

**TURKEY'S QUEST FOR A WESTERN ALLIANCE  
(1945-1952): A REINTERPRETATION**

**A THESIS PRESENTED BY BANU ELİĞÜR  
TO  
THE INSTITUTE OF  
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**BILKENT UNIVERSITY**

**MAY, 1999**

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**TO** *Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*

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
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
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Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 4.

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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.




Prof. Dr. George S. Harris

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Asst. Prof. Dr. David Pervin

## **Abstract**

This thesis is a study on Turkey's quest for a Western alliance between the years 1945 and 1952 within the framework of alliance theories. Neither of these theoretical explanations provide a sufficient answer to the question of "why did Turkey ally with the Western bloc but not with the Soviet bloc or choose neutrality?" This thesis argues that Turkey desired to join NATO because of external and internal reasons. Regarding the external reason of Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc, it is commonly argued that because of the 'Soviet threat' Turkey entered NATO. However, the argument of this thesis is that this was not the external reason of Turkey's quest for a Western alliance, because there was no 'Soviet threat' against Turkey, but only demands in order to realize the historic Russian desire to control the Straits and ensure access to the Mediterranean. Therefore, a continuous Soviet 'war of nerves' against Turkey was conducted but came to nothing. The major external reason of Turkey's entrance into NATO was lessons of the past, namely the diplomatic and military isolation, which was very costly to the Ottoman Empire. After WW II, the Turkish officials, coming from the Ottoman tradition and having had the experiences of the Ottoman era were suspicious that Turkey could again be a bargaining point between the great powers. Thus, Turkey as a newly established state and a weak power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Western countries, could guarantee its security only by tying itself as well as the Western powers into a military alliance. The domestic reason of Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc was the state policy of Westernization, which was its desire to divorce itself from the Arabic sphere of culture and tradition, and its full integration into the Western world as an equal, modern, and industrialized state within the Western world. The achievement of industrialization depended on the continuation of US military and economic aid to Turkey. And, by joining NATO, Turkey could distribute the costs of high military expenditures to foreign allies by which it could complete its civil industrialization program by redirecting its domestic budget.

## Özet

Bu tez Türkiye'nin 1945 ve 1952 yılları arasındaki Batı ile ittifaka girme arayışını ittifak teorileri çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Bu teorik açıklamaların hiçbiri “neden Türkiye Batı bloğu ile ittifaka girdi ama neden Sovyet bloğuyla ittifaka girmedi veya tarafsız kalmadı?” sorusuna yeterli bir yanıt verememektedirler. Bu tez Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girme isteğinin hem dış hem de iç sebeplerden kaynaklandığını ileri sürmektedir. Türkiye'nin Batı bloğu ile ittifaka girmesinin dış nedeni olarak genellikle ‘Sovyet tehdidi’ ileri sürülmektedir. Ancak, bu tez bunun Türkiye'nin Batı ile ittifak arayışının dış nedeni olmadığını savunmaktadır. Çünkü Türkiye'ye karşı ‘Sovyet tehdidi’ yoktu fakat sadece talepler vardı. Bu taleplerle Sovyetler Birliği tarihsel bir amaç olan Boğazları kontrol etmek ve Akdeniz'e ulaşmayı gerçekleştirmeyi istiyordu. Bu yüzden, Sovyetler Birliği Türkiye'ye karşı sürekli bir ‘sinir savaşı’ yürüttü; ancak, bununla hiçbir amacına ulaşmadı. Türkiye'nin NATO'ya girmesinin esas dış nedeni geçmişteki derslerdir yani, Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinden beri diplomatik ve askeri olarak yalnız kalması Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için çok pahalıya mal olmuştur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, Osmanlı geleneğinden gelen ve Osmanlı döneminin tecrübelerine sahip olan Türk devlet adamları, Türkiye'nin tekrardan büyük güçler tarafından bölünebileceği kaygısını duymuşlardır. Yeni kurulmuş, Sovyetler Birliği ve Batı ülkeleriyle karşılaştırıldığında zayıf bir güç olan Türkiye, güvenliğini sadece kendisini ve Batılı güçlerle bir askeri ittifaka bağlayarak sağlayabilirdi. Türkiye'nin Batı bloğu ile ittifakının iç nedeni, bir devlet politikası olan Batılılaşma politikasıdır. Batılılaşma politikası ile Türkiye kendisini Arap kültür ve geleneğinin etkisinden ayırmayı ve kendisini tamamen Batı dünyasına eşit, modern ve endüstrileşmiş bir devlet olarak bütünleştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Endüstrileşmenin gerçekleştirilebilmesi Amerikan askeri ve ekonomik yardımının Türkiye'ye devamına bağlıydı. Türkiye NATO'ya girerek yüksek askeri masraflarını yabancı ittifak üyelerine dağıtabilecek ve bütçesini düzenleyerek endüstrileşme programını tamamlayabilecekti.



## Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss for her excellent guidance, encouragement, and patience throughout the entire work. Without her profound help and invaluable contributions I could not have started, let alone finished this thesis. I have been very lucky to have the opportunity to know her and work as her research assistant during my studies. It is said that there are some cases where the words are insufficient to express the feelings. Dr. Criss, you are not only the adviser of this thesis for the last two years, but from the beginning of my education in International Relations. May I assure you that what I have learned from you will be the life-long guidance for me. Many thanks to you; who made me.

I am also deeply grateful to Prof. Dr. George Harris not only because he honored me by his invaluable comments and contributions to this thesis but also, his invaluable books on Turkey provided me an excellent guidance during writing this thesis.

I am very grateful to Asst. Prof. Dr. Gülnur Aybet who is a prominent specialist in NATO. I have been lucky to have the opportunity to know her and be her student during last year through which I could find the opportunity to enhance my knowledge. Therefore, I would like to express my special thanks to Dr. Aybet, for her kindness, guidance, and patience during my graduate studies and writing this thesis.

I would like to express my deep gratitudes to Asst. Prof. Dr. David Pervin who was so kind for sharing with me his vast knowledge and sources on alliance theories on which this thesis is based. His guidance to write this thesis within the framework of alliance theories made it possible to be an explanatory one rather than merely a descriptive one. Without his excellent guidance and help I could not finish this thesis.

To my parents, I am sure that I could not accomplish this work without their encouragement and patience. I am so grateful to my father, who worked for long years in NATO as a member of the Turkish Armed Forces, for his invaluable contributions and comments to my thesis. There are two persons in my family who from the beginning of my studies in International Relations have encouraged me in choosing this career path: my grandmother Afife Eligür and my father Özcan Eligür. Since this thesis is the first step in this career path, I would like to dedicate it to them.

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# CHAPTER I

## LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE TURKISH CASE

### 1.1 Literature Review of Alliance Theories

#### 1.1.1 The Concept of Alliance

Most commonly, alliance is defined as formalized international cooperation focusing solely on national security matters, generally in the form of intended responses to actual or perceived threats. According to this definition, formal treaties (mutual defense pacts) as well as less explicit agreements (nonaggression pacts, neutrality agreements, and ententes) are the components of an alliance.<sup>1</sup> Alignment is also defined as a set of mutual expectations, which is not signified by formal treaties, between two or more states committed to each other's support in the military dimension of international politics. Some scholars include in the term of alignment not only security concerns but also political, economic, and cultural dimensions of international politics.<sup>2</sup> The terms alliance and alignment are sometimes used interchangeably since the concept of alliance is regarded as difficult to define and measure with precision. Stephen Walt defines alliance as a formal (written treaty) or

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Don Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*, (Monograph Series in World Affairs: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1982), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 7; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 41:1 (1990), p. 105. Alignment is also defined as "arraying of states or individuals for or against a cause. Alliance is a written, formal agreement among two or more states which is designed to serve, for a specified term, the interests of those states, or their statesmen and bureaucrats, in regard to national security." Roger Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Paul Gordon Lauren, *Diplomacy: New Approaches*, New York: Free Press, 1979, p. 249.

informal commitment (*ad hoc* agreements) for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states against an external threat.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding types of alliances, Walt argues that an alliance can be either offensive, which is established to attack some third party or defensive, which is set up to provide a mutual guarantee in case of an attack of another state on one of the alliance members. Alliances can also be divided as symmetrical, and asymmetrical, depending on whether the members have roughly equal capabilities and offer broadly identical commitments to each other. Alliances can also be totally expedient arrangements between states with very different regimes and political values which was the case in the alliance between the USA, the UK, and the USSR during WW II. On the other hand, states which have similar strategic interests and ideological principles can form an alliance as is in the case of NATO. Alliances also differ according to their level of institutionalization. They can be highly institutionalized, like NATO, or they can be *ad hoc* coalitions like the Axis alliance of 1939-1945. Alliances also vary according to their functions. For instance, most of the great power alliances were formed in order to aggregate power through which member states pool their resources to attain a common goal.<sup>4</sup> It is commonly argued that “whether offensive or defensive, limited or unlimited, equal or unequal, bilateral or

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<sup>3</sup> Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” *Survival* 39:1 (Spring 1997), p. 157; Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 12, 14. Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, like Stephen Walt use the term alliance in its broadest sense which refers to “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more states and involving mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future.” Barnett and Levy, “Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the case of Egypt, 1962-73,” *International Organization* 45:3 (Summer 1991), p. 370. On the other hand, Glenn Snyder, makes a clear distinction between the terms alliance and alignment since, he defines alliance as the only formal subset of alignment “for the use (or nonuse) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified.” *Ibid.*, p. 104. Arnold Wolfers defines alliance as a “formal and mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the event one of the alliance partners is attacked.” Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliances, balance, and stability,” *International Organization* 45:1 (Winter 1991), p. 123.

<sup>4</sup> Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” p. 157.

multilateral, alliances must involve some measure of commitment to use force to achieve a common goal.”<sup>5</sup>

### 1.1.2 Alliance Theories

Glenn H. Snyder argues that, “one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations is alliance theory.”<sup>6</sup> Alliance theories “are dominated by the realist and neorealist schools of thought. According to this tradition, the systemic structure, that is systemic anarchy and structural polarity, determine the formation of alliances. The anarchic nature of the international system leads states to give primacy to their external security interests. In this hierarchy of goals of states, external factors (perceived threats from another state or states, imbalances of power in the international system) rather than domestic factors, play a predominant role in the formation of alliances. Facing external threats, in order to enhance their military capabilities states seek alliances. As George Liska argued, “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”<sup>7</sup> According to realism, states have a hierarchy of goals; among these state security is the primary goal. Therefore, military power, security interests and external threats rather than domestic factors determine states’ alliance formation. Hence, alliances are regarded “as instruments of power politics”. States choose to ally so as to diminish anarchy’s impact on their security. Glenn Snyder argues that besides systemic anarchy, structural polarity-the distribution of military power and potential among major states- plays a significant role in alliance formation and alliance politics. Therefore, alliances have to be placed

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<sup>5</sup> Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in K. Knorr, (ed.) *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), p. 227.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” p. 103.



in the context of system structure and process.<sup>8</sup> According to Snyder, in a bipolar system alliances are formed much more easily than in a multipolar system: in a bipolar world, the structure of the system predominantly determines the formation of alliances rather than the preferences of states. The superpowers, have no intention to ally with each other because, there is no third state which is strong enough to threaten them both. Therefore, generally alliances in a bipolar system have less independent impact on relations than alliances in a multipolar system because the structure of the system determines interests and expectations, and hence formation of alignments. Also, alliance management is much easier in a bipolar world than a multipolar world since the system structure offers little opportunity or incentive for defection. Also, in a bipolar system, the danger of abandonment is low, but, both the superpowers and their allies face the fear of entrapment.<sup>9</sup>

Neorealists argue that besides their benefits (security and nonsecurity), alliances entail costs (e.g. the loss of political autonomy, political and economic as well as material costs). Therefore, alliances are formed if only member states believe that the benefits outweigh the costs.<sup>10</sup> Besides this cost-benefit analysis, Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan propose that there is a direct relationship between the extent of external threat and alliance cohesion. Since alliances are formed against an external threat, the cohesion of alliances diminishes when there is

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<sup>7</sup> Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14:4 (1992), p. 22; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," p. 107.

<sup>8</sup> Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy and Third World Security," pp. 22-23; Glenn Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," p. 107; Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," p. 228; Serdar Güner, "A Game Theoretical Analysis of Alliance Formation and Dissolution. The Case Study of the Relationship Among the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Université de Genève, 1990), p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Glenn Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," pp. 117-118.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 452.

a reduction in the duration and intensity of the external threat, the disappearance of which will be the major reason of their disintegration.<sup>11</sup>

A state facing an external threat has two alternatives: it will either balance or bandwagon. Stephen Walt defines balancing as “allying with others against the prevailing threat”, and bandwagoning as “alignment with the source of danger.”<sup>12</sup> Walt, while accepting the importance of power as a stimulus for a state to ally, argues that power is not the only determinant factor for alliance. Thus he introduces the Balance of Threat theory as an alternative to the structural Balance of Power theory according to which states ally in order to balance against threats rather than against power alone. The extent of threat is not solely affected by aggregate power but also through geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived aggressive intentions. An imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition becomes more dangerous than the second most threatening state or coalition. On the other hand, the structural Balance of Power theory assumes that the distribution of power, which is defined as aggregate capabilities (population, economic and military capability, technological capacity, and political cohesion), is the only important variable: states ally in response to imbalances of power, that is, when the strongest state or coalition becomes more powerful than the second strongest in the system. On the other hand, the Balance of Threat theory argues that the probability of the vulnerable state to seek alliance increases when threat

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<sup>11</sup> Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War,” *International Organization* 50:3 (Summer 1996), p. 450.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 17. The term bandwagoning was first introduced by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz uses bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing which refers to allying with stronger side, and balancing refers to allying with weaker side. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security* 19:1 (Summer 1994), p. 80. “On the other hand, Thomas Christenson and Jack Snyder argue that, when facing a systemic threat, the affected minor powers could enter alliances to either balance against or bandwagon with the threat, or they could seek neutrality in order to pass the buck of defending the status quo to other countries.” Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past,” *World Politics* 46:4 (July 1994), p. 502.

increases. Regarding geographical proximity, there is a direct relationship between proximity and threat. Accordingly, a small state<sup>13</sup> bordering on a threatening great power may choose to bandwagon rather than balance. A vulnerable state may also choose to bandwagon if it faces an immediate threat with offensive capabilities. However, Walt argues that perceived intentions determine alliance formation rather than solely power. Because, if a state is regarded as unchangeably aggressive, other states will choose to balance.

In some cases states may choose to balance the weaker side by allying with the stronger side since the former is more dangerous, which indicates that power alone is not the sole determinant in alliance formation. Commonly, states when confronted by an external threat, choose to balance rather than to bandwagon with the adversary for two reasons. Firstly, states are more secure if balancing, allying with the weaker side, since no aggressor will be permitted to dominate the other states. Thus, the aggressor will face combined opposition. Secondly, balancing serves for the new member as a means to enhance its influence within the alliance because the weaker side is in need of assistance. Security will decrease if bandwagoning is the dominant tendency: when the aggressor is successful, it will attract additional allies through which it will aggregate its power while diminish that of its opponents. Bandwagoning is preferred for two reasons: firstly for defensive reasons a state allies in order to appease the potential threat to protect its independence. Secondly, a state chooses to bandwagon for offensive reasons, in that case to “share the fruits of victory.” Extremely weak states are more likely to bandwagon if they are neighbors of the threatening power since they have little means to defend themselves, “they will be the first victims of

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<sup>13</sup> Robert L. Rothstein defines small power as “a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of another states, institutions, processes, or development to do so.” Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.



expansion.” The unavailability of allies, and the appearance of the dominant power to be appeased also increases the tendency of bandwagoning.<sup>14</sup>

Walt argues that ideological solidarity, foreign aid, and transnational penetration (a state’s manipulation of another state’s domestic political system through foreign propaganda, or lobbyists) play only a limited role in alliance formation. Although states which share similar domestic ideologies are more likely to ally with each other, in reality, there is an inverse relation between ideology and external threat, the importance of ideology diminishes when the extent of external threat increases. Foreign aid (economic and military), which is one type of balancing behavior, is only the result of the alliance but not the aim. It is accepted that as the extent of foreign aid increases, there will be a greater chance for alliance formation. In addition, especially if an asymmetry of dependence between the donor and recipient states exists along with the extent of external threat, and monopoly of the donor state on the commodity provided, the donor’s leverage over the recipient will increase. However, the donor country’s efforts to manipulate by foreign aid and to with covert penetration are usually responded to with resentment by the recipient country.<sup>15</sup>

As a critique of Walt’s Balance of Threat theory, Randall L. Schweller introduces the Balance of Interest theory according to which, a state’s alliance

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<sup>14</sup> Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 5, 17-26, 29-31; Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 53-54. “However, Walt only tests for balancing and appeasement type bandwagoning among threatened states, while it ignores the behavior of unthreatened states that align for reasons other than security and that present the threats that drive Walt’s theory.” Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” p. 83.

<sup>15</sup> Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 33-49, 214-218, 266-269. Ideological solidarity is defined “as a tendency for states with similar internal traits to prefer alignment with one another to alignment with states whose domestic characteristics are different.” Ibid., p. 181. Like Walt, Robert Rothstein argues that, “a common ideology may facilitate matters, but it is not imperative since sufficiently important common interests can overcome the difficulties inherent in conflicting ideologies.” Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 60.

decision is not mainly determined by danger, or security but by opportunities for gain, and for profit. Therefore, the promise for rewards rather than the threat of punishment motivates a state to bandwagon. Compatibility of political goals rather than the imbalances of power or threat leads states to align with each other since the alliance members lose some foreign policy autonomy. On the one hand, satisfied states (security-maximizers) will join the status-quo coalition, even when it is the stronger side, to preserve the status-quo. On the other hand, dissatisfied states (power-maximizers) which are motivated by profit more than security will voluntarily bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state for profit.<sup>16</sup>

There are four types of bandwagoning: the first type is “jackal bandwagoning” in this type of bandwagoning, a powerful revisionist state or coalition offers to share the spoils of victory (e.g. additional territory) in order to attract lesser aggressors: an offensive bandwagoning occurs. This enables the prevention or blocking of the formation of a strong status-quo coalition. In order to achieve this goal, the revisionist leader often allows the members to share the spoils of victory. The second type of bandwagoning is called “piling on bandwagoning” which happens at the end of wars, when the outcome of a war has already been determined. Thus states bandwagon either to claim unearned share of the spoils or, out of fear of being punished by the victor. The third type of bandwagoning is called the “wave of the future,” in which states choose to bandwagon with the stronger state because they regard it as the wave of the future. Lastly, an external force may create a chain reaction for states to bandwagon like dominoes. According to the Balance of Interest

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<sup>16</sup> Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” pp. 79, 88. Randall L. Schweller, criticizes Stephen Walt “because of his consideration only cases involving a significant external threat. His selection of cases Walt, ignores the behavior of unthreatened states that align for reasons other than security. Therefore, the theory only tests for balancing and appeasement-type bandwagoning among threatened states. For Schweller, in order to confirm the balancing hypothesis a case should be chosen in which a state is not facing directly threatened by a predatory state but chooses to balance against it in order to protect its long-term security interests.” Ibid., p. 83

theory, the balance between the revisionist and status-quo powers determine the stability of the system. Thus, when there is an imbalance between revisionist powers (power maximizers) and status-quo powers (security-maximizers), that is when the former becomes more powerful than the latter, the international system will be unstable.<sup>17</sup>

As an alternative to traditional realism, Dan Reiter introduces the Learning theory and argues that “state behavior is determined by experiential learning.” This happens when states decide to ally primarily by drawing lessons from formative historical experiences (formative events) rather than merely by external threats. Reiter takes the systemic wars (WW I and WW II) as formative events in order to understand the alliance preferences of small powers with great powers. He argues that systemic wars, as formative experiences, determine small powers’ alliance choices. Because, referring to the experiences of the past is a way of coping with uncertainty. Faced with uncertainty, minor powers have two options: they will either enter an alliance or choose neutrality depending on their belief about which one more effectively deals with threats. Reiter, unlike Walt argues that the international arena is not a zero-sum game. Hence, states may choose neutrality rather than ally with one of the sides in a conflict. As Robert Osgood stated, “Every state must have an alliance policy, even if its purpose is only to avoid alliances.”<sup>18</sup>

Entering an alliance provides security by extending deterrence and military assistance in case of war, but carries with it the risk of entrapment. By choosing the latter option a state refrains from the risk of entrapment, but may be left with the risk

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 93-99, 104; Robert Jervis defines domino beliefs as the “expectation that a defeat or retreat on one issue or in one area of the world is likely to produce, through variety of mechanisms, further demands on the state by its adversaries and defections from its allies. Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, (eds.) *Dominoes and Bandwagones: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past.” p. 501.

of having no allies to help to deter aggressors or to defend against attacks. Therefore, neither of these strategies can always be the dominant strategy.

Learning theory assumes that minor powers, when trying to decide whether to ally with a great power or stay neutral, look to formative events in choosing which strategy best protects state security. According to this, a state can choose either buck-passing/neutrality or balance/bandwagon to deal with the emerging threat according to formative events. Accordingly, if a minor power chose neutrality during a systemic war, and was not invaded, then it will choose neutrality,<sup>19</sup> the former event offers success. If the minor power was allied with the winning side, and was not invaded, this experience is successful. However, it would be a failure if it was allied with the losing side, or if it was on the winning side but was invaded, and did not recover its population in postwar territorial settlements. Hence, in a systemic war, a minor power may choose neutrality or alliance according to its formative experience. This theory also explains the formulation of long-term ideas about grand strategies. Even if there is no current external threat, a state can choose alliance with a great power since that state experienced success in formative events. However, if the state previously experienced failure, then it will opt for neutrality.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> "Invasion constitutes the failure of neutrality since the primary reason neutrality is chosen is to avoid participation in war." Ibid., p. 498.

<sup>20</sup> Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances the Weight of the Shadow of the Past," pp. 490-492, 495-497, 499, 502, 504-506, 519. "The empirical analysis in this paper is limited to the alliance choices of minor powers. A minor power is concerned mostly with direct threats to its security, whereas a great power must also consider the security of those proximate and overseas territories and countries instrumental to the security of its homeland and national interests. This greater simplicity of minor power's foreign interests means that experiences can be more easily coded as successes or failures, as a minor power focuses mostly on the question of how its choice of alliance or neutrality affected the national security and territorial integrity of the homeland. A great power, on the other hand, must assess the effects of an experience- such as a major war or diplomatic crisis- along a number of dimensions because of its extended foreign policy interests. Limiting the data set to minor powers makes it easier to compose a complete list of possible lessons a state might garner from a formative experience, increasing confidence that the learning hypotheses are a valid test of learning theory. Systemic wars are used as formative events, the model focuses on the preference of minor powers for alliance with greater powers. For each case, behavior was coded for about the length of a generation, 20 years, at 4 points in time: in the post-WW I period, 1921, 1927, 1933, and 1939; in the post-WW II period, 1949, 1955, 1961, and 1967." Ibid., pp. 496-498. 506. Kenneth Waltz introduced the terms chain-ganging and buck-passing. The former means to an ally chain itself unconditionally to



Besides realist and neorealist explanations regarding alliance theories, there are also other explanations which emphasize domestic factors as well as external factors that lead states to form alliances. These scholars take their cases up predominantly with the Third World states. They argue that the realist and neorealist views are inadequate to explain the Third World states' alliance formation. Accordingly, the Balance of Power theory is not applicable to the Third World, because of its distinctive characteristics.<sup>21</sup> And secondly by focusing solely on external factors it can not explain changes in alignment mainly because of internal factors as in the case of the Third World alignments both of which ignore the distinctive characteristics of the Third World states. Third World politics takes place in a uniquely dangerous context. Therefore, it is argued that "conditions in the Third World require a theory of alignment that applies primarily to the Third World." As an alternative to the Balance of Power theory, Steven David introduces the theory of Omnibalancing. Omnibalancing accepts the realist premises that in an anarchic world where interests are bound to conflict, survival is of primary importance, therefore, power, interests, and rationality are crucial concerns of international politics. However, this theory departs from the Balance of Power theory since it assumes that the Third World leadership's need to counter all threats causes Third World-type alignments. Hence, while the Balance of Power theory takes into consideration a state's need to counter external threats, the Omnibalancing theory focuses both on internal as well as external threats to the leadership. Thus, unlike realism, Omnibalancing does not

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reckless allies whose survival is seen indispensable to the maintenance of the balance. On the other hand, buck-passing refers to counting on third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rising hegemon. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity," *International Organization* 44:2 (Spring 1990), p. 138.

