

WHY DO POLITICAL PARTIES SPLIT?  
UNDERSTANDING PARTY SPLITS  
AND FORMATION OF SPLINTER PARTIES  
IN TURKEY

A PhD Dissertation

by  
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Ankara  
August 2014

*To Defne and Günay*

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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ANKARA

AUGUST 2014

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **WHY DO POLITICAL PARTIES SPLIT? UNDERSTANDING PARTY SPLITS AND FORMATION OF SPLINTER PARTIES IN TURKEY**

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The process of splinter party formation has been understudied. This is related with the difficulties in studying the intraparty realm of politics and the inability of the splinter parties to turn into successful competitors. Employing an actor-oriented approach, this study traces the reasons behind splits in mainstream parties and formation of splinter parties. It intends to develop a theoretical model for explaining party splits in Turkey. It is asserted that party split is one of the possible outcomes of the competition between the dissenting faction and the dominant faction supporting the party leader. This outcome is preceded by two stages: dissent, and intraparty conflict. Strategies developed by dissenting faction and the party leader's response are conditioned by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include the nature of disagreement, relative

power of competing factions across the different layers of party organization and leadership autonomy. Exogenous factors include the costs of forming a new party and the perceived viability for a new party. Splinter party is formed in case the dissident faction that departs from the parent organization chooses to invest on a new party rather than switching to an established party.

The model proposed in this dissertation is illustrated by a comparative analysis of five cases of party splits in Turkish party system since the transition to democracy in 1946. The political parties that are analyzed within the scope of this study include the Democrat Party, the Republican People's Party, the Justice Party, the True Path Party and the Democratic Left Party. The analysis reveals that endogenous factors are more influential over party splits compared to the exogenous factors. Moreover, in case the dissidents are unlikely to voice within the party platforms, they might simply resign without voice.

Key words: Party Split, Splinter Party Formation, Turkish Politics, Political Parties.

## **ÖZET**

### **SİYASİ PARTİLER NEDEN BÖLÜNÜR? TÜRKİYE’DE PARTİ BÖLÜNMELEİNİN VE BÖLÜNEREK OLUŞAN PARTİLERİNİ ANLAMAK**

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Aralık 2013

Parti bölünmeleri ve bölünerek oluşan partiler üzerine fazla çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Bu durum parti içi dinamikleri çalışmanın zorluğundan ve bölünerek oluşan partilerin çoğunlukla tercih edilir partilere dönüşmemiş olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma aktör odaklı bir yaklaşım izleyerek ana partilerde bölünmelerin ve bölünerek parti oluşumlarının altında yatan sebeplere değinmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle Türkiye’de yaşanmış parti bölünmelerini açıklamaya yönelik teorik bir model ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmada temel olarak parti bölünmesinin lideri destekleyen hizip ile muhalif hizip arasındaki çatışmada izlenebilecek yollardan birisi olduğu ortaya koyulmaktadır. Bu yolun tercih edilmesi üç aşamalı bir süreç sonunda gerçekleşmektedir: rahatsızlık, parti içi çatışma ve ayrılık. Muhalif hizip ve parti lideri tarafından tercih edilen stratejiler

parti ii ve parti dıřı faktrler tarafından belirlenmektedir. Parti ii faktrler anlařmazlıęın nitelięi, atıřan hiziplerin partinin deęiřik katmanlarındaki gc ve lider otonomisinden oluřmakta iken parti dıřı faktrler ise yeni parti kurma maliyeti ve yeni partiye olan ihtiya algısından oluřmaktadır.

Yazar tarafından sunulan model 1946'da demokrasiye geiřten bu yana yařanmıř beř rnek olay zerinde karřılařtırılmalı olarak uygulanmıřtır. alıřma kapsamında incelenen partiler Demokrat Parti, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Adalet Partisi, Doęru Yol Partisi ve Demokratik Sol Partiden oluřmaktadır. Parti dıřı faktrlerin zaman iinde deęiřmiř olmasından kaynaklı olarak incelenen zaman dilimi  paraya blnmřtr. Bahsi geen parti blnmelerinin incelenmesi sonucunda parti ii faktrlerin parti dıřı faktrlere kıyasla parti blnmelerinde daha belirleyici olduęu bulunmuřtur. Ayrıca muhalif hizbe mensup yelerin parti iinde rahatsızlıklarını dile getirme imkânı olmadıęı durumlarda partiden direk ayrılmayı tercih ettikleri gzlemlenmiřtir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Parti Blnmeleri, Blnerek Oluřan Partiler, Trk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasi Partiler



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	ix
LIST OF TABLES .....	xiv
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xvi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1.    Defining the Research Subject and Problems .....	8
1.1.    Justification .....	14
1.2.    Methods and Data Collection.....	16
1.3.    Tentative Arguments and Findings .....	19
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW .....	21
2.1.    Approaches to the Study of Splinter Parties .....	24
2.1.1.    Sociological Approach and Theory of Structural Change .....	26
2.1.1.1.    Bringing the Political Back.....	29
2.1.2.    Institutional Approach and Institutional Factors.....	32

2.1.2.1.	Formation Costs .....	33
2.1.2.2.	Public Funding and Media Access .....	34
2.1.2.3.	Electoral system and Disproportionality.....	36
2.1.2.4.	Candidate Selection: Nomination and Ballot Structure .....	42
2.1.2.5.	Type of Government: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism.....	45
2.1.2.6.	Locus of Discretionary Control over Resources.....	48
2.1.3.	Rational Choice Perspective and Party Building .....	51
2.1.3.1.	Opportunity Structure .....	52
2.1.3.2.	Retrospective Voting .....	53
2.1.3.3.	Party System Institutionalization and Splinter Party Entrance .....	55
2.2.	Conclusion .....	59
CHAPTER III: A MODEL OF SPLINTER PARTY FORMATION.....		61
3.1.	Defining Political Parties .....	62
3.2.	Defining Factions .....	68
3.3.	Stages of Splinter Party Formation .....	71
3.3.1.	Dissent.....	72
3.3.1.1.	Rise of New Demands and Pressures for Party Change .....	73
3.3.1.2.	Conflict over Formation of Coalitions.....	77
3.3.1.3.	Conflicts over Selective Benefits and Leadership Succession Crisis	79
3.3.2.	Intraparty Conflict: Voice or Exit .....	81
3.3.3.	Factors influencing the Outcomes.....	86
3.3.3.1.	Endogenous Factors .....	87
3.3.3.2.	Exogenous Factors .....	93
3.3.4.	Departure: Splinter Party Formation versus Infiltration .....	97
3.4.	Conclusion .....	101
CHAPTER IV: PARTY SPLITS AND SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE 1950s ..		103
4.1.	Reasons of Dissent .....	106
4.2.	Intraparty Conflict.....	111

4.2.1.	Exogenous Facilitators of the Split in the DP .....	116
4.2.1.1.	Entry Costs.....	117
4.2.1.2.	Viability of New Parties .....	121
4.2.2.	Endogenous Facilitators of the Split in the DP .....	122
4.2.2.1.	The Nature of Disagreement.....	122
4.2.2.2.	Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization .....	124
4.2.2.3.	Leadership Autonomy.....	126
4.3.	Formation of the HP.....	127
4.4.	Conclusions .....	128
CHAPTER V: PARTY SPLITS AND SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE 1960s ...		130
5.1.	Exogenous Factors of Party Splits in the 1960s.....	132
5.1.1.	Entry Costs .....	133
5.1.2.	Viability of New Parties.....	138
5.2.	Intraparty Conflict over Party Change: Split in the CHP and Formation of the Reliance Party, 1967 .....	144
5.2.1.	Dissent.....	145
5.2.2.	Intraparty Conflict.....	150
5.2.3.	Endogenous Factors of Party Split.....	156
5.2.3.1.	The Nature of Disagreement.....	156
5.2.3.2.	Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization .....	158
5.2.3.3.	Leadership Autonomy.....	159
5.2.4.	Departure: Formation of the Reliance Party .....	160
5.3.	Conflict over Distribution of Selective Benefits: Split within the Justice Party and Formation of the Democratic Party, 1970.....	161
5.3.1.	Dissent.....	162
5.3.2.	Intraparty Conflict.....	166
5.3.3.	Endogenous Facilitators of Party Split.....	170

5.3.3.1.	The Nature of Disagreement.....	171
5.3.3.2.	Relative Power of Each Faction within Different Faces of Party Organization.....	175
5.3.3.3.	Leadership Autonomy.....	176
5.3.4.	Departure: Formation of the Democratic Party.....	177
5.4.	Conclusions .....	177
CHAPTER VI: PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION AND PARTY SPLITS IN THE 1990s .....		180
6.1.	Exogenous Factors of Party Splits .....	186
6.1.1.	Entry Costs .....	188
6.1.2.	Viability of New and Established Parties.....	192
6.2.	Fragmenting the Center-Right to Unite the Center-Right: Split within the True Path Party and Formation of the Democrat Turkey Party, 1997 .....	198
6.2.1.	Dissent.....	201
6.2.1.1.	Exclusion of the Old Guard from the Selective Benefits.....	202
6.2.1.2.	Coalition Formation Attempts and Demands for the Merge of Center Right .....	204
6.2.2.	Intraparty Conflict.....	207
6.2.3.	Endogenous Factors of Party Split.....	209
6.2.3.1.	The Nature of Disagreement.....	210
6.2.3.2.	Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization .....	212
6.2.3.3.	Leadership Autonomy.....	213
6.2.4.	Departure: Conflict among the Dissidents and Formation of the Democratic Turkey Party .....	214
6.3.	Exit without Voice: Breakdown of the Democratic Left Party and Formation of the New Turkey Party, 2002. ....	216
6.3.1.	Dissent.....	219
6.3.1.1.	The Rahşan Ecevit Factor .....	219
6.3.1.2.	Leadership Succession Crisis.....	220
6.3.1.3.	Decreasing Value of the Party's Brand Name: The 1999	

Earthquake and the 2001 Economic Crisis .....	223
6.3.2. Departure: Exit without Voice .....	223
6.3.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split.....	226
6.3.3.1. The Nature of Disagreement.....	227
6.3.3.2. Relative Power of Competing Faction across Different Layers of Party Organization .....	228
6.3.3.3. Leadership Autonomy.....	231
6.4. Conclusion .....	232
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS .....	234
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	243

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Splinter Parties Represented in the Turkish Parliament (1946-2011) .....	2
Table 2: Host Party Status and Party Splits .....	5
Table 3: Host Parties, Splinter Parties and Elections (1946-2011).....	6
Table 4: The Analytical Framework for Measurement of Party ‘Newness’ .....	9
Table 5: Ways to Voice Dissent.....	83
Table 6: Factors influencing the Competing Factions’ Strategies .....	87
Table 7: Chronology of Events (1955) .....	114
Table 8: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and the RRP Index (1950-1957) ...	120
Table 9: Electoral System for the National Assembly in the Second Republic..	135
Table 10: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and RRP Index, (1961-1977) .....	137
Table 11: Chronology of Events (1965-1967) .....	151
Table 12: Chronology of Events (1969-1970) .....	168
Table 13: Successors, Genuinely New Parties and Mergers in the 1980s .....	181



Table 14: Splits, Mergers, Genuinely New, Splinter and Successor Parties (1990-2002) .....	183
Table 15: Mergers, Splits and Genuinely New Parties after the 2002 Elections	185
Table 16: Electoral System (1983-2002) .....	190
Table 17: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and the RRP Index (1983-2011) .	191
Table 18: Indicators of the Viability of the New and the Established Parties (1983-2011) .....	193
Table 19: Chronology of Events (1995-1996) .....	208
Table 20: Chronology of Events (2002) .....	225

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Three Faces of Party Organization .....	64
Figure 2: Stages of Splinter Party Formation.....	71
Figure 3: Potential Reasons of Dissent .....	73
Figure 4: Rise of New Demands, Electoral Defeat and Intraparty Conflict .....	76
Figure 5: Potential Responses of the Party Leadership.....	85
Figure 6: Leader Selectorate and Leadership Autonomy.....	92
Figure 7: Analytical Narrative of Split within the DP .....	105
Figure 8: Economic Indicators (1950-1956) .....	110
Figure 9: Indicators of the Viabilities of New Parties (1950-1957).....	121
Figure 10: Indicators of Viability of New and Established Parties (1961-1977)	139
Figure 11: Economic Indicators (1962-1980) .....	143
Figure 12: Analytical Narrative of the Split within the CHP.....	145
Figure 13: Electoral Performance of the CHP (1950-1977) .....	147
Figure 14: Analytical Narrative of Split within the AP .....	161

Figure 15: Economic Indicators (1981-2002).....	195
Figure 16: Analytical Narrative of Split within the DYP .....	200
Figure 17: Analytical Narrative of the Breakdown of the DSP .....	218

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Turkish political history has been populated with the frequent emergence of new parties. Since the 1946 elections, various splinter and genuinely new parties have emerged to compete with the established parties for winning office. When they were outlawed, established parties were re-organized under new party labels or genuinely new parties were formed to compete for the votes of the outlawed parties; conversely established parties merged under new party labels in order to enhance their competitiveness. Finally, conflicts within host parties resulted in the entrance of splinter parties as new competitors.

A brief review of Turkish history reveals that legislators elected from the list of the established parties switched to newly formed splinter parties nearly in every legislative term (Table 1). From 1946 to 1960, all new parties that gained representation in the assembly were splinter parties. Indeed, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP), the ruling party from 1950 until 1960, had split from the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP). During the 1950s, the

DP gave birth to three splinter parties, the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*-MP), the Peasants' Party (*Köylü Partisi*-KP) and the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*-HP).

**Table 1: Splinter Parties Represented in the Turkish Parliament (1946-2011)**

Legislative Term	Splinter Party	Split from	Date of Formation	Seats Held
1943-1946	DP	CHP	1946	4
1946-1950	MP (1)	DP	1948	19
1950-1954	KP	DP	1952	6
1954-1957	HP	DP	1955	36
1961-1965	MP (2)	CKMP	1962	14
1965-1969	GP	CHP	1967	32
1969-1973	DkP	AP	1970	38
1969-1973	CP	CHP	1972	12
1987-1991	HEP	SHP	1990	12
1987-1991	SBP	SHP	1991	4
1991-1995	YP	ANAP	1993	6
1991-1995	BBP	MHP	1993	5
1991-1995	YDH	SHP	1994	3
1995-1999	DTP	DYP	1997	33
1995-1999	DEPAR	DSP	1998	1
1999-2002	AKP	FP	2001	60
1999-2002	YTP (2)	DSP	2002	65
2007-2011	TP	AKP	2009	1

Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007); TBMM (2010); TÜİK (2008). Numbers in parentheses are used to distinguish two parties with the same party labels. Splinter parties that were not represented in the parliament are excluded.

The 1960 intervention changed the dynamics of party system development. Local branches of the outlawed DP united around the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP) whereas some of the former DP deputies formed the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*-YTP). Conflicts in the Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*-CKMP) led the former MP leader to re-establish the MP (2). After the infiltration of radical officers to the CKMP, the party adopted a more nationalist stance and changed its name to Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP). Starting with the second half of the 1960s, the CHP gave birth to two splinter parties, the Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*-GP) and the Republican Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Parti*-CP), and these two parties merged under the banner of the Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*-CGP) in

1973. Finally, conflict in the ruling AP ended up with the formation of the Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti-DkP*). From the 1973 election until the 1980 military intervention, no parties were prone to split despite the prevalence of a permissive institutional design and party authoritarianism both of which are commonly cited as reasons behind party splits.

The military, which conducted another intervention in 1980, completely changed the dynamics of party system development through the measures it enacted, including, the purge of political parties and their leadership, ban on party switching and veto over successors of the outlawed parties. Following the permission of political activities in 1983, the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi-ANAP*), the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi-MDP*) and the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti-HP*) arose as the genuinely new parties that the military permitted to run in the initial elections. During the same period, outlawed parties were re-established under different names. These successor parties included the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP*), the Conservative Party (*Muhafazakâr Parti*) and the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi-RP*). Additionally, some of the members of the outlawed CHP formed the Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi-SODEP*) whereas the former leader of the CHP formed the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP*) as a genuinely new party. Within a short time, the HP and the SODEP merged under the banner of the Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-SHP*). The return of the purged politicians with the constitutional referendum in 1987 and the removal of the ban over outlawed parties in 1992 further fragmented the party system. After

the repeal of the ban, the CHP was re-established in 1992 by the dissident members of the SHP.

By the 1990s, political parties on all sides of the political spectrum were prone to divisions. Some of the members of the SHP switched to the Socialist Unity Party (*Sosyalist Birlik Partisi*-SBP), the New Democracy Movement (*Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi*-YDH) and the pro-Kurdish People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*-HEP). Following the death of the President and former ANAP chair Turgut Özal, his brother Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, formed the New Party (*Yeni Parti*-YP). Conflict in the MHP on the issue of secularism paved the way for the formation of the Great Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*-BBP).

The rise of political Islam as an important political actor and the so-called '28 February Process' facilitated party splits and merges. After the 1994 local elections, the SHP merged with the CHP in order to maintain unity on the left against the rising political Islam. Intra-party conflict due to the DYP chair's decision to form a coalition with the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-RP) ended up with the formation of the Democrat Turkey Party (*Demokrat Türkiye Partisi*-DTP) in 1997. The DSP also faced splits; in addition to the Changing Turkey Party (*Değişen Türkiye Partisi*-DEPAR), conflict over leadership succession resulted in the formation of the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*-YTP). Finally, following the dissolution of the Virtue Party, (*Fazilet Partisi*-FP), conflict within the National View Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*) ended up with the formation of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP) in 2002. Since then, party fissions have been replaced with party fusions, with the minor exception of the formation of the Turkey Parti (*Türkiye Partisi*-TP)

by a former minister to the AK Parti government. During this period, the ANAP merged into the DYP whose name changed to the Democrat Party (3), and the YTP (2) merged into the CHP. On the other hand, the DTP, which changed its name to Freedom and Change Party (*Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi*-HÜR PARTİ), merged with the People's Ascendancy Party (*Halkın Yükselişi Partisi*-HYP).

**Table 2: Host Party Status and Party Splits**

Host Party	Splinter Party	Year of Split	Host Party Status	Votes in Previous Elections (%)
CHP	DP	1946	Governing	-
DP	MP (1)	1948	Major opposition	-
DP	KP	1952	Governing	55.2
DP	HP	1955	Governing	58.4
CKMP	MP (2)	1962	Opposition	14.0
CHP	GP	1967	Major opposition	28.7
AP	DkP	1970	Governing	46.6
CHP	CP	1972	Coalition Partner	27.4
SHP	HEP	1990	Major Opposition	24.8
SHP	SBP	1991	Major Opposition	24.8
ANAP	YP	1993	Major Opposition	24.0
MHP	BBP	1993	Opposition	-
SHP	YDH	1994	Coalition Partner	20.8
DYP	DTP	1997	Coalition Partner	19.2
DSP	DEPAR	1998	Opposition	14.6
FP/SP	AKP	2001	Major Opposition	15.4
DSP	YTP (2)	2002	Formateur partner	22.2
AKP	TP	2009	Governing	46.6

Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007); TBMM (2010). Numbers in parentheses are used to differentiate different parties with the same names.

Party splits are expected to be occur when the parent organization is in opposition. This is due to high costs of being out of government under a highly centralized administrative structure that allocates vast amounts of resources to be distributed to the clients in the hands of the government (Danielson and Keleş 1980; Özbudun 1988, 40). However, Table 2 reveals that the governing parties were also prone to split. The KP, HP, DkP, CP, YDH, DTP, YTP (2) and the TP constitute



examples of splinter parties that were formed during the time when the parent organizations were in government. An interesting fact is that the HP, SBP, HEP, YDH, YTP (2) and the TP were founded even though their parent organizations had received the highest votes in their histories in previous elections.

**Table 3: Host Parties, Splinter Parties and Elections (1946-2011)**

Host Party	Splinter Party	First Elections	Votes (%)		Seats	
			Host	Splinter	Host	Splinter
CHP	DP	1946	-	-	397	61
DP	MP	1950	55.2	4.6	416	1
DP	KP	1954	58.4	0.6	503	0
DP	HP	1957	48.6	3.5	424	4
CKMP	MP (2)	1965	2.2	6.3	11	31
CHP	GP	1969	27.4	6.6	143	15
CHP	CP <sup>1</sup>	1973	33.3	5.3	185	13
AP	DkP	1973	29.8	11.9	149	45
SHP	HEP <sup>2</sup>	1991	24.8	-	88	18
ANAP	YeniP	1995	19.6	0.1	132	0
SHP	SBP <sup>3</sup>	1991	20.8	-	88	-
SHP (CHP) <sup>4</sup>	YDH	1995	10.7	0.5	49	0
MHP	BBP <sup>5</sup>	1995	8.2	-	0	8
DYP	DTP	1999	12.0	0.6	85	0
DSP	DEPAR	1999	22.2	0.1	136	0
FP/SP	AKP	2002	2.5	34.3	0	363
DSP	YTP (2)	2002	1.2%	1.2%	0	0
AKP	TP <sup>6</sup>	(2011)	49.8	-	327	-

Source: Compiled by the author from TBMM (2010); TÜİK (2008). Numbers in parentheses are used to differentiate different parties with the same names. First elections refer to the first general elections in which a splinter party participated.

1. CP merged with the GP before the 1973 elections.
2. HEP formed electoral coalition with the SHP in 1991 elections.
3. SBP did not participate in any general elections. It received 0.3% of the votes in 1994 local elections.
4. SHP merged with the CHP before 1995 elections.
5. BBP formed electoral coalition with ANAP in 1995 elections.
6. TP did not participate in the 2011 elections but TP leader Abdüllatif Şener ran as independent candidate from Sivas.

Table 3 shows that the splinter parties were mostly unsuccessful in achieving electoral support. It was only the MP (2) and the AKP that could receive more votes than the host party. The others have been defeated in consecutive elections, or they have merged with other splinter parties or other established parties. Among the splinter parties, only the DP and the AKP won a majority.

Probably, due to this, much attention has been paid to the DP and the AKP. Others have been studied as a part of the history of the host parties or they have been studied in relation to intraparty democracy in host parties<sup>1</sup>. A few numbers of studies focusing on single cases of splinter parties have not brought a comprehensive analysis of the reasons behind the party splits<sup>2</sup>. The formation of splinter parties despite the low levels of electoral support, especially in the 1990s, remains a puzzle to be solved.

Neither splinter parties nor the underdevelopment of the literature on these parties are unique to Turkey<sup>3</sup>. Although there has been a growing concern with the issues of intraparty democracy, factionalism, legislative party switching, party cohesion and new party formation, comparative studies specifically focusing on splinter party formation are few. With the exception of Mair (1990) and Ceron (2011), studies on party splits have focused on explaining single cases<sup>4</sup>.

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1 For more on intraparty democracy within Turkish parties and party authoritarianism, see Anadolu Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı (1997); Ankara Barosu (2006); Bektaş (1993); Bosuter (1969); Çancı (2001); Çarkoğlu et al. (2000); Kabasakal (1991); Özbudun (1968); Perinçek (1968); TESEV (1995); Tuncay (1996); Yanık (2002). For factionalism within Turkish parties, see Türsan (1995). For party switching in the Turkish Assembly, see Duran and Aksu (2009); Turan, İba, and Zarakol (2005); Turan (1985).

2 For studies on individual splinter parties in Turkey, see Bozkır (2007); Çakmak (2008); Dağcı (2005); Özçetin (2004); Pancaroğlu (2006).

3 Harmel and Robertson (1985, 509) found 85 splits in Anglo-American and Western European countries from 1960 to 1980. Mair (1990, 133) found 34 splits in Western countries (excluding France, Greece, Spain and Portugal) between 1945 and 1987. Hug (2001, 83) states that 130 splinter parties competed in elections in 22 Western democracies between the period of 1950 and 1990. Ceron (2011, 201) notes 29 instances of party fissions in Italy between 1946 and 2009.

4 For the studies on individual party splits, see Charney (1984); Cole (1989); Fell (2006); Katrak (1961); Nuvunga and Adalima (2011); Sharma (1976).

Additionally, the splinter parties have been studied together with the genuinely new parties in the literature on the new party formation. However, the literature on the new party formation does not take the differences between genuinely new parties and splinter parties into consideration. That is, they remain silent on intraparty conflicts but mostly focus on factors exogenous to the host party where the conflict occurred. Hence, a detailed examination of the splinter party formation has remained absent.

### **1.1. Defining the Research Subject and Problems**

This study deals with a particular type of new party, the splinter party. The definition of a splinter party first requires a definition of the political party. Whilst we acknowledge the variety of definitions of political parties, we define political parties as any political organization seeking to elect governmental officeholders under a given label (which may or may not be on the ballot) (Epstein 1993, 9)<sup>5</sup>. This definition enables us to differentiate political parties from not only factions but also interest groups, political movements and political associations (Sartori 2005, 54). Additionally, this definition draws our attention to the registration process, which might bear an important cost for new party formation.

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<sup>5</sup> For more on the definition of political parties, see Graham (1993, 3–16); Maor (1997, 3–14); Sartori (2005, 3–12); Ware (1996, 1–6).

The definition of a splinter party secondly requires a definition of the new party. Acknowledging that newness of a phenomenon varies in extent and nature, Barnea and Rahat (2010) state eight criteria used in the literature to assess the newness of a party (Table 4). Among them, the seven criteria are non-dichotomous whereas the formal status is the only dichotomous criterion. This study adopts the criterion of formal status to assess the newness of a party and takes political organizations registered as a political party for the first time as a new party. Unlike other criteria, the formal status is practically dichotomous and operationally straightforward (Barnea and Rahat 2010, 5); this helps us to distinguish new parties that adopt labels of the former parties from the old parties. However, this constitutes a problem, especially in Turkey where new parties adopt the names of outlawed parties with the aim of signaling to the voters that the new party inherits the legacy of the old party.

**Table 4: The Analytical Framework for Measurement of Party ‘Newness’**

<b>Criterion</b>	<b>Operational Definition</b>
Party Label	Is the name genuinely new or does it contain an old party name?
Ideology	How different is the new party platform from the old party/ies platform/s?
Voters	How different is the ‘new’ party electoral base from the old one
Formal/Legal Status	Is the party registered as new?
Institutions	Were the party institutions separated and differentiated from those of the old party/ies?
Activists	Does the ‘new’ party have activists or did they immigrate to it from the old party/ies?
Representativeness	Ate the top candidates new (non-incumbents)? Did most or all of them come from a single party?
Policies	How different are the ‘new’ party’s policies from the old party/ies’ policies?

Source: Barnea and Rahat (2010, 4).

As Barnea and Rahat (2010, 7–8) state, the adjective ‘new’ might be defined either in chronological terms (as something that has recently come into existence),

or, in relative terms (as being other than the former). Scholars defining new parties in relative terms categorize them according to the novelty of the issues that they represent. ‘Protest parties’ (Powel, 1982, cited in Harmel and Robertson 1985, 518); ‘prolocutor’ (Lucardie 2000) or the ‘promoter’ parties (Harmel and Robertson 1985, 517) which refer to parties that were formed to represent new issues and have been categorized into subcategories of ‘left-libertarian’ (Kitschelt 1988), ‘Green’ (Deschouwer 2004), ‘new right’ (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987) or ‘extreme right-wing’ parties (Ignazi 1992). On the other hand, scholars defining the new party in chronological terms focus on their origins. Based on the origins, parties have been classified into ‘mergers’, ‘splits’ (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 257; Mair 1990), ‘start-up parties’ (Heller and Mershon 2009, 8), ‘electoral coalitions’ and ‘genuinely new’ parties (Harmel 1985; Hug 2001; Tavits 2006).

This study defines newness in chronological terms and classifies new parties based on their origins. Similar to Hug (2001, 79) and Tavits (2006, 106), it omits the party mergers and electoral coalitions from the scope of analysis since they are, in fact, a reorganization of the established parties to enhance their competitiveness within the electoral market (Bolin 2007, 8). Following Hug (2001, 14) this study positions a new party as “a genuinely new organization that appoints, for the first time, candidates at a general election to the system’s representative assembly”. Employing this definition leads us to exclude parties that were officially recognized but did not participate in elections. The advantage of defining a new party based on appearing on the ballot is that it expands the universe of cases and may provide generalizable theories of new party formation.

This study defines splinter parties as a new party that has been formed by dissident faction or factions of an existing political party. Acknowledging the variety of definitions and typologies of factions, it underlines the importance of the fact that factionalism is a dynamic process (Boucek 2009) and defines factions as “any intraparty combination, clique or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively –as a distinct block within the party – to achieve their goals” (Zariski 1960, 33). Although factionalism is a prerequisite for a party split and the splinter party formation, not all factionalized parties split.

Finally, this dissertation defines party split as a multi-staged process of intra-party conflict within an established party, which ends with the exit of dissenting faction, usually to join their own parties.

Keeping this in mind, this research aims to provide an insight into both intraparty dynamics and the exogenous factors that influence the decision of a dissident faction within an established party to form a splinter party. Specifically, we attempt to provide an answer to the questions of “what are the factors that lead dissenting factions to invest their resources in splinter parties?” The answer to this question is closely related with the answers to following questions:

1. Why does intraparty conflict occur?
2. What are the strategies employed by dissidents and established party leadership?
3. Why do the resigned dissenting party members form a new party?

Whilst defining the splinter parties and selecting the cases to be analyzed in this work, we are faced with three problems. Firstly, in certain cases, splinter parties resemble fresh start-up parties in the sense that deputies from more than one party might switch to a new party in both types of new parties. However, unlike the fresh start-up parties, splinter parties occur mostly after a series of intra-party conflicts.

The second problem in studying the splinter parties in the post-1980 Turkey is the constitutional article banning party switching. The 84<sup>th</sup> article of the 1982 constitution called for the expulsion of party changers from the parliament and stipulated that such persons could not be designated as a candidate by another party during the elections immediately following the term during which they changed their party (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 8). Until the removal of the restriction in 1995, deputies that demanded a switch to other parties circumvented the constitutional provision in two ways. Firstly they formed ‘pretend marriage parties’ (*Hülle Partileri*) that decided to merge with a political party to which the deputies wanted to move in the first instance. Secondly, pretend marriage or established parties dissolved themselves so that deputies that became independent could freely join the other parties (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 8)<sup>6</sup>. Although pretend marriage parties resemble party splits, the criterion of appearance on the ballot helps us to

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6 Gençer (2004) found 22 pretend marriage parties until the constitutional amendment in 1995.

distinguish these parties from splinter parties. Since none of the pretend parties have contested national elections, they are eliminated from the scope of our research.

The third problem in defining splinter parties in Turkey is created by the dissolution of the political parties by military governments or constitutional courts. As in most new democracies, the distinction between the established and new parties in Turkey is blurred due to the fact that parties are short-lived, party switching is frequent and the number of new participants is high (Bolin 2007, 7). The picture is further complicated by the interruption of the natural evolution of the electoral market by military interventions and frequent closure of political parties, especially after the 1980 military intervention. Barnea and Rahat (2010, 4) suggest that new parties can be distinguished from the established ones according to the newness of their representatives. However, ban on leadership and deputies of the outlawed parties disable us to use this criterion. Given the fact that democratic regime was interrupted in nearly every decade, we define parties that have participated in at least two consecutive elections as established parties. On the other hand, given the fact that political parties and their leaders have been outlawed, we consider parties formed by the caretakers as continuation of established parties. Finally, as stated before, we omit parties that have merged with other parties or that have changed their names since they are reorganization of the established parties.

For narrowing the cases, we adopt Sartori's criteria of relevance (Sartori 2005, 108). Accordingly, relevant splinter parties are those that have coalition potential or blackmail potential. Splinter parties that have had coalition potential after they split from the established parties are the MP (2), CGP, DkP, DTP, AKP



and YTP (2)<sup>7</sup>. On the other hand, the splinter parties who had altered the direction of competition were the HEP and the AKP. However, this study focuses on the splits in mainstream parties so that it excludes the HEP and the AKP from the scope of analysis. On the other hand, although the criterion of relevance leaves the HP out of scope of analysis, this study finds the analysis of the HP valuable due to two reasons. Firstly, the HP became the major opposition party, albeit for a limited period (Özçetin 2004, 89). Secondly, and more importantly, the party was born into an institutional context that was the least favorable for new party entrance. Hence, including the HP into the scope of analysis enables us to evaluate the influence of different institutional contexts over party splits. As such, this work deals with the breakdown of the DP, CHP, AP, DYP and the DSP which ended with the formation of the HP, GP, DkP, DTP and YTP respectively.

### **1.1.Justification**

Whether political parties are worth to be studied is a point of debate in the political party literature. Cynicism about politicians and political parties, decreasing level of affiliation with political parties, declining political party membership, the challenge posed by interest groups for the articulation of interests, the rise of new middle class voters with predominantly post-materialist values, and technological

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7 The name of the GP was changed to the CGP after its merge with the CP. Although the party did not have coalition potential on the day it was formed, it turned to be a relevant party during the 12 March period and after the 1973 elections.

developments have led some scholars to conclude that ‘the golden age of party literature may now have passed’ (Daalder 2001; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Montero and Gunther 2001). Nevertheless, political parties matter. As Schattschneider (1942; cited in Montero and Gunther 2001, 3) stated long ago, “Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties”. In the words of Mair (1997, 90) “the old parties which were around well before Rokkan elaborated his freezing propositions are still around today, and, despite the challenges from new parties, and new social movements, most of them still remain in powerful, dominant positions”. The situation is not different in Turkey. Although voters are highly skeptical of politicians and political parties and although mass membership does not prevail with some exceptions, Turkish politics is characterized as party politics (Frey 1965, 301; Özbudun 2000, 81). Both the 1961 (Article 56) and 1982 constitutions (Article 68) regarded political parties, whether in power or in opposition, as indispensable elements of political life. In this sense, political parties are important for the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

Although splinter parties have not turned into viable electoral competitors in Turkey, they are worth studying due to two reasons. Firstly, participation of the splinter parties in the electoral competition influences the terms of competition even though they might not evolve into significant political actors (Hug 2001, 1). For example, together with the MSP, the rise of the DkP fragmented the votes of the center right in the 1973 elections (Özbudun and Tachau 1975, 475) and paved the way for the change of the party system from predominant to moderate multipartysim (Sayarı 1978, 46–47) or limited pluralism (Özbudun 1981, 231).

Secondly, splinter parties, as examples of new parties have important consequences for the consolidation of democracy, especially in new democracies. The influence of factionalism on party performance contributes to the legitimization or delegitimation of democratic institutions and practices (Türsan 1995, 170). A frequent increase in the number of parties because of party splits hinders the development of stable political identities and leads to electoral volatility. In return, parties are less likely to develop long-term policy commitments and are less accountable to voters. On the other hand, since dissident deputies who switch to splinter parties are not answerable to their voters, the principle of accountability is undermined (Janda 2007, 5). The decrease in the quality of representation and the predictability of parties challenges the stable development of a polity, which in turn hinders the consolidation of democracy (Tavits 2007, 113).

## **1.2.Methods and Data Collection**

This study is a single country case study that encompasses several splits, which occurred under different social and institutional settings in Turkey. This diachronic analysis (Gerring 2007, 27) starts with the introduction of multiparty regime in 1946 and ends in 2002. Since the military interventions in 1960 and 1980 have altered the institutional structure, the chapters are divided into three time periods in order to keep institutional factors constant. The first period starts with the 1950 elections and ends with the 1960 military intervention. The second period starts with the introduction of a new constitution and a new electoral law in 1961 and ends with the 1980 military intervention. The final period starts in 1983 and ends with the 2002 elections. In this sense, the study uses Mill's most different

system design for case selection. Since no significant party splits occurred after the 2002 elections, the post-2002 period is excluded from the scope of analysis. Hence, this case study consists of five observations. These observations include the splits within the Democrat Party (1955), Republican People's Party (1967), Justice Party (1970), True Path Party (1997) and Democratic Left Party (2002).

The advantage of conducting case study is that it can help us to shed light into a large class of cases (Gerring 2007, 20). Case study research provides an explanation for the emergence of the new parties and allows the researcher to "peer into the box of causality to locate causal mechanisms between some structural case and its purported effect" (Lago and Martinez 2011, 9). Besides, case studies are fruitful for the analysis of 'the political' in a more comprehensive way than 'the few variables many cases' approach (Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis 2006, 41). As a part of intra-variation studies, case studies provide explanations for variables explaining new party formation in the medium to long term, such as the transformation of social cleavages and the process of political modernization, in cases where observed variables in inter-variation studies, including institutional system, remain unchanged (Lago and Martinez 2011, 5–6). Given the lack of parsimonious models for explaining splinter party formation, case studies are appropriate for hypothesis generating and identifying causal mechanisms behind party splits (Gerring 2007, 39). Finally, case studies provide comparable and judgmental data necessary to conduct systematic cross-national analysis if it is planned with eventual comparison in mind (Harmel 1985, 415; Landman 2008, 4).

Both theoretical preferences and practical considerations have influenced the choice of the topic and the method of this research. In data collection, this work

primarily relies on secondary data. For identification of the factions and changes in relations of the factions, we use multiple resources, including general period political history of Turkey, general histories of the host parties, biographies of major factional leaders, party programs and bylaws, speeches, congressional and parliamentary votes and newspapers.

In order to identify the reasons behind party splits in post-1980 period, we supplement our research with primary data to be obtained by semi-structured elite interviews. Elite interviews are fruitful for interpreting the secondary data that we gathered and is more productive if carried out at the latter stages of the research (Harrison 2001, 95). The reason behind using semi-structured elite interview is the fact that the politicians we interview are experts in their areas; hence standardized questions might lead us to miss crucial points (Harrison 2001, 98). Besides, semi-structured elite interviews help us to gain insightful information that might not be gathered in other ways (McNeill and Chapman 2005, 58). Given the negative attitude towards factionalism, semi-structured elite interview seems promising to uncover the reasons behind party splits. However, the greatest problem in conducting elite interview is accessibility. For this reason, our interviews have been conducted mainly with the members of the DSP and the YTP. The gap has been filled with interviews made with journalists and academicians. Especially, the documentaries prepared by Mehmet Ali Birand (2007; 1994), the interviews of Abdi İpekçi (1969), Cılızoğlu (1987), Simav (1975), Akar (2002), Dünder (2008) Akar and Dünder (2008) assisted the research in understanding party splits.

### **1.3.Tentative Arguments and Findings**

This work mainly argues that splinter party formation is only one of the possible outcomes of the strategic interaction between the dissident faction and the dominant faction supporting the party leader. This outcome is preceded by two stages: dissent, and intraparty conflict. During the dissent phase, discontent is voiced behind doors. It is in the second stage, the intraparty conflict phase, that minority faction manifests its dissent in various forms and party leadership responses. This interaction is conditioned by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include leadership autonomy, the nature of disagreement and the relative power of competing factions across the different layers of the party organization. Exogenous factors include entry costs and the perceived viability of a new party. Once the party leader refuses to accommodate dissident faction's demands, the third phase starts. The dissident faction might chose to remain loyal, switch to an established party or form a new party. Splinter party formation is the last and the most likely of these paths once they depart.

The next chapter deals with the approaches and variables that have been used in explaining party splits. This chapter starts with locating the splinter parties within the studies on party switching, party cohesion, factionalism, new party formation and party system fragmentation. Next, the advantages and disadvantages of the three approaches to the study of party split, namely sociological, institutional and rational-choice, are analyzed in detail. This part also deals with the variables used in the studies listed before that are fruitful for understanding party splits.

The model proposed above is presented in detail in the third chapter. This chapter starts with an organizational definition of political parties. Besides, since party splits are initiated by factions, it provides a definition of faction. This is followed by the demonstration of the three stages of party split: dissent, intraparty conflict and departure. It is mainly asserted that dissent can be manifested in various ways and that a party leader has various options in case of dissent. It is also stated that party split occurs when dissidents do not retreat from voicing their dissent in a challenging way and when the party leader chooses not to accommodate the demands of the dissidents. This outcome is conditioned by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors.

The rest of the thesis gives a detailed analysis of the analytical narrative of the splits within established parties and tests the hypotheses constructed in the third part. The fourth chapter deals with the rise of dissent in the DP, strategies employed by the competing factions and the factors conditioning the outcome of splinter party formation. The fifth chapter deals with the splits in the governing and main opposition parties in the second half of the 1960s. The chapter starts with the analysis of the exogenous facilitators of party splits and then examines the splits in the CHP and the DP in detail. In a similar vein, the sixth chapter deals with the exogenous factors facilitating new party entrance during the 1990s and the early 2000s and present the analysis of the split in the DYP and the DSP. The conclusion chapter provides a general summary of the findings of the research, identifies the weaknesses and strengths of the research and proposes new research questions for further empirical research.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Splinter party formation has remained understudied. This is closely related with the nature of the subject. Party splits are on the borders of within party and inter-party relations (Cotta 1996, 70). Splinter parties influence institutionalization of party systems but the proto-party elite that form the splinter parties takes the degree of party system institutionalization into consideration before forming their parties. Factionalism is a prerequisite for party splits but not all factionalized parties split. Legislators might switch to established parties but not all dissatisfied legislators form splinter parties. Finally, splinter parties constitute examples to new parties, but unlike the genuinely new parties, formation of the splinter parties is influenced not only by the exogenous factors but also by endogenous factors.

With the exception of Mair (1990) and recently Ceron (2011), splinter parties have been studied together with the new parties. Briefly, there are two types of studies on explaining new party formation: inter-variation and intra-variation studies (Lago and Martinez 2011, 4). Inter-variation studies, such as those by Harmel and Robertson (1985), Hug (2001), Tavits (2006, 2007), and Bolin (2007)



analyze the formation of new parties across countries and examine the effects of electoral institutions, cleavages and other social, political and structural factors. Others, such as Kitschelt (1986, 1988), Ignazi (1992), Inglehart and Flagan (1987) explain the formation of a particular class of new parties across countries, with reference to transformations in cleavage structures. These inter-variation studies are powerful in inferring valid generalizations that explain new party formation but fail to explain the rise of the new parties in the cases where institutional settings remain the same or in the case s where social cleavages are not significantly influential. On the other hand, intra-variation studies of Berrington (1985), Chhibber and Kollman (1988), Agh (2000), Selb and Pituctin (2010), and Lago and Martinez (2011) deal with the formation of new parties within a single-country. These studies are powerful for explaining the rise of new competitors in the long, but not in the short run (Lago and Martinez 2011, 5). Both the inter-variation and intra-variation studies underline the importance of factors exogenous to established parties but undermine the intraparty dimension of party politics as well as the importance of the differences between genuinely new and splinter parties.

