

‘EVERYTHING OR NOTHING, ALL OF US OR NONE’:
EMOTIONAL ARTICULATION OF DIFFERENT SUBJECTIVITIES
IN GEZI PARK PROTESTS

A Master’s Thesis

by

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Ankara
June 2017

*To all those silenced, oppressed, dispossessed, killed
in dreaming of a better, braver world*

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

‘EVERYTHING OR NOTHING, ALL OF US OR NONE’:
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While Feminist IR provides valuable insights on gendered political analysis, intersectional analysis seeks to expand our understanding of gender and feminism to include diverse and plural experiences of woman at the intersection of gender, class, and race. The multi-systemic approach in understanding oppression and privilege within intersecting structures, as well as understanding how various subjectivities become reified or transformed is an integral part of intersectional analysis. Although intersectional analysis aims to understand how power operates at intersections of various subjective positions, conceptual and methodological challenges in understanding power - subjectivity interrelation persists. This research combines intersectional analysis with politics of emotions to trace how subjectivities marginalised are articulated and sustained. Deriving from the understanding that emotional is political, it is possible to enrich intersectional analysis through the emotional literature of IR that seek to move beyond the understanding of emotions as ‘derivations of rationality’ and recognise the political and social significance of emotions in global politics. The 2013 Gezi Park Protests will provide useful grounds to seek the role emotions play in understanding how the intersecting oppressive structures are perceived and resisted by the so-called Gezi community. By demonstrating emotional articulations of political through an intersectional analysis of Gezi, this research explicates that although Gezi movement that mobilised people from various subjective positions, the emotional articulation of resistance narratives articulated by the movement itself as well as the government at that time, the protests failed in realising its potential of creating an alternative socio-political culture in Turkey.

Key words: Feminist IR, Intersectionality, Politics of Emotions, Social Movements, 2013 Gezi Park Protests

ÖZET

‘KURTULUŞ YOK TEK BAŞINA, YA HEP BERABER YA
HİÇBİRİMİZ’:

GEZİ PARK PROTESTOLARINDA FARKLI ÖZNEL KİMLİKLERİN
DUYGUSAL İFADELENDİRİLMESİ

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Feminist UI siyasetin toplumsal cinsiyet üzerinden şekillenışı açısından değerli okumalar sunuyor olsa da kesişimsellik toplumsal cinsiyet ve feminizmi algılarını toplumsal cinsiyet, sınıf ve ırk kesişimlerindeki kadınların farklı ve çoğul tecrübelerini kapsayacak şekilde genişletmeyi hedefler. Baskıcı yapıların kesişiminde baskı ve imtiyazı anlarken kullandığı çok-sistemli yaklaşımı ve özne konumlarının dönüşümü ve somutlaşmasına yoğunlaşması kesişimsel analizin temel parçalarındandır. Bakıcı yapıların kesişiminde güç dinamiklerini anlamaya çalışan kesişimsellik, Güç – özne kimlik ilişkisini anlamada kuram ve metod bazlı sorunlarla karşılaşmaktadır. Bu tez kesişimselliği duyguların politikası literatürü ile birleştirerek ötekileştirilmiş özne kimliklerin oluşumu ve sürdürülmesini incelemektedir. Duygusal olan siyasidir anlayışı ile yola çıkan bu literatür, duyguları mantık ile zıt noktalarda okuyan UI anlayışından öteye gitmek ve duyguların sosyal ve siyasi önemini vurgulamaktadır. 2013 Gezi Park Protestoları kesişim halindeki baskıcı yapıların protestocuların tarafından nasıl algılandığı ve meydan okunduğunun duygusal yönünü incelemek açısından uygun bir siyasi olaydır. Gezi olaylarından siyasinin duygusal ifadelendirilişinin kesişimsel analizini sunan bu araştırma, Gezi’nin alternatif bir sosyo-politik muhalefet kültürü oluşturacak potansiyele sahip olduğunu ancak gerek protestocuların açısından direniş hikayelerinin gerekse dönemin hükümeti tarafından sunulan direniş hikayelerinin duygusal şekillendirmesinin bu potansiyeli gerçekleştirmediğini göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Feminist UI, Kesişimsellik, Duyguların Politikası, Sosyal Hareketler, 2013 Gezi Park Protestoları

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anadolu Agency
AKP	Justice and Development Party
BAK	Academics for Peace
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CHP	Republican People's Party
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EZLN	Zapatista Army of National Liberation
FETÖ-PDY	Fethullahist Terror Organization-Parallel State Structure
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party
IR	International Relations
LGBT+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and + representing minority gender subjectivities and sexual orientations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
TIKB	Union of Revolutionary Communists of Turkey
TOMA	Intervention Vehicle Against Social Incidents
WEF	World Economic Forum
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Debates about popular demonstrations tend to be governed either by fears of chaos or by radical hope for future, though sometimes fear and hope get interlocked in complex ways.” (Butler, 2015: 1-2)

The 2013 Gezi Park Protest was a complex and rich period in contemporary Turkish political history. What started at May 27, 2013 with a small group of environmental activists occupying Taksim Gezi Park to prevent the demolition of one of the few green spaces left in İstanbul for an urban development project turned into a massive protest that lasted until late August, 2013. Such complex phenomena mobilised approximately three and a half million people in 79 provinces of Turkey (Özel, 2014), people from various subjective positions of race, gender, class, and age with diverging demands for social and political change stemming from different grievances. Protests showcased conventional as well as non-conventional, albeit engaging modes of confrontational action varying from marches to occupations of public spaces, from engaging in direct violent conflict with the police forces to reading books and offering red gillyflowers to the riot police blocking the routes, from dance rituals to banging pots and pans, from standing man (duran adam) to

human chains for peace, from reading books in front of important monuments to earth tables (yeryüzü sofraları); from using humour to embracing naming-and-shaming narratives of the government. This diverse confrontational action repertoire is informed by both non-violent and violent resistance, paying attributions to various socio-political cultures in Turkey. For instance, red gillyflowers are used heavily by the leftist fractions. Earth tables was a commune interpretation of the traditional break of fast during Ramadan, highlighting the modest spirit of fasting to relate to the poor. It challenged the posh Ramadan dinners thrown by the newly prospering conservative elite as well as the official Ramadan dinners of the government at that time. Diverse bodies out on the streets with diverse grievances wanted change and expressed their dissidence through diverse tactics. Because of its rich and complex potential of envisioning a better living space, Gezi harboured an immense potential for social and political transformation and rethinking about the demarcation and polarisation caused by the past histories of conflict and violence.

1.1 Taksim Gezi Park: More Than ‘One of the last remaining green spaces in Istanbul’

Taksim Gezi Park as an urban space was no longer one of the last remaining green sites in Istanbul, the demolition of the park for an urban development project transformed it into a site of reproduction of political subjectivities. This urban place that previously “had been a space of seemingly strange encounters that cut across class, political ideology and gender identity divides long before its occupation by a variety of activists and concerned citizens (Yıldız, 2014: 106)” was socially and emotionally articulated as an agent of transformation bearing a potential to mobilise masses. What was striking was that the Park stood at the intersection of histories of conflict. During the Ottoman rule, the park and the surrounding area was an

Armenian cemetery belonging to the Armenian community, confiscated in 1930s to demolish and build an artillery (Nalcı and Dağlıoğlu, 2011). In 1940s the artillery project was turned into Taksim Gezi Park. Bearing the wounds of the troublesome past of Turkish and Armenians, the park was a space of strange encounters at the intersection of race and political ideology.

Further, the urban renewal project meant much more than a building project of late capitalism for the LGBT+ community: former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip “Erdoğan’s larger renewal project always has been equally interested in generating capital accumulation and heterosexual procreation” (Yıldız, 2014, p. 107). Regarding the urban renewal project of the Gezi Park through a broader political project of building a ‘conservative generation’ through procreation allows an understanding of why various subjectivities involved in Gezi in the first place. This project implies a body politics that designate heterosexual bodies as legitimate objects of social acceptance while designating other bodies that are not operation at a non-binary gender scale as objects of disgust and even hate. The park that stands at the intersection of a race, political ideology and gender opened up the possibilities of a political agency that could “enact a provisional and plural form of co-existence that constitutes a distinct ethical and social alternative” (Butler, 2015, p. 16) to the increasingly authoritarian regime of AKP that marginalised various bodies at the intersection of race, gender, and class.

Gezi created multiple spaces for various subjectivities to manifest themselves socially and politically. Although most research on the protests refer to it through a broader Gezi with a capital G, there were multiple Gezi’s in terms of time and space as well as composition of different subjectivities. This was particularly the case in

Ankara, where protests took place in several districts. Whereas protestors committed to non-violent resistance mostly inhabited Kuğulu Park (one of the few green spaces in the city centre of Ankara) and Tunali, Kızılay district witnessed violent clashes between the protestors and the riot police. This was also the case in İstanbul where protestors tried to keep Gezi Park in Taksim as non-violent resistance zone while surrounding streets witnessed violent clashes to maintain the occupation of the park. In addition to multiple Gezis in term of various oppositional tactics, in terms of composition of the protestors in various districts throughout cities with protests also marked various Gezis. “Everywhere is Taksim, everywhere is resistance!”, a slogan that became the mantra of the Gezi movement was representing this intersectional potential of the park, producing a local resistance sparked by environmental concerns that turned into a national massive uprising due to immense crackdown (David and Toktamış, 2015), turning ‘everywhere’ a political site for resistance.

1.2 Gezi Park Protests: More than ‘a few trees’

Although what initially started the protests was the attempts to save ‘a few trees’ in Taksim Gezi Park: “what we call the Gezi resistance thus refers to a larger scale collective reaction - not only to existing and ongoing urban re-modelling projects but also to the mounting political authoritarianism that affects daily life in Turkey” (İnceoğlu, 2014, p. 25). The occupation of the park by environmental activists provided the grounds for a rupture. Through the political space offered by the occupation and expression of environmental concerns, protestors were able to express their grievances ranging from increasing government control over media to significant increase in domestic and gendered violence during the 11 years of AKP rule, neoliberal urban gentrification, increasing privatisation and market deregulation, concerns over the restriction of freedom, liberty and lifestyle as well as

concerns about democracy and humans rights. Such diverse grievances enriched Gezi, giving it an edge, allowing the protests to become a battle ground for struggles against patriarchy, racism, sexism, vicious capitalism and authoritarianism. Gezi also enriched public perception of political conflict: it allowed to move away from classical distinctions of right-wing / left-wing and secular / Islamist confrontations as Gezi highlighted a variety of concerns over environmental, gender, social and economic justice. The commune experience in Taksim Gezi Park stressed socio-politically transformative potential of the movement: “Searching for a non-hierarchical, pluralist governance alternative, these spaces featured mutual aid and legal assistance workshops, anti-tear gas campaigns, reading groups, communal debates on solidarity and story-telling, as well as performance events” (Potuoğlu-Cook, 2015, p. 99). Hence, Gezi was about more than a few trees; in a way it served as a *movement of movements*, a multitude of movements for environmental, social, political, economic, sexual and libertarian justice.

1.3 Gezi and Its Probable Bearings on the Articulation of an Alternative Socio-Political Culture in Turkey

Perhaps one of the most explored questions that motivate research on the 2013 Gezi Park Protests is how a small protest motivated by urban-ecological issue could mobilise the masses in a country where state violence has been normalised over decades. Research on Gezi mostly focused on why people joined Gezi, how Gezi spread and turned into a ‘colourful showcase (Örs and Turan, 2015, 455)’ and why it failed to create a sustainable political opposition movement in contemporary Turkish politics (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014; Bakıner, 2014; Özen, 2015). Further, changes Gezi brought for social and political environment of Gezi was tackled (Eken, 2014; Abbas and Yiğit, 2015; İnçeoğlu, 2014; Özel, 2014; Örs, 2014; Örs and

Turan, 2014; Canlı and Umul, 2015). In addition, the involvement of women's movements (Erhart, 2013; Potuoğlu-Cook, 2015), LGBT+ involvement and politics of visibility (Yıldız, 2014; Ünan, 2015) were addressed. Accordingly, literature also focused on understanding Gezi at the historical trajectory of the AKP rule since 2002 (Yörük, 2014; Bozkurt, 2015), changes in the youth political activism during such period (Gümüş and Yılmaz; 2015; Arda, 2015), comparison of Gezi with the 2007 Republic Demonstrations (Toktamış, 2015) and most importantly through a meticulous assessment of the party politics during the AKP rule in understanding the crisis of representation that led to the emergence of Gezi (Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2014).