<sup>21</sup> Steven David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 3. Steven David argues that since, the Balance of Power theory came out of the experiences of Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, it may have no universal applicability. Therefore, the Balance of Power theory is not applicable to the Third World.

assume that states are unitary actors that pursue national interest.<sup>22</sup> According to Omnibalancing, internal threats play a major role. Third World leaders decide to ally in order to resist the principal immediate and dangerous domestic opponents that they face. Since the nature of Third World politics is unstable and dangerous, the decision of the leaders will be determined by which outside state is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power. The morality rate is assumed to be low, and very few Third World leaders worry about losing their state.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the political survival of the leadership predominates the survival of the state so, the level of analysis is not the state but leadership. Omnibalancing theory assumes that the threatened leadership aligns with one threat to deal with the other. That is, leaders choose to align with their secondary adversaries in order to focus their resources on primary adversaries. Since in the Third World, the source of threat is not only external, but is mainly internal, the predominant factor that affects the Third World leaders' decision to align is made in order to address the more immediate and dangerous domestic threats. Therefore, the leaders align with their domestic opponents' international allies, through which they appease their secondary adversaries. Hence, this is not bandwagoning but balancing because, in the Third World, the foremost goal of the leaders is to balance against both external as well as internal threats to their leadership. Omnibalancing theory assumes that the "leaders are weak and illegitimate and the stakes for domestic politics are very high." Therefore, this theory argues that the foremost determinant of alignment is the drive

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<sup>22</sup> Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991), pp. 233, 235; Steven David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, pp. x-xi, 6-8. Steven David, uses the UN categorization of the Third World as including all countries except the US, the SU, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European states, and the People's Republic of China. Ibid. p. 11.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. x-xi, 15-18; Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," pp. 242-245.

of Third World leaders to ensure their political and physical survival.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the realist assumption, where the state is assumed to be a unitary actor, in the Third World states, where there is neither strong consensus nor an integrated society to inhibit conflict.<sup>25</sup> Hence, while the Balance of Power theory assumes that the decision maker asks, “how does this policy affect the power of the state?” Omnibalancing theory assumes instead that the decision maker asks, “how does this policy affect the probability of my remaining in power?” And whereas the Balance of Power theory assumes that the state’s leader asks, “which outside power is most likely to protect my state from the threats posed by other states?” Omnibalancing assumes that the decision maker asks, “which outside power is most likely to protect me from the internal and external threats that I face?” Internal threats are far more likely to challenge a Third World leader’s hold on power than are threats from other states: hundreds of Third World leaders, have been overthrown by their internal enemies. In the Third World, the government is neither legitimate nor a protector. Therefore, it would not be wrong to consider Third World domestic politics as a “microcosm of international politics.” As a result, balancing to ensure survival is critical for groups within states as it is between states.<sup>26</sup>

Jack Levy and Michael Barnett explain Third World states’ alliances by domestic political and economic factors. They argue that regime stability or survival

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<sup>24</sup> Steven David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, pp. 6-8; Robert L. Rothstein, “The ‘Security Dilemma’ and the ‘Poverty Trap’ in the Third World,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 8:4 (1986), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> “Waltz, recognize that violence and the use of force to deal with it occur as often within states as between states. For Waltz, this means that neither the occurrence of violence nor the use of force per se can be used as a standard by which to distinguish domestic from international politics. Instead he argues, the distinction is marked by government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force to deal with violence. Citizens, therefore, need not worry about protecting themselves; they can appeal to the government for assistance. In international politics, by contrast, states can only rely on themselves for defense. Thus, international politics, is system of self-help, whereas domestic politics is not.” Steven David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” p. 251.

<sup>26</sup> Steven David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, pp. 15-18; Steven David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” pp. 238. 242-245. 251; Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World,” *World Politics* 43 (January 1991), p. 263.

is often at stake while state survival is rarely questioned. According to their view, Third World states, as in the case of other states, have two alternatives to provide for their security; they will either depend on external alliances or on internal military preparations which are frequently determined more by domestic political and economic considerations rather than systemic structures and threats. The former provides a security guarantee with some loss of autonomy (presence of foreign troops or interference in their domestic political affairs) and carries some risks of abandonment and entrapment. However, the latter is more costly as well as slower than the former. It is argued that these alternative security strategies in the Third World states are often determined more by domestic political and economic considerations rather than by systemic structures and threats.<sup>27</sup> In the Third World, the source of internal threat originates from the weakness of the domestic political economy rather than merely of the domestic political interests of the leader in power. Therefore, internal economic weakness has direct influence on alliance choices, and it denies the state to utilize its economic resources necessary for a strategy of internal mobilization. It also affects alliance choices indirectly by reducing the level of domestic political support for the regime in power and by imposing political constraints on further domestic sacrifices. In both cases, there is a common incentive for political leaders to ally with an economically more powerful state which can provide scarce resources, through which, internal economic and political problems may be resolved. Third World leaders try to attain the goals of social welfare, economic development, and political stability as well as power, security, wealth, and autonomy. Since the costs of internal mobilization can diminish the state's ability to realize these domestic welfare goals, Third World states are more likely to ally with

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<sup>27</sup> Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," pp. 19-20, 26-27.

an economically more powerful state which will provide scarce resources that will help the resolve internal economic and political problems. Even though Third World states would desire to have an independent arms production capacity by which they could preserve their autonomy, they do not have a sufficient industrial base, economic resources, and technology. Another reason that makes Third World states depend on external alliance is the problem of universal conscription. Because of the low level of legitimacy and political stability, Third World states avoid mass conscription and rely on armies drawn from loyal individuals. By choosing to depend on external alliance the state gets economic as well as military aid from its ally and uses aid both for its internal and external security needs. Thus, besides providing external security, alignments also play the role of a resource securing function (economic resources and military equipment) which has crucial importance for Third World leaders since it secures their position and power against their domestic rivals.<sup>28</sup>

It is also argued that even strong states, which have high legitimacy, extractive capacity, and control over production can face domestic constraints which restrict their war preparation ability, thus play a significant role in explaining the state's security policy. Because, resources for war preparation which are manpower, extraction of revenue, and war material are societally controlled resources. Hence, the state engages in two kinds of battles when it participates in a war. On the one hand, it will try to defend its borders against its adversaries, on the other hand, it will try to extract resources even though it may face domestic constraints. Modest levels of war preparation endeavors of a state do not lead to political instability; however, intensified war preparations do. Since the political costs are high, the state chooses to

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 26-30, 33; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the case of Egypt, 1962-73," p. 373; Levy and Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and

preserve political stability over war preparations. Therefore, a state which is highly restricted by its domestic context will ally formally or informally in order to distribute the costs of its war preparation onto foreign actors rather than increasing the costs over its own society while accepting some degree of dependence.<sup>29</sup>

## **1.2 The Case of Turkey**

In this thesis, the reasons of Turkey's entrance into NATO will be examined. A distinction is made regarding the meaning of the words: threat and demand. Although these words have the same objective which is the territorial expansion of one state at the expense of the other state, there is a clear difference regarding their meanings. A state is a threat to another state if it makes war preparations to attack that state. A state is also a threat to another state if it creates and/or materially supports militant groups in that state for weakening the existing government. On the other hand, demand refers to the claims of a state over the territory of another state. A state in order to realize its demands can pursue a 'war of nerves' against another state. The aim of this 'war of nerves' is the realization of the claimant state's goals by only putting pressures over the latter without aiming to wage war. These pressures can be continuous radio and press attacks, rumors of troop movements, renunciation of existing treaties of friendship between two states as was in the case of the Soviet 'war of nerves' against Turkey. The aim of these pressures is to weaken the existing government of the latter state by creating public discontent. However, this 'war of nerves' may lead to the latter's firm public resentment regarding the former's demands and may lead to the strengthening of the existing government rather than its weakening. Hence, 'war of nerves' can turn to be a threat if only it can find internal

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Third World Security," pp. 23-24, 27-28.

militant supporters: otherwise, the former's demands came to nothing as was in the case of the Soviet 'war of nerves' against Turkey.

Although there are a variety of explanations within the framework of alliance theories, none of these theoretical explanations provide a sufficient answer to the question of "why Turkey allied with the Western bloc but not with the Soviet bloc or did not choose neutrality?" The realist and neo-realist schools of thought cannot offer a full answer to this question since they solely concentrate on external factors. According to this point of view, a state facing an external threat will either balance or bandwagon. It is commonly argued that because of the 'Soviet threat,' Turkey allied with the Western bloc.<sup>30</sup> However, the extent of 'Soviet threat' against Turkey is debatable since there were no known Soviet war aims (to this date) for attacking Turkey in order to achieve control of the Straits as well as the Kars-Ardahan region, since the Soviet Union was war weary. There was no 'Soviet threat' against Turkey but only a perception of it by the Turkish military and civil bureaucrats. Obtaining control of the Straits and being the dominant power in the Mediterranean Sea was not a new Soviet policy. Russia tried to realize this aim 13 times in wars against the Ottoman Empire during the czarist era, which made clear that the Soviet Union was following the same lines of the Imperial Russian policy by adding to this policy expansion of the Communist ideology if the situation was favorable.<sup>31</sup> Soviet demands on Turkey reached their peak during 1945 and continued until the Fall of

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<sup>29</sup> Michael Barnett, "High Politics Is Low Politics The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977," *World Politics* XLII:4 (July 1990), pp. 532, 534-537, 543, 562.

<sup>30</sup> Ferenc Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) p. 173. Váli argues that "the Soviet demands and the manner of their presentation left no doubt in the Turkish mind that their aim was not only control of the Straits but also submission of Turkey to satellite status. Against such an immediate danger, Turkey sought protection in the arms of the West, principally of the US, through the political, military, and economic systems of the Atlantic area." Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds.) *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, pp. 60-63.



1946. During these years, the Soviet Union demanded the Kars-Ardahan region as a means to gain bargaining leverage against Turkey, in order to bring the latter into bilateral talks for revising the Montreux Convention to favor the Soviet Union. Thus, there was no Soviet aim of territorial aggrandizement against Turkey. The Soviet tactic in these years was a 'war of nerves' which consisted of Soviet radio and press attacks against Turkey. There were also rumors of troop movements against Turkey, but these were never proven. It was obvious that the Soviet Union would desire the establishment of a 'friendly regime' in Turkey. However, there were no militant communist elements in Turkey, since the Turkish Communist Party was banned in 1926 by Atatürk. Communism could not grow in a state like Turkey which was a non-industrialized, agricultural country, and composed of predominantly peasants and Muslim people. Moreover, the tenets of Communism were completely incompatible with the Muslim religion since Communism referred to atheism. Besides few people, if any, were aware of Muslim national Communism in the Soviet Union of the Mir Sultan Galiev type. Also, there was not a large labor class from where Communist ideas would be empowered. The Turkish romantic Communists were composed mainly of writers, artists, and academicians. Hence, Communism in Turkey was solely an intellectual exercise. Therefore, there was not much chance for the Soviet Union to export Communism to Turkey. Facing the firm opposition of the US and British governments to its note dated August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union, officially did not raise any demands over the Straits with the exception of the Soviet Navy's official publication, *Red Fleet* in April 1950. Hence, while Turkey was still trying to join NATO even though facing the opposition of the member countries, there were even no Soviet demands over Turkey, let alone threats.

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<sup>31</sup> George McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West," *Foreign Affairs* 32:4 (July 1954), p. 619; Necmettin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs* 27:2 (April 1949), p. 459.

Dan Reiter's Learning theory argues that state behavior is determined by experiential learning. According to this, minor powers, when trying to decide whether to ally with a great power or stay neutral, look to formative events in choosing which strategy best protects state security. Hence, formative historical experiences rather than solely external threats determine the alliance decisions. Accordingly, if the formative alliance choice is successful, then there will not be an alteration regarding a state's alliance behavior. Hence, if neutrality proved to be unsuccessful, then that state will choose to form an alliance. Turkey, during WW II was nonbelligerent, which brought it success. Because, by choosing nonbelligerency, it avoided the costs of war, while being secure. However, after the war Turkey decided to ally with the Western bloc. For this reason, this theory cannot explain the Turkish case. It could explain Turkey's decision to ally after WW II, if it did not restrict the historical experiences by only looking to the formative events which were systemic wars of WW I and WW II. Because, one of the main reasons for Turkey's insistence to join NATO, was the historical experience that came from the Ottoman era which was the fact that diplomatic and military isolation cost the Ottoman Empire much. In 1911, Italy was offered to take Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as a price to renew the Triple Alliance with Germany. In WW I Ottoman Territories were apportioned by the secret treaties of Istanbul (March-April 1915), London (April 1915), Sykes-Picot (February 1916), and Saint Jean de Maurienne (April 1917). The Istanbul Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia during their meeting in St. Petersburg between March 4-April 10, 1915. Accordingly, Istanbul and the Straits were left to Russia's control. By the treaty of London of 1915, Italy agreed to come into the war on the allied side. The 1916 Sykes-Picot treaty confirmed the French claim to Syria. The treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne in

1917, contained promises for territorial gains for Italy included the Antalya and Aydın provinces of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>32</sup> Since Turkey was a newly established state and a weak power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Western countries, as well as having the experiences of the Ottoman era, it was suspicious of all powers. After WW II, the world was being divided between two great powers. The question for Turkey was where its place was to be in this division. Historical experience, as well as the continuous Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, made clear that it would be for the benefit of Turkey if it entered into a military alliance with the Western bloc to guarantee its national security. By this way, Turkey would tie both itself and the Western great powers into a military alliance through which it would avoid being bargained over or partitioned in a possible sphere of influence agreement between the great powers of the two blocs. Turkey did not know whether the USA and Great Britain were making concessions to the Soviet Union over Turkey at the end of WW II. Because, at the beginning of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Churchill expressed his willingness to revise the Montreux Convention. Also, the US government was still regarding the Soviet Union as its war time ally. Hence, in the beginning it did not overtly object to the Soviet demands over Turkey. But we do not know yet as to how much Yalta and Potsdam discussions were known to the Turkish side, if at all. This raised suspicions among the Turkish military and civil bureaucrats who came from the Ottoman tradition. And, having the example of the Ottoman Empire as well as the recent event of the conclusion of the Spheres of Influence Agreement,<sup>33</sup> between Churchill and Stalin, by which they divided the Central,

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<sup>32</sup> Tevfik Bıyıkloğlu, "Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde (1914-1918) ve Mondros Mütarekesi Sıralarında (30 Ekim 1918-11 Ekim 1922) Boğazlar Problemi," *Belleten* XXV:97-100 (1961), p. 91; David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Avon Books, 1989), p. 392.

<sup>33</sup> In October 1944, Rumania 90%, Hungary 80%, and Bulgaria 80% were conceded to the Soviet sphere of influence and Greece 90% to the British. Yugoslavia was to be divided equally. Hence the

Eastern and Southeast countries into spheres of influence, raised the Turkish anxieties that Turkey could be divided between these great powers. For Turkey, the cooperation of these two historic rivals might refer to its division between these great powers. Because, by concluding this agreement, Great Britain accepted that the Soviet Union had a sphere of influence along its periphery. And, there was the danger of the fact that Turkey could be left to the Russian sphere of influence by Britain as it did to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, as a small power Turkey saw alliance with the Western bloc as the only solution to guarantee its security. For this reason, even though no official Soviet demands were raised against Turkey after the Fall of 1946, Turkey insisted on becoming a member of NATO in spite of the hesitancy of the USA and resistance of Great Britain as well as other European countries regarding the extension of NATO to Turkey and Greece.<sup>35</sup>

By entering NATO, Turkey would also feel secure against any possible Soviet aggression (though there were no signs of this) as well as the renewal of any future Soviet demands over Turkey. Hence, Stephen Walt's Balance of Threat theory which argues that facing an external threat states either choose to balance, ally with others against the prevailing threat or bandwagon, align with the source of danger, partially explains Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc. In this case, Turkey was not facing an external threat but, continuous Soviet war of nerves, which was the external reason of Turkey's alliance (balancing) with the Western bloc.

Randall L. Schweller's Balance of Interest theory does not offer a complete explanation of the Turkish case. Because, according to this theory, the alliance

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British and Russian policies were traditionally same. But, after WW II, Britain was not strong to maintain this policy thus, needed the US backing.

<sup>34</sup> *Times*, "The Balkan Outlook," October, 13, 1944; *Times*, "Anglo-Russian Aims in Balkans: Turkey and Need for Definition," October, 16, 1944.

<sup>35</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, "Türk Dış Politikası ve Batı (1908-1945)," in *Bilanço 1923-1998: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yılına Toplu Bakış Uluslararası Kongresi*, (Ankara, ODTÜ Kültür ve Kongre

decision of a state is not determined by its security concerns but, by opportunities of gain and for profit. Accordingly, satisfied states which are security-maximizers, align and balance to preserve the status-quo, and the revisionist states which are profit-maximizers choose to bandwagon to gain profit. Turkey, as a territorially satisfied state did not ally with the Soviet Union but, in order to preserve the status-quo allied with the Western bloc.

However, Turkey's decision to join NATO cannot be explained by only concentrating on external factors. Because, domestic factors also played a crucial role. But, the theoretical explanations which emphasize to the importance of domestic factors of a state's decision to ally are not applicable to the Turkish case, because these theorists took their cases with the Third World states which makes their theories incompatible with the Turkish case. Among these theorists Steven David introduces the theory of Omnibalancing which argues that Third World leaders, in order to provide for their political survival, decide to ally. In that case, their decision was determined by immediate and dangerous domestic threats against their leadership. For this reason, these leaders ally with their domestic opponents' international allies which makes Omnibalancing completely incompatible with the Turkish case. Because, Turkey is not a Third World state since it has the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, and it has neither been a colony of another state, nor has it ever been composed of peoples without a state.<sup>36</sup> A Western type of modern state was established by Atatürk. And, there are no problems regarding the legitimacy of state leaders or social unrest within the state, to the extent that threatens the survival of the state.

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Merkezi, 10-12 Aralık 1998) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları. Forthcoming): Nur Bilge Criss, "Önsöz," in Melih Esenbel, *Türkiye'nin Batı ile İttifakı*, (İstanbul: ISIS Yayınevi. Forthcoming)

<sup>36</sup> Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrim: Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1998). p. 127.

The main domestic factor which led to Turkey's entrance into NATO was the state policy of Westernization. Westernization is the constant foreign policy goal of the Turkish state. Therefore, Turkey has always expressed its desire to enter the military, political, and economic organizations of the West. After the War of Independence, the goal was the integration of the Turkish people into European civilization. Because, for Atatürk Turkey could remain independent only by being a part of the Western world. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the obvious example that indicated what may happen when the ties between the Empire and Western Europe are broken. According to Atatürk, those who failed to achieve modernization would eventually be dominated by the advanced nations. Economic development and industrialization have been parts of the Westernization policy. Atatürk argued that the maintenance of full independence of Turkey was dependent on its industrialization. However, first during WW II because of mobilization and then facing Soviet war of nerves, Turkey felt the necessity of maintaining large armed forces which drained nearly half of its budget which was the main obstacle to its industrialization. Therefore, Turkey wanted to distribute its military costs through joining NATO. By this way it would find the opportunity to modernize its army, and to be an industrialized country. The theorists Jack Levy and Michael Barnett, even though take their cases primarily from the Third World, can partially explain the economic aspect of Turkey's entrance into NATO. They argue that by choosing to depend on external alliance, the state gets economic and military aid from its ally and uses this aid both for its internal and external security needs. Unlike the Third World states, Turkey was not facing internal security problems since there were no domestic rivals to the leadership. However, this theory explains how Turkey's objective to distribute the costs of military preparation to provide for its external security needs,

played a significant role in its decision to enter NATO. Because, Turkey which was already receiving US economic and military aid was concerned about the possible reduction of this aid, especially after the establishment of NATO. By joining NATO, Turkey would continue to receive US military aid, hence, could distribute the costs of its defense expenditures while decreasing these costs to the society.

In conclusion, both external and domestic factors played a crucial role for Turkey's decision to form an alliance with the Western bloc. The external factor was not the commonly argued 'Soviet threat' but the Turkish feeling of insecurity, after the experiences of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the continuous Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, and its desire to guarantee its national security. By joining NATO, Turkey tied itself as well as the Western great powers into a military alliance. The Turkish Westernization policy which was also related to its aim of achieving industrialization, was the domestic factor for Turkey's entrance into NATO. By entering NATO, Turkey would be a member of a Western organization as a continuation of its Westernization policy this time in the military sense, and at the same time, it would distribute the costs of heavy defense burdens on its budget to its allies. Hence, it would achieve economic development and industrialization.

### **1.3 Synopsis of the Chapters**

In the second chapter, the Soviet demands over Turkey from the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) up to their official end (April 1950) is examined in detail. This chapter also contains the content of the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, its tactics to bring Turkey into bilateral discussions to revise the Montreux Convention in its favor, as well as the changes and continuities in the policies of the Turkish, US, and British governments against the Soviet demands.



The third chapter, discusses the extent of Soviet threat over Turkey. Then, it focuses on domestic reasons of Turkey's entrance into NATO which was its state policy of Westernization and related to this, its goal to achieve industrialization. The US economic and military aid to Turkey from 1946 up to the establishment of NATO; the alterations in the US foreign policy regarding the changed world conjuncture, and their effects on its policy to Turkey are examined. ~

The fourth chapter focuses on Turkey's endeavors to join to NATO which began from mid-1948 up to February 1952. The policies of the USA and Great Britain as well as other NATO members regarding Turkish membership are examined.

The fifth chapter, as a summary makes an evaluation of Turkey's reasons for entering NATO and the effects of this membership on Turkey on a theoretical basis.

## CHAPTER II

### SOVIET DEMANDS OVER TURKEY

#### 2.1 Introduction

It is commonly argued that Turkey joined NATO because of Soviet threats. However, there was not a Soviet threat against Turkey but only demands. Also, Cecil V. Crabb evaluates the Soviet policy toward Turkey after WW II as, “some combination of Soviet pressures and intimidation directed against a vulnerable country.”<sup>1</sup> In order to achieve its historic policy goal of controlling the Straits and ensuring access to the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union pursued a continuous war of nerves against Turkey. This Soviet aim of controlling the Straits became obvious during Molotov-Ribbentrop-Hitler discussions, in November 12-13, 1940, in Berlin where the Soviet government demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention for having a greater freedom of passage for Soviet warships as well as bases in the Straits.<sup>2</sup> In October 1944, Stalin during his conversation with Churchill, in Moscow, raised the issue of revising the Montreux Convention and the latter supported the Soviet demand. During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin once again brought up the question of revising the Montreux Convention. Roosevelt was not very knowledgeable about the problem, and Churchill favored the revision of the Montreux Convention. The USA still regarded the Soviet Union as its war time ally. The Near and Middle East region was of secondary importance for the USA, hence,

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<sup>1</sup> Cecil V. Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future*, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 163, 210.

it regarded the Soviet policy toward Turkey as an issue to be solved primarily by the Soviet Union and Great Britain as it had been in the past. Such exchanges, even if the details were not known, raised the anxieties of the Turkish government, having had the historical experiences of the Ottoman era, that it could be a bargaining point between great powers. This feeling of insecurity became the external factor of Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc. Since, especially after the Yalta Conference, the Soviet war of nerves was intensified against Turkey in order to bring it into bilateral discussions to revise the Montreux Convention in its favor. Within this framework, the Soviet Union denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925, demanded the Kars-Ardahan region, continued its radio and press attacks against Turkey as well as creating rumors of troop movements as if it would wage war against Turkey although there were no signs of this. It took no steps to force territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey. Having realized the real intention of the Soviet Union, after the Soviet note of August 7 1946, both the US and British governments took a firm stand against Soviet demands on the Straits. And, facing the firm objection of these two powers, after the Fall of 1946, the Soviet Union did not officially raise the revision of the Montreux Convention again. Hence, the Soviet war of nerves came to nothing to achieve control of the Straits.

## **2.2 The Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945)**

During the Yalta Conference, specifically on February 10, 1945, the problem of the Turkish Straits once again was raised by Stalin who claimed that "he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles." According to Stalin, the Montreux Convention was "outmoded" and "needed revision" on the grounds that firstly, "the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the

treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union.” Secondly, the treaty was connected with the League of Nations which no longer existed just like the Japanese Emperor was not present at the Yalta Conference, and thirdly, under the Montreux Convention Turkey had the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if it felt that there was a threat of war. And lastly, Stalin mentioned the fact that the treaty had been drawn when relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not good. However, Stalin claimed that “he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese.” Stalin wanted the treaty to be revised in a manner which would consider the interests of Russia, but he did not propose anything specific on this issue in order not to prejudice decisions. Stalin claimed that “it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat.” But he also mentioned the importance of not damaging the legitimate interests of Turkey. Stalin suggested that the question of revising the treaty could be considered by the three Foreign Ministers at their first meeting since they were meeting periodically every two or three months.<sup>3</sup>

President Roosevelt, by pointing to the US-Canadian border as an example for the solution of the Straits question, showed both his “idealism” and “ignorance of the Turco-Soviet relations.”<sup>4</sup> He said that for over a hundred years, the United States had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada where neither any fort nor armed forces exist and suggested that the other frontiers in the world should be in this manner.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1955), pp. 903-904.

<sup>4</sup> Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.219.

<sup>5</sup> FRUS, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 904.

The British Prime Minister Churchill, recalled that Stalin had mentioned this question in Moscow in October 1944. However, the Soviet government still had not presented its proposal on this subject. Churchill made clear that Great Britain shared the views of the Soviet Union regarding the necessity of revising or reconstructing the Montreux Convention without harming Turkey's independence. Churchill said, "I certainly feel that the present position of Russia-her Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit- is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will make their proposal."<sup>6</sup>

Hence, on February 11, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that the question of revision would be considered in London where the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries would be held. They should consider proposals regarding this question whereby it was understood that the Soviet Union would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and they would report to their governments. It was decided that at the appropriate moment the Turkish government should be informed that the subject was under discussion. And, in case of a change in the Montreux Convention, Turkey should be given a joint guarantee of its independence and unity.<sup>7</sup>

### **2.3 The Soviet Denunciation of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December, 1925**

On March 19, 1945, the Soviet Union denounced the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, which signaled the resurrection of the Eastern Question. People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav M. Molotov explained to the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Selim

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 910. In October 1944, Stalin during his discussion with Churchill wanted Russian warships to have the right of passage at all times. And, Churchill claimed that in principle, the British government was not against a revision of the Montreux Convention.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 982; Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1983), p. 291.

