evolved into an international crisis with Israel's attack on Egypt on 29 October according to a preplanned design with Britain and France.[20] Consequently, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on 30 October, "calling upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces to behind the 1949 armistice lines."[21] The draft resolution, however, was vetoed by France and Britain, the principal shareholders in the Suez Canal Company. Instead, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt "calling on both parties to retreat to ten miles (16 kilometers) from the Canal."[22] The ultimatum was accepted by Israel, whose troops were in any event far from the canal, and rejected by Egypt, on the grounds that "its right to defend its territorial sovereignty should not be dictated by the British or the French."[23] Following Egypt's rejection of the ultimatum, Britain and France attacked Egypt on 31 October

which they "alleged, as a pretext for their invasion of Egypt, that they were intervening on behalf of the international community to protect and isolate a waterway essential to international commerce from a local war."[24]

The paralysis of the Security Council because of the British and French vetoes necessitated the transfer of the matter to the General Assembly in accordance with the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Therefore, the General Assembly once again assumed responsibility in an international crisis, "but this time for peacekeeping, not peace enforcement."[25]

Acting under the terms of the Uniting for Peace Resolution the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution, proposed by the United States, calling on all parties to an immediate cease-fire. The resolution, however, was ignored by the parties to the conflict. The continuance of fighting prompted further action and on November 4 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions, proposed by the Canadian delegate to the UN. Resolution 998 requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan ..... to establish a United Nations force to secure and supervise the cease-fire in accordance with previous resolutions adopted with respect to the crisis. Resolution 999 noted the noncompliance of the parties to the cease-fire and requested the Secretary-General to obtain the withdrawal of all forces behind the 1949 armistice lines. Finally, on November 5, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1000, which established United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). UNEF's mandate comprised the following:

> (1) to secure and supervise a cease-fire by forming a buffer zone between Anglo-
> French-Israeli and Egyptian force;

(2) to supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory and the canal clearing operations;

(3) to patrol border areas and deter military incursions; and

(4) to secure the provisions of the Egypt-Israel armistice agreements.[26]

Because the UN had never established a force-level peacekeeping operation there was nothing before the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to serve as an example. Thus, his and his staff's decisions regarding the Force's command structure, logistics, composition and funding were improvised. [27] For the size, type and equipment of troops Dag Hammarskjold consulted Lieutenant General who, at that time was the Force Commander of UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO was established in 1948 the mandate of which was to supervise truces between Israel and its Arab neighbors through observer groups deployed along the borders of Israel and those of its neighbors.[28]

The Force would be deployed only on the territory of Egypt since Israel did not give its consent to such a UN presence on its own territory. Accordingly, Dag Hammarskjold and Nasser, the President of Egypt, signed a memorandum stating that the presence of UNEF was dependent on continued Egyptian consent.

The Force would be composed of voluntary contributions of contingents from the members of the UN. Since none of the permanent members of the Security Council were politically neutral to the crisis and since the crisis was to be isolated from great power rivalries Dag Hammarskjold preferred to choose small and neutral countries to contribute to the Force. The Force would be lightly armed since it did not have a

combatant character and was not a party to the conflict. Force would be used only as a last resort and for the purpose of self-defense.

Dag Hammarskjold recommended that the Force be funded through the regular UN budget. His recommendation, however, caused much debate in the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites argued that the cost of the operation should be borne by the aggressors in the crisis, that is, Britain, France and Israel. Therefore the Soviet Union refused to pay its assessments for UNEF. This debate continued on the subsequent crises and bringing the UN on the verge of bankruptcy.

On November 12, 1956, contingents began to arrive at UNEF's temporary headquarters in Cairo.[29] UNEF operated until 1967 and successfully fulfilled mandate conveyed to it. In May 1967 UNEF had to withdraw upon the request of the Egyptian government and the famous Six Day War erupted between Egypt and Israel shortly after UNEF began to withdraw.

UNEF I successfully fulfilled the mandate conveyed to it; by December 1956, all British and French forces were withdrawn from the Egyptian territory, followed by complete withdrawal of Israeli troops by March 1957. The Suez Canal was reopened in December 1956. UNEF I was also successful in forming a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel, thus preventing the recurrence of fighting. Furthermore, while allowing Britain and France to withdraw without disgrace[30] UNEF I also proved

successful in preventing the conflict to become a battlefield of great power confrontation. The success of UNEF I increased the UN's credibility in dealing with international crises in addition to establishing a precedent in dealing with subsequent conflicts.

1.2 The UN Operation in the Congo:

One of the largest peacekeeping operations that the UN has undertaken is the United Operations in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) with its 20,000 troops at its peak strength in addition to a Civilian Component. Initially established to provide the newly founded Congolese government for "technical assistance of a military nature"[31] for the maintenance of law and order in the country ONUC soon found itself in a much more complex and rapidly changing situation caused by external aggression, civil war and secession. Added to these was the difficulty of operating in country, which is almost equivalent to the size of Western Europe. Last, but not least, the Congo, because of its rich resources, looked set to become the next superpower battleground.[32] Having been compelled to cope with all these factors at the same time it took four years (from 1960 to 1964) for UN to restore law and order in the Congo.

The operation itself, on the other hand, proved to be a very bitter and severe experience for the UN and "almost bankrupted the world organization and threatened

its political life."[33] Thus, the UN Operation in the Congo became an operation that "a generation of UN officials wanted to forget, or, if not forget, then never to repeat."[34]

1.2.1 The initial UN Involvement in the Congo:

The Congo's quest for independence from the Belgian colonial rule began in 1959 resulting in Belgium's decision to grant independence to the country. Although the Belgian colonial administration provided the Congolese population with one of the highest living standards on the continent[35] it had not been that generous in providing for political and educational advancement. Thus, at the time of independence the Congo was a country with only 17 university graduates and with a population having little or no experience in political and administrative fields.

Following the elections that were held at the end of May 1960 the Congolese Parliament convened and on June 29, the Congo became independent. On the same day the Belgian and Congolese governments signed a treaty of friendship, assistance, and cooperation.

> Under the treaty, most of the administrative and technical personnel would remain in the Congo on secondment to the Congolese government hence the Congolese population's lack of experience in those fields. Furthermore, two Belgian military bases would be maintained in the Congo and the Belgian troops would, at the request of the Congolese government, assist the government in maintaining law and order. Force Publique, the 25,000-man security force responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the Congo, would continue to be commanded by a Belgian Lieutenant-General together with 1,000 Belgian officers. The treaty, however, was never ratified.[36]

The crisis in the Congo began on 5 July, when the Congolese soldiers mutinied as a result of the rejection of their demands to get more promotion. As some mutineers

attacked Belgians and other Europeans most Belgian administrators and technicians fled the country, adding to the breakdown in public services and to the government's general inability to function.[37] Being faced with a rapid deterioration of law and order in the country the Congolese government appealed to the UN for assistance of a purely technical nature. The Congolese government requested military advisers, experts and technicians, to assist it in developing and strengthening the national army for the twin purposes of national defense and the maintenance of law and order.[38] Subsequent developments, however, led to a change in the nature of the government's request for UN aid. On July 11, the Belgian troops, without the prior consent of the Congolese government, moved into the Congo for the declared purpose of protecting European life and property. Simultaneously, Moise Tshombe, the Provincial President, announced the independence of Katanga, a mineral rich province on the south of the Congo. As a result of these events, the Congolese government requested UN military aid against external aggression, which constituted a threat to international peace.[39]

Using his powers under article 99 of the UN Charter[40] the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold brought the matter before the Security Council. On July 14, 1960 the Security Council adopted resolution 143 (1960) calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and

> decid[ed] to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the United Nations, the national security forces [would] be able, in the opinion of the Government, to fully meet their tasks.[41]

20

Therefore, the initial mandate of ONUC was twofold: to help the Congolese Government restore law and order, and to bring about the withdrawal of Belgian forces. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, in his report to the Security Council, lay out the principles regarding the organization and activities of the UN Force in the Congo within the mandate conferred to the peacekeeping force. The principal guidelines were as follow:

(a) The Force was to be regarded as a temporary security force to be deployed in the Congo with the consent of the Congolese government.

(b) The Force was ... under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council. The Force was thus not under the orders of the Congolese Government and could not be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict.

(c) The authority granted to the United Nations Force could not be exercised within the Congo either in competition with the representatives of its Government or in cooperation with them in any joint operation. Thus, the United Nations Operation must be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities.

(d) The units of the Force must not become parties to internal conflict. They could not be enforced to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive for such a solution.

(e) The United Nations military units were not authorized to use force except in self-defense.[42]

First troops of the UN peacekeeping force arrived in the Congo in mid-July. As ONUC forces deployed Belgian troops returned to their bases in the Congo and by the beginning of August 1960 the complete withdrawal of Belgian troops, except the province of Katanga and the two bases, was realized.

The withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga proved to be more problematic. On the one hand Lumumba, the Prime Minister, wanted ONUC to put down secession in Katanga by force, on the other hand the Katangese authorities strongly opposed the entry of the UN thus leaving Belgian troops with reluctance to withdraw. Under these circumstances the Secretary-General referred the matter to the Security Council. The

Security Council adopted resolution 146 (1960) of 9 August 1960 confirming "the authority given to the Secretary-General by [previous] Security Council resolutions ... and request[ed] him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby."[43] The Security Council further declared that the entry of United Nations Forces into Katanga was necessary. With regards to Lumumba's demand that ONUC end Katangese secession by force, the Security Council reiterated the Secretary-General's position that "the United Nations Force in the Congo [would] not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict."[44] Frustrated by the fact that ONUC would not help the Congolese Government to put down secession Katanga, Lumumba, from then on refused to cooperate with the UN making the work of ONUC even more difficult.