While these questions provide fruitful grounds for further research, this research focuses on how marginal subjects manifested themselves emotionally and how subjectivity is reproduced or reshaped emotionally in Gezi and what these emotional narrative on Gezi could offer for research on social movements and for broader exploration of power subjectivity nexus. Further, as new social movements of the 21st century are “social laboratories for the production of alternative codes, values, and practices” (Juris, 2004: 341), this research will argue that Gezi provided venues for articulating an alternative socio-political culture based on equality, inclusivity and justice to challenge the post-truth regime of AKP that suppress political, social and cultural diversity and livelihood of oppositional groups. Adopting such a posture, this research focuses on the narratives of resistance and counter-resistance to explore how this potential of creating an alternative socio-political culture resolved during Gezi.

1.4 Gezi: Everything or nothing, all of us or none

The protests provided a moment of solidarity to bodies from various and sometimes hostile subjective positions with different grievances and concerns about social and political life in Turkey: “Solidarity is based on ‘insecurity’ rather than ‘need’ in new modernity: it is through the perception of shared risk that communities become a ‘binding force’” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). These bodies were standing side by side against brutal police crackdown and demarcating official narratives deeming them terrorists, denying them political agency to took to the streets for social and political change. These bodies that are already denied social and political liberties, say over their bodies and voice over their concerns about their parks, cities and even their county were resisting to the precarious politics of the government at that time. Albeit the varying degree of marginalisation and precarity, protestors halted against the neoliberal rationality that privatised and personalised the public duties of a social welfare state (Butler, 2015) and hence framing their political concerns and claims about the social and political life in Turkey as personal and private.

Gezi signified “new potentialities of collective political action and new understandings of democracy that are not bound by the hegemonic forms of politics and representation” (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014, p. 118). As stressed earlier, Gezi served as a *movement of movements*. The variety of grievances and demands of the protests as well as the diversity in the composition of the protestors signalled a shift in the conventional perception of opposition culture in Turkish politics. Gezi showed that political confrontation was not limited to left-wing / right-wing ideologies and secular / Islamist conflicts that dominated Turkish social and political history to a larger extent. The calls for environmental, social and economic justice; gender

equality; restoration of checks and balances mechanisms; respect to freedom of rights liberties and press all showed the diversity in how hegemonic power is conceived. This diversity in how power is perceived and contested showed that it was possible to conceptualise politics and democracy not bound by the notions and histories of traditional political struggles in Turkey. Both in terms of space and grievances, Gezi provided multiple terrains of resistance for people from various subjective positions. It was in that sense that Gezi appropriated battle grounds for bodies from various subjective positions to tackle age old ethnic conflicts in Turkey; struggles between secular and Islamic circles; social and political ills shaped by gendered, neoliberal and heteronormative power structures; and address demands for social, economic, ecological and political justice. This research argues that this social and political transformative potential of Gezi entailed potentials of articulating an alternative socio-political opposition culture in Turkey to challenge precarious politics of AKP as well as tackle social and political ills in Turkish history.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Intersectional Feminism & Feminist International Relations

Feminism in International Relations (IR) is an approach that strives to integrate gender concerns into the agenda of studying global politics. In “Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations” (1992) V. Spike Peterson explains Feminism as: “neither just about women, nor the addition of women to male-stream constructions; it is about transforming ways of being and knowing as gendered discourses are understood and transformed” (Peterson, 1992, p. 205). It is in that sense Feminist IR posits that we make sense of the world and world politics through our gendered bodies.

Although Feminist IR is united in the sense that gender is used as the central category of analysis, various ontological positions as well as various approaches to theorise global politics is present in Feminist approaches. Feminist approaches to IR adopted three ontological assumptions of “empiricist feminism”, “standpoint feminism” and “post-modern / post-structural feminism” (Keohane, 1989, p. 245). These gender ontologies correspond to three aspects of gender as epistemological perspectives prominent in Feminist IR (Hansen, 2013). Various perspectives within Feminist IR can be identified as; realist, liberal, constructivist, critical, post-

structural/post-modern, post-colonial and ecological feminism. While all these perspectives use gender as central category of analysis and calls for the recognition of the impact of gender on global politics, their interest on interpreting global politics differ greatly.

Feminist IR posits that gender, indeed, is a salient concern in global politics. Gender is central to understanding underlying power relations. Including gender as a category of analysis, that is “characterising it as both constitutive of and a causal factor in international politics”, is an integral step in revealing gender hierarchies and the gendered structure of international society. It is also seen as an integral step in achieving the Feminist emancipatory agenda of eliminating gender inequalities. As it is within most of the critical approaches to IR, most approaches under Feminist IR is committed to progressive and emancipatory goals (Tickner, 1997, p. 616).

While most of the Feminist literature recognises that there are multiple experiences of gendered global politics (that is different cultures, bodies, language and culture posits plural experience of gender as a power relation), gender have a significant impact on our social and political life as gender is “a set of discourses that represents, constructs, change and enforce social meaning” (Connell, 1995). Using gender as a central category of analysis is a means to make: “...the invisible visible, bringing women’s lives to the centre, rendering the trivial important, putting the spotlight on women as competent actors and understanding women as subjects rather than objects of men” (Sjoberg, 2009).

However as Black Feminism as well as Intersectional Feminism emphasise, gender alone cannot account for precarious experiences of women and other

marginalised subjectivities. Regarding gender, race, class as mutually exclusive analytical categories could deem experiences of women at the intersection of these various subjective positions invisible. As Kathryn Russell explains;

a real-life person is not, for example, a woman on Monday, a member of the working class on Tuesday, and a woman of African descent on Wednesday. The concept of intersectionality captures this matrix of social relations, acknowledging that women do not all experience sexism in the same way; there is an irreducible diversity among us (Russell, 2007, p. 47).

Further, rendering various subjective positions invisible could very well hinder the efforts to eliminate gender inequalities. Rather than achieving emancipatory feminist agenda for all women and other marginalised subjectivities, analysis of global power hierarchies that focus solely on gender will reproduce other oppressive power structures.

Hence, intersectionality -whether regarded as a concept, theory, methodology or heuristic- is embraced by critical race, feminist and queer theory. As framework that focuses on the doings of power at the intersection of race, gender and class as well as how these interlocking power structures shape subjective positions in relation to one another, intersectional thought has a rich heritage and holds a powerful critical value. Taken its strength from black feminism's critique of white solipsism in feminist theory and its critique of regarding race and gender as separate analytical categories, intersectionality was quickly embraced by legal, political, social, cultural and international studies from 1980s onwards. This fruitful framework seems to entail various directions for research on gender as a social power:

Intersectionality refers to the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional

arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power (Davis, 2008, p. 68).

Apart from its strong critical reading of white solipsism in feminist theory, intersectionality harbours a wide scope of analytical power; it focuses on women's experiences at the intersection of gender, race and other subjective positions; it also scrutinises the social practices and the material manifestations of power structures that dictate such experiences.

2.1.1 Intersectionality & Black Feminism

While Feminist IR provides valuable insights on gendered political analysis, intersectionality emerged as a criticism to monistic readings of gender that fragments Black women's experiences (Harris, 1990, p. 589; Carastathis, 2014, pp. 304-5). Although Intersectionality as a metaphor¹ was introduced by Kimberlé W. Crenshaw and became a buzzword from 1980s onwards, the idea that oppression and discrimination does not stem solely from gender was prominent in the black feminist thought as of 1960s. For instance, Frances Beal (1970) draws our attention to how the interlocking of gender and racism, namely the 'double jeopardy', shapes the oppression of black woman. Another black feminist analysis that could be regarded as pioneering works of intersectional framework is 'multiple jeopardy' reading of Deborah King (1988) that highlights the impact of slavery on the subordination and oppression of black woman. Apart from academic readings, the impact of black feminist activism as well as other minority political movements active in the United

¹ "Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars travelling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them" (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 149).

States from 1970s onwards on intersectional feminism is worth mentioning. The Combahee River Collective's political manifesto 'A Black Feminist Statement' (1982) challenged white solipsism in feminist readings that disregarded how oppression is shaped at the intersection of race, gender, and class. In addition to black political movement, the Latin American, Chicana and other women of colour movements also highlighted the importance of the intersection of race, gender, and class in understanding oppression (Carastathis, 2014, p. 306).

2.1.2 Enter Crenshaw: Intersectionality as a Provisional Concept

Building upon the critique of Black feminism that challenged the mainstream feminist analyses that regarded gender, race, and class as separate analytical categories, Crenshaw shaped intersectional framework as an alternative to monistic readings of gender. In 'Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics' (1989) Crenshaw offers an analysis of 3 discrimination lawsuits brought by black women to show that the US anti-discrimination law disregards the racial and gendered discrimination black women face as race and gender are regarded to be mutually exclusive analytical categories in articulating the legal doctrine of discrimination in the US. A more complex understanding of intersectionality is introduced in 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence against Women of Colour' (1991) as Crenshaw provides a threefold definition of the concept; structural intersectionality, political intersectionality, and representational intersectionality. Structural intersectionality calls attention for the qualitative difference between the experiences of women at various positions at the intersection of race and gender (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1245). Political intersectionality accounts for the ways in which feminist and anti-racist politics operate in marginalising the

oppression black women experience (Crenshaw, 1991, pp. 1251-2). Finally, representational intersectionality concerns how popular culture represents the women of colour and how these racialized and gendered representations marginalise women of colour (Crenshaw, 1991, pp. 1282-3). While structural aspect of Crenshaw's provisional concept is used heavily in operationalising intersectionality (Carastathis, 2014, p. 306), political aspect seems to be much more promising in highlighting the disempowering dimension of treating gender, class and race as mutually exclusive categories in understanding how power operates. Crenshaw's provisional concept that successfully provided critical black feminist readings of legal studies as well as challenged monistic readings of gender quickly became a buzzword and found its place in feminist and queer theory.

2.1.3 Intersectionality: Concept, Theory, Methodology, and Heuristics

Intersectionality as an analytical tool that draws attention to interlocking categories of gender, race, ethnicity, colour, age, social class, language, culture, history, migrant status as well as intersecting systems of oppression to challenge the essentialist readings of women's experience (Russell, 2007, p. 47). As a theoretical framework, intersectionality allowed complex readings of subjective experiences (McCall, 2005, pp. 1773-4) and intersecting systems of oppression² through its four analytical interests: "simultaneity, complexity, irreducibility, and inclusivity" (Carastathis, 2014, p. 307). In essence, intersectionality emerged as an intellectual project to challenge unitary understandings of oppression that both focus heavily on gender and disregard how multiple categories of sex, race, ethnicity, colour, age, and

² These intersecting oppressive structures of gender, race, ethnicity, colour, age, social class, language, culture, history, migrant status are referred as kyriarchal structures by Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza. See: Schussler Fiorenza, E. (2001) *Wisdom Ways: Introducing Feminist Biblical Interpretation*. New York: Orbis Books.

social class work in relation to each other. By focusing on how intra-relational power structures emerges and persist, intersectionality seeks to unveil multiple forms of exclusion and oppression woman face ‘without fragmenting those experiences through categorical exclusion’.

Inclusivity as one of the analytical rigour of intersectionality fosters the potential of promoting ‘deep political solidarity’ (Hancock, 2011, p. 181-3; Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1299; Cole, 2008, p. 447). By maintaining the intellectual heritage of Crenshaw and others, intersectional analysis can be useful in revealing how exclusionary practices are reproduced in transformative social movements. However, using intersectionality merely for its intellectual popularity without challenging the white solipsism of the feminist theory may reproduce the oppressive knowledge structures that intersectional theory seeks to dismantle. Although its claim to capture the complexity of different subjectivities constitutes a huge part of intersectional intellectual project, it is often criticised for categorical essentialism. The inter-categorical approach used in intersectional analysis runs the risk of offering a reading of various intersubjective positions of women without understanding how interlocking oppressive structures that create and sustain these categories. Without an intra-categorical approach in addition to understanding multiple aspects of subjective experiences of women, the conceptual challenges persist.

While intersectional analysis faces these conceptual challenges, it still offers valuable insight for understanding different subjectivities. The need to revisit the intellectual heritage of intersectional analysis should be a primary concern for

scholars who seek to challenge monistic readings of subjective experiences of woman. I would further argue that incorporating research on political, social and cultural ramifications of emotions could enhance our understandings of intersecting systems of oppression and privilege. Emotions as an analytical lens could enhance the intersectional analysis as emotions will reveal how interlocking power structures sustain and secure itself. The most important contribute of this research to intersectional analysis is using emotional research to seek and explain how systems of oppression came into being, how it constructed and sustains multiple subjective positions of marginalised bodies in the 2013 Gezi Park Protests.