Sarper, that the treaty was “out of date and required revision” since serious changes took place especially during the course of the Second World War, and this treaty “no longer corresponded to the new situation.” Molotov mentioned the existing treaty between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and the present diplomatic relations with the United States as examples so as to describe the changed world conditions. He suggested that the Soviet government wished to conclude a new treaty with Turkey which would correspond to the changed world conditions.<sup>8</sup>

The Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Sarper requested Molotov’s views regarding the manner by which the present treaty might be “improved.” However, Molotov did not suggest any opinion and claimed that he would be glad to learn the response of the Turkish government on this issue.<sup>9</sup>

Beyond this denunciation of the treaty, there was no detailed discussion of a new treaty. The Turkish government, expressed its desire to maintain and strengthen the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey, and declared that it accepted the proposition of replacing the denounced agreement with a new one which would better serve to the mutual interests of the two countries.<sup>10</sup>

The foremost objective of the Soviet Union by denouncing the treaty of December, 1925, was to put pressure on Turkey in order to revise the Montreux Convention in its favor. The Soviet policy was being observed by the US Ambassador to Moscow, Averell W. Harriman who reported on March 21<sup>st</sup> to the US Secretary of State,

In view of this Embassy, the main factors underlying Soviet policy toward Turkey at this moment are probably (a) the Soviet desire to obtain

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<sup>8</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969), p. 1223. According to the protocol of November 7, 1935 the treaty itself was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for further 2-year periods unless denounced 6 months before expiry. If therefore the treaty were not to remain operative until at least November 7, 1947 it would have to be denounced by one party or the other by May 7 of 1945, at the latest. FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 1221.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 1222.

<sup>10</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 216.

a revision of the regime of the Straits more favorable to Russian prestige and security than the present one and (b) the assumption that such revision will probably not be readily acceptable to Turkey and that considerable pressure may therefore eventually have to be applied.<sup>11</sup>

The US Ambassador in Turkey, Laurence A. Steinhardt, shared the same views with Harriman. He reported to the Secretary of State that “the decision of the Soviet government to terminate the Soviet-Turkish treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was accepted philosophically by the Turkish government as the forerunner of the inevitable request for a modification of the Montreux Convention.” Also Ambassador Harriman reported that the “denunciation itself was not a surprise for the Turkish government.” This was also observed by Harriman who stated that “It has been anticipated in Turkish circles in Moscow that the Russians would wish to denounce the treaty, and the Turkish Ambassador had advised his government to this effect 1 or 2 months ago. However, the circumstances in which it took place were unexpected.”<sup>12</sup> By denouncing the Turkish-Soviet treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, the Soviet government aimed to achieve bargaining leverage over Turkey, by which it would induce Turkey to enter into bilateral discussions to revise the Montreux Convention.

Another tactic of the Soviet Union for gaining leverage over Turkey was its radio and press attacks. The Soviet government had already begun its radio and press attacks against Turkey immediately after the Yalta Conference, which had been increased especially after the denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. At that time, the three sides of Turkey were surrounded by Soviet or pro-Soviet forces. Bulgaria (end of September 1944) and northern Iran were under

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<sup>11</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 1222.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 1221-1223.

Soviet domination, and the Greek Communists were getting some Soviet support and were threatening to overthrow the existing government in Greece.<sup>13</sup>

Both Ambassador Sarper, and Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Feridun Cemal Erkin, discussed Soviet policy toward Turkey with Ambassador Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov on a number of occasions. Sarper expressed the desire of the Turkish government to enact another treaty of friendship with the Soviet government, “not like the one which had just been denounced.” However, while Vinogradov accepted the fact that both countries should have some kind of treaty relationship, he claimed that the matter should be discussed with Molotov and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, “which the Turkish government considered dangerous.”<sup>14</sup>

While Turkey refrained from holding bilateral conversations with the Soviet Union, it tried to involve the United States and Great Britain by consulting with them in formulating its policy toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet aim of bringing Turkey to bilateral talks during the potential revision of the Montreux Convention by denouncing the treaty of friendship was also acknowledged by the US and British governments.

The British Foreign Office viewed the Soviet termination of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship as the first step in a Soviet plan to “soften” Turkey in order to bring it into bilateral discussions on the Straits. Therefore, the British government had advised the Turkish government to remind the “international nature” of the

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<sup>13</sup> Ferenc A. Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, p. 172; David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, *When Titans Clashed: How Red Army Stopped Hitler*, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), p. 221.

<sup>14</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*, pp. 216-217.



Montreux Convention to the Soviet government and state that Great Britain was also interested in the administration of the Straits.<sup>15</sup>

The American Ambassador to Turkey, Laurence A. Steinhardt, shared the views of the Turkish and British governments. On March 26, 1945, the Ambassador, in his telegram to the Secretary of State mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union viewed the control and the administration of the Straits as a completely “Black Sea affair” and resented non-Black Sea powers as signatories of the Montreux Convention. The real intention of the Soviet Union was to force Turkey into bilateral discussions for revising the Montreux Convention by which it would make a *fait accompli* against Britain. According to Steinhardt, the Soviet Union would follow the same policy which it followed in 1939, which was continuous criticism of the Turkish government and press and radio attacks against Turkey, and rumors to alarm the Turks in order to “soften” the Turkish government and bring them into a bilateral mode to change the Montreux Convention in the way that the Soviet government wanted. Therefore, according to the Ambassador, the real Soviet aim was not territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey but, to attain complete freedom of navigation for all types of vessels at all times for the Soviet Union, at the same time exclude the non-Black Sea powers from the Straits. Steinhardt enumerated the real intention of the Soviet Union regarding the Straits as follows:

1. Joint free access to and egress from the Black Sea to Soviet vessels of every type in times of war as well as in times of peace while denying the same to non-Black Sea powers in times of war or threatened conflict.
2. Automatically constitute Turkey an ally of the Soviet Union in any future war involving the Soviets.
3. Oblige Turkey to sustain the first impact of any contemplated attack on the Soviet Black Sea ports.

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<sup>15</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1228-1229.

4. Eliminate Great Britain from any direct voice in the control and administration of the Straits.
5. Enhance Soviet and diminish British prestige throughout the Balkans and the Middle East.<sup>16</sup>

Steinhardt also made clear that as a response to Soviet policy he expected that Turkey would seek the support of both Great Britain and the USA while resisting Soviet demands. The American Ambassador was right in his evaluation since, on March 31, during a conversation with Steinhardt, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka, expressed his views regarding the Soviet policy toward Turkey. According to him, the Soviet government would try to bring Turkey into a bilateral discussion regarding the future of Turkish-Soviet relations, including the regime of the Straits which would be a *fait accompli* for Britain. For Saka, in order to achieve its aims the Soviet government would apply to “its customary methods” which would be exertion of extreme pressure over Turkey by criticizing and denouncing the Turkish government through press, radio and by other means. But he made clear that the Soviet Union would not resort to force against Turkey since the Soviet losses against Germany during WW II were so great that it required large occupation forces in Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria as well as manpower which would be used for the reconstruction of Soviet cities, industries, railroads which it would not be able to spare. In addition to these, any Soviet attack would create an unfavorable position in the eyes of the world, thus, a Soviet attack against Turkey was unlikely. The Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Sarper had also informed the American Chargé in Turkey, Packer, that he did not believe that the Soviet Union had any desire to advance claims to Turkish territory in the Kars and Ardahan region. For Sarper the Soviet government would press Turkey into bilateral conversations to revise the

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 1225-1228.

Montreux Convention but, he did not expect any attempt at coercion from the Soviet Union against Turkey.<sup>17</sup>

On April 4, 1945, the Turkish government declared its wish of maintaining and strengthening good neighborly relations and sincere friendship with the Soviet Union and declared its acceptance of the Soviet suggestion of replacing the expiring pact with another one which would be applicable to the present interests of both states.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, the Soviet war of nerves continued against Turkey. There were rumors of a Soviet attack against Turkey from Thrace. However, according to the British Foreign Office, “these stories were ‘planted,’ probably by the Russians in their current war of nerves since, it was fanciful to consider that Russia would launch an act of aggression against Turkey at the present juncture “even though this might not be the case in two or three years.”<sup>19</sup>

Also, on April 11, 1945, the US Representative in Bulgaria, Maynard B. Barnes, reported to the Secretary of State that the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs gave assurances that so far as Bulgaro-Turkish relations were concerned, no change was planned. Nicola Antonov, the recently appointed Bulgarian Minister to Ankara, also assured the Turkish government that Bulgaria had neither the intention of altering its policy of good neighborly relations with Turkey, nor had any desire for adventure against Turkey. Antonov stated that there was no increase in the strength of Bulgarian and Russian military forces in southeastern Bulgaria.<sup>20</sup>

On June 7, 1945, Molotov informed Sarper, regarding the price of the new treaty between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Molotov claimed that to make it

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 1229-1230, 1233-1234.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 1231.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 1232.

possible for concluding a new treaty, there were some questions that had to be settled between the two states.

The first question was the retrocession of Kars and Ardahan, which had been ceded to Turkey on October 13, 1921<sup>21</sup>, to the Soviet Union. Sarper refused to discuss any question affecting Turkey's territorial integrity. Molotov then stated that "they would lay the question aside for the time being but the Ambassador should understand that it remained unsettled."

The second question was about the Straits. Molotov claimed that the Soviet government recognized that Turkey acted with goodwill during the war and conducted itself satisfactorily regarding the defense of the Straits. However, Turkish goodwill was not enough to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. It was claimed that a people of 200,000,000 inhabitants could not depend solely on the goodwill of Turkey in this matter. Sarper asked what this meant: "Did it mean bluntly that Russia wished bases in Turkish territory? Molotov replied affirmatively." Then Sarper regretted that he could not discuss such a demand.

The third question was the revision of the Montreux Convention. Molotov wanted a prior agreement between the Soviet Union and Turkey that at any future international conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention the two countries would stand together regardless of the views of other parties. Sarper reminded Molotov of the international nature of the Montreux Convention, and that there were other parties to the Convention. He claimed any such prior agreement would lead to mistrust of the other governments. However, Molotov insisted that since the Soviet Union and Turkey were independent countries, it was not necessary for them to ask the views of other powers on this matter. During the discussion of

this matter, Sarper was given the impression that if Turkey would break away from its alliance with Britain, then the Soviet government would not feel it necessary to insist on the three points which Molotov had raised.

On June 18, 1945, during the second conference which took place between Molotov and Sarper, the Turkish government gave a firm negative response to Molotov since it refused to discuss any question of ceding Turkish territories as bases any more than it could agree with the Soviet proposal of concluding a private agreement regarding the Straits prior to holding an international conference. Sarper claimed that the Turkish government was not prepared to reopen the question of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921 because it was freely negotiated. Secondly, he declared that the Turkish government could not grant bases to the Soviet Union in the Straits. Lastly, regarding the Montreux Convention, Sarper reiterated the international nature of the treaty, which made holding bilateral discussions impossible between the two states alone. Hence, Sarper indicated to Molotov that any treaty of friendship could be based on "mutual respect and esteem" between the two states but, could not be based on the questions that were raised by Molotov. He made this clear to Molotov by saying that the continuation of Soviet proposals would only draw these states further apart instead of creating a better understanding between them. Faced with this firm response, the Soviet Union eased its demands since Vinogradov informed the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister, Nurullah Sümer, that Molotov had "put aside" the territorial question. He also added that the Soviet Union did not need any additional territory but the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic did. Sümer indicated the unacceptability of such a statement by the Turkish government, and reiterated that the Turkish government would like to draw up a new

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<sup>21</sup> The Tsarist Russia took Kars and Ardahan after the war of 1877-78. In 1921 the Soviet Union returned these two provinces to Turkey. Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, (Washington, D.C.:

treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union provided that all territorial and other unacceptable provisions were left aside.<sup>22</sup>

On June 21, instructions were sent to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, according to which he was authorized to indicate that “Turkey would attach value to a new treaty of friendship drawn up on a proper basis.” Also, regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention the Turkish government demanded the views of the Soviet Union in order to discuss these with the other interested states.<sup>23</sup>

## **2.4 The Policies of the Great Britain and USA Until the Potsdam Conference**

Although at the end of the Yalta Conference the British government supported Soviet claims regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention, after the Soviet Union’s termination of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, it realized that Soviet policy was aimed at making a *fait accompli* for Great Britain. Since after WW II, Britain lost its previous power, it began to seek the cooperation of the USA for supporting Turkey and Greece. On June 18, the British Chargé d’Affaires, John Balfour, stated the British government policy regarding Soviet policy toward Turkey. He made clear, by emphasizing the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, that the British government supported the Turkish position since Molotov was acting in a conflictual manner with his statements at Yalta where Stalin had agreed that “appropriate assurances should be given to Turkey regarding the maintenance of her independence and integrity.” The British government declared its hope of creating a firm joint Anglo-American approach regarding the problem before the meeting of the Big Three.

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Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 117.

<sup>22</sup> FRUS, *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1960), pp. 1018, 1020-1021, 1024-1025.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 1025.

However, since the Dardanelles was considered of secondary importance for US interests, the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), considered that the conversation between Sarper and Molotov was exploratory and was held in a friendly atmosphere. The US government regarded that it would be premature to protest what only amounted to a “preliminary exchange of views.” The US State Department declared that it was not aware that any formal demands had been made by the Soviet Union of Turkey. The US government indicated that future conversations between Turkey and the Soviet Union would be conducted according to the principles of the International Security Organization.<sup>24</sup>

On the other hand, on June 20, 1945, the new US Ambassador in Turkey, Edwin Wilson, recommended to the Acting Secretary of State that the US government should express an interest in this question at the Big Three meeting in Moscow since the Soviet proposals were completely incompatible both with the spirit and principles of the new world organization in which the Soviet Union was expected to have a seat. Wilson expressed his view that he did not expect a military action against Turkey on the eve of the Big Three meeting. But, he suggested that the USA should firmly express its views regarding the matter.<sup>25</sup>

After this inactive policy of the US government, Turkey began to claim that the Soviet Union was a threat to it on a number of occasions. On June 25, 1945, Sarper expressed his views to the US Ambassador in Moscow, Averell W. Harriman. Sarper indicated that the Soviet Union was not bluffing, and Soviet policy was designed to make Turkey a satellite of the Soviet Union like Poland.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 1027-1028; David Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980), pp. 55-56.

<sup>25</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, 1945*, Vol. I, p. 1023.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 1029-1030.

Meanwhile, rumors of troop movements were continuing. On June 26, the Acting Foreign Minister, Nurullah Sümer, told the US Ambassador Wilson that the Soviet Army units were withdrawing from Poland and Hungary to Bulgaria and expressed that these military movements looked like potential threats. However, when Wilson asked him whether he really thought that the Soviet Union would take military action against Turkey on the eve of the Big three meeting, “he said frankly he doubted but Turkey could not be caught unprepared.”<sup>27</sup>

The US regarded Soviet policy toward Turkey clearly as an issue between Britain and the Soviet Union and on June 29, 1945, declared its policy toward Turkey in a report. According to this report, because of its geographical position, Turkey had always been “an area of diplomatic, economic and military conflict between Britain and the USSR.” This raised Turkish anxieties that Turkey could be abandoned by the West and might be divided between the two blocs. This feeling of insecurity which came from the time of the Ottoman Empire, was one of the main reasons for Turkey’s insistence to join NATO by 1949. Because, in this way Turkey aimed to tie itself as well as the West into a military alliance, in order to avoid being a possible bargaining point between the powers.<sup>28</sup>

On June 27, 1945, the US government declared that the foremost US interests in this problem were “(a) freedom of commerce and (b) the establishment of a regime of the Straits which would effectively promote the cause of world peace in accordance with the principles of the International Security Organization to which the US government was pledged.” The US government on the one hand declared that it did not object to minor changes in the Montreux Convention regarding the transit and navigation of warships from the Straits and their right to sojourn in the Black

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 1031.



Sea. On the other hand, the US government also declared that there was no justification for the USSR to propose major changes in the Convention because, the Montreux Convention had proved that it was a successful regime. The problems that occurred during WW II were the result of the Axis control of the region but not because of the shortcomings of the Convention. The US government argued that any major change in the Convention required the free consent of the Turkish government. Otherwise it would be violation of Turkish sovereignty, and the Convention which was drafted during the League of Nations' tenure could be easily adapted to the International Security Organization. The US government declared that it would not remain silent in case any state took steps against the independence and integrity of Turkey at the Big Three meeting.<sup>29</sup>

On June 30, 1945, the US government put forth in Potsdam its preferences regarding possible changes in the Montreux Convention:

1. In time of peace the Straits would be open to commercial vessels of all nations.
2. In time of peace the Straits would be open for ingress or egress of war vessels of Black Sea powers.
3. In time of peace there should be certain restrictions upon the aggregate strength in the Black Sea at any one time of the war vessels of non-riparian Black Sea powers.
4. During a war in which one or more of the Black Sea riparian powers is involved, no war ships of any non-riparian power shall be admitted into the Black Sea without the consent of the riparian power or powers at war, unless they are moving under the direction of the UNO.
5. During time of war, regardless of whether one or more of the Black Sea powers is involved, the war vessels of the Black Sea riparian powers shall have free ingress and egress through the Straits in the absence of contrary directions of the UNO.
6. No power other than Turkey shall be granted the right to have a fortification on the Dardanelles or to maintain any bases in the Dardanelles without the free consent of Turkey.
7. Regardless of the points above, if Turkey is at war or threatened with imminent danger of war the passage of warships shall be left entirely

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 1016-1017; David Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The US and Turkey, 1943-1946*, pp. 56, 59-60; Nur Bilge Criss, "Önsöz," in Melih Esenbel, *Türkiye'nin Batı ile İttifakı*.

<sup>29</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, 1945*, Vol. I, pp. 1012-1013.

to the discretion of the Turkish government unless the course taken by Turkey under this provision is interdicted by the UNO.<sup>30</sup>

Ambassador Wilson was urging the US government to pursue a more active policy since it was necessary to take the demands of the USSR into consideration regarding the Kars and Ardahan provinces (Kars and Ardahan were lost to Russia in the war of 1877-1878) as well as bases in the Straits. According to Wilson "it was a matter of prestige for present Soviet government to recover what Czarist regime formerly held." Furthermore these territories had high strategic value because of their geographical position. The fact that the Straits could be controlled by air power based on the Greek Islands made the Soviet demand of bases in the Straits invalid. Hence, he expected that the Soviet claims related to its security could be extended to the Aegean and in this case the whole debate could be extended from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Suez, and Gibraltar. Wilson also mentioned the fact that Eastern Europe had been lost to the Soviet Union, and the US interests in the Middle East as well as its interests in world cooperation and security required support for Turkey to resist these demands which would affect its independence.<sup>31</sup>

On July 17, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in a memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), drew attention to Soviet policy in Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Ruthenia, and indicated that the Soviet Union would seize by the use of force what was not granted to it by agreement. However, it accepted that its current demands and proposals were not exactly in the same category, and that it was war-weary, over-extended by great efforts and in need of years to reestablish its economy, a process which required US support and assistance. Therefore, the JCS offered that the policy should be revision of the

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 1014-1015.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 1033-1034, 1041-1042.

Montreux Convention along the lines which were proposed by the State Department, and support for the demilitarization of the Straits, and if this failed, the USA should refuse to grant to any other state other than Turkey, to have bases or other rights for direct or indirect military control of the Straits.<sup>32</sup>

## **2.5 Turkey's Response Toward British and US Policies Until the Potsdam Conference**

The Turkish government feared of abandonment by the USA and to be left as a matter to be solved between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, expected from the USA to pursue a more active policy regarding the Soviet desires on Turkey. For this reason, the Turkish government criticized US policy on a number of occasions. For instance, on June 2, 1945, Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu expressed his views regarding US policy. He said that he could not believe that the USA required from Turkey to continue further discussions with the USSR on issues regarding the cession of Turkish territories and bases. He made clear that Turkey was ready to discuss the revision of the Convention, but it would fight in case the Soviet Union made any attempt against the independence of Turkey. He gave Bornholm, Trieste, Albania, Greece, Iran, and Turkey as examples of Soviet tendency towards world domination and required the establishment of a firm policy by the USA and Britain against the USSR. Regarding the discussions with Molotov, Saracoğlu emphasized the fact that Molotov had left the door open in conversations with Sarper in order to have a chance to retreat if it was necessary. Since Molotov did not explicitly raise the question of bases on the Straits, during the conversation he talked around the question of security it was Sarper who asked if he meant bases. Then, Molotov replied affirmatively. Also, Molotov did not mention specifically Kars and Ardahan

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<sup>32</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, 1945*, Vol. II, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1960), pp. 1421-1422.

but, claimed that the treaty of 1921 had to be rectified, because it was negotiated when the Soviet Union was weak.<sup>33</sup> The door was left open by which the Soviet Union would gain bargaining leverage over Turkey during a possible negotiation.

On July 7, 1945, the Turkish Ambassador to the USA, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, talked with the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, during which Baydur criticized US policy toward the Soviet demands against Turkey. Baydur asked Grew if the Soviet government demanded from the US to cede to it the cities of Boston and San Francisco, would the US still consider such a demand not a threat but a matter of negotiation. Grew replied definitely in the negative. Then, Grew asked whether the Soviet government specified the nature of the frontier rectification which it desired and whether its demands were yet of such a concrete nature as to be regarded as open threats. Baydur repeated the Soviet desire for the rectification of the treaty of 1921, by claiming that when it was concluded the Soviet Union was weak. This pointed to the obvious desire of the Soviet Union for the return of Kars and Ardahan. Baydur made clear that Turkey would not cede any territory to the Soviet Union.<sup>34</sup>

On July 11, 1945, Foreign Minister Hasan Saka, in his conversation with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, characterized the Soviet policy toward Turkey as “sinister” since he believed that the fourth but unspecified demand which was mentioned by Molotov was aimed to bring Turkey economically and politically into the Soviet orbit. Eden mentioned the bargaining tactics of the Soviet government as often expressing demands in extreme terms. When Saka asked whether the revision of the Montreux Convention and related matters would be a matter of discussion at the Big Three meeting, he was told that that was planned but, it could not be foreseen how these discussions would develop. However, it was felt that the

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<sup>33</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, 1945*, Vol. I, pp. 1034-1036.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 1044-1046.

question of the revision of the Montreux Convention and the question of bases and territorial changes should be kept separate and be dealt with separately.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile, Soviet war of nerves was continuing against Turkey. There were rumors of large increase of Soviet troops in Bulgaria which was regarded by the British Foreign Office as a part of war of nerves on Turkey. The Foreign Office did not think that there would be further Soviet diplomatic maneuvers against Turkey before the Big Three meeting.<sup>36</sup>

## **2.6 The Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2, 1945)**

During the plenary session on July 22, 1945, the subject of the Straits came up when Churchill claimed that he agreed with Stalin for a revision of the Montreux Convention. He also made clear that he was ready to accept the free movement of the Russian ships of all types through the Black Sea and back. Hence, Churchill opened the discussion in a friendly manner. But, he also warned the Soviets not to alarm Turkey since the Turkish government was quite alarmed by the concentration of Soviet troops in Bulgaria, by the continuous press and radio attacks against Turkey as well as Soviet demands of territory and bases from Turkey during the Molotov-Sarper conversations. Churchill said that he had understood that these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet government since the Turkish government asked for an alliance with the Soviet Union Molotov had stated the conditions for such an alliance. But, the Turkish government was alarmed by the conditions that were put forward by Molotov. Molotov claimed that it was the Turkish government which took the initiative and had proposed an alliance. Stalin declared that the Soviet government would not object to the conclusion of a treaty of alliance if the two

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 1050.

conditions were met which were the retrocession of the treaty of 1921, and the revision of the Montreux Convention. Stalin also indicated that after solving these two questions, the Soviet Union was ready to settle any questions which would be raised by Turkey. However, if Turkey was not prepared to make an agreement on these two questions, the Soviet government would take the initiative and would make an agreement on the Straits alone with the Black Sea powers.<sup>37</sup>

The Soviet delegation proposed that the Montreux Convention should be revised as it no longer corresponded to the present time conditions. Secondly, the determination of the regime of the Straits should be decided by Turkey and the Soviet Union since they were chiefly concerned and able to ensure the freedom of commercial navigation and the security in the Black Sea Straits. And thirdly, Turkey and Soviet Union should prevent through their “common facilities” the use of the Straits by the other states for purposes which were inimical to the Black Sea powers which referred to the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits in addition to Turkish military bases.<sup>38</sup>

Churchill stated that this proposal went far beyond the discussions between Eden, himself, and Stalin. Molotov pointed to the existence of similar treaties of 1798, 1805 and 1833 which existed between Russia and Turkey. Churchill made clear that the British government was not prepared to push Turkey to accept the Soviet proposals.<sup>39</sup>

On July 23, 1945, Churchill stated that the British government could not accept the establishment of a Soviet base on the Straits, and claimed that he expected that Turkey would also refuse such a demand. However, Stalin reiterated that “Turkey

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 1043.

<sup>37</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, June 18-August 2, 1945*, Vol. II. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1967), pp. 256-257.

<sup>38</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, 1945*, Vol. II, pp. 1427-1428.

was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case any complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see them defended by force.” Stalin gave the Panama and the Suez Canals as examples in order to convince that force was necessary, and suggested some other base where the Soviet fleet could protect the Straits would also be acceptable to the Soviet Union in case the naval bases on the Straits were unacceptable to the Turkish government.