Works of Cotta (1996), Olson (1998), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Bielasiak (2002), Bochsler (2005), Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) on party system institutionalization in new democracies also note the frequent splits, merges and new party formation and explain these developments with reference to the institutional factors, past legacies and the contingencies of transition phase. Bielasiak (2002), Tavits (2007) and Lago and Martinez (2011) argue that uninstitutionalized party systems provide the fertile ground for party splits and new party formations. Accordingly, party system institutionalization,

measured by the effective number of political and legislative parties and electoral volatility conditions the calculations of the proto-party elite regarding the electoral viability of a new party. Party fissions and fusions are expected to be more frequent in countries without institutionalized party systems. However, similar to the literature on new party formation, the party system institutionalization literature does not deal with the intraparty conflicts which pave the way for party splits.

Whilst the literature on new party formation and party system, especially in new democracies, sheds light into exogenous factors influencing party splits, the literature on party cohesion provides us clues for understanding the inner dynamics of political parties. Institutional factors such as the type of government (i.e. parliamentarism versus presidentialism) (Maor 1997, 162; Özbudun 1968; Yanık 2002), changes in the size of parliament (Bolin 2007, 12), procedural advantages that parties enjoy in determining legislative program and in shaping the composition of the legislative committees (Chaisty 2005, 311), anti-defection laws (Janda 2007; Miskin 2003), market reforms (Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes 2009), the locus of discretionary control over resources (Desposato and Scheiner 2008) and closed-list ballots (Carey and Shugart 1995; Desposato 1997, 2) are found to increase the degree of party cohesiveness. Studies on candidate selection procedures note that parties with more centralized candidate selection procedures are more cohesive (Field and Siavelis 2008, 626) and that primary elections decrease cohesiveness by encouraging the development of internal factions (Duverger 1970, 381; Zariski 1960, 37).

The relevance of party cohesion for understanding party splits comes from the fact that a decrease in party cohesion of an established party is a prerequisite for

party splits. However, as the case studies on factionalism indicate, decrease in cohesiveness of the parent organization is not sufficient for party splits. While factionalism threatens party unity, strategies developed by the party leadership to manage intraparty conflicts also matters. The neutrality of German Nazi Party leader Hitler in the factional strife in 1925 and the identification of the idea of National Socialism with the charismatic leader (Nyomarkay 1965), and the Australian Labor Party's leadership's ability to absorb and manage intraparty conflicts by permitting organized factions (McAllister 1991) show the importance of party leadership's response to intraparty conflict in avoiding party splits. This leads us to question to what extent factional conflict is manageable. For Boucek (2009), party unity is easier to be sustained under cooperative factionalism than competitive and degenerative factionalism. This is easier in the cases where factions agree on their own party's major goals (McAllister 1991, 217). While this agreement is easier in ideological parties, it will be harder in patronage-based parties (Owens 2003, 23; Reiter 2004, 268). Besides, maintaining harmony among factions will be harder as the size of the parties increase (Reiter 2004, 268). However, although individual cases of party splits demonstrated in the studies on factionalism sheds light into the dynamics of intraparty competition, they do not infer a theoretical model for understanding party splits.

## **2.1.Approaches to the Study of Splinter Parties**

The study of new party formation revolves around three main approaches: sociological, institutional and rational-choice (Bolin 2010, 3; Krouwel and Bosch 2004, 2). Studies on new party formation that employ the sociological approach

consider changes in the party systems and formation of new parties as reflections of the transformations in the underlying social structure. Hence, splinter parties are expected to rise when new social forces come into the scene. Institutional approaches draw attention to institutional facilitators and inhibitors of new party formation, including the electoral system, locus of discretionary control over resources, executive-legislative relations and laws governing political parties. Splinter parties are expected to arise when the institutional factors are permissive or when the institutional design is changed to a more permissive one. Finally, studies employing a rational-choice perspective underline the importance of the intraparty actors (i.e. proto-party elite) for splinter party formation. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs operating under uncertain electoral markets develop strategies in order to increase their chance of winning seats. Splinter party formation is considered as the result of the interplay between the proto-party elite and the host party's ruling elite whose decisions are conditioned by the signals sent by the electoral market.

Studies employing sociological and institutional approach focus on factors exogenous to host parties to explain new party formation but neglect the role of the proto-party elite in party splits. On the other hand, the rational choice perspective grants agency to intraparty actors in understanding new party entrance without undermining the importance of institutional facilitators or socio-economic changes on political parties. The following part will deal with the premises of each approach, factors in explaining party splits and splinter party formations and the weaknesses and strengths of each approach and factors.

### **2.1.1. Sociological Approach and Theory of Structural Change**

The sociological approach to the study of political parties employs a functionalist definition of political parties and regards them as reflections of social cleavages. Earlier sociological works on political parties have been dominated by the interest theory of political behavior which can be traced back to the Marxian theory of class consciousness (Duverger 1970, v). Accordingly, parties are instruments of class interests that represent democratic translations of class struggles (Lipset, 1960; cited in Sartori 1990, 151). They are considered as projections of underlying social groups into the political arena so that their activities are attributed to the demands of social groups (Graham 1993, 28; Panebianco 1988, 3). In their seminal work, Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 5) stated that parties have two main functions. Firstly, they have the expressive function. That is, they act as alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body of politics, which develop a rhetoric for translation of contrasts in the social and cultural structure into demands and pressures for action or inaction. Secondly, they are instrumental in that they force the spokesmen for the many contrasting interests and outlooks to strike bargains, to stagger demands and to aggregate pressures.

For Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50), European party systems in the 1960s reflected the cleavage structures of the 1920s. These cleavages were frozen as a result of four critical stages: “first the formal incorporation of strata and categories of residents kept out of the system under the original criteria; second the mobilization of those enfranchised citizens in electoral contests; third their activation into direct participation in public life; and fourth the breakdown of the traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organized parties

into municipal elections, what we call the process of politicization” (Mair 1997, 179–180). However, increasing volatility and the rise of third parties in Europe in the 1970s led the political scientists to question the validity of Lipset and Rokkan’s frozen cleavage hypothesis. Although Rose and Urwin (1990) found support for the hypothesis, others have argued that the increase of party fragmentation, electoral volatility, decreasing turnout rates, declining class voting and the rise of the New Left, New Right, new extreme right, left-libertarian, ecology, and separatist parties reflected the process of voter re-alignment in European politics (Flanagan and Dalton 1990; Ignazi 1992; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Inglehart 1971; Kitschelt 1988; Wolinetz 1990).

In 1971, Inglehart proposed a theory based on the scarcity and socialization hypotheses in order to explain the changes in European party systems. According to Inglehart, economic factors play a decisive rule under conditions of economic scarcity (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1289). Once scarcity diminishes, other factors start to shape voter preferences. For Inglehart, since older generations faced economic difficulties, they placed higher value on acquisitive values. With the increasing economic prosperity and decreasing income inequality in post-war Europe, a new generation that valued post-bourgeoisie values arose (Inglehart 1971, 997). Through intergenerational replacement, this new generation formed the new class for the environmental and antinuclear movements and gradually moved into positions of influence and authority in early 1980s (Inglehart 1981, 892). With the rise of this class with sociotropic concern, class-based polarization was replaced by value-based polarization among the materialist and post-materialists (Inglehart 1981, 879). The change of the cleavage structure forced the existing parties of the

Left to redefine their positions towards the new demands. Non-incorporation of the post-materialist values resulted with the split of the Social Democratic Party from the Labor Party in the UK, and the split of the Green Party from the Social Democratic Party in West Germany (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1297).

Inglehart's argument on the influence of a sense of security on voting behavior has been shared by Kitschelt (1988), Flagan (1987) and Ignazi (1992) to explain the rise of left-libertarian, new right and extreme new-right wing parties. While Kitschelt agreed with Inglehart that the safety net and subjective sense of security led to a change in voter's agenda and ended with the formation of left libertarian parties, Flagan and Ignazi argued that the rise of post-materialist values found its echo on the right and resulted with a new voter profile with authoritarian value orientation which was the voter base for new right and extreme new-right wing parties.

Accounts on the transformation of the cleavage structure are based on the Schumpeterian view that "the success of the capitalist institutions and values will ultimately bring about the demise of capitalism's organizational and moral foundations" (Kitschelt 1988, 204). Accordingly, the legitimacy of political parties, will fade away as they perform their functions (Kitschelt 1988, 196). While political parties as institutions satisfy some demands, their success in performing the functions attributed by the voters will, in the long run, challenge the basis of their legitimation due to the structural changes which are the very results of these institutions. When existing parties are unresponsive to the representational needs of the society, new parties are expected to be formed to fill the gap.

#### **2.1.1.1. Bringing the Political Back**

Structural change theories propose the salience of new cleavages as the potential factor for the rise of new parties to the extent that established parties are unresponsive to meet the new demands. They place heavy emphasis on what Rudig (1990; cited in Hug 2001, 37) calls the problem push (i.e. the presence of a neglected demand or a new issue that triggers new party formation). However, as Kitschelt (1986) demonstrated, they fail to explain the variations in the expression of the new demands across countries. That is, although theories of post-industrialist society and values can account for the change in individual orientations, preferences and capabilities to engage in collective action, they do not provide an explanation for the conditions and opportunities under which these values and preferences are transformed into new political parties (Kitschelt 1988, 208). In this sense, transformation in the cleavage structure does not automatically correspond to transformations in the party system.

Lipset and Rokkan's approach to the study of political parties, called by Panebianco (1988) as 'sociological prejudice', underestimates the importance of institutional factors and intraparty politics. Perception of political parties as products of social cleavages leads us to the conclusion that intraparty conflicts are the results of conflicts between the representatives of different social classes (Panebianco 1988, 3–4). As a matter of fact, it is common to explain party splits in Turkey with reference to rise of new social classes or the conflicts between social classes that were represented once in the same political party. However, such an approach to the study of intraparty conflicts neglects the fact that the party as an organization is a producer of inequalities within its own structure. As Panebianco



(1988, 4) states, “Qua organization, the political party is a system which is at least partly autonomous vis-à-vis social inequalities, and the tensions that often persist within it are primarily the product of such a system”.

Sociological determinism proposed by the sociological approach is also a matter of debate. Sartori (1990), Mair (1997, 65) and Cott (2005, 27) agree on the point that there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between an individual party and presence of a cleavage, for some cleavages might be expressed by two or more parties competing for more or less the same constituency. Besides, as Cott (2005) and Birnir (2004) demonstrate social cleavages are not translated into political parties unless the institutional designs are permissive. In a similar vein, Kitschelt (1986) demonstrates the importance of the political opportunity structure in explaining the variance of strategies adopted by the anti-nuclear movements in different institutional settings. Kitschelt’s (1988, 209) words regarding the relationship between the institutional factors and the social cleavages are worth quoting:

Forming new parties in order to press for new political demands requires more effort than using existing political channels, such as established parties and interest groups. Rational actors will attempt to build new vehicles of interest representation only if traditional organizations fail to respond to postindustrial demands. Moreover, these actors must be able to take advantage of opportunities and acquire resources to build a new party. Thus, new political parties will form only when the unresponsiveness of existing political institutions coincides with favorable political opportunities to displace existing parties.

Another problem with the sociological approach is that it is less explanatory in explaining new party splits and intraparty conflicts in new democracies. In these

cases, cleavage structures are less salient compared to other factors such as electoral (Agh 2000; Olson 1998) or economic performances (Manning 2005, 708). As Manning (2005, 718) states, new parties in late democratizers largely arise as a response to political, rather than socio-economic change. In a similar vein, McAllister and White (2007) found that political parties in new democracies are less effective in representing social cleavages. Due to these, the sociological approach is less explanatory in new democracies.

Nevertheless, changes in social classes and the rise of new classes are not completely irrelevant for new party formation, especially in a country such as Turkey that transitioned to democracy in 1950. The modernization process has definitely impacts on the formation of splintering groups or genuinely new parties. Scholars explain the success of the splinter DP with reference to the center-periphery cleavage (Mardin 1973, 184; Tachau 2002) or the rise of a new middle class (Karpas 1962, 1973). In a similar vein, the fragmentation of the party system in the early 1970s is explained with reference to the replacement of the center-periphery cleavage with functional cleavages (Özbudun 1976, 221). What, is ignored, however is that structural transformations pave the way for new parties if three conditions are met. Firstly, existing social cleavages or the transformation in the cleavage structure should be politicized. Hence, long-standing religious, sectarian or ethnic cleavages were not translated into new political parties in Turkey until they were politicized in the second half of the 1960s (Özbudun 1981, 233; Sayar 1978, 51). Secondly, established parties have to be reluctant to articulate the new demands. When the party leadership adapts the demands of the new groups, they are less likely to split since the costs of split outweigh the benefits to be

obtained by forming a new party. However, when established parties are unresponsive to new demands, those advocating change in party position might calculate that they will attract the supports of newly rising groups. Finally, permissive institutional contexts, such as proportional electoral systems and absence of legal barriers are crucial for the formation of new parties to articulate new demands (Özbudun 1981, 231; Sayarı 1978, 43).

### **2.1.2. Institutional Approach and Institutional Factors**

The absence of frozen cleavages in new democracies and variations in strategies developed by dissident groups in established democracies led scholars to underline the role of institutional factors in explaining new party entrance. According to the institutional approach, the institutional context and the historical setting within which the actors operate conditions the strategies and decisions of political actors (Biezen 2003, 15–16). Inter-variation studies on formation of new parties deal with the importance of institutional factors for the formation of new parties under certain institutional settings, whereas intra-variation studies show the effects of institutional changes on new party formation within single countries. Studies on party cohesion and party switching also underline the importance of institutional factors for the cohesiveness of party organizations, costs of dissent and for the frequency and direction of party switching.

Electoral systems are perhaps the most cited institutional factor in explaining party cohesion, party system change and new party formation. Scholars analyzing the effects of the electoral systems underline the importance of electoral

laws, and the set of rules concerning legal aspects of elections (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 16). Electoral laws have six dimensions, including the right to vote, right to candidacy, electoral register, agency in charge of elections, procedures for casting votes and procedures for sorting out the winners and losers (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 16). Although most scholars have paid attention to the last two dimensions, works on new party formation introduced the legal regulations on political parties, registration procedures for ballot, nomination procedures and campaign stage as relevant for analysis. Other cited institutional factors are the type of government (parliamentarism versus presidentialism) and the locus of discretionary control over resources.

#### **2.1.2.1. Formation Costs**

An important factor that influences the calculations of the proto-party elite before forming a new party is the legal requirements to form new parties and to appear on the ballot. Political parties are mostly required to submit a written declaration of the principles and the party constitution, statute, statements about party organization structure, rule book, a list of party officers and the names of a certain minimum number of party members or signatures in order to register officially (Norris 2005, 7). Once they register, parties are expected to fulfill certain requirements in order to appear on the ballot. These include monetary deposit, petition requirements and spatial requirements. Monetary deposit is the amount of deposit for registering in elections whereas petition requirement refers to the number of signatures required to access the ballot. Spatial requirements refer to the obtainment of signatures from certain parts of the population or the state (Birnie

2004, 5). These requirements might deter the nomination of frivolous candidates or parties with regional concentration of support (Birbir 2004; Norris 2005, 8).

The extent to which these requirements discourage new competitors is far from certain. Hug (2001) and Tavits (2006; 2007) found that petition requirements actually increase rather than decrease the number of new parties. While Tavits (2006; 2007) found that the monetary deposit deters new comers in established and new democracies, Hugh (2001) found a weak relationship between monetary deposit and new party formation in established democracies.

Monetary deposit and petition requirements might be significant factors in cross-national studies, but are less explanatory in case studies. If spatial registration requirements are not permissive for parties with regionally concentrated support, such as the ethnic parties in Latin America, the proto-party elite might refrain from forming new parties (Birbir, 2004; Cott, 2005). However, as the example of the pro-Kurdish HEP and its successor parties in Turkey demonstrate, ethnic parties might overcome spatial registration requirements to appear on the ballot through electoral alliance with other established parties or through running independent candidates. Due to this, while dealing with the influence of formation costs on party splits, the dynamic nature of party politics should be acknowledged.

#### **2.1.2.2. Public Funding and Media Access**

Political parties require resources in order to conduct public pooling, electoral campaigns and their daily affairs. They may finance their activities by membership dues, contributions paid by elected office-holders, donations from

natural or legal persons, income from business activities or other assets, grants received from party branches and public funding. With the introduction of public funding, parties have become more dependent on state subsidies (Biezen and Kopecky 2007).

Political parties might increase their visibility to voters not only through electoral campaigns but also through media exposure. As Bolin (2010, 8) states, parties have to pass through the ‘visibility filter’ in order to attract voter’s support. While earlier party organizations relied on voluntary labor for communicating with voters, modern political parties can communicate their messages directly to the electorate via newspapers, radio or television (Biezen 2003, 42). Similar to public subsidies, developments in communication technologies, especially the pervasiveness of television, enhanced the position of the party in public office vis-à-vis the party on the ground (Katz and Mair 2001, 125–126) and led to a further concentration of power in the hands the party leader (Webb and Poguntke 2005a, 349).

The greater reliance of political parties on public subsidies and developments in communication technology has led some scholars to conclude that a new type of party called ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco, 1988) or ‘cartel party’ (Katz and Mair, 2001) has emerged. The professionalization of political parties has coincided with the process of ‘presidentialization of politics’, which is characterized by the greater autonomy of the party leader vis-à-vis party activists and the personalization of the electoral process (Webb and Poguntke 2005b, 5). The relevance of organizational changes for new party formation is indirect and twofold. Firstly, the usage of mass media discourages party leaders and candidates from

building mass party organizations (Biezen 2003, 40). The absence of stable links between political parties and electorates to be sustained by solid party organizations contributes to electoral volatility, which in turn decreases barriers for new participants (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 156–157). Secondly, public funding and developments in communication technologies contribute to greater autonomy of party leaders and the party in public office from the pressures of party activists on the ground (Biezen 2003, 40; Katz and Mair 2001, 123). The increasing centralization of power might create intraparty conflict and disillusionment of the party activists. However, whether increasing centralization of power will lead to splinter party formation is an outcome of the interplay between the dissenting faction and the party leadership. Besides, the extent to which public funding and media access provide room for new party entrance through leading to centralized party organizations is far from certain in the Turkish case. This is due to the fact that mainstream political parties have always been highly disciplined and centralized from the beginning (Özbudun 1968). Moreover, with the exceptions of the RP, and recently the AKP, Turkish parties have never had mass party organizational characteristics, so that the influence of public funding and media access on change of organizational characteristics of established parties is hard to assess (Özbudun 2000, 68). Due to this, influence of public subsidies and media access on party splits should be dealt with caution.

#### **2.1.2.3. Electoral system and Disproportionality**

The electoral system is the set of legal regulations on transformation of preferences into votes and of the votes into the seats (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009,

17). Four dimensions of the electoral system, namely, electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral and legal thresholds and ballot structure are the most cited factors in analyzing party cohesion, party system variance across countries and new party formation.

Electoral formula is the mechanism by which the votes are transformed into seats (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 23). Briefly, there are two main types of electoral formulae: majoritarian and proportional. Seats are allocated to the candidate or political party that gets most of the votes, either with simple or qualified majority in majoritarian electoral formula. In the case of proportional representation, there are two common characteristics: firstly there are multiple winners, and secondly, seats are distributed according to the proportion of votes that candidates or parties win (Amy, 2000, 1–2).

A majoritarian electoral formula is expected to deter new comers through decreasing voter support for third parties. According to Duverger (1970), voters prefer to vote for parties that have a chance of winning a share of political power. Since there is only one winner in single-member district winner-take-all systems, the number of viable candidates or parties are two. As such, third parties, including the new comers, are unlikely to be voted unless they have regionally concentrated support (Chhibber and Kollman 1988; Lucardie 2000; Norris 1997). Besides, the majoritarian formula leads to more disproportional voter-seat allocation, which in turn, increases entry costs (Tavits, 2006; 2007). On the other hand, the proportional formula is expected to decrease the costs of new party formation since a smaller proportion of vote is necessary in order to win seats (Tavits, 2006). Due to this,



Sartori (2005, 87) hypothesized that winner-take-all electoral systems encourage fusion, whereas proportional systems produce fission.

Whether majoritarian systems lead to two party systems is a matter of debate. Even Duverger (1990, 290–292) acknowledged that two-partyism could be maintained as long as extremist tendencies in both poles are limited in effect. Once tendencies among the same pole cannot meet on the same ground, two-partyism might give way to multi-partyism through party splits. In Duverger's words (1990, 292):

It was in this way that the split in Switzerland between Radicals and Liberals breached the original 1848 two-party system (Conservative v. Liberal) and created a three-party system that the Socialists later transformed into four-party system. The same is true of France: the gradual formation of the Radical party split the Republicans, with the result that by the end of the nineteenth century there were three basic tendencies visible: Conservatives, Moderate Republicans (Opportunists) and Radicals. In Denmark and Holland, the birth of the Radical Party was the product of an identical tendency: a split over the options common to moderates and extremists. About 1920, there were many cases in Europe of an increase in the number of parties due to splits between Communists (Revolutionaries) and Socialists (Reformers).

There are conflicting findings on the relationship between electoral formulas and new party entrance. Tavits (2006; 2007) and Bolin (2007) found that proportional electoral systems provide more opportunities for new party entrance. Ceron (2011, 210) found that party breakdown is lower in disproportional electoral systems. Kitschelt (1988, 224) found that majoritarian systems are less conducive for the formation of left-libertarian parties. Norris (2005, 13) found that the effective number of parties in countries using majoritarian formulas is lower compared to those with proportional formulas. On the other hand, Mair (1990, 137–

138) found no significant relationship between disproportionality and party breakdown. Cott (2005, 29) found no correlation between the formation of ethnic parties and proportionality. Harmel and Robertson (1985, 517) found that proportional systems contribute to new party success rather than the formation of new parties. Krouwel and Bosch (2004, 5–6) found that new party entrance is more likely in disproportional systems that decrease party distinctiveness.

The reason behind the conflicting findings is closely related with the fact that seat allocation formulas work with the thresholds and district magnitudes in determining the ratio of votes to seats for each party (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 23). The electoral threshold is the number of minimum votes necessary to earn a seat. There are two types of electoral thresholds: legal threshold and effective threshold. Legal threshold is the minimum percentage of votes and seats to be received by a party in order to gain representation in Parliament. It might be applied at the constituent level, as in Spain, or at national level, as in Germany, or at both levels, as in Sweden (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 32). On the other hand, the effective threshold is the median value between the ‘threshold of inclusion’ and ‘threshold of exclusion’, where threshold of inclusion refers to the level necessary to have a chance of winning seats and the threshold of exclusion is the value which in any case is sufficient to win the seat (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 33).

Effective threshold works with the district magnitude, average number of seats allocated to a constituency in determining the distribution of seats. In fact, district magnitude and effective threshold are the two sides of the same coin since a low district magnitude has the effect of high electoral threshold (Lijphart 1999, 153). Together with the electoral formula, effective threshold and district

magnitude determine the difference between the percentage of votes received and percentage of seats a party gets in the resulting legislature, the disproportionality. Smaller district magnitude, majoritarian electoral formula and higher effective and national thresholds increase the disproportionality of an electoral system (Cott 2005, 30).

The relevance of disproportionality for new party formation is that it increases the votes required to gain representation in Parliament. As such, disproportional electoral systems are expected to discourage new party entrance (Tavits 2007, 128). As Cott (2005, 30) states, the extent to which small parties are helped by a given seat allocation formula depends on the district magnitude and the size of divisor and remainders used in the allocation formula. They are expected to win seats more easily under larger district magnitude, large assemblies, larger quotas or larger gaps in formulas for allocation of seats, such as the urban areas that are more populous compared to rural areas (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 7; Taagepera 2007, 83). These electoral systems that produce more proportional vote-to-seat distribution decrease entry costs and hence, encourage new party formation.

With the exception of Krouwel and Bosch (2004, 4) who found no significant relationship between electoral threshold and new party entrance, studies on new party formation reveal that higher effective threshold and lower district magnitude deter new comers. Willey (1998, 245) found that new parties operating under small district magnitude are less successful than new parties operating under larger district magnitude. Tavits (2006) found that district magnitude is positively and significantly correlated with the predicted number of new parties. Hug (2001, 112–13) found that an increase in the threshold of representation decreased the

number of new parties significantly. Similarly, Selb and Pituctin (2010, 154) found that the threshold of representation reduced the propensity of the Green Party of Switzerland to enter the race. Taagepera (1999) found that the effective number of parties competing in a party system was dependent on not only the social heterogeneity but also the effective magnitude of electoral systems. Mainwaring (1991, 26) found that a low threshold and high district magnitude facilitated the representation of a high number of parties in the Brazilian Congress.

District magnitude and electoral thresholds might influence not only new party entrance but the cohesiveness of party organizations. For example, in a single-member district, deputies might direct their attention to local constituencies rather than the party in central office since the deputies' chances of re-election depend on their recognition in the district. This might lead the deputies to come into conflict with the party in central office (Duverger 1970, 60). Under multimember district plurality voting, since all candidates nominated at the party list are elected if the party receives the plurality of votes in a constituency, they will have more incentives to increase party rather than personal reputation (Araslı 1972, 69). In the case of multimember district proportional representation, candidates might compete for realistic positions in the party list, which in turn challenges party cohesiveness. On the other hand, the legal threshold might indirectly lead to intraparty conflict through forcing less viable parties to form electoral coalitions. For example, the decision of the pro-Islamist RP to form an electoral coalition with the nationalist MHP before the 1991 elections triggered discontent among the RP members with Kurdish background (Sakallıoğlu 1998).

#### **2.1.2.4. Candidate Selection: Nomination and Ballot Structure**

Another factor that influences the cohesiveness of an established party is the candidate selection methods. Candidate selection is “a predominantly extralegal process by which a political party decided which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates” (Ranney, 1981; cited in Field and Siavelis 2008, 621). The process of candidate selection is an outcome of three successive processes: “certification, involving electoral laws, party rules, and informal social norms that define the criteria for eligible candidacy; nomination, involving the supply of eligible seeking office and the demand from selectors when deciding who is nominated, and election, the final step determining which nominees win legislative office” (Norris 2006, 89). The first two processes, eligibility and nomination, are mostly analyzed together in studies on candidate selection, whereas the selection part is analyzed with reference to ballot structure. Each process is structured by the electoral regulations and party laws but the candidate selection is basically a private affair (Duverger 1970, v; Hazan and Rahat 2010, 3)<sup>8</sup>.

The analysis of nomination sheds light into intraparty politics in two ways. Firstly, nomination is an indicator of power configuration within the established

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<sup>8</sup> For more on the dimension of candidate selection, see Rahat and Hazan (2010), Field and Siavelis (2008, 623–624), Norris (2006), Lundell (2004, 29–30).

parties (Norris 2006, 92). As Schattschneider (1942; cited in Yavuz 2009, 99) states “the nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of party; he who can make nominations is the owner of the party”. It is due to this that most vital factional disputes in any party revolve around the choice of candidates (Hazan and Rahat 2010, 8). Secondly, candidate selection is crucial for the career advancement of politicians. Studies on party switching underline the importance of re-election goals in motivating deputies to change their party affiliations (Desposato 1997, 1; Heller and Mershon 2003, 2; Janda 2009, 7; Miskin 2003, 15). Besides, deputies are not only interested in re-election but also in winning higher offices and serving as deputy is mostly a prerequisite for upward mobility. To the extent that re-election and upward mobility is channeled through political parties, party leaders can use nominations for achieving cohesive blocks (Field and Siavelis 2008, 625; Strom and Müller 2009, 30; Zariski 1960, 38). Therefore, parties with centralized nominations and restricted selectorate are expected to be more cohesive than parties with decentralized nominations and open primaries.

Nomination works together with the ballot structure in shaping party cohesion. Despite various categorizations, ballot structures can be grouped into three main categories: nominal, dividual and ordinal. Categorical ballots which are also known as nominal ballots enable voters to vote for only one candidate, candidate of a party or party list, whereas in ordinal papers, voters can rank-and-order the parties or candidates. Finally, dividual ballots enable the voters to split their votes among more than one party (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 7–10). In this sense, ordinal and dividual ballots provide the voters relative with freedom to choose among candidates compared to nominal ballots.

The ballot structure influences the cohesiveness of party organizations together with the nominations and the district magnitude. Firstly, the ballot structure determines the extent to which the party leadership can control electoral prospects of nominated candidates. If the voters can only vote for party lists (closed-list), nomination procedures gain importance. If the party leadership has the control or veto power over nomination processes, it can use the nominations under closed-list ballot structure to discipline the party members (Strom and Müller 2009, 37). Under such institutional contexts, it is highly costly for dissenting factions to revolt against the party leadership since dissenting will decrease their nomination or re-nomination chances. For this reason, closed-list ballot structures pave the way for more cohesive parties (Desposato 2005, 17). On the other hand, if voters can rank-and-order candidates over the other within the party list (preferential voting) or if the voters can directly vote for a candidate (candidate-list), candidates will be more likely to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995; Mainwaring 1991, 30; Norris 2006, 104–105).

Ballot structures other than the closed-list are likely to increase competition among the candidates of the same party. In order to enhance their electoral chance, they will develop personal networks at constituencies to distinguish themselves from co-partisans (Carey and Shugart 1995, 431; Hine 1982, 45). Besides, in ballots other than closed-list, parties are more likely to nominate influential and locally well-known candidates in order to attract the attention of the voters (Lundell 2004, 34). Once elected, these representatives who do not owe their mandate to their parties are less likely to be sanctioned if they act independent of party programs (Mainwaring 1991, 27–28). Party cohesion and discipline, in turn, decrease.

However, while party cohesion might decrease, party unity can be sustained under open lists. For example, Lakeman (1981, 15) argued that if a single transferable vote and multi-member plurality electoral system had been employed in the UK, the Labor Party could have prevented its social democrats to defect from the party line.

Nomination and ballot structures condition the future electoral fortune of the dissident deputies and enable us to gain an insight to dispersion of power within the established party organization. It is also plausible to expect an absence of party splits in established parties, where the party leadership controls the nomination of candidates. However, the Finnish and Chilean party systems, which are marked by deep ideological divisions, reveal that parties might be highly cohesive even though open-list ballot structures are used (Mainwaring 1991, 29). Additionally, although the nomination process was highly centralized in post-1980 Turkish parties, all major parties faced disunity. Hence, while the analysis of the nomination procedures and ballot structure helps us to gain an understanding of the intraparty affairs and to reveal the viable offices that factions compete for, nomination procedures and ballot structure should not be taken as the main factor conditioning the intraparty discipline (Özbudun 1968, 244).

#### **2.1.2.5.Type of Government: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism**

The type of government is argued to influence intraparty conflicts by enhancing the potential cohesiveness of party organizations. Parties that operate under parliamentary systems are expected to be more disciplined and cohesive than



their counterparts in presidential systems since building and sustaining governments in parliamentary systems depend on the continuous support of the deputies (Giannetti and Benoit 2009, 22; Maor 1997, 162; Özbudun 1968, 137; Yanık 2002, 62). Hence, in order to sustain cohesion, party leaders will be more likely to nominate like-minded candidates that will vote in line with the party leaders' preferences (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, 9). Besides, party leaders are more likely to build well-disciplined voting blocs through their control over ministerial assignments, patronage, access to media and committee assignments (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, 10; Özbudun 1968, 139). This depends on the size of parties in Parliament, the rules of procedures and the nomination procedures stated in party bylaws. The hypothesis that parliamentary systems foster party cohesion has been confirmed by a number of studies. Epstein (1993, 321) and Özbudun (1970; cited in Maor 1997, 143) found that party unity is the greatest in parliamentary systems with two party systems.

Although parliamentarism might be an explanatory factor for party cohesion in inter-variation studies, it cannot explain the changing cohesiveness of an individual time across time or different degree of cohesiveness of different parties at a certain time if the type of regime stays constant over time. Chaisty (2005, 303) found that Russian parties operating within the *Duma* Council became more cohesive in time despite the presidential system in Russia. Hagopian, Gervasoni and Moraes (2009) found that party discipline and party-oriented legislators increased in number after the market reforms that diminished the resource base for patronage. Owens (2003, 23) notes that ideological parties such as the Brazilian Workers Party and the Fujimoristas in the Peruvian Congress are more cohesive

despite the presidential system . Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (1997) observed that leftist parties in the Brazilian Congress were highly disciplined compared to catch-all parties. In a similar vein, Heller and Mershon (2003, 13) found that party switching was less common in ideological parties. Reed (1988) found high frequency of splits and party switching in Japan between 1949 and 1955 despite the parliamentary regime. The case was no different for Italy, which faced a frequent rise of splinter parties and party switching under a political context of high uncertainty between 1996 and 2001 (Heller and Mershon 2003). Thames (2007) found that it was the party system institutionalization rather than the type of government that led to undisciplined parties in the Russian *Duma* and Ukrainian *Rada*. Finally, highly disciplined administration of Turkish parties (Özbudun, 1968) did not lead to cohesive blocks; rather party switching was highly common among the deputies (Turan 1985, 2003).

Whether parliamentarism fosters new party formation is also a matter of debate. Lucardie (2000, 180) argued that presidential regimes are less conducive to new party formation since they promote polarization and concentration of parties. Similarly, Willey (1998, 239) argued that since any presidential office is by definition a nation-wide single-member district and since lower district magnitude increases disproportionality, new parties are less likely to be successful in presidential systems. Against this, Tavits (2007, 116) found that presidential regimes are more conducive to new party entrance since presidential regimes provide higher potential benefits to be obtained from controlling the office. On the other hand, Harmel and Robertson (1985, 514) found no significant relationship between parliamentary systems and new party formation. Bolin (2007, 12) argued

that the size of parliament rather than parliamentarism mattered and found that an increase in the size of parliament is more conducive to new party formation.

Nevertheless, parliamentary regimes matter for understanding the splinter party formation. After all, government depends on the support of deputies in parliamentary regimes. If the established party is in government, the vote of confidence provides an important bargaining power for the dissident deputies of the established party. Besides, the privileges granted to parliamentary groups in terms of committee assignments, proposal of laws, tools to monitor the conduct of executive, access to mass media, and public subsidies might facilitate splinter party formation (Mainwaring 1991, 25–26). Hence, an analysis of splinter party formation should also take the characteristics of the type of the regime into consideration.

#### **2.1.2.6. Locus of Discretionary Control over Resources**

Discretionary control over resources refers to the institutional design on distribution of public and private benefits. It is common to associate the centralization of decision-making and implementation power over the distribution of private and public benefits with the state and provincial governments in federalism and with the national governments in unitary systems (Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 75). However, as Chhibber and Kollman (2004, 79) note, the degree of centralization may vary across different policy realms in any country: “military policies have been centralized virtually everywhere, whereas streets and sanitation policies remain decentralized everywhere”. More importantly, the degree of

centralization within a country might vary over time. For example, although the USA and India had federal systems, power was heavily centralized in the hands of national governments after the great depression in the USA and during the reign of Indira Gandhi in India (Chhibber and Kollman 1988). Thus, what matters for ambitious politicians is not whether the regime is federal or unitary but which institutions are responsible for decision-making and implementation of distribution of public and private benefits.

The degree of centralization is frequently noted in the studies on party switching. These studies assume that politicians are interested in the distribution of private and public goods in order to increase their election and/or re-election chance. Since, access to resources is crucial in achieving their goals, especially in pork-oriented systems; legislators are more likely to switch to parties that control access to these goods. It is in this way that “the institutions that assign control over state resources are likely to shape power relations and incentives that drive political behavior throughout the system, and different patterns of resource control ought to lead politicians to pursue different career strategies” (Desposato and Scheiner 2008, 509). If resources are controlled by states and provincial governments, voters will be concerned about politics at the state level and will be more likely to vote for locally strong parties even though these parties might not be competitive at national elections (Chhibber and Kollman 1988). Candidates who want to maximize their electoral fortune will respond to the concerns of voters and will be more likely to adapt to locally viable parties. This, in turn leads to fragmented national party systems such as the party systems of Argentina, Canada, Peru and Brazil (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, 10). In the event that resources are centralized in the hands of

national governments, both voters and candidates will be concerned with national parties, which in turn will contribute to the nationalization of party systems, such as the cases of Chile, Honduras, Jamaica and Uruguay (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, 11). This, in turn, will empower the party in central office vis-à-vis the party on the ground and increase not only the disciplinary power of the party in central office over the legislators but also the costs of dissension.

A group of scholars argue that the formation of new parties is more likely in countries where power is devolved to local authorities. This is related with the lower costs of organizing a party at regional level (Cott 2005, 25; Lucardie 2000, 180). Once ethnic and ecology parties consolidate their support base and organizational strength at local level, they become better equipped to compete at national elections. Others argue that the locus of control of resources shape the legislative preferences related to party switching. In their study, Desposato and Scheiner (2008) found that legislators were concerned with national politics in the centralized Japanese political context and with ‘gubernational’ politics in decentralized Brazil. They also found that defectors from the governing Liberal Democrat Party formed new parties in order to be part of a coalition government so that they could maintain easy access to pork (Desposato and Scheiner 2008, 516). In another study, Desposato (2006) found that legislators in Brazil abandoned their party affiliations in order to maximize pork. Finally, the type of interest intermediation is argued to influence the prospects for dissenting groups. According to Kitschelt (1988, 211–212), corporatist measures increase the rigidity of the system and opposition to corporatism provides fertile ground for the rise of new-left parties. Unlike Kitschelt, Tavits (2006, 105) argues that corporatism is an

impediment for new party entrance since corporatist measures decrease the benefits to be obtained by controlling the public office.

### **2.1.3. Rational Choice Perspective and Party Building**

Starting with the new millennium, a group of scholars, including Hug (2001), Tavits (2006; 2007), Bolin (2007; 2010) and Lago and Martinez (2011) employed rational-choice approaches to the study of new party formation. Similarly, a number of studies on party switching, including Laver and Benoit (2003), Heller and Mershon (2003), Hagopian, Gervasoni and Moraes (2009), Desposato and Scheiner (2008), and Desposato (2006) have also dealt with the calculations of individual legislators. These studies start from the premise that politicians are ambitious entrepreneurs that are interested in achieving certain goals, including re-election or winning higher seats (Strom and Müller 2009, 30). However, politicians face collective dilemmas, “situations in which the rational but unorganized action of group members may lead to an outcome that all consider worse than outcomes attainable by organized action” (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 77). The method of solving the collective dilemmas that politicians face is the creation of attractive leadership posts (Strom 1990, 574). Leaders have three essential features (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 84):

(1) They bear the direct costs of monitoring the community faced with the collective dilemma, (2) they possess selective incentives (individually targetable punishments and rewards) with which to reward those whom they find cooperating or punish those whom they find “defecting”, and (3) they are paid, in various ways, for the valuable service they provide.

Just as the political parties are formed by political entrepreneurs that bear the costs, new parties are formed by a proto-party elite who coordinate their members' activities (Ceron 2011, 183). While selecting the strategy to be employed against the party leadership, these political entrepreneurs take risks and potential benefits of dissent and new party formations into consideration (Berrington 1985, 442). They engage in a strategic game with the party leadership for enforcing their demands. The outcome, for Ceron (2011, 184) depends on the focal point and strategic move and for Hug (2001, 46), on the nature of demand and potential strength of the potential party. Although both the party leadership and dissident faction operate within a political context named the opportunity structure, they are far from possessing perfect information about electoral behavior or about the choice of each other (Hug 2001, 41; Lago and Martinez 2011, 7). For this reason, similar opportunity structures end with different outcomes. In this sense, although the opportunity structure constraints the actors with conflicting interests, it is the calculations and decisions of the political actors that explains why some parties split and why proto-party elites form a new party rather than joining an established one.

#### **2.1.3.1.Opportunity Structure**

The rational-choice approach does not neglect the importance of the institutional or sociological factors, but analyzes these factors within the concept of an opportunity structure. Opportunity structure has been developed by resource mobilization theories in order to explain social movements but was then used in explaining the variance of formation of Green parties across advanced democracies (Lucardie 2000, 180). Briefly, the term is used to express the degree of 'openness'

or ‘accessibility’ of a political system for political entrepreneurs (Bolin 2010, 3). Although most attention has been paid to electoral systems, other institutional variables, including rules on public funding, regulations on party’s access to media, executive-legislative relations and federalism have been considered as a part of the opportunity structure. Kitschelt (1986, 58) defines a nation’s political opportunity structure as comprised of “special configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others”. Strom (1990, 579) defines the structures of political opportunities as “the offices that parties seek, the rules for attaining them and the general pattern of behavior surrounding their attainment”. Similarly, Lucardie (2000) notes five dimensions of the opportunity structure, namely, formal access to state, political structure, interest association, cleavage structure and political conjuncture. Hug (2001, 56–60) states five dimensions of opportunity structure that are influential over strategic behavior of conflicting sides. These are formation costs, salience of new issues, benefits from important demands, electoral benefits for new parties and fighting costs. Tavits (2006; 2007) states that there are three dimensions of the opportunity structure, namely, cost of formation, benefit of office and perceived level of electoral viability, which influence the prospects for new party formation.

#### **2.1.3.2. Retrospective Voting**

The concept of opportunity structure provides room for not only sociological and institutional factors, but also contingencies, such as incumbents’ economic performance and political scandals. The latter provides space for new



comers by leading to an increase in the number of dissatisfied voters. According to retrospective voting hypothesis, votes are cast on the basis of economic performance rather than economic policy proposals and promises (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2005, 549). The central premise of the retrospective voting hypothesis is that uncertainty about the future and about the sincerity of the candidates and/or parties makes past action the best guide for assessing their future utility (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2009, 379). Economic performance might be measured by GDP growth, inflation and unemployment rates. The relevance of incumbents' economic performance for party splits is that poor economic performance might provide an opportunity for new party formation. Accordingly, voters dissatisfied with the government's economic policies have two options: they might vote for an established party in opposition or for 'untried parties, including radical and newly formed ones. Vote switching based on the incumbents' economic performance refers to 'incumbent volatility', whereas the voting for the untried parties refers to 'traumatic volatility' (Hazama 2007, 29)<sup>9</sup>.