2.2 Politics of Emotion

Understanding various theoretical, methodological and empirical debates on what emotions are, what they do and how to theorise them is an essential part of making sense of emotions research. While classifying various approaches to understanding and theorising emotions could potentially lead to stripping these ideas of its complexity, this section that reviews the literature on the emotion research in political, social and international studies will briefly touch upon some major debates: traditional understandings versus interpretive understandings of emotions to trace the dichotomy of emotion and reason; emotion versus affect to provide conceptual clarification; macro approaches versus micro approaches to theorise emotions in order to make sense of the challenges in theorising emotions; and emotional versus affective turn³ to have a broader sense of tensions within critical approaches in rendering emotions political.

³ Perhaps regarding this debate as the Politics of emotions versus the Counter-politics of emotions would be more insightful to reveal the tensions in various critical approaches to emotions.

2.2.1 Emotions and Politics: Traditional versus Interpretive Understandings of Emotion

Up until the studies on foreign policy and political psychology proliferated in 1970s, emotions were perceived as irrational responses. This depended heavily on the dichotomy of emotion and reason that manifested itself from enlightenment onwards. The modern attitude of regarding emotional as irrational meant abstaining from any explicit or implicit theoretical engagement as politics had no room for these impulsive phenomena. While both political realism and liberal understandings of world politics had emotional connotations⁴, in the 1950s and 1960s the IR discipline lacked any attempts of addressing and theorising emotions (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008). Rather emotions were ‘derivations of rationality’ (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008, p. 116). These approaches stripped emotional from its political and social agency as well as concealed the emotional aspects of reason (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 170-2). Apart from challenging the rational – emotional dichotomy, various critical readings of emotion also stress the collective dimension of emotions that lack in traditional understandings of world politics that regard emotions to be individual and thus irrelevant. By situating emotions at the very centre of political reasoning, Jonathan Mercer (1996) and Neta C. Crawford (2000) were among the first to challenge traditional understandings of emotions in the study of politics and international relations.

⁴ On the one hand fear and emotions associated with mistrust lies at the very heart of Political Realism from Machiavelli to Thucydides. On the other hand, emotions associated with trust are inherent in the cooperative assumptions of liberal doctrines.

2.2.2 Affect and Emotion: Concepts in Emotion Research

Before moving on to approaches in theorising emotions, it is important to clarify conceptual debates about affect and emotion to highlight the cultural, social and political significance of emotion and justify the need to incorporate emotion into political research. There are various views on the difference between what constitutes affect and emotion. Perhaps the widely accepted, basic conceptual distinction, that is also embraced in this graduate research, is regarding affect to be a biological and psychological response stemming from the individual body while emotion is the social disposition of such response. However, the very distinction of affect and emotion that serves to differentiate the phenomenological and sociological quality of affective responses is essentially contested:

At the end of the day, the difference between emotion and affect is still intended to solve the same basic fundamentally descriptive problem it was coined in psychoanalytic practice to solve: that of distinguishing first-person from third-person feeling, and, by extension, feeling that is contained by an identity from feeling that is not (Ngai, 2005: 27 cited in Gorton, 2007: 334).

It is in that sense that emotion research that sought to trace the doings of power, such as the works of Teresa Brennan (2004) and Sara Ahmed (2014) use concepts of emotion and affect interchangeably, putting “importance on the way in which feeling is negotiated in the public sphere and experienced through the body” (Gorton, 2007: 334).

In his discussion of research design in corporeal approaches, Can E. Mutlu (2012) describes affect as “an intensity that exists in the body and its prior to any sociolinguistic fixity such as consciousness, emotion, feeling, or language” and emotion as “the mediated form of affect embedded within the constraints of the

sociolinguistic domain” (139). Affect, then, is pre-reflective, pre-social and pre-linguistic, stripped of temporal and spatial awareness as well as far from constituting the basis of embodied action and mediating experience. Emotion, in return, is an affective state that gains temporal as well as spatial awareness; rendering social, cultural and political significance. Such distinction corresponds with Sara Ahmed’s understanding of emotion as “aligning individuals with communities, bodily space with social space, through the very intensity of their attachment” (2004: 119). For Ahmed (2004), emotions are form of affective responses that does not stem from the body itself but gain its affective value through its sociality, that is, through its circulation among the collective. Through this circulation, emotion gain its social, cultural and political significance: “...emotions ‘matter’ for politics; emotions show us how power shapes the very surface of bodies as well as worlds. So in a way, we do ‘feel our way’” (Ahmed, 2014: 12).

2.2.3 Theorising Emotions: Macro-level and Micro-level Approaches

Both macro-level and micro-level approaches to theorising emotions challenge the traditional assumptions about emotions. Whereas macro-level approaches sought to develop general theories of emotions that matter for studying global politics, micro-level approaches to theorising emotions focus on the emotional articulation of political in particular contexts. While some scholars like Brent Sasley (2010) use macro-level approach, micro-level approaches to theorising emotions seems to provide more empirically sound accounts of how emotions gain resonance in various settings as well as tracing what is at stake with macro-level approaches that could oversimplify complex emergent. These levels of analysis are not mutually exclusive: while some scholars trace the doings of emotions in specific settings they also provide genealogical accounts of the intra-relations between sociality, politics

and emotions (Ahmed, 2014; Berlant, 2004; Garber, 2004). Micro-level approaches to emotions provide diverse accounts of emotional articulation of political and social. These include studies on the emotional narratives of people-to-people peace-building activities, humanitarian interventions and disaster managements (Head, 2015; Pupavac, 2004; Hutchison, 2014), emotional articulation of communities through politics of humiliation and dishonour in China and the Middle East (Callahan, 2004), politics of humiliation and articulation of antagonised subjectivities (Tuathail, 2003; Ahmed, 2014), politics of compassion as the new culture for conservatism and its reification of other 'others' (Berlant, 2004), among many context specific interpretive readings of emotions. I would argue that approaching emotions through a combination of micro and macro-level could be more beneficial in tracing the political and social significance of emotions. Understanding how specific emotions such as fear, anger, shame, joy and empathy as well as emotions associated with trust are articulated in and manifested itself in the micro context of the Gezi Protests would be possible through a micro-level approach to theorising emotions. How emotional politics of Gezi gain resonance at the 21st century anti-corporate movements and contemporary contentious politics would be possible through a combination of micro and macro-level approach.

2.2.4 Critical Approaches to Emotion: Affective Turn versus Emotional Turn

Finally, for the tensions within the critical understandings of emotions or the so-called emotion versus affect debate: I would argue that these tensions arise due to various ways of conceptualising emotions as well as tracing what do emotions do. Whereas what we might call 'emotional is political' influenced emotional IR influenced by Jonathan Mercer and Neta Crawford among others and prominent in

Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison's writings seeks to unveil the role of emotions in relations to political and social phenomena; scholars like Sara Ahmed (2014, pp. 169-72), Judith Butler (1997), Wendy Brown (1995), Lauren Berlant (1997) and Karin M. Fierke (2013, pp. 244-6) trace the doings of emotions and how sociality of emotions articulate different subjectivities as well as provide a broader critique of our emotional attachments. These are diverging positions of regarding emotions at a broader critical intelligibility. Regarding this as a tension is not necessarily to say that these different engagements with emotions produce irreconcilable understandings, while the former allows us to trace to emotional articulations of political narratives the latter understandings invites us to consider "how emotions can attach us to our subordinations" (Ahmed, 2014, p. 12). In essence both understandings provide valuable understandings of how political and social structures are created and sustained emotionally and how they shape the living experiences of various subjective positions.

2.3 Social Movements & Emotions

Until the 1960s social movement literature was dominated by crowd based theories. Crowds that took to the streets were perceived to be motivated by excess sentiments (Jasper and Goodwin, 2006, p. 612). Social movement literature that posits a sharp contrast between emotions and rationality was highly influenced by the idea of emotions as derivations of rationality (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2001, p. 4). Early 1970s marked the shift from collective based social movement research to structural approaches of rational actor models and organisational theory that seeks to unpack the strategic question of how social is motivated (Jasper and Goodwin, 2006, p. 614). Emotions disappeared from the social movement research that regarded social action to be rational and organised. The cultural turn of 1980s was a call for

recognising the cultural dimensions of social action while the emotional attachment embedded in the call for social change was disregarded as the literature was heavily focused on cognitive aspects of ‘framing’ and collective identity (Jasper and Goodwin, 2006, p. 614). While the cultural dimensions of action for social change is recognised by the literature on social movements that focuses on frames and narratives of protest, most work fail to address the emotional dimensions adequately (Jasper, 2011, pp. 286-7). Although rationality is still prevalent in social movement literature, “feminist theories of protest sought to legitimate their work not by avoiding emotions, but by embracing them” (Jasper and Owens, 2014, p.530):

Given their highly unpredictable and confrontational nature, mass direction actions, in particular, produce powerful affective ties. As the ‘glue of solidarity’ emotions are particularly important within fluid, network based movements that rely on non-traditional modes of identification and commitment (Juris, 2008, p. 63).

Emotions lie at the very core of actions for social change and tracing the affective ties that are embedded in the social movements that thrive for change should be the main agenda of the social movement and protest research. Social movements such as the 2013 Gezi Park Protests that harboured actors of social change from diverse background and used creative modes of resistance as well as emotional rituals mark the importance of reconnecting with the emotional as well as cultural dimensions of actions of social change. While the literature on Gezi focus on emotions associate with trust (Hacıyakupoğlu and Zhang, 2015) and emotions associated with sarcasm (Deren van het Hof, 2015) and humour (Dağtaş, 2013; Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014; Balaban, 2015), research that focus on emotional articulation of the resistance narratives as well as protesting bodies is largely missing. The presence of protestors

from diverse backgrounds and various subjective positions require an intersectional analysis. Gezi created a site for solidarity of various actors of social change such as the women's rights movements, the LGBT+ movements, and the Kurdish movement. Such affective ties could be understood through intersectional analyses that incorporate emotions as analytical lens.

2.3.1 Social Movement after 1999 Seattle WTO Protests

With the increasing trans-nationalisation of economic and political structures, the last decade of the 20th century marked a shift in the organisational as well as confrontational mode of social movements (Feixa, Pereira & Juris, 2009, pp. 423-4). As a reaction to this increasing globalisation, 1990s and 2000s witnessed the rise of grassroots globalisation (Appadurai, 2001): "In economic, political, and cultural systems, the growth of interconnections has generated new conflicts as well as opportunities for expressing these conflicts at multiple territorial levels" (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter, 2006, p. 16). Carles Feixa, Ines Pereira and Jeffrey S. Juris (2009) regard this emergence of global activism and protests as the "'new new' social movements' (423). What made anti-globalisation movements distinct from the so called old social movements is: the shift from collective action framework to 'transnational collective action' (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005, p. 2); the development of innovative action repertoires and emotional rituals and using global media to disseminate their political message (Juris, 2008 pp. 64-5; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter, 2006, p. 15); use of internet and other technological means for transnational networking of local protests (Castells, 2001; Juris, 2004); the effect of personal is political in the change of demands for political and social justice which could be regarded as an effect of 1980s students and minority movements as well as the development of the idea of 'global citizenship' (Roche, 2002) and the

hopes for “a world with an inclusive global citizenship based on diversity” (Hoikkala, 2009: 11); and last but not least the attempts to translate local movements to transnational organised movements (Pianta and Marchetti, 2007).

There seems to be a consensus among scholars doing research on social movements that the 1999 Seattle WTO Protests inaugurated anti-globalisation movements and marked the beginning of the attempts to link local movements transnationally: “one of the most important lessons of Seattle is that there are now two visions of globalisation on offer, one led by commerce, one by social activism” (Newsweek, 1999 cited in della Porta and Reiter, 1998, p. 175). Although the Battle of Seattle was the first anti-globalisation to be recognised globally as well as positing a model of confrontational direct action, Oriol Romani and Fiexa (2002) regard the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) resistance against the Mexican government’s decision to ratify the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 as the beginning of anti-globalisation movements and emergence of new forms of collective action. The 1994 EZLN resistance constitutes the *latency phase* of new cycle of social movements, followed by the 1999 Battle of Seattle that constitutes the *phase of emergency* (Feixa, Pereira & Juris, 2009, p. 424). Finally, the organisation of the first World Social Forum (WSF) in 2001 as an alternative to world Economic Forum (WEF) in Porto Alegre, Brazil marked the beginning of the phase of consolidation, a phase that gave the reactive anti-globalisation movements its proactive edge (Feixa, Pereira & Juris, 2009, p. 424).