President Truman argued that the Montreux Convention should be revised in a way which would guarantee that the Straits would be a free waterway open to the whole world which should be guaranteed by all “of us.” He drew the attention to the fact that all the wars of the last 200 years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia, and in the last two instances peace in the whole world had been overturned. According to him, it should be the business of the Potsdam Conference and of the coming peace conference to prohibit the occurrence such wars again. According to Truman, this could be achieved by providing free passage of goods and vessels through the Straits as had also been the case in American waters.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, the Montreux Convention had to be revised which would provide freedom of intercourse in all that section. Truman claimed that he would like to see Russia, Britain and the USA have access to all seas in the world. He regarded the territorial dispute (Kars and Ardahan) between the Soviet Union and Turkey as a problem that could be settled between these states, but the question of the Black Sea Straits was a question which concerned the USA and the whole world. Churchill said that he completely agreed with Truman.<sup>41</sup> At that time, the US concern was the creation of an

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<sup>39</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, June 18-August 2, 1945*, Vol. II, pp. 256-258.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 303-304.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 304, 312-313.

economically sound Europe in which the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France as well as other countries could trade profitably.<sup>42</sup>

On July, 23, 1945, the US delegation submitted a proposal of “free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways.” Accordingly,

The establishment of interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine which would provide the restoration and improvement of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the US, the UK, the USSR, France and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these governments.<sup>43</sup>

Stalin’s main objective was to control access to the Mediterranean by getting a military base in Turkey. And, for that purpose, he was ready to make concessions regarding the place of such a base. At a banquet, Stalin asked Churchill “If you find it impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could we not have a base at Dedeagatch (in Eastern Thrace)?” Churchill replied carefully as he claimed “I will always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year round.”<sup>44</sup>

On July 24, 1945, Stalin replied to the US proposal concerning “inland waterways” negatively by retorting that it did not deal with the Turkish Straits but dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. According to Stalin, the US proposal was too broad since it offered the joint control of the US, the UK, the USSR, France, and other riparian powers. Therefore, Stalin asked to postpone the question of the Turkish Straits because the question was not ready for discussion. The necessity to hold discussions with the Turkish government was also agreed to by the Big Three.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*, p. 298.

<sup>43</sup> FRUS, *The Potsdam Conference, June 18-August 2, 1945*, Vol. II, p. 654.

<sup>44</sup> Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, pp. 263-264.

<sup>45</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, pp. 229-230.



On August 2, 1945, the Potsdam Protocol provisions concerning the “Black Sea Straits” were signed at Berlin. Accordingly,

1. The US, UK, and USSR agreed that the Montreux Convention should be revised since it failed to meet present-day conditions.
2. It was also agreed that as the next step this matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government.<sup>46</sup>

The Potsdam Conference, despite its inconclusive results was a turning point in the debate over the Straits. Truman made clear that the USA was ready to assume responsibility for the resolution of the problem. Although, the US policy was “vague,” it at least indicated to the Soviet Union that the USA would be an obstacle to Soviet ambitions. Britain welcomed American participation, which would create an obstacle to the Soviet Union in the region. Turkey also welcomed US participation since it always regarded the USA as an unselfish friend, hence, it sought US involvement in the problem from the beginning.<sup>47</sup>

On August 9, 1945, Truman reiterated the US policy that had been formulated during the conference in a report according to which

One of the persistent causes of wars in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways in Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states.

The US proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We think this is important to the future peace and security of the world. We proposed that regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities.

The function of the agencies would be to develop the use of the waterways and assure equal treatment on them for all nations. Membership on the agencies would include the US, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, plus those states which border on the waterways.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1236-1237.

<sup>47</sup> David Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The U.S. and Turkey, 1943-1946*, p. 66; FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1249-1250.

<sup>48</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1241-1242.

The Turkish Prime Minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu, declared that the Turkish government would accept the internationalization of the Straits if this would not impair Turkish sovereignty and if there would be an alteration in the Soviet attitude toward Turkey as a result. Although the US proposal of “inland waterways” was not satisfactory, Turkey did not reject it since it needed the assistance of the USA and Britain. The rejection would result in the isolation of Turkey “in the face of the USSR.”<sup>49</sup>

On September 3, 1945, the US submitted its draft proposal to Turkey and the UK. According to this:

1. the Straits would be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times,
2. the Straits would be open to the warships of Black Sea powers at all times,
3. the Straits would be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of all of the Black Sea powers,
4. creation of minor changes to bring the Montreux Convention in line with present day conditions, such as the substitution of the UN from the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.<sup>50</sup>

The US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, stated to Truman that the USA should not recommend the neutralization of the Turkish Straits, because if the USA requested from Turkey to dismantle its fortifications and agree to the neutralization of the Straits, it should also guarantee to give assistance to Turkey in case it would be attacked. He also reminded that reliance on the UN was not sufficient because with the veto power of the permanent members in the Security Council such action could be denied.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pp. 1241-1242; Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, pp. 232-233.

<sup>50</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1242-1245.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

On September 25, 1945, Ambassador Wilson, reporting to the Secretary of State, stated that, the development of air power made possible control of the Straits by air power based on the Greek Islands, e.g. Crete which could deny effective use of the Straits to the Soviet Union. Therefore, according to Wilson the real aim of the Soviet Union was not related to the revision of the Straits but, to bring Turkey under its domination by changing its internal regime. He emphasized the fact that Turkey was the only country which bordered on the Soviet Union and was not governed by a “friendly” to Moscow regime. A “friendly” regime in Turkey under Soviet domination referred to the actual control of the Straits by the USSR which would mean the termination of the Turkish-British alliance and the end of western liberal influences in Turkey as well as in the Middle East. Wilson regarded the Soviet troop movements, and the radio and press attacks against Turkey as a means to “soften up” Turkey, because these led Turkey to maintain large mobilized forces which caused high economic burdens. But, none of these tactics were successful. However, Wilson warned that any agreement which would give the Soviet Union a privileged position in the Straits would be dangerous for the security of Turkey and lead to the downfall of the present regime whereby it would eventually become a satellite of the USSR.<sup>52</sup> On October 23, 1945 he pointed out that the Soviets might have already decided to use force against Turkey at an early date. But implementation of this decision would be based on opportunism rather than the expiration of the treaty in 1945.<sup>53</sup>

Meanwhile, the Soviet war of nerves was continuing against Turkey. On October 8, 1945, the US Chargé in Moscow, George Kennan, reported to the Secretary of State that the Naval section of the US military mission reported that at

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp. 1248-1249.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 1257.

three Moscow factories workers had been informed that the Soviet Union might have to fight Turkey. According to Kennan, “domestic agitation might be designed to distract public attention from internal conditions, to explain continued military production and to increase factory output.” Kennan also mentioned that these might be tactics to soften up Turkey. However, on the other hand, he also warned that “the reports deserve careful attention” and they could not be ignored as “only idle gossip.”<sup>54</sup>

The US did not expect an armed attack against Turkey by the Soviet Union. The US Ambassador in the USSR, Harriman, evaluated Soviet policy regarding Turkey and indicated that the immediate effect of the expiration of the treaty on November 7 would be intensification of the war of nerves against Turkey.<sup>55</sup>

On the other hand, the Turkish government was very anxious over Soviet concentration of troops in Bulgaria and Rumania since the day of the expiration of the treaty was approaching. Saka, while admitting that these troop movements were components of the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, also mentioned the real possibility of a sudden military action against Turkey. The Turkish government consulted with the USA and UK regarding these troop movements. The British Ambassador, Sir Maurice Peterson, evaluated the situation as the continuation of the Soviet war of nerves. He claimed that the Soviets might feel their troops were unpopular in the Balkans, hence they should be kept on the move from one country to another. However, he also added that the possibility of a Soviet attack should not be ignored.<sup>56</sup>

According to Wilson, it would be illogical for the Soviets to attack Turkey. However, there were factors which could lead to an illogical decision such as the

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 1252.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 1258.

Turkish refusal of the Soviet demands, which might make the situation difficult for the Soviet government to retire gracefully and save political face since the Soviet government was continuing its claims on Turkey.<sup>57</sup>

As a response to the anxieties of Turkey, Molotov stated to Harriman that the Soviet Union did not have any intention of attacking Turkey, “it was unthinkable that there should be a war between the Soviet Union and Turkey and he was surprised that people would print such a rumor.”<sup>58</sup>

On November 2, 1945, the US government formally presented an American note to Ankara, London, and Moscow regarding the agreement reached at Potsdam and the principles enunciated by Truman. Accordingly, the Montreux Convention required revision and this problem should be left to direct conversations between each of the three governments of the USA, UK, USSR, on the one hand, and the Turkish government on the other. According to the US government, the problem of the Straits could be solved by promoting international security and taking into consideration the interests of Turkey and all Black Sea riparian states and by securing the free use of this important waterway to the commerce of all nations. The US government proposed that the Montreux Convention was subject to revision in 1946 in a conference in which the USA was willing to participate if it would be invited. The USA proposed the following principles as a basis for equitable solution of the question of the Straits:

1. The Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times;
2. The Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times;
3. Save for an agreement limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. 1260-1262.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 1263.

- powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the UN; and,
4. Certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the UN system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.<sup>59</sup>

On November 5, 1945, Erkin discussed the US proposal on the Straits in which he saw three difficulties with the British Ambassador. The first difficulty was that there was no indication of how the Black Sea powers would decide whether or not warships of non-Black Sea powers were to enter the Black Sea. Secondly, Turkey might find the whole Soviet and possibly satellite navies in the territorial waters of Istanbul at one and the same time, and lastly, with the American proposals the Black Sea would turn to be a Russian naval base from which the Soviet navy could make hit and run expeditions into the Mediterranean without danger of pursuit. However, Erkin indicated that the US proposal would be more acceptable for Turkey than the earlier ideas of demilitarization and internationalization.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, on November 12, 1945, the Turkish government declared that in principle it accepted the US suggestions, and details were subject to discussions at the conference. Erkin, regarding the first point said that Turkey completely supported the freedom of passage. However, in time of war, in case Turkey was belligerent, "it would be difficult to expect Turkey to permit the passage of the merchant vessels of neutral powers carrying munitions and supplies destined for country at war with Turkey." Regarding the second point, Erkin claimed that the complete freedom of warships of the Black Sea powers at all times could result in Soviets' sending their overwhelming naval force through the Bosphorus for a surprise attack on Istanbul. Therefore, he suggested that there should be a formula regarding the tonnage of warships of other

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<sup>59</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, pp.235-236; FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1265-1266; *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946*, Vol. VIII, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 860-861.

Black Sea powers for transit through the Straits. Also, the second point could lead the possibility of the Black Sea powers to send their navies through the Straits to attack some port in the Mediterranean and take refuge in the Straits where non-Black Sea powers could not pursue them. Regarding the third point, there would be procedural difficulties for obtaining the consent of the Black Sea powers for the passage of warships of non-Black Sea powers through the Straits.<sup>61</sup>

The USSR, while continuing its war of nerves against Turkey, did not present its proposal regarding the Straits. The Soviet government, informally expressed the view that the US proposal did not change the Montreux Convention, and declared that it should have more than “paper guarantees” in the region of the Straits. According to Vinogradov, the US proposal failed to offer security to the Soviet Union. Since, the Soviet view was that Turkey was too weak to deny the passage of warships through the Straits of non-Black Sea powers, it could not trust Turkey to fulfill this obligation. Vinogradov reiterated Soviet policy during the Potsdam Conference, and demanded bases on the Straits.<sup>62</sup>

The British government, even though it questioned the idea of excluding the passage of non-Black Sea warships into the Black Sea, on November 21, declared to Turkey that it agreed with the US proposals. According to the British government, revision of the Convention was necessary but was not “particularly urgent.” However, Britain indicated that it would participate in a conference if the Soviet Union and Turkey wanted to hold a conference.

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<sup>60</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 1270.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 1275-1276.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp. 1271-1272; FRUS, *The Near East and Africa, 1946*, Vol. VII, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969), p. 804.

Despite misgivings, on December 6, 1945, Saracoğlu stated that the Turkish government accepted the US proposal as a basis for discussion if the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Turkey would not be damaged.<sup>63</sup>

The Soviet Union was continuing its war of nerves. On December 20, 1945, two Georgian professors who were members of the Soviet Academy of the Georgian Republic wrote in *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Red Star* and argued that the Turkish territories of Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Turtum, Bayburt, Gumushane, Giresun, and Trabzon belonged to the Georgian Republic. This was followed by the announcement of the Soviet Union that it would grant facilities to Armenians abroad who wished to immigrate to the Armenian SSR. According to Wilson and Acheson, the Soviet plan was intended to bring a large number of people to the Armenian SSR by which they would then reinforce for annexation of eastern Turkish provinces.<sup>64</sup>

During the Moscow Conference on December 16-26, 1945, the Straits problem was not formally discussed but, Bevin stated to Byrnes that Britain could not be “indifferent to the Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her.” It was unacceptable for Britain to give bases to the USSR on the Straits and cession of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviets.<sup>65</sup>

On August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union sent its note to Turkey regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet government gave four instances of Turkish “neglect” during WW II which made it necessary to revise the Montreux Convention as proposed at Potsdam. “First one occurred on July 9, 1941, when Turkey allowed a German craft named “*Seefalke*” to pass through the Straits to the

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<sup>63</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1280, 1282-1283; FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 804; Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 237.

<sup>64</sup> FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1284-1285; Kamuran Gürün, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 301-302; Altınur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>65</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 238.



Black Sea. The second one happened in August 1941, when an Italian “auxiliary ship” named “*Tarvisio*” passed through into the Black Sea. The third one occurred on November 4, 1942, when the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara warned the Turkish government that 140,000 tons of German shipping (auxiliary warships disguised as merchant ships) were about to pass through the Straits, and lastly, in June 1944 the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara protested the passage, in May and June of 1944, of eight ships of the “*Ems*” type and five ships of the “*Kriegs transport*” type, from the Black Sea-where they were used for military purposes-into the Aegean Sea.”<sup>66</sup>

According to the Soviet government’s interpretation what was agreed at the Berlin Conference (Potsdam Conference) was that direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish government would be held. However, in reality, it was agreed that bilateral conversations but not bilateral negotiations would be held between each of the three powers and the Turkish government.

The Soviet government proposed that:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.
5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “The Straits: The Crux of World Politics,” *Foreign Affairs* 25:2 (January 1947), p. 298; FRUS, *The Near East and Africa, 1946*, Vol. VII, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969), pp. 827-828.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 829.

On August 9, 1946, the US government commented that the Soviet proposal ignored the existence of the UN and did not admit the interest of the non-Black Sea powers in the Straits. Regarding the accusation towards Turkey during WW II, according to the Montreux Convention, any surface vessel under 100 tons was not recognized as a warship. Hence, the “*Ems*” class boats which were 40 to 50 tons were not warships according to the Montreux Convention. The “*Kriegstransport*” or “*Mannheim*” class boats were about 800 tons but, according to Steinhardt’s telegram on June 15, 1944, “neither type of vessel was specifically covered by the Montreux Convention” which made clear that the Montreux Convention’s definition of war vessels was out of date. Hence, Turkey did not violate the Convention because, in general, the Turkish government policy in the period of Axis ascendancy was stiffly correct, favoring neither side and only Allied fortunes led Turkey to interpret the Montreux Convention more and more in favor of the Allies. It was the German occupation of the Greek Islands that created an obstacle to the passage through the Straits during the war, not the letter of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet government did not propose the revision of the Montreux Convention, but the establishment of a new regime which excluded the non-Black Sea powers and the UNO by proposing the defense of the Straits would be only be a Turkish-Soviet responsibility.<sup>68</sup>

Saka said to Wilson that without consulting the USA and UK, Turkey would not reply to the Soviet note.<sup>69</sup> According to Wilson, the real objective of the Soviet Union was not to revise the Montreux Convention, but to destroy Turkish independence by introducing to Turkey its armed forces with the ostensible aim of enforcing the joint control of the Straits and establishing a “friendly” regime to it and

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp. 830-832, 836.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 834.

make Turkey its satellite. Hence, the maintenance of Turkish independence was a vital interest for the USA, because if the former fell under Soviet control the last barrier would be removed and the Soviet Union would easily advance to the Persian Gulf and Suez. For Wilson, luckily the “Turks were tough obstinate people, determined to defend their position. They represent great asset in struggle maintaining peace, stability Middle East and the US should not permit this asset to be frittered away.”<sup>70</sup> The Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, also shared the same views that of Wilson since he said that in case the Soviet Union succeeded in its aim to obtain control over Turkey it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East. Therefore, the establishment of Soviet bases in the Straits would lead to the fall of Greece, the whole Near and Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean under Soviet control. Since the Near and Middle East was strategically important from the point of view of resources, mainly oil, and for communications, it would be the vital interest of the USA not to permit the USSR to realize its unilateral plans by force or by threat of force regarding the Straits and Turkey. Acheson declared that the USA was prepared if necessary to meet aggression with force of arms in order to deter the Soviet Union. If the UN was unsuccessful in stopping Soviet aggression, the USA would not hesitate to join other nations in order to meet armed aggression by force of American arms.<sup>71</sup>

On August, 14, 1946, the British government made clear that points one through three were in general accord with the US proposal. However, points four and five were not acceptable. The fourth point excluded all other non-Black Sea signatories as well as the USA from the responsibility of the Straits regime in the

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp. 836-837.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp. 840-842.

future. The fifth point meant the establishment of a the Soviet bases in the Straits which was also unacceptable. The British government indicated that the question should be solved by an international conference by all interested parties but not by direct discussions between Turkey and the USSR.<sup>72</sup>

On August 19, 1946, Acheson stated to the Soviet Chargé, Orekhov that the first three points in the Soviet proposal were generally, but not entirely, in accord with the US proposal of November 2, 1945. However, regarding the fourth point in the Soviet proposal, the Soviet government did not seem to require a revision of the Montreux Convention but the establishment of a new regime which would exclude all the non-Black Sea powers. The US government declared that the regime of the Straits was an international question which would be solved by all interested states, including the USA. Regarding the fifth point, the US government declared that Turkey should be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. If an attack occurred to the Straits this would be a threat to international security and thereafter would be a matter of action for the Security Council of the UN. The Soviet proposal was also criticized for not mentioning the UN. The US proposed that the matter should be brought completely in consistence with the principles and aims of the UN. The US also reiterated its willingness to participate in a conference to revise the Montreux Convention if invited.<sup>73</sup>

On August 22, 1946, the British government replied to the Soviet proposal stating that at the Potsdam Conference it was agreed that there should be direct conversations between each of the Three powers and the Turkish government for revising the Montreux Convention. However, the Soviet proposal suggested that there should be direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 842.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., pp. 847-848.

government. The British government, like the USA, criticized the Soviet proposal for not mentioning the UN. Britain indicated that any revision in the Montreux Convention should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN. Regarding the fourth proposal, Britain declared that the future of the regime of the Straits should be a concern of all interested powers, not solely of the Black Sea powers and Turkey. Regarding the fifth proposal, Britain stated that Turkey should continue to be responsible for the defense and control of the Straits, and lastly, that it would like to participate in an international conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention if all the interested parties agreed.<sup>74</sup>

On August 22, 1946, the Turkish government denied the Soviet allegation that Turkey had allowed the Axis Powers to use the Straits during the war. In the Montreux Convention there was no provision regarding ships which were less than 100 tons. Also, these ships were commercial ships and not warships. The "*Seefalke*" which was a 37 ton motorboat was an unarmed commercial ship hence, on July 6, 1941, its passage was permitted. The "*Tarvisio*" was unarmed and was permitted to pass in June 1941; however, when it was discovered that it had been registered as an auxiliary warship, its permission to pass was denied for a second time on August 9, 1941. On August 25, 1941, the Soviet government had expressed its appreciation for the decision of the Turkish government. The aggregate sum of the German commercial ships that passed through the Straits from January 1943 to January 1944 amounted to 19,476 tons but not to 140,000 tons which was claimed by the Soviet government that in October 1942 140,000 tons of German ships passed through the Straits. In fact, no German ship had passed through the Straits during November and December of 1942. The "*Ems*" and "*Kriegs transport*" types of ships were not defined under the Montreux Convention since they were commercial ships. But,

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 851.

when the Turkish government was warned by the British that they were being used as an auxiliary vessels for transporting troops, Turkey prohibited their passage. The Turkish government stated that the first three points were more or less the same with the US proposal of November 2, 1945. Turkey indicated that the Montreux Convention was valid until 1956, and it had been negotiated and signed by the Black Sea as well as the non-Black Sea powers. Hence, Turkey refused the fourth and fifth points. It was unacceptable to exclude the non-Black Sea powers from negotiations for the revision of the Convention, because, the non-Black Sea powers' interests could not be overlooked. Regarding the fifth point, the proposition of joint common defense of the Straits was also unacceptable to Turkey which would limit Turkish sovereignty on the Straits, and would upset international security.<sup>75</sup>

On August 23, 1946, the US JCS reported that the possession of bases in the Dardanelles would not provide effective defense of the traffic through the Straits if these rights would not be extended to the area for several hundred miles in all directions, which would lead to the Soviet military penetration in the Aegean. In addition to this fact the Soviet bases would lead to Soviet dominance of Turkey, which would make Turkey a satellite. The JCS stated that from the strategic point of view, Turkey was the foremost important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was the only state that followed a firm policy regarding the Soviet policy of expansion in the area. Hence, Turkey would be militarily supported by the USA since successful opposition to the Soviet efforts rested on the maintenance of the will of the Turkish government and people so as to pursue a firm policy against Soviet demands.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., pp. 852-855; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "The Straits: The Crux of World Politics," pp. 299-300.

<sup>76</sup> FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 857-858.

On September 9, 1946, Saka said to Wilson that he expected three possibilities regarding Soviet policy toward Turkey. The first possibility was a Soviet attack on Turkey. However, Saka regarded this as the most unlikely option since the USSR was both unready for war at the present time and did not want to take the risk of a general conflict. The second possibility was taking steps to convoke an international conference to revise the Montreux Convention. However, having realized that their fourth and fifth points would not be accepted, it would be unlikely to convoke an international conference which would put an end to Soviet claims. The last and the most probable possibility was allowing the problem to remain in “status quo” and waiting for a more favorable time to press Soviet claims against Turkey. For Saka, this was the most likely policy that the Soviet Union would pursue.<sup>77</sup>

On September 24, 1946, the second Soviet note was presented which was softer than the previous one, according to Erkin. The Soviet government refused to accept the Turkish response regarding Soviet allegations of the “misuse” of the Straits by Axis powers during the war. The Soviet government gave the British warning regarding the “*Ems*” and “*Krieg transport*” vessels as an example that the Montreux Convention did not prevent the enemy powers to use the Straits during war. According to the Soviet government, the Montreux Convention did not provide for the security of the Black Sea powers. Regarding the Turkish refusal of the fourth point, the Soviet government called the attention of the Turkish government to the special situation of the Black Sea as a closed sea which made it different from the Suez Canal and Gibraltar. Hence, it was normal for the Black Sea powers that were the most interested powers to have priority in controlling the regulation of the Straits regime. Regarding the Turkish refusal of the fifth point, the Soviet government stated that the former was in contradiction with its desire to reestablish friendly relations

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 859.

based on confidence with the Soviet Union, and reiterated that only these two states by a joint defense could provide the security as well as freedom of commercial navigation in the Straits. The Soviet government stated that its proposal was in conformity with the principles of the UN since it would provide assurance to the general interests of international commerce as well as maintenance of the security of the Black Sea powers hence, contribute to the consolidation of general peace. The Soviet government reiterated that there should be direct *pour-parlers* between governments in order to revise the Montreux Convention before calling a conference on the Straits.<sup>78</sup>

On October, 9, 1946, the US government responded to the second Soviet note. The USA stated that it adhered to the position that was outlined in its note of August 19, 1946 to the Soviet government, and reiterated that at the Potsdam Conference it was decided to revise the Montreux Convention because it failed to meet present day conditions. And, as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government. The USA also stated again that the revision was not solely of concern for the Black Sea powers but also for other powers including the USA. The US government declared that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and in case the Straits were attacked this should be a matter of action for the Security Council of the UN.<sup>79</sup>

On October 9, 1946, the British government replied to the Soviet note. By following the same policy of the USA, Britain made clear that there should be direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish government preliminary to the conference that would be held for revising the Montreux

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., pp. 860-866.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., pp. 874-875.



Convention, but not direct negotiations. The British government also declared that it would follow the same policy as it was stated in its note of August 21 regarding the fourth and fifth points of the Soviet proposal. Britain would attend to a conference in which the USSR, the USA, and France would participate as well as all the signatories of the Montreux Convention, except Japan for the revision of the Convention.<sup>80</sup>

On October 18, 1946, the Turkish government replied to the Soviet note. It reiterated its note of August 22. Regarding the Soviet objections against Turkey's policy in the Straits during WW II, Turkey made clear that no signatory power of the Montreux Convention ever raised objections on the matter. The Turkish government suggested the revision of Annex II that defined warships since it did not respond the present conditions and technical concepts regarding to differentiate between war and commercial vessels. Secondly, the provisions of the Montreux Convention related to the League of Nations should give way to the system that would be established by the UN in its task of preserving world peace. And, lastly, Japan should be removed from the list of contracting parties and the USA should be a signatory of the revised convention. The Turkish government stated that within this framework it would not object to the revision of the Convention. Turkey made clear that it would like to be represented at a conference for revising the Convention. The Turkish government stated that it could not accept "unfounded complaints tending to justify this revision on the basis of an alleged responsibility on its part, born of pretended violations of the regime of the Straits in the course of the WW II."<sup>81</sup> The suggestion about the direct conversations to be held proved not to be useful and advisable. Hence, the Turkish government reiterated that it was ready to attend a conference to revise the

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 876.

<sup>81</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 254.

Montreux Convention where the USSR, the USA, the UK, France, and the other signatories except Japan would participate.