After the adoption of the resolution Secretary-General himself led the first troops to Katanga on 12 August. By September, the Belgian Forces were withdrawn from both Katanga and the two military bases. Therefore within 3 months ONUC was able to clear the whole Congo from the Belgian troops. The secession of Katanga, however, remained unresolved.

1.2.2 The Constitutional Crisis (September 1960 - September 1961):

The events that led to the constitutional crisis and eventually to civil war in the Congo began in August when another tribe, Kasai, proclaimed its secession. Prime Minister Lumumba attempted to put down the secession through Soviet logistic support and

killed nearly 1,000 people of the Kasai province. Kasavubu, the President of the Republic of the Congo, opposed Lumumba's action and on 5 September he announced that he dismissed Lumumba from his office. In turn Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu- a legally untenable but potentially enforceable proposition because of Lumumba's Russian logistic support.[45] Furthermore in mid-September Colonel Mobutu staged a coup in support of President Kasavubu. However, Mobutu had a weak control over the army therefore Lumumba was able to resist him. During this turmoil what ONUC did was to set up protected areas for the safety of both the Africans and the Europeans. In addition to that ONUC guards were stationed around the residences of both Kasavubu and Lumumba while protection was given to the leaders of other political factions as well. From then on there was no internationally recognized government in the Congo although Kasavubu gained de facto recognition of his Government through winning the right to represent the Congo in the General Assembly.

Although the contending parties turned to ONUC for recognition and support[46] the Secretary-General issued a policy of equidistance from all political factions to maintain its impartiality.[47] However the principle of impartiality, which proved to have invaluable contributions to the maintenance of peace in an inter-state conflict, proved not to work out and give the desired results in an intra-state conflict. The contending factions either viewed ONUC with suspicion or an ally of the opposing side, which in turn made ONUC vulnerable to attacks from almost all political factions.

On the other hand, at the United Nations in New York Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold was exposed to immense criticism because of his policy of impartiality. The Soviet Union, supporting decolonization as a token to influence the Third World, severely criticized Dag Hammarskjold for not putting down secession in Katanga. After Lumumba's ouster the Soviet Union demanded the Secretary-General's resignation and deadlocked the Security Council. The matter then had to be transferred to the General Assembly, through a procedural vote in the Security Council[48], under the Uniting for Peace resolution. The General Assembly adopted resolution 1474 of 20 September 1960 expressing its full support of the previous Security Council resolutions and Dag Hammarskjold's policies. This was a clear signal to Moscow that, whatever suspicions there might be and however bitterly loyalties might be strained, the Africans and Asians were still determined to back the UN operation and not allow Cold War rivalries to open up irreparable splits.[49] After the adoption of this resolution the Soviet Union went a step further and demanded the resignation of the Secretary-General and his replacement by a troika (from pro-Western bloc, the non-aligned bloc, and the pro-Soviet bloc).[50] But this proposition failed to gain effective support in the General Assembly.

However, the Soviet Union was not the only country that attacked Hammaskjold. The Western countries were also criticizing the Secretary-Generals policy of impartiality because "it implicitly kept [pro-Soviet] Lumumba in the game when those [Western] countries wanted him out."[51] Therefore, while trapped in a critical situation in the Congo ONUC could not gain the support of the members of the Security Council

which is one of the fundamental prerequisites for the success of a peacekeeping operation.

The situation got worse with Lumumba's death. Towards the end of November 1960 Lumumba escaped from his residence in an attempt to reach upcountry where his political stronghold was. However he was captured by the ANC (Army Nacionel Congolese, the National Army of the Congo) soldiers loyal to Mobutu. He was then transferred to the province of Katanga and was killed on 17 January 1960. Lumumba's death was followed by a series of fights between the pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba factions. The situation worsened when the troop contributing countries of ONUC that are sympathetic towards Lumumba (Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia) "withdrew their contingents from the United Nations Force in protest after Lumumba's detention and death, temporarily reducing UN force levels by one third in a critical period."[52] Moreover, the Soviet Union announced that it would not recognize Dag Hammarskjold as the Secretary-General.

Therefore the Security Council met once again and adopted resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February 1961, by which it authorized ONUC to use force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo. The Security Council further stated that "measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries"[53], which had direct connection with Katanga's secession.

Throughout the constitutional crisis and the civil war ONUC had a hard time in fulfilling its mandate. Especially after the Security Council adopted resolution 161 (1961) the local factions "interpreted the Council's new resolution as an attempt to subdue them by force, and in retaliation, ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel.[54] Therefore, while endeavoring to bring peace to the country ONUC itself became a target for the local factions.

While ONUC was endeavoring to stop hostilities on the ground it spared no effort to persuade the political leaders to national reconciliation. Conciliation efforts were also made by the United Nations Conciliation Committee, established by the General Assembly resolution of 20 September 1960 which was composed of members of the troop contributing countries. At last the Parliament was able to reconvene on 2 August 1961 thanks to the good offices and mediation efforts and the protection provided to the members of the Parliament by ONUC.

1.2.3 Ending Secession in Katanga (September 1961 - February 1963):

During the constitutional crisis ONUC avoided from interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo thus not taking effective measures against the secession of Katanga in order to preserve its impartiality. Although the Security Council had taken steps in that direction by adopting resolution 161 (1961) it was not until the formation of an internationally recognized government in the Congo that the Security Council could deal actively with this matter. Therefore, after the formation of the Government of

26

National Unity ONUC turned its efforts at helping the Government remove the foreign

elements that had provided the teeth of the attempt to sever, in their own interests, the

Congo's richest province from the rest of the country.[55]

Although the Belgian troops withdrew from Katanga in August 1960 the secession of

Katanga could not be terminated because Tshombe continued to receive foreign

assistance from Belgian officers and mercenaries of other nationalities. In addition to

that, he also imported large quantities of arms, and war materiel, including aircraft,

from abroad.[56] Therefore, with the elimination of foreign assistance to Katanga the

secession would be ended.

While attempting to remove foreign assistance to Katanga ONUC faced with immense

difficulty with Tshombe's deceptive attitude and armed attacks against the UN

soldiers. Therefore, the Security Council once again revised the mandate of ONUC and

on 24 November 1961 adopted Resolution 169, the strongest and most direct

authorization of force. While the Security Council rejected the claim that Katanga is "a

sovereign independent nation" and recognized the Government of the Republic of the

Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,[57]

it also

> [authorized] the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of the
> requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention
> pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary
> personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and
> mercenaries.[58]

Although these were attempts directed at ending secession in Katanga the UN "never added it to the formal objectives of the Force. Even its most forceful actions against Tshombe's regime were taken, officially, to preserve its own freedom of movement."[59] While ONUC was endeavoring to remove foreign assistance in the field, the efforts of a plan for reconciliation continued on the diplomatic field. It took, however, two years for ONUC to remove all foreign assistance on which Tshombe relied. Once the foreign elements were removed Tshombe agreed to end the secession of Katanga.

> On 21 January 1963, the United Nations announced the end of military operations and of Katangan secession and declared that all important centers in Katanga were under UN control. In a release issued the same day in New York, U Thant stated that the military portion of ONUC had been completed and that UN troops would gradually be withdrawn.[60]

Therefore, ONUC began to withdraw from the Congo, gradually reducing its size to 3,000 officers, which continued to offer technical assistance to the Congolese security forces upon the request of the Prime Minister of the Congo and the recommendation of the UN Security Council. On June 1964 ONUC completely withdrew from the country. However, technical assistance, which had been supplied by the United Nations family of organizations continued under the responsibility of the Office of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme.[61]

1.2.4 The Civilian Component of ONUC:

The United Nations Operation in the Congo also included a civilian component for the purpose of restoring essential public services since the breakdown of these services was one of the fundamental causes of the conflict in the Congo. For this purpose a

28

consultative group of experts was set up, consisting of senior officials of the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned.[62] The training programs were carried out in the fields of economy, law and administration, agriculture and health. As a result of these training programs it became possible, in 1963, to replace some international personnel by qualified Congolese citizens.

1.2.5 Assessment of the UN Operation in the Congo:

Just as UNEF I demonstrates how peacekeeping can be successful when certain conditions are met, ONUC demonstrates the limits of peacekeeping and how it can produce disastrous results when it moves beyond those limits. As William J. Durch points out,

> [t]he UN Operation in the Congo lacked every element that history now says is necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission; namely, effective support from the Great Powers, consistent support of all local parties, a clear mandate, and stable and adequate funding.[63]

ONUC received political support neither from the mandating authority, that is, the Security Council nor from the local parties. The initial consensus in the Security Council that enabled ONUC to be established started to diminish once the Soviet Union realized that ONUC would not put down secession in Katanga through force. The murder of the pro-Soviet Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba further frustrated the Soviet Union leading to a deadlock in the Security Council and to the Soviet Union's declaration that it would no longer recognize Dag Hammarskjold as the Secretary-General.

ONUC did not receive the support of the local parties as well. Lumumba withdrew his support from ONUC when ONUC refused to end secession Katanga by using force. President Kasavubu, on the other hand, withdrew his support when he ousted Lumumba and ONUC continued to offer Lumumba protection in an attempt not to take sides with any political faction. Furthermore, ONUC refused to recognize Kasavubu even when his government won the right the represent the Congo in the UN General Assembly. Therefore, ONUC could not get the support of the state in whose territory it operated. In addition to that ONUC tried to preserve its neutrality during the constitutional crisis, which also proved to be detrimental rather than helpful. Each political faction in the Congo perceived ONUC as an ally of its opponent. Thus, ONUC became a target, indeed a vulnerable target for the political factions; hence the Force was not armed for combat, but rather for self-defense.