Emergence of action modes such as standing man (*duran adam*) and the use of creative protest styles suggest that Gezi embraced non-conventional direct action model inaugurated by anti-globalisation movements. Heavy reliance on social media

during the Gezi protests (Hacıyakupoğlu and Zhang, 2015) is another feature of the protests that borrows from new new social movements. In addition to social networking, international media's attention to the protests, attributions to past social movements such as #occupy movement as well as solidarity messages to the 2013 Brazil Protests occurring at the same time shows that Gezi was a local movement that opted for trans-nationalisation of the protests. The literature on Gezi also focused on the global ties of the protests and the ramifications of global networking on anti-globalisation social movements (Tuğal, 2013; Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014; Walton, 2015).

2.4 Operationalisation of Research Question

This study aims to understand how various structures that shape the living experiences of marginalised bodies of global politics are sustained. Albeit gender as a power hierarchy is explored intensely to understand the subjective experiences of women at the global, the political, and the social sphere; gender alone is not sufficient in understanding the lived experiences of marginalised subjects. Other subjective positions of race, ethnicity, sex, religion, and social status also shape the lived experiences of women and marginal others. These various power structures intersect in shaping and sustaining the subjective positions at an interpersonal level. Intersectional feminism will be useful in exploring intersecting intra-relational structures and how they manifest and operate. However, as intersectional analysis faces challenges of providing meticulous exploration of how these various structures work together: emotions as an analytical lens are expected to provide the necessary rigour in understanding how these structures are manifested and operating in junction. Incorporating emotions into intersectional analysis will show how the

intersectional and interlocking oppressive power structures as well as the subjective bodies they articulate are shaped and sustained by social and political emotions.

These two frameworks of intersectionality and politics of emotion that seek to understand how power operates and how it shapes the social, cultural and political experience of bodies as well as how they perceive the world around them in relation to power relations that articulate meanings for those subjective bodies. Combining analytical insights of those frameworks with the anti-globalisation social movements literature that strive to understand demands for social and political justice with regards to information capitalism, neoliberal rationality and increased transnationalisation of power structures as such. Due to its complex and rich nature, the 2013 Gezi Park Protests is a useful case to explore the insights that could be obtained from combining those frameworks in understanding power – subjectivity relation and dynamics of social and political change in settings of precarious politics.

Gezi protests mobilised people from various subjective positions that stand at the intersection of race, gender, class, age, religion and social status; not surprisingly these diverse subjectivities, that found themselves already marginalised during the 11 years of rule of AKP, took to the streets with divergent grievances, concerns and claims for social and political change. Intersectional framework proves useful in understanding the diversity in demands for social and political change and how these demands shaped by often conflicting understandings of social, cultural and political attachment to their country. Putting emotions, that are the social, cultural and political manifestations of affective states, at the analytical focus of this intersectional research will be fruitful in understanding the dynamics of social and

political change in the persistence of hegemonic power structures that intersect and shape how protestors perceive themselves as well as how their experiences are framed by the government at that time.

According to Laura Sjoberg (2009), feminists in the International Relations discipline have led the way in introducing “hermeneutic, historically contingent, sociological, or ethically based and ethnographic, narrative and cross-cultural methodologies” (p. 193). Being influenced by research insights of feminist approaches to global politics, this research will combine narrative analysis with auto-ethnography in understanding and exploring the emotional politics of Gezi. This thesis will use intersectional feminist analysis as Gezi is a complex and rich phenomena that mobilised people from various subjective positions of ethnicity, gender, ideology, and class. In understanding the narratives of the protests and diversity in the composition of the protestors, politics of emotion literature that render emotions political in understanding power – subjectivity relations will be incorporated into intersectional feminist analysis and literature on transnational social movements inaugurated by the 1999 Seattle WTO Protests (Hadden & Tarrow, 2007). This research will also focus on the emotional articulation of narratives of resistance as well as counter-Gezi narratives to show that Gezi that provided an opportunity for articulating an alternative socio-political culture in Turkey to challenge authoritarian regime of the government at that time, failed to realise such potential through exploring the emotional reproduction of certain narratives of the protests.

A successful research project should clearly identify its object of the study, how it will operationalise data, and reflect upon the data collection and analysis process. For a successful research, it is necessary to identify whether the emotional response of different subjectivities that were present in Gezi, or the meaning of those responses as the meaning the emotional response gains resonance at a specific cultural and social setting is the object of the study. Further identifying what counts as data of the emotion as well as assessing the extent of the study's reproducibility and generalisability lies at the core of the corporeal research process (Mutlu, 2012, p. 142-3). This sub-section seeks to address these questions by unpacking the research question. Can emotions as an analytical lens enhance our understanding of the 2013 Gezi Park Protests? This research question that guides this research of the Gezi is connected to a larger question of the analytical benefits of using emotion research that is combined with intersectional analysis in understanding social movements as well as understanding dynamics of the failure to realise demands for social and political change in relation to the persistence of oppressive power structures. The object of this study is to trace the emotional articulations of meaning attributed to the Gezi protests, the Gezi community, as well the manifestations of the other. Through understanding the meanings attributed to the affective and emotional reactions of the Gezi and counter-Gezi narratives, this research aims to trace the emotional articulations of the political and social of various marginalised subjectivities. An understanding of the emotional reproduction of worlds as well as the emotional nature of the social and political through feminist reflexivity will be enabling in tracing the doings of emotions in the context of Gezi. The value of this research is two-folded: while this research will contribute to intersectional feminist studies of global politics, it will also provide important insights to understandings of social

change and the role of emotions in resistance movements. On the one hand, intersectional analysis of intra-relational global power structures will benefit from the analytical insights drawn from exploring how these structures are manifested and sustained emotionally. On the other hand, tracing how the emotional articulations of Gezi shaped the lived experiences of various marginalised subjectivities that joined the protests will contribute to the literature on social movements and change.

While critical International Relations (IR) is mostly criticised as relying solely on discourse analysis, the ethnographic and discursive methods that supplement it with other kinds of analysis provides a strong basis for sound empirical research on politics of emotions. Through interpretive narrative analysis this research will analyse the performative linguistic connection between the emotions and its political as well as social narratives. Regarding “narratives not as authentic statements of the *way things are*, but as subjectivities within an ongoing dialogue of meaning-making and knowledge creation (Johnson, 2012, p. 67)”, this research analyse how discursive and social performances of Gezi and counter-Gezi resulted in the failure to realise the socio-political transformative potential of the protests. The aim of this study is to trace how the narratives of ‘Gezi’, the community of Gezi, oppressive structures as well as the manifestations of these structures as the ‘others’ are emotionally articulated and perceived by various marginalised subjectivities that took part in the Gezi protests. Tracing how these emotional narratives transformed the intersubjective positions of Gezi protestors will be beneficial in understanding the dynamics of social and political change and its interrelation with the interlocking and intersecting power structures.

This study that desires to enrich understanding of the dynamics of social and political change – the intersection of various power structures interrelation, will explore emotions, which are the socio-political manifestations of affective reactions, as an analytical lens. By using emotions as an analytical category in understanding marginalised bodies at the crossroads of various oppressive structures in the context of 2013 Gezi Park Protests in Turkey, the aim of this research is two-folded: It desires to contribute to the intersectional feminist literature in IR that emerges as a critique to identity based readings of collective political action that renders group unity to group uniformity. It seeks to contribute to intersectional analysis by using emotions as an analytical category in conceptualising the intra-action between the individuals and institutions in understanding intersection of subjectivities and oppressive structures. It aims to trace new directions for understanding social movements through emotions to move away from analysis that are constrained by rational and structural approaches dominating the social movement that regards social action solely as rational or interest-based action. I would argue that Gezi protests used emotional rituals heavily to attribute meaning to its contentions actions.

2013 Gezi Park Protests in Turkey will be a useful case study in recognising the benefits of intersectional account of different subjectivities and the role of emotions in civil resistance. Gezi is chosen as a case study for its novelties: What initially started as an ecological protest against the urban renewal plan to demolish the Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul turned into a massive uprising, mobilising a significant proportion of the population of the Republic of Turkey (Örs, 2014; İnceoğlu, 2014; Abbas and Yiğit, 2014; Özen, 2015; Arda, 2015; Canlı and Umul, 2015; Örs and Turan, 2015). Apart from its appeal and the ability to mobilise people

from diverse subjective positions, Gezi stood as a grassroots movement that mobilised these diverse groups without direct initiation of major political parties and dominance of political fractions (Arda, 2015; Gümüş and Yılmaz, 2015). Gezi happened during a hegemonic dominance of a political party for the last 11 years, a period as such that never occurred in Turkey after 1940s and a period that never been thought to cause such an uprising (Toktamış, 2015; Bozkurt, 2015). Due to the past histories of violence, polarisation and demarcation as well as successful polarisation narratives through counter-Gezi movement by the government at that time operating on a politics of post-truth, Gezi failed to make use of moments of solidarity. The failure to embrace moments of solidarity provided by the protests and failure in articulating a ‘we’ defined through social and political struggle defined by mutual respect and solidarity meant missing out the possibility of providing an alternative social and political culture that could struggle for peaceful co-existence of peoples of Turkey living without social, economic and political precarity.

2.4.1 Gezi & Auto-ethnography or how I learned to enjoy wearing swimming goggles in the city centre

From 31st of May to 15th of July I attended every single protest in Ankara and kept detailed records of protests as parts of my project of citizenship journalism. Using #direnankara (Resist Ankara) hashtag I tweeted about almost anything: minute by minute police intervention, presence of riot police and anti-water cannon vehicles (TOMA) in specific locations, safe routes for protestors leaving, alternative routes for newcomers, need lists for Gezi infirmaries, how to protect from riot control agents including tear gas as well as my reflections on police violence. Going through neighbourhood by neighbourhood, carrying a backpack filled with first aid kit

essentials for infirmaries and solutions for tear made of a mixture of water and anti-gas medicine I spent 46 days walking around the city centre and live-tweeted as Turkish media was not broadcasting about the protests. Although I regularly attended May 1st protests in Ankara since the age of 14 and was tear gassed before, Gezi was a complete shock due to the massive scale of police intervention.

Going through my citizenship journal archive made it even more evident as a protestor I reflected on this process as a learning experience from the second day of the protests onwards. What was striking was how this evolution was shaped by police violence increasing day by day. It included creative measures, such as wearing swimming goggles, employed by the protestors in protecting from the police intervention; updates about what to do in case of medical emergency; and whom to call in case of legal emergency. However, the most crucial learning process was shaped by the peculiar composition of different subjectivities out on the streets. The 1923 Turkish people making process led to the exclusion and marginalisation of various subjectivities of race, gender, ethnicity, class and religion. Reflecting upon the days I spent out on the streets, what I realised in Gezi was that reading and doing research about historical ills to understand the precarious lives of marginalised subjectivities, interacting with Kurdish and leftist intellectuals and advocating for the fraternity of the peoples of Anatolia on an equal footing could never be as revealing as witnessing how past histories are emotionally and subjectively reproduced through new encounters. By joining the Gezi protests, experiencing the circulation of emotions in the encounters of selves and others of modern secular Turkish Republic discourses, I can offer a narrative on Gezi that is novel not in the sense that the literature on Gezi emphasise but in the sense that seeks to reveal politics of civil

resistance and its ramifications for the reproduction of power hierarchies. Without an auto-ethnographic account of the days of protests in Ankara, this chapter could not have been possible. I would argue that how an activist thinks and perceives struggle and change is an important starting point in understanding political subjectivity and global power hierarchies for the discussion of transnational social movements. An auto-ethnographic research on social movements can be insightful in understanding power subjectivity nexus as well as unsettling the taken for granted readings of dissident subjects.

While this thesis is not making grand claims about facilitating methodological basis for auto-ethnographic research, it is intended to be a guide for further discussions about the possible venues to be explored through auto-ethnography. Morgan Briggs and Roland Bleiker's suggestions for exploring the possibility of auto-ethnographic knowledge seems to hold great potential and used in this article as a guiding posture: "Rather than relying on pre-determined criteria we argue that methodological uses of the self should be judged by their ability to open up new perspectives on political dilemmas" (Brigg and Bleiker, 2010, p. 781). My position as a protestor witnessing the initial shock upon encounter of the often conflicting subjectivities, which celebrated by the most of the literature on Gezi as a unique moment of peaceful coexistence in contemporary Turkish politics, as well as the aftermath of the moment of contact which was shaped by civil / uncivil distinction enabled me to offer an alternative narrative of Gezi as a clash of different dissident cultures. Regarding Gezi through a perspective of a clash of different dissident cultures will be insightful for two reasons; such a perspective could reveal the opportunities Gezi as a site of encounter for various subjectivities provided in

addressing age-old social, cultural and political ills in Turkey, and it will provide the crucial critical edge to scrutinise how those opportunities were missed. Further, such a perspective would provide an understanding of why Gezi failed to create a sustainable political opposition culture in Turkey where precarious politics is successfully embedded through conservative neoliberal development policies.