Retrospective voting hypothesis has been generally confirmed by the scholarly work on new party formations. Harmel and Robertson (1985), Lucardie (2000) and Hug (2001) found that economic recessions provide an opportunity space for new party entrance. Hug (2001, 92–93) found that new party formation is

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9 Incumbent volatility is expressed as “absolute net vote swings between governing parties and opposition parties” whereas the traumatic volatility is “represented by absolute swings between the parties that have at any time remained in government for more than one year consecutively and those that have not” (Hazama 2007, 29).

negatively associated with the economic growth rate and positively with unemployment. Pinard (1975; cited in Lucardie 2000, 181) found that unemployment and deprivation of small businessmen and farmers' welfare were the main reasons behind the formation of the Social Credit Party of Quebec. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, 12) and Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni (2009, 11) found that economic growth had a modest effect on electoral volatility, whereas inflation had no clear impact. Roberts and Wibbels (1999, 576) found that electoral volatility in Latin America in the post-1980 period was a function of short-term economic perturbations. Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar (2005, 558) found that economic voting for the AKP in 2002 elections is basically a reaction to personal sufferings caused by the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey. Hazama (2007, 134) found that the change in real per capita GNP and unemployment affected the changes in votes for incumbents in Turkey between 1950 and 2002. That is why, it is plausible to expect party fissions and new party entrance to be more frequent following poor incumbent economic performance.

#### **2.1.3.3. Party System Institutionalization and Splinter Party Entrance**

The party system is a system of interaction resulting from inter-party competition (Pedersen 1990, 197). It is mostly classified according to the number of relevant parties and the ideological distance separating these parties (Sartori 2005). The relevance of the party system to the study of new party formation comes from the fact that it influences the calculations of the proto-party entrepreneurs to enter or not enter in the electoral competition. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs are less likely to invest in new parties in the event that the party system is

institutionalized. Institutionalized party systems, which are characterized by a stable number of parties in the assembly, low levels of electoral volatility, higher levels of legitimacy of established parties, and a relative independence of the party organization from the interests of a few ambitious leaders signal to political entrepreneurs that their party will be less likely to receive an electoral support (Wolinetz 1990, 221–222). On the other hand, uninstitutionalized party systems, which are characterized by high electoral volatility, low popularity of established political parties, low turnout rates, weak grounding of parties in civil society, financial dependence of parties on state subsidies for their revenues, frequent party switching, a high effective number of parties, small party membership and weak partisan identities, provide more room for new party entrance (Enyedi 2006, 229; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, 6). Under such uncertain voting patterns and interparty competition, dissatisfied political entrepreneurs are more likely to try their chance in the electoral market (Lago and Martinez 2011).

Scholars working on party systems agree on the point that party systems in established democracies are more institutionalized than those of new democracies. Scholars analyzing the development of party systems in new democracies also converge on the point that party fissions and fusions have been more frequent after the initial elections. Accordingly, during the transition period, opposition to the authoritarian incumbents and the need to overcome the obstacles faced by the democratization process lead the opposition to form alliances. Once the authoritarian incumbents are turned down and once they are in office, these ‘transition oriented grand coalitions’ (Cotta 1996, 83) are likely to come to an end since the unifying cause for the groups with conflicting interests has eroded once

the authoritarian incumbents are replaced by democratically elected governments (Cotta 1996, 77; Olson 1998, 433). As Cotta (1996, 80) states, “when confronted with the new issues arising after the accomplishment of the transition, internal ideological differences (and personal rivalries between leaders) could not be overcome anymore and unity gave way to division”. Hence, following the initial elections, new incumbents splinter and recombine into numerous smaller groupings as answers to the new political agenda (Cotta 1996, 86). The number of effective parties, including splinter parties, substantially increases between the founding and subsequent elections.

Although scholars analyzing the party systems of new democracies converge on the point that party fissions and fusions have been more frequent after the initial elections, they diverge on the question of whether this phenomenon is ephemeral or long-standing. According to the shakedown hypothesis, party systems will get more and more ordered after consecutive elections (Bochsler 2005, 56). Firstly, electoral laws provide the mechanism to restrict the effective number of legislative parties. Secondly, political entrepreneurs will react to the electoral laws and invest their resources on viable parties. As the uncertainty decrease after consecutive elections and as the established parties develop clearer policy positions, voter preferences will be stabilized and electoral volatility will diminish (Olson 1998, 460; Tavits 2005, 296). As voters’ preferences become more predictable, party formation and party switching will be more costly. For this reason, the effective number of parties and the rise of splinter parties will decrease in the long run (Lago and Martinez 2011, 16; Tavits 2007, 114).

A number of studies found that the number of new parties decrease after consecutive elections in new democracies. Lago and Martinez (2011, 16) found that new party formation in Spain decreased after consecutive elections. Tavits (2007, 114) found that new party entries decreased as parties established their reputations over time. However the trend was not unilinear. While countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary have developed more stable party systems, many of the former Soviet Republics continue to lack institutionalized party systems (Bielasiak 2002, 205; Olson 1998, 463). Variances among countries in terms of party system institutionalization despite the consecutive elections have been explained with reference to institutional variables or historical legacies. Filippov (1999) found that party system fragmentation is lower in parliamentary systems compared to presidential systems. Toole (2000, 456) found that different electoral systems play a part in party system institutionalization by helping to lower the levels of fractionalization. Bochslers (2005, 49) found that electoral thresholds are responsible for the variances in party systems across former Soviet Union countries. Bielasiak (2002, 198) noted the importance of past legacies and argued that the Soviet regime precluded political movements outside the Communist party so that there were few attachments between the political actors and the public.

On the other hand, scholars comparing the party systems in new democracies and in advanced industrial democracies advocate that it is unlikely for new democracies to evolve to stable party systems of the established democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 156; Mair 1997, 180). This is a consequence of the period and sequence effects. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, 156) explained these effects as follows:

The period effect is that, in earlier competitive regimes, parties incorporated new citizens into the political systems. They had powerful identities, and the citizens who were mobilized by them developed strong attachments to them. Parties in later democracies were less central in mobilizing and creating new citizens. They did not form the encompassing social networks that working class and Christian Democratic parties did in early decades of the twentieth century, and they did not win the profound allegiance that these earlier parties forged. The sequent effect is related to the emergence of television as a major factor in enabling candidates to win election in competitive regimes created in recent decades. When television emerges as a major campaign vehicle before parties are well entrenched, political actors have less incentive to engage in party-building. It is easier and –in short term- more effective to use modern mass media than build a party.

Since parties formed in new democracies are unlikely to form encompassing social networks, electoral volatility will not diminish over time (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, 10). The argument is confirmed by a number of studies on electoral volatility. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, 165–166) analyzed 47 old and new democracies and found that the birth date of democracy has the highest effect on electoral volatility. Baldini and Pappalardo (2009, 10) found that the mean electoral volatility for democracies inaugurated by 1945, 1946 -1976 and after 1977 were 9.4%, 17.0% and 36.6%, respectively. In this sense, what matters is not the duration of democracy but its birth date (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 166). Hence despite the repeating electoral game, new democracies will continue to be more fertile for new party entries and party splits than established democracies.

## **2.2.Conclusion**

The review of the literature on new party formation, party system institutionalization and party cohesion leads us to gain an insight to both exogenous

and endogenous dimensions of party politics. Yet, none of the approaches listed above provide a full understanding of the reasons behind the decision of the dissident members of established party to form a party of their own. Studies employing a sociological approach to the study of party split overemphasize the importance of the problem push. The institutional approach to the study of splinter party formation underlines the importance of institutional facilitators of splinter party formation. Both approaches focus on factors exogenous to host parties to explain new party formation but neglect the role of the proto-party elite in party splits. On the other hand, the rational choice perspective grants agency to intraparty actors in understanding new party entrance without undermining the importance of institutional facilitators or socio-economic changes on political parties. Yet, scholarly work employing a rational choice perspective mainly focuses on the exogenous factors and undermines the difference between the genuinely new parties and splinter parties. Therefore, a model that explains how established parties split and when splinter parties are formed is necessary.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **A MODEL OF SPLINTER PARTY FORMATION**

The review of the literature in the previous chapter reveals the lack of theoretical studies on splinter party formation. Although scholarly works on the new party formations, party system changes, and party switching provide us with important clues about the exogenous factors that the political entrepreneurs of the proto-party take into consideration before forming a new party, these studies remain silent about the endogenous factors and the role of the proto-party elite in party splits. This chapter presents a theoretical model of splinter party formation. It is mainly asserted that party split is only one of the possible outcomes of the strategic interaction between the dissident faction and the majority faction supporting the party leader. This particular outcome is preceded by two stages: dissent and intraparty conflict. During the dissent phase, discontent is voiced behind doors. It is in the second stage, the intraparty conflict phase that minority faction manifests its dissent in various forms and party leadership responses. The decisions of the competing sides are conditioned by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include leadership autonomy, the nature of disagreement and



the relative power of competing factions across the different layers of party organization. Exogenous factors include entry costs and the perceived viability of a new party. Once the party leader refuses to accommodate dissident faction's demands and the dissident faction refuses to step back, the third phase starts. Dissident faction might choose to remain loyal, switch to an established party or form a new party. Party splits occur if the dissident faction chooses the last two paths.

This chapter is organized as follows: Firstly, definitions of political parties and factions are presented. This is followed by identification of the three stages of the model. Next, endogenous and exogenous factors influencing the decisions of the dissident faction and the party leadership are presented. The final part, deals with the potential paths to be taken by the dissidents and the reasons behind the dissident's opt for new party formation rather than infiltration.

### **3.1. Defining Political Parties**

Conventionally, political parties have been treated as unitary actors. This has been a sacrifice made for analytical gain in the study of inter-party politics and a consequence of the practical difficulties in gaining reliable information about political competition at a sub-party level (Benoit and Giannetti 2009, 229). However, most political parties face periods of intraparty conflict. Although most of these conflicts are resolved within party platforms, some of these conflicts are exposed, mostly by dissenting factions. These instances reveal that political parties are not in fact unitary actors. Moreover, the studies on factionalism reveal that


political parties are composed of sub-groups. In this sense, as Maor (1998, 1) states, “different coalitions of forces are being formed within the party and actors striving for dominance interact with each other in the struggle for relative influence within the organization; the interplay between internal actors, each with his or her own agenda, is thus the driving force of party life”.

Political parties might be defined as any group seeking to elect governmental officeholders under a given label, which may or may not be on the ballot (Epstein 1993, 9). While this definition enables us to select cases, it does not provide any room for intraparty actors. Hence, as Sartori (2005, 63) suggests, political parties might resemble to a miniature of a political system with their authority structures, representative processes, electoral systems and sub-processes for recruiting leaders, defining goals and resolving internal system conflicts. They are composed of different organs that are horizontally and vertically linked.

Katz and Mair’s three faces of party organization enable us to gain an insight into the changing viability of different party organs. Accordingly, party organizations have three faces: party in public office, party in central office and the party on the ground (Katz and Mair 2001). The party in public office refers to the elected members of the party in parliament and in government. It comprises the parliamentary party, known also as parliamentary group, which is crucial for cabinet formation in parliamentary systems. On the other hand, party in central office and the party on the ground constitute the extraparlimentary party. The party in central office refers to the national leadership of the party organization, whereas the party on the ground represents the rank-and-file of the party, comprising

ordinary party members as well as party activists who play a more extensive role than members at grassroot level (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Three Faces of Party Organization**



Source: Ayan (2009, 19).

Here, we should note that the relationship between these three faces of party organization and functions of three organizational faces have evolved over time. Historically, it was first the party in public office that was formed in response to the transfer of power to the legislatures (Scarrow 2006, 17). The enfranchisement of new voters increased competition among legislative groups and paved the way for the formation of the electoral committees. Finally, the need to mobilize a larger electorate ended with permanent connections between the parliamentary groups and the electoral committees in the form of formal party organizations (Duverger 1970, 5–7; Epstein 1993, 19; Sartori 2005, 37). However, as the urban and rural working classes increased in numbers, they felt the need to organize not only industrially but also politically (Biezen 2003, 21). These classes which were denied the right to vote formed a coherent and centralized extraparlimentary organization before they acquired parliamentary representation (Duverger 1970, 36).

According to Duverger (1970, 40–41), the organizational superiority of these externally-created parties led the internally-created bourgeoisie parties to adopt the organizational characteristics of the former. Hence, with the ‘contagion from the left’, the balance of power between the central party organization and parliamentary party shifted to the disadvantage of the latter in almost all Western democracies (Gibson and Harmel 1998, 215). However, starting in the 1960s, a group of scholars argued for the organizational ‘contagion from the right’ (Epstein 1993, 257) and for the transformation of the parties’ organizational structures to ‘catch-all’ (Kirchheimer 1990), ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco 1988, 262), or ‘cartel’ parties (Mair 1994). With the rise of these organizational types, the power shifted back to the party in public office. The trend is not unique to the parties in the West; the party in public office has the upper hand in control of the party organization in internally created and parliament-centered parties that were formed during the third wave of democratization (Biezen 2003, 31; Olson 1998, 434).

After noting the changing balance over power between the three faces of political parties, we should also deal with their functions for different party members. Briefly, political parties help deputies to overcome their coordination problems, articulate choices, aggregate preferences and supply labels under which candidates vie for public office (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Miskin 2003; Strom and Müller 2009). They provide incentives to different actors that are located at different layers of the party organizations. Panebianco (1988, 9) categorizes these incentives into two, namely collective and selective incentives. Collective incentives are benefits that the organization distributes equally among the participants and include “solidarity incentives – ‘intangible rewards created by the

act of associating’- and purposive incentives –‘intangible rewards that derive from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause’” (Bettcher 2005, 341). On the other hand, selective incentives are the benefits that the organization distributes only to some of the participants in varying amounts. They might include material incentives such as money and specific solidarity incentives –“intangible rewards arising out of the act of associating that can be given to or withheld from specific individuals (e.g. Offices)” (Bettcher 2005, 341).

Political parties are voluntary and collaborative devices for mutual gain that attract politicians, activists and the voters (Strom and Müller 2009, 29). Panebianco (1988, 25) identifies three recipients of organizational incentives: party members, activists and leaders. Party members are mainly motivated by solidarity and purposive incentives such as promises for future policy (Strom and Müller 2009, 36; Strom 1990, 575). On the other hand activists are the party’s small minority which continually participates and whose activities enable the organization to function (Panebianco 1988, 26). They supply the voluntary labor and funds required for the party to carry out its functions (Strom and Müller 2009, 36). Panebianco (1988, 25) states that the dividing line between party members and activists is unclear and argues that activists can be divided into two subgroups: believers and careerists. Believers are those whose participation depends primarily on collective incentives of identity, whereas careerists are those whose participation depends primarily on selective incentives. These selective benefits might include office payoffs such as posts in party body and in cabinet or electoral payoffs such as candidacies and parliamentary seats (Ceron 2011, 39). Careerists might be

interested in not only securing the existing selective benefits but also achieving higher political offices called ‘mega-seats’ (Depauw and Martin 2009, 109). Their responsiveness to selective incentives emphasizes their dependency to top leadership (Maor 1998, 16; Panebianco 1988, 27). For Panebianco (1988, 27) the careerists “constitute the main force behind the factional games, are often the human base for schisms, and represent a potential source of turbulence and threat to the organizational order which the leaders must neutralize”. They also constitute the pool from which future party leaders emerge.

Finally, party leaders are those that are willing to internalize the collective interests of the party and monitor their fellow partisans (Strom and Müller 2009, 32). They control selective incentives to reward cooperative party members and to punish those who defect. As such, they are likely to engage in conflict with the careerists (Depauw and Martin 2009, 109). In compensation, they are rewarded with attractive positions such as government offices. During the factional conflict, the party leadership will be more likely to take sides with the majority faction that has voted for the leader since party leaders are primarily concerned with keeping their status as party leader (Luebbert, 1986; cited in Back 2008, 74). This majority faction might be called the ‘dominant coalition’, which is defined by Panebianco (1988, 37–38) as a coalition of internal party forces that align with the party leader in ruling the host party.

### **3.2. Defining Factions**

Party split is a consequence of subgroup formation and conflicting subgroup identities and/or conflicting interests (Hart and Van Vugt 2006, 394). An analysis of the literature on factionalism reveals that these internal actors have been labeled as currents, fractions, factions, cliques, conflict groups, wings, interest groups, tendencies or clientele groups. This variety of labels stems from the fact that scholars working on factionalism have attempted to provide typologies of these sub party groups based on organizational and motivational dimensions.

Earlier works on factions considered any intraparty grouping that competed with each other for the realization of their goals as a faction. They were defined as semi-visible, irregular and unstable pre-party entities that could evolve into political parties (Chambers, 1963; cited in Belloni and Beller 1976, 534–535), or leader-follower groups with well-defined roles: “followers give support to the leader in parliament and in intraparty struggle; the leader has the primary responsibility to provide positions, funds and other necessities of a good life” (Nicholas 1977, 57). Against this, Rose (1964, 37–38) argued that factions are self-consciously organized as a body with a measure of discipline and cohesion that should be distinguished from tendencies defined as “a body of attitudes expressed in parliament about a range of problems: the attitudes are held together by a more or less coherent political ideology”. Rose was followed by Sartori (2005, 68–69) and

Bettcher (2005) in providing a typology of factions based on their organizational characteristics<sup>10</sup>.

Beller and Belloni (1978: 437; cited in Reiter 2004, 252) state that factions “structure the process of intraparty politics and decision making... define the struggle for control of the party, its policies, its leadership and offices, its doctrines, its treasury, etc... are devices for the distribution of party patronage –and, for governing parties, of government patronage; and they are instruments for generating and supporting rival candidates for public office”. They are relevant for party splits as they are the main actors initiating party splits and forming new parties (Boucek 2002, 461). Similar to social movements or citizen initiatives, they have a new demand or a neglected issue that they would like to be addressed (Boucek 2002, 459). They mostly pressure the party leadership for the fulfillment of the perceived demand but they might also evolve into a ‘proto-party’ (Lucardie 2000, 179) or ‘potential new party’ (Hug 2001, 40) in the sense that they mobilize their political resources in order to take part in the decision-making process.

For our subject, what is significant about factions are not their structural properties but their relationship, activities and consequences of these activities for party politics (Boucek 2009, 466). For this reason, we adopt the general definition provided by Zariski (1960, 33) and define factions as “any intraparty combination,

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10 For review of the definitions of factions and factionalism, see Belloni and Beller, 1976; Boucek, 2009. For more on the organizational typologies of factions, see Bettcher (2005, 343–344); Hine, 1982; Rae (1994, 8); Reiter (2004, 258); Sartori (2005, 68).




clique or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively –as a distinct block within the party – to achieve their goals”. These subgroups enable the dissatisfied members of the parent organization to voice their demands around a common leader.

Strom (1990, 566–568) has identified three models of party behavior: vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Accordingly, party members might be primarily interested in increasing their votes, holding offices or promoting certain issues or ideologies (Harmel and Janda 1994, 265). While all parties will hold multiple objectives, each party will have a primary goal that overrides other considerations. Likewise, factions have a primary goal. Zariski (1960, 33) states, goals of factions might include patronage (control of party and government office by members of the faction), the fulfillment of local, regional or group interests, influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe. Factions might simply be interested in distribution of offices or promotion of certain policies and ideologies. Although earlier studies on factions suggested that factions are self-seeking groups primarily concerned with the accumulation and distribution of selective and divisible goods such as party posts, campaign funds, government appointments and contracts, later works suggested that factions are not primarily interested in personal goals but are also motivated by policy and agenda-setting (Benedict 1985, 363; Sartori 2005, 22).

The accurate attribution of the motives of faction members is a hard mission. It is due to the fact that it is rare for politicians to use their own career interests as the explicitly-stated principles around which to organize a faction (Hine 1982, 41–

42). Indeed, even factions of principles struggle with the ruling coalition for controlling viable executive positions. For our subject, the relevance of the motivation of factions comes from the fact that they provide us with clues about the dissent within the host party. Then what are the reasons of dissent?

### 3.3. Stages of Splinter Party Formation



Splinter party formation is an outcome that is reached only after a series of stages. The first stage, dissent, is the phase during which dissident party members start to organize around a cause or during which already existent faction becomes disappointed with the party leadership's policies and strategies. The second phase, intraparty conflict, is the phase where dissent is manifested in the form of exit or voice. The final part, departure is the stage when dissatisfied dissidents decide on their final strategy (Figure 2).


### **3.3.1. Dissent**

Most parties pass through periods of unity and dissension. There are numerous reasons for dissatisfaction. Some of these reasons are contextual and impossible to be generalized. For example the Great Depression produced tensions and realignments in bourgeoisie parties in Norway, Germany and Spain (Hine 1982, 48). The British Conservative Party suffered from disunity which mirrored moments of major national choice: tariff reform and imperial preference at the beginning of the 19th century; question of defense and rearmament in the 1930s; the European Economic Community in the early 1960s; and the debate over monetary policy in the 1980s (Boucek 2009). The Sino-Indian border dispute split the Indian Communist Party into two factions (Katrak 1961, 139; Sharma 1976, 349). The occupation of Czechoslovakia by the USSR fractionalized the Turkish Labor Party (Lipovsky 1991, 99). The anti-colonialism movement led to a split within the French Socialist Party (Cole 1989, 80). The evolution of the Nation Party of South Africa into a party dominated by the Afrikaner bourgeoisie ended up with a party split (Charney 1984, 269). The victory of transition-coalitions eroded their unity and paved the way for frequent party splits and mergers in the second and the third wave democracies (Boucek 2002, 461; Cotta 1996). Lack of internal party democracy, elite competition for power, personal differences, intolerance and failure to handle factionalism within parties, personalization of power and the premium placed on personal loyalties led to the formation of breakaway parties in South Africa (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011, 7).

Nevertheless, we might derive from the literature a number of factors that facilitate factional conflict. These include the debate over the host party's policy

position due to rise of new demands or electoral defeat, conflicts over strategies over the coalition under multipartysim, conflicts over distribution of spoils, and leadership succession in polities with high degree of personalism (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Potential Reasons of Dissent**



### **3.3.1.1. Rise of New Demands and Pressures for Party Change**

The transformation of social cleavages is the most cited reason behind the change in party systems as well as the formation of new parties to represent new cleavages. Accordingly, the transformation of social cleavages leads to the rise of new voters whose demands should be articulated either by new or established parties (Ignazi 1992; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1988). However, the extent to which changes in cleavage structures find their reflection in party system change is a matter of debate. Although scholars working on party systems in established democracies argue that the transformation of the social cleavages in these countries is the primary reason behind the rise of new parties, those working on new democracies argue that there is not one-to-one fit between party systems in new democracies and the cleavage structures (Manning 2005; McAllister and White 2007).

In our model, the relevance of changes in cleavage structures comes from the fact that it forces established parties to reconsider their issue position. However, for this to occur, the cleavage structure has to be politicized (Özbudun 1981; Sayarı 1978). Once an existing or a new cleavage is politicized, the party leadership has to decide whether or not to adapt the new demands (Hug 2001, 46). Adapting these demands might sometimes require fundamental changes in party program, issue-position and even party label. Established parties are reluctant to incorporate new demands that require party changes due to three reasons. Firstly, they become identified with issue positions that constrain their political movement. Secondly, parties depend on the support of certain social groups that constrain their social appeal. Finally, parties are built on delicate power bases; party change might challenge cohesion and might deprive the party from the voluntary labor provided by political activists (Janda et al. 1995, 174). Nevertheless, some parties might decide to initiate change in their policy positions, especially following electoral defeats (Agh 2000; Janda et al. 1995; Somer-Topcu 2009).

All parties have a primary goal. The party's failure to realize its primary goal constitutes an 'external shock', which is defined by Harmel and Janda (1994, 267–268) as “an external stimulus so directly related to performance considerations on a party's 'primary goal' that it causes the party's decision makers... to undertake a fundamental re-evaluation of the party's effectiveness on that goal dimensions”. In this sense, the nature and scale of the shock depends upon the goal priority of the established party. Vote-seeking parties will be shocked by collapse of electoral support; office-seeking parties will be shocked by loss of participation in


government, whereas parties whose principal aim is ideological will be shocked by exogenous changes that undermine their credo (Duncan 2007, 71).

It should be noted that the influences of electoral defeat on intraparty politics depends on the perceptions of those holding the party ruling offices (Wilson 1994, 265). When party members believe that the party performed badly at the elections due to contingencies such as wars that have little to do with the policies that the party advocates, intraparty conflicts are less likely to arise (Janda et al. 1995, 185). Janda et al (1995, 182–183) have classified the perception of electoral results into five categories, namely calamitous, disappointing, tolerable, gratifying and triumphal, and defined calamitous elections and disappointing elections as follows:

A calamitous election is one viewed by party activists as decisively confirming a party's negative performance. Such an election can be evidenced by a large loss of seats in a single election or from a continued pattern of electoral decline or even stagnation. A party could also regard an election as calamitous if its major rival simultaneously achieved a huge victory that seemed to seal the fate of the frustrated party...A disappointing election is one viewed by party activists as a distinct rebuke to the party for its performance. Such an election could be evidenced by a moderate loss of seats and votes in single elections, by its rival's superior showing in the election, or by loss of a leading role in government. It could also be evidenced by a small loss of seats when activists expected a sizable gain.

From these, we might conclude that when the party members perceive electoral performance of the host party as calamitous or disappointing, it is more likely that dissent will occur.

**Figure 4: Rise of New Demands, Electoral Defeat and Intraparty Conflict**



The process of party change is a conflict-ridden one that mostly starts with an external stimulus in the form of a heavy electoral defeat or the rise of a compelling demand, continues with changes in party leadership and the composition of the dominant coalition and ends with changes in the party program (Harmel and Janda 1994, 279–280; Janda et al. 1995). The process is prone to division between those demanding and opposing party change (Figure 4). That is, the conflict takes place between reformers and conservatives. In the event that the reformist faction can control the ruling offices, including party leadership, party changes are more likely (Harmel and Tan, 2003). In such cases, the conservative faction is likely to feel a sense of perceived inability to voice dissent (Sani and Todman 2002, 1647). Besides, new norms proposed by the reformist faction might be perceived by the conservative faction as fundamentally denying group identity. When the conservatives perceive the new norms as subverting party identity, they might believe that the party that used to be no more exists (Sani and Todman 2002, 1648). When they feel that party identity has been subverted, they will see themselves as not having voice (Sani and Todman 2002, 1648). As a result, the

conservative faction might form a breakaway party or join an already existing party whose fundamental principles are consistent with the dissenting faction's members' beliefs, and values (Sani and Todman 2002, 1649). In this sense, if the reformist faction succeeds in controlling the party organization, the conservative faction is likely to form what Lucardie (2000) calls as 'purifier party' for purification of the original ideology of the host party.

In the event that the conservatives succeed in controlling the party organization, the reformers have two options. They might infiltrate into an established party which demands to articulate their interests or they might form a new party. This party might take the form of a 'prolocutor party', a type of new party formed to articulate particular interests without reference to an explicit ideology, or 'prophetic party', which articulates new ideologies that revolve around the new issues that are neglected by the established parties (Lucardie 2000).

### **3.3.1.2.Conflict over Formation of Coalitions**

The issues at stake might also involve the question of pure coalition strategy: the willingness to work with one set of parties rather than another (Hine 1982, 38). This is a potential problem in multiparty systems with parliamentary governments where none of the established parties is able to hold the majority of seats necessary for government formation. Under such contexts, the party's capacity to implement its program depends upon with whom it works in coalition, how strong that partner is, and what it will tolerate (Hine 1982, 38).



Earlier works on coalition-formation treated political parties as unitary actors in the bargaining process for coalition-formation (Druckman 1996, 398). While earlier studies on coalition formation assumed that parties were pure office-seeking unitary actors, later works have acknowledged that parties are policy-seeking actors so that they are more likely to form coalitions with ideologically closer parties (DeWinter and Dumond 2006). However, unitary-actor assumption of political parties has given way to studies that recognize the difficulties that the party leaders face during the formation and survival of coalitions. In 1986, Luebbert (cited in Back 2008, 74) argued that for party leaders who are in office, it is more important to remain party leaders than to remain in office. Hence, they will strive to minimize party disunity by attempting to base the party's attitude towards participation in a coalition on preferences that produce the least disunity (Maor 1998, 3). Since then, scholars have acknowledged the importance of factions in coalition formation. However, there are conflicting findings regarding the role of factionalism in coalition formation and termination. Most studies found that factionalism was negatively associated with a factionalized party's participation in coalition and the duration of coalition and positively associated with the duration of negotiations (Back 2008; Chambers 2008; Druckman 1996). Against this, Maor (1995, 1998) suggested that it is easier for factionalized parties to remain in coalition provided that there are organizational channels for diffusion of dissent. What is common in both studies with conflicting findings is that they highlight the importance of factional conflicts during the formation of coalition governments.

Coalition formation triggers intraparty conflict among factions regarding the stance of the host party towards participation in government. Especially,

ideologically-driven factions will be more concerned with the policies that the potential coalition partner advocates. Hence, it is likely that factions of principles are more likely to revolt against the party leadership in the event that the host party negotiates for a coalition with another established party ideologically distant from the host party.

### **3.3.1.3.Conflicts over Selective Benefits and Leadership Succession Crisis**

As stated before, political parties provide collective and selective benefits for their members with heterogeneous goals. Factions fight for the control of the party in order to provide more selective benefits to their followers and in order to influence the policy position of the parent organization (Boucek 2002, 459). Although factions of principles are primarily interested in policy goals, they have to fight for the control of the ruling offices within the party organization, as the factions of principles do in order to realize their policy goals. In this sense, the distinction between these two analytically separated faction types becomes blurred.

Fixed number of parliamentary seats and the mega-seats (i.e. higher political offices) result in factional competition for these limited seats. By establishing a set of internal rules that assign proportional payoffs to each faction, the party provides incentives for each faction to work together in order to maximize the party's strength (Ceron 2011, 133). In this sense, to the extent that the party leadership distributes office and electoral payoffs proportionally, a party split is less likely. However, party leaders are likely to enhance the strength of their followers within the party so that s/he can secure his/her status. The exclusion of a faction from

selective benefits might, in turn, trigger intra-elite conflict. In this sense, the way that party leadership distributes viable seats provides us with clues to understand the way that host parties split.

The distribution of selective benefits might turn to be a serious source of conflict during periods of leadership succession. The selection of party leadership is important especially in polities where party leaders possess enormous powers. Scholars working on Turkish politics have frequently underlined the importance of party leaders' decisions and choices in party politics in Turkey (Bektaş 1993, 71; Özbudun 2000, 83–84; Turan 2003, 157). As Sayarı (2002a, 3) states:

The importance of leaders in shaping political outcomes in Turkey stems largely, though not exclusively, from the near absolute control that they exercise over party organizations. By controlling the nomination of candidates in the elections, serving as the principal gatekeepers in the distribution of political patronage, and enjoying extensive autonomy (such as legal means to abolish local party units that oppose the central executive leadership and expel dissident party members from the organization) party leaders have managed to amass a great deal of personal power at the expense of organizational autonomy.

Given the highly important place of the party leader, it is natural for factions to compete to maintain the election of their leaders as party chair. Moreover, as doubts about the future of the present party leader increase, the balance of power within the party organizations is likely to be altered by new factional coalitions. Once one of the factions secure the election of its leader as the party chair, it is highly likely for the party leader to attempt to consolidate his/her power over the party organization by rewarding the electorate that elected him/her. This attempt will further alter the previous balance of power within the party. Besides, it might

require the dismissal of some of the existing party rulers in order to obtain vacant seats in ruling party offices. When the new leader alters the balance of power to the advantage of his followers, it is likely for the faction supporting the previous leader to revolt against the new leader. In this sense, not only leadership succession might result with party splits, but also the process after the election of the party's new leader is likely to be prone to intraparty conflict.

### **3.3.2. Intraparty Conflict: Voice or Exit**

Dissent starts in a latent way. It becomes observable when it is manifested by a group of dissidents in various forms, including party split. Intra-party conflict might take two forms: intra-elite conflict and elite-follower conflict. Intra-elite conflict is usually accompanied by elite-follower conflict since members of the conflicting elites have their respective followers in the party organization. Yet, they are analytically distinct modes of conflict (Maor 1998, 11). Intra-elite conflict is the conflict that occurs within the parliamentary party, including those between members of parliament and party representatives in government, whereas elite-follower conflict signifies any other internal disputes. As Maor (1998, 10–11) states:

Intra-elite conflicts, for example, may be manifested by resignation of elite members (i.e. the 'exit' option), dissension in parliament, and petitions and appeals to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in party strategy (i.e. the 'voice' option). Elite-follower conflict, by comparison, may be manifested by a decline in party membership (i.e. the 'exit' option), demonstrations of party activists and petitions or appeals to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in party strategy (i.e. the 'voice' option).

In 1970, Hirschman suggested that customers might react in the form of voice or exit when there is a decline in product quality. That is, dissatisfied members might leave the organization (exit), or express their dissatisfaction directly to some authority (voice) (Hirschman 1970, 4). According to Hirschman (1970, 38), voice is preferred to exit under two conditions:

An evaluation of the chances of getting the firm or an organization producing A “back to the track”, through one’s own action or through that of others; and a judgment that it is worthwhile for a variety of reasons, to trade the certainty of B which is available here and now against these chances.

This brings us to the loyalty option, which corresponds to an attitude of commitment to the organization (Amjahad and Sandri 2011, 7). According to Hirschman (1970, 77–78), any individual with considerable attachment to a product or organization will often search for ways to make himself/herself influential, especially when the organization moves in what s/he believes is the wrong direction. Because of this, loyal members of an organization are more likely to resort to voice rather than exit (Dowding, John, and Mergoupis 2000, 476).

Party split is initiated by the decision of the dissidents. When they are dissatisfied with the performance of the party leadership, they might simply depart from the party. In other words, they might resort to exit option either with or without attempting to voice their dissent within the host party (Dowding, John, and Mergoupis 2000, 473). After their resignation, they might simply remain as independent, switch to an ideologically neighboring party or form a new party. Although party switching is a preferable option for individual deputies, it is a highly costly option for the dissident faction. This is due to the size of the dissidents, which

makes it hard for the targeted party leadership to absorb the dissenting faction without harming the delicate balance of power within the target party. On the other hand, investing their resources in a political project that might not achieve success is likely to deter the dissenting faction from exit in the first place. For this reason, dissident faction is more likely to use the available means of dissent diffusion and voice their demands before departure.

**Table 5: Ways to Voice Dissent**

Within Party Organization	Party in Central Office	National Congress motions
		Call for extraordinary congress
		Competition for central offices
		Debate at the Executive Board
	Party in Public Office	Debate at Group Meeting
		Call for Group Meeting
		Competition for Group Executive Boards
Outside Party Organization	Party on the Ground	Competition for local executive boards
	Crossing the Floor	Abstention
		Bill proposal
		Voting against party bill
		Vote of no confidence
	Expose Dissent	Press Release
		Memorandum
	Exit	Resignation

Table 5 illustrates the possible ways of dissent manifestation. When dissatisfied members opt for voice, they might either use the party platforms or voice their demands outside the party. Firstly, members of the dissident faction might voice their dissent using the extraparliamentary organization. They might propose motions at the national congress. They might call for extraordinary congress to debate the party line. They might nominate candidates for administrative and disciplinary offices and party leadership. Moreover they might force the party leadership and executive boards to resign. In addition to these, they might attempt to increase the number of their supporters in the party on the ground to exert pressure over the party in central office. They might try to influence the


local congresses in order to maintain selection of their candidates. As in the case of Turkish political parties, they might compete for the control of local branches which are highly critical in controlling membership records (Turan 1988, 64). Through such control, they can eliminate the followers of competing factions and maintain the election of their supporters as delegates to the upper congress.

The parliamentary party provides another opportunity for dissidents to manifest their dissent. They might debate at the regular group meetings or call for parliamentary group to convene with a particular agenda. They might nominate their candidates for executive boards of the parliamentary party so that they can control the agenda setting process. They might also force the existing parliamentary party executive board to resign and then nominate their candidates.

Dissident factions' deputies might also voice their demands outside the party organization. As the study of Leston-Bandeira (2009, 701–703) on the Portuguese parliament shows, legislators of a dissident faction might manifest their dissatisfaction in various ways. Firstly, they might leave the committee or the plenary room just before a particular vote takes place. Secondly, they might delegate their right to vote to other deputies of the same party. Thirdly, with or without voting against the party line, they might release written explanations in order to justify their voting against the party line which will be published together with the parliamentary debate. Fourthly, they might present criticisms through questions or long speeches during the plenary sessions. Fifthly, deputies might act against the party line through amendments or bill proposals that are contrary to the party line. Sixthly, in order to show to the electorate that their interests have been defended in the assembly, legislators might organize press releases to express their

disagreements. Finally, dissident deputies might vote against the party line, and sometimes, vote against the cabinet.

**Figure 5: Potential Responses of the Party Leadership**



Party split is the result of the decision of dissidents. If the dissidents choose to remain silent or exit without engaging into competition with the party leadership, then the leadership of the party does not have to respond. In the first case, the party leadership lacks the information about the degree of discontent. In the second case, the party leadership has nothing to do to keep dissidents within the host party (Erlingsson 2002, 10). However, if the dissidents voice their dissatisfaction, the representatives of the established party have three options (Figure 5). They might simply accommodate the demands of dissidents, co-opt some of them to the ruling coalition or resort to disciplinary measures (Ceron 2011; Erlingsson 2002).

The party leader might simply accept the demands of the intraparty opposition and amend the party bylaw or the party program in order to realize their demands. Secondly, the party leader might co-opt the leadership of the dissenting



faction in order to neutralize intraparty opposition. Co-optation usually goes hand in hand with disciplinary measures and legitimation. In order to divide the dissident faction, the party leader might incorporate some of their members and expel the others. In order to weaken the dissenting faction, party leaders usually opt for the dissolution of party organs dominated by the dissidents. In cases of massive purges, the party leader is likely to seek a vote of confidence in order to legitimize his/her decisions.

### **3.3.3. Factors influencing the Outcomes**

Party split is a consequence of the interplay between the dissenting faction and party leadership. It occurs when the party leader refuses to accommodate the demands of the dissident faction and when the dissident faction insists on the realization of its demands. Studies on new party formation have shown that this interaction is conditioned by exogenous factors. The dissident faction is expected to leave the party when the costs of exit are low and when benefits of exit are high (Tavits 2006). However, even when costs of exit exceed perceived benefits of exit; dissident faction might be forced to exit when the party leader completely or partially purges members of dissenting faction.

Dissidents who voiced demands are expected to depart when the party leadership does not accommodate their demands. The party leader's resort to the option of whip depends on a number of endogenous factors, including the nature of disagreement, leadership's autonomy and the relative size of the dissenting faction both in the host party and in party system. On the other hand, while deciding

whether to retreat from opposing, the dissenting faction takes the exogenous factors into consideration. These factors influencing the calculations of the dissidents include the entry costs and perceived benefits of office (Table 6).

**Table 6: Factors influencing the Competing Factions' Strategies**

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
The Nature of Disagreement	<b>H.1:</b> Party leadership will be less likely to accommodate dissidents' demands in case of disagreements over party's policy goals.	Statements of dissident members regarding party change and their criticisms against the party leaders.
	<b>H.2:</b> The party leader is less likely to accommodate the dissidents' demands if the dissenting faction rejects the legitimacy of party leader's rule	
Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization	<b>H.3:</b> Party leadership is less likely to accommodate dissident faction when the dissidents do not hold a considerable number of supporters in the decision-making party organ	Distribution of seats of the ruling party office and the parliamentary seats among the competing factions.
	<b>H.4:</b> If the parent party is in government, the lower the parliamentary fragmentation and the effective number of parliamentary parties indexes, the lower the party leader is likely to accommodate the dissidents' demands	Parliamentary fragmentation and the effective number of parliamentary parties indexes
Leadership Autonomy	<b>H.5:</b> The more inclusive the party leadership selection method, the less likely it is that the party leadership will accommodate dissident's demands	Votes obtained by the party leader in Congress prior to and after the split.
Entry Costs	<b>H.6:</b> The lower the spatial the requirements, the less likely it is that dissidents will retreat	Spatial requirements
	<b>H.7:</b> The higher the disproportionality and the RRP, the more likely it is that dissidents will retreat	Disproportionality and RRP indexes
Perceived Viability of New Parties	<b>H.8:</b> The higher the volatility rates, the less likely it is that dissident faction will retreat	Total volatility index
	<b>H.9:</b> The higher the turnout rates, the more likely it is that the dissidents will retreat	Turnout Rates

### 3.3.3.1. Endogenous Factors

All factions are bound to be united by some kind of common endeavor. They might strive to change or conserve the policy position of the parent organization.

Or else, they might simply compete for the distribution of selective benefits. Studies on individual party splits demonstrate that parent organizations are prone to splits in case of major disagreements over policy goals or policy positions and strategies of the parent organization towards an external stimuli that leads to re-evaluation of the party's policy position (Boucek 2002; Cole 1989; Hine 1982). Hence, it might be concluded that, the threat to defect is credible when the ideological distance between the dissenting faction and the party's position increases (Ceron 2011, 137). This distance might stem from the party leader's decision to initiate party change. It might also stem from the perceived distance between the policies agreed upon by all factions and the actual measures employed by the party leadership. Therefore:

**H.1:** Party leadership will be less likely to accommodate dissidents' demands in case of disagreements over party's policy goals.

In cases where intraparty conflict is about the assignment of policy and electoral payoffs, the party leader might find it easier to integrate demands by redistributing viable seats or enlarging the number of seats. However, this is only possible when the factions agree on the party's major goals (McAllister 1991, 217). In the event that ideology does not act as a unifying bond, parties might be prone to splits (Owens 2003, 23; Reiter 2004, 268). Indeed, conflicts over selective benefits might threaten party unity in case their disagreement revolves around the legitimacy of party leader. If the dissenting faction directly attacks the party leader and attempts to undermine the legitimacy of his/her rule, then accommodation becomes impossible given that party leaders are primarily concerned with keeping their status as party leader (Luebbert, 1986; cited in Back 2008, 74). Due to this, even clientelistic parties might be prone to splits. Therefore:

**H.2.** The party leader is less likely to accommodate the dissidents' demands if the dissenting faction rejects the legitimacy of party leader's rule.

The nature of disagreement can be measured in two ways. Firstly, comparison of the programs of the splinter party and the host party enables us to find out the degree of ideological distance between the competing factions. Secondly, and more importantly, the criticisms directed by the dissidents provide us important clues about the reasons of dissent.