The mandate conferred to ONUC, on the other hand, was rather a vague one. However, "in a case involving so many competing political interests-local, regional, and Great Power- it would have been unrealistic to expect a mandate for the peacekeeping force that laid out precise objectives."[64] Although the Security Council "call[ed] upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo"[65] it avoided to use the term 'aggression' against Belgium's intervention because such a wording in the resolution would necessitate the use of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council, however, did not have the political will to deal with the crisis through enforcement given the strict circumstances of the Cold War context.

On the other hand, as the situation exacerbated by the constitutional crisis and civil war in the Congo the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement began to blur. After Lumumba's death the Security Council adopted resolution 161 (1961) enabling ONUC to use force, although in the last resort, to prevent occurrence of civil war in the Congo.

> This resolution had no parallel in UN history. The Council had authorized a 'non-threatening' peacekeeping force, neither mandated nor equipped to fight a campaign, to adopt an enforcement role without first determining that a threat to international peace and security existed, i.e. without a formal move to Chapter VII of the Charter, still less the adoption as a first expedient of non-military coercive measures such as economic sanctions.[66]

Therefore, ONUC began to move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement making it "a part of the conflict it was supposed to be controlling, and therefore a part of the problem."[67]

The financial aspect of the operation was no good either. In December 1960, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which is the budgetary and administrative body, proposed that the expenses of ONUC be considered "expenses of the Organization" and thus subject to mandatory assessments[68] under Article 17(2)[69] of the UN Charter. However, the Soviet Union refused to pay its assessments for ONUC and argued that "the whole operation in the Congo was Western-inspired and 'biased', and thus should be supported by voluntary contributions from those countries with a direct interest in it"[70] as it did in UNEF 1 when it argued that the expenses of UNEF 1 should be borne by the aggressors. Furthermore, while France also refused to pay for ONUC, some states with-held their funds in protest of UN policy in the Congo, and some others reduced their share to a minimum. Therefore, the UN found itself in a financial crisis.

The UN had to issue $200 million in UN bonds to cover expenses for ONUC and UNEF 1. The bonds would be repaid over 25 years through regular UN assessments.[71]

In 1962 the General Assembly requested the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on

> Whether certain expenditures which were authorized by the General Assembly to cover the costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo and of the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East "constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.[72]

The Court decided that the expenditures authorized by the General Assembly resolutions are legitimate expenses of the Organization which Member States could be obligated to pay. Despite the opinion of the International Court of Justice the Soviet continued not to pay for ONUC. Therefore, throughout 1962 and 1963 ONUC had to be funded through the issuance of bonds.

The UN Operation in the Congo was the most expansive operation that the UN has embarked upon during the Cold War. The tasks of peacekeepers ranged from providing technical assistance to the Congolese Government to prevention of civil war, ending secession and training of the Congolese personnel. In the end the UN was successful in keeping the Congo in tact but at a high cost. The Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold lost his life (1961) in a plane crash while he was traveling to Katanga to meet Tshombe. The UN personnel was attacked in some cases and suffered casualties. The funding was a problem, the use of force was another problem. Thus, from beginning to its end ONUC remained the most controversial operation in the history of the UN. From then on the UN became more hesitant to get involved in conflicts which

had internal dimensions and it never approved another peacekeeping operation without adequate funding or without establishing time limits. Hence it was not until the end of the Cold War era that the UN undertook such a comprehensive operation and without the existence of a cease-fire at least.

2. UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era, An Overall Analysis:

2.1 Characteristics of Peacekeeping Operations:

During the Cold War the tasks assigned to peacekeepers were limited hence the operations served a limited purpose, that is, keeping the *peace*, not imposing any solution to the parties in conflict. It is possible to divide peacekeeping operations into two broad categories: observer missions and peacekeeping forces. The observer missions are composed of usually unarmed military observers the tasks of which include observing cease-fires, detecting and reporting on the violations of the cease-fires and supervising troop withdrawals. As neutral observers, peacekeepers can ensure that none of the protagonists perform actions that violate the agreement that established the peacekeeping operation and the cessation of military hostilities.[73] The peacekeeping forces, on the other hand, are composed of national contingents. The primary responsibility of a peacekeeping force is to separate the warring parties through interposing themselves between them. Through such a buffer zone the conflicting parties are prevented from direct contact which lessens the possibility of hostile incidents that could escalate into a full-scale war. Although the peacekeepers

are lightly armed and cannot prevent a conflicting party from crossing the buffer zone it is not the arms but the moral weight that the peacekeeping force exerts. Hence, a state may be reluctant to use military force if it knows that military offensives must go through UN forces, risking loss of life and international condemnation.[74] In addition to that, the function of a peacekeeping force may encompass that of an observer mission. The most striking feature of peacekeeping operations is that they are noncoercive actions although they are essentially military in nature. Thus, peacekeeping is a non-threatening activity. This is crucial for the simple reason that if the operation, for some reason or other, abandons its non-threatening posture then it will inevitably become party to the dispute and hence lose its claim to be a peacekeeping body.[75] Therefore, the peacekeeping operation singles no one out as the aggressor and blames no one for the conflict nor it attempts to impose its will on the warring parties.

Another feature of peacekeeping is that -as the term 'peacekeeping' itself suggests- a peacekeeping force usually deploys in areas where there is a *peace* to be kept. In other words, a peacekeeping force is not designed to restore order or stop the fighting between rival enemies. Therefore, if the warring parties have a desire to let the UN handle the conflict then they must at least agree to a cease-fire. Although in some cases the UN faced situations where there was no peace to keep it resorted to minimal use of force and tried to persuade the warring parties to a cease-fire through the efforts of mediation and negotiation.

2.2 Elements of Success in a Peacekeeping Mission:

As mentioned earlier peacekeeping operations were established in an *ad hoc* manner. The term 'peacekeeping' is not defined in the UN Charter. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are no established rules or guidelines for peacekeeping that distinguishes it from collective security or any other form of military action. In fact the UN had to find its own way through gaining experience and learning lessons from each and every peacekeeping operation that it had conducted. Thus, over time there developed several principles on which the success of a peacekeeping operation depended. These principles served as guidelines for the UN in the establishment of subsequent peacekeeping operations. The lack of any of these principles often produced undesirable results for the UN and cast a shadow to the success of the operations. Among these principles, the consent of the parties to the conflict, the impartiality of the UN peacekeeping force, and non-use of force stand out as the most important ones which have been determining factors of the success of a peacekeeping operation. These principles still have relevance in the post-Cold War era.

2.2.1 The Consent of the Parties to the Conflict: The first and most important prerequisite to the success of a peacekeeping operation is the consent of the host state. For example, during the Suez crisis of 1956 UN peacekeeping forces were only deployed on the territory of Egypt since Israel did not give permission to UN presence on its own territory. Any attempt to deploy peacekeepers without the approval of the host state, on the other hand, would defeat the very purpose of limiting hostilities in

the area since such an action would precipitate attacks on peacekeepers by the host country. Therefore the consent of the host state "greatly reduces the likelihood that peacekeepers will encounter resistance while carrying out their duties."[76] The consent of the host state also shows that there is at least nominal commitment to peace. It should be noted, however, that the consent of the host state to the presence of a UN peacekeeping force in its territory "does not constitute an indefinite legal right for the operation; it may be withdrawn any time."[77] For instance, in 1967, just before launching an attack against Israel the Egyptian President Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UNEF I. Under such circumstances there is little option for the UN but to withdraw.[78]

2.2.2 The Impartiality of the UN Peacekeeping Force: The impartiality of the peacekeeping force suggests that the UN peacekeepers have no initial bias toward either side and thus cannot be party to any conflict either domestic or international nor they would resort to actions, which favor one side or the other. Therefore, to achieve impartiality, the UN has refrained from including contingents from the Permanent Members of the Security Council in the peacekeeping forces hence such an act would be against the very purpose of the mission, that is isolating local conflicts from the Cold War context. In addition to that the UN was careful in not including contingent from countries which have a direct interest in the conflict at hand. Thus, the UN peacekeeping forces would normally be composed of small and nonaligned states although there are exceptional cases where one or more Permanent Members of the Security Council stand out as troop contributors. For instance, France provided troops

for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and Britain provided troops for the UN Force in Cyprus.

2.2.3 The Principle of Non-use of Force: Peacekeepers carry light weapons and use them only as a last resort and in self-defense since they rely on diplomatic means for the solution of the dispute rather than on arms. Therefore, with limited military capability the peacekeepers are not threatening to belligerents. However, during the UN Operation in the Congo the peacekeepers were given tasks which required the use of force such as assisting the Congolese Government in restoring law and order, and expelling foreign elements from the province of Katanga. Therefore, the subsequent UN peacekeeping operations adopted a wider definition of the use of force for self-defense. "Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent [the peacekeeping force] from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council."[79] In practice, however, most commanders refrained from utilizing this wider definition of self-defense with the concerns that the peacekeeping force might lose its impartial character and that hence the peacekeepers are lightly armed they might be vulnerable targets for attacks from the local parties.