## **2.7 The End of the Soviet Demands Over Turkey**

On October, 26, the Soviet government stated that it did not share the British government's view regarding direct conversations which were envisaged at the Potsdam Conference. Because, according to the Soviet Union, it was premature to discuss establishing a new regime of the Straits by calling a conference. In reality, the Soviet Union, faced with the firm opposition of Turkey, as well as the USA and Great Britain, felt the necessity to back down. Therefore, after October 26, 1946, the Soviet Union did not formally raise the issue of the revising the Montreux Convention again. According to Article 29 of the Montreux Convention, its revision could arise within a five year period which corresponded to 1951. Only on April 19, 1950, *Krasnii Flot (Red Fleet)* which was the official organ of the Soviet Navy Ministry, mentioned the necessity of the revision of the Convention in favor of Soviet interests. However, the Soviet Union did not raise the question of revision again.<sup>82</sup>

From a general perspective American Cold War psychology corresponded to Turkey's long-term policies. If one of these policies was to avoid military and diplomatic isolation, another one was its quest for Westernization.

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., pp.258-260, 264-265; Kamuran Gürün. *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)*. pp. 308-309.

## **CHAPTER III**

# **WESTERNIZATION POLICY AS AN INTERNAL FACTOR FOR TURKEY'S ALLIANCE WITH THE WESTERN BLOC**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Institutional Westernization, in the sense of belonging to significant Western institutions, which was a state policy, is one of the domestic reasons of Turkey's desire to enter into NATO. Turkey did not want to be isolated from the Western world because it was trying to be a part of Europe and to become an industrialized state. However, faced with the Soviet war of nerves, Turkey felt the necessity to maintain large armed forces, a heavy burden on its budget, hence, an obstacle to economic development. It received US military and economic aid especially after the Truman Doctrine, but, the achievement of economic development required the continuation of this aid since, the amount received did not lead to a significant reduction in its defense expenditures. Moreover, Turkey's noninvitation to NATO as a member raised its anxieties that the US aid would come to an end, because, the continuance of this aid was dependent on US Congressional approval. Turkey desired to distribute the costs of its defense expenditures to foreign allies by being a member of NATO. Hence, by joining it, Turkey would feel itself secure because, by entering NATO, it would avoid being a bargaining point between great powers. Moreover, it would be part of the Western world as an industrialized modern state.

### 3.2 The Extent of Soviet Threat Over Turkey

Immediately after WW II, the Western countries regarded the Soviet Union as their wartime ally. Therefore, the Western governments did not realize the Soviet Union's objective of enlarging its own sphere of influence at that moment in time. The real intention of the Soviet Union became obvious during the San Francisco Conference, when it acted contrary to the points that were agreed at the Yalta Conference on the issue of Poland. However, the USA and Great Britain still thought that cooperation with the Soviet Union was possible, since they did not regard it as a dangerous adversary.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, they did not take a firm stand against Soviet intentions which led to Turkey's feeling of insecurity when faced with Soviet pressures, because there was no firm support for Turkey by the West. Based on the historical experiences of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey thought that it could again be a subject for bargaining between great powers. This feeling of insecurity, which was one of the main reasons for Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc, continued up to Turkey's entrance into NATO. By tying itself with the Western countries a military alliance, Turkey guaranteed its territorial integrity and independence from any possible division between the great powers.<sup>2</sup>

It now seems obvious that the Soviet Union could not wage war, since, it was war weary and yet did not possess atomic power. Although Stalin suggested to the Yugoslav Minister in the postwar Tito government, Milovan Djilas, that the Soviet Union would impose its social system as far as its armies could reach, he was aware

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<sup>1</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol-Haluk Ülman, et.al. "Savaş Sonu Dünyasında Türkiye'nin Durumu," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, (9<sup>th</sup> ed.) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p. 192; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 32; Deborah Welch Larson, *The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 325-326. "Truman demanded that elements of the London Poles join the Polish government and that elections be held immediately. However, Molotov protested, that he had never been talked like that." James Nathan and James Oliver, *US Foreign Policy and World Order*, (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1989). p. 32

of the fact that the Soviet Union could not wage a war against the USA and its allies since their military power was consolidated.<sup>3</sup> This was also realized by Winston Churchill who claimed during his “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 8, 1946 that “the Soviets did not want war but rather the fruits of war and the definite expansion of their power and doctrines.” Therefore, according to Churchill, the proper response was to show military strength.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet Union wanted the establishment of “friendly” regimes around its periphery as far as the West would permit, without having to go to war. Therefore, the Soviet Union after WW II, increased its pressures over Turkey in order to change the Montreux Convention in its favor. In order to bring Turkey into bilateral negotiation on this issue, it denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925, demanded Kars-Ardahan provinces and, continued its radio and press attacks as a means to gain bargaining leverage over Turkey. Fortunately, Turkey’s case was quite different from the Greek and Iranian cases. In Turkey, there were no effective militant Communist elements since the Turkish Communist Party was banned in 1926 by Atatürk. Communism never became a mass movement and remained as an intellectual exercise. Communist elements and active organizers, who were predominantly composed of artists, writers and academicians, were consistently suppressed and imprisoned. Since Turkey was an agrarian, non-industrialized country, there were neither proletariat nor capitalist classes. Its population was predominantly composed of peasants. Moreover, upward social mobility was open to all classes through a military or bureaucratic career. The Russian army had

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<sup>2</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, “Önsöz,” in Melih Esenbel, *Türkiye’nin Batı ile İttifakı*; Ferenc A. Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 103.

<sup>3</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 30; Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. 62. “Three quarters of its industrial plant destroyed and 20 million dead.” James Nathan and James Oliver, *US Foreign Policy and World Order*, p. 31

<sup>4</sup> James Nathan and James Oliver, *US Foreign Policy and World Order*, p. 50.

disintegrated by 1917. There was non such threat as far as the Turkish military was concerned. Turkey did not have a revolutionary organizer like Lenin and his colleagues. Therefore, the Marxist premise of Socialist Revolution was incompatible with Turkey. Marxism foresaw a Socialist Revolution in industrialized countries which had a large proletariat class, and, it foresaw that from the clash between the pröletariat and capitalist classes a Socialist Revolution would occur. Also, the Turkish Communist party, like the other foreign Communist parties was the client of the Comintern. They got their orders from the Soviet government which provided financial aid. This led to public resentment of such parties since Turkey had always been suspicious of Russian intentions due to its past experiences. Also, even though both Islam and Communism shared the idea of social justice, Communism was identified with atheism and it could not find a support base in Turkey. George Kennan, in his *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, also questioned the ability of the Russians to disaffect and dominate the entire Muslim world, because their ideology was in conflict with the Muslim faith. For all these reasons, Communist parties in Turkey which were established after WW II, such as İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Partisi and Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi could not get public support. Not that they feared domestic Communism but, Turkish leaders leery of any dissent. Moreover, after WW II, the age old Turkish Russophobia was combined with anti-communism. The public discontent with the leftist elements arose when several magazines and newspapers offered a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. This caused attacks by the Turkish university students on pro-Soviet publications *Yeni Dünya* and *Tan* as well as bookstores that were selling Soviet literature on December 5, 1945.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Bilal Şen, *Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında TKP ve Komintern İlişkileri. Belgelerle Bilinmeyenlerin Öyküsü*, (İstanbul: Küyerel Yayınları, 1998), pp. 49, 91; George McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West,"

On the other hand, the Soviet Union could find active Communist elements in Greece and Iran as an instrument for the seizure of power in these countries. It supported the Greek Communist guerrillas during the civil war and refused the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Iran, and built the Tudeh (Communist) Party in Iran. Therefore, Turkey was the least vulnerable and threatened country, on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wanted to realize its policy that came from the time of Czarist Russia, which aimed to control access to the Mediterranean. Since it had no intention of fighting, the Soviet Union tried to realize this goal by pursuing continuous war of nerves against Turkey. The Soviet government tried to exploit the situation of Turkey at the end of the war, which was the lack support by the West while it faced Soviet pressures. Therefore, it can be argued that there was no Soviet threat against Turkey but, there were Soviet demands from Turkey, the realization of which would not be permitted by the USA and Great Britain. There was no actual Soviet threat but, when a big country even makes suggestions to a smaller neighbor about a change in status-quo this may well be perceived as a threat. During 1946, having realized the real Soviet intentions, the USA and Great Britain began to take a firm stand against the Soviet Union. In January 1946, when Soviet pressures increased against Turkey, Truman stated,

There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand—"How many divisions have you?"

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p. 620; Frenc Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, p. 67; Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye 'de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925)*, (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1978), p. 376; George Kenan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, (New York: Pantheon, 1983), p. 317; Aclan Sayılğan, *Solun 94 Yılı 1871-1965 Türkiye 'de Sosyalist Komünist Faaliyetler*, (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968), pp. 9-12, 131, 328-329, 407-408, 422. Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi, was established on 24 May, 1946 Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi was established on June 19, 1946. Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Partisi, was established on May 7, 1945; Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, p. 127; Walter Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1959), pp. 56-60; George Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Publications, 1967), pp. 3-5, 7, 10.

I do not think we should play compromise any longer. I'm tired of babying the Soviets.<sup>6</sup>

The situation in Iran as well as the increased war of nerves against Turkey, convinced the US government that the Soviet Union was aiming to dominate the oil rich Middle East region which would mean the disruption of the free world economy. The USA, in order to make clear to the Soviet Union that it would not permit the domination of the Middle East region, sent the battleship *Missouri* to Istanbul in April 1946. From then on, it became the cardinal policy of the USA not to permit Soviet domination of this vitally important region. On August 15, 1946, the USA announced that it would send its navy to the Mediterranean. One month later, the US government announced that it would have a permanent naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>7</sup> In the eyes of the USA, Turkey was gaining importance since Turkey, with its firm stand in the face of Soviet demands, suggested that it was a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Near and Middle East region. However, Soviet pressures continued, and that made it necessary to maintain large armed forces in Turkey even though these forces were a heavy burden on its economy. This heavy burden was an obstacle to Turkey's industrialization efforts. Therefore, Turkey requested both military and economic aid from the USA. The latter, in order to provide the maintenance of Turkey's firm stand against the Soviet Union, from 1947 onwards extended economic and military aid programs to Turkey by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

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<sup>6</sup> Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and US Policy*, p. 239.

<sup>7</sup> John C. Campbell, *The Defense of the Middle East, Problems of American Policy*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 5, 32; Mehmet Gönlübol-Haluk Ülman. et. al. "Amerika Birleşik



### 3.3 Westernization as a Turkish State Policy

The second reason of Turkey's entrance to NATO was part of the state policy of Westernization. The Westernization attempts started during the Ottoman era. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman armies were technologically behind the European armies. The technological improvements of Europe were not followed by the Empire at all and this ended up with the defeats of the Ottoman armies vis-à-vis the European armies.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, Westernization was regarded as a means of achieving the Empire's previous strength, hence, its survival. As, Bernard Lewis describes the Ottoman Empire during the 17<sup>th</sup> century,

Fundamentally, the Ottoman Empire had remained or reverted to a medieval state, with a medieval mentality and a medieval economy-but with the added burden of a bureaucracy and a standing army which no medieval state had ever had to bear. In a world of rapidly modernizing states it had little chance of survival.<sup>9</sup>

Westernization, which first started in the military realm, was extended to the political and social areas of the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era (1839-1878). This extension was the result of the spread of Western ideas through which educational, judicial, and bureaucratic modernization were achieved to some extent. The Young Turks became successful in establishing a new system in education. They set up secular primary and secondary schools, as well as teachers' training colleges. The educational opportunities were extended to females. Judicial reforms were also made. A new Family Law was adopted which extended the rights of women (1915). Religious courts that were concerned with family and personal status were put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. This was also a step that was taken in the

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Devletleri'nin Türkiye'yi Desteklemeye Başlaması," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 207; James Nathan and James Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, p. 52.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 26.

way of secularization. This modern secular authority was above the religious hierarchy.<sup>10</sup> To some extent social and political modernization was achieved but, the constitutional government did not develop. Bernard Lewis evaluates this era as,

The record of the ten years from 1908 to 1918 is a black one. The high hopes of the Revolution were swiftly disappointed, and the orderly progress of constitutional government was ended in the wretched cycle of plot and counterplot, repression and sedition, tyranny, humiliation, and defeat.<sup>11</sup>

In this situation, Westernization attempts could not save the Empire from collapse. Because, even though there was unanimity on the question of “how this Empire could be saved” there was no single answer to this question. It was mostly argued that the solution was Westernization of the Empire.<sup>12</sup> However, since there was no agreement on the answer to the question of “to what civilization did the Turks belong-and in what civilization did their future lie?”<sup>13</sup> Westernization had different meanings for each person. This was the one of the main obstacles to being able to achieve modernization in all areas during the Ottoman era.

There were mainly two groups who proposed solutions: the Islamists and the Westernizers. But, even among these groups there were divisions. The Islamists were divided as “four-square fundamentalists” and “moderate Islamists.” The first group argued that the derogation from the Holy Law and the faith were the causes of the decline of the Empire. On the other hand, the moderate Islamists argued that Islam was not an obstacle to modern civilization. For them, the abandonment of Islam led to the Empire’s decline. Therefore, looking to the West for political and social improvement was unnecessary because, the means for development could be found

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 229-230.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>12</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Batıllaşma Hareketleri, I.* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları, 1999), pp. 48, 94.

<sup>13</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 233-234.

in the Islamic past. They argued that only technology should be taken from the West. But, in political, judicial, educational, and social areas Islam should remain dominant.<sup>14</sup> This viewpoint ignored the fact that in the judicial arena, the Empire had never been theocratic, because the Shari'at was confined to family and personal law and not even to criminal law in the sense that was practiced in Arab world. Customary law (Örfi) and Political Law (Siyasa) was practiced all along.<sup>15</sup>

There was no unanimity among the Westernizers. The extreme Westernizers argued the necessity to adopt the West with its all structures. For them Westernization, which referred to European civilization, "was not a matter of choice but of survival." As writer Ahmet Muhtar wrote in 1912, "either we Westernize, or we are destroyed."<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, there were moderate Westernizers like Celal Nuri (İleri), who argued that there were two kinds of civilization: technical and real. Although the West reached the highest point of technical civilization, it did not and could not reach real civilization. Therefore, he argued that only the technical developments should be transferred to the Empire. And, it was useless to imitate the West in its entirety because Islam was superior.<sup>17</sup>

The collapse of the Empire proved that it was not possible to achieve Westernization within the existing traditional Islamic-Ottoman structures. Successful Westernization required the establishment of a secular nation state. Therefore, the foremost goal of Atatürk was the establishment of "an independent Turkish nation-state on the European model."<sup>18</sup> The basis of identity in the Turkish Republic was the Turkish nation, not the Muslim community. Hence, it was the victory of the nation

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 234-235.

<sup>15</sup> Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, (London: Phoenix, 1995), pp. 70-75.

<sup>16</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 235-236.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 235.

<sup>18</sup> Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1998), pp. 76-77.

state against the multi-religious empire. And, it was based on national sovereignty and independence.<sup>19</sup> The Turkish War of Independence was fought against the European imperialist powers but not against Western civilization.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, after the War of Independence, the policy of Westernization became the foremost goal of the new Republic. The goal was the integration of the Turkish people into European civilization. “Because according to Atatürk, there was only one civilization and this was the Western one. Therefore, becoming a member of the European community of nations on an equal status became the national goal of Turkey.”<sup>21</sup> Westernization attempts during the Ottoman era were quite different from the achievements of the Kemalist Republic. Because, Atatürk saw the necessity of the adoption of political, economic, judicial, social structures, and culture besides technological developments of the West into Turkey. The lack of one of these factors would lead to the failure of Westernization in Turkey as had happened during the Ottoman era. With the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, secularization at all levels of administration, educational and judicial reforms, adoption of the European alphabet and calendar, and the new dress code, Turkey would become a part of the Western world.

Atatürk, after establishing the Republic pursued a realistic foreign policy because he refused the adventurous ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. Nationalism in the Republic was not based on religion or race, “but like that of Europe, on common citizenship within realistic and defensible borders, and on national consensus.” Therefore, Atatürk pursued a peaceful foreign policy which was “peace at home and peace abroad” which facilitated its acceptance as an equal member by the Western community. For Atatürk, Turkey could remain independent

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<sup>19</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, (İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), pp. 511-513; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 233.

<sup>20</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, p. 514.

<sup>21</sup> Ferenc Váli, *Bridge Across Europe: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, pp. 56, 70.

only by being a part of the Western world. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a clear example indicating what would be the result of cutting ties between the Empire and Europe. Therefore after the War of Independence, the separation of Turkey from ancient Asian-Arabic sphere of culture and tradition and its transformation into a Westernized nation began. Because, for Atatürk those who failed to achieve modernization would eventually be dominated by the advanced nations. Atatürk's endeavors of modernizing the Turkish society led to the strengthening of the ties between Turkey and the Western community. Thus, Turkey followed a Western oriented foreign policy.<sup>22</sup>

Kemalist reforms were not static but were based on the continuous adoption of developments of the West to Turkey. This would provide the maintenance of Turkey's independence within the Western world. With its level of industrialization, Turkey lagged far behind the Western countries which began industrialization in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Turkey had to fill this huge gap because, according to Atatürk, the maintenance of full independence of Turkey depended on its economic development which referred to industrialization. Hence, the concepts of development, industrialization and Westernization were all interrelated. Without achieving industrialization, it was impossible to achieve Westernization, thus it was not possible to be totally independent. For this reason, industrialization became one of the major national goals as a means to achieve Westernization.<sup>23</sup> However, the development of industrialization necessitated foreign aid to Turkey. Therefore, in the late 1940s and throughout the following decade, Turkey successfully raised the issue of the Soviet threat, however exaggerated. The argument fits well into the US policy

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<sup>22</sup> Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, p. 77.

<sup>23</sup> Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi, Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli*, (6<sup>th</sup> ed.) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1998), pp. 34, 50, 115-118, 163, 171, 179, 279; Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, pp. 514-515.

of containment, but one should bear in mind that Turkey's goals were first and foremost economic development and joining Western institutions. Diplomatic and military isolation had to be avoided at all cost, even at the cost of developing a viable left opposition. Repercussions of this policy became apparent only in the 1970s<sup>24</sup>, but priorities of the previous decades were different. Because of Soviet pressures Turkey had to maintain large armed forces which was a heavy burden on its budget, and this, in turn, was an obstacle for industrialization and Westernization.

### **3.4 US Economic and Military Aid to Turkey**

Although, the Turkish economy was not devastated by WW II, Turkey was faced with two problems: the first problem was that prices of Turkish export commodities, which were high during the war, fell to a normal level with the end of the war. The second problem was Turkey's endeavors to pursue industrialization and maintaining a large armed force, at the same time. The transformation of Turkey from an agrarian to an industrialized country was one of the state's objectives. Even then agricultural production was conducted by primitive methods and poor transportation facilities. Although Turkey was rich in mineral resources, there were not sufficient facilities for their extraction and exploration of new resources. Thus, it was obvious that, the purpose of industrializing Turkey, which began from the time of founding the Republic, could not have been achieved singlehandedly. On the other hand, faced with the Soviet war of nerves, Turkey felt itself obliged to maintain large armed forces which cost approximately half of its budget. There were no signs of an economic collapse since Turkey had gold and foreign exchange reserves amounting to 245 million dollars. However, Turkey was keeping these reserves in order to use

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<sup>24</sup> Hasan Cemal, *Kimse Kızmasın, Kendimi Yazdım*, (9<sup>th</sup> ed.) (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999)

them in case of a Soviet attack, even though there were no signs such an event.<sup>25</sup> As a contingency measure, Turkey sought foreign military and economic aid.

In October 1945, President İnönü requested 500 million dollar credit from the Export-Import Bank for the realization of industrial development as well as infrastructure projects. It was obvious that the sum in question could only be obtained from the USA.<sup>26</sup> However, only 25 million dollars were offered to Turkey despite the endeavors of Ambassador Wilson who argued that not to exceed Eximbank's 25 million dollar aid, would be a severe shock to the Turkish government. Thus, he suggested that the State Department might take the following points into consideration before giving its final decision on Turkish loan policy: first, since the Turkish position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was critical, an unfavorable loan treatment could lead to misunderstandings in the Turkish government. Secondly, even though Turkey was not devastated by WW II, it was in need of financial assistance in order to make certain economic readjustments. Lastly, Turkey was in need of modernizing its agriculture, minerals development, transportation and communications so as to bring its economy to a better situation, all of which necessitated more credits.<sup>27</sup> However, on May 23, 1946, the Director of Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, made clear to the Turkish Ambassador that because of the Bank's shortage of funds as well as its previous commitments, the chances of giving a 25 million dollar loan to Turkey was high but, enhancing it to 50 million dollars was not possible. And on July 3, 1946, Eximbank, with the approval of the National Advisory Council, gave only 25 million dollars in

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<sup>25</sup> Mehmet Gönübol-Haluk Ülman, et.al. "Truman Doktrini ve Marshal Planı," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 212; Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and The World*, p. 142; George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace Stanford University, 1972), pp. 24-25.

<sup>26</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>27</sup> FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 903-904.

exporter credits to Turkey for fiscal years 1946 and 1947.<sup>28</sup> Obviously, this amount was insufficient for Turkey since the Turkish government aimed both at the maintenance of large armed forces against Soviet pressures as well as the realization of its state policy of industrialization.

During 1946, the policy of the US government was that it would not supply any military equipment to the Middle East countries, in order not to be charged as a provocator by the other powers. Therefore, when Turkey requested credit from the USA for purchasing airplanes, the US government made clear that it could only supply items of a general character such as trucks. On November 5, 1946, Byrnes stated that the US government was ready to help Turkey and Greece only economically, and he suggested that the Turkish government should look to its ally, Great Britain, in order to obtain military aid. The US government, while pursuing a nonprovocative policy by turning down all of the Turkish government's requests for military aid, was also concerned not to give the impression that its support of the territorial integrity and independence of Turkey was limited to words. Hence, the US government suggested that in case Britain was not able to offer military supplies to Turkey, it was ready to furnish them to Britain. In that case, Turkey would get military aid indirectly. Thus, the USA was reluctant to furnish arms to Turkey not because of its ignorance of its strategic importance, but because it was concerned of being accused as a provocator by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Turkish government had been discouraged to request military aid from the USA.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 907. "Term "exporter credit" means that Eximbank will participate up to 25 million dollars in financing projects put forward jointly by Turkish government and US suppliers, or put forward by US suppliers with approval Turkish government. In any event, since Turkish government notes or Turkey guarantee would be required before Bank would make advances under credit, no advances could be made without Turkish government's approval." Ibid., p. 911.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 916-917.



The dilemma of the Turkish government was that on the one hand, the maintenance of a large armed forces was a heavy burden on the Turkish economy, on the other hand, it was difficult to sell the idea to the army of reducing military expenses while facing a Soviet war of nerves. This situation was also accepted by Henderson who asked for another 25 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank for Turkey, even though there were no signs of an economic collapse.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, National Advisory Council (NAC), on November 6, 1946, approved an action of Maritime Commission that it could consider extension nearly 5 million dollar credit to Turkey for purchasing 6 ships.<sup>31</sup> By criticizing the US reluctance, the US Ambassador, Wilson, was suggesting that the USA should indicate to Turkey that it was able and willing to give Turkey support either by military equipment or by providing credits for economic purposes, the reverse would hamper Turkish morale, vital so far as the Soviet war of nerves was concerned.<sup>32</sup>

Although, the USA was pursuing a hesitant policy regarding to furnish economic and military aid to Turkey, its policy on the Straits did not alter. On January 20, 1947, Byrnes declared the US policy towards the Straits problem, according to which, Turkey was and should be the primary power responsible for the defense of the Straits. An attack by an aggressor would be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council since this would constitute a threat to international security.<sup>33</sup>

On February 21, 1947, the British government informed the USA that it could no longer bear the major share of burden of rendering financial and military assistance to Turkey and Greece, and that present assistance would cease on March

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 918-919, 922.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 919.

<sup>32</sup> FRUS, *The Near East and Africa, 1947*, Vol. V. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1971), pp. 7-8.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

31, 1947. The British government asked whether the US government could undertake the major share of the burden, because these countries would not survive independently without this aid which would mean the fall of the Middle East under Soviet control. The British Chiefs of Staff, in their examination of the strategic importance of Turkey as well as the state of the Turkish armed forces, emphasized the necessity of assisting Turkey. According to this report, the independence of Turkey was vitally important and should be maintained. However, the Turkish armed forces were unable to resist aggression from a first class power. Therefore, the Turkish Army was in need of large measure of reequipment. This task could not be handled by the British government because of the shortage of manpower and productive capacity. But the US government could undertake this task since it had the capacity to do it. The Turkish dilemma was also mentioned in that Turkey could maintain its existing industry without getting financial aid, but in order to finance an extensive program of industrialization or “meet any substantial foreign exchange demands for armaments”, it should either draw on its gold resources or find foreign assistance. Since Turkey was unwilling in the first instance and unable to realize both aims simultaneously, it had to choose either economic and industrial development or strengthening its military by purchasing armaments. For their realization, it was suggested that Turkey should look for external financial assistance. Since the British government was unable to offer financial aid, Turkey should request aid either from the US government or from one of its lending agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank or the IMF.<sup>34</sup>

After these British notes, the US government realized that it was the only country that could and should assume the task of aiding to Greece and Turkey.

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 35-37; Mehmet Gönübol-Haluk Ülman, et.al. “Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı,” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 213.