CHAPTER III

EMOTIONAL ARTICULATION OF DIFFERENT SUBJECTIVITIES IN GEZI: ‘EVERYTHING OR NOTHING, ALL OF US OR NONE?’

"To express hope for another kind of world, one that is unimaginable at present, is a political action, and it remains so even in the face of exhaustion and despair."

(Ahmed, 2014, p. 186)

3.1. The 2013 Gezi Park Protests: Multiple Gezis, Various Subjectivities

What initially started as an ecological protest against the urban development plan to demolish the Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul on May 28, 2013 spread to 79 provinces in Turkey (İnsan Hakları Derneği, 2013, p.4) with approximately three and a half million people participating (Özel, 2014). While the protests in smaller provinces faded quickly, the events in Istanbul, Ankara, Eskişehir, Izmir as well as Hatay continued for more than two months despite increasingly violent police measures. Gezi Park created a site for various subjectivities to manifest themselves socially as well as politically. In ‘Occupy Gezi as Politics of the Body’, Zeynep Gambetti puts it simply but elegantly: “What happened throughout June 2013 in

Turkey was novel, in the sense that our conventional political categories fail to explain or grasp its dynamics” (Gambetti, 2014, p. 100).⁵

Diversity was one of the most notable characteristics of the 2013 Gezi Park Protests in Turkey. Along with the cultural and political pluralism that marked Gezi resistance, the literature on Gezi emphasise that it provided a unique movement. Plurality at Gezi was observable first in the composition of its crowd being of a diverse background and orientation:

A colourful showcase by environmentalists, sports fans, animal activists, students, artists, academics, feminists, LGBTTTQ [lesbian gay bisexual transvestite transgender queer], Kurds, Armenians, Kemalists, Turkish nationalists, Muslim socialists, street children, investment bankers, and all kinds of blue as well as white-collar workers were among the hundred thousands of Gezi protesters (Örs and Turan, 2015, p. 455).

While Örs and Turan provide an extensive account of different subjectivities in Gezi Protests, there are few points that should be revised. Intersex should also be included within the LGBT+ community. Rather than Muslim socialists, identifying that community as the anti-capitalist Muslims would be more appropriate based on the political context these concepts are operating on: I would argue that being anti-capitalist is not necessarily the same thing as being socialist. The participation of the medical professionals is also notable. Finally, supporters of human rights and womens’ rights movement also were present in the Gezi protests.

⁵ While the environmental activists occupied the Taksim Gezi Park in 27th of May 2013, mass protests throughout Turkey started in June.

Due to this plurality and diversity, Gezi provided a site of encounter for various subjectivities. Bodies from various subjective positions of age, race, class, ideology, and gender were out on the streets; bodies that were almost impossible to imagine together, either due to social stratification or due to socio-political hostility were standing side by side, marginalised by the same manifestation of power structure namely the AKP government, being subjected to political discrimination, marginalisation and police violence. Gezi as a site of encounter harboured possibilities of either a state of cooperation among those various subjectivities or a state of conflict; the conflict prevailed and led to the opportunity of creating a sustainable socio-political opposition culture that could foster solidarity to settle historical conflict and provide a venue to challenge AKP policies, missed:

Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same struggles, or that our pain is the same pain, or that our hope is for the same future. Solidarity involves commitment, and work, as well as the recognition that even if we do not have the same feelings, or the same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on common ground (Ahmed, 2014: 189).

Regarding Gezi as a site of encounter for various subjectivities requires attention to various literatures that seek to understand power – subjectivity nexus; intersectionality, new new social movements and politics of emotion. As discussed in the second chapter, these literatures pay attention to the interaction of various subjectivities and how these interactions are being shaped by oppressive power structures as well as possibilities to challenge oppressive structures of trans-national capitalism.

While the literature on Gezi highlights how various subjectivities marginalised by the government at that time unified and coexisted together and

escaping the polarisation narratives of the ruling elite, this chapter focuses on #thisiscivilresistance campaigns and the death of Berkin Elvan to explore the clash of different dissidence cultures to assess the opportunities missed in: creating a coherent political discourse to challenge the social and political precarity caused by the conservative neoliberal policies of the government at that time; as well as to addressing the historical ills in Turkish social and political history and the failure in tackling the age-old culture of impunity in Turkey.

3.2 Gezi within Gezi: Clash of Dissident Cultures

Gezi itself was a clash; clash with the AKP government due to their neoliberal urban development agenda, envisioned legal reforms on but not limited to abortion and reproductive health, constraints on freedom of expression and press, and other measures targeting certain lifestyles not characterised by Islamic morality. The government at that time pursued what Judith Butler defines as precarisation, operating on neoliberal rationality that

demands self-sufficiency as a moral ideal at the same time that neoliberal forms of power work to destroy that very possibility at an economic level, establishing every member of the population as potentially or actually precarious, even using the ever-present threat of precarity to justify its *heightened regulation of public space and its deregulation of market expenditure* (Butler, 2015: 14, emphasis added).

Pursing precarious politics, the government at that time followed neoliberal development agenda as well as articulated conservative policies that threatened the life styles and livelihood of various communities, eventually leading to an outburst.

Although grievances stemmed from the same material manifestation of power structure, namely the government at that time, reasons behind the feeling of oppression varied greatly. For middle class secularists embodying the western modernist and secularist reforms set forth upon the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the occupation of the park created possibilities for resisting the AKP's New Turkey Project that rests upon neoliberal conservative discourse. AKP policies informed by Islamic-neoliberalism was regarded first and foremost threatened the existence of the Turkish Republic characterised by the Kemalist reforms of secularism and western modernism (Hurd, 2011, p. 177). Middle class secularists, whom still trying to cope with becoming the other of the newly articulated Turkish 'people', found themselves confronting the police, being politicised beyond their conception of civil politics. Kemalist elite holding a powerful share in Turkish politics since 1923 found itself depicted as the other through AKP project of New Turkey. The making of New Turkey rested on the depiction of Kemalist ideology suppressing the majority of Turkish public holding religious conservative values.

AKP transformation project constructed a temporal dichotomy of an old Turkey founded through a "republican-secularist revolution from above aiming at western type modernisation" (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014, p. 136) that othered the 'authentic' Turkish people by defining the Turkish nation through ethnicity and western values and a New Turkey embracing the 'repressed people' since 2002 elections, disempowering establishment of the old regime including a strong military involved in politics. For environmental activists as well as Leftist groups, Gezi provided an opportunity to challenge neoliberal development policies that aim to achieve economic progress with the cost of environmental degradation and socio-

economic destruction of lower class communities, privatisation of public commitments of a social welfare state, urban gentrification and cultural as well as historical destruction. For feminist and LGBT+ activists, Gezi created a political venue to challenge patriarchal, heteronormative policies of AKP that marginalised women and queer individuals in Turkey.

Whether it was Turkish nationalists, middle class secularists, Kurds, Alevis⁶, Leftist groups as well as feminist, LGBT+, and environmental activists, Gezi provided an opportunity to took to the streets and snap against oppressive structures either it was race, class or gender:

Gezi provided a unique moment when different grievances and concerns converged, providing the raw material for what might be called, in social movement parlance, ‘injustice frames’ which propelled a not insignificant part of the population to embark on collective action (Özkırımlı, 2014: 3).

Gezi created sites for various subjectivities to manifest themselves socially as well as politically. Gezi provided multiple sites of encounters; bodies from different socio-economic backgrounds and various subjectivities of race, gender, and class that sometimes never contact, either due to social stratification or to historical hostility, were together.

On the 2nd of June 2013, in Kuğulu Park located in the Tunalı district of Ankara that is mostly inhabited by middle class secular people, protestors in Ankara

⁶ Alevis are members of a cultural, and religious Islamic practice and can be regarded as a religious minority in Anatolian region. The majority of Turkish Muslims characterise their religious practices within Sunni-Islam. As Alevi-Bektashi cultural practice are regarded to be heterodox, they are marginalised by the Sunni community. facing ill-treatment and considerable social pressure. For further information, see: Olsen, T., Ozdalga, E., & Raudvere, K. (Eds.) (1998). *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*. Routledge.

witnessed a peculiar scene as Kurdish people were dancing 250 metres apart from Turkish ultra-nationalists singing Janissary March used by the Ottoman military in attacking. It was peculiar as due to historical hostility between Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, Kurdish folkloric dance and ultra-nationalist march were never expected to coexist together without either parties violently disrupting each other. Instances as such was read by the streets as well as the academia as a sign of a unique moment of peaceful coexistence if not cooperation against the conservative policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. Incidents of clash of dissidence cultures in Gezi could provide a learning opportunity for future attempts to take to the streets for social and political change in Turkey.

On her discussion of how emotions like fear and hate gain resonance upon contact Sara Ahmed discusses relevance of histories on impressions: “the ‘moment of contact’ is shaped by the past histories of contact, which allows the proximity of a racial other to be perceived as threatening, at the same time as it reshapes the bodies in contact zone of encounter” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 194). Witnessing the initial shock on the streets, as well as the shock of government in understanding the composition of the people in responding, first handed; I would argue that the moment of contact that gains resonance through past histories of conflict was delayed by the initial shock in the peculiarity of scenes of dissidence in the first few days. As soon as the shock wore off, the traumatic events of the troubling political history of the Kurdish and Turkish people shaped the encounters of those bodies out on the street: “unable to adequately express trauma, one’s social and linguistic world becomes ‘frozen pictures of the past’ as traumatic memories continue to structure being and what motivates interactions with others” (Hutchison, 2016, p. 8). For instance: “As

Bozcalı & Yoltar (2013) illustrate, uneasy silences around the mere word and stark reality of Kürdistan at the neighbourhood forums show that solidarity in times of ‘common suffering’ can be a liminal state” (Potuoğlu-Cook, 2015, p. 107). Not being able to deal with ghost of the past, the movement missed out on the chance to meet on a common ground to create a politically viable public opposition movement. This oversimplified a potentially rich and complex movement that could strive to challenge all forms of hegemonic power to a pragmatic co-existence only on anti-government grounds.

The temporal dichotomy of the Gezi as the first few days of shock and the initial aftermath that was handled through #thisiscivilresistance campaign is utilised by the government at that time in their counter-Gezi project. Through a polarising narrative as well as articulating a temporal dichotomy of the first few days / legitimate days and the illegitimate days of Gezi, the Turkish government at that time emotionally reproduced a self and others as well as other others. ‘The Gezi Protests were legitimate in the first few days, we were sympathetic and supportive of the protests initially’ as a narrative legitimising brutal police violence increasing day by day, also works to differentiate between the protestors that are the legitimate objects of recognition and the other ‘others’ that are not. In her discussion of a performative theory of assembly, Butler (2015) points out the opportunities provided by the notion of inclusiveness for public assemblies to articulate a political and alternative culture to precarious politics:

The point of democratic politics is not simply to extend recognition equally to all of the people, but, rather, to grasp that only by changing the relation between the recognisable and unrecognisable can (a) equality be understood

and pursued, and (b) ‘the people’ can become open to a further elaboration (15).

It seems that the peculiar scene discussed above and the resembling scenes of peaceful co-existence on the first days of the protest bear the possibility of creating a “provisional and plural form of co-existence that constitutes a distinct ethical and social alternative” (Butler, 2015: 15-6). However, the post-truth politics and the polarisation narrative of AKP coupled with the historical hostilities in Turkey that gained resonance upon moment of contact led to the failure of Gezi in the sense that the polity failed to extend “their mission to showcase an alternative world imagined as one of respect, solidarity, pluralism and peace, Gezi manner underlined, among others, generosity, politeness, an ethic of collective work, and on attachment to anti-violence and anti-harassment.” (Örs and Turan, 2015: 457). The commune experience at Taksim Gezi Park showcased an alternative socio-political culture, a micro experiment of an alternative Turkey where people from various subjective positions of age, race, class, ideology and gender were standing side by side in solidarity. It is in that sense that Gezi polity missed out creating an alternative living space of solidarity for marginalised subjectivities of New Turkey along with tackling the historical wounds of Turkey to make step towards social, cultural and political closure. Two cases that illustrate manifestations of moment of closure that undermined peaceful co-existence in will be discussed in the following sub-sections.