Other than the three basic principles of peacekeeping cited above there are other factors which are also necessary if success is to be ensured. First, peacekeeping operations must have full support from the Security Council. This is necessary not only in the initial stage of establishment of the peacekeeping operation but also in later stages when decisions are to be made regarding budgets, troop allotments and when

mandates come up for renewal. The problems that ONUC faced illustrates how difficulties arise when support from the Security Council is lacking. The peacekeeping force must have the support and cooperation of the local parties as well. Again, in the Congo it proved very difficult for ONUC to fulfill its mandate when the local parties turned hostile and withdrew their cooperation. Secondly, the peacekeeping operation must have a clear and practicable mandate. The goals of the mission should clearly defined and known to all parties involved. Such clarity of the mission helps to reduce local suspicion towards the peacekeeping force. Yet a certain degree of flexibility is desirable so that the peacekeepers may adapt their operation strategies to better fit changing circumstances.[80] Lastly, the Member States should be willing to provide adequate financing for the mission. Because peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter the process through which a peacekeeping operation should be financed remains absent as well. The problem of financing peacekeeping operations began with the establishment of UNEF 1 and reached its peak during the UN Operation in the Congo where the Organization was almost going bankrupt. Furthermore, ONUC deployed without the approval of its budget by the General Assembly. Later on, no peacekeeping operation was deployed without getting its budget approved in the General Assembly, which slowed down the process of deployment but at least ensured sustained funding.

2.3 UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War: Success or Failure?

As mentioned earlier the founders of the UN envisaged a collective security system to deal with international conflicts. However, the post-World War order did not permit the utilization of this system. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would block any initiative that they conceived to be against their interests through exercising their veto powers in the Security Council. Thus, the ideological rivalry of the two super powers caused much friction and prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its primary responsibility, that is, maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, peacekeeping emerged as a response to the stalemate between the Permanent Members of the Security Council and it became a substitute for collective security. Peacekeeping was thus a by-product ... of the Cold War; an improvisation in the effort of the UN to transcend or bypass the constraints of the Cold War in search of a role in a specific crisis.[81]

During the Cold War the major contribution of peacekeeping with regards to the maintenance of international peace and security was to contain regional or local conflicts so as to prevent them from escalating into major wars where a direct clash of the two superpowers would be inevitable given the circumstances of the Cold War system. In this sense peacekeeping was highly successful in that it was able to prevent another World War from breaking out.

Yet, UN peacekeeping was not that successful in addressing the root causes of conflicts and laying out plans for long-term political solutions. The peacekeeping

missions that have been going on for decades are a good illustration of the weakness of UN peacekeeping in this area. For instance, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to supervise Israel-Arab truces. After fifty years of its establishment this mission is still in place. Another one, which is still active today, is the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established in 1949 to monitor India-Pakistan truce in Kashmir. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, established in 1964, is still providing a buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek communities of the island of Cyprus. The two peacekeeping missions established in the Middle East in the 1970s, namely the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) -established in 1974- and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) -established in 1978- are also continuing to function today. Therefore, peacekeeping, which started as a mechanism for buying time in order to settle the underlying dispute "ended up as a substitute for it, a soft option or alternative for political inaction."[82] The reason for this political inaction is best explained by Brian Urquhart. He states that,

> ...the Security Council, because of its dissensions, had failed to create a benevolent international framework to assist combatants to resolve their differences and to provide the necessary protective apparatus. ... Without such an international framework it is often impossible for the parties to a situation that is violent, deep-rooted and complex to make progress on their own and in the open.[83]

Thus, the Great Powers were only interested in freezing the conflict so that they would avoid direct confrontation with each other. They were interested in a standstill rather than in really solving the problem "not to mention that solving the underlying problem would have reduced the dependence of the local parties on the superpowers."[84] It was not until the end of the 1980s, with the emergence of the cooperative mood in the

Security Council, that the UN was able to direct its efforts towards achieving long-term political solutions to the disputes.

Another weakness of UN peacekeeping operations stemmed from the fact that the operations remained distinctly *ad hoc*. That is, the UN did not acquire any military units at its disposal that it would send immediately to areas when the conflicts arose. Propositions were made for the creation standby forces or a permanent UN force but they did not receive much support. Only a few states, namely the Scandinavian countries and Canada, trained their soldiers specifically for peacekeeping.

During the Cold War, 13 peacekeeping operations were established with 7 of them being in the Middle East. The last peacekeeping operation established in the Cold War was UNIFIL in 1978. Then, until 1988 no new peacekeeping operation was established by the UN.

Chapter 3: Moving Towards Next Generation: The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping (1988-1991)

Although the change in the nature of peacekeeping gained momentum with an expansion of its activities after the Gulf War of 1991 it is possible to trace this change back to 1988 when new peacekeeping operations began to be established after a period of ten years. What enabled the re-entrance of peacekeeping in international politics was the change in the attitudes of both the Soviet Union and the United States towards the UN leading to an unprecedented consensus in the Security Council. The first signs of change came from the Soviet Union during in 1987. The Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in an article published in *Pravda* stated that "the world was becoming increasingly interrelated and interdependent: there was therefore a need for a mechanism which was capable of discussing common problems. The Permanent Members could become guarantors of regional security. More use should be made of UN peacekeeping bodies, and of the UN Secretary-General's potential peace-making role."[85] Furthermore, he announced that the Soviet Union would pay its debts to the UN, which amounted to $200 million including its assessments for peacekeeping operations. This was indeed a dramatic shift of Soviet foreign policy since the Soviet Union opposed paying its assessments for peacekeeping operations because it found the peacekeeping operations unconstitutional.

> The shift in the Soviet policy resulted from that country's need to withdraw support from numerous conflicts and concentrate on economic reform. A decade of military buildup and wars by proxy had drained its treasury, and the USSR had to retract its over-stretched foreign policy.[86]

The Soviet Union's initiatives to put the UN back in the agenda also helped the American behavior against the UN to moderate. In 1988 the American President Ronald Reagan "praised the work of the [UN], the Secretary-General, and UN peacekeepers, and ... vowed to repay US debts to the Organization."[87]

Thus, the Security Council was now again able to take part actively in matters regarding international peace and security. This time, however, the UN engaged not only in peacekeeping but also in peacemaking in long-standing regional conflicts. Beyond its traditional tasks of supervising withdrawal of troops, observing cease-fires and forming buffer zones between the belligerents peacekeeping also began to acquire new tasks such as observing elections, physical disarming of local factions or verifying human rights. Thus, the inclusion of a civilian component in these operations reflected the changing nature of peacekeeping. Therefore, the most striking feature of these new peacekeeping operations was that with the acquisition of new tasks, the UN was not only trying to freeze the conflict but it was also striving to find long-term political solutions thus also acting as a peacemaker.

1. New Operations and New Tasks for Peacekeepers

1.1 Afghanistan:

Although a traditional observer mission UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was the first peacekeeping operation in an area where one of

the superpowers was directly involved. In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with the declared aim of helping the Afghan Government to maintain law and order in the country. However, Afghanistan turned out to be the Soviet Union's Vietnam from which it sought to extricate itself in a face-saving way. The efforts of UN mediator Diego Cordovez during the 1980s bore its fruits and UNGOMAP was established in 1988 to monitor and verify the withdrawal of more than 100,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan. For this purpose the UN sent 50 military observers to Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was completed in February 1990 and UNGOMAP's mandate was terminated in March 1990. Thus, for the first time in its history the UN conducted an operation in which one of the Great Powers was directly involved.

1.2 Iran-Iraq:

The second peacekeeping operation established during the period between 1998 and 1991 was the UN Iran-Iraq Observer Mission (UNIIMOG). After eight years of war Iran and Iraq had finally come to an agreement to bring an end to the long lasting war and the Security Council was able to secure a cease-fire in 1988. Thus a group of 350 unarmed military observers from 25 countries were dispatched to the border between Iran and Iraq with the traditional aim of observation. The mandate of UNIIMOG included

> [the] establishment of cease-fire lines; monitoring compliance with the cease-fire; investigation of violations; prevention, through negotiation of any other change in the *status quo* pending withdrawal of their respective forces to internationally recognized boundaries; to supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces to these internationally recognized boundaries; and to obtain the agreement of the parties to other arrangements which, pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement, could help reduce tension and build confidence between them.[88]

44

Although some difficulties arose regarding the violations of cease-fire (in its firs five months UNIIMOG investigated almost 2,000 complaints of truce violations) UNIIMOG was able to prevent the renewal of war between Iran and Iraq.

1.3 Angola:

The third UN mission had a similar mandate with UNGOMAP. The UN established the first Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) the mandate of which was to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. UNAVEM I was established as a part of a regional peace settlement that would bring independence to Namibia, a former German colony administered by South Africa.

With support from the Soviet Union and Cuba Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) finally succeeded in winning the civil war which had begun in 1975, after the transitional government leading Angola out of Portuguese dependence collapsed in August of that same year.[89] On the other hand the two resistance movements in the country, namely National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) received support from the United States and South Africa. Thus, Angola was already in chaos with the two superpowers providing support for different political factions in the country. The situation worsened when South Africa conducted raids into the territory of Angola with the declared aim of capturing the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas -fighting against South Africa to bring independence to Namibia- escaping from Namibia. In turn the MPLA

45

government in Angola requested troops from Cuba. By 1988 the number of Cuban troops in Angola had reached to 50,000. Although the Security Council had taken steps to the resolution of this crisis, and even adopted resolutions "condemn[ing] South Africa's aggression against ... Angola and demand[ing] South Africa to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of ... Angola"[90] it was neither able to prevent South Africa from conducting raids against Angola nor it was able to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from that country until 1988 with the cooperative mood revealing in the Security Council.