Since, it became clear that the British government could no longer maintain its past imperial structure, hence, at the first meeting of the special committee studying assistance to Greece and Turkey, Henderson and the Deputy Director of European Affairs, John D. Hickerson suggested that the US government should accept the responsibility.<sup>35</sup> Henderson and the US State Department officer, John Jernegan declared that the Executive Branch of the US government was of the opinion that the political and territorial integrity of Greece and Turkey should be maintained and for this reason it was decided that the US government would make every effort to extend aid for that aim as well as to develop a “sound economy.” It was also declared that the British government was expected to continue to the extent of its ability to cooperate in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of these two countries.<sup>36</sup> Regarding Soviet policy, the US government did not expect an imminent Soviet attack against Turkey. But, the war of nerves was expected to continue indefinitely. The Soviet Union, by continuing this war of nerves against Turkey, aimed to disrupt the Turkish economy in the long run since the latter would feel itself obliged to keep a large standing army. Thus, Acheson stated that the US government would actively take part in meeting the economic and military needs of Turkey and Greece. But since the latter was in a more difficult situation, Greece would be the object of the first round of attention.<sup>37</sup> The Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, declared as the cardinal aim of the US foreign policy “a world in which nations shall be able to work out their own way of life free of coercion by other nations”. On March 12, 1947, Truman declared,

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<sup>35</sup> FRUS, *The Near East and Africa, 1947*, Vol. V, pp. 45-47.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp. 90-91, 95.

It is the policy of the US to give support to free peoples who are attempting to resist subjugation from armed minorities or from outside forces. The US will, within the framework of the Charter of the UN, assist in assuring the ability of peoples, who are now free, to work out their own destiny...I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.<sup>38</sup>

It was the Greek civil war which led to the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. Thus, only a bare mention of Turkey was made since it was not in immediate danger like Greece. However, the USA did not want to ignore a possible Soviet takeover of Turkey. Therefore, Truman approved a policy according to which the USA would extend all possible aid to Greece and to a lesser extent to Turkey. The US aim was to prevent Greece from succumbing to a Communist regime and also aimed at strengthening Turkey. During the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the USA realized the real intention of the Soviet Union which was aggressive and this created a national consensus in the USA that it was the only power to act as an obstacle to the Soviet Union. It was feared that if Greece fell under Soviet domination, not only Turkey but also Italy, France and the whole of Western Europe hence, the security of the USA might be affected.<sup>39</sup> In 1947, Undersecretary of State Acheson, pointed to this fact during a Congressional meeting,

In the past eighteen months, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost. It did not need to win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered immense gains. We and

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. 76-77; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York-London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), p. 222.

<sup>39</sup> FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 96-97; Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict & Crisis, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948*, (Columbia & London: University of Missouri Press, 1996), pp. 279-280.

we alone were in a position to break up the play. These were the stakes that British withdrawal from the eastern Mediterranean offered to an eager and ruthless opponent.<sup>40</sup>

Since Turkey was a natural barrier to any Soviet advancement to the Eastern Mediterranean as well as to the Middle East, the fall of Turkey under Soviet domination was regarded as a vital security concern for the USA.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, it should not be let to fall under Soviet control. This led to extensions of US aid to Turkey. On March 12, 1947, Henderson criticized that “Turkey obtained only 25 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank on a request of 250 million reconstruction loan.” The State Department envisaged long-term military assistance to Turkey.<sup>42</sup>

According to the report of the JCS, the Soviet Union had no desire to wage war against Turkey. However, it would try to achieve its goals through continuous war of nerves. Therefore, it was suggested that Turkey should be given assurances including concrete assistance. It was stated that “economic and direct military assistance, even if furnished in small quantities, indicates a will on the part of the western democracies to support the Turks in a situation where otherwise they might reasonably estimate that they have no recourse but progressive acquiescence to the probable progression of Soviet demands.”<sup>43</sup> There were two objectives of US military aid: The first objective was to stiffen the Turkish will to resist firmly Soviet pressures. And, the second objective was the improvement of the Turkish armed forces hence, in case of a war it would resist with force any Soviet aggression and by having the maximum possible military capability it could undertake a holding and delaying action in its territory. Therefore, it was decided that,

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<sup>40</sup> Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, p. 219.

<sup>41</sup> FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 110-114.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 109.

1. The greatest emphasis should be placed on the ground army and on defense against air attack.
2. The organization and the equipment should be designed for effective defense action in Turkish terrain. The equipment should in general be of types readily manned and operated by the Turks and, to the greatest degree practicable, be capable of manufacture in Turkey.
3. Most serious consideration should be given to a program by which Turks are assisted to attain arms and equipment through operation and development of their own arsenals. In this connection, about 80% of the present equipment in the Turkish army is of German design.
4. Economic aid for Turkey should be integrated with a program of military assistance, not only for the purpose of enabling the Turks to provide their own equipment but also for the purpose of improving selected communications and logistical facilities in the country. With improved transportation equipment the Turks may feel free to reduce the strength of their mobilized forces, thereby relieving some of the present strain on the economy of the country.<sup>44</sup>

After the Truman Doctrine, which is regarded as a “turning point in US history,” the USA openly devoted itself to providing economic and military aid to protect the Middle East and the Mediterranean. After British withdrawal, the question for the USA was whether to leave Greece and Turkey to their own devices. The JCS declared that effective US assistance to Turkey which would involve political, economic, and psychological factors as well as military factors was crucially important for the security of the US. Hence, the Truman Doctrine signaled the evolution of the US interest from “benign indifference to intense concern.”<sup>45</sup>

On March 12, 1947, the Congress approved the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill which provided loans to Greece and Turkey up to 400 million dollars, over a period ending on June 30, 1948. It was anticipated that 100 million dollars of this loan would be given to Turkey, and in addition the USA furnished military and naval equipment all of which were provided as a gift. In addition to that fund, a limited number of US

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 110-114.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 114; George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, p. 314; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, p. 220; David, Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The US and Turkey, 1943-1946*, p. 108.

military as well as civilian personnel would be transferred to these countries in order to assist in an advisory capacity, which was realized.<sup>46</sup>

On May 15, 1947, the Secretary of State, George Marshall stated that the maintenance of the present strong Turkish resistance to Soviet aggression required the continuation of a strong and well-equipped Turkish Army and the maintenance of economic well-being of the Turkish economy in order not to open a way to social unrest and to any Soviet-Communist penetration as the basic objectives of US assistance to Turkey. For Marshall, the strength and productivity of the Turkish economy had to be increased so as to promote the general welfare of the Turkish people while permitting Turkey to maintain its necessary defense forces.<sup>47</sup> This firm US commitment policy was approved on May 22, 1947 by the Congress, which approved Public Law 75, the Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey at the 80<sup>th</sup> Congress. The aid program was fully devoted to urgent military needs of Turkey, and it was hoped that the economic program could be financed by the International Bank and other sources.

Hence, US foreign policy began to change by the end of 1946, especially after January 1947, with the departure of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes. US policy toward the Soviet Union became firmer, when the supporters of the firm policy gained ground. By the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the USA assumed the responsibilities which had been abandoned by Great Britain. And, the containment policy of the US, which was formulated to restrict to the Soviet

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp. 153-154, 525; Mehmet Gönlübol-Haluk Ülman, et.al. "Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 215; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 222-223, 225; Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, p. 138. On April 22, 1947, the Senate passed the Greek-Turkish Aid Act by a vote of 287 to 107, and the House on May 9, 1947, by 67 to 23. "Turkish armed forces consist of 41 ground divisions, 7 fortress commands, an air force having some 300 operating aircraft, and a negligible navy, with a total mobilized strength of over 600,000 men. And, 80% of the present equipment in the Turkish army was of German design." Ibid., p. 113.

influence in the boundaries of the Soviet Union started. The Truman Doctrine meant for Turkey that the USA would be the principal backer of Turkey in the West. During 1947, only George Kennan objected to the US policy of assuming the role of Britain. For Kennan, it was not rational to provide a special aid program for Turkey. Because, the situation of Turkey was different from that of Greece since, "there was no serious Communist penetration in Turkey- no comparable guerrilla movement. Therefore Kennan claimed that the Turks had nothing to fear but fear." For Kennan, if Turkey was surrounded by pro-Soviet states, it would be harder for the Turks to continue their firm stance. Thus, aiding Greece was crucially important. However, Kennan argued that there was no necessity for a special aid program for Turkey. Importance should be given to domestic morale and firmness of diplomatic stance, but not to military preparations. Kennan suspected that the real intention of the Pentagon was military aid, thus the Pentagon was exploiting a favorable set of circumstances to infiltrate an aid program and transform it into a political and economic program which was prepared for Greece. Some of the officers argued that providing large scale US military aid to Turkey and Greece might be seen as provocative to the Soviet Union.<sup>47</sup> However, despite these criticisms, the US government continued to provide aid to Turkey.

In June 5, 1947, European Recovery Program (ERP), which was the official name of the Marshall Plan, was proclaimed by the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall during his famous speech at Harvard. The purpose of this plan was to assist the Western European countries in their endeavors to recover their economies. It

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<sup>47</sup> FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 172-173. "The Greek-Turkish Aid Act passed the House by a vote of 287 to 107, and the Senate by 67 to 23. The President signed it on May 22." Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 225.

<sup>48</sup> George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, pp. 316-317; George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950-1963*, (New York, Pantheon Books, 1983), pp. 337-340; George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 25; Robert Donovan, *Conflict & Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*, p. 282.



saved the war-weary Western European countries from economic as well as political chaos. Marshall stated,

It is logical that the US should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist... Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the US.<sup>49</sup>

With the Marshall Plan, the USA began to use foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy against the communist expansion. The war-weariness of the Western European countries as well as the drought which destroyed most of the 1946 wheat crop, and the severe winter in 1947 increased the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe. The situation strengthened the communist parties in France and Italy which exploited these unacceptable conditions of life. In Europe people were faced with the problem of inadequate food, shelter and clothing. Because of power shortages and the lack of raw materials, factories were shut down. There were not enough foreign exchange reserves to buy raw materials.<sup>50</sup> Membership in Communist parties of Europe increased. "For instance, the Belgian Communist Party grew from 9,000 in 1939 to 100,000 in November 1945; in Holland from 10,000 in 1938 to 53,000 in 1946; in Greece from 17,000 in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945; in Italy from 5,000 in 1943 to 1,700,000 at the end of 1945; in Czechoslovakia from 28,000 in May 1945 to 75,000 in September 1945. In Italy, France and Finland the Communist

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<sup>49</sup> Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 233.

<sup>50</sup> Theodore A. Wilson, *The Marshall Plan, an Atlantic venture of 1947-1951 and how it shaped our world*, Headline Series 236, (June 1977), (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Library of Congress Catalog No. 77-89364), pp. 10, 19.

vote was already 20% of the electorate in 1945.”<sup>51</sup> Therefore, the purpose of the Marshall aid was to prevent Western Europe from falling under the domination of the Soviet Union as well as creating profitable markets for the USA by reconstructing their economies. Obviously, this plan was faced with the severe criticisms from the Soviet Union which regarded the Marshall Plan “as blatant American imperialism.” After the Paris Conference of 16 European countries in July, 1947, the Soviet Union in order to provide economic aid to Eastern Europe, declared the Molotov Plan.<sup>52</sup>

In May, 1947, a US mission headed by General L. E. Oliver visited Turkey in order to determine needs for the allocation of funds that was authorized by the Congress. According to Oliver, Turkey was not in need of additional economic assistance since it was believed that Turkey’s needs were met by the Truman Doctrine. The Oliver group expected that Turkey would be self-sufficient after receiving military aid for five years. Turkey’s economy was sound, it was not war weary, and it was considered as a contributor to the ERP and as an agricultural country it could provide agricultural products to Western European countries. Hence, Turkey was regarded as a contributor rather than being a recipient of foodstuffs. Because, in 1947 the serious problem in Western Europe was shortage of food. The postwar recovery in agricultural production was inadequate. The population increased by 17 million, however, the postwar level of agricultural production dropped to 20-25% below the 1938 levels. However, Turkey could not have been a contributor but a recipient to the ERP, because of the continuation of its heavy military expenditures.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 7.

<sup>52</sup> Theodore Wilson, *The Marshall Plan*, pp. 19.

<sup>53</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 31-32; Leyla Şen, “Highway Improvement & Agricultural Mechanization: Turkish High Priority Economic Development Projects in the Framework of “Free” World Recovery Program & Their Repercussions,” (Unpublished M.A. Thesis to Bilkent University, June 1997), pp. 6-7.

However, Turkey was in need of aid hence, in July 1947, during the Paris Conference, it requested 615 million dollars for economic development against its heavy defense burden. But, only 10 million dollars in credits were given to Turkey in mid-March 1948 by the USA. On July 12, 1947, an agreement between Turkey and the USA was signed according to which military aid would be given to Turkey.<sup>54</sup> By this agreement although Turkey got military aid, its dependence on the USA began. Because, according to the 4<sup>th</sup> article of this agreement,

Determined and equally interested to assure the security of any article, service, or information received by the government of Turkey pursuant to this agreement, the governments of the US and Turkey will respectively take after consultation such measures as the other government may judge necessary for this purpose. The government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the government of the US, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished.<sup>55</sup>

This article would be the source of the deterioration of the relations between two countries by the Cyprus crisis in 1964. The Johnson letter pointed to this article and argued that Turkey should ask the approval of the USA in order to use this military aid for purposes other than decided in this agreement.<sup>56</sup> Also, according to the 6<sup>th</sup> article, this aid could be withdrawn upon the request of the Turkish government, or the US government, or if the Security Council or the General Assembly of the UN considered that this aid was unnecessary. Moreover, the 3<sup>rd</sup> article required that the aid program would be observed and reported by the

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<sup>54</sup> Mehmet Gönübol-Haluk Ülman, et.al. “ Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı.” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 221-222; Duygu Sezer, “Türkiye’nin Ekonomik İlişkileri.” in *ibid.*, p. 440.

<sup>55</sup> FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 190-192.

<sup>56</sup> Sezai Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978), pp. 98, 195; Haydar Tunçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü*, (Ankara: Ekim Yayınevi, 1970), p. 32.

representatives of the US Press and Radio.<sup>57</sup> Hence, the price was the loss of autonomy to some extent in return for US military aid.

In September 1947, the Turkish government declared its desire to reduce its armed forces from about 485,000 to about 330,000 men. And, it also required an additional 100 million dollars from the USA. The partial demobilization of the armed forces did not lead to resentment of the American and British governments. The British government argued that the Soviet pressure over Turkey would continue and was conditioned on the probable action of the other powers regardless of the size of the Turkish armed forces. Hence, as long as the American and British policy was maintained the reductions in the strength of the Turkish army would have no effect.

<sup>58</sup> But, the US government suggested in order not to encourage the Soviet Union, Turkey should handle the reduction in a way to give impression that it was reorganizing its armed forces, and should demonstrate that there was no change in its policy toward the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Washington refused to furnish additional 100 million dollar aid to Turkey.<sup>59</sup>

During 1948, Turkey was still in need of aid. Because, despite the US aid there was not too much difference in the situation of Turkey from the time of the enactment of the Public Law 75. Because, in order to maintain the equipment that was given to Turkey, nearly TL 400 million was spent. Hence, despite the aid there was no significant reduction in the defense expenditures. In addition to this fact, in order to get auxiliary materials for this equipment, Turkey was faced with the problem of finding foreign currency. Payments for these materials cost higher, in

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<sup>57</sup> FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 190-192.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 351.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., pp. 352-353, 364, 525-526.

fact, approximately 4 or 5 times the normal price.<sup>60</sup> On January 23, 1948, the Acting Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, Walter Wilds, argued to the Under Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, that the funds which had been given were not sufficient to modernize and strengthen the Turkish army. Since, the Turkish position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was dangerous, he emphasized the fact that American support was vitally important to strengthen the morale of the Turkish people as well as to discourage Soviet aggression. The Turkish army could not hold out against a Soviet attack until outside assistance came, because funds were not adequate. Also the maintenance of such a large army was a big burden on the Turkish economy which was curtailing its economic productivity as well as capital improvement which were necessary for raising the living standard of the Turkish peasant and workmen and the reverse of this would weaken Turkey's resistance to any Soviet aggression or infiltration of Communist ideas. Therefore, direct US support, which would create a firm, public commitment was necessary for Turkey's resistance to Soviet pressures. Wilds suggested that the future US aid could be in the form of firm public commitment of guaranteeing the national integrity of Turkey, or providing additional financial aid to Turkey to maintain the strength of its armed forces as well as its public morale. Financial aid was regarded as more flexible since it would remain limited, and thus was more acceptable to the US Congress and the public.<sup>61</sup>

The US Turkish special agreement was signed on July 4, 1948, which entitled Turkey to achieve Marshall aid. According to the Foreign Assistance Act, the USA extended aid to Greece and Turkey, amounting to 225 million dollars. 75 million

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<sup>60</sup> Mehmet Gönübol-Haluk Ülman, et.al. "Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 220; Duygu Sezer, "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik İlişkileri," in *ibid.*, p. 440; Haydar Tunçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü*, pp. 29-30, 34.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

dollars were given to Turkey.<sup>62</sup> In October, 1949, the US Senate approved the Mutual Defense Assistance Act which provided 500 million dollars to NATO members. A special budget was created for Greece and Turkey which amounted to 211,370,000 dollars. Also, by Point Four, Turkey received the US technical assistance. However, this aid was not enough for Turkey's realization of its goal of industrialization. And, after the establishment of NATO on April 4, 1949, Turkey both as a part of its Westernization policy of being a part of the Western world, as well as providing the maintenance of the US aid, began its endeavors to be a member of that organization.

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<sup>62</sup> Mehmet Gönübol and Haluk Ülman, et.al "Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı." in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 218-222; Sezai Orkunt, *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*, p. 143. Of this 75 million dollar aid 29 million dollars were furnished to the ground forces, 36 million dollars to air forces, and 10 million dollars to navy forces of Turkey.

## CHAPTER IV

### TURKEY'S ENDEAVORS TO JOIN NATO

#### 4.1 Introduction

The Coup in Czechoslovakia which took place on February 25, 1948, led to discussions between the Western European states and the USA regarding the establishment of a defensive alliance. The result of these discussions was the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948 by Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. This mutual assistance pact was directed against the Soviet Union. However, without American military support this accord could not be effective. Therefore, a debate on linking the USA to the Brussels Treaty began. On March 17, 1948. Truman, pointing to the increasing Soviet threat to Western Europe, suggested to Congress that the USA should give its full support to the Western European countries, especially those that were signatories of the Brussels Treaty.<sup>1</sup>

The Berlin blockade of June 24, 1948, ended remaining expectations for cooperation with the Soviet Union. From July 1948 up to April 1949, the debate was about the extension of the Brussels Treaty into a North Atlantic defense arrangement with the inclusion of the USA.<sup>2</sup> On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by which, the world was divided into two blocs not only economically and politically, but also militarily. The signing of this treaty was a turning point for the

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<sup>1</sup> James Nathan and James Oliver, *US Foreign Policy and World Order*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. pp. 68, 70-71. "Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense (Brussels Treaty), signed March 17, 1948, and put into effect August 25, 1948, establishing the Western Union of France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg." Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 145 (ff.)

USA. Because, originally, containment policy relied only on economic assistance. The Marshall Plan did not require US military commitment. George Kennan argued that since the Soviet Union had no aim of waging war, it was not necessary to furnish military assistance. Economic assistance could be the primary instrument of the containment policy. The aim of the Marshall Plan was to provide for the economic recovery of Western Europe, so that the Soviet Union could not benefit from a possible economic and political chaos. Kennan did not regard Europe and Asia in the American sphere of influence. For him, these regions would be independent centers of influence both from the USA and Soviet Union. "Kennan hoped for a world order based not on superpower hegemony but on the natural balance only diverse concentrations of authority, operating independently of one another, could provide."<sup>3</sup> He argued in the "X" article, that in the end a self-confident Europe would provide the best possible bulwark against Soviet aggressive tendencies; by 1947 he and other influential policy makers had become convinced that without American help in rebuilding Europe's war-shattered economies such self-confidence would never develop.<sup>4</sup>

However, the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade made clear that furnishing only economic assistance was not enough to provide security for Europe, which faced an overwhelming Soviet military presence. At that time the USA was providing military assistance on a country-by-country basis to Turkey, Greece, China, the Philippines, and certain Latin American countries.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the NSC 14/1, dated July 1, 1948, "The Position of the US with Respect to Providing Military Assistance

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<sup>3</sup>Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, p. 31.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90.



to Nations of the Non-Soviet World,” argued that the USA should provide military assistance.

The success of certain free nations in resisting aggression by the forces of Soviet directed world communism is of critical importance to the security of the US. Some of these nations require not only economic assistance but also strengthened military capabilities if they are to continue and make more effective their political resistance to communist subversion from within and Soviet pressure from without and if they are to develop ultimately an increased military capability to withstand external armed attack. Although they possess considerable military potential in manpower and resources, these nations are industrially incapable of producing intricate modern armaments and equipment in the necessary quantities. Consequently if they are to develop stronger military capabilities it is essential that their own efforts be effectively coordinated and be supplemented by assistance in the form of military supplies, equipment and technical advice from the US. Such military assistance from the US would not only strengthen the moral and material resistance of the free nations, but would also support their political and military orientation toward the US...<sup>6</sup>

Regarding the territorial scope of the North Atlantic Security Pact, on November 23, 1948, report of the Policy Planning Staff PPS 43, “Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact,” stated that the scope of the pact had to be restricted to the North Atlantic area since enlarging it beyond this region would have undesirable consequences. It was argued that “the admission of any single country beyond the North Atlantic area would be taken by others as constituting a precedent, and would almost certainly lead to a series of demands from states still further afield that they be similarly treated. Failure on our part to satisfy these further demands would then be interpreted as lack of interest in the respective countries, and as evidence that we had ‘written them off’ to the Russians.”<sup>7</sup> On April 4, 1949, parties to the North Atlantic Treaty declared that:

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 128-129.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 155.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.<sup>8</sup>

## **4.2 Turkey Seeks US Military and Economic Guarantees**

From mid-1948 until its entrance to NATO, Turkey sought from the USA to provide formal guarantees for its security. After the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade, the USA's primary concern was the establishment of a formal collective security arrangement for Europe without mention of Turkey. Discussions about the establishment of a Middle East pact had already started. The Greek Ambassador to Washington, Vassili Dendramis, on February 4, 1948, suggested the establishment of forming an entente between Greece, Italy, Turkey and the Arab states under the leadership of the great powers, mainly the USA and, Great Britain which could "give the necessary support and encouragement."<sup>9</sup> However, Turkey was doubtful about the establishment of such a pact on three grounds. Firstly, the Middle East pact was such a "grandiose" concept that could not be realized, and even if it was realized on paper it would not have any real value or effectiveness. Secondly, it might provoke the Soviet Union and its satellites since it would be considered that it was established against them. Therefore, the establishment of such a pact would not provide security but insecurity, since this could be used as pretext to take action against Turkey and Greece. And, lastly, the extent of the US military support to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries was not clear.<sup>10</sup> Turkish doubts were confirmed on April 23, 1948. The US Undersecretary of State, Robert Lovett, argued that the USA was not against such proposals, but made clear that it was neither

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 335.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

prepared to make any promises nor take any initiative about the proposed pact. The US Department of State regarded the prospect of including Arab states suspect, hence, suggested a trilateral Italian-Greek-Turkish declaration which seemed more advantageous.<sup>11</sup>

On May 11, 1948, the Turkish Ambassador Baydur, criticized US policy toward Turkey, because the USA was giving certain guarantees to Western European countries against aggression without any mention of Turkey. Baydur mentioned the existence of a small minority who were pro-Soviet in Turkey arguing that for such a small country like Turkey, it was hopeless to resist the Soviet Union. Hence, Turkey should voluntarily enter the Soviet sphere of influence. Baydur argued that the present American policy, which gave the impression that the security of Western Europe was more important than Turkey's, would not only encourage the Soviets to increase their pressures against Turkey, but also strengthen this minority group while undermining public morale. He also expressed the disappointment of the Turkish public regarding reduction of the European Recovery Program (ERP), assistance to Turkey.<sup>12</sup>

At the end of the Washington Security Talks which were held during July 6-September 9, 1948, between the representatives of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the UK, Canada, and the USA, "the Washington Paper" was drafted. It explicitly recognized the existence of a tie between European security and the USA, and "denigrated the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" with Soviet communism, and surveyed the practical problems of defining a North Atlantic security area."<sup>13</sup>

On the same day, the Turkish Ambassador to the USA, Feridun Cemal Erkin, reiterated Turkey's desire to adhere to the western union or to some other regional

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<sup>10</sup> FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974), pp. 71-72.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.79.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 83-85.

arrangement within the framework of the Vanderberg resolution. He argued that the Soviet propaganda line aimed at political and economic difficulties in Turkey. The fact that the USA gave security guarantees to West European countries while not giving the same guarantees to Turkey would weaken public support to the leaders who pursued a firm policy against Soviet pressures. Hence, in order to overcome this political difficulty, Erkin suggested a regional arrangement which would include Greece and Turkey with the support of the USA and Great Britain. He also expressed his personal view that the US government could declare its interest in Turkey bolder than it had declared in the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. But this request was refused by the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), Joseph C. Satterthwaite, who argued that Soviet foreign policy was being conducted by a “gangster system” which cost very little. However, the USA having assumed enormous responsibilities, had to make large expenditures in the Far East, which meant reduction in the expenditures for Europe.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile the Greek government proposed a Greek-Turkish-Iranian pact with association of the USA. Egypt’s inclusion was also considered.<sup>15</sup>

Turkey was being left alone in the political arena. Moreover, it faced the problem of the reduction in US military and economic aid. By the Truman Doctrine

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<sup>13</sup> Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, p. 144.

