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See also **Captivity Narratives; Iran Hostage Crisis; Leopold-Loeb Case; Lindbergh Kidnapping Case; Slave Trade.**

"KILROY WAS HERE," possibly the most popular graffiti in military history, has uncertain origins. Folklore traces the saying to a World War II shipyard worker, James J. Kilroy, who inspected the bottoms of warships under construction, indicating his inspection with a chalk mark. However, this mark was susceptible to erasure, so Kilroy began the practice of scrawling "Kilroy was here" in crayon. Servicemen around the world saw the slogan on the ships, and word spread that "Kilroy" had been there first. They began placing the graffiti wherever U.S. forces landed. Kilroy thus became a symbol of reassurance for soldiers in threatening situations—a "Super G.I." who had always already been wherever the real soldier went.

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See also **World War II.**

"KING COTTON" was an expression much used by southern authors and orators before the Civil War. The idea appeared first as the title of a book, *Cotton Is King*, by David Christy in 1855. In a speech in the U.S. Senate on 4 March 1858, James H. Hammond declared, "You dare not make war upon cotton! No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is king." The phrase expressed the southern belief that cotton was so essential that those who controlled it might dictate the economic and political policies of the United States and of the world. Southern confidence in cotton's economic power contributed to the decision to establish the Confederacy in 1861. During the Civil War, however, northern industry proved far more decisive than southern agriculture in the war's outcome.

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See also **Commodity Exchanges; Cotton Gin; Inflation in the Confederacy; Lower South; Mason-Dixon Line.**

KING GEORGE'S WAR (1744–1748). Nominally at peace from 1713 to 1744, France and England conflicted over boundaries of Acadia in Canada and northern New England and over claims in the Ohio Valley. When the War of Jenkins's Ear (England's commercial war with Spain, 1739–1743) merged into the continental War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748), England and France declared war on each other. The French at Louisburg (Cape Breton Island) failed in an early attack in which they attempted to take Annapolis (Port Royal). In retaliation, New Englanders captured Louisburg and planned, with English aid, to attack Quebec and Montreal simultaneously. Seven colonies cooperated to raise forces in 1746, but the promised English aid did not arrive, and the colonials finally disbanded the next year.

Meanwhile, France sent a great fleet in June 1746 to recapture Louisburg and devastate English colonial seaports. However, assorted fiascoes—including storms, disease, and the death of the fleet's commander—frustrated the attempt. British squadrons defeated a second French fleet on the open sea in 1747. Gruesome raids along the New England–New York borders by both conflicting parties and their Indian allies characterized the remainder of the war, with no result except a temporary check on frontier settlement. Weary of futile and costly conflict, the warring parties signed the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1748, granting mutual restoration of conquests but leaving colonial territorial disputes unresolved.

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See also **Colonial Wars; Jenkins's Ear, War of; Ohio Valley.**

KING PHILIP'S WAR (1675–1676). White New Englanders who coveted farmland but needed help surviving in harsh conditions built uneasy partnerships with neighboring American Indians during the seventeenth century. By 1660, however, most Anglo-American communities had achieved economic and demographic stability, and white New Englanders who valued agriculture and fishing over the fur trade increasingly downplayed their economic partnership with Indians and justified seizures of Indian land. Conversely, many Indians suspected English motives, resisted English laws, and resented Puritan missionary efforts. When Massasoit died (1662), new Indian leaders rejected alliances with Anglo-Ameri-