Strategies developed by the dissenting minority faction and the dominant coalition are also influenced by their relative powers and dispersion of their influence within the party organization. As Ceron (2011, 137) states, to be harmful to party unity, the dissenting faction should have a considerable number of supporters. This number is significant in relation with the party's organizational characteristics. As stated before, the party has three faces: party on the ground, party in central office and party in public office. The faction which holds the majority in the party face that is responsible for nominations and determination of party policies holds the control of the party. If the dissenting faction has a considerable number of supporters, or if the supporters of the dissidents increase over time, the party leadership is less likely to neglect the former's demands. On the other hand, if the dissenting faction is gradually losing its strength over the ruling party organization, then it is easier for the party leader to neglect their demands. Therefore:

**H.3:** Party leadership is less likely to accommodate dissident faction when the dissidents do not hold a considerable number of supporters in the decision-making party organ.

The relative strength of the dissenting faction and the party leader's faction can be observed through Congress results. Congressional votes of competing candidates and their lists both prior to the split and at the first congress after the split reveal the extent to which the competing factions received support. Secondly, the number of deputies/senators signing a memorandum and the number of resigned deputies show the number of the dissident faction's relative strength. Finally, the number of resigned or purged provincial chairs shows us the extent to which the dissidents are supported by the party on the ground.

In a parliamentary system in which government formation or termination depends on the support of the majority of deputies, the relative size of the dissenting faction should be considered together with the distribution of seats in Parliament. The dissenting faction might constitute a harmful threat for party unity if the number of seats it holds in Parliament is crucial for the maintenance of government. Otherwise, the leader of the ruling party might find it easy to neglect their demands. Due to this, when dissidents voice their demands in a predominant party system, the party leader might trade party unity with party cohesion and whip the dissidents. Moreover, if the party leadership finds itself in an electorally safe situation, such as the existence of an unviable opposition or a sub-competitive electoral market, the host majority party is expected to factionalize and party leadership is expected to neglect dissidents' demands than accommodate their demands (Canon 1978, 834; Sartori 2005, 76).

The relative power of the ruling party in Parliament can be measured by the indexes of parliamentary fragmentation and effective number of parliamentary parties. Parliamentary fragmentation weights parties by size and is obtained by first


taking the percentage of filled seats won by all parties as a decimal, squaring this value and summing these values for all parties. The figure obtained is then subtracted from one to produce the figure for parliamentary fragmentation. On the other hand, the effective number of parliamentary parties weights parties by size by first taking the vote share of each party as a decimal, squaring this value and summing these values for all parties. The figure obtained is then inverted to produce the figure for effective number of electoral parties (Siaroff 2000, 27–28). In both indexes, independents are ignored. Lower values indicate predominant parliamentary party system, whereas higher values indicate fragmented party systems. Therefore:

**H.4:** If the parent party is in government, the lower the parliamentary fragmentation and the effective number of parliamentary parties indexes, the lower the party leader is likely to accommodate the dissidents' demands.

The way the party leader is elected has considerable leverage upon the ways that intraparty conflicts are handled (Ceron 2011, 37). Accordingly, the party leader who is mainly concerned with keeping his/her chairmanship status is responsible for the allocation of payoffs within factions. The electorate that is authorized for leader election can range from a small circle of party elites to all party members (Figure 6). If the leader is nominated by small committees in which factions will retain considerable veto power over nomination of the party leader parallel to their relative strength, the appointed leader will be more likely to stick to the inter-factional arrangement on which the leader's delegation was based on (Ceron 2011, 36). On the other hand, if the leader is directly elected by a wide selectorate, the factions' veto powers will shrink. In such cases, the leader will be stronger vis-à-

vis the factions and will provide the party with the added value of his/her charisma (Ceron 2011, 37). In addition to this, the overall electoral performance of the party will help the party leader to retain the legitimacy of his/her rule and contribute to leadership autonomy.

**Figure 6: Leader Selectorate and Leadership Autonomy**



Source: Ceron (2011, 50).

Ceron hypothesized that the more inclusive the party leader election methods, the more party leaders have autonomy over the distribution of payoffs. The more the leader is autonomous in the distribution of payoffs; the more likely it is that the leader will disproportionally distribute the payoffs in favor of the dominant coalition. This, in turn, will prolong the disappointment of the minority faction. Therefore:

**H.5:** The more inclusive the party leadership selection method, the less likely it is that the party leadership will accommodate dissident's demands.

Here we should note that the introduction of public funding and access to the media has decreased the dependency of the party leadership on membership dues and voluntary labor provided by party members and activists. Moreover, as

stated before, developments in communication technology have contributed to the further concentration of power in the hands of the party leader and the ‘presidentialization of politics’ (Biezen 2003; Katz and Mair 2001; Webb and Poguntke 2005b). These developments have indirectly increased the autonomy of the party leader vis-à-vis a dissenting faction. For this reason, it is plausible to expect party leaders to whip or neglect the demands of dissidents after the introduction of public funding and developments in communication technology.

### **3.3.3.2.Exogenous Factors**

As stated before, party splits are likely to occur when the party leader refuses to accommodate the dissident faction’s demands and when the dissident faction refuses to step back in the factional strife. While deciding on their strategies, the leadership to the dissenting faction exercises some degree of foresight and is aware of the possibility that they might be expelled (Ceron 2011, 196–197). Hence, they take the costs of new party formation and potential viability of a new party into consideration before entering into factional competition with the party leader and the dominant coalition.

Entry costs are the costs required for the formation of a new party. These costs include the costs to register officially, to appear on the ballot, to pass through the visibility filter, and to access public offices (See Chapter II). Costs to register officially and to appear on the ballot are the petition, and spatial and monetary requirements which can be found by the analysis of the electoral laws, and if available, the party laws. Since petition requirements and monetary deposits



become meaningful in inter-variation studies, they are excluded from the scope of this study. On the other hand, spatial requirements are included since these requirements have varied with each institutional change in Turkey. Spatial requirement refers to the requirement to organize in a certain number of constituencies before entering into an electoral competition. If this number is high, it is likely that dissidents will prefer to voice than exit. Therefore:

**H.6:** The lower the spatial the requirements, the less likely it is that dissidents will retreat.

Disproportionality, the most cited variable impeding new party entrance measures the extent to which the results each party gets at the elections are reflected onto their seat shares in the legislative assembly (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 57). Similar to disproportionality, the index of relative reduction in parties (RRP) captures the reductive effects of electoral law on the party system by showing the extent to which electoral systems set barriers to entry (Boucek 2002, 467). Electoral systems producing disproportional vote-to-seat conversion and higher RRP increase the votes required to gain access to Parliament. When these rates are high, splinter groups are required to gain a higher number of votes for being elected. Due to this, they are expected to refrain from new party formation under such electoral systems. Therefore:

**H.7:** The higher the disproportionality and the RRP, the more likely it is that dissidents will retreat.

Disproportionality can be measured by various indexes<sup>11</sup>. Here, we use the Loose-more-Haneby Index. This is found by taking the absolute difference between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats won by a particular party (or the others) and summing this value for all parties (and others). Finally, since one assumes that one party's gains are another's loss, the figure is divided by two (Siaroff 2000, 29–30). On the other hand, the RRP index is expressed as the difference between the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) and is calculated as follows (Boucek 2002, 467):

$$\frac{ENEP - ENPP}{ENEP} \times 100$$

Another exogenous factor influencing the calculations of the dissidents is the perceived viability of a new party. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs are less likely to invest on new parties when the party system is institutionalized since they calculate that their potential new party will be less likely to receive support (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Wolinetz 1990, 221–222). Uninstitutionalized party systems characterized by high electoral volatility, low popularity of established political parties, low turnout rates, a weak grounding of parties in civil society, the financial dependence of parties on state subsidies for their revenues, frequent party switching, high effective number of parties, small party membership and weak

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11 For these indexes, see Kalaycıoğlu (2002, 57); Lijphart (1999).

partisan identities provide more room for new party entrance (Enyedi 2006, 229; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, 6; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004, 151). Among these factors, the volatility is the most important indicator of party system institutionalization. Higher total volatility figures indicate the lack of voter attachment to the established parties and the presence of free-floating voters which can be considered by the proto-party elite as the potential support base of a possible new party (Lago and Martinez 2011, 8). Therefore:

**H.8:** The higher the volatility rates, the less likely it is that dissident faction will retreat

This study uses Pedersen formula for calculating volatility. Total volatility is calculated by first taking the absolute difference between the percentage of votes won in the elections and the percentage won in the previous elections by a particular party and summing this value for all parties. The value obtained is then divided by two to yield total volatility (Siaroff, 2000: 32).

Dissident deputies might also find it easy to exit when the host party's viability decreases (Heller and Mershon 2003; Miskin 2003, 11). This decrease might be a consequence of a government crisis, corruption scandals, economic crisis or international developments (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2001; Lucardie 2000). Else, in the case of polities where voters vote for the party leader rather than the party name, developments related to the party leader might decrease the viability of the host party.

The viability of a possible new party and the host party can be measured by public polling. However, since public polling was unavailable to Turkey before the

1977 elections, political entrepreneurs could use the one-third senate renewal and local elections to assess support to the host party<sup>12</sup>. Due to this, this study will use public polling results if available, and the election results to assess the value of the host party. Additionally, voter turnout rates will be used for assessing the viability of a new party. Lower turnout rates might indicate electoral market failure (Lago and Martinez 2011, 12), anti-party sentiments (Lewis 2001, 545), and voters' discontent with established parties (Krouwel and Bosch 2004, 7) or even the system of governance (Lyons and Linek 2010, 393). These might signal to the proto-party elite that it is the right time to form their own parties to attract dissatisfied voters. Therefore:

**H.9:** The higher the turnout rates, the more likely it is that the dissidents will retreat.

#### **3.3.4. Departure: Splinter Party Formation versus Infiltration**

Once the dissidents depart from the parent organization, they have four options. They might abandon politics, remain independent for a while with the hope that their demands will be reconsidered by the host party leadership, infiltrate into an ideologically neighboring party that welcomes the dissidents or form a new political party to represent the issues which they believed were underrepresented

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12 The first pre-election study was conducted in 1977 by Üstün Ergüder and Selçuk Özgediz funded by the daily Hürriyet. The findings were published by Ergüder in 1980 (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 167).

by the parent organization (Berrington 1985). Although individual party members might simply abandon politics, this is less likely for members of a dissenting faction. This is due to the fact that they have a unifying theme to be realized (Boucek 2002, 459). Hence, they have three main options (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 19).

The first option, resign and remain independent, is mostly a preliminary step to the formation of a new party. That is, resigned deputies mostly wait for the echoes of their exit in the host party with the hope that their departure would trigger discontent of a larger section of the host party. During this wait-and-see period, they are less likely to engage in publicized negotiations with another established party since such an act will not be welcomed by dissidents' remaining sympathizers. However, once they realize that they will no more influence developments in the host party, they will either search for dialogue with the existing parties or start to work on new party formation (Turan 1985, 24).

Negotiations with a target party depend on a few factors. Firstly, deputies are likely to switch to established parties to ideologically neighboring parties (Berrington 1985, 442; Desposato 1997, 5; Heller and Mershon 2003). Hence, there should be a target party which is closer to the dissidents in terms of their policy goals. Secondly, this target party should be an electorally viable one so that investing on this party can increase the dissidents' chance for future payoffs (Desposato 1997, 2). Finally, a penetration of the dissidents to the target party should enhance expectations of the target party members (Laver and Benoit 2003, 216).

Infiltration into an established party is a viable alternative since the dissidents can benefit from the brand name of the target party if the target party has proven its viability (Berrington 1985, 456). However, there are various obstacles. For the dissidents, submission to discipline of the target party will bring new uncertainties. Since the dissident faction will be an outsider, it will be hard for the members of the dissenting faction to get into the narrow circle around the target party leader. This implies the persistent political inefficacy of the departed faction in the target party. Besides, even if they could reach for an agreement on allocation of certain ruling seats and nominations in coming elections, the extent to which this agreement will be realized is far from certain. This is because of the fact that they might lose their positions in the coming national Congress of the target party. Unless the dissenting faction is not accompanied by an important number of supporters that will also penetrate into the target party and that will maintain re-election of their patrons to ruling offices of the target party, their political career will depend on the mercy of the target party's delegates. Hence, departed dissidents will be less likely to merge into a target party.

In addition to the possible uncertainties after the merge, we might state three more reasons for the unwillingness of the dissident faction to merge with the target party. Firstly, switching to even an ideologically close party is likely to be regarded negatively by the constituencies of the switching dissidents (Miskin 2003, 5). Secondly, if the dissident faction has enough seats to act as a veto player in the formation of government, as in the case of fragmented party systems, dissidents will receive more office payoffs by new party formation rather than submitting themselves to the benevolence of target party (Boucek 2002, 463; Turan 2003, 157).

If the entry costs are low and the electoral market is permissive, then the dissidents might receive more payoffs by forming a new party than joining an established one. Due to these, if the electoral system sustains proportional distribution of the seats and if there is a perceived demand for a new party, then departed dissidents will be more likely to form a new party.

There are also various obstacles for the target party leadership to welcome the dissenting faction. First of all, the penetration of the dissenting faction to the target party should increase target party membership's expectations. If the target party holds a majority of the parliamentary seats, then it will be less likely to welcome the new comers (Laver and Benoit 2003). On the other hand, if the arrival of the dissidents increase collective payoffs such as government formation, it is likely that the target party will welcome the departed dissidents. However, the need of the target party for the departed dissidents will increase the bargaining power of the dissidents. The departed dissidents will be more likely to demand higher payoffs than their proportion. This, in turn, will lead to a deadlock in the negotiation process.

More importantly, infiltration of the dissenting faction into the target party will bring additional beneficiaries to the fixed payoffs. During the negotiations, the dissenting faction will demand a certain number of ruling seats so that they can influence the policy-making process and guarantee their nominations in the coming elections. This, in turn, will trigger discontent of the existing believers and careerists of the target party who believe that they should receive a larger amount of payoffs in return for their loyalty. In this sense, the target party will be prone to conflict over the arrival of the new comers. To the extent that the target party

leadership is autonomous from existing factions within the target party, it can handle the possible dissatisfaction after the arrival of the new comers. Paradoxically, the autonomy of the target party leader impedes the penetration option since leaders of both the dissenting faction and the target party will try to develop particular interests in the perpetuation of their positions (Turan 2003, 157). Due to these obstacles, the penetration option will mostly be an unattractive option.

### **3.4.Conclusion**

This chapter was an attempt to provide answers to four questions:

1. Why does dissent within a host party occurs?
2. What are possible options for dissenting faction and party leadership?
3. What are the major determinants influencing the ways that competing factions opt for?
4. Why does the dissident faction, after its departure from the host party, opt for forming a new party rather than joining a target party?

We have firstly provided definitions of political parties and factions. We have also dealt with different motivations that parties provide for different party members. Next, we have provided a model of splinter party formation that occurs in three stages: dissent, intraparty conflict and departure. During the first stage, dissent is latent and might be caused by a leadership succession crisis, a distribution of selective benefits, conflict over party change and conflict over coalition formation. The second stage is the stage where dissent is manifested in the form of either voice or exit. The way that dissent is manifested and the reaction of the party



leadership to dissent depends on a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. We have argued that party split was initiated by the dissenting faction and that it is likely for dissident faction to depart from the host party when its demands are not accommodated. The final stage starts with a wait-and-see period and ends with either infiltration or new party formation. The latter option is likely due to uncertainties in the event that the dissidents penetrate into an ideologically neighboring party, i.e. target party, and due to the decreases in payoffs to be distributed by target party leadership in the case of infiltration.

The theoretical explanations for explaining the entrance of genuinely new and splinter parties to the political market that were presented in the previous chapter relate to the behavior of political entrepreneurs to the ‘problem push’ and the ‘opportunity pull’ surrounding the proto-party elite. While this work does not underestimate the importance of social, political and institutional factors in shaping the preferences and strategies of the proto-party elite, it differs from these works in three ways. Firstly, since one cannot speak of party split without dealing with the role played by the factions of any kind, it introduces factions into the scope of analysis. Secondly, it underlines the differences between the genuinely new and the splinter parties and emphasizes the importance of the intraparty dimension of politics in splinter party entrance. Within this context, it presents some hypotheses to be tested for understanding the response of the party leader to the demands voiced by the dissidents. Finally, acknowledging that not all the factionalized parties are prone to party splits, this work underlines the importance of the strategies and the preferences of competing factions in understanding party splits.

## CHAPTER IV

### PARTY SPLITS AND SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE 1950s

Single party authoritarianism that characterized the early years of the Turkish Republic was replaced with multipartyism with the decision of the authoritarian incumbents for regime liberalization in 1945<sup>13</sup>. From the formation of the first opposition party in 1945 to the first free elections in 1950, both the ruling incumbents and the main opposition party gave birth to new parties. Demand for reform within the ruling Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP) ended with the expulsion of the reformists and the formation of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP), the main opposition party during the liberalization period (Lewis 1951, 321)<sup>14</sup>. Following the split of the DP from the CHP, both the ruling

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13 For a review of the reasons behind liberalization of the regime, see Albayrak (2004, 18–42); Karaömerlioğlu (2006).

14 For details on the formation of the DP, see Albayrak (2004, 43–62); Aydemir (2000, 109–121); VanderLippe (2005, 115–120); Yalman (1970, 31–39).

CHP and the DP were fragmented into the moderate and radical factions<sup>15</sup>. The DP gave birth to the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*-MP) in 1948 as a consequence of the conflict over the main opposition party's relations with the authoritarian incumbents during the liberalization of the regime<sup>16</sup>. Once democracy became "the only game in town" with the 1950 elections, albeit for a limited period, the DP was faced with two more splits. First, the attempts of the party in central office to intervene in the administration of the DP *Seyhan* provincial branch and exclusion of the nationalists from the DP ended up with the resignation of five deputies who formed the Peasants' Party (*Köylü Partisi*-KP) in 1952 (Ağaoğlu 1972, 74). Next, the discontent of the liberal deputies with the antidemocratic measures and poor economic performance of the DP government resulted in another split in the governing DP, which ended up with the formation of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*-HP) in 1955. The split that ended with the formation of the KP was a local incident but the split that ended with the formation of the HP was a more important development that shocked the DP leadership. Both splits were unexpected due to the electoral system, which converted votes to seats disproportionately.

The HP was formed in late 1955 by 26 deputies that split from the governing DP. Conflict within the DP was closely related with the deteriorating economic


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15 For more on the factionalism in the CHP during the liberalization of the regime, see Bila (1999, 123–131); Kili (1976, 96–100); VanderLippe (2005, 165–167; 171–174).

16 For details about the intraparty conflict in the DP and formation of the Nation Party, see Ağaoğlu (2002); VanderLippe (2005, 174–176); Yalman (1970, 126–128)

performance and the DP leadership's failure to meet its promises for further democratization of the regime. The conflict became manifest when a group of DP deputies initiated the legislation for the right to proof (*Ispat Hakkı*). The DP leadership's response to the dissident faction was the expulsion of the leaders of the faction, seeking a vote of confidence and promising to accommodate some of their demands. The leadership of the dissident faction who were purged from the DP prior to the fourth national congress of the DP first waited for the developments within the DP. DP leader Menderes reconfirmed the legitimacy of his leadership. Yet, he was shocked by a second wave of dissent over the riots in Istanbul known as the '6-7 September Incidents'. Due to the revolt of the remaining dissidents at the parliamentary group, Menderes stepped back. In return, the fourth Menderes government received a vote of confidence. Once the government was formed, the leading dissidents, who had expected that the remaining dissidents at the DP group would joined them, formed the HP (Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Analytical Narrative of Split within the DP**



This chapter deals with the intraparty conflict in the governing party that ended with the formation of the HP. It will start with the detailed analysis of the dissent in the DP parliamentary group. Next, the strategies developed by the dissenting liberals and the party leader's responses will be given in details. Finally, the endogenous and exogenous factors conditioning the decisions of the conflicting factions will be analyzed.

#### **4.1.Reasons of Dissent**

Dissent within the DP that ended with the formation of the HP stemmed from the policy distance between the liberal promises of the DP and the actual authoritarian measures of the DP government, and the government's failure to manage the economy that ended with an economic downturn in the mid-1950s.

As in the case of the second and third wave democracies, it was the intentions of various social groups to overthrow the authoritarian incumbents and the DP's promises for more freedom from the oppression of the state that led to the victory of the party in the 1950 elections. However, similar to these examples, the victory of the opposition eroded its unity and paved the way for disunity. The DP's overwhelming victories in the 1950 and the 1954 elections led the DP leadership to conclude that the DP was the real representative of the 'national will' (Demirel 2011, 151). They believed that the people would not vote for the DP if the party had alienated the nation (Ahmad 2003, 110). Besides, the economic boom until the 1954 elections and the machine politics helped the DP overcome social discontent. Hence, despite its liberal promises, the DP did not further democratize the regime

but leaned on the institutional design that the party had inherited from the single-party regime.

Following the 1954 elections, the government first introduced measures that would work to the advantage of the government. Hence, the electoral law (Law No. 5545, dated February 16, 1950) was amended with the Law No. 6428 (dated June 30, 1954). The amendment brought four novelties. Firstly, a candidate rejected by any party could not stand for another party in subsequent elections. With this amendment, the DP aimed to prevent the candidates that the DP rejected to join the ranks of the opposition parties. Secondly, the state officers that would run as candidates were required to resign six months prior to elections. Hence, the bureaucrats who had traditionally supported the CHP would be deterred from running in elections given that their re-appointment was determined by the government (Toker 1991, 27–28). Thirdly, political parties were forbidden from putting forward joint lists so that the opposition parties could not unite against the DP. Finally, the state radio would no more be used for electoral purposes. The implication of this amendment was the limitation of the usage of the radio only to the governing party (Eroğul 1970, 115; Sarıbay 1991, 126).

The DP government also increased its hold over the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy's autonomy from the executive branch was curtailed with the law that empowered the government to retire civil servants, including university professors and judges, who either had twenty-five years' service or were over sixty (Dodanlı 2007, 89; Sarıbay 1991, 126). Later, a new law enabling the government to dismiss any civil servant was passed (Eroğul 1970, 117). Moreover, the government

restricted the autonomy of universities by authorizing the Ministry of National Education with the right to dismiss academicians (Eroğul 1970, 117).

But, more importantly, the DP tightened the press law. Prior to the 1954 elections, a new Press Law that increased the maximum penalty for spreading inaccurate information calculated to endanger the political and economic stability of the country was passed (Lewis 1974, 146). Additionally, journalists were denied the right to prove what they published in case they were tried. Restrictions over freedom of the press led to the deterioration of relationship between Menderes and some prominent journalists, who had been demanding a liberal democratic order (Başar 1956, 21; Nutku 1979, 258). It was the introduction of these anti-democratic laws that alienated the liberal intelligentsia, which had supported the DP for its liberal promises (Başar 1956, 61; Karakuş 1977, 219–221; Nutku 1979, 300). Hence, the liberals of the DP concluded that the DP had changed during the chairmanship of Menderes.

In addition to the distance between the liberal promises of the DP in opposition and the actual measures of the Menderes governments, the economic policies of the Menderes governments constituted another source of opposition. Once in government, the DP began a period of deficit financing for rapid industrialization, heavy construction of infrastructure and expansion of agricultural production (Simpson 1965, 144). The agricultural sector was considered by the DP government as the driving force of economic development. Hence, cheap farm credits, import of agricultural machinery, distribution of state-owned lands, subsidies for agricultural goods, and virtual tax exemption for farmers were introduced to promote the development of the agricultural sector (Ahmad 2003,

115–116; Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 76–79; Zürcher 2004, 224). The mechanization of agriculture and contingent developments such as US financial and technical assistance, increased demands to Turkish agricultural exports and good weather conditions led to a sharp increase in the incomes of the agricultural sector, the backbone of the DP (Eroğul 1970, 98; Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 81). Additionally, the DP government invested in infrastructure to facilitate the export of agricultural goods and to exchange votes for government services (Ahmad 2003, 115; Simpson 1965, 147). The consequence of these policies was the support of the agriculture sector to the DP (Bulutay and Yıldırım 1969, 12).

The DP government also promoted the development of the private sector. The Industrial Development Bank was founded by the government in order to facilitate long-term internal and external credits and technical assistance to the private sector (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 70). However, the DP efforts in this direction “were of a nature to foster not the spirit of entrepreneurship but rather the spirit of profit” (Başar 1956, 34–39; Buğra 1994, 121). That is, the private sector did not invest in productive enterprises due to unstable conditions and high risks attached to capital ventures. Rather, the private sector concentrated their investment on speculative real estate and service sector and profited from contracting with the state (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 70–71; Buğra 1994, 123; Simpson 1965, 149). The DP government also kept the Turkish lira overvalued. This made the import of goods extremely profitable for the private sector as long as the government issued import licenses (Ahmad 2003, 116). The consequences of these policies were close relations between some of the businessmen and the politicians, rumors about wealth accommodation through illicit deals with politicians, illicit deals in the allocation



of import licenses, and abuse in the allocation of public funds (Buğra 1994, 122–124). Denial of the right to proof exaggerated these rumors.

**Figure 8: Economic Indicators (1950-1956)**



Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2009). Economic Growth indicates yearly change in Gross National Product (GNP). Inflation indicates yearly change in GNP Deflator.

By 1954, the economy began to show signs of stagnation (Figure 8). The side effect of the DP's rapid economic development policies was increasing inflation, foreign trade deficit and difficulties in the payment of a gigantic foreign debt (Eroğul 1970, 120; Simpson 1965, 146). Moreover, agricultural production fell and problems on importing capital goods and spare parts started (Ahmad 2003, 116). The DP government first asked for more foreign loans but the US government rejected the demand (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 72). Although the devaluation of the overvalued Turkish lira was the cure to economic problems, the DP government was worried about the political impact that devaluation would have (Simpson 1965, 148). Hence, the government turned to short-term high interest credits while trying to stop inflation through direct controls of prices and profits with the Law for Regulating Profits and the National Defense Law (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 72; Buğra 1994, 125). The side effects of the government's measure was widespread

black market, shortages and a marked distortion of the price structure (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 82; Simpson 1965, 148). It was within this context that the first wave of conflict within the DP parliamentary group came to the fore.

#### **4.2. Intraparty Conflict**

Dissent within the DP group was manifested when eleven DP deputies issued a motion for enabling journalists the right to prove the truth of what they had written in case they were taken to court (Karpas 1961, 438; Zürcher 2004, 231)<sup>17</sup>. The motion known as the ‘right to proof’ received public attraction due to the trial of the journalists publishing the rumors of corruption about a prominent DP minister, Mükerrrem Sarol (Baban 1970, 182–183; Karakuş 1977, 371; Sarol 1983, 247; Toker 1991, 105–106; Yalman 1970, 327). The debate over the proposal marked the summer of 1955 and the number of signatories increased to 19.

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<sup>17</sup> During the First and the Second Menderes cabinets, the DP group was also prone to conflicts. Dissent within the cabinet was manifested in the form of individual resignations. Hence, Avni Başman, Muhlis Ete, Nihat Reşat Belger, Refik Şevket İnce, Halil Ayan, Nihat İyriboz, Zühtü Velibeşe, Fahri Belen, Feyzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, and Enver Güreli, resigned from the first and second Menderes cabinets (Karakuş 1977, 198; Öymen 2009, 59). The DP group was also dissatisfied with the Menderes cabinets. Dissident deputies showed their dissent by abstaining from vote of confidence. Despite the fact that the DP group had 408 members, the first and the second Menderes governments were able to receive 245 and 244 votes during the voting at the DP group, respectively. 163 and 97 DP deputies did not participate in the group meeting on the government program respectively. When the first and second Menderes government programs came to the assembly floor, 126 and 73 DP deputies abstained from voting of the government programs, respectively. Finally, during the voting of the second Menderes cabinet, 61 DP members voted against at the DP group. These 61 deputies were known as the *Atmış Birler* or as the *Yaylacılar* (Ağaoğlu 1967, 146; Çakmak 2008, 158).

In the initial stage of the conflict, the DP leadership did not consider the dissent as a threatening one (Sarol, 1983: 482). However, the insistence of the dissident deputies that became known as *İspatçılar* or *Onbirler* and the support of journalists to their cause signaled to Menderes the seriousness of dissent (Toker 1991, 109). More importantly, the support of Feyzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, who were highly influential in the party, alarmed the DP chair and led him to perceive that his leadership had been debated (Toker 1991, 110).

The issue of the right to proof came to the agenda of the DP parliamentary group once again in October 1955. Two members of the General Administrative Council (GAC), the highest decision-making organ of the DP after the General Congress, signed the motion (Çakmak 2008, 161). In order to prevent a challenge posed by the *İspatçılar* at the coming congress, the DP GAC terminated the membership of these two members and declared that they would not be allowed to attend the fourth Congress (Sarol 1983, 484; Toker 1991, 156). Besides, the DP Ethics Committee demanded the 19 parliamentarians to submit their defense to the Party Council (Sütçü 2011, 171). In its declaration, the Committee regarded the *İspatçılar* as a “defeatist group who spoiled the solidarity within the party and whose only political capital was the right to proof” (Özçetin 2004, 71). In order to divide the dissidents, the Committee expelled nine of them, and asked the others to

withdraw their proposal (Karakuş 1977, 295)<sup>18</sup>. However, they did not retreat and resigned (Çakmak 2008, 162)<sup>19</sup>.

The *İspatçılar* first waited for the 4<sup>th</sup> DP congress (Bozdağ 1975, 52). Prior to the Congress, Menderes demanded the resignation of Sarol in order to weaken the opposition (Sarol 1983, 492–493). The fourth General Congress ended with the victory of Menderes. With the fourth congress, the DP chair retained his control over the party in central office. Moreover, he legitimized the expulsion with the Congress decision confirming the expulsions (Sarol 1983, 484)<sup>20</sup>. Next, Menderes curbed the support base of the *İspatçılar* by dismissing their supporters in local branches (Özçetin 2004, 73). Besides, in order to prevent further resignations and divide the *İspatçılar*, Menderes declared that they would be welcomed to the DP (Nutku 1979, 292).

Although Menderes retained control over the extraparliamentary party, he was far from suppressing the dissident within the parliamentary party. The remaining dissidents who did not back the *İspatçılar* were disappointed with the inability of the government to manage the 6-7 September incidents and the

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18 Purged deputies were Feyzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Safaettin Karanakçı, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, Behçet Kayaalp, Ziyaat Ebuziya, Mustafa Timur and Sabahaddin Çıracıoğlu.

19 Resigned deputies were Fethi Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, İbrahim Öktem, Raif Aybar, Şeref Kamil Mengü, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Ekrem Alican, Mustafa Ekinci and Kasım Küfrevi. Seyfi Kurtbek took side with DP chair Menderes. The dissidents were called the *Nineteens* (Çakmak 2008, 153–154).

20 For details on the fourth DP congress, see Toker (1991, 155–161).

mounting economic problems (Başar 1956, 99; Birand, Dündar, and Çağlı 2007, 87; Bozdağ 1975, 47–51). They demanded the government to share information about the 6-7 September incidents (Karakuş 1977, 285–288)<sup>21</sup>. When Menderes avoided the discussion of the events, the dissident deputies challenged Menderes's candidate Teyfik İleri, and elected their candidate Burhanettin Onat as the DP group chair.

**Table 7: Chronology of Events (1955)**

1 May	11 DP deputies submitted the motion for the right to proof. The proposal was rejected by the DP group.
6-7 September	Riots in Istanbul and Izmir
16 September	Changes in the cabinet due to the 6-7- September incidents.
9 October	Minister of State Mükerrer Sarol resigned due to allegation of corruption.
15 October	9 DP deputies were expelled. 10 DP deputies resigned.
15-18 October	Fourth DP congress ended with the victory of Menderes.
22 October	It was published that DP executive board would make changes in executive boards of at least 20 provincial organizations.
30 October	Burhanettin Onat was elected as the DP group chair against Menderes's candidate Teyfik İleri.
4 November	Menderes called the resigned deputies to join the DP.
19 November	The <i>İspatçılar</i> declared that they would form a new party
22 November	Debates at the DP parliamentary group.
29 November	Third Menderes government fell. Menderes asked for personal vote of confidence and won vote of confidence.
2 December	Mükerrer Sarol was temporarily dismissed from the DP on the ground that he had violated party unity.
5 December	President Bayar held a meeting with the DP deputies.
8 December	Fourth Menderes cabinet was declared.
14 December	Menderes government received vote of confidence. 398 votes were in favor of government program and 58 were against.
20 December	The HP was formed

Source: Compiled by the author from Ahmad and Ahmad (1976).

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<sup>21</sup> The status of Cyprus emerged as a major foreign relations problem for the DP in the summer of 1955. In order to show the international community the opposition of the Turkish people against the *Enosis*, demonstrations were held in major cities in September, 1955. However, the demonstrations got out of control and large-scale riots took place in Istanbul and Izmir. Following the incidents, Minister of Internal Affairs Namık Gedik and Minister of Defense Ethem Menderes resigned.

The challenge posed by the remaining dissidents within the DP led the resigned *İspatçılar* to assume that a new party would receive considerable support of the remaining dissident DP deputies. Besides, the *İspatçılar* were worried about Menderes's call for the *İspatçılar* to return to the DP since the call could divide the intraparty opposition (Çakmak 2008, 154). Yet, they estimated that Menderes would not retreat so that the remaining dissidents within the DP would switch to a party formed by the *İspatçılar* (Nutku 1979, 298). Hence, they held a press release for declaring their decision to form a new party. However, things did not happen as expected.

The DP group meeting met to discuss the 6-7 September incidents and criticized the DP government for its poor economic performance (Bozdağ 2004, 150–151; Karakuş 1977, 298–300; Nutku 1979, 295; Sarol 1983, 460–469). The dissidents in the DP group presented an interpellation on the subject of inflation and requested the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Foreign Affairs to resign (Bozdağ 1975, 55; Toker 1991, 172–173). Thanks to the solution proposed by a minister who was targeted by the dissident deputies, Mükerrerem Sarol, Prime Minister Menderes allowed all members of cabinet to resign and sought a vote of confidence for himself (Aydemir 2000, 235; Toker 1991, 168; Yalman 1970, 330). The solution known as the 'Sarol Formula' worked and only nine deputies voted against Menderes. In the end, the third Menderes cabinet fell.

The new Menderes cabinet and government program was presented on the 13<sup>th</sup> of December 1955<sup>22</sup>. In order to prevent further resignations from the DP, the government promised to fulfill all of the demands that the dissident members had presented to President Bayar (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 144). These included the abolishment of anti-democratic laws, an amendment of the election law, the right to proof, the introduction of an upper house, an efficient combat against black marketing and inflation, the liberalization of the press law and autonomy for universities (Çakmak 2008, 163). Besides, President Bayar met with DP deputies in order to convince them to support the new Menderes Cabinet. In the end, although 37 DP deputies voted against the government program and seven deputies abstained from voting, the Fourth Menderes cabinet received a vote of confidence (Nutku 1979, 297). With the compromise of the party chair, the *İspatçılar* whose number had increased to 23, had nothing to expect from the DP group.

#### **4.2.1. Exogenous Facilitators of the Split in the DP**

Comparative studies on new party entrance highlight the importance of institutional factors in explaining variances across countries. New party formation is expected to increase under permissive institutional contexts with low spatial requirements and lower barriers to enter Parliament. Additionally, political

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22 For details on the formation of the cabinet, see Toker (1991, 175–181).

entrepreneurs are expected to invest in new parties when the existing ones are not likely to receive much support. However, this was not the case for the split in the DP.

#### **4.2.1.1.Entry Costs**

During the 1950s, the requirements to register officially and to appear on ballot were favorable for new party entrance. According to the Law on Associations (Law No. 3512, dated June 28, 1938), political parties could be formed without prior approval<sup>23</sup>. There were no monetary deposit or petition requirements to appear on the ballot. The 35<sup>th</sup> article of the Law on Election of Deputies (Law No. 5545, dated February 16, 1950) stipulated that political parties could nominate candidates only for provinces that the political party had formed provincial branches in (Araslı 1972, 105). Hence, there was no spatial requirement to compete in elections.

Although there were few requirements for new parties to compete in elections, they were in a disadvantageous position in terms of using state's financial resources. During the 1950s, parties were not granted any subsidies (Aydın 2005, 246). Despite the absence of public funding, the governing party was in a highly advantageous position since it could use governmental resources in exchange for

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23 The fourth article of the Law No. 3512 (dated June 28, 1938) stipulated that prior permission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was required to form a political party. With the amendment of the law in 1946, the prior permission requirement for political associations was repealed (Gülsoy 2007).



votes, thanks to the centralization of economic and administrative resources in the hands of the executive (Özbudun 1988, 40). Actually, during the 1950s, the governing party functioned as a highly effective political machine and distributed party patronage in the form of roads, waterways, mosques and various public works. The party also established close contacts with the leaders of the business community who were accorded special privileges with respect to licenses, contracts or import quotations in return for large donations to the party (Sayarı n.d., 613). This posed a vicious cycle for the opposition as their failure to access governmental resources reduced the possibility to exchange votes with goods and services (Sayarı n.d., 613). Moreover, the governing party could legislate to take away the assets of the opposition parties<sup>24</sup>. Also, the governing party could decide regarding the dissolution of opposition parties<sup>25</sup>. Hence, investing on a new party was a highly risky option.

The opposition parties were also in a highly disadvantageous position to pass through the visibility filter. During the first half of the 1950s, the main political communication means, radio and the newspapers, were effectively used by the governing party (Öymen 2009, 56). Although the electoral law permitted all competitors to use the state-owned radio for a period of ten minutes during the

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24 For example, in December 1953, the Assembly passed the Law No. 6195 (dated December 14, 1953) for the expropriation of CHP's all movable and immovable assets.

25 For example, the DP group decided the temporary closure of the MP on the 8<sup>th</sup> of July 1953 because of its use of religion for political interests. The party was banned by the judicial court on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January 1954. It was reconstituted as the Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi in 1954.

electoral campaigns, the DP amended the law in 1954 to prohibit the opposition from using the state radio (Aksoy 1960, 63–64)<sup>26</sup>. The DP government also transferred the right to distribute official advertisements, which constituted an important source of revenue of the dailies, to the government so that it could selectively reward or punish newspapers (Demirel 2011, 204; Karakuş 1977, 190–193). Finally, the DP tightened the press law in order to punish those journalists criticizing the government.

Another factor inhibiting new party entrance was the electoral system. According to the 13<sup>th</sup> article of the 1924 constitution, legislative elections would take place every four years. There was no fixed size for the legislature; provinces served as constituency, electing one member if its population was under 55.000 and one additional member for each 40.000 inhabitants (Hale 1980, 402). Although party ballots, candidate ballots and preference ballots were permitted, the majority of the electorate used party lists without amendment (Hale 1980, 402). The combination of the simple plurality electoral formula with the voter preference for party lists led the party with the majority of votes in the constituency to win nearly all seats per district (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 74). Under the multi-member district

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26 According to the 45<sup>th</sup> article of the electoral law, parties that have nominated candidates at least for five provinces had the right to use the state radio. Those that had nominated candidates for more than twenty provinces could use the radio two times per day during the electoral campaigns. With the amendment of the electoral law in 1954, parties were denied the right to use the state radio for electoral purposes. Yet, the speeches about the acts of government were not considered as electoral propaganda. For statements of the DP and CHP leaders regarding the use of radio, see Aksoy (1960).

winner-take-all system, only the well-known politicians and regionally concentrated parties could gain access to Parliament (Hale 1980, 410).

**Table 8: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and the RRP Index (1950-1957)**

Year	Parliamentary Fragmentation Index	Effective Number of Electoral Parties	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	Disproportionality Index	Relative Reduction in Party Index
1950	0.25	2.16	1.33	30.22	41,3
1954	0.132	2.14	1.15	34.58	48,8
1957	0.568	2.42	1.76	20.91	30,4

Source: Calculated by the author from TÜİK (2008). Parliamentary fragmentation index, the effective number of electoral parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties are calculated by the formulae proposed by Siaroff (2000). Relative reduction in party index is calculated by the author by the formula proposed by Boucek (2002).

The most important consequence of the majoritarian electoral formula was the highly disproportional distribution of parliamentary seats, which worked to the disadvantage of minor parties (Table 8). The electoral system encouraged the search for electoral coalitions and party mergers. First, the CHP and the Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*-CMP) and then the CHP, the HP and the CMP negotiated electoral coalitions before the 1954 and the 1957 elections<sup>27</sup>. Moreover, following the 1957 elections, the KP merged with the CMP and the latter's name changed to Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*-CKMP) whereas the HP merged into the CHP.


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27 For details on the negotiations for electoral coalition between the CMP and the CHP prior to 1954 elections, see Toker (1991, 127). For details on the negotiations for electoral coalition between the CMP, CHP and the HP, see Toker (1991, 210–237).

Although the majoritarian electoral formula was expected to discourage fissiparous tendencies (Hale 1980, 410; Sayarı 2002b, 27), it did not prevent the rebellion of 19 DP members against Menderes's leadership. Despite the obstacles for new parties to pass through the visibility filter, the absence of state funding, and the electoral system producing high RRP and disproportional levels, the dissident political entrepreneurs within the DP revolted against the DP leadership (Hale 1980, 410). Hence, the formation of the HP invalidates our hypothesis that higher exit costs deter party splits.

#### 4.2.1.2. Viability of New Parties

**Figure 9: Indicators of the Viabilities of New Parties (1950-1957)**



Source: Computed by the author from TÜİK (2008).

The split in the DP does not confirm our expectation on the relation between the perceived viability of the new parties and the tendency of the dissidents to split (Figure 9). Prior to the formation of the HP, volatility levels had been the lowest in the history of the Republic. Indeed, volatility increased after the DP split. Additionally, although turnout rates had decreased slightly, this was far from signaling market failure. In this sense, the split within the DP does not confirm the

hypothesis on the relationship between the perceived viability of new parties and the dissidents' insistence on their cause.

#### **4.2.2. Endogenous Facilitators of the Split in the DP**

The split in the DP, despite the highly unfavorable institutional context and the lack of signals for the demand for a new political party, can be better understood with reference to the endogenous factors that enabled the party leader first to neglect but then to accommodate the demands of the dissident deputies.