<sup>14</sup> FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, pp. 148-149; George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), p. 111; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, Cilt, 1, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), pp. 15-16. “In 1948, NSC-9 recommended that the US approach the members of the Brussels Pact about concluding a collective defense agreement for North Atlantic Area. It noted that, because it was an election year, Congress would not be in session long enough to consider American membership in the proposed alliance in 1948. But preliminary steps could be taken. The document suggested a resolution declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that the US policy should favor regional and collective arrangements under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the Brussels Pact was. US policy also should manifest a willingness to associate with such arrangements. To obtain a show of bipartisan support for the new policy the administration wanted the resolution introduced by a Republican. Vanderberg agreed to do it, and he and Lovett drafted Senate Resolution 239 “the Vanderberg Resolution.” The Vanderberg Resolution, pointed the way toward a US military alliance with Western Europe and was the forerunner of unprecedented American participation in NATO in 1949. The Senate adopted the resolution, 64 to 4.” Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict & Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*, pp. 365-366.

<sup>15</sup> FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, p. 173.

which was implemented on the basis of Public Law 75 and Title III of public Law 472, during the 80<sup>th</sup> Congress, limited military assistance would be provided until the end of 1948 to Turkey for modernizing its army while releasing manpower for productive work. This should have sufficed to enhance confidence among the Turkish public facing Soviet pressures. And, even though Secretary Marshall requested the maintenance of additional appropriations for the fiscal year 1949, continuation of this aid was not clear. Because, the appropriations were requested by the Congress on a year-by-year basis. At that time, the US government was hesitant to include Turkey and Greece in its long-range strategic interests. For this reason, the US Department of State requested from the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), to submit proposals to the National Security Council (NSC), in order to decide whether assisting Turkey and Greece militarily through providing equipment as well as advisory personnel was justified, and whether the continuation of this aid was advised when the long-range security interests of the USA were taken into consideration. It was stated that “there is involved the question of priority of such assistance in conformity in comparison with other strategic demands, relationship to the US policies with respect to the so-called “Western Union” countries, any “Eastern Mediterranean Bloc” which may develop, possible plans for defense of the Persian Gulf oil area, and policies of the UK.”<sup>16</sup>

The Director of the office of NEA, Satterthwaite, on October 26, 1948, like Erkin, mentioned the danger of publicly declaring that the USA would come to the assistance of Western European countries in case of an armed attack against them, while not extending the same guarantee to countries that were threatened equally and have little means to defend themselves compared to the Western European countries. Because, this situation would give the false impression that the USA was not

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 158-160; George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu*, p. 110.

concerned with the security of these countries, and it was refraining from making any commitment to defend them in case of an attack. This would increase the possibility of the Soviet Union to increase its pressure over these countries and might even lead to use of force. Moreover, this would also damage to political leaders in these countries who were supportive of Western powers and might lead to the reversal of their policies by following a pro-Soviet line. Therefore, the NEA argued that public assurances which were given regarding the defense of Western European countries should also be given to the countries that were threatened by the Soviet Union. However, it was argued that this would not necessarily require “a close mutual assistance pact of the type of that contemplated for the North Atlantic region,” nor would it require to provide military assistance to those countries.<sup>17</sup>

The US government gave foremost primacy to Western Europe, while Acheson defined Western Europe as “the keystone of the world.”<sup>18</sup> However, it was accepted that the Middle East region was also vitally important and had an “auxiliary relationship to Western Europe” by holding the largest oil sources and offering bases, for “airfields on which the US and British strategic plans depended.”<sup>19</sup> For the USA, the Middle East region was a peripheral area, of secondary importance which would be utilized for the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan.<sup>20</sup> The American objective was “to bring nations into a US-led orbit in order to insure that they would cooperate strategically in wartime and allow Western corporations to develop and control their petroleum resources in peacetime.” However, these objectives were difficult to attain because, this region was characterized with “poverty, strife,

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<sup>17</sup> FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, p. 174.

<sup>18</sup> Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, p. 277.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 237-238, 310.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 261.

nationalist fervor, and regional hatreds.”<sup>21</sup> This was realized by the US planners who stated in early 1949 that the USA could not defend the Middle East.

On November 24, 1948, the JCS declared that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East were vitally important for future US security. Greece and Turkey were the two countries with strategic importance that would stand against any Soviet expansion. Therefore, it was accepted that neither of these countries should fall under Soviet domination. Both Turkey and Greece offered bases which could be used by the Soviet Union during an operation against the islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus as well as against communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Strategically, Turkey was more important than Greece, because, it dominated the main “air, land, and sea routes from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields.”<sup>22</sup>

Although Turkey was regarded as important to US security concerns, on December 15, 1948, Robert Lovett argued that Turkey was neither in Western Europe nor on the Atlantic, therefore it was doubtful that Turkey could be regarded as a geographical part of the North Atlantic group. Thus, Turkey was advised not to insist on inclusion in the North Atlantic group. At the same time, in order not to discourage Turkey, the USA reiterated the continuation of its military aid program as well as its diplomatic support as clear evidence of the fact that Turkey had a special place in US foreign policy. The exclusion of Turkey from this pact opened the possibility of the establishment of a possible Mediterranean security arrangement with other Mediterranean countries as an alternative. However, Turkey could not get US support on this issue. As a response to the Turkish proposal of a Mediterranean Pact, Lovett

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 286.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 191-192.

expressed that he was neither encouraging nor discouraging the establishment of such a pact, while suggesting that the Turks should be patient and not be discouraged.<sup>23</sup>

During February 1949, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak actively explored the possibilities for establishing a Mediterranean Pact. Therefore, he journeyed to London, Paris and Brussels but, he could not achieve any results. The USA insisted that it was neither for nor against to such a regional grouping.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, Turkey was still needed the continuation of US financial aid. However, the ECA aid was reduced. Therefore, on February 19, 1949, Sadak expressed the anxieties of the Turkish government about the reduction of aid to Turkey in the ECA's recent requests of the Congress. However, Averell Harriman, argued that parts of the development program were beyond the scope of ECA financing. Therefore, he suggested that Turkey should push the negotiation to obtain World Bank funds in order to finance some of these projects. Sadak reiterated Turkey's need for the continuance of foreign assistance. Because, 48% of the Turkish budget was devoted to defense purposes which drained sources to be spent for constructive purposes.<sup>25</sup>

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The Turkish government expressed its willingness to join the treaty. Because, its exclusion might indicate the reduction of US strategic interest as well as reduction of US aid. Although the American and British ambassadors informed Turkey that the arrangement was a geographical one, which contained only countries of the North Atlantic region, Turkey learned that Italy, which was a Mediterranean country, as well as territory in North Africa comprising the Algerian departments of France, would be included in the scope of the North Atlantic Pact. This led to increased Turkish

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>24</sup> FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 1669.



objections and deep uneasiness in the Turkish public. Turkey felt itself abandoned, because the USA pledged itself to come immediately to the aid of the Western European countries in case of an attack, but such a guarantee was not offered to Turkey. Therefore, it was feared that the USA would no longer maintain a powerful interest in the maintenance of Turkey's independence and territorial integrity against potential Soviet pressures. On April 12, 1949, Sadak told Acheson that he was unable to explain this situation to the Turkish Parliament and public, and requested his help. Acheson rejected the idea that the USA had abandoned Turkey, and he reminded Sadak that the American government had not lost its interest in Turkey which could be obviously seen by statements during the beginning of 1946, made by Truman and Acheson regarding the Soviet Union's claims over the Turkish Straits. Secondly, the USA provided military assistance to Turkey, and in a few days a new military assistance bill would be presented to the Congress. In addition to this, Turkey benefited from the ERP for its economic development. Regarding the invitation of Italy, Acheson stated that France argued that throughout history, Italy was the back door into France by which attacks were made upon it; thus, it was necessary to include Italy in this arrangement. However, the USA did not give any guarantees about the extension of the Atlantic Pact or support of a possible Mediterranean Pact of which Turkey would be a member. When Sadak asked whether the US would come to the assistance of Turkey in case of an attack, Acheson stated that "one of the most marked characteristics of President Truman was that once his word was given there was no going back on it; it was therefore doubly important to be prudent and sure of our ground before undertaking to give assurances."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 1643-1644.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 1652.

Facing this stalemate, the Turkish government was trying to ensure the maintenance of US economic aid to Turkey. On April 14, 1949, Sadak in his meeting with Assistant of State for Economic Affairs, Willard Thorp, requested enhancement of US financial aid since the defense burden problem of Turkey continued and created an obstacle for internal contributions to financing ECA and anticipated IBRD projects. Therefore, Sadak requested an additional 30 million dollars under the military aid program so as to finance current consumption items.<sup>27</sup> However, this request was refused and Turkey was advised to submit its proposal to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), by which it would be possible for the ECA to increase its allocation to Turkey.<sup>28</sup> But, the Turkish government thought that the OEEC countries would not be sympathetic to additional Turkish request or ECA aid, because this would mean a reduction in their own shares. Therefore, Sadak requested from Acheson that Turkey be judged by the same criteria as Greece for political reasons.<sup>29</sup> However, Thorp stated to Erkin, under Public Law 75, the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of May 22, 1947, the USA granted 100 million dollars for military, naval, and air force modernization and training programs, as well as a limited public roads program. Under Public Law 472, additional allotment was provided with an estimated value between 50,000,000 and 75,000,000 dollars. In addition to this, the USA welcomed Turkey's participation in the ERP, and a limited amount of ECA funds were being made available on a credit basis. Turkey, by entering the war late, had escaped from the destructions of the war; therefore, it had no reconstruction problems. In addition to this, it had gold reserves. Hence, it was assumed that Turkey could contribute to the European recovery by increasing production and export of foodstuffs and minerals. The Turkish government was

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 1653.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 1657-1659.

advised to take measures to attract foreign as well as domestic private investments. Also, unlike Poland and Rumania, there were no native communist elements in Turkey, it was oriented toward western democracies, and it was determined to resist to the Soviet Union. Turkey with all these qualifications played a stabilizing role in the Middle East, therefore Thorp maintained that the USA was determined to continue its assistance, to prevent any Turkish hesitation about resisting Soviet pressures.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, the US government was still reluctant to undertake actions which gave credence to the Soviet thesis that the North Atlantic Treaty was aggressive in intent and operation. For this reason, on April 15, 1949, the Department of State did not approve the construction of airfields and the stockpiling of aviation gasoline in Turkey, since this action would cause doubts on the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>31</sup>

The American attitude toward Turkey increased Turkish anxieties as to whether the US was at the verge of abandoning it. As a response to the Turkish doubts regarding US policy, on April 26, 1949, Truman assured İnönü by reiterating his address to the Congress of March 12 by which he tried to make clear that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), would not reduce the interest of the USA in the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Turkey as well as other countries outside the Atlantic area. Truman argued that Turkey's security would be enhanced by strengthening the collective security of the Atlantic Treaty countries. He stated,

...the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in no wise diminishes the concern felt in the US for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Turkey and other free nations outside the Atlantic area; but rather, by strengthening the collective security of the Atlantic Treaty countries, the creation of this pact serves to enhance Turkey's security as

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 1659.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 1660-1663, 1665-1667, 1669; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, pp. 107-113, 131-132.

<sup>31</sup> FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1655.

well. Through it, the principles first enunciated with respect to Greece and Turkey are further implemented with respect to other freedom-loving peoples of the community of nations.<sup>32</sup>

On May 5, 1949, the US Department of State declared that the foremost aim of the USA in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was promotion of peace and stability. Turkey was recognized as an obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Near East hence, a vital strategic area which could be used as a base by the USA and its allies in case of war. Turkey's firm resistance against Soviet pressures led to the continuation of US military and economic aid. This stance led to debates whether to provide security commitment to Turkey either by inclusion in NATO or by the establishment of a regional defensive arrangement.<sup>33</sup>

During Secretary Snyder's visit in July 18-20, 1949, to Ankara, İnönü argued that since both countries had a common cause, which was defense against the Soviet Union, military aid was not sufficient, but financial aid should also be extended to Turkey, because Turkey would suffer from financial difficulties in the next two or three years. Financial remedies which could be provided by national means was doubtful, since the deficit in the national budget was growing, and once the financial equilibrium was upset, the Turkish economy would worsen, and, the armed forces could not subsist.<sup>34</sup>

The National Security Council (NSC), drew attention to the strategic importance of Turkey and Greece so that they would not fall under Soviet domination, and that this necessitated the continuation of US aid to Turkey. Since strategically Turkey was more important than Greece, the USA had long-range strategic interests in its military establishments. Therefore, if Turkey fell under Soviet domination, the security

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 1656-1657.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 1660, 1669-1670.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 1676.

interests of the USA in the Middle East as well as the Mediterranean would be hampered. For this reason, the National Security Council (NSC), suggested that the USA should take these facts into consideration while providing military aid programs to Turkey by which it should strengthen Turkey's position against Soviet pressures.<sup>35</sup>

The lack of an invitation to Turkey to be a founding member of the Council of Europe on May 5, 1949, increased Turkey's feeling of abandonment. Although the Council of Europe was only a political organization, Turkey as a continuation of its institutional Westernization policy was eager to be a part of this organization. Exclusion from this European organization led to bitter criticisms in Turkey. "After much behind-the-scenes activity," on August 8, 1949, Turkey and Greece were invited to be members of the Council of Europe.<sup>36</sup>

In 1950, Turkey was still in need of economic aid. Turkey, because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, maintained large armed forces which was a heavy burden on its budget which still amounted to nearly half of its national budget (35-40%). Hence, it could not finance investment projects. On the other hand, the Western European countries were spending only small amounts of their budgets for defense. For instance, Belgium was spending 8% and France was spending between 18-20% of their budgets for national defense. Therefore, these countries could reach their prewar production levels and were continuing their economic development. However, Turkey still could not begin to start economic development projects. Obtaining US Congressional approval for aid was the main obstacle for Turkey. Because, it was not possible for the USA to provide direct military aid from its budget outside the existing military aid programs. Therefore, on February 1, 1950, Sadak suggested that the US

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 278-279.

<sup>36</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 38; Mehmet Gönübol-Haluk Ülman. et.al. "Blokların Kuruluşu ve Türkiye," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 226-227; İlter Turan-Dilek Barlas. "Batı İttifakına

could furnish Turkey with some consumer goods for military use. Sadak argued that this would help Turkey's need in this field and would lighten the burden on its defense budget. However, this request was refused by the head of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), Paul G. Hoffmann, who suggested that Turkey should look to the OEEC to get assistance of that kind. It was argued that Turkey should attract private investment and this would be the a permanent solution to Turkey's economic problems. Therefore, upon Turkey's request, Hoffmann, arranged appointments with American bankers. But, the proximity of Turkey to the Soviet Union was discouraging for the private investors. They required the guarantee of Turkish gold reserves for loans. This was of course refused by Sadak. However, because the Marshall Plan credits were decreasing Sadak, requested Hoffmann's assistance to obtain the same aid conditions in the coming year by reiterating the immense burden on Turkey's defense budget. Sadak stated that even if Turkey could not get assistance, it would keep its army strong because it faced Soviet danger at its border. But, he did not know how this could be done without help. Hoffmann stated that he would do everything he could in order to promote a general understanding of Turkey. Harriman suggested that Turkey should include in its program for OEEC a request for consumer goods that were necessary to finance its investment and development programs under the ERP, and attract private investment by creating a climate which would encourage the flow of the American capital to Turkey. At that time, "the Turkish government introduced a bill to the Grand National Assembly guaranteeing foreign investments, their right to transfer reasonable profits out of the

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Üye Olmanın Türk Dış Politikası Üzerindeki Etkileri." in Faruk Sönmezoglu (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998).

country and offering other additional guarantees.” But still the US capital was moving slowly to Turkey.<sup>37</sup>

Turkish economic policy was also criticized by the ECA Mission Chief in Turkey, Russell Dorr, who argued that the Turkish government was not making serious efforts to balance the budget and create internal financial stability. Dorr suggested to the Turkish government that it should undertake a development program within its financial capabilities, because, the ECA funds would be on a declining scale. It was anticipated that for the fiscal year beginning March 1, 1951, the budgetary deficit would be TL 250,000,000 in contrast to the fiscal year beginning March 1, 1950, of TL 155,000,000. And, balancing this amount by inflationary borrowing would undermine the objectives of the ECA program in Turkey. The Turkish budget was composed of two categories of expenditures: those for defensive purposes and for economic development. It was anticipated that there would not be a reduction in defense expenditures, and, therefore, Turkey had to curtail its economic development expenditures which meant limitation of the investment program for the fiscal year 1951.<sup>38</sup> US military aid continued to Turkey during fiscal year 1950. Turkey would get 81 million dollars from a total amount of 265 million dollars aid for Greece and Turkey. This aid was in the form of material and training, effective in providing for the modernization of the Turkish army. Greater combat effectiveness with less number of men was achieved by this aid. But, the maintenance of the defense establishment still imposed a heavy burden on the Turkish economy which amounted nearly to 35-40% of Turkey's budgetary revenues. The direct Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), assistance in fiscal year 1950 would be 59 million dollars. For the fiscal year 1951, Turkey would receive 46 million dollars in

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<sup>37</sup> FRUS, *The Near East, South Africa, and Africa, 1950*, Vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1978), pp. 1224-1228.

direct ECA aid and 30 million dollars in drawing rights. These funds were utilized for purchasing modern agricultural equipment in order to enhance Turkey's agricultural production, to enlarge coal mines, to develop the transportation system, and power resources. However, the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb, stated to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Lay, that Turkey was still unable to overtake the economic burden to maintain modernization of its armed forces without direct US military aid and without the extension of economic aid through ECA. Therefore, Webb argued that the US aid to Turkey should be maintained.<sup>39</sup>

On February 15, 1950, Erkin proposed the establishment of a regional Near Eastern pact with the support of the USA. By proposing this pact, Erkin tried to extract some sort of a US security assurance to Turkey. But, he also argued that unilateral US assurance would also meet Turkish needs. Such an assurance could be in the form of a declaration by the American President which would put Turkey in the same category as members of the North Atlantic Pact. Such an assurance would also strengthen the Republican People's Party, (RPP) government before the coming Turkish elections.<sup>40</sup> The Turkish government also suggested, while awaiting the decision for a US political commitment, that the General Staffs of the two countries could undertake discussions of common defense and assistance plans. However, this offer was refused by the USA on the ground that such planning could not be undertaken if there was not a prior political agreement.<sup>41</sup> On March 20, 1950, the US government stated that under the present circumstances, the USA still could not consider extension of its formal security arrangements. However, General McBride

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. 1229-1230.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 1236-1238. The US military aid made possible a reduction of the size of the Turkish armed forces from an estimated 500,000 men to less than 300,000 men in 1950. "In fiscal year 1950, Turkey received 59 million dollars of direct ECA aid, of which 35 million was in the form of loans, plus a net figure of 46 million dollars of indirect aid in the form of drawing rights." Ibid. pp. 1317-1320.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 1232.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 1236-1238.



accepted to give strategic military advice to Turkey within the limits of his authority. But, he also stated that such an advice would not mean that the USA would directly or indirectly commit itself to any future course of action.<sup>42</sup> On March 26, 1950, the Army Chief of Staff, General Lawton J. Collins, stated to İnönü that in case of a war, there would be a tremendous strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union. İnönü requested more detail and asked whether the USA would bomb the Soviet Union if the latter attacked Turkey. General Collins answered, “if the Congress declared war the US would.” It was his personal opinion that if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey, such an attack would be part of a world war.<sup>43</sup>

The Turkish government could not achieve any American guarantee for its security, and was concerned over the revision of the Montreux Convention as suggested by the Soviet Union. Therefore, on April 27, 1950, Erkin, by pointing to the possibility of the Soviet Union to create a crisis in order to alter the Montreux Convention in 1951, suggested that the establishment of a Mediterranean security pact would enhance the confidence of Turkey as well as serve as a warning to the Soviet Union. Erkin requested his suggestions to be included on the agenda of the London meetings. For Erkin, it was not possible to provide the security of the Atlantic area by excluding Turkey and Greece, both of which would provide for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, during the London meetings, the principal item was making NATO operational, hence its enlargement was not discussed. The US government thought that the time was not ripe to make concrete commitments to the Middle East, because European needs required priority. In order to compensate for

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 1239-1240.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 1246.

Turkey's disappointment, jet aircraft and rehabilitation of air strips at Diyarbakır, Kayseri, and Eskişehir were added to the US aid program.<sup>44</sup>

Nearly one month after the election of the Democratic Party, the Korean War started on June 25, 1950. On July, 25 1950, the Menderes government, in order to get an advantage for Turkey's acceptance to NATO, announced its decision to send a 4,500 man unit to the Korean War. The Turkish forces fought successfully, but Turkey was the country had the greatest casualties proportionally after the USA.<sup>45</sup> However, even these losses were not enough to provide for Turkey's entrance to NATO. Since, in October 1950, General Omar Bradley in his article in *Reader's Digest*, argued that Turkey, Siam, Burma, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq were within the scope of potential 'local war' area. And, he stated, "we will refuse absolutely to allow local wars to divert us unduly from our central task. They must not be allowed to consume so much of our manpower and resources as to destroy our strength and imperil our victory in a world way."<sup>46</sup>

What caused the alteration of American policy to consider Turkey as a candidate was its anxiety that Turkey without security guarantees, might choose neutrality in case of a war. This possibility was mentioned in the report of NSC by the director of NSC, Paul Nitze, in the Spring of 1950. The NSC68 called for more military expenditures by pointing to the Soviet Union's achievement of nuclear capability. It was stated that there was no room for neutrality and diplomacy was

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. 1252-1253, 1264-1265, 1270-1271; Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 353; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, pp. 174-175.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 1286-1320. "Out of 29,882 Turks who participated in three years of combat, there were 706 dead and 2,111 wounded with 168 missing, and 219 known to be prisoners which amounted to 66% of Turkish forces that were sent to the war." George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu*, p.143.

<sup>46</sup> Altınur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, p. 157.

regarded as a zero-sum game. Therefore, Turkey, Greece, and Iran which resisted Soviet pressures were territories vital to US security concerns.<sup>47</sup>

On August 25, 1950, Erkin told the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, George McGhee, that in Europe there were three important organizations which were the OEEC, the Council of Europe and NATO. He reiterated Turkey's desire to join NATO. Italy, France and Canada indicated that they would support Turkey's admission if the USA agreed. Erkin also argued that the real danger came from the Eastern Mediterranean hence, in order to provide the security of the Mediterranean, it should be defended from its east, which meant the inclusion of Turkey to NATO. Therefore, Erkin requested from the USA to follow a more active policy during the New York meetings of September.<sup>48</sup>

However, the JCS on September 9, 1950, argued that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey to NATO could adversely affect the progress which was achieved. Because the inclusion of these states would cause a problem in concerting military planning and actions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East with those already in progress in Western Europe. Therefore, the JCS offered to give these countries associate status by which their representatives would participate in coordinated planning against any Soviet attack. The JCS also evaluated the other alternatives. The first alternative was granting to Greece and Turkey a consultative status in NATO. However, the JCS argued that granting a consultative status would be only a temporary expedient and its effectiveness would be mostly on the extent and nature of the consultations which would be held. The second alternative was the establishment of a regional pact in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East area. However, since with the possible exception of Turkey, the countries in the Near and Middle East

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<sup>47</sup> Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 314, 356-357, 360; Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, (eds.) *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, pp. 383-442.

were militarily weak, the establishment of such an arrangement was militarily unsound. The third alternative was a unilateral, non-reciprocal declaration by the USA, or possibly a multilateral declaration with Great Britain and France so as to make clear that an armed aggression against Turkey, Greece, or Iran would not be tolerated. The JCS did not favor such a commitment because, the USA had made a military commitment, and it could not provide more military aid in the near future. The JCS argued that the USA, by joining with Great Britain and France, could informally assure Turkey that a Soviet attack would mean the beginning of a global war and the three powers would act accordingly. Such assurances would dispel the Turkish feeling of insecurity and compensate to some extent the possible disappointment in Turkey's failure to achieve full membership in NATO. However, the JCS stated that the defensive strength of NATO did not achieve the necessary improvement which would permit Turkey's membership. Therefore, it suggested an associate status in NATO so that the representatives could participate in coordinated planning without delay. At the same time, it supported the idea of offering Turkey and Greece full membership as soon as the defense of the members of NATO were reasonably guaranteed. Regarding Iran, the JCS did not offer either a consultative status or associate status in NATO. <sup>49</sup>

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, informed Erkin that France would support the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. However, the smaller members opposed the extension of the treaty to Turkey. Therefore, Schuman suggested that Turkey could look for the establishment of a regional pact which would include France, Britain, and the USA. However, Turkey rejected the idea of the establishment of a regional pact as a substitute for membership in NATO. Therefore,

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<sup>48</sup> FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 1301-1302; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışışlerinde 34 Yıl*, pp. 159-160.

<sup>49</sup> FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 1306-1309; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışışlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 186.

Turkey insisted that it would like to be a member of NATO. Erkin argued that the attitude of the great powers especially of the USA, would be the determining factor in this decision, and not of the small states. For Erkin, the issue of granting full membership to Turkey was more urgent than the previous year, because Turkish people began to feel very dissatisfied by being treated as second rate members of the European society. And, they felt that they were abandoned in spite of the Truman Doctrine and US aid.<sup>50</sup> On September, 12, 1950, President Celal Bayar stated to the US Ambassador to Turkey, George Wadsworth, that the exclusion of Turkey from NATO despite Turkey's forthright action during the Korean War, would seriously affect the public morale which could be used by the Soviet Union as a means of propaganda.<sup>51</sup> Hence, Turkey required not only US military and economic aid but also its full political and military commitment within the framework of a defense pact.