In December 1988 the Security Council was able to establish UNAVEM I with the signing of peace agreements between South Africa, Angola and Cuba. The mandate of UNAVEM I was to "verify the redeployment northwards and the phased total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between Angola and Cuba."[91] For this purpose 70 military observers supported by 22 international and locally recruited staff was dispatched to Angola. Two days later from the adoption of this resolution Angola and Cuba signed a bilateral agreement, which set the timetable for the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. According to the timetable the withdrawal of Cuban troops would be completed within 27 months. During this period both Angola and Cuba complied with their commitments, and therefore the withdrawal of Cuban troops was completed two months before the actual time set. One reason for this was that the presence of Cuban troops in its territory cost to Angola $20 million a year, which it could no longer afford.[92] Consequently, on 6 June 1991 the Secretary-General reported to "the

[Security] Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it."[93]

Thus, the UN was now able to resolve conflicts, which remained unaddressed by the Organization for a long time because of the Security Council's inability to reach a consensus on these issues. Although these first three missions were observer missions the success of these missions reflected the cooperation of the Great Powers in the Security Council and signaled the beginning of a new era in which the UN could now assume more responsibility in matters regarding international peace and security.

1.4 Namibia

The establishment of United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia pointed out to the emergence of the multidimensional character of UN peacekeeping.

Although the efforts of the Security Council to bring independence to South West Africa (Namibia) from South African colonial rule date back to 1970s, it was not until 1989 that the Council could take concrete steps in that direction. In fact, UNTAG was established in 1978 (through Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978) but it did not become operational for ten years because South Africa rejected UN presence in Namibia. South Africa linked the Namibian settlement with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola because it perceived this presence as a direct

threat to its security. After the Reagan administration took office, South Africa gained support from the United States in that view. With international circumstances becoming more favorable for the de-colonization of Namibia at the end of the 1980s the UN could take the establishment of UNTAG back to its agenda. Thus, through adopting resolution 629 (1989) of 16 January 1989 the Security Council decided that resolution 435 (1978) would be implemented starting from 1 April 1989. Originally -in 1978- UNTAG was to be an operation the nature of which would be military. However, after ten years of its initial establishment the mission "had become a non-traditional peacekeeping effort, with much more of a civilian, political role. This change was reflected in a downsizing of the military component and an increase in the number of civilian police monitors."[94]

UNTAG had three objectives which would be carried out by various components. The civilian electoral personnel of UNTAG was responsible for supervising and controlling elections to ensure that they are free and fair. Although the elections were to be organized and conducted by the South African Administrator General the elections were to be under the supervision and control of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This meant that " the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had at each stage, level and stage and place to satisfy himself that the conduct and the procedure of the election, including the establishment of the list of candidates, the taking of the poll, the determination of the results of the poll and the declaration of the results of the election are fair and appropriate."[95]

The monitoring of the South West African Police (SWAPOL) was the responsibility of the UN police monitors (CIVPOL) whereas the military component of UNTAG was charged with the responsibility of monitoring the cease-fire. This responsibility also included the withdrawal of SWAPO guerrillas to recognized bases in Angola and Zambia and to ensure that they are disarmed before they are repatriated. The military component was also responsible for monitoring the conduct of South African military personnel who continued to perform civilian duties. UNTAG also registered voters and facilitated information about the election process.[96]

The UN operation in Namibia went smoothly because the parties were committed to peace hence they cooperated with the UN. The UN followed traditional rules of peacekeeping (consent, minimal use of force, and impartiality) which also contributed to the success of the operation. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were held between 7-11 November 1989 and SWAPO won the elections with their leader Sam Nujoma being elected as the President of Namibia. On 14 November the Special Representative of the Secretary-General declared that the elections were free and fair. In April 1990 Namibia joined the United Nations as an independent nation. With the inclusion of new tasks and the emphasis given on civilian operations UNTAG foreshadowed the beginning of a new era in the UN peacekeeping operations where the UN could now concentrate on the comprehensive settlement of disputes rather than just freezing them. Because of the variety of tasks peacekeepers undertook in Namibia, UNTAG is usually referred to as the first in the new (second) generation of peacekeeping operations.[97]

1.5 Latin America

The final peacekeeping operation of the period between 1988-1991 took place in Central America, where the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) played an important role in the peace process that sought to bring stability to the region. Later on, ONUCA was complemented by the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) and by the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

In 1987 the five Central American states -Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador- signed the Esquipulas II agreements in which they promised to "work towards national reconciliation."[98] The Esquipulas II agreements committed each of these five states a number of pledges:

> The cessation of hostilities; democratization including freedom of the press and political pluralism and the ending of states of emergency; the holding of free and fair elections; ending support for irregular and insurrectionist forces and the prevention of the use of their territory for attacks on other states; and finally, to provide support for refugees and displaced persons.[99]

Thus, ONUCA's role in this peace process would be to verify that the parties had committed themselves in the implementation of the articles contained in the Esquipulas II agreements. The first prerequisite to the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Central America was the creation of a secure environment. However, the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (called as the 'Contras') were continuing their attacks against the 'Sandinista' government in Nicaragua from their bases in Honduras. Under these circumstances the Secretary-General refused to "instigate a peacekeeping

mission until circumstances produced a more conducive environment."[100] Fortunately

the situation was to change with the Nicaraguan government's declaration to hold

democratic elections no later than February 1990. In response to the declaration of the

Nicaraguan government the four states, which were parties to the Esquipulas II

agreements, agreed to develop a plan "for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or

relocation of the Nicaraguan resistance and their families."[101] Accordingly, the UN

Secretary-General agreed to establish the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral

Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) in accordance with the Nicaraguan government's

request for the UN to monitor the elections. ONUVEN became operational on 25

August 1989. Here, it should be pointed out that ONUVEN was *not* established by the

Security Council. The Secretary-General, the General Assembly, and the Security

Council "all wanted to act quickly and seemed ready to let [General] Assembly's vague

endorsement in earlier resolutions of UN involvement stand as a sufficient legal and

political basis for establishing ONUVEN."[102] Furthermore, many countries were

concerned to ensure that election-monitoring on its own was not considered to be

under the jurisdiction of the Security Council.[103]

One distinguishing characteristic of ONUVEN was that it was the first time that the

UN would observe elections in an independent country. Previously, the UN had

refused such requests on the grounds that Article 2 (7)[104] of the UN Charter prevented

the UN from intervening in domestic affairs of states. Another striking future of

ONUVEN was the cooperation of the UN with regional organizations, in this case,

with Organization of American States (OAS). Prior to the establishment of ONUVEN

the secretaries-general of both the UN and the OAS created an International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) to ensure the fairness of elections in Nicaragua. After the elections CIAV also undertook the responsibility assisting in the implementation of a joint plan for demobilization, repatriation and relocation of members of the Nicaraguan resistance.[105]

The elections in Nicaragua were held in February 1990 and resulted with the defeat of the 'Sandinista' government. Through close oversight of Nicaraguan officials at each stage of the elections and throughout the country, ONUVEN directly contributed to the electoral process. During the polling ONUVEN deployed 207 observers to monitor the elections.

The Secretary-General, on the other hand, recommended the establishment of ONUCA to the Security Council following the declaration of the Nicaraguan government to hold democratic elections. Consequently, the Security Council approved the established ONUCA through adopting resolution 644 (1989) of 7 November 1989 the mandate of which was to conduct on-site verification of the security undertakings contained in the Esquipulas II Agreement.[106] Its mandate was expanded to cover the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan contras after the elections held in Nicaragua in February 1990. Thus, the UN was for the first time engaging in physical disarmament. While ONUCA was responsible for implementing the military aspects of demobilization CIAV was responsible for the civilian aspects including "the repatriation, relocation and resettlement and subsequent monitoring of the welfare of

members of the [Nicaraguan] Resistance."[107] Once the military aspect of demobilization was complete ONUCA returned to its original mandate of verifying compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement. In 1992 ONUCA completed its mission and withdrew from Central America.

Overlapping ONUCA was the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) established in May 1991 following a series of negotiations that took place between the government of El Salvador and the resistance movement Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.[108] In July 1990 the first agreement that the parties achieved was Agreement on Human Rights which provided for the establishment of a UN verification mission "to monitor nationwide respect for and the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador."[109] Although the peacekeeping mission was to be established only after the parties agreed to cessation of the conflict both parties requested the Secretary-General to set up the mission even before a cease-fire was achieved. Thus, the Secretary-General sent a preliminary mission to El Salvador in March 1991. The operation officially became operational on 20 May 1991 through Security Council resolution 693 (1991) the mandate of which was to monitor all agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN. The initial mandate, thus, only comprised the human rights verification. At this stage, the tasks of ONUSAL included "investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promoting human rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination of violations; and reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the UN

General Assembly and Security Council." [110] In addition to investigating allegations of human rights violations, identifying and punishing those who are responsible for such crimes ONUSAL also initiated a human rights education program together with an information campaign on human rights.

Subsequent agreements reached between the parties in December 1991 and in January 1992 necessitated the enlargement of ONUSAL's mandate so as to cover military and civilian police aspects of the agreements. While the human rights division continued to perform its tasks the military division was responsible for

> verifying the cessation of the armed conflict, dealing with the redeployment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador to the positions they would maintain in normal peace time, and the concentration of the FMLN forces in agreed "designated locations" in the areas of conflict. Its function was to monitor the troops of both parties in these locations, verify the inventories of weapons and personnel, authorize and accompany the movements of both forces, and receive and investigate complaints of violations. [111]

In addition to these responsibilities the military division also helped control and coordinate the clearing of 425 minefields.