##### **4.2.2.1. The Nature of Disagreement**

Disagreement within the DP was closely related with the distance between the promises of the DP and the actual measures employed by the DP government. Although the DP had promised to further democratize the country, the Menderes governments enacted a series of laws to curb the freedom of the opposition. From 1950 to 1955, dissidents within the DP came to the conclusion that constitutional changes should be introduced so that the DP would not repeat the perceived mistakes made during the single-party rule (Hürriyet Partisi 1957, 47). While dissidents first demanded to enhance freedoms, they demanded further institutional

changes once they formed the HP<sup>28</sup>. Although the DP programme promised to fulfill some of these demands, the remaining institutional demands were not found in the party programme<sup>29</sup>. Actually, the DP chair was against the unrestricted freedom of press and the proportional electoral system since the former “would be harmful to the democratic order” (Sütçü 2011, 169) and the latter would result in coalitions and consequent political instability (Ağaoğlu 1972, 63; Kocamemi and Ayberk 1958, 46). Although the fourth Menderes government had promised to fulfill the remaining demands of the dissidents that were parallel to the principles stated in the HP party program, the prior performance of the Menderes governments led the departed dissidents to conclude that the government programme was not reliable. Finally, the DP leadership believed that they represented the national will since the electorate had voted for the DP despite the authoritarian measures they were blamed for (Ahmad 2003, 110; Bozdağ 2006, 39). The majoritarian understanding of democracy on the part of the DP leader was not acceptable for the liberal *İspatçılar* who perceived themselves as the ‘idealists’ of the DP (Bozdağ 1975, 54; Nutku 1979, 306) and who believed that the DP was not only responsible for the emanation of the national will but also for the protection of fundamental freedoms (Hürriyet

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28 Among these institutional changes were the amendment of antidemocratic laws, a proportional electoral system, the introduction of bicameralism and the Constitutional Court, autonomy for universities, the establishment of a non-partisan administration, freedom of press and guarantees for the protection of civil liberties (Hürriyet Partisi 1956, 68–76).

29 The DP program emphasized the importance of the autonomy of universities (article 39), establishment of non-partisan administration (article 19), protection of fundamental rights and freedoms (article 8), and removal of the laws that violated the fundamental rights and freedoms (article 8) (Demokrat Parti 1952).

Partisi 1956, 68). Given that the dissidents did not believe in the sincerity of Menderes regarding the institutional reforms, the intraparty conflict within the DP was hard to resolve.

#### **4.2.2.2. Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization**

The party leadership is less likely to accommodate the dissenting faction's demands if the dissidents do not hold a considerable number of seats in the parliamentary party, party on the ground and/or party in central office. The case was no different for the DP. The DP group won 503 of the 541 seats in Parliament in the 1954 elections and the number of dissident deputies who had proposed the law on right to proof was only 19. Besides, the dissidents had only two seats in the DP GAC, which was composed of 15 members, including the party chair<sup>30</sup>. Finally, the dissidents did not have considerable support from the party on the ground. The declaration of Menderes about the rearrangement of provincial executive boards in 20 provinces might be interpreted as a sign that the opposition was strong in these provinces (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 142). However, given the fact that the 20<sup>th</sup> article of the DP bylaw enabled the GAC to dismiss members of the local executive boards, the intraparty opposition could not rely on provincial branches (Kabasakal

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30 These two GAC members were Feyzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu and Fethi Çelikbaş. Karaosmanoğlu received 760 out of 871 delegates and Çelikbaş received just 338 votes at the third DP congress.

1991, 205). Besides, the confirmation of the expulsion of the *İspatçılar* at the fourth Congress revealed that the DP leader was highly influential over Congress delegates. In short, the dissidents could not rely on the extraparlimentary party for voicing their demands. As such, the DP chair could easily neglect the demands of the opposition.

When the second wave of discontent hit the DP leadership in November 1955, Menderes chose to accommodate the dissidents' demands. This was due to the fact that the remaining dissidents had a considerable number of seats in the DP group as indicated by the election of dissident's candidate as DP group chair. Although the DP leadership's candidate for TBMM spokesman, Refik Koraltan, had received 193 votes, the dissidents' candidate, Fahri Belen, got 147 votes. Hence, the fourth Menderes government promised to fulfill the demands of the remaining dissidents in order to avoid them switching to a new party that would be formed by the *İspatçılar*. The support of 341 deputies to the fourth Menderes cabinet against the 44 DP deputies, which voted against the government or abstained, revealed that the *İspatçılar* had no chance to 'purify' the DP.

With respect to its mechanics, the 1950s conforms to the basic characteristics of two-party systems with a high ratio of two-party vote and seat concentration, and low level of support to the third parties (Özbudun 1981, 230, 2011, 59; Sayarı 2002b, 11). Moreover, deep-rooted rivalries, feuds or competition for supremacy between the opposing factions at local level contributed to a crystallization of voter alignments and the institutionalization of the two-party system (Sayarı n.d., 605–606). However, when the criterion of control over governmental power rather than the party number is used, the Turkish party system



during the 1950s falls into the category of a ‘predominant party system’ in which “the same party wins, over time, an absolute majority of seats (not necessarily of votes) in Parliament” (Sartori 2005, 173; Sayarı 1978, 44–45). Besides, the indexes of parliamentary fragmentation and effective number of parliamentary parties reveal that the electoral system produced a predominant party system in Parliament. Hence, Menderes did not accommodate demands of the *İspatçılar* until the second wave of intraparty revolt.

#### **4.2.2.3. Leadership Autonomy**

In the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Michels (2001, 135) stated that “in virtue of the democratic nature of his election, the leader of a democratic organization has more right than the born leader of the aristocracy to regard himself as the emanation of the collective will, and therefore to demand obedience and submission to his personal will”. Hence, party leaders that are elected by more inclusive election methods can easily neglect dissidents’ demands since a directly elected party leader can retain high legitimacy.

A more inclusive leadership selection method and consequent leadership autonomy from the factional pressures led the DP chair to neglect the demands of the dissidents. According to the 17<sup>th</sup> article of the DP bylaw, Congress delegates that were elected at the provincial congresses were responsible for the election of the party leader, and the members of the General Administrative Council and the Disciplinary Boards (Demokrat Parti 1952). Not only the direct election of the party leadership by the congress delegates but also the victory of the DP in 1954 elections

retained Menderes's legitimacy. The DP received 58.4% of the total eligible votes and won 503 seats in 1954 elections. Such a great majority led Menderes to perceive himself and the DP as the representative of the national will, for which he alone held himself responsible (Baban 1970, 178; Demirel 2011, 264; Toker 1991, 112). Hence, he could legitimize the authoritarian measures introduced to suppress intraparty opposition and the opposition party with reference to the electoral victory and to the leadership selection methods. As such, the DP leader could neglect demands of the *İspatçılar*.

#### **4.3. Formation of the HP**

Once it became clear that the dissident *İspatçılar* had no room within the DP, they started to work on a new party. The selection of a new party formation path stemmed from the HP leadership's overestimation of their support and the enmity between the DP and the CHP. Firstly, the HP leadership was in the idea that once a 'genuinely democratic' party was formed, the remaining dissidents within the DP would switch to their party as the Menderes cabinet would not fulfill its promises. They were expecting that at least 100 and at most 168 DP deputies would switch to their parties (Simav 1975, 50). Besides, the HP leadership was in the idea that they would win 33% of the votes and 203 seats in the next elections (Kocamemi and Ayberk 1958, 86). However, the increase of the seats held by the HP from 26 in December 1955 to 36 in January 1956 invalidated the HP leaders' expectation (Nutku 1979, 301).

Secondly, cooperation with the leader of the CHP, who was blamed for the single-party regime, was unlikely since such a strategy would challenge their claim that they were the true democrats, given that the memories of the authoritarian CHP rule were still fresh (Özçetin 2004, 91; Toker 1991, 182–183). Indeed, the HP leadership was in the idea that the CHP ceased to be a viable opposition party (Simav 1975, 20). It was only after the adaptation of the demands of the HP for institutional changes by the CHP in 1956 that the policy distance between the HP and the CHP decreased (Kili 1976, 118; Bila 1999, 172). On the other hand, infiltration into the CMP was an unviable option since the electoral history of the MP/CMP had revealed that the party was not a viable one<sup>31</sup>. In the end, the HP was formed on 20<sup>th</sup> of December, 1955.

#### **4.4.Conclusions**

The analysis provided above reveals the importance of endogenous factors in understanding party splits. Firstly, the dissidents and the party leader disagreed upon the fundamentals of the party's policies. Though the party leader believed that the party's primary goal was the emanation of the national will, the dissidents believed that the party should be responsible for enhancing freedoms. Secondly, the lack of support to the dissidents at the party on the ground led the party chair to

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31 The MP/CMP received 4.6%, 5.3% and 6.5%, of the votes in 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections, respectively.

easily neglect their demands. Additionally, the predominant party system decreased the bargaining power of the dissidents. Finally, the autonomy of the party leader from the factions made it easy for Menderes to expel the dissidents. Hence, despite the high entry costs and low viability of new parties, the dissidents of the DP had to depart from the parent organization due to the exclusionary measures of the party leader.

The analysis above also reveals that a party split is a dynamic process. Although the DP leader was reluctant to meet the demands of the *İspatçılar* at first, he accommodated the demands voiced by the remaining dissidents parallel to the demands of the *İspatçılar* when they challenged the Prime Minister. This was due to the fact that the remaining dissidents had a considerable number of seats in the DP Parliamentary Group and they could use the vote of confidence as a strategic tool to enforce their demands. When their demands were met by the DP leadership, the remaining dissidents did not prefer to switch to a new party. This was unanticipated by the *İspatçılar*, who were in the idea that a considerable number of deputies would join them once they formed the new party. In this sense, while the expectations about the potential defections from the parliamentary group might lead the proto-party elite to form a new party, the strategies of the leadership of the parent organization might prevent their expectations to come true. Due to this, the dynamic nature of the factional competition should be underlined in the study of party splits.

## CHAPTER V

### PARTY SPLITS AND SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE 1960s

On 27 May 1960, a group of low ranking officers put an end to the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP) rule. The transient government ruled the country until the convening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*-TBMM) on 25<sup>th</sup> of October, 1961<sup>32</sup>. Although the officers had declared that the so-called 27 May Revolution did not target any party or groups, the leaders and the deputies of the DP were imprisoned and were banned from politics<sup>33</sup>. This was followed by the dissolution of the DP on the ground that the party had not convened its regular convention (Gençkaya 1998, 166)<sup>34</sup>. The dissolution of the DP and the

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32 For more on the military rule between 1960 and 1961, see Giritlioğlu (1965, 170–216); Güngör (1992, 17–58); Weiker (1963)

33 The military incumbents incorporated an article to the new constitution in order to purge the imprisoned DP leaders from politics. The 68<sup>th</sup> article of the 1961 constitution stipulated that persons who had been sentenced to imprisonment for more than five years were not eligible for election even if such persons have been pardoned.

34 For more on dissolution of the DP, see Özbey (1961). For more on the Yassıada trials, see, Weiker (1963, 25–47).

imprisonment of DP leaders left an artificial political vacuum to be filled by new parties with new political entrepreneurs that would otherwise remain outside politics (Ahmad 2003, 138). Some of the former members of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*-HP) formed the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*-YTP), whereas the DP on the ground united around the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP).

Parties of the 1950s were prone to splits in the 1960s. Conflict within the Republican Peasants' and Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*-CKMP) over the party's stance towards the coalition with the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP) ended with the resignation of the party chair and the re-opening of the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*-MP) in 1962 (Abadan-Unat 1966, 184)<sup>35</sup>. Opponents of the left-of-center in the CHP formed the Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*-GP) as a reaction to the perceived contamination from the left. Next, conflicts over the stance of the CHP towards the military-imposed governments after the 1971 memorandum and disagreements over the limits of the 'left-of-center' ended with the formation of the Republican Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Parti*-CP) in 1972<sup>36</sup>. On the other hand, although the AP had come first in the 1969 elections, deputies who were disturbed by the increasing control of the AP chair over the party formed the Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti*-DkP) in 1970. From the critical

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35 For the history of the Nation Party, see Pancaroğlu (2006).

36 For details on intraparty conflict that ended with the formation of the CP, see Bakşık (2009, 298–387); Bila (1999, 236–266); Cılızoğlu (1987); Ecevit (1972); Kili (1976, 267–337); Neftçi (1997); Satır (1972)

realignment elections of 1973 to the next military intervention in 1980, no party splits occurred despite the prevalence of permissive conditions for new party entrance.

This chapter deals with intraparty conflicts in the two mainstream parties, the CHP and the AP that ended with the formation of the GP and the DkP, respectively. The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, since the institutional, political and social factors conditioning the dissident factions did not significantly change between the two splits in 1967 and 1970, the exogenous factors are analyzed in detail. Secondly, a detailed analysis of the three stages and the role of endogenous factors in explaining splits within the cases are presented. This part starts with the presentation of the reasons of the dissent within the CHP and continues with the analysis of the strategies and preferences of the competing factions and the role of endogenous factors in shaping these preferences. Next, the split within the AP is analyzed in the same order.

### **5.1.Exogenous Factors of Party Splits in the 1960s**

Prior to the initial elections, a new electoral law and Constitution was enacted. The new institutional design provided fertile ground for new party entrance by decreasing disproportionality. Additionally, the ban on the Democrat Party provided suitable conditions for new party entrance. Below we examine the external environment shaping the preferences of competing factions.

### 5.1.1. Entry Costs

The electoral law enacted prior to the initial elections in 1961 increased the spatial requirements compared to the 1950s. Similar to the case of the 1950s, there were no monetary or petition requirements for political parties to appear on the ballot. However, compared to the previous electoral law, the new Law on Election of Deputies (Law No. 306, dated May 25, 1961) stipulated that only parties that had established their province and sub-province branches in at least 15 provinces six months before the elections or had parliamentary group were eligible to register for the ballot with the condition that they convened their respective general congresses. Hence, if the dissidents could pass the ten seat threshold that was required to form a parliamentary group, they could override the spatial requirement and appear on the ballot with no additional costs<sup>37</sup>.

Nevertheless, new parties were in a more advantageous position in terms of protection from arbitrary government decisions, such as passing through the visibility filter and benefiting from public funding. The new constitution made the dissolution of political parties more difficult. Unlike the 1950s during which the political parties could be dissolved by the Cabinet or ordinary courts, only the

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37 10<sup>th</sup> article of the Law No. 306 (dated, May 25, 1961) stipulated that parties that held their executive committee meeting, that organized at least in the 15 of 67 provinces six months before the elections took place, and that nominated candidates for all seats available in these 15 provincial electoral districts were eligible to register to the ballot. The article was amended with the Law No. 533 (dated February 13, 1965). With the amendment, new parties with parliamentary groups were exempted from the spatial requirements (Arash 1972, 108).



Constitutional Court could deliver the verdict to dissolve political parties in the new Republic. In this way, political entrepreneurs were relatively freer from the governing party's interventions.

One of the important novelties brought by the new Political Parties Law (PPL) (Law No. 648, dated July 13, 1965) was the introduction of public funding for political parties. 74<sup>th</sup> article of the PPL stipulated that parties that received 5% of the votes in former elections were eligible to receive public funding<sup>38</sup>. As such, although splinter parties could not benefit from public funding until they entered the next elections, they could gain the right to public funding if they win 5% of the votes or at least ten seats. Given the absence of national thresholds and the introduction of proportional representation, minor parties could easily benefit from public funding. Hence, the costs of new party formation decreased.

Finally, new parties were in a more advantageous position in terms of gaining access to the state media compared to the 1950s. The 1961 constitution retained the state monopoly over the radio and television broadcasting, granted autonomy to the State Radio and Television Corporation and relatively freed the

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38 The Political Parties' Law (PPL) was amended in 1968 in order to provide public funding for splinter parties. However, the amendment was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1969. In return, the PPL was amended in 1970 in order to provide funding for parties that received more than 5% of the votes in previous elections. This time, the Court found any state subsidies as unconstitutional in respect of substance. Due to this, the parties agreed on a constitutional change. The only splinter party that benefited from public funding without participating in elections was the GP (Aydın 2005, 248; Perinçek 1968, 56). With the constitutional amendment in 1971, political parties that received at least 5% of the total eligible votes or that won at least ten seats had the right to public funds.

institution from government interferences (Weiker 1981, 171). More importantly, the 52<sup>nd</sup> article of the Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voters' Registrations (Law No. 298, dated April 26, 1961) guaranteed access of political parties to the state-owned radio, one of the main media of electioneering in the 1960s. As such, it became easier for new parties to pass through the visibility filter.

**Table 9: Electoral System for the National Assembly in the Second Republic**

	<b>1961</b>	<b>1965</b>	<b>1969</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1977</b>
Term	4 years	4 years	4 years	4 years	4 years
Electoral formula	D'Hondt with district-level quota	D'Hondt with national remainder	Classical D'Hondt	Classical D'Hondt	Classical D'Hondt
District Magnitude	1-31	1-31	1-33	1-38	1-44
Ballot structure	Separate ballots/ Open list	Combined ballot paper/ Closed list	Combined ballot paper/ Closed list	Combined ballot paper/ Open list	Combined ballot paper/ Open list
Candidate nominations	Central office quota (10%)	Primaries (95%) +central office quota (5%+1/3 of national remainder)	Primaries (95%) +central office quota (5%)	Primaries (95%) +central office quota (5%)	Primaries (95%) +central office quota (5%)

Source: Compiled by the author from Kalaycıoğlu (2002, 64); TBMM (1982); Tuncer (2003).

The military regime significantly changed the institutional design within which the political parties operated (Table 9). The 1961 Constitution maintained the supremacy of Parliament but introduced a second chamber, a demand voiced by the opposition parties in the 1950s. According to the new constitution, the TBMM was composed of two houses: the National Assembly (*Millet Meclisi-MM*) and the

Senate of Republic (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu*)<sup>39</sup>. The MM, the lower house to which the government was responsible consisted of 450 deputies that were elected for a four-year term. Each province was taken as a provincial election district and the number of deputies to be elected was assigned in relation to the constituent unit's population (Hale 1972, 394). Although the new electoral system did not bring any legal threshold, the candidates had to receive votes more than the constituency threshold that changed according to district magnitude (Türk 1993, 21). Open list ballots were used for 1961, 1973 and 1977 elections though voters refrained from using preferential voting<sup>40</sup>.

The new electoral system posed a challenge to party cohesion in two ways. Firstly, competition for the realistic positions started<sup>41</sup>. Under the multimember district majoritarian electoral system of the 1950s, the rank of the candidate in the party list was not much important since all candidates could be elected if the party won a plurality in a constituency. However, with the introduction of the proportional system in the 1960s, the importance of realistic position increased, since there could be winners from multiple parties in the same electoral district. Hence, whether a candidate was at the first or the second position in the party list

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39 The MM shared its legislation power with the Senate but could override the veto of the Senate. According to the 92<sup>nd</sup> article of the constitution, if a bill was approved by the lower house but rejected by the Senate, the former had the right to enact the law if it exceeded the percentage that the Senate rejected the bill.

40 Only four candidates in two provinces was elected with preferential voting in 1973 whereas voters did not change lists proposed by parties in 1961 and 1977 elections (E. Tuncer 2003, 133).

41 Realistic positions include all positions or districts that are seen as winnable before the elections (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 14).

influenced his/her electoral fortune. Consequently, the competition for these positions increased (Araslı 1972, 69). More importantly, the introduction of the primaries intensified factional conflict for nominations. As will be demonstrated below, this was one of the main reasons of factional conflict in the AP.

**Table 10: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and RRP Index, (1961-1977)**

Year	Parliamentary Fragmentation	Effective Number of Electoral Parties	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	Disproportionality Index	Relative Reduction in Party Index
1961	0.694	3.40	3.26	2.80	4.12
1965	0.619	2.71	2.62	2.98	3.32
1969	0.574	3.33	2.35	14.72	29.43
1973	0.699	4.31	3.32	11.12	22.97
1977	0.595	3.13	2.47	11.03	21.09

Source: Computed by the author from TÜİK (2008). Disproportionality, parliamentary fragmentation, the effective number of electoral parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties are calculated by the formulae proposed by Siaroff (2000). Relative reduction in party index is calculated by the author by the formula proposed by Boucek (2002).

Secondly, and more importantly, the shift from a majoritarian to proportional electoral system decreased entry costs. The new electoral law (Law No. 306, dated May 25, 1961) which brought the D'Hondt electoral formula for allocation of the MM seats produced more proportional vote-to-seat conversion (Table 10)<sup>42</sup>. Given the fact that both the disproportionality and the relative reduction in party index decreased significantly compared to the 1950s, dissident deputies were more likely to be re-elected in case they formed splinter parties (Hale 1980, 411). Hence, the lower entry costs provided dissident deputies more

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42 The electoral system was amended in 1965. With the amendment, constituency threshold was abolished in favor of national remainder system which worked to the advantage of the smaller parties (TBMM 1982, 104; Türk 1993, 21). Following the 1965 elections, the AP majority in the parliament re-introduced the D'Hondt system for elections to the TBMM (TBMM 1982, 109).

bargaining power in their conflict with the established party leadership (Sayarı 2002b, 12).

On the other hand, the proportional electoral system indirectly increased the viability of new parties since the system paved the way for coalition governments which increased the bargaining power of minor parties, including the splinter ones, in coalition-formation (Ayata and Ayata 2001, 91; Hale 1980, 411; Sayarı 2002b, 27). By entering into coalitions, these minor parties could gain access to state resources for distributing them to their clients. However, despite the multiparty system after the 1973 elections, which increased the benefits to be obtained by forming splinter parties, party splits did not occur between 1973 and 1980. This shows that the proportional electoral systems or the multiparty systems are not sufficient for encouraging party splits on their own.


#### **5.1.2. Viability of New Parties**

The perceived viability of new parties is likely to facilitate the entrance of new parties either formed by dissident entrepreneurs of the existing parties or by those with no relation to the established parties (Tavits 2006). Party splits and splinter party formation are expected to be more frequent in the subsequent elections in uninstitutionalized party systems with high levels of volatility and during periods when there is a trend of decreasing turnout rate (Lago and Martinez 2011; Tavits 2007).

An analysis of the Turkish case reveals that turnout rates significantly decreased after the military intervention (Figure 10). With the exception of the 1961

elections, all elections held during the Second Republic had lower turnout rates compared to the majoritarian elections of the 1950s. Scholars explained this difference with reference to four reasons: deinstitutionalization of party system due to the ban on the DP (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 18); replacement of the mobilized voting with autonomous voting behavior during the phase of modernization (Özbudun and Tachau 1975, 470–471; Özbudun 1976), the degree of polarization (Hale 1980, 411) and the frequency of elections (Weiker 1981, 143).

**Figure 10: Indicators of Viability of New and Established Parties (1961-1977)**



Source: Computed by the author from TÜİK (2008)<sup>43</sup>.

The frequency of party splits and new party entrance and the trend of decreasing turnout rate until the 1973 elections confirm our expectation that party splits are more likely to occur when the turnout rates are in a trend of decrease. During the period, the mainstream parties were prone to party splits. However,

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43 Disparities between the total volatility values we have calculated and the values calculated by other scholars such as Hazama (2007) and Tosun (1999) stem from the fact that we have taken the AP as a genuinely new party, whereas Tosun (1999), Siaroff (2000) and Sayarı (1978) have taken it as continuation of the DP. Hazama (2007) and Özbudun (2000) have omitted 1961 elections. Similar to Siaroff (2000), we included the 1961 elections into analysis in order to demonstrate the effects of military interventions on the voter preferences.

when the turnout rate entered a pace of increase with the 1973 elections, no splits occurred even though factionalism was persistent in some parties such the CHP (Bila 2009, 279–289). Indeed, the increase in turnout trend was accompanied by fusions. For example, rather than using their coalition potential, dissident members of the AP, who had formed their parties, returned back to the parent organization in 1975 (Bozdağ 1975, 120–123). In this sense, although the 1980 military intervention prevents us from making further generalizations, the relationship between turnout rate and dissidents' insistence on their demands seems to be validated.

Electoral volatility, which is an important indicator of the degree of party system institutionalization, is expected to influence calculations of the dissident party members before their departure from the host party. Volatility is significant for party splits since it signals to ambitious dissidents the existence of a floating voter base that may vote in case they form a party of their own. However, the relationship between volatility and party split is not straightforward. The increase in the supply of new parties due to party splits might increase total volatility. On the other hand, political entrepreneurs might interpret the high levels of volatility as the signal of a free floating voter base that might support a new party so that they might be more likely to depart from the host party. In this sense, there is a tautological relationship between the total volatility and new party entrance (Krouwel and Bosch 2004; Lago and Martinez 2011).

The tautological relationship between volatility and new party entrance is evident in the case of the post-1960 Turkish party system. High levels of volatility during the 1960s stemmed from the dissolution of the DP and the fragmentation of

the right. When the DP was dissolved, former DP voters mostly voted for the AP, and to a less extent, the YTP, CKMP and later the MP. The success of the AP in capturing the DP votes in 1965 elections at the expense of the YTP contributed to electoral volatility in 1965 elections. On the other hand, the downward trend of volatility was reversed in the 1973 elections due to the split in the AP and the entrance of the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*-MNP) as a genuinely new competitor on the right. Hence, it was the increase in the supply of new parties and the support of voters for these right-wing parties that led to an increase in volatility levels in the 1973 elections.

Nevertheless, the deinstitutionalization of the Turkish party system with the military intervention in 1960 contributed to the rise of a floating voter base whose demands could be answered by splinter or genuinely new parties. This is especially true in the case of the formation of the DkP that received the blessing of the former Democrats who withdrew their support from the AP chair due to the latter's reluctance to meet the former's demands for the restoration of their political rights<sup>44</sup>.

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44 Once they were released, the former Democrats who were supported by the dissidents of the AP demanded the restoration of their political rights (Karpas 2004, 59). The fourth General Congress of the AP decided to amend the constitution in order to restore the political rights of the released Democrats. Besides, the CHP proposed to amend the 68<sup>th</sup> article of the constitution, which acted as a barrier for the Democrats' political rights (Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 156). Yet, under the pressures of the President and the military, the AP Senate Group referred the proposal back to the commission (Sakallıoğlu 1993, 79; Uraz 1970, 50–75). In return, former President Bayar called the former DP voters not to vote for any party in the 1969 elections (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 374). Bayar's call and the decrease in turnout rates coincided. On the other hand, once the DkP was formed, Bayar took part in the electoral campaigns of the DkP and called for voters to vote for the DkP (Bilgiç 2002, 232; Bozdağ 1975, 106). This time, the DP leader's support to the DkP concurred with the support of the 11.9% of the voters to the DkP.



On the other hand, the dissidents of the CHP probably believed that the classes which they believed had been alienated from the party due to changes in the policy orientation of the CHP could be attracted by a new party. In this sense, the dissidents in both the AP and the CHP hoped to receive the votes of the voters who were dissatisfied with the performance of the parties that they had voted for in previous elections.


It should be also noted that the high levels of volatility did not encourage dissidents to form their own parties after the 1973 elections. In this sense, though volatility provides us with clues about the entrance of new parties formed by dissidents until the 1973 elections, the extent to which volatility rates prepared the ground for new party entrance after the 1973 elections is far from clear.

In addition to the electoral indicators presented above, party splits might be a consequence of the poor economic performance of the governing parties. The inability of the governing party to deal with economic difficulties might trigger intraparty conflict. Moreover, such a situation might also decrease the viability and potential electoral support for the governing party in coming elections. This, in turn, decreases the benefits to be obtained by the dissenting faction from remaining in the governing party. Consequently, the dissenting members might be likely to depart from the ruling party.

The expectation stated above is not confirmed (Figure 11). The AP, which governed the country from 1965 until the 12 March 1971 memorandum had a positive economic performance. Despite this, the AP was prone to fission in 1970. In the case of the CHP, the party had been prone to intense factional strife starting

with 1976. The tension in the party reached its peak when the Third Ecevit government failed to deal with economic problems in 1979 (Bila 2009, 284). Despite this, the CHP did not split. In this sense, the economic performance of the governing party seems not to contribute to party splits.

**Figure 11: Economic Indicators (1962-1980)**



Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2009). Economic growth indicates the yearly change in Gross National Product (GNP). Inflation indicates the yearly change in the GNP Deflator. Averages for each legislative term are taken. Average for the period 1972-1973 is taken independently since the military had imposed above-party governments.

In short, the new institutional design decreased disproportionality and enabled minor parties, including newly formed splinter parties to benefit from the state-owned radio broadcasts and public funding. Such a permissive institutional context decreased the costs of entry and encouraged party splits and new party formations in the 1960s. However, the absence of party splits despite the enduring institutional permissiveness and persistent factionalism in the second half of the 1970s shows that institutional facilitators are not solely responsible for party splits.

In addition to this, the downward trend in voter turnout rate seems to be associated with party splits in the 1960s. Especially, as will be dealt below, dissatisfaction of the former DP members with the AP leadership seems to play an

important role for the low turnout rates in 1969 elections. Moreover, the increase in volatility due to the military intervention seems to have paved the ground until the 1973 elections but not after that. Finally, unlike the case of the DP, in which the economic performance of the government played an important role in triggering intraparty conflict, the AP experienced party split even though the government had a positive economic performance.


Although these institutional and contextual variables are influential over the strategies developed by competing factions, party split is also a consequence of endogenous variables, including the nature of disagreement, the relative power of competing factions and leadership autonomy. The following part will deal with the analytical narratives of the party splits in two mainstream parties, namely the CHP and the AP, and analyze the endogenous factors facilitating party split and splinter party formation.

## **5.2. Intraparty Conflict over Party Change: Split in the CHP and Formation of the Reliance Party, 1967**

The split within the CHP, which ended with the formation of the GP, was a consequence of the party's veteran leader İsmet İnönü's attempt to define the CHP as left-of-center. İnönü was suspicious of the ambitions of the conservative faction; hence, he allied with the reformist faction known as the New Movement. The defeat of the CHP in the 1965 elections provoked factional conflict that ended with the split in 1967. The New Movement gained the control of the ruling offices at the 1966 Congress, thanks to the support of party chair. The opponents of left-of-center,

who were of the idea that the left-of-center slogan was the prime reason behind the electoral defeat in the 1965 elections, publicized the intraparty conflict and demanded the party chair to stop supporting the reformist faction. Although İnönü tried to balance the conflicting factions at first, he then traded party unity for party cohesion. Hence, he called the extraordinary congresses to convene in order to stop the dichotomy between the parliamentary and extraparlimentary parties. That ended with the defection of the dissident conservatives and the formation of the GP (Figure 12).

**Figure 12: Analytical Narrative of the Split within the CHP**



### 5.2.1. Dissent


Dissent in the CHP was closely related to the veteran CHP leader's support for the rising New Movement, which advocated the party's move to the left-of-center. Starting in the mid-1950s, the CHP had started to pay attention to socioeconomic issues (Karpas 2004, 114). However, during the 1950s, the party was mainly concerned with institutional changes such as the introduction of bicameralism and proportional representation. When these demands were met with

the 1961 Constitution, the salience of socioeconomic issues increased. Simultaneously, the rise of the Turkish Labor Party with its capable and articulate leaders and the debates of leftist intellectuals who had organized around the journals of *Yön*, *Özgür İnsan* and *Forum* in the first half of the 1960s found its reflection in the debates on the party's policy position (Ayata 2002, 103; Kili 1976, 211; Özbudun 1981, 231; Zürcher 2004, 237). It was within this context that the party's stance on the new issues was debated at the Party Assembly in 1962 (Sağlamcı 1974, 170). During the meeting, a group of Party Assembly members stated that the CHP could no more claim to represent the interests of all social classes after the introduction of proportional electoral system and that the party had to abandon its reliance on local notables (Koloğlu 2000, 71). Against this, the conservatives stated that there was no need for reforming the CHP and argued that the demands voiced by the reformers would be a clear violation of Atatürk's legacy (Simav 1975, 78–84). Nevertheless, the conflict over party change was postponed until the 1965 elections.

Prior to the 1965 elections, the CHP had already started to change. The 17<sup>th</sup> Congress held in 1964 concluded that the ideals stated in 'Primary Aims Declaration' and 'Principal Targets' had been realized. Therefore, a new phase called 'the Progressive Turkey Ideal' started (Tachau 1991, 107). Next, the electoral manifesto for the 1965 elections was prepared by representatives of both the conservatives and the reformers (Altuğ 2001, 138). The electoral manifesto of the

CHP included promises that signaled the party's move towards the left<sup>45</sup>. Finally, in the June of 1965, the CHP chair İsmet İnönü stated that the CHP as an etatist party could be located at the left of center (Bila 1999, 214).

**Figure 13: Electoral Performance of the CHP (1950-1977)**



Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2008).

The 1965 election results constitute an example of what Janda et al (1995) defined as ‘calamitous elections’. The CHP came the second with its votes declining to their lowest level since 1950 (Figure 13). More importantly, the victory of the AP just five years after the military intervention was perceived as a ‘counter-revolution through the ballot’ (Arcayürek 1992, 13). The consequences of electoral defeat for the CHP were twofold. Firstly, as will be shown in detail below, the

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45 In its electoral program, the CHP promised tax and land reforms, general health insurance, nationalization of the strategically important mining industries, state regulation over the oil industry, state-private sector partnership for industrialization, elimination of the regulations that challenge the development of national industry, promotion of the establishment of cooperatives and participation of labor to the management of state-owned enterprises (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1965).

factional conflict over party change intensified. Secondly, the factions and their leaders became clearer.

The left-of-center slogan and the 1965 electoral results divided the CHP into two main factions: the reformers and the conservatives. The reformers, known also as the ‘left-of-center movement’ (*Ortanın Solu Hareketi*) or the ‘New Movement’ (*Yeni Hareket*), argued that the CHP had to acknowledge class conflicts and abandon representing the landed interests and the conservative notables<sup>46</sup>. They pointed out the party’s relationship with the notables as the prime reason behind the electoral defeat in 1965 (Toker 1993, 88). Prior to the elections, Turhan Feyzioğlu and Nihat Erim were considered as the natural leaders of the movement (Neftçi 1997, 91; Sağlamer 1974, 175). However, following the electoral defeat, Feyzioğlu took side with the conservatives, whereas Erim chose to remain neutral (Koloğlu 2001, 302). Those who demanded party change asked Bülent Ecevit for the leadership of the New Movement (Koloğlu 2000, 78). Ecevit welcomed the call with the permission of İnönü and became the leader of the New Movement (Akar and Dündar 2008, 118; Altuğ 2001, 138).

Until the 1965 elections, conservatives were headed by Ferit Melen. Following the elections, Turhan Feyzioğlu, who was once considered as the leader

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46 The New Movement was composed of three groups (Toker 1993, 79). First were the deputies that were recruited during the 1950s which demanded more voice. Second were the academicians who would later be known as the Mülkiye Junta (*Mülkiye Cuntası*). Finally, the Marxists of the CHP advocated the left-of-center positioning of the CHP (Akar and Dündar 2008, 119; Altuğ 2001, 132).

of the reformers became the spokesmen of the conservatives (Koloğlu 2001, 302). Unlike the New Movement, which adopted a self-ascribed name, the conservatives did not adopt a clear name. Rather they were labeled by the press as the Seventy-Six (*Yetmişaltılar*) or the Eights (*Sekizler*) and by the CHP leader as ‘right-wing’ (Emre 2007, 109). Against the New Movement, the opponents of party change were of the idea that the left-of-center indicated a party change, which was unnecessary and against Kemalist principles (Bila 1999, 218; Koloğlu 2001, 131). Hence, they demanded the party leader to abandon the left-of-center policy.

Leadership succession constituted another dimension of dissent. The CHP chair İnönü was born in 1884 and was at the age of 81 in 1965. Following the 1965 elections, he held a series of bilateral meetings with the leading CHP politicians. In the end, İnönü reached the conclusion that the conservatives and Feyzioğlu posed a threat to his leadership (Aykan 2003, 203; Bakşık 2009, 229; Cılızoğlu 1987, 85). Among the leading CHP members, Ecevit was perceived as the least ambitious politician by İnönü (Altuğ 2001, 71)<sup>47</sup>. Hence, starting with the 1965 elections, İnönü supported Ecevit while trying to preserve the balance of power among factions.

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47 It was not only Inonu but also opponents of Ecevit that welcomed his leadership to the new movement. According to Nihat Erim and Turhan Feyzioğlu, two important competitors of Ecevit, Ecevit would not pose a threat their influence over the party administration (Altuğ 2001, 71; Koloğlu 2000, 78; Sağlamer 1974, 234).



### **5.2.2. Intraparty Conflict**

Following the 1965 elections, the conflict within the CHP revolved around the relationship between the slogan of the left-of-center and the electoral defeat (Abadan-Unat 1966, 161). A group of party members were of the idea that the use of the left-of-center slogan was a mistake. Others argued that it was the association of the left-of-center with communism that alienated the masses (Bila 1999, 218). More importantly, the conservatives argued that the emphasis on land reform alienated the conservative notables, the traditional support base of the CHP (Toker 1993, 88). Against this, the representatives of the rising reformist faction argued that it was the alliance with the conservative notables that constituted the obstacle to the success of the CHP (Toker 1993, 88). İnönü first opted for a compromise between the competing factions. The CHP did not use the slogan left-of-center in the 1966 senate one-third renewal elections. Although the Party Assembly and the CHP Parliamentary Group issued declarations that confirmed the party's policy position, the party's opposition to socialism was underlined in order to find a middle way between the competing factions (Koloğlu 2001, 297; Sağlamer 1974, 199). However, with the CHP's defeat in the 1966 by-elections, the conflict between the factions intensified (Toker 1993, 78).

The dissident right wing first used party platforms in order to voice dissent (Sağlamer 1974, 199). This was followed by the memorandum of 76 deputies who demanded the CHP leader to declare that the left-of-center slogan alienated masses from the CHP (Bozkır 2007, 276). The dissidents also competed with the New

Movement at the 18<sup>th</sup> general congress. However, they lost the competition with the New Movement over the Party Assembly, hence the party in central office<sup>48</sup>.

**Table 11: Chronology of Events (1965-1967)**

10 October 1965	1965 elections were held. The AP won a majority of seats and votes.
19-21 November 1965	The influence of left-of-center slogan over the CHP's defeat was debated at the CHP parliamentary group.
5 June 1966	Senate one-third renewal elections. CHP avoided using the term left-of-center.
10 June 1966	The CHP group confirmed the left-of-center policy.
4 August 1966	76 deputies demanded İnönü to declare that left-of-center slogan alienated masses from the CHP
9-12 August 1966	The Party Assembly meeting confirmed that CHP was located at the left-of-center.
24 September 1966	In the Istanbul provincial congress, İnönü warned that the dissidents would lose their seats in case they insist on their opposition to party policies.
14 October 1966	The book "Left-of-Center" written by Ecevit was published.
18 October 1966	18 <sup>th</sup> General Congress convened. The New Movement won 23 out of 43 seats of the Party Assembly. Conservative faction won eight seats.
October 1966	The Party Assembly elected Ecevit as secretary general.
31 December 1966	The Party Assembly declared the CHP's adherence to the left-of-center. Eight members opposed the declaration.
2 January 1967	Dissidents published a booklet claiming that Ecevit was attempting to turn the CHP into a socialist party.
8 January 1967	The Central Executive Committee accused the eight of being in collaboration with the opponents of the CHP.
9-11 January 1967	The Conflict between Ecevit and Feyzioğlu intensified.
25 January 1967	The CHP group meeting convened with the demand of dissidents. 84 of the deputies voted in favor of the existing group executive board.
4 February 1967	Provincial chairs declared their support to Ecevit.
15 March 1967	The Central Executive Committee demanded the expulsion of the eight dissidents but the parliamentary group rejected the demand.
16 March 1967	İnönü called for extraordinary Congress to convene
28 April 1967	4 <sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Congress convened. The congress decided to adopt changes demanded by the chair. 33 deputies and 15 senators resigned.
12 May 1967	The Reliance Party was formed.

Source: Compiled by the author from Ahmad and Ahmad (1976); Emre (2007).

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48 Party Assembly was the highest decision-making body of the CHP. It was composed of the chair, chairs of the women and the youth branches and 40 members elected at the General Congress. The Assembly was responsible for administrating the party between two general congresses and for taking any decisions on behalf of the party with the exception of changing party bylaw and deciding on party dissolution. Moreover, the Assembly had the right to select and dismiss the secretary general and the members of the Central Executive Committee.

Following the 18<sup>th</sup> General Congress, the CHP was torn into two competing organs: the parliamentary group supported the conservatives, whereas the New Movement held the majority at the party in central office (Karakaya 2008, 338). Dissidents competed with the New Movement for the control of the group executive boards and maintained the election of their leaders to the group executive boards even though the party chair was against this (Erim 2006, 840). They also continued to voice their opposition at the Party Assembly meetings. During the Party Assembly meeting in December 1966, they criticized the secretary general for his ambitions to turn the CHP into a socialist party (Emre 2007, 130). They also opposed the Party Assembly resolution and demanded the incorporation of the statement “the CHP was not a socialist party and would not be a socialist party”, a statement made by İnönü and issued as a Congress resolution at the 18<sup>th</sup> General Congress. However, this was rejected by the New Movement. Following the publication of the debates in *Ulus*, the daily of the CHP, the dissidents issued a communique accusing the party administration for violating the party programme and the electoral manifesto (Emre 2007, 131). Next, they published a booklet accusing the secretary general Ecevit for his alleged ambition to turn the CHP into a socialist party (Kili 1976, 233–234). Besides, despite the opposition of the party in public office, the dissidents called for the CHP MM group meeting in order to seek for vote of confidence from the parliamentary groups. 88 deputies participated and the parliamentary group executive board, which was held by the dissidents, received the support of 84 deputies (Bektaş 1993, 80; Neftçi 1997, 108). Following the Party Assembly meeting on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March, 1967, the dissidents issued a

memorandum accusing Ecevit and the New Movement of an inclination towards socialism (Emre 2007, 134–135).

Before dealing with the CHP leader İnönü's response to the dissenting conservatives, a few points should be mentioned. Firstly, the CHP leader İnönü traditionally discovered fresh talents and supported them against prominent CHP politicians in order to protect his leadership (Toker 1993, 83–85). During the course of liberalization in 1945, İnönü first gave his support to Nihat Erim and the moderates in their competition with the hardliner prime minister Recep Peker (Bila 1999, 136). During the confrontation between secretary general Kasım Gülek and the party chair İnönü in the 1950s, the latter discovered a new talent, Turhan Feyzioğlu, as a potential leader against Gülek (Toker 1993, 87). Once Feyzioğlu lost his reliability during the CHP coalitions in the first half of the 1960s, İnönü encouraged Minister of Labor Bülent Ecevit for the leadership to the reformist wing of the party. Finally, in his confrontation with the secretary general Ecevit during the 12 March period, İnönü supported Kemal Satır against Ecevit (Kurt 2002, 64).