Despite these endeavors of the Turkish government, the Foreign ministers of France, the USA, and Great Britain at their meeting in New York on September 13, 1950, decided not to associate Turkey and Greece with NATO defense planning in the Mediterranean area.<sup>52</sup>

The usual Soviet propaganda against Turkey continued but, there were no special instances of Soviet pressure against Turkey. The only exception was an article of the official organ of the Soviet Navy Ministry, *Red Fleet*, on April 19, which proposed revision of the Montreux Convention on the Straits. The Soviet claim was responded to on April 21, by the US Secretary of State, that the Soviet claim was unacceptable. This led to Turkey's insistence to be included to NATO or some other

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 1310-1311.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 1312.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 1315.

regional security arrangement under the guarantee of the USA and possibly other allied military support in case of an attack.<sup>53</sup>

On September 19, 1950, the North Atlantic Treaty Council began to display signs of recognizing the importance of Turkey's role in the free world and the Near East region, but it was argued that without achieving the necessary strength within the pact, it was not possible to extend it to Turkey. However, it was suggested that Turkey could associate itself with appropriate phases to NATO's military planning regarding the defense of the Middle East area. The USA again refused to make any unilateral commitments to Turkey since it had already too many commitments.<sup>54</sup> The USA only supported to grant associate status to Turkey and Greece by which their representatives could participate in coordinated planning without delay. However, this was not satisfactory for Turkey since it desired the full-fledged security arrangement with the USA either on a bilateral or multilateral basis. But, in October 1950, the Turkish government accepted associate membership.<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile, US economic aid to Turkey was being reduced. On October 13, 1950, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Burton Berry, informed Erkin that the ECA aid to be allocated to Turkey would be reduced in the coming fiscal year as a result of substantial reductions in ECA appropriations.<sup>56</sup>

Since Turkey was not successful in any of its attempts to gain formal US military commitment in case of a war with the Soviet Union, on January 24, 1951, Erkin proposed the extension of the US security commitment to Turkey through adhering to the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939. Erkin

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 1317-1320.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., pp. 1320-1322.

<sup>55</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 41.

<sup>56</sup> FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 1325-1326.

argued that this would have some advantages. First, it would eliminate the protracted discussions which would grant full membership to Turkey in NATO or the establishment of a regional organization. Secondly, since it would not be a regional arrangement, its scope and purpose would be limited hence, no other country would ask for inclusion. Erkin suggested that by changing article 3 of this treaty, the security of Greece could be included which had not been a party to that treaty.<sup>57</sup> However, this proposal had little significance to provide security to Turkey.<sup>58</sup>

Although Turkey was faced with reductions in US economic aid as well as the unwillingness of the USA to make any formal commitment for its security, on January 27, 1951, it sent additional units to Korea. On February 5, 1951, Henry S. Villard, in a memorandum to the Director of the PPS, Paul Nitze, drew attention to the importance of Turkey in the defense of the Mediterranean area which was vital to US security concerns. Therefore, he suggested that a formal American commitment in the form of a written guarantee to Turkey was necessary. This “would confirm Turkey’s faith in the US and would assure the US of a strong fighting ally on the Eastern Mediterranean flank.” On the other hand the JCS was opposed to any formal US commitment. But, Villard argued that a limited guarantee of the USA or allied air or naval support would satisfy Turkey. Because, the unwillingness of the USA to make any commitment led to anxieties in Turkey that it was not within the primary defense perimeter of the USA. At that time, Turkey accepted associated membership status as a halfway step to full membership. Villard argued that Turkey would accept to be a member of a regional Mediterranean defense pact on the lines of NATO. This

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<sup>57</sup> FRUS, *The Near East and Africa, 1951*, Vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), pp. 1110-1112. The 1939 Treaty involved a commitment of France and Britain to come to the aid of Turkey in case of an attack against the latter. Article 3 provided an indirect guarantee by all three powers to Greece if it were attacked. Erkin also recognized that the Treaty should be modified slightly because according to this treaty, Turkey would not be called upon to take action which would involve an armed conflict with the Soviet Union.

<sup>58</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 42.

regional pact would contain all of the bordering countries on the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Suez. This pact should include the USA or at least have US backing.<sup>59</sup> However, McGhee argued that until NATO could achieve real strength, the US was not prepared to make any formal commitments.<sup>60</sup>

On February 22, 1951, the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Missions was held in Istanbul. It was concluded that to attain US political, military objectives in Turkey and Greece, and in the entire region of Middle East, the USA should enter as soon as possible into reciprocal security arrangements with the two countries. By this way, Turkey's belligerency would be assured in case of a war which involved the USA.<sup>61</sup>

The question of Turkey's policy in case of a war was the main reason for the USA and its allies' acceptance of Turkey's full membership to NATO. They feared that Turkey with a vital strategic importance, might be neutral in case of a war with the Soviet Union. Since it had no means to defend itself against a Soviet attack, it could even make concessions to the Soviet Union which would hamper the defensive policies of the USA and its allies. The best way to guarantee Turkey's alliance with the West was to include it into NATO with full membership status.

On February 26, 1951, a national intelligence estimate evaluated the will and the ability of Turkey's alignment with the West in case of a war with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, it was assumed that Turkey would resist the Soviet Union since it was solidly aligned with the West. Turkey was trying to get formal US military commitment to secure itself in case of a Soviet attack. It was argued that "a shift in the US policy to one hemispheric defense would oblige Turkey to abandon its pro-US

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<sup>59</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 1117-1119.

<sup>60</sup> FRUS, *European Security and the German Question, 1951*, (in two parts), Part I, Vol. III, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p. 468.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 501-502.



alignment and fall back on a policy of neutrality.” It was assumed that if Turkey was cut off from the West through a Soviet conquest or absorption of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, it was expected to pursue a more cautious policy toward the Soviet Union. If Greece was attacked by the Soviet Union and if the USA failed to stop its invasion, it was estimated that Turkey’s policy would depend on broader considerations. It was considered that Turkey’s pro-US alignment would continue so far as America firmly maintained its support without causing doubts on the Turkish side. However, in case Turkey could not get American assurances, this would lead to adoption of a neutrality policy. And, if land communications of Turkey were cut off with the West through a Soviet invasion of Greece in its western flank, and Iran, Iraq, and Syria, in its eastern flank, Turkey was expected to follow a policy of neutrality since it had no firm US commitment facing Soviet invasion. Hence, in time, it could even make some concessions to the Soviet Union. It was also estimated that Turkey, in case of a general war in which it was not attacked, would maintain the status of non-belligerency while doing everything to facilitate victory of the West.

It was stated that one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy was to obtain an US military commitment in case of an attack by the Soviet Union. American military and economic assistance to Turkey did not alter Turkey’s desire to obtain a formal US guarantee for its defense. Turkey which was strategically more important than Greece, could provide bases to the USA, in return for a formal US military commitment. Because, Turkey being the strongest anti-communist country on the periphery of the Soviet Union, got its strength to resist to the Soviet pressures from two sources. First was its national unity where the majority of the public was united against Soviet demands and fully supported its government’s policy of joining NATO. And, the second source of strength was its army. Despite the shortcomings of its

armed forces, economic weakness, and its geographical vulnerability, Turkey could resist any Soviet or satellite aggression. With its strategic importance to the USA, Turkey was expected to offer air bases for US air forces. It was argued that if Turkey altered its pro-US alignment, this would seriously affect US interests in the Near East.<sup>62</sup>

On March 1, 1951, Henry Villard argued to the Director of the PPS, Nitze that although the 1939 Treaty was not obsolete, it appeared weak for defense of the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence, Villard suggested that the USA could enter into some form of commitment to Turkey and Greece.<sup>63</sup>

On March 8, 1951, the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, Carney stated to Eisenhower, the Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, that in case of a war, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Scandinavia would all contribute and, would assist in the defense of the Western Europe. Therefore, Carney suggested that the countries of the north shore of the Mediterranean should be considered as a part of SACEUR's right flank.<sup>64</sup>

The smaller members of NATO resisted membership of Greece and Turkey. They regarded that it would be disadvantageous for their short and long term interests through extending their own financial commitment and security risk. This would also be disadvantageous for their long term economic and political interests.<sup>65</sup> On the other hand, in May 1950, the British government was supporting the idea of establishment of a Middle East Command (MECO), consisting of the UK, the Arab League states,

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<sup>62</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 1119-1126.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., pp. 1126-1127.

<sup>64</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 480-481.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 506; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, pp. 177-178.

Israel, Turkey, Persia, Greece and Egypt. The British government was not supporting Turkey's membership to NATO.<sup>66</sup>

On the other hand, the American Ambassador in Greece, John E. Peurifoy, stated to Acheson that Greece and Turkey were assets rather than liabilities to NATO military capabilities. He argued that the question of whether Greece and Turkey could be identified with Western civilization so that they could be a member of NATO was a question of secondary importance. Because, at the present, participation in NATO did not involve a commitment to a political union since it was a military organization. He argued that broadening the Eastern Mediterranean pact was more difficult than extending NATO to Turkey and Greece. Since, the Near and Middle East countries were divided between themselves because of the Palestine issue. He proposed the formation of a four power pact between the USA, UK, Turkey, Greece to which France and/or Italy could join if they so desired, and to which Yugoslavia could ultimately adhere, as the best alternative to provide security for Turkey and Greece.<sup>67</sup>

While these alternatives were being debated, and after the national intelligence estimate of February 1951, it became obvious that the best decision was the adherence of Turkey as well as Greece to NATO. Because, especially after its contributions to the Korean War, facing disappointment, Turkey could choose neutrality. In case of a war, the Soviet Union would occupy Turkey in order to prevent the use of strategically important bases by the USA. Then, the question was which had been asked by Sadak during his Washington visit in mid-April, 1949, "why should Turkey take such risks if the USA would not promise to defend it? Why provoke the Kremlin if the Soviets might otherwise avoid war with Turkey, as they had done during the

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<sup>66</sup> Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 583.

<sup>67</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 509-510.

WW II?”<sup>68</sup> Therefore, George McGhee argued that only NATO membership could provide security to Turkey and Greece. Therefore, he refused the other alternatives which were, conjoining Turkey and Greece to NATO either as a separate regional group or directly by bilateral arrangements between the USA and Turkey, and the USA and Greece; making multilateral arrangements between the USA, UK, Turkey, and Greece; or by some other plan which would also take into consideration political, military and administrative problems.<sup>69</sup> And, on May 15, 1951, the USA proposed full membership to Turkey and Greece within NATO to its allies. By joining Turkey to NATO, the USA would tie Turkey firmly to its side. This would make possible the diversion of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe as well as utilization of Turkish air fields by NATO allies.<sup>70</sup>

Between May 16-24, 1951, discussions were held at Washington by the American and British officials related to command problems in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Middle East regions. Britain wanted the establishment of a Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, who would be British. Under this commander, there would be a Commander in chief who would be American, and would be responsible for all naval forces in the Mediterranean. Britain desired the establishment of a separate Middle East Command under a British Supreme Commander who would be responsible for the supply line from the NATO front to the Middle East. Britain was concerned with the protection of its interests in the Middle East. Therefore, it desired to form a Middle East defense organization which would include Arab states and Israel. Accordingly, Turkey would have a key role hence, Britain insisted that any plan offering membership in NATO to Turkey should be

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<sup>68</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 289-290; FRUS, 1949, Vol. IV, p.177; FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, 1651-1652.

<sup>69</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 511-515.

<sup>70</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 42.

conditional on Turkey's cooperation with this arrangement. On the other hand, the USA desired a separate but interlocking Middle East command structure with NATO. At end of the discussions, no binding conclusion was reached.<sup>71</sup>

On June 8, 1951, a meeting was held in London, between the British Chief of Staff, William Slim, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley. The US government suggested that the Middle Eastern countries if they wished, could take their place on a Middle East Cooperative Defense Board. However, this was rejected by the British. The latter wanted that such a defense board should be drawn from countries who were full or associate members of NATO. Hence, according to the British proposal, Turkey and Greece should be part of the Middle Eastern Command Organization (MECO), which would be linked with NATO. Although, General Bradley expressed his personal opinion that Turkey would not like to be under a British commander in the Middle East. The British government did not want to withdraw the British Mediterranean Fleet from that region. Because, such a withdrawal meant leaving the British bases in Gibraltar and Malta. Therefore, the US proposal was not a practical solution for the British.<sup>72</sup> The British government required,

1. Under the British Supreme Commander, the Middle East, would be the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would command and operate all the British naval forces and bases throughout the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of the Middle East Command and any traditional allied requirements from British bases.
2. Admiral Carney would be the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Flank, and would command and operate all US naval forces in the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of General Eisenhower.
3. The British Naval Commander-in Chief and Admiral Carney would keep in very close touch and co-ordinate naval and maritime air operations throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They

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<sup>71</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 522-524, George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 43.

<sup>72</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 528-530; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 215.

would also coordinate the activities of allied naval forces in the Mediterranean.<sup>73</sup>

On July 4, 1951, the British government gave its support for Turkey's membership to NATO. Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü stated that Turkey was prepared to collaborate with the USA, UK and France in the defense of the area.<sup>74</sup> British government accepted Turkey's entrance to NATO if it would be part of the "Middle Eastern theatre of operations under an integrated command, and provided that theatre, which would include Egypt and certain members of the Commonwealth in addition to Turkey and the three great Western Powers, be placed under a special military organism that assures its high level strategic direction. As far as Greece was concerned it would be attached to theatre of operations of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe."<sup>75</sup>

In July, 1951, British and American governments reached an agreement on the Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East issue. Accordingly, Greece and Turkey would be admitted as full members of NATO. The USA considered that it was desirable that Turkey should play a full part in the defense of the Middle East under an allied Middle East Command, and was prepared to urge this course upon Turkey as soon as it became a NATO member. The Middle East Command would not be a NATO Command. It would, however, be closely associated with NATO by virtue of the association of USA, UK, Commonwealth, French, and Turkish officers at its headquarters. The Commander of the Allied Middle East Command would be a British officer. The USA would use its good offices to make this proposal acceptable to the Turks.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 530-531.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., pp. 554-555.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 556.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp. 563-564.

During the Ottawa meetings in September 15-20, 1951, Britain desired the assignment of Turkish and Greek forces to a British general. However, Turkey wanted that its forces would be under an American general and not to be part of the Middle East Command (MECOM) but part of the regular NATO European army. Turkey was invited to be a founding member of MECOM. On September 24, 1951, Foreign Minister Köprülü declared the acceptance of the Turkish government in principle to be a founding member in the setting up of the Middle East Command. However, "the Turkish government believed that its NATO Command relationship must be worked first and that only after this has been done would it be able to consider what additional responsibilities it might be able to undertake in the Middle East Command."<sup>77</sup> But, in October 1951, Egypt refused to take part into a Middle East Command, because, the Egyptian government was trying to break the links with the past and did not want to be under complete British control. The Egyptian government wanted the withdrawal of the British forces from the Suez Canal; however, this was refused by the British. The Wafd government denounced the treaty of 1936, which made the British presence illegal according to the Egyptian law. Therefore, it was unacceptable for Egypt to offer bases to the British. The Egyptian refusal to be part of such an arrangement put an end to the plans for MECO.<sup>78</sup> Hence, the British proposal of MECO came to nothing. A separate South European Command under an American general was created. And, on February 18, 1952, Turkey joined NATO as a full-fledged member.<sup>79</sup>

Regarding the role of Turkey within NATO; certain units of Turkish Armed Forces, including army, navy, and air-force have been assigned to NATO. Command and control of these forces are exercised through the Command of Land Forces South

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 613.

<sup>78</sup> Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951*, p. 710.

(COMLANDSOUTH), and Six Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF), Command Naval Forces South (COMNAVSOUTH) according to published NATO operations orders and in coordination with Turkish Armed Forces authorities.

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<sup>79</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 44.



## CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

In this thesis, Turkey's reasons to join to NATO are examined. Turkey desired to enter into NATO both because of external and domestic reasons. However, neither of the alliance theories can provide a sufficient answer to the question of "why Turkey allied with the Western bloc but not with the Soviet block or did not choose neutrality?" The realist and neorealist schools of thought emphasize only external factors which are external threats, existence of imbalances of power between states, systemic anarchy, structural polarity, distribution of military power among states, and opportunities for gain. However, these considerations do not explain the external reason of Turkey's balancing behavior by entering into NATO rather than bandwagoning, allying with the Soviet Union or staying neutral. It is commonly argued that because of the 'Soviet threat' Turkey joined NATO. However, there was no 'Soviet threat' against Turkey since the war weary Soviet Union had no aim of waging war against Turkey. However, there were demands of the Soviet Union over Turkey regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention in its favor. The foremost objective of the Soviet Union was to control the Straits and be a dominant power in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to realize this historic aim which came from the era of czarist Russia, the Soviet Union pursued a continuous 'war of nerves' against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Western powers viewed the Soviet Union as their war time ally therefore, during the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the USA and Great Britain did not take a positive stand against the Soviet demands regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention which encouraged the Soviet Union and led to the intensification of its 'war of nerves' against Turkey. This 'war of nerves' which

consisted of Soviet radio and press attacks, demanding implicitly the Kars-Ardahan region by denouncing of the treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925 as well as rumors of troop movements against Turkey. And, all these activities were aimed at bringing Turkey into bilateral talks to revise the Montreux Convention. The Soviet Union would desire the establishment of a 'friendly regime' in Turkey. However, there was no possibility for the Soviet Union to export Communism to Turkey. Because, after the ban of the Turkish Communist party by Atatürk in 1926, Communism became a solely intellectual exercise, supporters of which were composed of writers, artists, and academicians. Moreover, there was not a large proletariat class from where the Communist ideas could be empowered. The tenets of Communist were totally incompatible to Turkey which was an agricultural country, composed predominantly of peasants and Muslim people. Hence, no militant communist activities could grow in Turkey.

Turkey, while facing this 'war of nerves', was trying to involve the USA and Great Britain. The nonchalant attitude of the USA, which regarded the Soviet policy toward Turkey as a problem to be solved by the Soviet Union and Great Britain as had been in the past, raised Turkey's fears that it could again be matter of a bargaining point which had been in the case of the Ottoman Empire, between these great powers. These two powers in October 1944, had drawn the Spheres of Influence Agreement by which they divided the Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe into spheres of influences.<sup>80</sup> This feeling of insecurity was the external reason for Turkey which led to its alliance with the Western bloc. Because, the Turkish statesmen coming the Ottoman tradition and having the experience of the Ottoman Empire concluded that the military and diplomatic isolation had cost too much. Therefore, Turkey as a newly established state and a weak power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Western countries,

was suspicious of all powers. Hence, this feeling of insecurity, and not the 'Soviet threat' is the external reason of Turkey's balancing behavior. Because, the Soviet government, facing the firm opposition of the USA and Great Britain after its note of August 7, 1946, did not officially raise the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention after the Fall of 1946. The only exception was the Soviet Navy's official publication, *Red Fleet* in April 1950 which argued that the revision of the Montreux Convention was necessary. Hence, when Turkey was insistent upon joining to NATO, while it was facing the reluctance of the USA and the resistance of the Great Britain as well as the European member states, there were even no Soviet demands over Turkey, let alone threats.

Bearing in mind the historical experiences of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish decision-makers concluded that only by entering a military alliance with the Western powers, could it protect its security, and prevent itself from being a matter of bargaining point between the great powers. It could also feel secure in case of a renewal of Soviet demands or against any possible Soviet aggression it though there were no apparent signs of this. Therefore, the Learning theory can explain the external reason of Turkey's balancing behavior, which was, as a small power, Turkey's leaders desired to tie itself as well as the Western powers into a military alliance to avoid from being a bargaining point between great powers, if it looks to the Turkish case from a longer historical perspective rather than only focusing on its formative historical experiences during systemic wars of WW I, and WW II. Another factor, that led to Turkey's balancing behavior lies in the fact that it was a satisfied state. Because, after the War of Independence, Atatürk refused any adventurism in foreign policy and, set up this new state within the borders of the National Pact, (the Mosul case is an exception) and 'peace at home, peace in world' became the constant foreign

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<sup>80</sup> Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, pp. 109-125.

policy goal of Turkey. Hence, as a satisfied power, acted as a security maximizer just like the Western bloc states, and in order to protect the status-quo, Turkey chose balancing rather than bandwagoning.

Turkey's entrance into NATO cannot be explained by external factors alone. The state policy of Westernization, plays a significant role as an internal reason for its balancing. Alliance theories that emphasize domestic factors to explain a state's alliance formation, are not applicable to the Turkish case, since the primary concern of these theories are with the Third World states. Since Turkey is not a Third World state, the domestic realities of these states do not correspond to Turkey. Turkey, has never been a colony of another state, nor it has been composed of peoples without a previous state. A Western type of modern state was established by Atatürk. Also, unlike the Third World states, there were neither problems regarding the legitimacy of state leaders nor any social unrest within the state which would affect the state's alliance formation.

The internal reason for Turkey's balancing choice was Westernization. The foremost goal after the War of Independence, was to divorce Turkey from the Arabic sphere of culture and tradition and to transform it into a Westernized nation. The objective was the full integration of Turkey into the Western world as a modern state. Because, for Atatürk only by being a part of the Western world, could Turkey remain independent. Hence, Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc was a continuation of this state policy of Westernization. Turkey has always expressed willingness to join military, political, and economic organizations of the West. For instance the non-invitation of Turkey as a founding member to the Council of Europe had led to criticisms of the Turkish government. Likewise criticisms abound today because

governments failed to adjust legislation to meet European standards required to qualify for membership in the European Union.

Another reason which was a part of the Westernization policy, was the goal of industrialization. Kemalist reforms were based on continuous adoption of Western improvements to Turkey which would provide the maintenance of Turkey's independence within the Western world. However, with its level of industrialization Turkey was far behind the Western countries. Hence, Turkey had to fill this huge gap. The concepts of economic development, industrialization and Westernization are all interrelated. Because, without achieving industrialization it was impossible to achieve Westernization, hence it was not possible to be totally independent. Therefore, industrialization became a major national goal to attain Westernization. The Turkish economy was not devastated by WW II, and moreover, it had 245 million dollar worth of gold reserves. But, it was holding these reserves back in case of a Soviet attack though there were no signs of this. Turkey had a two fold aim one of which was to maintain large armed forces which was a heavy burden on its budget, and secondly, industrialization. However, its economy was not up to materializing these goals simultaneously. Hence, Turkey was in need of foreign aid, which it was receiving through US military and economic aid. But, the amount and duration of such aid depended on US Congressional approval. After the establishment of NATO, Turkey was anxious because of the possibility of the reduction in the flow of US aid. It desired to distribute the costs of military expenditures to foreign allies (in this case the burden was shared with the USA) by which it could complete its industrialization program. Hence, Westernization policy and industrialization were the domestic reasons of Turkey's entrance into NATO.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an evaluation of a cost and benefit analysis of Turkey's entrance into NATO. In this study, the reasons of Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc is examined only. However, because the beginning of Turkey's dependence on the USA started in this era, some mention to this matter should be made. Regarding the costs of alliance all alliance theorists accept that there are costs in entering into an alliance besides benefits. A small state by entering into an alliance, with a great power or powers, obtains economic and military aid as well as security, it has to pay the cost of losing autonomy to some extent. Turkey, by entering into NATO benefited from its security umbrella, it got continuous aid for defense, but the cost was the loss of autonomy to some extent. This loss of autonomy began by the July 1947 aid agreement which was concluded between Turkey and the USA. According to the 4<sup>th</sup> article of this agreement, Turkey could not use this military aid for purposes other than it was decided without the consent of the USA. This article was used against Turkey during the Cyprus crisis in 1964. The Johnson letter, by pointing to this article, argued that Turkey should ask the approval of the US government for using this military equipment. By entrance into NATO, Turkey provided military bases to the USA and its NATO allies hence, the presence of foreign forces (air force units and military advisers) began. However, sometimes Turkish statesmen and high ranking army officers were not informed regarding the activities of these foreign forces while Turkish territories were being used by these forces as was in the case of the Lebanon landing in 1958 when the Incirlik base was used for a non-NATO operation, and U2 event in 1960. Also, during the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, Turkey felt itself abandoned when it heard that Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to remove Jupiter missiles, IRBMs from Turkey as a price for the removal of the SS-5 Soviet MRBMs from Cuba. During the Cyprus crisis in 1964,

President Johnson informed the Turkish government about the possibility of the interference of the Soviet Union, and in that case Turkey could be left alone by NATO allies. Moreover, in 1967 two incidents happened. Firstly, the Soviets forced downed a US military aircraft which carried the American chief of JUSMMAT, on board. Secondly, an American RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft crashed into the Black Sea and the Soviets notified Turkey of the accident. It looked as if it compromised the Turkish sovereignty. Whether the Turkish Prime Ministers and Chiefs of the General Staff knew about American reconnaissance flights over the Soviet border or not. This situation, became an embarrassment to Turkey when American aircraft were either downed by the Soviets or were involved in an accident. Even sometimes the Turkish Army Generals were not permitted to enter into these bases without a written permission from American authorities in Ankara. This asymmetrical dependence of Turkey on the USA, damaged the former's full independence, and hence, raised public resentment, and the deterioration of relations with the USA as of the 1960s.<sup>81</sup>

All these things happened in the 1960s, when there was no Soviet aggressive behavior towards Turkey. These negative events led to change in Turkish foreign policy, in that, it started to become multi-dimensional. Moreover, Turkey began to shed its psychology of alliance from total dependence on a powerful ally towards a healthier balancing of its Euro-Atlantic ties.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, "U.S. Forces in Turkey," in Simon W. Duke & Wolfgang Krieger, (eds.) *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp.346-350; Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20:3 (September 1997), pp. 97-122.

<sup>82</sup> It is not a coincidence that in 1963 the Ankara Agreement was signed with the European Community, and went into effect the next year towards Customs Union and full membership.

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