3.2.1 Berkin Elvan and the Cultural Politics of Impunity

On June 16, 2013, 15-year-old Berkin Elvan was hit in the head by a tear gas canister in İstanbul. On March 11, 2014, Berkin died after spending almost a year in coma. There were speculations about the reasons behind Berkin’s presence at the

street where he was shot by a police officer: the pro-government news outlets claimed Berkin went out to join the protests and was throwing stones with a slingshot, which quickly became the official narrative of the government at that time operating on post-truth politics. According to his parents, Berkin was out on the streets to buy bread. Counter-Gezi project articulated scenarios about Berkin's supposed violent activities on the day of the incident precisely to utilise the long lasting tradition of impunity in Turkish political and social culture. The initial response by the so called Gezi community was dramatic if not underdeveloped; "Berkin went out to buy bread, he was just an 'innocent' child" quickly became the official counter-narrative on the shooting of Berkin Elvan. What was missing from the Gezi narratives was large public support for calls to demand an effective investigation of death of a civilian due to the states use of force. In an event that led to the death of a civilian due to use of force by the law enforcement, there were no effective investigation conducted by the Turkish authorities and to this day people who are responsible for Berkin's death is unknown.

Instead of emphasising the impunity enjoyed by the İstanbul riot police force, regardless of the motivation behind the presence of Berkin out on the streets on the day of the incident, some of the protestors focused on countering the narrative of the government by using symbols of innocence and bread. Emphasis on Berkin's 'real agenda' and his supposed use of slingshot was a product of the cultural politics of impunity, a long lasting statist tradition in Turkey resting upon arousing suspicion through offering alternative explanations. While some protestors emphasised bread and Berkin's age as symbols of innocence to counter official narratives as well as highlighting the severity of the police violence experienced by the protestors, such

narratives led to what could be called as counter-politics of impunity. Focusing on the motivation behind Berkin's presence on the day of the incident resulted in neglecting the severity of the incident that resulted in the death of a 15-year-old civilian due to police force. Rather than demanding an effective investigation of a criminal incident that could be premeditated and emphasising the violation of right to life (including the lack of an effective investigation) as well as consideration of a possible violation of Article 3 Prohibition of Torture under European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)⁷, some of the protestors emphasised symbols of innocence and contributed to the securing of a cultural politics of impunity in the case of Berkin Elvan.

3.2.2 #ThisIsCivilResistance

One of the most notable instances of the clash of dissident cultures or to say the Gezi within Gezi manifested itself in the #thisiscivilresistance campaigns. To counter the increasingly violent police measures and maintain the occupation of spaces, Leftist and Kurdish protestors experienced with vis-à-vis confrontation with the law enforcement and Turkish military employed defensive measures in protesting. On the one hand, these experienced groups were in the frontlines; measures to maintain occupation and confrontation included maintaining the barricade to prevent a possible police raid and mass arrests, throwing rocks or gas canisters back to the police. On the other, middle class secularists that almost never took to the streets and never exposed to police violence were inexperienced. Without any know how of their own to establish the baselines as well as limits of their

⁷ See the Case of Abdullah YAŞA and others v. Turkey (Application no. 44827/08) reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights. The court founded violation of Article 3 inhuman treatment due to Turkish law enforcement firing anti-riot agents directly at the demonstrators, risking serious injury or death of civilians.

confrontational strategies, inexperienced protestors framed their disobedience as an opposition to traditional confrontational culture informed by Kurdish and leftist resistances that utilise symbolic violence. This led to the emergence of #thisiscivilresistance campaign, highlighting the importance of civil disobedience to justify the rightness of their claims and condemning ‘partisan’ strategies aiming to convert Gezi into a fight for identity politics. On 2nd of June, 2013 #thisiscivilresistance campaign was initiated online, the image above got circulated on Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr. Campaign included calls to warn protestors, whom being called as junglis⁸ in one of the posters, using violent counter-measures including throwing rocks, vandalising public property in building barricades and stop using flags of partisan organisations including leftist student unions and workers’ unions flags and vests.

While this clash seemingly influenced by opposing confrontational tactics, the #thisiscivilresistance campaign that establish its civil character through referring the protestors using symbolic and strategic violence as uncultured and uncivilised. Regarding violence as an irrational response, protestors using violent measures to protect occupied spaces were deemed emotional, uncultured and uncivil. This distinction between the civil and uncivil protestors contributes to a long lasting hostility between working class and the elite as well as the Turkish people defined by 1923 secular revolution and Turkish people making project that excluded ethnic minorities. Civil – uncivil distinction, in this case, was generated through rehearsing

⁸ According to Oxford Dictionary jungli is an adjective meaning uncultured; wild. The poster in Turkish referred to protestors using symbolic violence as Ayı (bear in Turkish), regarding those protestors mostly from lower class and Kurdish ethnicity. Jungli seems to be a proper interpretation of the intended meaning of the phrase used in the poster entitled ‘Sen Gelme Ulan Ayı (Don’t come you jungli)’

the dichotomies of urban – rural, elite – worker, Kurdish – Turkish, Western – non-Western. While the feeling of threat by the uncivil other, the fear of losing the ‘legitimacy’ of the protests, desire to be recognised as a part of the new transnational movements and global dissidence network, and the fear of being labelled as ‘junglis’ resorting to violence in confronting the state and the police can be regarded as innate experiences, through repeating past encounters these emotions generated their objects, namely the usual suspects of the Turkish dissident politics.

Regarding emotions to be social and political performativities, emotions circulated in the encounters of different subjectivities (Ahmed, 2004, 119) in Gezi gained its social, cultural and political significance through #thisiscivilresistance campaign that rehearsed the civil / uncivil, Western / non-Western, Turkish / and the dangerous minorities distinction articulated in the Kemalist discourse. The history of the subjectivities demarcated during the foundation of the Turkish Republic, bodies denied any part due to their ethnic, racial, gender, class difference was repeated in the emotional articulation of Gezi as a civil resistance movement. Leftist and Kurdish others resorting to violence as a confrontational tactic were perceived as contaminating the Gezi resistance, hijacking it by partisan politics and threatening the existence of western, rational and civil dissidents. Gezi as a site of encounter for these subjectivities to contact provided a venue for the gendered reproduction of the age old conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish nationalists as well as the conflict between the middle class liberals and leftists. In his discussion of ontological insecurity and non-West spaces, Ali Bilgiç (2015) explains: “It makes the non-Western space and subjects susceptible to the so-called ‘legitimate’ Western political and military intervention as the holder of the temporal standards of masculinity, in

order to ‘civilise’, ‘modernise’ or ‘democratise’ those who could not meet the ‘standards’” (p. 203). Hence, aggressive protestors resorting to violence is de-valourised through promotion of a Gezi without flags, without identities, and certainly without ‘junglis’. Articulation of Gezi as such rests on hyper-masculinisation and exclusion of protestors opting for a Gezi with partisan politics and usage of strategic violence.

3.3 Conclusion: Everything or nothing, all of us or none?

‘Everything or nothing, all of us or none’ is a verse taken from Bertolt Brecht’s ‘All of us or none’ poem. It was translated into Turkish and used as a slogan during Gezi. While the slogan has its roots in the Turkish Revolutionary Communist Union (TIKB) an armed leftist oppositional group mostly active in the 1980s, it soon was embraced by the protestors. Being in the city centre or a park located in the most crowded square of the city, chanting this side by side with thousands of people is an emotional scene. Scenes as such are susceptible to be read as scenes of solidarity among a crowd that coexist despite the polarising narratives of the government at that time and despite various historical hostility between them. However, being out on the streets, witnessing such powerful scene as well as witnessing how such coexistence unrevealed as the shock wear off, the imagined solidarity between ‘all of us’ was replaced by an emphasis on Gezi as a ‘civil’ resistance that asked ‘some of us’ not to join the protests anymore. Everything or nothing, all of us or none as a chant for solidarity was no longer relevant.

The emotional articulation of civil / uncivil protestors distinction through repeating the past demarcations of the Kemalist project gained its significance in

#thisiscivilresistance campaign that asked protestors resorting to violence in maintaining the occupation of spaces as well as protestors opting for partisan / identity politics or protestors they simply referred as junglis not to join the protests. Resting upon a 'bourgeois-rational' type of masculinity, Gezi imagined as a civil resistance was a Gezi re-claimed from the uncivil protestors. By hyper-masculinising the protestors opting for a Gezi with partisan politics and committed to usage of strategic violence, #thisiscivilresistance campaign reproduced gendered power hierarchies of Turkish / dangerous minorities, urban / rural, elite / worker, Western / non-Western. Emotions as social and cultural performativities repeated past conflict and articulated civil / uncivil protestor distinction that manifested itself as a clash in the form of clash of different dissident cultures. Such division within the Gezi polity was capitalised by the government at that time to strip Gezi of its socio-political edge provided by the composition of people from various subjectivities: AKP framed Gezi as a yet another secular elite outcry against the Islamic majority of the country and the leaders of such majority, namely the government at that time striving to make Turkey a prospering nation. The loss of solidarity among the Gezi polity due to the clash of dissident cultures resulted in the movements loss of articulating an alternative socio-political culture against the precarious policies of AKP that threatened the civil and political liberties, existence of environmental, political and social justice.

Further, the response by the Gezi community to the official narrative on Berkin Elvan's death was limited in the sense that Berkin's death signalled a symbolic moment in the history of children killed by state violence and the impunity enjoyed by the institutions of the state in such incidents. While Berkin was not the

first and certainly not the last victim of political violence that does not discriminate between children and adult bodies, the increasingly critical socio-political environment provided by Gezi was an opportunity to stress the long lasting culture of impunity in Turkey. Emphasising the innocence of a child body through symbol of bread in responding to the narrative of slingshot without stressing the importance and the connections of Berkin's death to the history of political violence and impunity in Turkey meant missing out a moment of creating a socio-political oppositional culture and public that could tackle social and political ills of the Turkish History. Creating socio-political awareness on histories of political violence and impunity opens up possibilities of closure from the historical ills of the Turkish History that still constitutes the basis of polarisation and demarcation among the peoples of Turkey.

All in all, due to its diverse composition of people as well as its potential as a movement of movements, Gezi bear the potential of articulating an alternative socio-political culture to conservative neoliberal policies of AKP and the precarious politics it entailed for increasingly marginalised peoples of Turkey. The political agency appropriated by the commune experience at the park as well as the spirit of solidarity Gezi movement marked opened up the possibilities for imagining a better Turkey for silenced, oppressed and demarcated people from various subjectivities of race, gender and class. The cases presented in this chapter illustrated how past histories of violence and polarisation surpassed the spirit of solidarity that could constitute the basis of socio-political transformation in Turkey. The spirit of solidarity that was dominant at the beginning lost its significance: "The structural incompatibilities between some protesting groups, such as Kurdish groups and Turkish nationalists, proletarian groups and professionals, and religious groups and

secular ones, were among the factors that made it difficult to unify everyone around a common identity” (Özen, 2015, p. 544). While Gezi was signalling the possibilities of a future challenging the precarious politics by chanting ‘everything or nothing, all of us or none’, Gezis within Gezi undermined the formation of such an alternative socio-political culture.

CHAPTER IV

COUNTER-GEZI PROJECT: A TURBULENT PERIOD IN THE MAKING OF THE ‘NEW TURKEY’

What the world does to you, if the world does it to you long enough and effectively enough, you begin to do to yourself. You become a collaborator, an accomplice of your own murderers, because you believe the same things they do.

James Baldwin

4.1 The Emotional Politics of Gezi Park Protests: A ‘network of treachery’

A small-scale environmental protest against the urban development project in Taksim Gezi Park turned into a mass-scale civil resistance while the Justice and Development Party (AKP), ruling party at that time, was enjoying its 11th year in power. During those 11 years, the ruling party at time successfully disempowered the Kemalist establishment, hence ‘elite’ regime as well as most of the remnants of military coups of 1960 and 1980 (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014: 121). Efforts to disempower the remnants of old regime through the 2010 Turkish Constitutional Reform was within greater efforts of normalisation and democratisation. To come to power, AKP formulated a populist discourse that created a socio-spatial dichotomy between the repressed people of Anatolia due to their religious beliefs and conservative values and the repressing elite regime established in 1923 with the

founding of the Republic of Turkey. Using this socio-spatial dichotomy, AKP articulated itself as the leaders of the repressed people of Anatolia, with the aim of creating a living space for those excluded by the elite regime defining itself through Western secular democracy. Ergo, it was not surprising that the ruling party at the time of Gezi Protests articulated a similar demarcation between the protestors and the people who did not joined the protests as well as within the protestors themselves in responding to the crisis of Gezi. In its 11th year power, AKP faced a massive uprising that mobilised people from diverse backgrounds with various demands for social and political change. In responding to the crisis, AKP reduced this complex and albeit socially and politically rich movement to a secular elite outcry and exercised post-truth politics to promote polarisation. Embracing post-truth politics, the government at that time framed Gezi as a secular elite movement striving to overthrow the conservative government that represents the ‘national will’ of the 50 per cent of the country, and used counter-Gezi to re-define the ‘people’ of Turkey. Disregarding the diverse composition of people in Gezi as well as the diversity of the socio-political grievances of the masses, AKP government articulated an alternative narrative of the protests that framed Gezi as secular movement against the Islamic majority of Turkey.