Secondly, İnönü conventionally traded party cohesion for party unity (Heper 1999, 136). The demands of the four CHP deputies for intraparty reform ended with İnönü's speech openly calling on them to form a new party in 1945 (Bila 1999, 110). Moreover, İnönü challenged the dissident faction at general or extraordinary congresses and relied on his charisma and consequent impact over Congress delegates. In order to purge Kasım Gülek from the CHP, İnönü called the delegates of the 15<sup>th</sup> General Congress to choose either him or Gülek (Bila 1999, 189). The situation was not different in the later factional conflicts. When he wanted to remove the conservatives, he competed with them at the fourth extraordinary

Congress and persuaded delegates to support Ecevit. Finally, when he decided that he could no longer work with the New Movement, he challenged the faction at the fifth extraordinary Congress (Arcayürek 2006, 63).

During the conflict between the conservatives and the New Movement, the CHP leader supported the latter while trying to keep the party united. İnönü constantly declared his support to the left-of-center and warned its opponents that they would lose their positions in the CHP at provincial congresses (Ecevit 1966, 67; Kili 1976, 224). Although the candidates of the New Movement were not well-known by Congress delegates, the Movement could succeed in winning 23 of 43 Party Assembly seats with the support of İnönü (Altuğ 2001, 147). Though İnönü was in favor of the election of a moderate figure that would not provoke the conservatives, Bülent Ecevit, was elected as the secretary general by the Party Assembly<sup>49</sup>. From then onwards, Ecevit held the second important seat in the party<sup>50</sup>.

When the confrontation became public in the late 1966, İnönü retained his support for the New Movement. In reaction to Feyzioğlu's attempt to seek the support of the parliamentary board, İnönü called for the minor congress to convene.

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49 İnönü was in favor of election of a moderate politician that would be also welcomed by the conservatives, Kemal Satır as secretary general. However, Ecevit insisted on holding the office. Ecevit was also supported by Satır and Nihat Erim. In the end, Ecevit received 31 votes out of 43 members of the Party Assembly and was elected as secretary general (Altuğ 2001, 147; Bakşık 2009, 236; Sağlamer 1974, 223).

50 The secretary general was the leader of the Central Administrative Committee. The members of the Committee and secretary general were elected by the Party Assembly among its members.

During the Congress, İnönü stated that he did not want to work with the leading dissidents (Bozkurt 1969, 118; Kili 1976, 235). This was followed by the Party Assembly meeting on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March, 1967. Following the meeting, the Central Executive Committee called the Parliamentary Group Board of Discipline to punish the dissidents. However, the disciplinary board members took side with the conservatives and refused the demand of the party in central office (Özbudun 1968, 229). Failing to discipline the dissident *eights*, İnönü concluded that they should be expelled. Hence, he called the extraordinary congress to convene in order to amend the party bylaw to authorize the Party Assembly to refer its members to disciplinary boards.

The fourth Extraordinary General Congress convened on the 28<sup>th</sup> of April, 1967. During his speech at the opening of the congress, İnönü stated that the conservatives overrode the authority of the extraparliamentary party by publicly declaring their opposition to the decisions taken at the General Congress, Party Assembly meetings and the provincial chairs' meetings (İnönü 1967, 7). For İnönü, the harmony between the extraparliamentary and parliamentary parties had been broken. İnönü stated that he was responsible for maintaining the harmony between these two parts of the party so that the party bylaw should be amended to empower the party chair to perform his duty. In the end, Congress decided for the amendments in the party bylaw to authorize the Party Assembly with the right to refer Party Assembly members to the Higher Board of Discipline (Kili 1976, 237). In order to prevent huge scale resignations, İnönü declared that only the eight Party Assembly members would be referred to disciplinary board (İnönü 1967, 21–22). Despite this, 33 deputies and 15 senators resigned from the CHP, criticizing the

CHP leader for promoting socialists and for violating the authority of the deputies (Karakaya 2008, 332–333). In response, the CHP Party Assembly accused them of attempting to rule the parliamentary party as a separate party, for publicizing the conflict and charged them with treason against the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1968, 9–10).

### **5.2.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split**

Although the institutional design was highly permissive for the entrance of splinter parties, the decision of the dissidents to depart from the CHP was more a result of the neglect of their demands by the party chair. This was due to the ideological nature of factional disagreement, the weakness of the dissidents in the extraparlimentary party and the existence of a highly autonomous and charismatic leader that took part with the New Movement.

#### **5.2.3.1. The Nature of Disagreement**

Intraparty conflict in the CHP was to a most extent ideological and revolved around two main points. The first point of disagreement was the relationship between the role of the left-of-center slogan and the CHP's defeat in 1965 elections. According to the conservatives, the ordinary Turkish citizen had a distaste of the word 'left'. Hence, the redefinition of the party's position as the left-of-center ended with the electoral defeat in 1965 elections (Toker 1993, 88). This argument was opposed both by the party chair and the secretary general. The CHP chair argued that the party members' support to the left-of-center invalidated the conservatives'

claims (İnönü 1967, 10). In a similar vein, Ecevit (1966, 42) argued that the Turkish people were already at the left-of-center with their belief in democracy, equality and social justice. The problem for Ecevit was not about the left-of-center, but with the CHP's failure to deliver its message to the masses.

Secondly, factions disagreed on the relationship between the left-of-center and party change. The conservatives argued that the left-of-center indicated a change in the party's policy position. They believed that this was a subversion of the party's original ideology, Kemalism (Karakaya 2008, 332–334). They were in the idea that the New Movement had a hidden agenda to convert the CHP into a socialist party in the long run (Karakaya 2008, 331). Against them, both İnönü and Ecevit claimed that the left-of-center did not refer to a change in party policies; rather it was a redefinition of the party line with the concepts that had become popular. As İnönü (cited in Emre 2007, 81) states:

While our country is developing, I wish to define the terms 'leftist', 'rightist' that is used in the current civilization in economic and political terms. We were saying the same thing while we were statist for 40 years. I said we are on the left-of-center for this reason. In fact we have been on the left-of-center since we said we are secular... You become on the left-of-center if you are on the left-of-center. But you do not mess with someone else's religion conviction. You do not make them communist or create insecurity. You are reformist. You are not a conservative. Your constitution stands on the social basis. You adopt social justice.

In a similar vein, Ecevit (1966, 68) stated that the left-of-center was a movement that stemmed from the party's original ideology. According to the CHP chair and the secretary general, the left-of-center was a short definition of the Kemalist principles of populism, etatism and reformism (Ecevit 1966, 64–65; İnönü



1967, 9). This need stemmed from the enactment of a reformist constitution and the changing social needs brought by the modernization process (Bila 1999, 215; Ecevit 1966, 13).

Both İnönü and Ecevit rejected the claim that the left-of-center indicated the first step of the transformation of the CHP into a socialist party (İnönü 1967, 9). For İnönü, the left-of-center was different from socialism with its emphasis on nationalism, secularism and republicanism and the rejection of the domination of a particular class (CHP, 1967: 11). In Ecevit's opinion (1966, 32), the left-of-center would never turn into a communist movement since it was in favor of democratic order, private property rights and since it was against the tyranny of not only the wealthy but also the state (Ecevit 1966, 34–36). Indeed, both İnönü and Ecevit argued that the left-of-center would set barriers to the extreme left by maintaining economic development with social justice (Ecevit 1966, 91; İnönü 1967, 10). In this sense, the competing factions could not reach an agreement regarding fundamental party policies.

#### **5.2.3.2. Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization**

During the conflict, the CHP was torn between the party in central office dominated by the New Movement and the parliamentary group controlled by the dissidents. The New Movement won 23 seats out of 43 seats of the Party Assembly at the 18<sup>th</sup> CHP congress. Moreover, the party's Central Executive Committee came under the control of the New Movement (Bakşık 2009, 236). Besides, the New

Movement received the support of the party on the ground at the minor Congress held in February 1967 (Bozkurt 1969, 118). In this sense, the New Movement held the support of both the party in central office and party on the ground. However, it was deprived of the support of the parliamentary party. The support of 84 deputies out of 185 CHP deputies to the existing group executive board held by the leading conservatives indicated that the conservatives held on to a close majority in Parliament. Nevertheless, since the extraparliamentary party had the authority to amend the party bylaws and nominate candidates, and since the party leader was highly influential over Congress delegates, the dissident conservatives would not be able to maintain their political career in the CHP. Due to this, it was easier for the party leader to neglect the dissidents' demands.

#### **5.2.3.3. Leadership Autonomy**

The CHP adopted a decentralized party model in which the party members on the ground delegated their authority to the party in central office through a chain of local congresses. Similar to other parties, the CHP bylaw designated the natural members and the general congress delegates who were chosen at provincial congresses as the selectorate for party leader (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1966). Additionally, the personal charisma of the CHP leader in the eyes of the party members increased leadership autonomy as well as the costs of opposition to the party leader. Hence, the CHP leader could find it easy to neglect dissidents' demands by relying on election methods and personal charisma.

#### **5.2.4. Departure: Formation of the Reliance Party**

The changes in the party bylaw adapted at the 4<sup>th</sup> extraordinary congress and İnönü's intention to purge the leading conservatives showed the dissidents that they could no longer maintain their political career in the CHP. Here, the words of Coşkun Kırca, a leading member of the conservative faction, deserve attention (cited in R. Akar and Dünder 2008, 124):

The important thing for those that resigned from the party was their ambition to struggle against Ecevit's intention to distance the CHP from Kemalism. This struggle could no more be held in the party. Since İsmet Paşa, Kemal Satır and Nihat Erim had come out against us, it was impossible for us to remain within the party.


Once they resigned from the host party, the conservatives started to work for a new party without engaging in any contact with the established parties. This is closely related with the political project proposed by the dissidents. The conservatives proposed a nationalist and Kemalist political project as an antidote to the spread of communism. They were of the idea that Turkey was under a serious communist threat. The communists, who first tried to incorporate their demands to the 1961 constitution, had penetrated into the cadres of the CHP and were in an attempt to transform the CHP into a socialist anti-system party (Güven Partisi 1968, 35, 1969, 8; İpekçi 1969, 128). Communism was a clear violation of Kemalism and a serious threat posed to national unity (Güven Partisi 1968, 37). However, the CHP leader was so old that he was not aware of the danger (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 335). On the other hand, the AP was incapable of conducting an effective struggle against the communist threat (Güven Partisi 1968, 42). Hence, the reformist and the nationalist Reliance Party was presented as the only viable option that would protect

freedoms, democracy and national unity and effectively struggle against the radical left and fascism (Güven Partisi 1967, 9, 1968, 76–78, 1969, 9–11; İpekçi 1969, 130).

### 5.3. Conflict over Distribution of Selective Benefits: Split within the Justice Party and Formation of the Democratic Party, 1970

The Justice Party was formed on 11<sup>th</sup> of February, 1961 as the successor to the outlawed Democrat Party. From the beginning, the AP was fractionalized into three groups: the moderates, the radicals and the nationalists. During the leadership of Ragıp Gümüşpala, the radicals dominated first the parliamentary party and then the party in central office. Despite this, a moderate figure, Süleyman Demirel, was elected as the second AP chair, after the death of Gümüşpala. From then on, the party faced factional conflict between the moderates and the radicals which became to be known as the *Yeminliler* and the *Bilgiççiler*.

**Figure 14: Analytical Narrative of Split within the AP**



The series of events that ended with the formation of a new party started following the victory of the AP in the 1969 elections (Figure 14). Conflict over the nominations and the composition of the second Demirel cabinet, and the expulsion of some of the dissidents led the *Bilgiççiler* to issue a memorandum calling for intraparty democracy. When their demands were neglected, the dissidents voted against the government budget and led the second Demirel cabinet to fall. In return, the AP chair purged the leading dissidents from the AP and formed a new cabinet, excluding the dissidents once again. The dissidents first waited to see the results of the fifth AP congress. After the confirmation of Demirel's leadership at the fifth congress, the DkP was formed.

#### **5.3.1. Dissent**

Duverger (1970, 1) states that parties are influenced by experiences that they had during their formative phase. In a similar vein, Panebianco (1988, xiii) notes that crucial decisions made by the founders of a new party, the first struggles for organizational control and the way in which the organization was formed leaves an indelible mark. This holds true for factionalism in the AP.

The AP was built over former Democrats' local organizations and was composed of various groups that were united in their opposition to the military intervention and the CHP but that were divided on the strategies to be employed during the transition to democracy (Demirel 2004, 57; Sakallıoğlu 1993, 122;

Şahinoğlu 1966, 38; Weiker 1963, 136)<sup>51</sup>. It was divided into three main factions: the Moderates (*Mutediller*), the Radicals (*Müfritler*), and the Radical Nationalists (*Turancılar*). The *Mutediller* were the new political entrepreneurs that were disappointed with the measures of the military government but that had no clear contract with the former Democrats (Demirel 2004, 30; Levi 1991, 136–137). They constituted the majority among the founders but lost their control over the party in public office to the *Müfritler* after the 1961 elections and the first General Congress (Bektaş 1993, 153; Bozdağ 1975, 80). The *Müfritler* were the right-wing faction which demanded a more conservative and nationalist outlook for the party (Sherwood 1967, 61). Unlike the *Mutediller*, the *Müfritler* asked for an uncompromising attitude towards the demands imposed by the military and called for measures that would provoke the military, including the nomination of a former DP member as candidate in presidential elections and an amnesty for the imprisoned DP deputies (Bilgiç 2002, 82; Karpat 2004, 55). Finally, the *Turancılar* was the minority faction that demanded a more nationalist outlook for the AP and that asked for a more active struggle against the ‘communist threat’ (Güler 2003, 56; Levi 1991, 137)<sup>52</sup>. They were in agreement with the *Müfritler* in their demand

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51 For more on the foundation of the Justice Party, see Şahinoğlu (1966).

52 In addition to these factions, the imprisoned Democrats acted as a pressure group outside the party. The Democrats were those who had lost their chair and who ran their relatives in their stead (Burçak 1994, 111–112). They were mainly concerned with the release of the imprisoned DP members and the restoration of their political rights. To achieve their aim, they aligned with either the *Mutediller* or the *Müfritler* (Cebeci 1975, 115; Levi 1991, 138). They gave their support to Demirel during the second congress but then criticized Demirel since the AP chair did not support the CHP’s proposal for a constitutional referendum regarding political rights of released Democrats.

for the AP's preoccupation with moral development but differed from the *Müfritler* with their close relations with the radical members of the National Unity Committee (Abadan-Unat 1966, 122; Kayalı 1994, 116).

The dissent within the AP that was closely related to the split in the 1970 was the competition for secondary leadership positions in the party organization<sup>53</sup>. The conflict can be traced back to the election of Süleyman Demirel as the AP chair at the second AP General Congress in 1964. Demirel had less chance in competition for elections for the new AP leadership compared to Saadettin Bilgiç, the representative of the *Müfritler* who was well-known to the party on the ground and party in public office (Bilgiç 2002, 126–128; Cebeci 1975, 104; Sayarı 1976, 190). However, his personal skills and the support of the press, businessmen, military and the Democrats ended up with the election of Demirel as the second AP Chair (Arat 2002, 89; Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 111; Kayalı 1994, 128; Toker 1992, 221). What led to dissatisfaction of the figures around Bilgiç was not the election of Demirel as the new chair but their exclusion from the ruling positions (Bozdağ

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53 In addition to this, the coalition with the CHP in 1962 and the demands of amnesty to the imprisoned DP deputies was a source of conflict in the AP. (Bilgiç 2002, 82; Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 40). The domination of the *Müfritler* on first the parliamentary party and then the extraparlimentary party until the death of the first AP Chair Ragıp Gümüşpala in 1963 ended up with the switching of some of the Mutediller to the YTP, than the formation of a new party (Bilgiç 2002, 90–95).

1975, 87; Cebeci 1975, 115–116). From then on, the conflict took place between the supporters of Demirel (*Yeminliler*) and supporters of Bilgiç (*Bilgiççiler*)<sup>54</sup>.

The composition of the cabinet and the distribution of nominations before the 1969 elections constituted another dimension of intraparty conflict. Demirel refrained from presenting himself as the candidate of a closed circle; therefore he excluded the *Bilgiççiler* first from the ruling party offices and then from the cabinet (Bozdağ 1975, 89; Cebeci 1975, 116). However, following the third General Congress, the AP chair realized that he could not maintain a sustainable cabinet without the support of the *Bilgiççiler*. Hence, he included seven of the *Bilgiççiler* to the cabinet in 1967 (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 326). Yet, the *Bilgiççiler* came into conflict with the party chair and the *Yeminliler* with their demand to hold seats both in the General Administrative Council (GAC) despite the party bylaw (Bektaş 1993, 159; Güler 2003, 74)<sup>55</sup>. Moreover, during the primaries for the 1969 elections,

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54 *Yeminliler* was a name ascribed by the supporters of Bilgiç and indicated those who protected their seats through submitting their will to the party leader (Bilgiç, 2002: 135). The *Bilgiççiler* was ascribed by the journalists. Both of the factions never adopted their names.

55 The General Administrative Council was the executive organ of the AP and the locus of power (Dodd 1979, 122; Sayarı 1976, 1976). It was composed of the chair, Senate Group Chair, National Assembly deputy chairs and 24 members to be elected at the general congress. It was responsible for implementing decisions taken by the General Congress and the Central Representatives Council, administrating the party, approving candidates for primary elections (with the exception of standing parliamentarians), nominating 5% of candidates, deciding on the party's policies regarding the coalitions, taking decisions regarding the nomination of ministers in consultation with the parliamentary party executive boards, setting up the new organizational units and dissolving the local branches. The AP bylaw stipulated that at most eight General Administrative Council members could hold seats both in the Council and the cabinet. Prior to the fourth AP congress, chair Demirel reserved four ministerial posts for the *Bilgiççiler* but the latter insisted on keeping six seats. The fourth AP congress selected nine of the ministers as members of the Council. Demirel demanded the resignation of some of the *Bilgiççiler* from the cabinet. In return, two ministers resigned in January 1968 (Güler 2003, 74; Kuru 1996, 95).



the *Bilgiççiler* came into conflict with the *Yeminliler* and worked against candidates nominated by the GAC in some constituencies during the electoral campaigns for the 1969 elections (Cebeci 1975, 122). Besides, despite the warnings of the GAC, Saadettin Bilgiç held a separate electoral campaigns (Bilgiç 2002, 194). These events led the AP chair to conclude that the proportional distribution of selective benefits would not end up with a cohesive party organization and a harmonious cabinet.

### **5.3.2. Intraparty Conflict**

The series of event that ended with the formation of the DkP started with the AP's motion to limit interpellation debates to 20 minutes (Uraz 1970, 156). While 34 AP Deputies left the floor in protest, only three of them were referred to the disciplinary board. Despite the opposition of the *Bilgiççiler* in the GAC, the GAC dominated by the *Yeminliler* referred the AP Mayors who worked against the party candidates and dissolved the local branches that did not work for party candidates (Bilgiç 2002, 200; Uraz 1970, 211). In return, 72 deputies and senators signed a memorandum opposing the referrals and accusing Demirel for betraying the ideals of the party in order to establish a single man rule (Demokratik Parti 1971,

16–22)<sup>56</sup>. Demirel did not retreat and called the dissidents to use party platforms for voicing dissent and to obey to decisions of the democratically elected party organs (Güven 1997, 11–13; Uraz 1970, 221). Once Demirel did not take the demands of dissidents into consideration, the leading dissidents in the GAC resigned.

The dissidents were in conflict about their future strategies. Although 41 deputies were of the idea of voting against the government budget in order to force Demirel to reconsider his decisions, about 30 deputies opposed this strategy (Güven 1997, 17). In the end, 41 AP Deputies and five purged deputies voted against the budget and demanded President Cevdet Sunay to appoint another AP member as prime minister (Birand, Dünder, and Çaplı 1994, 167; Demokratik Parti 1971, 43–45).

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<sup>56</sup> The memorandum stated that the General Administrative Council's decisions indicated the first step of the plan to transform the AP from a party of principles to a party of individuals and groups. The petitioners reclaimed that the AP group executive board's decision to refer three deputies to the Honor Divan was against the AP bylaw and the constitution since there was no binding group decision and since the constitution ordered non-accountability of the members of the TBMM. Regarding the extraparlimentary conflict, the petitioners argued that evidences were not collected properly and the procedures mentioned in the AP bylaw were not fully realized. In its final part, the memorandum demanded ruling offices to reconsider the referrals (Demokratik Parti 1971, 16–22).

**Table 12: Chronology of Events (1969-1970)**

12 October 1969	1969 Elections.
3 November 1969	Demirel excluded the <i>Bilgiççiler</i> from the second Demirel cabinet
7 November 1969	146 deputies left the AP Group Meeting on the new government program
12 November 1969	Former AP Group Deputy Chair Ethem Kılıçoğlu accused Demirel with frauds.
22 December 1969	34 AP deputies left the AP Group Meeting that had convened to debate the proposal to limit the interpellation debates
30 December 1969	Three of the dissident deputies were referred to the High Honor Divan.
7 January 1970	Local executive boards supporting the <i>Bilgiççiler</i> were dissolved. 5 members of the <i>Bilgiççiler</i> were referred to High Honor Divan.
17 January 1970	The memorandum of the 72s.
4 February 1970	Six GAC members resigned.
8-18 February 1970	The news published in <i>Günaydın</i> alleging Demirel family with corruption and political influence.
12 February 1970	41 AP deputies voted against the government budget proposal.
14 February 1970	The second Demirel government fell. President Sunay reappointed Demirel for the formation of the cabinet.
17 February 1970	The CHP requested for parliamentary investigation regarding publications in the <i>Günaydın</i> .
21 February 1970	The Central Representatives Council convened and supported Demirel
15 March 1970	The third Demirel government received vote of confidence. 43 AP deputies abstained from the voting.
25 June 1970	26 AP deputies were permanently expelled.
12 August 1970	The investigation commission published its report finding no evidence of frauds.
5 September 1970	Bilgiç declared that the dissidents would form a new party.
25 September 1970	The dissidents met to debate on a new party.
19 October 1970	The MM Spokesman Ferruh Bozbeyli resigned.
21 October 1970	5 <sup>th</sup> AP Congress convened. Demirel received 1425 votes of the 1500 delegates.
November 1970	Individual resignations.
18 December 1970	The Democratic Party was formed.

Source: Compiled by the author from Ahmad and Ahmad (1976); Demokratik Parti (1971); Kuru (1996).

The *Bilgiççiler* also employed an attrition campaign against Demirel. A group of members led by the former deputy chair of the AP MM group, Ethem Kılıçoğlu, and the former ministers Mehmet Turgut, Vedat Önsal and Faruk Sükan started the Filed Opposition (*Dosyalı Muhalefet*) in order to remove Demirel by accusing him of fraud (A. Tuncer 1971, 15; Uraz 1970, 301). The charges of the so-called filed opposition were published in the daily *Günaydın* between the 8<sup>th</sup> and

18<sup>th</sup> of February, 1970 (Gevgilili 1987, 465)<sup>57</sup>. The CHP requested a parliamentary investigation on the allegations of political influence for obtaining personal favors for Demirel's family (Gürkan 1973, 256). The investigation committee formed on the 24<sup>th</sup> of June 1970 found no evidence of unjust enrichment<sup>58</sup>. The next day, 26 deputies were permanently expelled from the AP. This decision was followed by individual resignations that increased especially after the convention of the fifth General Congress<sup>59</sup>.

The AP Chair Süleyman Demirel chose to neglect dissidents' demands and whip them. When the 72 deputies and senators issued a memorandum, Demirel stated that he would not decide by memorandums (Uraz, 1970: 198). Following the fall of the second Demirel cabinet, the AP chair did not make any changes that would please the dissidents. Neglect was accompanied by the whip. Yet, Demirel refrained from disciplinary measures that would lead to huge scale resignations. Hence, the Joint Honor Divan met after the government crisis suspended the membership of the leading dissidents for a period of one year and forgiving ten deputies. Demirel stated that similar punishments would be decided in case the remaining dissidents voted in favor of the Third Demirel Government (Kuru 1996,

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57 Demirel and his family were accused of the sale of a piece of land belonging to the Turkish State Railways to Demirel's brother under price, and of obtaining credits from various state banks by using political influence. The daily also published a list of companies belonging to the Demirel family (Demokratik Parti 1971, 31–32; Uraz 1970, 355–356).

58 For more on the investigation committee, see Gürkan (1973, 256–259); Uraz (1970, 374).

59 Following the Congress, ten deputies and senators resigned from the party.

121). However, the abstention of the dissidents from voting on the third Demirel cabinet and their support to the CHP's proposal for the formation of an investigative committee led Demirel to permanently expel 26 dissident deputies (Bilgiç 2002, 217)<sup>60</sup>. Finally, Demirel attempted to legitimize the purges. During the conflict, Demirel constantly pointed out the fact that he was democratically elected by the highest decision-making organ and that conflict could be resolved by using party mechanisms (Güven 1997, 23–25; Uraz 1970, 484–487). Moreover, Demirel called on the Central Representatives Council to convene and received the support of the Council, and hence the party on the ground. (Uraz 1970, 487–490)<sup>61</sup>.

### **5.3.3. Endogenous Facilitators of Party Split**

The dissidents' decision to rebel against the party leader was shaped by the decrease in the entry costs compared to the 1950s as well as the decrease in the turnout rates, which signaled the voters' discontent with the established parties. Moreover, they were certain that the former Democrats who had withdrawn their

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60 The 43 AP deputies that abstained from the voting of the government issued a communique stating that they were adherents to the founding philosophy of the AP and that they would not support Demirel until the allegations were revealed (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 384).

61 The Central Representative Council was composed of the party chair, 15 elected parliamentarians, former chairs, former prime ministers, provincial chairs and the chairs of the youth and women branches. It was responsible for confirming or modifying party policies in accordance with the directives of the General Congress and for the election of the four deputy chairs. Although it was envisioned as the second highest decision-making party organ, it mostly acted as a consultative body to coordinate relations between the three faces of the party (Sayarı 1976, 191). Levi (1991, 147) notes that the Council chose a committee of fifteen among themselves in order to prepare a list of candidates for the central bodies of the party, which was mostly accepted by the Congress delegates unanimously.

support from the AP leader before the 1969 elections would take side with them in their competition with the party leader. However, challenging the party leader was a risky decision since the entry costs slightly increased with the amendment of the electoral law in 1968, and more importantly, since half of the voters cast their votes for the AP. Their decisions were more a response to Demirel's decisions to neglect their demands and whip them. The latter's decision can be explained with reference to endogenous factors.

#### **5.3.3.1. The Nature of Disagreement**

A limited number of studies over the intraparty conflict in the AP relates the split to the overrepresentation of industrial conglomerates' interests during Demirel's chairmanship. Accordingly, the assessment of foreign-trade policy problems and proposed solutions were on the hearth of the conflict between these different factions of the private sector who were struggling to influence government strategies in order to increase their share of economic rent. The protectionist coalition, including the import substituting industrialists, the importers, the State Economic Enterprises and the institutions with import and industry related duties were concerned with overvalued exchange rates, high import barriers and the de-emphasis on export promotion. Their interests conflicted with the pro-trade groups, including the tourism sector, exporters, the producers of exportables and the agricultural sector, who demanded realistic or undervalued exchange rates, a liberal import regime and the promotion of exports (Tekin 2006, 134). The affirmative populism developed by the AP could postpone the interest conflict to the extent that the government could sustain economic growth (Keyder 1987, 204). However, the

balance of payment crisis in the late 1960s alienated the commercial and agricultural groups, who were disturbed by the overrepresentation of the industrial interests (Sakallıoğlu 1993, 63; Sencer 1974, 377–388; Tachau 2002). Moreover, small capital was also in a disadvantaged position in its relations with the government compared to big business that enjoyed easy access both to sources of information and to decision makers in getting available funds (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 74; Buğra 1994, 157). When the AP government proposed a tax reform in 1970 that would hurt the interests of small capital and the agricultural sector, these groups allied with the commercial groups in their struggle against the overrepresentation of the industrial conglomerates' interests and took sides with the DkP (Bulutay 1970, 89; Dodd 1979, 110; Gevgilili 1987, 461; Güler 2003, 85; Karpat 2004, 319; Sencer 1974, 410; Tosun 1999, 107; Zürcher 2004, 252).

The argument that the AP split due to the resentment against the overrepresentation of industrial and big business interests holds true to some extent. For example, the DkP chair Ferruh Bozbeyli criticized the enrichment of the top businessmen through informal contacts with political authorities and the use of state resources to reward Demirel's followers (Bozbeyli 1976, 190). For Bozbeyli (1976, 190), the DkP was at the right of the AP with its emphasis on nationalism, moral values and the protection of small-scale producers against large economic forces. Bozbeyli also stated that his party's emphasis on freedom of private property indicated the formation of a financial market that would protect the savings of ordinary citizens rather than the enrichment of the top business through their contacts with political authorities.

Despite this, it was only after their departure from the AP that the dissidents openly criticized the AP government for the overrepresentation of particular interests. During the intraparty conflict phase, they were more concerned with the leadership style of Demirel than the underrepresentation of the agricultural or the small-scale producers' interests. During the 1970, the dissidents were of the idea that they were the devotees of the 1946 spirit and that Demirel and the *Yeminliler* had betrayed the ideals of the AP in order to obtain seats and personal gains (Bilgiç 2002, 274; Bozbeyli 1976, 164–165; Demokratik Parti 1971, 120–121). Moreover, they criticized the AP chair for violating the principle of intraparty democracy in order to sustain a single man rule<sup>62</sup>.

It was only after their expulsion from the party that the dissidents started to voice different criticisms. Prior to the formation of the new party, Demirel was criticized for not effectively dealing with the economic difficulties and the communist threat (Demokratik Parti 1971, 30). For the expelled dissidents, the taxation law proposed by the new Demirel cabinet would bring an extra burden on small and medium-scaled entrepreneurs and would deteriorate the living conditions of the low income groups (Demokratik Parti 1971, 62). Besides, it was a clear violation of private property rights (Demokratik Parti 1971, 60). These criticisms would be repeated after the formation of the DkP (Bilgiç 2002, 224–228; Bozbeyli

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62 For the letter of resignations and criticisms about the lack of intraparty democracy, see Demokratik Parti (1971).



1976, 163; Demokratik Parti 1971, 130–131). However, as stated before, these criticisms were voiced after the departure of the dissidents.

The way that the AP chair perceived the conflict might provide clues about the nature of the disagreement. Demirel believed that the conflict in the AP was about the distribution of selective benefits. Accordingly, the dissidents considered Demirel's chairmanship as illegitimate since they lost the intraparty elections for the ruling offices (Demirel 1973, 181). Proportional representation and the compulsory primary elections had encouraged personal vote seeking behavior and had intensified personal conflicts in the party on the ground (Demirel 1972, 4; 1973, 177; 1974, 31). He was of the idea that the main targets of the dissidents were to remove him from the AP and to hold the control of the cabinet so that they could rule the country as they wished (Gürkan 1973, 241–242). However, Demirel noted that this was illegitimate since the AP delegates had democratically elected him (Demirel 1972, 18; 1973, 180). In this sense, the AP leader believed that the conflict was not about ideologies and policies; rather leadership struggles and conflicts the distribution of selective benefits lied at the hearth of the conflict.

In short, the dissent during the intraparty conflict phase was about the distribution of cabinet posts and ruling positions in party organization. Compared to a conflict over party's ideology, this source of conflict could be more easily accommodated. Yet, since the dissidents rejected the legitimacy of the AP chair's rule and since the AP leader rejected to accommodate their demands, the conflict could not be managed.

### 5.3.3.2. Relative Power of Each Faction within Different Faces of Party Organization

Since his election as party chair till the party split, Demirel gradually extended control over the party's main ruling office, the GAC. Although only 9 candidates nominated by the AP chair could be elected to the GAC at the second General Congress, this number increased to 23 and decreased to 18 in the third and the fourth congresses. On the other hand, although 11 members from the list proposed by Bilgiç were elected to the council at the second General Congress, this number decreased to 10 and 8 in the third and fourth congresses, including candidates nominated by both factions (Bilgiç 2002, 170; Cebeci 1975, 120; Kuru 1996, 60–64). On the other hand, the support of provincial chairs to chair Demirel at the Central Representatives Council meeting on the 21<sup>st</sup> of February, 1970 reveals the support of the party on the ground to Demirel (Uraz 1970, 487–490). In this sense, the dissidents were in minority in the extraparliamentary party, which held the upper hand in ruling the party.

Demirel and the *Yeminliler* also constituted the majority in the parliamentary party. During the elections for the National Assembly Group Executive Board after 1969 elections, the candidates nominated by the *Bilgiççiler* received 84 votes whereas the candidates of the *Yeminliler* won the elections with the votes of 156 deputies (Güler 2003, 75; Toker 1993, 182; Uraz 1970, 116). The abstention of 146 deputies and senators during the debates on the second Demirel government program at the AP joint group meeting might be interpreted as discontent with the new cabinet (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 378). However, the support for the *Bilgiççiler* gradually eroded as the conflict between the party leader

and the *Bilgiççiler* intensified. Although 72 deputies and senators had signed the memorandum, only 41 deputies voted against the government budget proposal, whereas 26 voted in favor (Demokratik Parti 1971, 89–90). It was due to the power of Demirel and the *Yeminliler* over all layers of party organization that they could easily neglect the demands of the dissident *Bilgiççiler*.

Finally, the predominant party system helped the AP chair to neglect the demands of the dissidents. Although the votes of the AP decreased slightly in the 1969 elections, the party won 256 of 450 seats, thanks to an amendment of the electoral law in 1968. It was due to re-introduction of the D'Hondt system that the parliamentary fragmentation index and effective number of parliamentary parties had decreased slightly (See Table 10). Hence, the predominant party system that started with the 1965 elections (Sayarı 1978, 44) made it easy for Demirel to neglect the demands of the dissidents.

### **5.3.3.3. Leadership Autonomy**

Similar to the other parties, the AP bylaw stipulated that the party leader would be elected by Congress delegates with an absolute majority. Additionally the victory of the AP under Demirel's chairmanship in the 1965 and the 1969 elections led Demirel to retain additional legitimacy. Hence, the party leader could legitimize his decisions by pointing out that he was democratically elected by not only the Congress delegates but also by the majority of the voters as demonstrated by the 1965 and re-confirmed with the 1969 elections.

#### **5.3.4. Departure: Formation of the Democratic Party**

Once they were purged from the AP, 26 members of the *Bilgiççiler* faction first waited to see the effects of their act over the party. In order to provoke further dissent against chair Demirel, Bilgiç held a press meeting and declared that they would form a party before the fifth General Congress convened (Bozdağ 1975, 102; Demokratik Parti 1971, 57). However, the Congress ended with the re-election of Demirel with 1425 votes of 1500 delegates. Once Demirel secured his leadership at the fifth congress, the dissidents formed the Democrat Party without negotiations with any other existing parties on the 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 1970.

#### **5.4. Conclusions**

The analysis of the splits in the governing and the main opposition parties in the second half of the 1960s reveals that the lower entry costs and the perceived viability of new parties have played an important role in shaping the decisions of the dissident factions in both parties. With the introduction of the proportional representation, the disproportionality and the RRP index decreased significantly. Additionally, the decrease in turnout rates and the high levels of volatility which was primarily a consequence of the ban over the DP signaled to the dissidents of each party that it was the right time for strategic entry. However, given the fact that party fissions disappeared after the 1973 elections despite a permissive institutional context and despite the deterioration of economic conditions, the influence of the exogenous factors should not be overestimated. Indeed, after the 1973 elections, the dissident *Bilgiççiler* returned back to the AP, whereas the dissidents in the CHP

refrained from splitting though the party was prone to factionalism and the party had displayed poor economic performance. In this sense, the strategic entrance of the dissidents to the political market cannot be explained solely with reference to exogenous factors.

This brings us to the importance of endogenous factors once again. In the case of the CHP, the party change initiated by the party leader and the New Movement alienated the conservatives who opposed the party's move towards the left. While such an ideological conflict was absent in the case of the AP, the dissident *Bilgiççiler* were of the idea that they were the real representative of the '1946 spirit' and that the AP chair was violating this spirit by his attempts to exclude the 'devotees of the AP' from the selective benefits. Secondly, although the conservatives in the CHP had dominated the parliamentary party, they were far from receiving the support of the extraparlimentary party. Given the fact that the PPL had designated the extraparlimentary party as the upper party branch, the numerical superiority of the dissidents in the CHP parliamentary party could easily be overridden by the CHP leader. On the other hand, the dissidents of the AP lacked the support of both the parliamentary and extraparlimentary party. Additionally, the predominant party system made it easier for the AP leader to neglect the demands of the dissidents. However, unlike the previous case of the DP in which the seats held by the dissidents had no significance for termination of the government, the dissidents of the AP held enough seats to threaten the AP leader with government termination in case of defection. Despite this, the AP leader did not retreat from expelling the dissidents as the 1969 elections and the results of the 1970 General Congress confirmed the legitimacy of the party leader. In a similar

vein, although the CHP had performed poorly in the 1965 elections, the inclusiveness of the delegate selection method and the charisma of the party leader made it easy for the CHP chair İnönü to legitimize his decision to expel the dissidents. In this sense, similar to the case of the DP, the cases of the splits within the CHP and the AP confirm that the endogenous factors play a highly important role in explaining party splits.

## CHAPTER VI

### PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION AND PARTY SPLITS IN THE 1990s

The evolution of the Turkish party system was interrupted with the military intervention on 12<sup>th</sup> of September, 1980. The military incumbents introduced a number of measures that significantly changed the rules of the game before transition to democracy. The new constitution abolished the Senate of Republic, increased the power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, excluded the Marxist, ethnic and religious parties from the political market and purged the pre-intervention politicians from politics for some time (Hale 1988, 169–170). The designers of the new political system, who prioritized governmental stability over representativeness introduced a new electoral law and political parties' law, which were expected to deter new comers (Hale 2008, 235; Turan 1988, 69). Moreover, the military vetoed the successors of the outlawed established parties and promoted the formation of two parties at the center-right and center-left, namely the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti*-HP) and the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*-MDP) (Ahmad 1984, 7–8; Özbudun 2000, 113–114). However,

the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP), the only genuinely new party formed by the civilians and permitted to participate in the initial elections in 1983 won the majority of seats (Ergüder and Hofferbert 1988, 97).

**Table 13: Successors, Genuinely New Parties and Mergers in the 1980s**

Year	Successor	Genuinely New	Mergers
1983	DYP; RP; MP (MÇP/MHP); SODEP	ANAP; MDP; HP	-
1984		IDP (MP)	
1985		DSP	SODEP-HP (SHP)
1988		Socialist Party	

Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007). Abbreviations in parentheses indicate the name changes.

Artificial parties promoted by the military incumbents disappeared from the political scene within the next three years (Table 13). On the right, the deputies elected from the MDP list switched to ANAP and the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*-DYP), the successor of the outlawed AP<sup>63</sup>. After the dissolution of the party in 1986, the MDP deputies remained independent or joined the Free Democrat Party (*Hür Demokrat Parti*-HDP) formed by Mehmet Yazar, a former DYP member who ran as a candidate for the DYP chairmanship (Akay 2008, 42). Yet, the HDP merged with the ANAP after the 1986 by-elections. On the other hand, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-RP) and the Conservative Party (*Muhafazakâr Parti*) took their places at the right of political spectrum as the successor of the outlawed National

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63 Followers of Demirel first formed the Great Turkey Party (*Büyük Türkiye Partisi*-BTP) before the 1983 elections. However, the party was dissolved by the military government on the ground that it was the continuation of the outlawed Justice Party. Hence, the True Path Party was formed. The BTP was revitalized during the conflict within the DYP. For more on the formation and dissolution of the Great Turkey Party, see Akay (2008, 66–71); Çavuşoğlu (2009, 7–15)



Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP) and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP)<sup>64</sup>. Finally, the Reformist Democracy Party (*Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi*-IDP) rose at the right to attract the votes of conservative-nationalist voters<sup>65</sup>.

While the center-right was fragmented into two main parties, there were two main competitors for the center-left as well. The Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*-SODEP), the left-wing party formed by the former CHP members merged with the military-promoted left-wing HP and the latter's name was changed to the Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Partisi*-SHP) in 1985 (Turan 1988, 78). However, Bülent Ecevit chose to invest on a new party, called the Democratic Left Party (*Demokrat Sol Partisi*-DSP) together with his wife Rahşan Ecevit (Bila 2001, 120–122). Finally, with the repeal of the ban over the purged politicians with the constitutional referendum in 1987, the depurged leaders, namely Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş, were elected as the chairs of the successor parties. Hence, although the military intended to promote a moderate two-party system, the

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64 In 1985, the name of the Conservative Party was changed to Nationalist Working Party (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*-MÇP) in 1985. Once the pre-intervention parties were re-opened in 1992, the former MHP merged into the MÇP and the name of the MÇP was changed to MHP.

65 Following the repeal of the ban on outlawed parties, the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*-MP) was re-opened in 1992. The party decided to merge with the IDP and the latter changed its name to MP.

consequence of the intervention was the fragmentation of the center-left and center-right.

**Table 14: Splits, Mergers, Genuinely New, Splinter and Successor Parties (1990-2002)**

Year	Successor	Splinter	Genuinely New	Mergers
1990		HEP		
1992	CHP*; DP (2)*; İP**		YDP	AP-DYP*; MHP-MÇP*; IDP-MP*
1993	SİP (TKP)	BBP; YP		
1994	HADEP**		YDH; LDP	
1995				SHP-CHP
1996			ÖDP; DBP; BP; EMEK	
1997	FP**; DEHAP**; EMEP**	DTP		YP-DP (2); YDH-BP
1998		DEPAR; ATP		
2001	SP**	AK Parti	BTP	
2002		YTP (2)	Yurt Partisi; Genç Parti	Genç Parti-YDP

\*Parties formed after the repeal of the ban over the parties outlawed by the military.

\*\*Parties formed as successor of the parties outlawed by the Constitutional Court.

Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007); TBMM (2010); TÜİK (2008). Abbreviations in parentheses indicate name changes. Numbers in parentheses are used to distinguish parties from the former parties with same names. Parties that did not enter in any general elections are excluded.

The 1990s was characterized by the overpopulation of the party system with new parties (Table 14). With the repeal of the ban over the outlawed parties in 1992, the CHP was re-established by the dissidents of the SHP whereas the former members of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP) re-opened their parties (Duran 2012, 41–42)<sup>66</sup>. Additionally, the leadership succession crisis in the ANAP, DYP, DSP and the MHP ended up with the formation of the New Party (*Yeni Parti*-YP), Democrat Turkey Party (*Demokrat Türkiye Partisi*-DTP), New Turkey Party

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<sup>66</sup> Although the AP was re-opened in 1992, the AP congress decided for the merge of the AP with the DYP.