The police division, on the other hand, was responsible for the creation of a new Salvadorian police force and maintenance of public order and security until the National Civil Police became operational. The police division also assumed additional responsibilities when the new National Police began to deploy throughout the territory of El Salvador in March 1993. The division carried out an evaluation of the performance of the new police force in the field and provided it with technical advice and logistical support between April and September 1993. [112]

ONUSAL's mandate was again enlarged after the Government of El Salvador requested the UN to observe the elections that were to be held in March 1994. Thus, the Security Council, through resolution 832 (1993) of 27 May 1993, enlarged ONUSAL's mandate to cover the observation of the electoral process. The responsibilities of electoral division, which would be implemented in five stages, were to verify citizens' registration and to follow political activities, to observe the electoral campaign, to observe the elections, to count the votes and announce the results.[113] For these purposes ONUSAL deployed 900 electoral observers. The elections were held on 20 March 1994 and the next day the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that, in the light of the information gathered by the observers on election day, and view of the systematic observation of the electoral process over the preceding six months, ONUSAL believed that in general the elections had taken place under appropriate conditions in terms of freedom, competitiveness and security.[114] He also pointed out that ONUSAL observers had not recorded any frauds that could have had a significant impact on the outcome of the elections. Since no candidate in the presidential election obtained an absolute majority a second round of elections were held on 24 April 1994. Although ONUSAL's mandate was to be terminated following the elections the Secretary-General requested the Security Council that its duration should be extended for another 6 months because the implementation of the peace accords, especially the police division was not complete. Thus, the Security Council extended the mandate of ONUSAL for a period of six months.

These five peacekeeping operations that had been conducted between 1988-1991 point out to radical changes in the nature of peacekeeping. During the Cold War peacekeeping was relatively limited in terms of responsibilities it had to assume because both the Soviet Union and the United States were not really interested in addressing the root causes of the conflicts but rather preventing their escalation. With the changes that occurred in the Soviet and American policies towards the end of the 1980s both powers were now willing to engage not only in peacekeeping but also peacemaking. Therefore, the UN assumed multidimensional tasks in its peacekeeping activities with the aim of settling long lasting regional conflicts. The responsibilities of new UN peacekeeping included election monitoring, physical disarming of political factions, police activities (including training), human rights, assisting in mine clearance and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. Thus the cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council enabled the UN to take more active steps towards long term settlements. One new feature of the new UN peacekeeping was that the UN helped the implementation of the agreements concluded by states who needed an impartial body to verify that the terms of the agreements are carried out properly. Thus, the UN could operate in an environment where the conflicting parties themselves had already committed themselves to settling their disputes, which enabled the UN to perform its tasks in a more peaceful environment. Another unique feature of the new UN peacekeeping was that the nature of conflicts began to reflect that of a an internal one. In other words, the UN established peacekeeping missions not only on the borders of states but also *within* their borders the aim of which was to achieve national

reconciliation. As a result besides the emergence of new tasks for UN peacekeepers the environment in which they operated began to change as well.

2. Moving From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Gulf War

The consensus in the Security Council that began to reveal itself at the end of the 1980s reached its peak during the Gulf crisis to avert Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The operation launched against Iraq was *not* a peacekeeping operation hence it was conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Furthermore, it did not qualify as a collective security action under Article 42 of the UN Charter since the UN lacked such a collective security mechanism to deal with crises as laid out in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Rather, the operation was launched by the US-led multinational coalition, which bore some resemblance to the Korean War forty years ago. But this time the coalition forces did not use UN flags and symbols. Nor was the United States responsible to the authority of the UN through regular reporting and participation by UN personnel in decisionmaking.[115]

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 prompted strong international reaction against this aggression. The Security Council immediately responded to the Iraqi invasion and, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted resolution 660 (1990) on the same day stating that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security. Furthermore, the Council condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded its immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The

Council also "call[ed] upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and support[ed] all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States."[116] The Arab League, however, failed to mediate a solution that would alter Iraqi behavior. Thus, the Security Council met once again and decided to impose mandatory sanctions against Iraq (excluding humanitarian supplies).[117] Iraq responded to the Security Council's decision by annexing Kuwait as the nineteenth province. Despite the fact that there had been territorial claims or border disputes throughout the globe it was the first time in the history of the UN that a state had forcibly annexed another. The Security Council stated that the annexation of Kuwait was null and void and called "upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action of dealing that [would] be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation."[118] The Security Council further imposed a maritime blockade on 25 August with resolution 665 (1990). Following the maritime blockade the Security Council took measures in order to supply food and medical supplies in cooperation with the Committee of the Red Cross or other humanitarian agencies.[119] Thus, from August until November 1990 the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions in order to bring an end to Iraqi invasion. However, neither the sanctions nor the mediation of efforts of the UN and the Arab League brought any positive outcome. Therefore, the Security Council, on 29 November 1990 adopted resolution 678 (1990) and stated,

> 1. [the Security Council] demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) ... to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution.[120]

However, Iraq failed to comply with the Security Council resolution and on 16 January 1991 the US-led coalition began the air campaign against Iraq, which was called as the *Operation Desert Storm*. The air raids continued for six weeks in which the coalition forces destroyed most of Iraq's air power and the infrastructure of the country. The operation continued with the launching of the *Operation Desert Sabre*, the land phase, on 24 February. The operation lasted three days and by that time Kuwait was cleared of Iraqi occupation. On 28 February the cease-fire came into effect. With the goal of expelling Iraq from Kuwait achieved attention turned again to the Security Council to set the conditions for peace with a long series of resolutions.

On 2 March 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 686 (1991) which set out steps to consolidate the cease-fire. The Security Council demanded that all 12 UN resolutions that had been adopted prior to the Operation Desert Storm were to be unconditionally accepted by Iraq, all hostile actions cease immediately and that the prisoners were to be exchanged and released. The following month the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which is, in some UN circles, referred to as the "mother of all resolutions"[121], containing 34 paragraphs which laid down the conditions under which sanctions would be lifted, and military presence by the allies would be ended.

First of all, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish a UN observer mission to monitor the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq and a demilitarized zone.[122] The Security Council unanimously agreed to the establishment of UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) the mandate of which was to report on violations of the demilitarized zone and investigate complaints on alleged violations of the cease-fire. This was the first observer mission that included personnel from all the Permanent Members of the Security Council. Furthermore, although an observer mission in the traditional sense, what distinguished UNIKOM from other observer missions was the fact that it was not established with the consent of the host state, that is, Iraq. Initially the mission was composed of unarmed observers, but in the face of a series of border violations the Security Council, in February 1993, "decided to increase UNIKOM's strength and to extend its terms of reference to include the capacity to take physical action to prevent violations of the demilitarized zone and of the ... demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait."[123] UNIKOM is still active today with 1,102 military personnel operating along the border and the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait.

Secondly, the Security Council established a Special Committee for the destruction of chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles, which represented a further innovation in enforcement for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the region. The Commission's mandate comprised the following:

> To carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities; to take possession for destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related sub-systems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; to supervise the destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic missiles with a range

The Security Council also authorized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect and destroy known and suspected nuclear facilities and materials.[125] However, both the Special Committee and the IAEA faced difficulties while carrying out their investigations because of Iraq's non-cooperative attitude and denial of access to documents and buildings. Iraq's consistent policy has been, very simply, to save what it could of these weapons by declaring the existence only of what was already known and using the full range of human ingenuity to conceal the rest.[126] Consequently, the Commission and the IAEA have not progressed much on this issue, which has been the major reason for the continuance of sanctions on Iraq still today.

Thirdly, the Security Council made Iraq liable, under the international law, for "any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Government, nationals and corporations."[127] For this purpose the Council created a fund to compensate these losses which would be drawn partly from Iraq's petroleum revenues. The economic sanctions on Iraq would continue, excluding food and medical supplies.

In addition to establishing the above-mentioned measures the Security Council, for the first time in the history of the UN linked humanitarian and security issues. The Council adopted resolution 688 (1991) in which it condemned Iraq's repression of its minorities, especially the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq, "which led to a massive

flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions"[128] and thus threatened international peace and security in the region. For the purpose of protecting the Kurdish minority the Security Council decided to establish *Operation Provide Comfort* the aim of which would be to set up safe havens (in the north of the 36th parallel) for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and authorized the non-governmental agencies to offer assistance. A subsequent resolution of the Security Council established a no-fly zone over southern Iraq to protect the Shi'ite population there. Although resolution 688 (1991) did not refer to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, given the overwhelming power of the allied forces Iraq had to acquiesce the Council's decision though in protest of the violation of its national sovereignty. This was for the first time the Security Council made an unprecedented intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign member state.

The Gulf War therefore represents a turning point in the history of the UN. It was the first time since the Korean War that the UN Security Council could use its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to such an unprecedented degree. But this time both the Soviet Union and the United States were cooperating with each other and not using their veto power, their most important political weapon in the Security Council. Without the cooperation of the great powers it would be very difficult if not impossible to bring an end to the Iraqi aggression in such a short time and in such a decisive manner. During the Cold War many conflicts that could be termed as aggression remained unaddressed in the UN because the conflicts were in the spheres of influence of either the United States or the Soviet Union which had been

the reason for the birth of peacekeeping. Although not a collective security action as envisaged in the UN Charter the Gulf War signaled the beginning of a new era where the Security Council could now reassume its role as the guarantor of international peace and security.