Regarding emotions as socio-political phenomena, this chapter embraces the idea that emotions matter for understanding global politics. “Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, we need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the collective” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 119). Building on the idea that ‘emotional is political’, this chapter seeks to unveil how

AKP's post-truth politics framed Gezi as a secular – Islamic conservative clash and reduced the movement to an elite secular movement through capitalising the socio-spatial dichotomy articulated since the beginning of their political rule; and how the distinction of legitimate and illegitimate days of the 2013 Gezi Park Protests is created and secured through politics of emotion successfully used in the discursive practices of the ruling political party in Turkey during the protests. Studies on Gezi emphasise its importance as the “first and only spontaneous rebellion in the history of Turkey” (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014, 119). Perhaps one of the most important questions that motivate research on Gezi is how an urban-ecological issue could mobilise the masses in a country where state violence has been normalised over decades. What starts with ‘saving few trees’ becomes a significant uprising of the Gezi community that chants ‘everything or nothing, all of us or none.’⁹

Focusing on the counter-Gezi demonstrations by the Turkish government, this chapter demonstrates how a leadership “capitalising on social cleavages than repairing them” (Ferguson, 2014, p. 80) and polarisation narratives embedded in counter-Gezi movement deemed Gezi polity a ‘network of treachery’. Through tracing how the ‘network of treachery’ was articulated discursively, this research will explicate the post-truth politics employed in the counter-Gezi narratives to provide an analysis of how non-violent resistance transformed into a violent clash between the protesters and police force and the role of counter-Gezi mobilisation in the marginalisation of protestors. In addition to discursive construction of legitimate and illegitimate days of the protests; the articulation of a strong notion of the self and the

⁹ ‘Everything or nothing, all of us or none’ is a verse taken from Bertolt Brecht’s poem *All of us or none*. The verse was translated into Turkish as ‘Kurtuluş yok tek başına, ya hep beraber ya hiçbirimiz’ and used as a slogan during the Gezi Park Protests in 2013.

other of the New Turkey; counter-mobilisation through ‘Respect for the National Will’ Rallies; and the politics of post-truth used in promoting Kabataş allegations will be discussed to trace how the government at that time stripped Gezi of its complexity and reduced it to a yet another old elite secular movement to challenge AKP’s political regime.

4.2 Counter-Gezi Mobilisation & The Politics of Polarisation

Understanding how discursive features of emotion operates in the Gezi context can reveal how politics of emotion can work to reproduce polarisation in the Turkish society and secure the distinction between the protestors as legitimate and illegitimate practitioners of social change. One of the most prominent narrative of Gezi was “While the first few days were legitimate, following days of the protests gained a violent and illegitimate characteristic”. Such narrative that articulated a temporal dichotomy works to differentiate between the protestors as the acceptable and unacceptable dissidents. Further, a notion of the majority of the population, the real people of New Turkey reflecting the national will and the ‘network of treachery’ seeking to dismantle the prospering New Turkey articulates a strong notion of the self and the other of the Turkish nation. Differentiation of the others and other others coupled with an articulation of a strong notion of the self and other of the nation can contribute to the polarisation in the Turkish society. Polarisation works to identify and separate people based on the way they identify as their way of being and living. Exercised by the state as a technique of power, it functions by identifying the self as well as the other (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014, p. 122). Apart from reproducing polarisation within Turkish society, a temporal dichotomy of legitimate and illegitimate days of the protests articulated on the basis of the use of protest violence could potentially lead to the de-politicisation and weakening of the movement.

According to Jeffrey S. Juris (2005), “The state can use images of protest violence to distinguish peaceful minorities from violent minority fringes in order to politically divide social movements and reinforce their least confrontational elements” (p. 423). The polarising discourse of the ruling party in Turkey during Gezi is not limited to the prominent narrative that created a temporal dichotomy and reproduced a socio-spatial dichotomy. It is extended to social practices of the counter-Gezi rallies to assert that the ‘real’ people of Turkey, the ‘majority’ of the population is mobilising to support the ‘national will’. These rallies were an integral part of the larger efforts to demonise Gezi protesters.

During the first few days of the protests, the government created a narrative of “The first few days of the protests were legitimate, later on protests gained a violent and an illegitimate characteristic”, which was supported by the pro-government media outlets. Articulation of such temporal dichotomy of the Gezi meant a strict differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate bodies on the street. While protestors who joined Gezi were already the other of the New Turkey, the body of nation made up of earnest people of Anatolia with religious beliefs and conservative values, postulation of a legitimate / illegitimate protestor demarcation through a temporal dichotomy of the days of the protest articulated the other others. In addition to extreme marginalisation the ‘other others’ face, demarcation through de-valorising some aspects of the protests could potentially serve to de-politicise the Gezi movement. Along with a temporal dichotomy of the days of the protests, the government at that time reproduced and transformed its socio-spatial dichotomy, or in other words the supposed polarisation between the earnest, religious and conservative peoples of Anatolia and the old elite regime that suppressed the

religious-conservative population. Through counter-Gezi mobilisation, the ruling party at that time incorporated Gezi protestors into its narrative of the suppressed and the suppressor of the old Turkey. According to AKP, the Gezi community or the ‘network of treachery’ was using ‘few trees’ to prevent New Turkey from its agenda of prosperity and growth. Further, defining New Turkey along the strict lines of the self, the ‘real’ people of Turkey that turned the other cheek and Gezi community, hence the other, a ‘network of treachery’ with the aim of overthrowing the government meant two things; the Gezi movement was not only targeting the leaders of the suppressed people but also the suppressed peoples of Anatolia, and that Gezi reflected the fascist mind-set of the old elite regime.

The government at that time responded to the crisis through violent measures. The Turkish government at that time framed the Gezi movement as disrupting the normality of the Turkish Republic through a destructive agenda to prevent the AKP project of making Turkey a great welfare nation that supposedly reached its peak on the 11th year of the rule of AKP. AKP’s narratives on Gezi deeming the moment to be controlled by a ‘network of treachery’ served to justify using ‘extreme measures’ in order to restore normality and democracy challenged by the protests. Apart from increasingly violent measures by the police force, the ruling party orchestrated ‘Respect for the National Will’ Rallies. Anadolu Agency (AA), a state-run news agency, announced these rallies as ‘a counter attack to the Gezi Park Protests’ (“AK Party's "Respect to National Will" rallies to be held at weekend,” 2013). AA further declared the subtheme of the rallies as ‘Let’s Spoil the Big Game and Write History’ (“AK Party's "Respect to National Will" rallies to be held at weekend,” 2013). ‘The Respect for the National Will’ rallies held by the AKP played a significant role in the

construction of the polarising discourse of the Turkish government. According to Zeynep Gambetti:

The aim was to show that Gezi Protestors were a minor fraction of the population, whereas the leading AKP represented 50 per cent of all Turkish citizens. Alluding to the investment of the space by the Gezi resistance, Erdoğan declared in a television programme that he was having trouble holding back the 50 per cent who voted for him from pouring out into the streets (Gambetti, 2014, p. 92).

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speeches in rallies held in Ankara and İstanbul on 15th and 16th of June, 2013 marked a clear distinction between the earnest Turkish People, whom he also referred as his people, and the Gezi polity filled with looters disrupting the order. Rallies introduced official narratives regarding demands of the protestors concealing the real motives behind Gezi which sought to prevent AKP's projects of political and economic development. The support of members of the parliament from CHP and Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) was depicted as an attempt to overthrow the government at that time. One of the banners in Ankara rally compared Gezi to Operation Sledgehammer (Balyoz), an alleged coup attempt by some high ranked officials from the Turkish Military in 2003. Erdoğan also targeted the international media that covered the events of the protests in İstanbul and that regarded the protests as an extension of Arab Spring. In İstanbul rally, Erdoğan claimed that the real Turkish Spring occurred in November 3, 2002 when AKP gained the majority of seats in the Turkish Parliament ("Erdoğan Kazlıçeşme mitinginde konuştu!," 2013).

Erdoğan considered Gezi polity as not representing the Turkish people. The official narratives extended to regarding ‘his 50 percent’ as the real marginal voices, the ever suppressed people of Anatolia, that should be heard to understand the ‘real’ Turkey and the ‘real’ Turkish public. His statements in rallies marked a clear distinction between the protestors and those who did not joined the protests; the official narrative reflected on those speeches framed Gezi as a secular movement against the Islamic population and the conservative government. Such distinction not only articulated a notion of those who belong to the Turkish ‘people’ and who does not, but also articulated a strong notion of the self and the other that reflected the boundaries of the self and the other of the socio-spatial dichotomy articulated by the government during the first year of its 11 years in power. In Ankara rally on June 15, 2013 Erdoğan delivered a speech that suggested the boundaries of the self and the other of New Turkey:

They assaulted our police, we tolerated. They assaulted our young girls because of their headscarves, we tolerated. They denied their right to higher education, they tolerated. They entered our mosques with their shoes on and consumed alcohol, we tolerated. Why? Because we knew it reflected their inner selves. They disturbed woman, children and elders, we tolerated. We will continue tolerating. We will resort to the rule of law (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013).¹⁰

Although the target of Erdoğan’s statement was Gezi protests, he referred to several timelines in Turkish politics. The headscarf and higher education statement was a reference to the banning of headscarf in public institutions (including public education institutions) with 1980 military coup and its extension to private

¹⁰ Directly translated from Erdoğan’s speech in Sincan Rally on June 15, 2013

universities in 1997. Such statement resembled Gezi to a coup, regarded this movement to be an extension of the fascist mind-set of old elite regime that restricted the freedom of religion and repressed people of Anatolia due to their conservative values. Highlighting consumption of alcoholic beverages inside a mosque and an assault to a women wearing headscarf was meant to highlight the immoral, degenerated nature of the protestors. ‘The Respect for the National Will’ rallies that worked to legitimise the violent and demarcating measures taken in suppressing the ‘illegitimate’ protestors stripped of morality, particularly Islamic understanding of morality. Further, as mentioned above, the use of ‘them’ and ‘us’ suggests a clear demarcation of the self (referred as we) and the other (referred as they) of the New Turkey in the making. The self of the New Turkey, according to the AKP project is the genuine people of Turkey, ever suppressed by the Kemalist revolution due to their religious subjectivity. Immoral protestors constituted the other of New Turkey that desired to overthrow AKP government to restore the old elite regime and Western secularist democracy. Additionally, Erdoğan’s statement that framed ‘his 50 per cent’ as people with high religious moral grounds that tolerate vicious assaults or that ‘turns the other cheek’ so to say. Such statement is a direct response to Gezi manners highlighted by the Gezi polity: “In their mission to showcase an alternative world imagined as one of respect, solidarity, pluralism and peace, Gezi manners underlined, among others, generosity, politeness, an ethic of collective work, and an attachment to anti-violence and anti-harassment” (Örs and Turan, 2015, p. 457). In responding to the so-called Gezi Spirit and the promotion of positive manners of the Gezi polity, Erdoğan reverted the discourse and framed his polity of bearing high moral grounds that tolerated immoral behaviours of the protestors.

4.2.1 Kabataş Incident, Post-Truth and the Politics of Polarisation

Erdoğan's aggressive statements on Gezi including the Kabataş incident in İstanbul in which topless male protestors wearing leather gloves and black headband, allegedly assaulted and urinated on a woman wearing headscarf "suggests a leadership more intent on capitalising on social cleavages rather than repairing them" (Ferguson, 2014, p. 80). The Incident was announced firstly by the Prime Minister on June 11, 2013 during the AKP group meeting:

Who will account for the attacks our girls wearing headscarves face? They dragged the daughter in law of a close friend of mine on the streets near to the Prime Minister's office, assaulted her and her child. Is this their understanding of freedom and environmentalism? We tolerated all these patiently. İstanbul folk responded to this while welcoming me on my way back from North Africa, responded by saying that "this is what real freedom is" ("Başbakan: Bu Tayyip Erdoğan değişmez," 2013).

After Erdoğan's statements about a brutal attack to a woman wearing headscarf and her baby, a 'heroic' journalist found the victim and interviewed her. In the interview conducted by Elif Çakır that was released in Star, a newspaper known to be a pro-government news outlet, interviewee Zehra Develioğlu claimed that she was sexually assaulted by 70-100 men in Kabataş while she was with her baby. Develioğlu, the daughter-in-law of Bahçelievler Mayor, claimed that on June 1, 2013 these male protestors physically assaulted her for 52 seconds, dragged her on the street, celebrated by drinking beer while a group of female protestors provoked the attack because Develioğlu was wearing headscarf. In days, the incident turned into a huge

media circus. Kabataş Incident was used extensively by the AKP, distorting the facts of the incident and creating an epistemic murk around the alleged assault:

We have learned that where a subservient and thoroughly de-professionalized mainstream media exists, alternative realities are bound to co-exist in the minds of people depending on what they have been exposed to. Under such circumstances a government willfully distorting the truth and mobilizing its party organization can manage to control the narrative of events (Özel, 2014, p. 8).