(*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*-YTP) and the Bright Turkey Party (*Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi*-ATP). Finally, the genuinely new parties of the Liberal Democrat Party (*Liberal Demokrat Parti*-LDP), Rebirth Party (*Yeniden Doğuş Partisi*-YDP), Young Party (*Genç Parti*)<sup>67</sup> and the Homeland Party (*Yurt Partisi*) on the right and the New Democracy Movement (*Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi*-YDH), Peace Party (*Barış Partisi*-BP), and the Democracy and Peace Party (*Demokrasi ve Barış Partisi*-DBP) on the left were founded as alternatives to the established right and left parties (Duran 2012, 40–41; Kaynar et al. 2007).

The political spectrum was further populated with the rise of the socialist and ethnic parties during the 1990s. The Socialist Party (*Sosyalist Parti*-SP), Socialist Rule Party (*Sosyalist İktidar Partisi*-SİP), Labor's Party (*Emeğin Partisi*-EMEP) and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*-ÖDP) were formed as socialist alternatives. Moreover, the salience of ethnic demands resulted in the exit of SHP members to form the People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*-HEP) in 1990 (Ciddi 2009, 78; Dağıstanlı 1998, 172; Duran 2012, 40–41).

Religious demands had been traditionally represented by the RP, which was succeeded by the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*-FP) after the dissolution of the RP in 1998. Once the FP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, the conflict

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67 In order to appear on the ballot, the Genç Parti merged with the YDP and the YDP's name was changed to the Genç Parti.

between the moderates and the conservatives ended with the formation of two new parties, namely the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AK Parti*) and the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi-SP*) (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 5). On the other hand, the conflict over the issue of secularism in the nationalist-conservative MHP paved the way for the rise of the Great Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP*) (Duran 2012, 39; Landau 2002, 158). Finally, the Independent Turkey Party (*Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi-BTP*) was formed to receive the support of voters with religious concerns (Kaynar et al. 2007, 338).

**Table 15: Mergers, Splits and Genuinely New Parties after the 2002 Elections**

Year	Successor	Splits	Genuinely New	Mergers
2004				YTP (2)-CHP
2005	DTP**		HYP	DP (1)-ANAP
2007			DYP (2)	
2008	BDP**		HEPAR	HÜRPARTİ-HYP
2009				ANAP-DP (2)
2010		SP-HASPARTI	MMP	ATP-MHP

Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007) and various newspapers for post-2005 period. Numbers in parentheses are used to distinguish parties from the former parties with the same names. Parties that did not enter in any general elections have been excluded.

The fissiparous tendencies disappeared after the 2002 elections (Table 15). The YTP merged with the CHP whereas the DTP, which changed its name to Freedom and Change Party (*Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi-HÜRPARTİ*) merged with the People's Ascendance Party (*Halkın Yükselişi Partisi-HYP*) (*Milliyet*, January 1, 2008). The DYP changed its name to Democrat Party in 2007 and the ANAP merged with the DP in 2009 (*Sabah*, November 1, 2009). The only minor splits took place in the Islamist SP, and the post-Islamist AK Parti (*Sabah*, November 2, 2010; *Sabah*, May 26, 2009). The People's Voice Party (*Halkın Sesi Partisi-Has Parti*) that was formed by the dissidents of the SP entered the 2011 elections

whereas the leader of Turkey Party (*Türkiye Partisi*-TP) Abdüllatif Şener, a former minister and member of the AK Parti, ran as independent candidate in the 2011 elections. Later, in 2012, the Has Parti merged with the AK Parti, whereas the TP was dissolved in the same year (*Agos*, September 19, 2012; *CNN Türk*, August 27, 2012).

This chapter deals with the splits in two mainstream parties, namely the DYP and the DSP, which resulted in the formation of the DTP and the YTP. The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, the exogenous factors are analyzed in detail. Secondly, a detailed analysis of the stages of party splits and the role of endogenous factors in explaining splits within the cases are presented. This part starts with the presentation of the reasons of the dissent within the DYP and continues with the analysis of the strategies and preferences of the competing factions and the role of endogenous factors in shaping these preferences. Next, the split within the DSP is analyzed in the same order. Since the dissidents of the DSP did not engage in conflict with the party leadership, the reasons of this unique phenomenon are discussed in detail.

### **6.1.Exogenous Factors of Party Splits**

The frequency of party splits in the 1990s was unanticipated by the military, which introduced measures to curb party system fragmentation in order to maintain stable governments (Ergüder and Hofferbert 1988). These measures included the removal of state subsidies, limitations on terms of the party officers, ban on party switching, compulsory primary elections, reduction of the parliament's size, the

increase in the duration of legislative term and in the spatial requirements and the introduction of the 10% national threshold (Turan 1988). However, these measures were far from discouraging party system fragmentation.

Most of these institutional barriers on party splits and new party entrance were removed following the transition to democracy. The ban on party switching was removed with the amendment of the constitution in 1995<sup>68</sup>. State subsidies were re-introduced in 1984. Compulsory primary elections<sup>69</sup> and limitations on terms of party officers<sup>70</sup> were repealed in 1986 and 1990, respectively. The size of Parliament was increased to 450 in 1987 and to 550 in 1995. The spatial requirements were first increased in 1986 and then decreased to their previous level in 1988 (Tuncer 2003, 46). In this sense, only the spatial requirements and the D'Hondt system with a 10% national threshold were intact previous to the splits

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68 The 84<sup>th</sup> article of the 1982 constitution stipulated that the membership of deputies who switched to another party or who accepted ministerial appointment in a cabinet that is not supported by his or her party would be terminated. Such deputies would be denied the privilege of being nominated by central organs of any party in the coming elections. In order to overcome the limitations on party switching, individual deputies first formed 'pretended marriage' (*Hülle*) parties and then merged these parties with the target parties (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 8).

69 Originally, the 37<sup>th</sup> article of the PPL stipulated that candidates would be determined by primary elections. The party in central office was granted the right to nominate 5% of the candidates. This practice, which had been inherited from the previous Law on Political Parties (Law No. 648, dated July 13, 1965), was repealed with the Law No. 3270 (dated March 28, 1986). With the amendment, candidate nomination process was left to the discretion of the political parties.

70 The 15<sup>th</sup> article of the PPL stipulated that party chairs could serve for no longer than six consecutive terms of two years. On the other hand, the provincial and the sub-provincial leaders could serve for five consecutive terms. The limitations, which were introduced to assure leadership circulation, were amended in 1986 with the Law No. 3270 (dated March 28, 1986) and were repealed in 1990 with the Law No. 3648 (dated May 17, 1990).

that took place after 1995. Below, the analysis of the institutional design on new party entrance that was in force after the 1995 elections is presented.

#### **6.1.1. Entry Costs**

The new Political Parties' Law (PPL) (Law No 2820, dated April 22, 1983) ordered no petition or monetary requirements for political parties to appear on the ballot. However, compared to the previous PPL (Law No. 648, dated, July 13, 1965), the new PPL increased spatial requirements significantly. According to the 37<sup>th</sup> article of the PPL, political parties should hold their provisional congresses and complete their organization in at least half of Turkey's provinces and one-third of the districts within these provinces at least six months before the elections in order to appear on the ballot in coming elections. Parties with parliamentary groups had been exempted from the spatial requirement. Yet, the 95<sup>th</sup> article of the 1982 constitution increased the number of seats required to form parliamentary groups from 10 to 20. This increased the burden on dissident factions to access the privileges provided for parties with parliamentary groups.

The original PPL introduced by the military incumbents removed the practice of annual government grants to political parties. Public funding for parties that had passed the 10% national threshold was re-instated in 1984 with Law No. 3032 dated June 27, 1984 (Turan 1988, 72). The PPL was amended in 1987 and 1988 in order to provide public funding for parties with parliamentary groups or those received at least 7% of the total eligible votes in previous elections (Aydın 2005, 251). With the incorporation of the provisional article 16 to the PPL in 1992,

political parties with at least three seats in Parliament were eligible to receive state funding provided that they had fulfilled spatial requirements to appear on the ballot (Gençkaya 2002, 12). Hence, from 1992 to 2005, nearly all splinter parties could benefit from state subsidies (Gençkaya 2002, 10)<sup>71</sup>. It was only the YTP that could not receive state funding since the Supreme Board of Elections decided that the party did not organize in at least 41 provinces six months before the elections (*Sabah*, September 19, 2002).

The 52<sup>nd</sup> article of the Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers (Law No. 298, dated April 26, 1961) stipulated that all political parties that are eligible to appear on the ballot have the right to use the state radio and television for electioneering activities. However, developments in communication technologies hindered the importance of state media in accessing voters. After the abolishment of the state monopoly over the radio and television, political parties could use private television and radio channels. But more important than this was the role played by the media in shaping the political fortunes of leaders and hence the established parties. For example, the support of the mainstream media to Çiller played an important role in her election as the new DYP chair (Erel and Bilge 1994, 130). Else, the news on the allegation of corruption seems to have played an

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71 The provisional article was repealed in 2005. Since then, only parties that received at least 7% of votes in previous elections are eligible for public subsidies.



important role in the alienation of voters from the center-right parties<sup>72</sup>. But, the most striking example is the role played by the media in the fall of the DYP-RP coalition<sup>73</sup>.

**Table 16: Electoral System (1983-2002)**

	<b>1983</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>
Term (Years)	5	5	5	5	5	5
Number of Seats	400	450	450	550	550	550
Electoral formula	D'Hondt	D'Hondt + Contingency mandate	D'Hondt + Contingency mandate	D'Hondt	D'Hondt	D'Hondt
District Magnitude	4.82	4.33	4.21	6.63	6.55	6.47
Number of Constituencies	83	104	107	83	84	85
Ballot structure	Closed list	Closed list	Preferential Vote	Closed list	Closed list	Closed list
National Threshold	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%
District Threshold	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Compulsory primary Election	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Source: Compiled by the author from Colomer (2004); Hale (2008); Kalaycıoğlu (2002); Tuncer (2003).

The new electoral system reflected the military's intentions to promote governmental stability at the expense of representativeness (Hale 2008, 235; Kalaycıoğlu 1999, 47). Until the amendment of the electoral law in 1995, five important measures were brought forward to promote governmental stability that

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72 A number of books on the allegation of corruption about the DYP leader Tansu Çiller have been written by the journalists. See Bildirici (1998); Erel and Bilge (1994)

73 For examples to the works on the attitude of the media towards the Refahiyol coalition, see Hongur (2006); Soncan (2006). For a critical evaluation of the issue, see TBMM (2012).

also increased disproportionality (Table 16). Firstly, the Senate of Republic was abolished and the number of seats in the assembly was decreased from 450 to 400. Secondly, the district magnitude was lowered<sup>74</sup>. Thirdly, the contingency mandate was introduced in 1986<sup>75</sup>. Fourthly, parties were required to receive at least 10% of total eligible votes. Finally, parties were required to pass the constituency threshold, which was calculated by the simple proportion of the valid votes to the parliamentary seats per district (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 61).

**Table 17: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and the RRP Index (1983-2011)**

Year	Parliamentary Fragmentation	Effective Number of Electoral Parties	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	Disproportionality Index	Relative Reduction in Party Index
1983	0.605	2.85	2.53	7.78	11.23
1987	0.513	4.11	2.05	28.59	50.12
1991	0.721	4.67	3.58	14.11	23.34
1995	0.773	6.16	4.4	17.07	28.57
1999	0.795	6.79	4.87	18.65	28.28
2002	0.460	5.43	1.85	45.25	65.93
2007	0.557	3.5	2.26	15.40	35.43
2011	0.577	3.5	2.36	9.62	32.57

Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2008). Only the parties that have participated in general elections for the first time are included. Parties that have changed their names and that have merged with the other parties are excluded. Effective number of electoral parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties are calculated by the author by using formula proposed by Siaroff (2000). Relative reduction in party index is calculated by the author by the formula proposed by Boucek (2002).

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74 According to the fourth article of the Law on Election of Deputies, no constituencies could return more than seven deputies and larger provinces had to be subdivided into two or more separate electoral districts. With the Law No. 3377 (dated March 25, 1987), the upper limit for the number of seats per constituency was decreased to six in 1987 (Tuncer 2003, 140–141).

75 In districts with more than three seats, one of the seats was allocated using plurality and the other seats allocated using proportional representation (Colomer 2004, 461). For more on the contingency mandate, see Tuncer 2003, (122–123).

Most of these institutional obstacles for representation of minor parties were removed prior to the 1995 elections. Firstly, the size of Parliament was increased from 450 to 550. Secondly, the district magnitude was increased<sup>76</sup>. Finally, the contingency mandate and the district threshold were abolished (Hale 2008, 236; Tuncer 1996, 5–7). Despite these, the electoral system continued to produce disproportional vote-to-seat allocation due to the presence of the 10% national threshold (Table 17). Interestingly, despite the highly disproportional vote-to-seat conversion, the party system was further fragmented from 1995 to 2002. This was closely related with the decreasing support for the existing parties and the increase in the number of new parties. Hence, unanticipated by not only the military but the model proposed in this work, dissidents of the established parties chose to invest on new parties despite the high levels of disproportionality and the RRP indexes.

#### **6.1.2. Viability of New and Established Parties**

The splits within the established parties and the frequent entrance of genuinely new or splinter parties in the 1990s were more a consequence of the perceived viability of new and established parties. In addition to voter turnout and

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<sup>76</sup> Fourth article of the Law on Election of Deputies was amended with the Law No. 4125 (dated October 27, 1995). With the new amendments, the upper limit for district magnitude was increased to 18. Provinces that were allocated seats between 19 and 35 were divided into two constituencies and those having seats with 36 and more were divided into three constituencies.

volatility rates, political entrepreneurs in the 1990s could extensively use the public polling results for strategic entry.

**Table 18: Indicators of the Viability of the New and the Established Parties (1983-2011)**

Year	Turnout Rate (%)	Invalid Votes (%)	Total Volatility
1983	92.30	4.80	-
1987	93.30	2.60	38.5
1991	83.90	2.90	20.3
1995	85.20	3.40	22.5
1999	87.10	4.50	22.3
2002	79.10	3.90	56.85
2007	84.25	2.80	24.75
2011	83.16	2.24	12.11

Source: Compiled and calculated by the author by using data obtained from Çarkoğlu (2011); TÜİK (2008).


Turnout rates in the post-1980 period had been relatively higher compared to the pre-intervention period (Table 18). This is partly a result of the introduction of compulsory voting (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 72; *Hürriyet*, December 27, 2001). Yet, disillusioned voters had overcome this legal barrier by invalid vote casting. Due to this, the number of invalid vote casts increased slightly during the times that the voters were dissatisfied with the existing parties.

A more valid indicator for voters' disillusionment with the established parties was extracted from public polls. Various surveys pointed to a growing rate of protest votes starting in 1996 (Erder, 1996; 1999; cited in Hazama 2007, 22). Surveys conducted from 2000 to 2002 elections showed that the percentage of undecided voters ranged between 10% and 20% (*Hürriyet*, August 6, 2002; ANAR 2001, 24; 2002, 27). During the same period, the number of voters stating that they would not vote for any of the established parties ranged between 14.5% and 31.1% (*Hürriyet*, January 2, 2001; March 4, 2001; October 5, 2002; ANAR 2001, 25; 2002, 29). Parallel to the findings of the opinion polls, turnout rates decreased

significantly in the 2002 elections. Hence, although compulsory voting forced the voters to vote for any of the parties, opinion polls signaled to political entrepreneurs that it was the right time for strategic entry for receiving the support of the disenchanted voters.

High levels of volatility prepared the fertile ground for frequent splits and the mergers in the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s. Electoral volatility during the post-1980 period stemmed from the fragmentation of the center-left and center-right due to the artificial barriers put by the military, frequent party closures, absence of close relations between the political parties and civil society organizations and the inability of the center-right and center-left parties to cope with economic problems (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 35; Özbudun 2000, 78). Firstly, the decisions of the military regarding the political entrepreneurs of the pre-intervention period increased the number of free-floating voters. Dissolution of all pre-intervention parties and purge of their leaders resulted in the disruption of political socialization (Kalaycıoğlu 2008, 299) and party-cleavage linkages (Hazama 2007, 93). Moreover, the repeal of the ban on political activities of former party leaders with the referendum in 1987 (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 33) and the re-establishment of some of the outlawed parties in 1992 increased both the party system fragmentation and the volatility levels.

**Figure 15: Economic Indicators (1981-2002)**



Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2009). Economic growth indicates the yearly change in Gross National Product (GNP). Inflation indicates the yearly change in the GNP Deflator. Averages for each legislative term are taken.

In addition to artificial barriers, the economic performances of coalition governments in the 1990s played a major role in the high levels of electoral volatility during the 1990s. The 1990s, named by the OECD as a ‘lost decade’, was characterized by volatile GDP growth, skyrocketing inflation, considerable unemployment problems and years of economic crises that were followed by recoveries (McLaren 2008, 85; Pamuk 2008, 290) (Figure 15). Frequent economic crises during the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium shook the confidence of voters towards established parties. Scholarly works on the relationship between economic performance and voting for incumbents confirms the retrospective voting hypothesis, which asserts that voters tended to punish the incumbents with poor economic performance (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2004, 310, 2005, 558; Çarkoğlu 2002, 34; Hazama 2007, 127; Özbudun 2000, 79; Waterbury 1992, 132) and reward parties that are perceived to manage the economy successfully (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2009, 388;

Kalaycıoğlu 2008, 308–309)<sup>77</sup>. Given the fact that all center-right and center-left parties participated in the coalition governments of the 1990s, their poor economic performance provided fertile ground for high electoral volatility (Hazama 2007, 127), and hence new party entrance.

It was not only the mounting economic problems that decreased the voters' confidence in established parties but also corruption scandals. According to the Transparency International, Turkey, which ranked the 29<sup>th</sup> among 41 countries in 1995, scored the 64<sup>th</sup> among 102 countries in 2002<sup>78</sup>. The allegation of corruption damaged the public image of mainly the leaders of the center-right parties (Lowry 2000, 32)<sup>79</sup>. Surveys conducted between 1997 and 2002 showed that the participants demanded clean politics (*Hürriyet*, July 7 1997). However, they were not sure about the capabilities of the politicians to solve the problem of corruption (*Hürriyet*, March 4, 2001). This was due to equation of the politicians with corruptions (*Hürriyet*, December 14, 2002). Indeed, various surveys showed that political parties were the least trusted political institutions<sup>80</sup>. The lack of public trust

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77 For examples to the public polls on the relationship between economic performance and incumbent popularity published in *Hürriyet*, see *Hürriyet*, March 4, 2001; *Hürriyet*, October 21, 2002. See also ANAR (2001, 79).

78 For corruption scores and ranks of Turkey, see Transparency International, available at: [http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/previous\\_cpi](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi)

79 For examples to the public polls on public images of the party leaders, see *Hürriyet*, December 1, 1998; *Hürriyet*, January 7, 1998; *Hürriyet*, November 19, 1999.

80 For these opinion polls, see *Hürriyet*, November 29, 1997; *Hürriyet*, December 1, 1998; *Hürriyet*, November 28, 1998; *Hürriyet*, March 6, 2001.

for existing politicians increased the viability of political entrepreneurs with no relations with the alleged corruption and frauds.

Finally, the demand size of the electoral market was further populated with the salience of religious and ethnic demands to be represented either by the established parties or by new parties. The rise of support for the RP and the HADEP led scholars to conclude that secularism versus Islamic fundamentalism and Turkish versus Kurdish nationalism became new sources of political divide in the 1990s (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2004, 310; Ciddi 2009, 89–91; Çarkoğlu 2002, 35; Çelebi, Toros, and Aras 1996, 26–27; Hale and Özbudun 2010, 13; Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 421, 1999, 62, 2008, 300–301; Özbudun 2000, 78). Hence, with the rise of new demands, it was natural for electoral volatility and party system fragmentation to increase (Kalaycıoğlu 1999, 74)<sup>81</sup>.

In short, although the entry costs were high in the 1990s, the perceived viability of new parties contributed to the fragmentation of party system and prepared the ground for the entrance of splitter parties. Nevertheless, the picture will be deficient without taking the inner dynamics of the party splits into account.

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81 Some of the scholars argued that these cleavages overlap with the center-periphery cleavage and that the secularist-religious cleavages reinforce rather than cross-cut the center-periphery cleavages. For these studies, see Çarkoğlu (2002, 35); Hale and Özbudun (2010, 34); Kalaycıoğlu (1994, 421). On the other hand, some of the scholars relate the rise of the new cleavages to the influences of globalization. See Öniş (1997).



Below, we provide the details of the intraparty conflict in the DYP and the DSP, which ended with the formation of the DTP and the YTP, respectively.

## **6.2.Fragmenting the Center-Right to Unite the Center-Right: Split within the True Path Party and Formation of the Democrat Turkey Party, 1997**

The DYP was formed in 1983 as the successor of the outlawed AP<sup>82</sup>. During the period that former AP leader Süleyman Demirel was outlawed, the DYP was ruled by caretakers, namely Ahmet Nusret Tuna, Yıldırım Avcı and Hüsametdin Cindoruk. When the ban on former politicians was lifted in 1987, the party congress elected Süleyman Demirel as the chair. From the 1987 to the 1991 elections, the party constantly increased its votes to 19.1% and 27.0 % respectively. Following the 1991 elections, the DYP formed a coalition government with the SHP. After the sudden death of President Turgut Özal, Demirel was elected as the new President with the support of the SHP.

The DYP was primarily the party of Demirel and his close associates. Although the party was built through the mobilization of the traditional clientele of the AP, competition with ANAP in a new political context that was characterized by the trends of ‘Americanization of political competition’ and ‘effective governance’ ended up with searches for changes in the ideology and leadership

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
82 For more on the founding of the DYP, see Çavuşoğlu (2009, 18–48). For more on the developments in the DYP until 1987, see Acar (1991).

practices of the DYP (Cizre 1996, 144–145, 2002a, 83–85). In order to change its image as the ‘rural party’ and in order to appeal to the new urban middle class, which placed more emphasis on individualism and economic liberalism and which had grown in size in the 1980s, the DYP leadership incorporated new young and dynamic faces to the party that could appeal to the new voters (Bildirici 1998, 158; Cizre 2002a, 86; Erel and Bilge 1994, 23; Süter 2002, 12). It was within this new context of political competition that Tansu Çiller, a professor of economics that had no prior relation with the DYP, was elected as member to the DYP General Administrative Council (Cizre 2002b, 1999; Süter 2002, 20).

Once Demirel left and was elected as the new President, the leadership of the DYP became a matter of question. At first, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the Speaker of the TBMM and the former chair of the DYP, was expected to stand for the DYP chairmanship (Güven 2008, 8). However, President Demirel demanded him to remain as TBMM speaker (Cizre 2002b, 202) and stated that he would not support

any candidates (Heper and Çınar 1996, 499)<sup>83</sup>. In the end, Tansu Çiller was elected as the new DYP chair at the second extraordinary congress convened in 1993<sup>84</sup>.

**Figure 16: Analytical Narrative of Split within the DYP**



During her leadership, Çiller purged the old guard from the ruling seats. This in turn, led to the alienation of the old guard from the party chair. Simultaneously,

83 Cindoruk's candidacy was demanded by 110 DYP deputies. After the meeting with President Demirel, Cindoruk declared that he would not register for the elections (Erel and Bilge 1994, 118). According to Çavuşoğlu (2009, 148), the support of Cindoruk to Saadettin Bilgiç during the split of the AP was the prime reason behind Demirel's dislike of Cindoruk. For Cizre (2002b, 202), Demirel's reluctance to endorse Cindoruk stemmed from his concern of creating a strong rival for himself in the DYP. For Deva (2000, 224), Demirel was at odds with Cindoruk due to the latter's opposition to the merge of the AP with the DYP. In his interview with Turgut Yılmaz Güven (2008, 39–45), Cindoruk stated Demirel demanded him to remain as the speaker of the TBMM so that the DYP could hold all important seats. In another interview with Deva (2000, 233–234), Cindoruk rejected the argument that Demirel was at odds with him due to the latter's intentions to be elected as the new President. Here it should be recalled that ANAP demanded Cindoruk to be nominated as President.

84 The three candidates, namely Tansu Çiller, İsmet Sezgin and Köksal Toptan, received 574, 320 and 212 votes, respectively. Sezgin and Toptan declared that they would not participate in the second round. Çiller received 933 votes at the second round and was elected as the DYP chair (Güven 2008, 31–32). Çiller was supported by President Demirel's close associates as well as the provincial chairs and the deputies who believed that the ANAP's new leader Mesut Yılmaz could be countered with a new political talent (Erel and Bilge 1994, 125). Besides, Çiller also received the support of The Union of Chamber and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the largest businessmen association in Turkey (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 152).

the rise of the RP as a powerful competitor for the votes of the center-right increased the pressures over the two center-right parties for a coalition. The dissidents used these demands to challenge the DYP chairwoman. However, Çiller's co-optation and divide-and-rule tactics constantly challenged the unity of the dissidents. Once the DYP leader decided to form a coalition with the Islamist RP, dissent rose again (Figure 16).

After they resigned from the DYP, the dissidents waited for the developments in the DYP and the ANAP with the hope that their project for a new party could attract the remaining dissidents in the DYP and the disappointed members of the ANAP. However, the longevity of the new party formation undermined the basis of the anti-Çiller coalition. In the end, the old guard of the DYP formed the DTP at the beginning of 1997.

The following part will deal with the reasons of discontent that ended up with party split. That will be followed by the analytical narrative of the intraparty conflict phase and analysis of the reasons behind party split. Finally, the departure phase will be discussed in detail.

#### **6.2.1. Dissent**

Conflict within the DYP revolved around two issues: exclusion of the old guards from the cabinet and the demands for cooperation between the two center-right parties.

### 6.2.1.1.Exclusion of the Old Guard from the Selective Benefits

Discontent in the DYP was not much related to the election of Çiller as the new DYP chair; it was more about the way the party chair treated the prominent members of the DYP who had dedicated their lives to first the AP and then the DYP. Following her election as the new chair, Çiller attempted to consolidate her control over the party. The removal of the associates of Demirel from the first Çiller cabinet was followed by the dissolution of the provincial executive boards prior to the fourth congress (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 157)<sup>85</sup>. The pace of Çiller's attempt to maintain the control of the party led to the dissatisfaction of the old guard. They demanded Cindoruk to run as candidate for the DYP chair at the coming congress in 1993 but the latter rejected their demands (*Milliyet*, November 15, 1993). Hence, the dissidents started to negotiate with the party leader for securing their seats at the General Administrative Council (GAC)<sup>86</sup>, the highest decision-making mechanism of the DYP after the General Congress (*Milliyet*, October 21, 1993)<sup>87</sup>. Given the absence of any significant competitors, Çiller was easily re-elected. But more

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85 Among the close associates of Demirel, Çiller assigned seats in the cabinet to only Necmettin Cevheri and Mehmet Gölhan (Erel and Bilge 1994, 140). During the debate on the first Çiller cabinet at the DYP group, nearly half of the DYP deputies voted against the new cabinet (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 157). In order to protest the new cabinet, three DYP deputies resigned.

86 For the details of the developments prior to the congress, see Şamil Tayyar, "DYP'de Kongreye Doğru", *Milliyet*, November 14-18, 1993.

87 The DYP bylaw stipulated that the General Administrative Council, which was composed of 40 members elected at the General Congress, was responsible for taking all decisions with the exception of dissolution of the party and making changes in party bylaws and program. The Council had the right to determine the nominations, decide on termination and formation of governments, elect the deputy-chairs, and pardon those punished by disciplinary boards (Doğru Yol Partisi 1990 Article 50).

important than her election was the approval of the list that Çiller had proposed for the GAC by the Congress delegates (*Milliyet*, November 22, 1993)<sup>88</sup>. Hence, within six months, Çiller gained the control of the extraparlimentary party.

Once she consolidated her power over the extraparlimentary party, Çiller ruled the cabinet and the party without any input from the associates of Demirel. She legitimized the exclusion of the old guard from selective benefits with reference to her attempts to create a new, urban, modern and young image for the party (Cizre 2002b, 203). However, this directed the criticisms of the old guard against Çiller. In 1994, the dissidents who were excluded from the administration of the party started to gather around Cindoruk once again. Cindoruk and the dissidents complained about Çiller's attempts to purge the 'devotees of the 1946 spirit' and to fill the party with her supporters which were defined by Cindoruk as the 'fools and the yes-men' (*Milliyet*, May 5, 1995). In another case, Cindoruk stated that the masses would not only vote for political window dressing (*Milliyet*, May 13, 1995). Cindoruk also warned that it was the old guard who had paved the way for Çiller's chairwomanship and stated that they could remove her if they wanted (*Milliyet*, August 12, 1995). Yet, the DYP leadership insisted in her attempts to renew the DYP cadres and responded to the criticisms of the old guard by stating that the DYP

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88 In addition to the 16 members who could secure their seats in the GAC, 24 new members were elected by the Congress delegates (*Milliyet*, November 22, 1993). Against the claims that the associates of Demirel were excluded from the GAC, Çiller stated that the GAC list had been prepared by the provincial chairs and added that the will of Congress had to be respected (*Milliyet*, November 22, 1993). It should be also noted that prior to Congress, 39 provincial chairs had declared their support to Çiller (*Milliyet*, November 8, 1993).

was not the war veterans associations, a highly insulting criticism (*Milliyet*, August 29, 1995). In this sense, the conflict over the distribution of selective benefits characterized the early years of Çiller's rule.

#### **6.2.1.2. Coalition Formation Attempts and Demands for the Merge of Center Right**

The fragmentation of the center-right and the inability of the two center-right parties to cooperate in order to overcome the country's mounting problems had been a matter of complaint in the 1990s. Developments in the SHP augmented demands for the unification or the coalition of the two center-right parties<sup>89</sup>. More importantly, the victory of the RP in the 1994 municipal elections led the businessmen, the army and the press to ask for cooperation between, and if possible merge, of the two main center-right parties in order to avoid a further increase in the support of the parties which were considered as a potential threat to the regime (Zürcher 2004, 295).

As early as 1993, DYP deputies had started to demand the replacement of the DYP-SHP coalition with a DYP-ANAP coalition (*Milliyet*, November 2, 1993). Just a few days after the 1994 municipal elections, the demands for the DYP-ANAP

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89 In 1993, the SHP leader Erdal İnönü retired and was succeeded by Murat Karayalçın. When the country was hit by an economic crisis in 1994, disagreements among the coalition partners came to the fore. For more on the conflict among the coalition partners during the chairmanship of Karayalçın to the SHP, see Çavuşoğlu (2009, 162–170)

coalition were voiced by the businessmen and 60 DYP deputies (*Milliyet*, April 1, 1994). Next, in response to the decreasing support to the DYP-SHP coalition, 37 DYP deputies demanded the termination of the coalition in October, 1994 (Güven 2008, 70–72). Despite these, the DYP leader decided to form a minority government. This raised the discontent of those demanding a center-right coalition (*Milliyet*, September 27, 1995)<sup>90</sup>. Being aware of the potential dissatisfaction with the minority government, Çiller coopted some of her ardent critics by including her opponents to the cabinet of the minority government and by nominating İsmet Sezgin, a close associate of Demirel and a highly influential challenger, as candidate for the TBMM Speaker (Cizre 2002a, 95). Besides, Çiller expelled Cindoruk and the dissident deputies who had abstained from voting for the government (*Milliyet*, October 17, 1995)<sup>91</sup>.

The dissenting deputies assumed that President Demirel would designate Hüsamettin Cindoruk as the prime minister once the minority government of the DYP fell (*Milliyet*, October 6, 1995). However, the designation of Çiller as prime minister and the formation of DYP-CHP coalition was a shock for the dissidents, who were dreaming of uniting the center-right around the re-opened Democrat

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90 In the interview with Deva (2000, 237), Cindoruk stated that he and his associates opposed the formation of a minority government since minority governments did not have the capacity to legislate and implement policies to solve the problems of the country.

91 Prior to the voting, four deputies resigned from the DYP (*Milliyet*, October 13, 1995). During the voting of the minority government's program, seven DYP deputies voted against, whereas six of them abstained from voting (*Milliyet*, October 16, 1995).



Party (*Milliyet*, October 14, 1995; *Zaman*, September 10, 1995). When their plans to remove Çiller failed, the expelled dissidents ran as candidates from the ANAP list, whereas Cindoruk remained independent to wait for the developments in the DYP after the elections (*Milliyet*, December 19, 1995; *Zaman*, October 20, 1995).

The DYP came the third and received 19.13% of the votes and 135 seats at the 1995 elections. More importantly, the RP rose as the winner of the elections. During the negotiations between the ANAP and the RP for coalition formation, the military, press and the businessmen pressed for the coalition of the two center-right parties (Gökmen 1999, 57–59)<sup>92</sup>. This demand was shared by most of the DYP and the ANAP provincial chairs as well as the old guard (*Milliyet*, January 2, 1996). In the end, the Motherland (*Anayol*) coalition was formed (*Milliyet*, 07.03.1996). However, the coalition collapsed when ANAP supported the RP's motions calling for Çiller's investigation about the TEDAŞ and the TOFAŞ corporations that had been allegedly sold for less than their real value (Meyer 1999, 491–492). This proved that the merge of the center-right parties was impossible until their leaders stepped down.

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<sup>92</sup> The intervention of the military in negotiations for coalition formation would later be subject to the so-called trials of 28 February. Besides, a parliamentary investigation committee was formed to investigate the military interventions and the memorandums. The commission reported that the Chief of General Staff Ismail Hakkı Karadayı got into contact with the TBMM Speaker Mustafa Kalemli and demanded Kalemli to prevent the formation of the ANAP-RP coalition (TBMM 2012, 946). The pressure over the two parties exerted by the military is noted by various journalists who had witnessed the period. For examples to similar statements, see Çalmuk (2000, 167–189); Gökmen (1999, 128–131).

The termination of the *Anayol* coalition also showed that no stable government could be formed without the support of the winner of the 1995 elections (Zürcher 2004, 299). The DYP leadership negotiated with the RP and the latter offered the DYP chair to suspend the parliamentary investigations into her financial dealings in exchange for her support for a coalition between these two parties (Pope and Pope 1997, 321). In the end the DYP and the RP agreed on the coalition (Özdalga 2002, 134). It was after this agreement that the dissidents fled away from the DYP.

#### **6.2.2. Intraparty Conflict**

Intraparty conflict, which was postponed with Çiller's call for early elections gained pace at the beginning of 1996. After the formation of the *Anayol* coalition, the old guard first tried to challenge the DYP chair through the meeting of the extraordinary congress (*Zaman*, April 7, 1996). They utilized the allegation of corruption about Çiller in their struggle against the DYP chair (*Milliyet*, April, 29, 1996). Once their plan to remove Çiller through the extraordinary congress failed due to the decision of the County Election Board, they demanded the resignation of the DYP deputies to protest Çiller (*Zaman*, May 21, 1996).

**Table 19: Chronology of Events (1995-1996)**

19 September 1995	The DYP-CHP coalition was terminated.
13 October 1995	The DYP minority government could not receive vote of confidence
16 October 1995	Cindoruk and nine DYP deputies were expelled from the DYP.
30 October 1995	The DYP-CHP coalition was formed
24 December 1995	1995 General elections. The DYP came the third.
6 March 1996	The ANAP-DYP coalition was formed.
22 April 1996	30 ANAP deputies declared that they would vote in favor of the RP's request about Çiller. Çiller declared that the DYP was ready for a coalition with the RP.
24 May 1996	The DYP General Administrative Council decided to withdraw from the government.
6 June 1996	The Constitutional Court decided that the vote of confidence for the ANAP-DYP coalition was void. Prime Minister Yılmaz resigned.
15 June 1996	The BTP was re-opened.
21 June 1996	Four members of the DYP General Administrative Council resigned to protest negotiations for a coalition with the RP.
28 June 1996	The RP-DYP coalition was declared
8 July 1996	The RP-DYP coalition won vote of confidence. 278 deputies voted in favor of the coalition whereas 265 deputies voted against.
16 July 1996	Eight DYP deputies who had voted against the coalition resigned from the DYP
21 July 1996	The 5 <sup>th</sup> DYP Congress. Çiller won 1095 of 1208 votes of delegates.

Source: Compiled by the author from *Milliyet* and *Zaman*.

The dissidents exploited the dissatisfaction that stemmed from the party's decision to form a coalition government with an anti-system party in the summer of 1996. Those disappointed with Çiller's decision showed their dissatisfaction in the form of either exit or voice. Prior to the voting of the first Erbakan's government programme, the founders of the DYP issued a communique calling for the DYP deputies to vote against the *Refahyol* coalition (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 208). Besides, eight deputies resigned from the DYP, five of them switching to ANAP (*Milliyet*, 2 July 1996). The old guard also rejuvenated the Great Turkey Party (*Büyük Türkiye Partisi*-BTP) in order to attract the support of the disappointed deputies in not only the DYP but also ANAP and RP (*Milliyet*, 08 June 1996; *Milliyet*, 11 June 1996; *Milliyet*, 12 June 1996). Despite the attempts of the dissidents, the party leader did not retreat from forming a coalition with RP. Next, the dissidents of the DYP voted against the government programme. However, the *Refahyol* was approved by a

close majority, thanks to the support of the BBP (*Milliyet*, July 9, 1996). Following the approval of the coalition by Parliament, eight of the fourteen DYP deputies who voted against or abstained from the voting resigned from the DYP (*Milliyet*, July 17, 1996). With the resignations, the number of the DYP seats at the parliament decreased to 120 (*Milliyet*, 17 July 1996).

### **6.2.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split**

The political context within which the intraparty conflict in the DYP occurred was relatively favorable for the entrance of splinter parties compared to the pre-1995 period. With the amendments prior to the 1995 elections, the barriers on the entrance of new parties had decreased even though the disproportionality and the RRP values were relatively high due to the 10% national threshold. More importantly, public polls and the decrease in the votes of the two main parties signaled the disappointment of voters with the established parties. On the other hand, the fragmentation of the party system increased the bargaining of the minor parties in case of coalition formation. Since the *Refahyol* coalition was approved with a close majority, a new party could receive the support of the DYP deputies who were dissatisfied with the party chair and who were in a demand to benefit from the state resources if the new party became a part of an alternative coalition. In this sense, the new party could bargain for disproportional distribution of ministerial position under the fragmented party system. Finally, the political future of the DYP leader was far from certain. Given the pressures over the *Refahyol* coalition exerted by business, the military and the mainstream media and given the proposals for parliamentary investigations on the allegation of corruption and

misconduct about the DYP chair, the dissidents believed that they could attract the remaining dissidents in the DYP in case they formed a new party. In this sense, the uncertainty about the future of the coalition and the DYP facilitated the party split.

On the other hand, the DYP leader did not accommodate the demands of the dissidents due to three reasons: the questioning of the legitimacy of the party leader made accommodation impossible, the dissidents were weak in all layers of the party organization and the leader had established autonomy from the factions prior to the 1995 elections.

#### **6.2.3.1. The Nature of Disagreement**

The reason of dissent within the DYP was twofold: exclusion of the associates of Demirel from selective benefits, and the pressures over the party chair for the *Anayol* coalition. The first source of conflict was more easily resolved compared to the demands for the merge of the two parties. During the fourth congress in 1993, Çiller co-opted some of her ardent critics by nominating them from her list for the General Administrative Council (GAC). Besides, Çiller also rewarded her potential challengers with ministerial positions in the minority government. Such measures by the leadership divided the dissidents who were primarily concerned with the distribution of selective benefits and who were far from agreeing on the leadership to their movement. However, the dissidents who later founded the DTP believed that the DYP had turned to be a vehicle for personal gains of its leader and that the allegation of corruption had damaged the image of the DYP (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi 1997, 7). In this sense, although the dissidents

and the DYP leadership did not significantly differ in terms of their policy goals, the former were of the idea that the DYP leader had betrayed the original ideals of the party. The rejection of the legitimacy of the party leader prevented the accommodation of the conflict over the distribution of selective benefits.

The merge of the two center-right parties was a hard mission. Scholars that compared these two parties found that they had differences in terms of their social bases (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2004) and policy goals (Cizre 1996; Çavuşoğlu 2010). But the general idea is that the two center-right parties did not significantly differ in ideological terms (Öniş 1997, 751). The impossibility of the merge of the two center-right parties was the result of two reasons. Firstly, the DYP members were of the idea that ANAP was the product of the military intervention. This perception stemmed from the fact that ANAP and the military had tried to prevent the DYP from revitalizing itself and from mobilizing its traditional clientele (Cizre 1996, 144, 2002a, 85). ANAP's attitude during the referendum for the repeal of bans on outlawed politicians, the amendment of the electoral law before the 1987 elections in order to provide more seats for ANAP, and the election of Turgut Özal as President despite the declining votes of the ANAP in the 1989 local elections had been contested by the DYP leadership. Hence, ANAP was portrayed as "the emanation of the coup using the political influence of the military for furthering its political fortunes" (Cizre 2002a, 88). Moreover, the DYP became dependent on negating some unsavory aspects of the neo-liberal discourse of ANAP, such as social welfare, civilization and democratization, rather than crystalizing its own ideological commitments (Cizre 1996, 146). Given the enmity between the two parties, the merge of the center-right was an uneasy mission to be accomplished.

Doubts about ANAP's intentions was another factor making the merge of the DYP and ANAP a difficult mission during the reign of Çiller. It was true that the gap between the two parties in terms of economic policies had decreased with the advent of Çiller's leadership (Cizre 2002a, 89). This time, personal disagreements and distrust between the leaders of DYP and ANAP made the merge impossible (Pope and Pope 1997, 314). The DYP leadership was of the idea that the ANAP leader was in an attempt to rule out the DYP leader by various ways, including supporting the prime ministry of Hüsamettin Cindoruk, negotiating with the dissidents of the DYP, and using the corruption inquiries. Hence, the demands of the dissidents could not be easily accommodated by the DYP leader.

#### **6.2.3.2. Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party Organization**

The dissidents of the DYP were in a minority in all layers of the party organization both prior to and after the 1995 elections. The DYP Congresses held in 1993 and 1996 had proven that the DYP leader had the support of the delegates, and hence the party on the ground. Dissenting party members, who later exited the party held 12 out of 40 seats of the General Administrative Council in the 1993 Congress. Besides, Çiller received 1045 votes out of 1215 Congress delegates. Moreover, both in 1993 and 1996 Congresses, the candidates for GAC nominated by the party leader were approved by Congress. Çiller was re-elected in the 1996 Congress by obtaining 1095 out of 1208 votes. These Congresses indicated that Çiller could control the ruling party offices. In addition to these, the dissidents lacked the support of the parliamentary party. Only 13 and 14 deputies voted against

the DYP minority group and the *Refahyol* coalition, respectively. Besides, 33 out of 135 DYP deputies switched to the DTP. This made it easy for the DYP leader to neglect the demands of the dissidents without leading to the termination of the coalition with the CHP and the RP.