Although the UN proved to be successful in achieving its stated goal, that is, to bring an end to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the way that this goal was achieved has been exposed to criticism. First and foremost *Operation Desert Storm* was not undertaken by the UN itself. Under Article 43 of the UN Charter the Military Staff Committee was to conclude agreements with the Member States in order to make military forces available to the UN for use by the Security Council. However, these agreements were never concluded because of the Cold War. Therefore the UN acquired no military troops at its disposal that it could quickly send to areas of conflict. During the Cold War, when the UN was to establish a peacekeeping operation it had to rely on voluntary troop contributions from its members. Consequently the UN was caught unprepared for the Gulf crisis leaving it with no option than to delegate its enforcement powers to a coalition of 28 nations under the United States command. As a result, "between January 15 and March 2 the UN faded from the picture as U.S.-led bombing raids and ground action forced Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait."[129] Lacking a direct link to the UN, most UN members had no say in the operation. Germany and Japan, which were expected to contribute monetary resources for the collective action, were excluded from important decision making meetings.[130] Therefore, the operation showed the UN's weakness in conducting a collective security action under its

command and was criticized because of American dominance of the operation. Within this framework "the Gulf War highlighted an important problem of the post-Cold War era: The ambivalence of many states toward a stronger UN [was] now coupled with apprehension about a pax Americana, even a UN-centered one, without a Soviet counterweight."[131]

Another criticism of the Gulf War was related to the use of force by the US-led coalition. Resolution 678 remained very vague and did not establish any restrictions on the what kind of, how much and how long force could be used, but only authorized "all necessary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Therefore, the United States was left with a blank check to pursue the expulsion of Iraq.[132] Furthermore, it was argued that the UN resorted to force without really taking sufficient time to see whether the sanctions were effective or not. In this respect, the goal of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is action short of force if possible. However, the Security Council moved too quickly from sanctions to use of force without a formal determination as to the inadequacy of sanctions before Operation Desert Storm was launched."[133]

In addition to these criticisms the Gulf crisis posed serious questions regarding national sovereignty of states. As mentioned earlier it was the first time that the UN had intervened in domestic affairs of a state in a such unprecedented degree through setting up safe havens for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq for humanitarian concerns. The developing states, for example, although supporting the action, worried about precedents for UN interference in states' internal affairs.[134] Indeed subsequent UN

peacekeeping operations which included a humanitarian dimension such as in Somalia and Bosnia further witnessed the erosion of national sovereignty of states. Consequently, although hailed as a success the Gulf experience posed serious questions about the UN's ability to deal with similar cases of aggression in the future.

CONCLUSION:

With the failure of the League of Nations to preserve international peace and security the victorious powers of World War II sought the creation of a more powerful and efficient system of collective security. Consequently, on October 24, 1945 the United Nations was established as a follow-up of the League of Nations. With the creation of a smaller executive body (i.e. the Security Council) that was empowered to take binding decisions upon the member states the United Nations was envisaged to play a more effective role in dealing with international crises where urgent decisions needed to be taken. The UN relied on two sets of actions to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. In the first place the conflicting states would seek a solution through peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation or judicial settlement as outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The second set of actions referred to cases where there were threats to peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. In such cases the Security Council was authorized to take a wide range of actions, from imposing sanctions to enforcement, to restore international peace and security. However, the alliance of the communist East and democratic West that helped to win a victory over the Nazis would not last long. The world would soon be stumbled into two ideologically rival blocs that could not be foreseen by the creators of the UN. Soon the ideological differences began to reveal themselves which would paralyze the UN system of collective security. The world had entered a new period, the Cold War, where either the United States or the Soviet Union would block each move that they perceived to be harmful to their ideological interests. The first test case which

helped the world to see that the collective security mechanism would not work in the future was the Korean War. At the beginning of the war the Security Council took the opportunity of utilizing Chapter VII of the UN Charter against the communist North Korea because of the absence of the Soviet delegate in the Council. Once the Soviets returned to their seat in the Security Council the Council was paralyzed with the veto. Thus, the only way to continue with the operation was through the Uniting for Peace Resolution which enabled the General Assembly to take responsibility if the Security Council was deadlocked by a veto. Unlike the Security Council the General Assembly could only *recommend* measures in cases that threatened international peace and security.

The first case of enforcement under the UN thus clearly indicated that no such action would be possible in the future as long as the ideological rivalry of the great powers would be the determining factor in international politics. Hence the UN, for forty years, could not resort to Chapter VII even though there were a number of cases which required enforcement action. From then on the UN had to resort to something different, something not envisioned in the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, that is, conducting peacekeeping operations.

The term peacekeeping was not mentioned in the UN Charter. Rather it was an innovative response to the deadlock in the Security Council. The first force level peacekeeping operation was established during the Suez crisis of 1956 in which the key principles of peacekeeping had been laid down. The innovation of peacekeeping

provided a valuable means for limiting superpower involvement in regional conflicts (with their consent) and coping with the threats to peace and security posed by the emergence of new states, border conflicts among those states, and intractable conflicts in the Middle East.[135] The peacekeepers operated on three basic principles namely the consent of the host state, impartiality of the UN peacekeeping force and non-use of force except in self-defense. Because no aggressor was singled out for blame the peacekeepers operated in a relatively peaceful environment. During the Cold War the tasks of peacekeepers were limited to containing regional conflicts so as to prevent a direct clash of superpowers. With the lack of the superpowers' political will to utilize the collective security mechanism peacekeeping served at least to stop conflicts in various parts of the world while not providing long lasting solutions to the underlying crises.

Towards the end of the 1980s, with the re-emergence of cooperation between the superpowers in the Security Council provided by the change of the Soviet foreign policy, the UN was able to establish a number of peacekeeping operations which proved to have a different nature than the ones established previously. With the acquiescence of the non-permanent members and new collaboration between the Security Council and the Secretary-General, UN peacekeepers chalked up a series of successes that led to the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.[136] Thus, as John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra argue,

> the end of the Cold War established new parameters and removed many political tensions that had limited the scope and application of peacekeeping. Although the national interests of the superpowers were still vigorously maintained, their destructive zero-sum game was abandoned in many theaters.[137]

The cooperation of the superpowers enabled the UN to tackle long lasting regional conflicts. Rather than only separating the belligerents the UN was also addressing the root causes of the underlying disputes in order to achieve long lasting solutions hence the most important obstacle to the proper functioning of the UN (ideological struggles of the superpowers) had been eliminated. Therefore the UN peacekeepers could acquire additional tasks with an emphasis on civilian components rather than the military ones. The additional tasks of the UN peacekeepers comprised election monitoring, verification of human rights, assisting in mine clearance, civilian police functions, physical disarming of armed insurgents. The environment in which the UN operated began to change as well. During the Cold War the UN usually dealt with inter-state conflicts, but now the emphasis was given on internal conflicts with the aim of putting an end to civil wars.

Between 1988 and 1991 the UN established five peacekeeping operations which were aimed at settling long lasting regional conflicts. The UN provided a face-saving way for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan while it was able to bring an end to the war between Iran and Iraq that had been lasting for ten years. Furthermore, the UN was able to bring independence to Namibia, which was administered by South Africa. Lastly, the UN established the UN Observer Group in Central America to help the five Central American states to implement the peace agreements that they had previously agreed upon. Through the implementation of the peace agreements the UN would be able to bring peace to the region that had been ruined by civil wars for almost a decade. For this purpose the UN established a mission

in Nicaragua to help that country for a peaceful transition through holding democratic elections. The UN also established a mission in El Salvador the purpose of which was to bring an end to the long lasting civil war and achieve national reconciliation in that country.

The first enforcement action after the Korean War was the Operation Desert Storm which had been undertaken to revert Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The UN successfully reverted Iraqi aggression within a relatively short time due to the absence of Cold War struggles in the Security Council. The operation, however, showed the UN's weakness in its operational structure because of the fact that it again had to rely on a group of states, as it did forty years ago in Korea, to enforce the decisions of the Security Council.

Hence peacekeeping, which started out as an innovation proved to be the most valuable conflict resolution tool for the UN during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War the UN could return to Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter for the resolution of conflicts. However, peacekeeping has proved so useful that UN had extended the scope of peacekeeping to cover peacemaking and peacebuilding with the acquisition of additional responsibilities. Rather than abandoning such a useful mechanism the UN should work towards improving peacekeeping to be able to eliminate the problems that it has been consistently facing due to its *ad hoc* nature.

ENDNOTES:

[1] United Nations Department of Public Information. *Basic Facts About the United Nations*, New York: Department of Public Information, 1989, p. 1.

[2] The UN Charter originally envisaged 6 non-permanent members for the UN Security Council. However, in 1965 this number was increased to 10 to reflect the rapid increase in UN membership after decolonization, *in* Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 25.

[3] Michael Howard, "The Historical Development of the UN's Role in International Security" *in* Adam Roberts, and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 65.

[4] Georges Abi-Saab, "United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of the Issues" *in* Daniel Warner, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 1.

[5] Stephen M. Hill and Shahin P. Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Cambridge: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1996, p. 17.

[6] Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 20.

[7] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 21.

[8] Edwin M. Smith and Michael G. Schechter, *The United Nations in A New World Order*, Monograph Series / The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies; no. 6, 1994, p. 3.

[9] Michael Howard *in* Roberts and Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 30.

[10] Jane Boulden, *Prometheus Unborn: The History of the Military Staff Committeee*, Canadian Center for Global Security, 1993, p. 1.

[11] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 25.

[12] Boulden, *Prometheus Unborn* (1993), p. 9.

[13] Boulden, *Prometheus Unborn* (1993), p. 9.

[14] A. B. Fetherston, *Towards A Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1994, p. 11.

[15] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 27.

[16] Michael Howard *in* Roberts and Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 67.

[17] Michael Howard, *in* Roberts and Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 67.

[18] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 27.

[19] These two missions are UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in 1948 and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established in 1949. The former's mandate was to supervise Israeli-Arab truces while the latter was responsible for monitoring India-Pakistan truce in Kashmir. These missions do not contain any military forces but military observers in order to observe cease-fires. Both peacekeeping missions are still active today.

[20] Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I" in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case studies and Comparative Analysis* New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993, p.109.

[21] Wendell Gordon, *The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform* Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p.45.

[22] Mona Ghali *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), 109.

[23] Mona Ghali *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 109.

[24] Georges Abi-Saab *in* Warner, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* (1995), p. 1.

[25] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 46.

[26] Mona Ghali *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 109.

[27] Mona Ghali *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 127.

[28] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 42.

[29] Mona Ghali *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 116.

[30] Fetherston, *Towards A Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (1994), p. 13.

[31] United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 176.

[32] Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping* (1994), p. 14.

[33] Weiss, et al., *Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 46.

[34] William J. Durch "The UN Operation in the Congo", *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*(1993), p. 316.

[35] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 175.

[36]William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), 316.

[37] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), pp. 317-318.

[38] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 176.

[39] Telegram dated 12 July 1960 from the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo to the Secretary General (UN Doc. S/4382 of 13 July 1960), *in* Robert C.R. Siekmann, *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-keeping Forces*, second enlarged edition, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 75.

[40] Under article 99 the Secretary-General is authorized to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

[41] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 326.

[42] First report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960 (UN Doc. D/4389 of 18 July 1960), paras. 7-15, *in* Siekmann *Basic Documents on United Nations* (1989), p. 76-77.

[43] Security Council document, S/RES/146 of 9 August 1960.

[44] Security Council document, S/RES/146 of 9 August 1960.

[45] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 321.

[46] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 182.

[47] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 321.

[48] The procedural votes cannot be vetoed by the permanent members of the Security Council.

[49] Anthony Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1994*, London: Clays Ltd., 1995, p. 85.

[50] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 323.

[51] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 321.

[52] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 321.

[53] Security Council Document, S/RES/161 of 21 February 1961.

[54] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 180.

[55] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 188.

[56] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 188.

[57] Security Council Document, S/RES/169 of 24 November 1961.

[58] Security Council Document, S/RES/169 of 24 November 1961.

[59] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 346.

[60] Indar Jit Rikhye "The United Operation in the Congo: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding" *in* Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 215-216.

[61] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 188.

[62] UN Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets* (1996), p. 188

[63] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 345.

[64] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 326.

[65] Security Council document, S/RES/143 of 14 July 1960.

[66] Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace* (1995), p. 87.

[67] Sally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring" *in* Roberts and Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 191.

[68] Sally Morphet *in United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 198.

[69] Article 17(2) of the UN Charter states that "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."

[70] William J. Durch *in* Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 329.

[71] William J. Durch *in* Durch ed., *Evolution in UN peacekeeping* (1993), p. 330.

[72] Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 20 July 1962; *in* Siekmann, *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces* (1989), p. 133.

[73] Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 9.

[74] Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 10.

[75] Shanin and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (1996), p. 15.

[76] Weiss et al., *The UN and Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 52.

[77] Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (1993), p. 9.

[78] Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 26-40.

[79] Marrack Goulding, "The Use of Force by the United Nations" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.1, (Spring 1996), pp. 1-18.

[80] Adam Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force" *Survival*, Vol.37, No.4, (Winter 1995-96), pp. 7-28.

[81] Georges Abi-Saab *in* Warner, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* (1995), p. 2.

[82] Georges Abi-Saab *in* Warner, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* (1995), p. 5.

[83] Cited *in*, Michael Howard *in* Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 78.

[84] Georges Abi-Saab *in* Warner, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* (1995), p. 6.

[85] Sally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring" *in* eds., Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), pp. 183-239.

[86] Weiss et. al., *The UN and Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 60.

[87] Weiss et. al., *The UN and Changing World Politics* (1994), p. 60.

[88] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (1996), p. 63.

[89] Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace* (1995), p. 112.

[90] Security Council document, S/RES/387of 31 March 1976.

[91] Security Council document, S/RES/626 of 20 December 1988.

[92] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (1996), p. 76.

[93] http://www.UN/org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavemi.htm

[94] Virginia Page Fortna, "Success and Failure in Southern Africa: Peacekeeping in Namibia and Angola"; *in* Daniel, and Hayes, eds. *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (1995), p. 252.

[95] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the UN* (1996), p. 66.

[96] http://www.UN/org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untag.htm

[97] Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 83.

[98] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the UN* (1996), p. 67.

[99] Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace* (1995), p. 156.

[100] Agostino Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996, p. 56.

[101] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the UN* (1996), p. 67.

[102] Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping* (1995), p.125.

[103] Sally Morphet, *in* Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 217.

[104] Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."

[105] Zacarias, *The UN and International Peacekeeping* (1996), p. 57.

[106] Mingst and Karns *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 84.

[107] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (1996), p. 68.

[108] Although this thesis covers period between 1950 and 1991, for the purpose of presenting a comprehensive study of ONUSAL the developments regarding this peacekeeping operation after 1991 are also included.

[109] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (1996), p. 72.

[110] http://www.UN.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onusal_b.htm

[111] http://www.UN.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onusal_b.htm

[112] http://www.UN.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onusal_b.htm

[113] Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (1996), p. 68.

[114] http://www.UN.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onusal_b.htm

[115] Mingst and Karns *The UN in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 88.

[116] Security Council document, S/RES/660 of 2 August 1990.

[117] Security Council document, S/RES/661, 6 August 1990.

[118] Security Council document, S/RES/662, 9 August 1990.

[119] David J. Whittaker, *United Nations in Action*, London: UCL Press Ltd., 1995, p. 91.

[120] Security Council document, S/RES/678 of 29 November 1990.

[121] Alan Dowty, "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order", *The Washington Quarterly* vol.17, no.3 (Summer 1994), pp. 179-198.

[122] The demilitarized zone extended ten kilometers into Iraq and five kilometers into Kuwait from the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq (S/RES/687 of 8 April 1991).

[123] http://www.UN.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unikom.htm

[124] http://www.UN.org/unscom/unscom.htm

[125] Mingst and Karns *The UN in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 88.

[126] Alan Dowty, "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order" *The Washington Quarterly* vol.17, no.3 (Summer 1994), pp. 179-198.

[127] Security Council document, S/RES/687 of 3 April 1991.

[128] Security Council document, S/RES/688 of 5 April 1991.

[129] Mingst and Karns *The UN in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 86.

[130] Gene M. Lyons "A New Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace", *The Washington Quarterly* 17:2 (Spring 1994), pp. 173-199.

[131] Bobby R. Inman, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William J. Perry, and Roger K. Smith "Lessons From the Gulf War", *The Washington Quarterly* 15:1 (Winter 1992), pp. 57-74.

[132] Whittaker, *United Nations in Action* (1995), p. 94.

[133] Brian Urquhart "Security After the Cold War", *in* Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (1993), p. 84.

[134] Mingst and Karns *The UN in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 88.

[135] Mingst and Karns, *The UN in the Post-Cold War Era* (1995), p. 80.

[136] John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping", *The Washington Quarterly*, 14:1 (Winter 1991), pp. 207-220.

[137] John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", *The Washington Quarterly*, 15:3 (Summer 1992), pp. 113-131.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles:

_____. *Basic Facts About the United Nations*, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1989.

_____. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York: United nations Department of Public Information, 1996.

Blodgett, John Q., "The Future of UN Peacekeeping", *The Washington Quarterly* 14:1 (Winter 1991).

Boulden, Jane, *Prometheus Unborn: The History of the Military Staff Committee*, Toronto: Canadian Center for Global Security, 1993.

Daniel, Donald C. F. and Hayes, Bradd C., eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Diehl, Paul F., *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Dowty, Alan, "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order", *The Washington Quarterly* 17:3 (Summer 1994).

Durch, William J., *The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1993.

Fetherston, A. B., *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1994.

Gordon, Wendell, *The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.

Goulding, Marrack, "The Use of Force by the united Nations" *International Peacekeeping* 3:1 (Spring 1996).

Hill, Stephen M. and Malik P., *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Cambridge: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1996.

Inman, Bobby R., Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Perry William J., and Smith, Roger K., "Lessons from the Gulf War", *The Washington Quarterly* 15:1 (Winter 1992).

Lyons, Gene M., "A New Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace", *The Washington Quarterly* 17:2 (Spring 1994).

Mackinlay, John and Chopra, Jarat, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", *The Washington Quarterly* 15:3 (Summer 1992).

Mingst, Karen A. and Karns, Margaret P., *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Parsons, Anthony, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1994*, London: Clays Ltd., 1995.

Ratner, Steven R., *The New UN Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict, eds., *United Nations, Divided World*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Roberts, Adam, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force", Survival 37:4 (Winter 1995-96).

Siekmann, Robert C. R., *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces*, second enlarged edition, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989.

Smith, Edwin M. and Schechter, *The United Nations in A New World Order*, California: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies / Monograph Series; no:6, 1994.

Warner, Daniel, ed., *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995.

Weiss, Thomas G., Forsythe, David P., and Coate, Roger A., eds., *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Whittaker, David J., *United Nations in Action*, London: UCL Press Ltd., 1995.

Zacarias, Agostino, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996.

Security Council Resolutions:

S/RES/143 of 14 July 1960.

S/RES/146 of 9 August 1960.

S/RES/161 of 21 February 1961.

S/RES/169 of 24 November 1961.

S/RES/387 of 31 March 1976.

S/RES/626 of 20 December 1988.

S/RES/660 of 2 August 1990.

S/RES/661 of 6 August 1990.

S/RES/662 of 9 August 1990.

S/RES/678 of 29 November 1990.

S/RES/687 of 3 April 1991.

S/RES/688 of 5 April 1991.

Sources from the Internet:

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavemi.htm

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untag.htm

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onusal_b.htm

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unikom.htm

http://www.un.org/unscom/unscom.htm