#### **6.2.3.3. Leadership Autonomy**

The autonomy of the party leader in the DYP stemmed from the Political Parties Law that ordered the election of party leader by the congress delegates and the DYP bylaw that gave the GAC the right to dissolve local executive boards. According to the 14<sup>th</sup> article of the PPL, party leaders, members of Central Decision-making and Administration Council and members of the Central Disciplinary Board were elected by Congress delegates who were elected by provincial congresses. On the other hand, the 37<sup>th</sup> article of the DYP bylaw (1990) stipulated that the GAC had the right to dissolve the provincial and sub-provincial branches. With this right, Çiller who had succeeded in achieving the control of the GAC in 1993 Congress could dissolve the provincial executive boards in order to control the selection of Congress delegates. In addition to the determination of the selectorate, the DYP leader could use the benefits of being in government in order to increase her autonomy from the factions. That is, the DYP chair could weaken intraparty opposition by controlling the distribution of cabinet posts. The consequence was a highly autonomous party leader who could retain the legitimacy of her decisions simply by pointing out the leadership selection methods.



#### **6.2.4. Departure: Conflict among the Dissidents and Formation of the Democratic Turkey Party**

Following their resignations, the opponents of Çiller started to work on a new party without any expectations from the coming DYP congress that would convene on 21<sup>st</sup> of July, 1996 (*Milliyet*, July 11, 1996). This was due to the fact that the supporters of Çiller had already won the provincial congresses (*Milliyet*, May 31, 1996). Hence, during the meeting on the 16<sup>th</sup> of June 1996, eight of the dissidents in the DYP started to resign, whereas two of them remained in the party (*Milliyet*, June 17, 1996)<sup>93</sup>.

For Çiller's opponents, a new party that would rejuvenate the '1946 spirit' and unite the fragmented center-right in line with the demands of the voters had to be formed (*Milliyet*, 11 July 1996; *Milliyet*, July 17, 1996)<sup>94</sup>. According to their estimation, a new center-right party would receive around 25% of the votes (*Milliyet*, September 12, 1996). Additionally, the dissidents believed that a new party would also attract deputies from ANAP and force the DYP and ANAP leaders to joint action (*Milliyet*, June 16, 1996; *Milliyet*, June 20, 1996). Hence, the dissidents waited for the results of the ANAP Congress that would convene in August 1996 (*Milliyet*, July 25, 1996). While deciding on their strategy, they also

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93 These deputies were Gencay Gürün, Ayseli Göksoy. (*Milliyet*, 17 June 1996).

94 Public opinion conducted by the dissidents found that 55% of the participants demanded the opponents to continue with the DYP, whereas 43.9% demanded them to form a new party (*Milliyet*, 20 July, 1996).

got into contact with the leaders of minor right-wing parties such as the BBP and the YDP (*Zaman*, November 20, 1996). They were expecting that the coalition with the Islamist party would trigger further resignations from the DYP (*Milliyet*, July 23, 1996). However, none of their expectations came true.

During the wait-and-see period, the disagreements among the dissidents came to the fore. For some of the resigned deputies that had gathered around Köksal Toptan, a new nationalist, conservative and modern party that would rejuvenate the ‘1946 spirit’ and the AP tradition would become the focal point of attraction for the voters and the deputies who were disappointed with the leaders of the center-right parties (*Milliyet*, July 20, 1996). Besides, Toptan believed that it was impossible for the DYP leader to terminate the *Refahyol* coalition since the RP could effectively use the allegation of corruption against the DYP chair (*Milliyet*, July 20, 1996). Hence, Toptan demanded the formation of a genuinely new party that was located at the center of the political spectrum (*Milliyet*, July 29, 1996). Against this, Cindoruk and the old guard believed that the success of a new party depended on its ability to transfer more dissatisfied voters from the DYP (*Milliyet*, September 16, 1996). This, for Toptan, would erode the viability of the new party and turn it into a movement of the resentful (*Milliyet*, 16 September 1996).

Additionally, the dissidents came into conflict about the leadership of the new formation (*Zaman*, September 24, 1996). In order to overcome this, Ismet Sezgin was pointed as the third alternative (*Milliyet*, October 7, 1996). Additionally, the supporters of Cindoruk set the termination of the *Refahyol* government as their first goal and called for early elections in order to trigger discontent within the DYP (*Milliyet*, October 16, 1996). This led Toptan and Çağlar to withdraw their support

from the new formation on the ground that Cindoruk and his followers were far from proposing an alternative to the existing center-right parties (*Milliyet*, December 12, 1996). In the end, the Democrat Turkey Party was formed by 33 DYP deputies but without the support of the younger dissidents on the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 1997, the anniversary of the formation of the Democrat Party.

### **6.3. Exit without Voice: Breakdown of the Democratic Left Party and Formation of the New Turkey Party, 2002.**

The DSP was a genuinely new party that was formed by the Ecevit in 1985. Despite the demands of the former CHP members for the support of Ecevit to SODEP, Mr. Ecevit refused to form a party during the liberalization period (Bila 2001, 21). In fact, Ecevit's experiences during the period he was CHP chair led him to conclude that no cohesive party could be formed together with the political entrepreneurs of the CHP (Akar 2002, 88). The following words of Ecevit are worth quoting in order to understand the reasons behind the formation of a genuinely new party rather than cooperation with the existing SHP (Bila 2001, 204–205):

I hit the pavement not to divide the social democrats but to rescue them from the separatism of the factions. Both I and the DSP aim to unite the social democrats and to bring them to the government under a more consistent and modern direction, under a more steady organization and by rescuing them from the shadow of those at more left. I cannot be a guarantor for an organization that carries the flaws of the past. If the CHP had not been outlawed, we would try to remedy the flaws within the CHP.... This party considers itself as responsible for reaching millions of social democrats who have been trapped under rightist parties due to the mistakes and repulsiveness of some of the leftists in the past... Leaving aside those who have not escaped from the habit of factionalism, those who look down on masses, and those who call them to be leftist while cooperating with the dominant forces, I am calling for the unification of social

democrats around the masses rather than around an organization that is prone to split due to ideological struggles.

Ecevit was highly disturbed by the elitist outlook of the CHP (Akar 2002, 35) and the definition of etatism proposed by the party (Bila 2001, 206). For Ecevit, as long as the elitist attitude of the CHP prevailed, the party would not attract the votes of the masses that had a dislike for the term left (Arcayürek 2006, 241)<sup>95</sup>. In short, the DSP was formed in response to the factionalism of the CHP and the radical leftists who, the Ecevits believed, had led to the alienation of the masses from the left.


From its foundation, the party was run by the Ecevits. Before forming the new party, they carefully reviewed and selected the founders of the new party among nonprofessional politicians (Akar 2002, 34; Bila 2001, 123–128). As the party grew in size, the Ecevits were accompanied by third figures but they always retained the control of the party in their hands (Akar 2002, 38). The party gradually increased its electoral strength in consecutive elections and became a relevant party in formation or termination of the coalitions. Following the demise of the *Refahyol* coalition, the DSP took part in the second Yılmaz cabinet. This was followed by the minority government formed by the DSP. In the 1999 elections, the DSP came the first and formed a coalition government with ANAP and MHP. When Ecevit's

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95 For the statements of the Ecevits regarding the ideological differences between the SODEP/SHP and the DSP, see Bila (2001, 136–152); Yağız (2002, 67–69). For Ecevit's ideas on the intellectuals and the CHP, see Arcayürek (2006, 236–245)

health condition deteriorated, Ecevit was accompanied by Hüsamettin Özkan in cabinet affairs (Bildirici 2000, 171; Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 94; Dünder 2008, 244). However, the deterioration of the relations between Özkan and Mrs. Ecevit ended up with the resignation of Özkan from the DSP.

**Figure 17: Analytical Narrative of the Breakdown of the DSP**



After the resignation of Özkan, the party suddenly broke down. Among the party splits analyzed in this work; the split of the DSP was unique due to the absence of any identifiable factions and due to the decision of the dissidents to exit without voicing their demands within the party platforms. This was closely related with the fact that the DSP was primarily the party of its leader and that the party's charismatic leader had constantly excluded any dissenting party member from the DSP. While the exclusionary strategies pulled the dissidents out of the DSP, economic problems, dissatisfaction of voters with the established parties and the demands of business for leadership turnover, which in the case of the DSP was impossible, constituted the opportunity push. Hence, within the day after their resignation, dissident deputies that primarily relied on the personal images of two

successful ministers, Ismail Cem and Kemal Derviş worked on the formation of a new party. In the end, the YTP was founded only within a few weeks (Figure 17).

### **6.3.1. Dissent**

The breakdown of the DSP was closely related with the dependence of the party to the image of party leader which had ceased after the 1999 earth quake, 2001 economic crises, and the uncertainties created by the deterioration of the DSP's charismatic leader's health conditions. Additionally, the fact that the party was run by the Ecevit family had led to dissatisfaction of DSP members.

#### **6.3.1.1. The Rahşan Ecevit Factor**

Dissent within the DSP mainly stemmed from the close control of the Ecevits over the party organization. Since the foundation of the DSP, Rahşan Ecevit has always been highly influential over the extraparliamentary party. During its foundation years, Rahşan Ecevit formed the party with reliable party members who, the Ecevits supposed, would not engage in factional games (Akar 2002, 36). Once Bülent Ecevit was elected as the party chair, Rahşan Ecevit formally or informally continued to exert influence over the administration of the party (Akar 2002, 92). Indeed, although the party's secretary-generals were responsible for the extraparliamentary party affairs, it was Mrs. Ecevit who was the de facto ruler of the extraparliamentary party (Kınıklıoğlu 2002, 5). It was primarily Mrs. Ecevit's authoritarianism, one interviewee said, that was the reason behind the breakdown of the party in 2002 (Interview with Ali Günay, June 15, 2013).

### **6.3.1.2. Leadership Succession Crisis**

More important than the Raĥsan factor was the uncertainty about the future of the party due to the party chair's health conditions. The DSP primarily relied on the personal charisma and public image of Blent Ecevit for electoral success. In the minds of the voters, Ecevit was the savior of Cyprus as well as the honest, dependable and humble politician who had captured Abdullah calan, the leader of the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (Ciddi 2009, 100; Lowry 2000, 30). Although the personal image of the DSP leader was an asset for the party in 1999 elections, it turned to be a liability after the deterioration of Mr. Ecevit's health condition. Once Ecevit was taken to hospital, doubts about the future of the party increased.

Ecevit's health condition also increased doubts about the future of the coalition. The businessmen, the press and the military were mainly concerned with the future of the coalition in which Ecevit's personality acted as a unifying bone among coalition partners with conflicting goals and interests. For the businessmen, strict obedience to economic reforms and enactment of the political reforms required for the country's accession to the EU depended on the harmony between the partners of the coalition, which had been maintained under the prime ministry of Ecevit. In 2001, it was Ecevit who could convince the MHP leader for a constitutional amendment in order to restrict the death penalty to crimes committed in cases of war, or the imminent threat of war and terror crimes (Bildirici 2000, 32–33; zbudun 2007, 186). The MHP leader's opposition to the third reform package, which included new reforms such as the abolition of the death penalty, the use of local languages other than Turkish in radio and television broadcasting and the instruction of local languages in private language courses (zbudun 2007, 184),

was well-known (Bila 2004, 102–103). It was also clear that the MHP leader would break up the coalition if any person other than Ecevit was appointed as prime minister. Within this context of political uncertainty and the pressing problems of the country, the businessmen started to search for alternatives. Replacement of the DSP leader with a new political talent was one of those alternatives spoken indoors and sometimes voiced outdoors.

Once the military, press and the businessmen demanded the replacement of Ecevit with a new political talent, the Ecevits started to believe that Özkan was taking part in the plot against them. Although Özkan rejected the claim that he had intentions of being the new prime minister (*Milliyet*, November 9, 2001), he could not convince the Ecevits, especially Mrs. Ecevit (Bila 2004, 28–30). Simultaneously, Cengiz Çandar wrote an article stating that Saddam Husain of Iraq would not be toppled by the USA unless Ecevit resigned (*Yeni Şafak*, November 30, 2001). This led the Ecevits to conclude that they were in the middle of an international plot to remove the Ecevits<sup>96</sup>. Nevertheless, the conflict was postponed until the Prime Minister was taken to the hospital in May 2002.

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96 In our interviews, both the dissidents and the supporters of Ecevit agreed on the idea that the USA was behind the plot against Ecevit. Ali Günay stated that the USA was demanding Ismail Cem's prime ministry since they were in the idea that they could convince Cem for realization of the demands of the USA before attacking Iraq. Günay also added that representatives of the USA embassy visited Cem and that Cem rejected their demands. For Günay, it was after this visit that the support for the YTP decreased (Interview with Ali Günay, June 15, 2013). In a similar vein, Zeki Sezer, the successor of Ecevit after the latter's resignation in 2002, stated that it was the external forces that triggered conflict in the DSP in order to maintain the prime ministry of a new politician that would realize the USA's demands (Interview with Zeki Sezer, July 18, 2013). These arguments were shared by journalists such as Yağız (2002) and Bila (2004), who had witnessed the period.



The Prime Minister was taken to hospital at the beginning of May, 2002. During the period that Ecevit was in hospital, Derviş stated his demand for early elections as a solution for political uncertainty (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 165). However, for the DSP leadership, Derviş's words were the evidence of the plot against the Ecevits and of the participation of Derviş, Cem and Özkan to this plot (Bila 2004, 71). For Rahşan Ecevit, Hüsamettin Özkan was planning to be the new Prime Minister with the help of internal and external forces (Bila 2004, 88). Although Özkan rejected these claims and accused some of the DSP members around the Ecevits for misguiding Mrs. Ecevit, (Bila 2004, 89), Bülent Ecevit started to believe in the scenarios. In reaction to Derviş, Ecevit stated that he would not resign since it could provoke another economic crisis. Besides, Ecevit noted that the designation of a successor would be an undemocratic practice as the DSP delegates would democratically elect the new DSP chair once stability was maintained (Bila 2004, 71)<sup>97</sup>.

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<sup>97</sup> In our interview, Zeki Sezer stated that even though Ecevit had resigned, it was highly likely for Ecevit to designate Sezer as his successor (Interview with Zeki Sezer, July 18, 2013). Actually, just after the 2002 elections, the Ecevits pointed out Sezer as their successor and the latter was elected as the new DSP chair. Hence, it was unlikely for Özkan to become the chair to the DSP.

### **6.3.1.3.Decreasing Value of the Party’s Brand Name: The 1999 Earthquake and the 2001 Economic Crisis**

Two events decreased the value of the DSP for political entrepreneurs who intended to guarantee their re-election: the earthquake on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August, 1999 and the economic crisis in 2001. The earthquake, which hit the Marmara region, was devastating for Turkey’s industrial heartland. The political effect of the earthquake was discontent with the incompetence of state institutions and the government, which failed to manage the disaster effectively (Jalali 2002, 126; Kubicek 2001, 38). However, more devastating for the public image of the DSP was the 2001 economic crisis. Following a heated argument between the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister Ecevit at the National Security Council meeting in February 2001, Turkey experienced its worst economic crisis (Ciddi 2009, 100; Kınıklıoğlu 2002, 7). The economic crisis led the voters to blame Ecevit and the DSP for the economic crisis (*Hürriyet*, 21.10.2002). The DSP lost its electoral viability so did the DSP deputies their re-election prospects.

### **6.3.2. Departure: Exit without Voice**

The series of events that ended with the departure of the DSP deputies to form the YTP started at the meeting of the coalition partners on the 4<sup>th</sup> of July 2002. During the meeting, Derviş restated his demand for early elections on the ground that the disagreements between coalition partners would prevent constitutional changes that were required Turkey’s accession to the European Union (*Hürriyet*, October 15, 2002). The silence of Hüsamettin Özkan to the critiques voiced at the

meeting led the party leader to conclude that Özkan had taken side with the domestic and international forces behind the plot for discharging Ecevit from politics (*Hürriyet*, July 8, 2002). On the 5<sup>th</sup> of July 2002, Ecevit held a meeting with DSP leaders to discuss the recent press campaign against him. Following the meeting, a press meeting was held and Özkan was accused of taking side with the forces trying to remove Ecevit (Bila 2004, 119). Next, while Özkan was away from the capital city, Ecevit declared that he had split up with Özkan<sup>98</sup>. In reaction, Özkan resigned from the DSP together with 19 deputies and three ministers on the next day (Bila 2004, 132). On the same day, the MHP leader announced that early elections would be held (*Hürriyet*, September 28, 2002). The number of DSP seats in the parliament decreased from 128 on the 8 July to 69 on the 16<sup>th</sup> of July, 2002 (*Ayın Tarihi*, June 16, 2002).

The day after Ecevit's statements, Özkan met with Ismail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bila 2004, 42). Cem first waited for Ecevit's move, but when the DSP chair appointed Şükrü Sina Gürel to the place of Özkan, Cem resigned (Bila 2004, 133; Dündar 2008, 246). On the same day, Özkan met with his followers and told them that they would form a new party together with Ismail Cem and Kemal Derviş (*Hürriyet*, July 11, 2002). Simultaneously nine deputies who had

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98 For Raĥsan Ecevit, the external forces were trying to purge her husband through medical report to be received from the hospital that Ecevit was taken to. Raĥsan Ecevit later convinced her husband for changing his doctors (Bila 2004, 136). This argument was later repeated in the so-called *Ergenekon* trials. The Doctor of Bülent Ecevit was charged for taking part in the plot against the government (T24, February 2, 2011).

previously demanded the DSP leader to designate a new leader for the DSP met with Derviş and demanded him not to take part with the dissidents until they asked the DSP leader for the convention of the extraordinary congress (Bila 2004, 137). Derviş met with the DSP leader and stated his resignation but the latter and the President demanded him to retreat from his decision (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 176). Although Derviş had previously told Cem and Özkan about his intentions for a unified left, they held a press meeting on the 12<sup>th</sup> of July 2002 and declared that they would form a new party together with Derviş (Bila 2004, 141). The press meeting accelerated the resignations in the DSP. The number of resigned deputies increased from 18 on 8<sup>th</sup> of July to 63 on 22<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2002, at the day the YTP was formed.

**Table 20: Chronology of Events (2002)**

4 May	Ecevit's health problems
10 May	Derviş stated that early elections could be held to end political uncertainty
4 July	Derviş called for early elections.
5 July	The DSP issued a communique criticizing deputy prime minister Özkan for taking part in the plot to remove Ecevit.
7 July	MHP leader and deputy prime minister Bahçeli stated that the TBMM should convene and decide for early elections to be held in 3 September.
8 July	Hüsamettin Özkan and 19 DSP deputies resigned.
9 July	Two ministers resigned. Derviş met with Cem.
10 July	Two more deputies resigned. The seats of the DSP decreased to 93. Derviş met with Özkan for a new party.
11 July	Ismail Cem resigned.
12 July	Formation of a new party was declared
15 July	The seats of the DSP group decreased to 75. Coalition partners agreed to hold early elections on the 3 <sup>rd</sup> of November, 2002.
16 July	6 DSP deputies resigned. The number of the resigned deputies reached to 59. DSP seats decreased to 69.
17 July	Derviş met with CHP leader Baykal.
21 July	Ecevit argued that the developments in the DSP was a consequence of a conspiracy of foreigners and their partners in Turkey
22 July	The YTP was formed.

Source: Compiled by the author from *Hürriyet* and *Ayın Tarihi*.

During the formation of the new party, the founders of the YTP expected that Derviş would take side with them, even though the latter had stated his demand

for the unification of the center-left. For Derviş, as long as the center-left remained divided, neither the CHP nor the YTP could pass the 10% national threshold (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 187). This could end up with the domination of the AK Parti in Parliament. Hence, Derviş searched for the unification of, or at least an electoral coalition of the center-left parties (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 181–182). However, once his efforts for electoral coalition among the center-left parties failed, Derviş joined the CHP. This was shocking for the founders of the YTP who believed that Derviş's betrayal had made the YTP 'stillborn' (Dündar 2008, 248)<sup>99</sup>. The YTP first searched for coalition with the DTP. Next, the party supported the attempts to postpone the elections. In 2002 elections, the party received 1.2% of the votes.

### **6.3.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split**

Formation of the YTP without any attempts of the dissidents to voice their demands within the party platforms was related with the uncertainty about the future of the DSP due to the party's highly autonomous but aging leader who considered the dissidents as a serious threat to his leadership and the weakness of the dissidents in the extraparlimentary party.

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<sup>99</sup> This perception stemmed from the fact that Kemal Derviş was considered as the second most popular alternative to the existing party leaders after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The opinion polls conducted by ANAR (2002, 91) revealed that the voters demanded Kemal Derviş to be the leader of the left.

### 6.3.3.1.The Nature of Disagreement

The comparison of the YTP and the DSP electoral manifestos reveals that the DSP put more emphasis over national interests, whereas the YTP presented itself as the agent of reform and change (Demokrat Sol Parti 2002; Yeni Türkiye Partisi 2002). However, it was not the dissatisfaction of the dissident deputies with the DSP's policies that resulted in their departure. Rather, they were primarily dissatisfied with the way the DSP was administrated. Yet, even if the only reason of discontent was the enormous control of the Ecevit over the party, this demand could not be managed given the fact that the DSP was unthinkable without the Ecevit (Akar 2002, 239).

The perception of the Ecevit is more important than the complaints of the resigned deputies for understanding why the dissent could not be managed. For the Ecevit, the intraparty opposition led by Özkan was in an attempt to remove them from the DSP. They also believed that external forces were trying to put an end to the coalition government since the DSP and the MHP leaders were challenges on the way to their interests (Yağız 2002, 11). This argument was spread to the party organization around country on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 2002 (Yağız 2002, 12–13) and was recalled in the 2002 electoral program<sup>100</sup>. Hence, given the doubts of the Ecevit

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100 In its electoral programme, the reason of the party split was related to domestic and international forces who were disturbed by the new economic system on the allocation of resources (Demokrat Sol Parti 2002, 12). When they failed to remove Bülent Ecevit from party chairmanship, the argument goes on, these forces encouraged the dissidents to split from the DSP so that they could remove Ecevit from Prime Ministry (Demokrat Sol Parti 2002, 13).

about the intentions of the ‘troika movement’, it is implausible to expect that the Ecevit would accommodate the dissents’ demands, which were never voiced in detail.

#### **6.3.3.2. Relative Power of Competing Faction across Different Layers of Party Organization**

The split in the DSP was an exception since there was no identifiable faction in the party. With the exception of the criticisms of individual deputies, there was no sign of factional dissatisfaction. Indeed, although Bülent Ecevit’s chairmanship was challenged at the fifth General Congress for the first time in the history of the DSP, the dissident deputies that would later form the YTP refrained from supporting Sema Pişkinsüt’s candidacy<sup>101</sup>. Nevertheless, Ecevit received 963 out of 1049 votes in 2001 Congress.

The absence of any identifiable faction stemmed from the strategies developed by the Ecevit who were known for their dislike of factionalism. From the election as the CHP chair in 1972 to the military intervention, the CHP was a highly factionalized party<sup>102</sup>. Factionalism within the CHP reached its peak in the mid-1970s (Bila 2009, 252–289). Partly, in reaction to his prior experiences, Ecevit

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101 In order to protest the attacks on Pişkinsüt at the Congress, two deputies resigned from the DSP (Hürriyet, May 1, 2001).

102 For details on factional conflict in the CHP in the 1970s, see Bila (2009); (Dağıstanlı 1998).

refused to join the SODEP and decided to form a highly centralized genuinely new party, which would be formed by ordinary members rather than influential political entrepreneurs with conflicting goals, which could pose a threat by engaging in factional games (Ciddi 2009, 75; Yağız 2002, 50).

Once the DSP was formed, the Ecevit employed a number of measures, including minimization of the functions of the party organization, establishment of direct relation with the voters, limitation of the number of party members in order to control selection of delegates, controlling approval of membership registration and restriction of intraparty elections in order to centralize the power in the hands of the party leader (Akar 2002, 91; Ayata and Ayata 2007, 228; Kınıklıoğlu 2000, 12–13)<sup>103</sup>. In addition to these, provincial executive boards were constantly abolished in order to prevent the rise of locally powerful bosses (Akar 2002, 90)<sup>104</sup>. Hence, as one DSP member stated, the limited membership approach led to unlimited support to the Ecevit (Ciddi 2009, 111). The consequence of the absence of any local or ideological factions based on townsmanship, ethnic origins or

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103 Kınıklıoğlu (2000, 13) and Ciddi (2009, 111) state that the DSP leader consciously limited the maximum number of party members in any district organization with the number of 149 since the political parties law required delegate selections for the provincial congresses in case the number of members in a party exceeded 150. By limiting elections in district congresses, the Ecevit could appoint the loyal party members as delegates to the provincial congresses.

104 In our interview with Ali Günay, Günay stated that Raşan Ecevit, the DSP secretary general, was continuously dissolving provincial executive boards so that deputies did not know who the provincial chair was. In a similar vein, in an interview, the YTP leader İsmail Cem noted that the provincial chairs refrained from establishing close relations with the deputies of the province in order to avoid taking attention of Raşan Ecevit (Dündar 2008, 195).



ideologies (Akar 2002, 242–244)<sup>105</sup>. Indeed, the DSP lacked a cadre (Akar 2002, 261). Naturally, the dissident deputies lacked the support of the party on the ground and the party in central office. The dissident members held 6 out of 40 Party Assembly seats. Under such circumstances, it was obvious that dissenting deputies could not use the party as a platform to realize his or her demands.

Another consequence of the management strategies of the Ecevits was the absence of the intraparty conflict phase in the case of the split in the DSP. Since the Ecevits consciously prevented the rise of powerful competitors that could challenge their authority, the deputies were far from developing loyalty to the party (Akar 2002, 91). Constant suppression of any intraparty opposition resulted in high levels of political inefficacy. Actually, the dissidents within the DSP complained that they did not know whether they were party member or not (Akar 2002, 99). In this sense, the fear of the Ecevits from factionalism hindered the institutionalization of the party and prevented the rise of a party identity.

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105 Oppression of the intraparty opposition does not mean that the DSP had never been prone to intraparty conflict. Although Raĥsan Ecevit had carefully picked up the founders that numbered 612, 233 of them rebelled against the party leader in 1986. In return, Raĥsan Ecevit suspended the membership of these founders (Akar 2002, 113–128). A decade later, a movement known as the *Çile Çiçekleri* called for extraordinary congress and demanded the recognition of their membership rights by the party in central office (Akar 2002, 144–149). In return, they were expelled from the party. In addition to these organized intraparty opposition movements, dissent was manifested in the form of individual resignations. In 1997, the DSP expelled seven deputies, namely Veli Aksoy, Yüksel Aksu, Hilmi Develi, Bülent Tanla, Bekir Yurdakul, Cevdet Selvi and Gökhan Çapoĝlu. With the exception of Çapoĝlu, all deputies joined the ranks of the CHP whereas Çapoĝlu formed the Changing Turkey's Party in order to unite the center-left (Daĝistanlı 1998, 340–342). In addition to them, Mümtaz Sosyal who was one of the important figures of social democrats resigned from the DSP due to rapprochement between Ecevit and the leader of an influential Islamic sect, Fethullah Gülen (Daĝistanlı 1998, 338). Following the 1999 elections, the criticisms of Sema Pişkinsüt and Ridvan Budak ended up with their expulsion.

Personal attachment to the Ecevit rather than the party turned into a liability when the health condition of the party leader deteriorated. The voters voted for the DSP leader than the party. However, the value of the personal image of Ecevit diminished after the earthquake and the economic crisis. Moreover, given that the party depended on the image of Ecevit for its success, the future of the party in case Ecevit resigned due to health problems was far from certain. The decreasing brand value of Ecevit signaled to dissident deputies that they would lose their seats in the coming elections in case they remained loyal to the party leader. In this sense, the personalization of the party brought its demise and break down once the uncertainties about the future of the party leader increased. Due to the inability of the dissidents to compete in the party platforms and the decreasing brand value of Ecevit, 65 deputies chose to follow the rising political talents rather than voicing within the party.

#### **6.3.3.3. Leadership Autonomy**

Similar to all post-1980 political parties, the General Congress was the highest decision mechanism that was authorized to elect the party leader (Demokrat Sol Parti 1991, 17). However, what increased the leadership autonomy in the DSP was not only the leadership selection method but the leadership's control over membership registrations in order to limit membership to extremely trusted members (Kınıklioğlu 2000, 13). As stated above, the leadership's dominance over the party was reinforced by the continuous dissolution of the provincial executive boards in order to avoid the development of local bosses. This type of management of the party resulted in a highly autonomous leader. The leader's autonomy and

legitimacy was further reinforced with the 1999 electoral results in which the DSP became the first party. Hence the party leader could find it easy to legitimize his decisions regarding the dissident party members.

#### **6.4. Conclusion**

The cases analyzed in this chapter invalidate the expectation that the dissidents would choose to remain within the party if the disproportionality and the spatial requirements were low. However, the disappointment of voters with the existing parties in the 1990s encouraged the dissidents to invest on new parties. Although the turnout rate is not a proper indicator to assess voter's discontent with the existing parties due to the introduction of compulsory voting, opinion polls were effectively used by the dissidents to measure the viability of potential and the existing political parties. Additionally, the high levels of volatility signaled to dissidents of both the DYP and the DSP that it was the right time for strategic entry to catch the votes of free-floating voters. Finally, given that the multiparty system increased the power of minor parties in coalition formation, the benefits of splinter party formation increased.

The cases of the splits within the DYP and the DSP reveal the importance of endogenous factors in shaping the factional conflict. In the case of the DYP, the conflict revolved around the distribution of selective benefits. The exclusion of the old guard from office and the electoral payoffs led to their alienation from the party. However, since the DYP leader needed their support for forming coalitions, she employed co-optation and divide-and-rule strategies. This postponed the departure

of the dissidents who were dissatisfied with the performance of the DYP chair. When doubts about the future of the DYP and its leader increased after the 1995 elections, the dissidents chose to invest on a new party with the hope that they could attract the support of center-right deputies from other parties. In addition to these, the leadership's relative autonomy from the old guards and the weakness of the dissidents in the party enabled the party chair to refuse to accommodate the dissidents' demands when they challenged the legitimacy of the party leaders' rule.

The case of the DSP is unique due to the absence of any identifiable factions and due to the fact that the dissidents chose to exit in silence. This was related with the suppression of any possible opposition by the Ecevit and the decreasing value of the party. The absence of any attachment to the party and the association of the party with the Ecevit led to the breakdown of the party when the uncertainties over the future of the party leader increased. Additionally, the doubts of the Ecevit about the intentions of the dissidents signaled the later that they would be purged. Given their weakness in the party and the high degree of leadership autonomy, the party leader could easily neglect their demands even though they held important number of seats in the parliament.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study attempted to give answer to two crucial questions: why did the leaders of the Turkish center-right parties refrain from accommodating the demands of the dissenting factions even if it would lead to a party split; and why did the dissident factions insist on their cause even if it would lead to their expulsions? In order to provide an answer to these crucial questions, it dealt with the paths to party split, reasons of dissatisfaction and strategies employed by competing factions and tested nine hypotheses over five cases of party split.

The model proposed in this dissertation started with the sources of dissatisfaction. The possible reasons of dissent have been grouped under three headings. With the exception of the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP*), all parties suffered from complaints about the party change. For the dissidents of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP*), party change was the prime reason behind the party's defeat in 1965 elections. On the other hand, disproportional distribution of office payoffs was a salient reason of conflict in the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*) and the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP*). Yet, the dissident members of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti-*

DP) and the CHP, the dissidents criticized those who held secondary positions. The issue of leadership succession intensified the conflict over the distribution of selective benefits. Conflicts revolved around the attempts of the new party leaders to reward their followers in the AP and the DYP, whereas the uncertainty about the future party leadership triggered intra-party conflict in the CHP and the DSP. Finally, intra-party conflict revolved around the coalition with the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*- RP) in the DYP. Besides, doubts about the future of the coalition government seem to trigger conflict in the DSP.

With the exception of the DSP, dissident factions of other parties preferred to use various strategies before leaving their parties. Congress motions, attempts to hold extraordinary congresses, competition to control the ruling offices or debates at the ruling party offices were among the means used by dissident party members. Besides, dissident deputies used the parliamentary group in order to voice their dissatisfaction. They either called for group debate or competed for controlling the group executive boards. Dissenting members of especially CHP and AP used the local branches to increase their hold over the party. However, the result of the factional conflicts depended on the distribution of power in the party in central office.

Dissenting deputies also used Parliament to voice their dissatisfaction. They abstained from voting, proposed bills contrary to party line, voted against party bills or used the vote of no confidence to challenge party leadership. Besides, they aired grievance through memorandums or press releases. Finally, when their demands were not met, dissenting deputies resigned from their parties.

Here, the DSP constituted an exception. Dissident deputies of the DSP resigned from their parties without using the voice option. This was closely related with the inefficiency of dissent diffusion mechanisms for the DSP. Dissident DSP members were unable to influence the decisions of the provincial congresses since the DSP leaders deliberately limited the number of party members in order to appoint congress delegates. Moreover, suppression of any potential challengers by the Ecevit made any attempt to voice demands impossible. Hence, the inefficiency of the party organs for voicing dissent rendered the voice option meaningless.

The case of the DSP also reveals the importance of a sense of party identity to understand the party's exceptionalism. In all cases, the parties had separate identities, which were shared by the dissidents. The dissidents of the DP, AP and the DYP considered themselves as the devotees of the '1946 spirit' or 'genuine democrats'. The dissidents of the CHP considered themselves as Kemalists. It was after they reached the conclusion that the party leaders had betrayed these ideals that the dissidents chose to depart. However, in the case of the DSP, personal attachment to the party leader acted as a unifying bond. When doubts about the future of party leader increased, dissidents did not complain about anything, but simply left the party in order to form a new one. This exceptionalism shows that the strategies to be employed by dissenting members depend on their loyalty to the party identity than the party leader. Therefore, we might conclude that parties, which fail to develop separate party identities may be more likely to split within a short time. Verification of this expectation depends upon comparison of splits in policy-oriented parties and personal parties. Therefore, further research should be conducted in order to evaluate the impact of party identity over party splits.

This study found that the entry costs did not constitute a barrier for the party splits whereas the belief in the demand for a new party and the endogenous factors, namely, the nature of disagreement, weakness of dissenting faction in the ruling party face, and leadership autonomy, encouraged party splits. Firstly, all splinter parties were exempted from spatial requirements due to their followers in Parliament. Due to this, spatial requirements did not constitute a barrier for party splits. Secondly, although there was correlation between party splits and disproportionality in the 1960s, the occurrence of splits in the 1950s and the 1990s despite disproportional vote to seat conversion shows that the electoral systems did not constitute an obstacle for party splits. Therefore, contrary to the findings of inter-variation studies, this research found that the entry costs may not deter splinter parties. It may be true that higher entry costs may constitute an obstacle for politicians to secure their re-election goals. However, the case of the expelled factions is different. Once they are purged, the best option seems to be investing on a new party. In this sense, the difference between genuinely new and splinter parties, which is neglected by the studies on new party formation, should be taken into consideration.

Perceived demand for a new party seems to trigger splinter party formation in the 1960s and the 1990s. Decreasing turnout rates were associated with party splits in the 1960s whereas the electoral volatility was associated with party splits in the 1960s and the 1990s. Moreover, pre-election surveys, which indicated disappointment with the existing parties seem to trigger party splits in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, DP split despite the high turnout and low volatility levels in 1954 elections. Although the DP case constitutes an exception, perceived demand



for a new party may provide clues for understanding the decreasing trend of party splits after the 2002 elections. During the period, disproportionality decreased from 45.25 in 2002 to 15.40 and 9.62 in 2007 and 2011 elections, respectively (See Table 17). This implies a fertile ground for splinter party entrance. However, turnout rates increased from 79.10% in 2002 to 84.25% and 83.16% in 2007 and 2011 elections. Besides, total volatility, which was 56.85 in 2002 decreased to 24.75 in 2007, and 12.11 in 2011 elections (See Table 18). These imply that voters tend to vote for the established parties. In fact, the votes for the two main parties, namely the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP) and the CHP, increased from 53.7% in 2002 to 67.5% in 2007 and 75.9% in 2011 elections. In other words, support for the third parties gradually declined. Consequently, the electoral market was not favorable for new parties, including the splinter parties, between 2002 and 2011.

The findings of this study also imply that the analysis of the endogenous factors determine the absence of accommodative strategies developed by the party leader. First of all, the nature of disagreement played an important role in the neglect of the dissidents' demands by the party chair. With the exception of the DSP, perceived party change, which led to ideological disagreements over the parties' fundamental aims, made the peaceful resolution of intra-party conflict a hard task. Besides, rejection of the legitimacy of party leaders prevented a compromise between conflicting factions. Since the *Bilgiççiler* in the AP and the old guard in the DYP did not consider the leaders of the party as a legitimate leadership and since both of the factions used the allegation of corruptions to challenge the party leader, the leaders of the AP and the DYP hesitated to accommodate the demands

of the dissidents. Finally, in the case of the DSP, although the dissidents avoided criticizing the Ecevit, their distaste for Rağsan Ecevit and the doubts of the Ecevit about the intentions of the dissidents prevented the accommodation, and actually the manifestation of the conflict, within the party platforms.

Secondly, weaknesses of dissident factions in the ruling party faces encouraged party leaders to opt for exclusionary measures. In all cases, the extraparlimentary party, in which the dissidents remained minority, held the upper hand in determining party policies and strategies, disciplining party members and nominating candidates. Such an organizational structure enabled the party leader to neglect their demands and rely on disciplinary measures when the faction supporting the party leader was in power.

Two things deserve to be mentioned at this point. Firstly, party leaders did not always opt for exclusionary measures. For example, until they maintained their control over the party organization, the AP and DYP leaders refrained from exclusionary measures. Additionally, the DP leader agreed to accommodate dissidents' demands after a second wave of intra-party conflict. Secondly, although dissenting deputies expected to be accompanied by a significant number of deputies in their attempt to form a new party, the strategies of the party leaders or disagreements among the dissidents about the strategies towards their parties eroded the unity of the dissidents. For example, Menderes's promise for accommodation of the demands of the dissidents of the DP and Ciller's co-optation strategies prevented the remaining dissidents from joining the resigned dissidents. Additionally, disagreements among the dissidents about the strategies to be employed towards the leaders eroded the unity of the dissidents. This was the case

for the AP before the voting of the government and the DYP after the departure of the dissidents. These points imply that party split is not a simple outcome, but a dynamic process of intraparty conflict. The dissidents might step back and wait for a more suitable time to rebel or the party leader might step back or employ different measures to keep party unity. Hence, factional conflict does not always end up with party disunity.

These points also imply that the authoritarian nature of Turkish party leaders do not always result with exclusionary measures. The conventional wisdom is that Turkish party leaders are authoritarian in nature and that this tendency leads to the expulsion of dissenting factions, which in turn, triggers party splits. The findings of this thesis do not explain why the party leaders of Turkish parties are authoritarian in their nature. Rather, it shows that Turkish party leaders may use factional conflicts in order to protect their positions by either expelling the dissidents or accommodating their demands. Events in the DP, AP and DYP show that the party leaders may opt for accommodative strategies until the party leaders consolidate their control over the party organization. In this sense, authoritarian party leaders cannot always opt for exclusionary measures; rather power dispersion within the party organization influences their strategies.

Additionally, in cases where the parent organization was in government, the predominant party system paved the way for the expulsion of the dissidents. In the case of the DP, the dissidents were far from threatening the party government until the second wave of dissent. In the examples of the AP, the predominant party system was associated with the exclusionary strategies of Demirel after the 1969 elections.

In addition to the power dispersion within the party organization, leadership autonomy made it easier for the party leaders to legitimize their decisions to expel the dissidents. Delegation system employed by Turkish political parties enabled the party leaders to curb the supporters of dissident factions in the party on the ground. This organizational structure, which made party leaders free from factional pressures, provided legitimacy to their decisions. Moreover, the electoral victories of the DP, AP and DSP provided additional legitimacy to the leadership of the party chair. Consequently, party leaders could demand obedience to their rule by pointing out their democratic election methods, the inclusiveness of the selectorate, and in some cases the previous election results.

Although this study did not deal with the split in the National View Movement (*Milli Görüş Hareketi*), the findings of this study may provide insight to the split, which ended with the formation of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP). When the RP and its charismatic leader Necmettin Erbakan were outlawed, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*-FP) was formed as a successor party. Conflicting political projects of competing factions, namely the Reformists (*Yenilikçiler*) and the Traditionalists (*Gelenekçiler*) regarding the future of the FP as well as the opposition of Erbakan to the demands of party change proposed by the Reformists, paved the ground for party split. The split was facilitated by the viability of a new party, weakness of the dissidents in the ruling party face and leadership autonomy. Pre-election surveys during the early 2000s showed potential support for a new party to be formed by the leaders of the dissidents, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. Besides, the 1999 earthquake and the inability of the coalition partners to deal with the mounting

economic difficulties decreased the viability of the existing parties. Although the Reformists competed with the Traditionalists for the leadership to the FP, they lost the control of the new party, thanks to the support of outlawed Erbakan to the Traditionalists. Moreover, the inclusiveness of selectorate increased party leader Recai Kutan's autonomy. Hence, when the party was outlawed in 2001, the Reformists decided to form a new party whereas the traditionalists joined the successor Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*-SP).

The findings of this study are limited to the Turkish mainstream political parties with decentralized organizational structures, in which the extraparliamentary party controls the parliamentary party. The major limitation of this study is the absence of variations in the dependent variable, namely party splits. This is a consequence of the case selection design. Since this dissertation has used Mill's most different design, the dependent and the independent variables do not vary (Gerring, 2007: 141). For this reason, further research comparing splits of parties with different organizational structures may be conducted in order to find the extent to which the findings of this study can be explanatory for other splits. Besides, this study undermines the importance of the loyalty option for explaining the behaviors of deputies in times of intra-party conflict. Due to this, further research on organizational commitment of the party members and deputies may be conducted.

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