Several journalists including İsmet Berkan, Balçıçek İlter, Abdülkadir Selvi, from pro-government media outlets supported Çakır who claimed she have seen the video footage of the assault and police reports. However, months after the alleged assault, CCTV camera footages circulated in a TV channel known to criticise the government revealed that the allegations were fabricated. Further Develioğlu's police testimony and the interview was conflicting, suggesting that Çakır exaggerated Develioğlu's statements. Four years after Gezi Protests, to this day, there seems to be no evidence supporting the Kabataş allegations.

A subtle dimension of polarisation narrative embodied in Kabataş Incident is the attempts of de-politicising the Gezi movement through exaggerated, hypersexualised imagery of the perpetrators. The image of a group of men assaulting a woman and her six-month-old daughter on Kabataş, a thoroughfare quarter located on the European shore of Bosphorus and that harbours a variety of public transportation connections, during a Saturday evening is bizarre at best. The scene gets even more intricate as Çakır provides an explicit account of the alleged sexual assault; 70-100 topless men wearing leather gloves and 'peculiar' headbands

sexually assaulting a woman and her six-month-old daughter, urinating on the victim, dragging her on the street, removing her headscarf, kicking her six-month-old daughters stroller, celebrating their attack by drinking beer while a group of women cheers and verbally assaults the victim. Scene describe by Çakır is an atrocious assault committed by an overly marginal group with no respect to basic human dignity. Further, in the interview Çakır asserted that this is not an isolated incident that could not be attributed to the Gezi polity, there are several other examples of similar attack to conservative-religious people (Aslangül, 2013). The distorted depiction of Kabataş Incident works to further differentiate between protestors that were already divided by the temporal dichotomy constructed by the government at that time. Through this hypersexual brutal attack committed by the Gezists, the Gezi movement is politically divided into legitimate minorities and illegitimate minorities committing heinous crimes to assault the body of nation of the New Turkey. With Kabataş Incident and the overall counter-Gezi narrative, polarisation is extended to the Gezi polity, securing the creation of the other others.

Erdoğan's narrative on the Kabataş Incident reflects heavily on the theme of motherhood and the 'fragile' nature of women. Develioğlu's motherhood as well as her headscarf are the most prominent features of her depiction in the mainstream media and official narrative. The manipulation of Kabataş Incident by the government as well as pro-government journalists reflected the gendered dimension of the polarising narratives. The Kabataş Incident was carefully constructed to manipulate the intersecting oppression a woman wearing headscarf could face in Turkey. In addition to the gendered power structure that shapes the experience of the victim, her religious subjectivity became the core element of her abuse. Living in a country that suppressed religious freedom for decades and normalised gendered

violence, Develioğlu supposed attack was fed by two axes of her subjective positions. Manipulating the intersection of oppression, the government at that time successfully created a narrative of individual injury that correlated with past histories of violence and pain. During the Ankara rally, Erdoğan said: “A lady wearing a headscarf and her baby gets assaulted. Perpetrators kicked her six-month-old baby’s stroller, removed her headscarf and dragged her in the streets. Is this their understanding of freedom and justice?” (“AK Party's "Respect to National Will" rallies to be held at weekend,” 2013). While Develioğlu’s original testimony does not include anything about her headscarf being removed by the perpetrators, Erdoğan’s addition to the incident overlaps with the narrative that the Gezi protestors reflect the fascist mentality of the 1980 coup that restricted the freedom of religion and that oppressed women wearing headscarves. The depiction of Gezi protestors as immoral became a central theme of the polarising discourse that designated protestors as the legitimate objects of hate: “These statements, no doubt, facilitated the channelling of the hatred of the Islamic majority against the Gezi Park protesters” (Mercan and Özşeker, 2015, p. 104). Building upon the 1980s and the restriction of freedom of belief in Turkey, the government at that time used Kabataş narrative to shape the boundaries of the others of New Turkey, designating those immoral assaulters as extensions of the fascist mentality of the 1980 coup and the old elite regime. By utilising past histories of pain and violation, the Kabataş Incident is extended. Violation of a women and a mother because of her religious beliefs resonates with the violation of a nation by the immoral protestors to disrupt the wellbeing of the prospering New Turkey: “We are the real owners of this country. Do you believe your headscarf is holy? We will do horrible things to you, not even your so-called

holy headscarf can save you” (Aslangül, 2013). By designating the Islamic majority of Turkey as victims, the protestors are designated as immoral perpetrators.

4.3 Conclusion

The polarisation narratives of counter-Gezi practices as well as the use of emotions in the articulation of Kabataş Incident worked to reproduce the boundaries of the self and the other of New Turkey through marginalising the Gezi polity and secure the distinction between the protestors as legitimate and illegitimate practitioners of social change. Through a polarising narrative as well as articulating a dichotomy of the legitimate days and the illegitimate days of Gezi, the Turkish government at that time emotionally reproduced selves and others as well as other others. ‘The Gezi Protests were legitimate in the first few days, we were sympathetic and supportive of the protests initially’ as a narrative that seems to resonate sympathy and empathy at hindsight works to legitimise brutal police violence that increased day by day. It also works to differentiate between the protestors that are the legitimate objects of recognition and the other ‘others’ that are not.

Securing a distinction of temporal dichotomy enabled the government to frame the protests as an act of treachery with a hidden agenda of hindering the prosperity of the Turkish nation. Such agenda was reproduced emotionally through Kabataş Incident, the media depiction of the alleged assault and the use of it counter-Gezi official narratives suggested a gendered fictionalisation of Gezi protestors lacking moral values violating and assaulting the newly prospering Turkey. Counter-Gezi practices and the politics of polarisation worked to de-legitimise the Gezi protestors claims that the AKP policies were an attack on their ways of being and

living. By creating a hypersexualised scene of the alleged attack, the counter-Gezi narratives also worked to dismantle the Gezi movement by designating some aspects of the movement as overly marginal, leading to a political divide of the movement to de-politicise Gezi. Further through discursive and symbolic elements, the government articulated Gezi as an attack of stigmatising the ways of being and living of the Islamic majority voted for AKP. Defining the boundaries of the selves and others as well as other others of New Turkey through morality, particularly religious morality and respect to the rule of law; the government at that time seek to dismantle the Gezi movement and secure its political agenda of conservative neoliberal development.

In conclusion, through using a micro-level approach to emotions, this chapter unveiled how discursive features of polarisation operated on the Gezi context. This chapter revealed how AKP responded to the Gezi protests by articulating a temporal dichotomy of the days of the protests: “What paralysed the AKP power during the first few days of the Gezi Park riot was its inability to name the event and label it in line with its identitarian fiction” (Karakayalı and Yaka, 2014, p. 122). Once the shock wear off, the government at that time launched its counter-Gezi movement, including but not limited to heavy use of media in distorting the images of resistance, capitalising on social cleavages to marginalise protestors and orchestrating rallies to demonstrate ‘the real people’ of Turkey. The emotional reproduction of Kabataş Incident through post-truth politics as well as framing Gezi as a secular uprising against the Islamic majority of the country and their popular will was used to create a strong dichotomy of us and them, self and other. Such dichotomy worked to marginalise protestors and denied them political agency. In addition to the polarising

narrative used to secure the boundaries of the self and the other as well as other others of the New Turkey in the making, the use of post-truth politics by the government at that time worked to weaken and de-politicise Gezi movement. Regarding Gezi through legitimate / illegitimate days of resistance contributed to the marginalisation of the protestors and divided them further. What started out as a massive uprising mobilising people from diverse subjective positions and divergent grievances against the authoritarian policies of the government at that time was successfully stripped of its richness and complexity by the government at that time through counter-Gezi practices.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

We live in capitalism, its power seems inescapable – but then, so did the divine right of kings. Any human power can be resisted and changed by human beings. Resistance and change often begin in art. Very often in our art, the art of words.

Ursula K. Le Guin

Understanding the demands for change is as important as understanding how change is resisted by the power structures in analysing the dynamics of change. “Emotions provide a script, certainly: you become the ‘you’ if you accept the invitation to align yourself with the nation, and against those others who threaten to take the nation away” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 12). Embracing Sara Ahmed’s framework on emotion, this research explicated the narratives as well as counter-narratives of resistance that emotionally articulated resisting bodies of the 2013 Gezi Park Protests and the boundaries of the self and the other of the New Turkey in the making. Combining insights of emotion research with intersectional feminist analysis, this research offers a reading of power – subjectivity interrelation with regards to diverse composition of intersecting subjective positions of race, class, gender, age, ideology and social status and the interlocking power structures of neoliberal power and state power.

Gezi proved to be a useful case in recognising the benefits of exploring the emotional reproduction of protest as well as counter-protest narratives in understanding dynamics of change as well as persistence of social and political structures in the demands for change, inclusion and peace. By looking at how emotions worked in reproducing the 1923 Kemalist people-making project and divided the protestors, Chapter 3 showed how emotions work to operate by concealing past histories. Further, it also showed how emotion research provides novel readings of social movements and how Gezi violently unravelled. Accordingly, Chapter 4 showed how emotional reproduction of counter-resistance narratives delegitimised the movement and de-politicised the demands for social and political change. Emotions as an analytical lens incorporated into intersectional research seems to offer novel readings of the 21st century social movements that are local in essence but produce transnational ties.

5.1 From Movement of Movements to Movements within Movements

What started out as a movement of movements ended with clashes of movements within movements. By focusing on Gezi narratives as well as counter-Gezi narratives, this research showed that the potentiality of creating an alternative socio-political culture, to increasingly authoritarian regime of AKP that marginalises large segments of Turkish population, silences opposition and its precarious policies guided by neoliberal rationality, was not fulfilled. However, with regards to an increase in social and political mobility for causes of environmental, social, economic, and political justice, Gezi movement achieved some social and political transformation in Turkey. Although Gezi could not realise the dream of sustaining ‘everything or nothing, all of us or none’, through its legacy of starting a slow but

steady transformation in social and political culture for the last for years, AKP is confronted by the spectre of Gezi.

Focusing on the counter-Gezi movement launched by the government at that time to de-politicise the movement, this researched showed how marginalising discourses as well as social performativity is used in emotional reproduction of bodies out on the street as well as the images of resistance. The failure of AKP in labelling the protestors coming from diverse subjective positions as well as failure in framing their claims for taking to the streets resulted in the creation of a temporal dichotomy. To marginalise protestors and de-politicise Gezi, the government discursively divided days of Gezi into the legitimate first few days and the illegitimate days controlled by a ‘network of treachery’. After the initial shock in understanding the composition of people, in addition to the excessive use of force in suppressing the protests, AKP responded to the protests by framing Gezi as yet another secular elite outcry. Gezi was framed as a secular movement against the ‘glorious’ rule of AKP for the last 11 years and the Islamic majority of the country, counter-Gezi movement sought to strip the protests of its richness and complexity. Using its media influence, the government at that time distorted the events and scenes of the protests to marginalise and stigmatise protestors. Using post-truth politics effectively, AKP used Kabataş Incident to deepen social cleavages and stigmatise protestors. Marginalisation was further secured through the ‘Respect for the National Will’ Rallies that ‘demonstrated’ the ‘real people’ of Turkey, creating a strong notion of us and them between the protestors and AKP supporters. All these political reproduction of polarisation within Turkish society shaped the surface of resisting bodies and their position within the nation.

Gezi mobilised people from diverse if not conflicting subjective positions, creating an environment for co-existence and solidarity against police brutality. However, the strange encounter of hostile positions of race, gender and class and past histories polarity and violence was also quite relevant in shaping the moment of contact for those bodies that could not be imagined side by side. The peculiar scenes of peaceful-coexistence and solidarity of the initial days were interrupted by what Ahmed (2014) refers to as the ‘moment of contact’ (p. 104) that emotionally reproduced the troubling histories of Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, class antagonism, as well as gender binaries among the protestors and caused a clash of cultures. As one of the incidents of such clash, #thisiscivilresistance campaign, exemplified an instance of emotional reproduction of traumatic past and re-shaped the resisting bodies that reflected the historical clashes of Turkey. This campaign that tried to re-establish Gezi as a civil movement asked protestors prone to use violence in maintaining the occupation of the spaces as well as expressing their grievances through symbolic violence not to join the protests. Apart from unwelcoming come of the protestors, the socio-linguistic ramification of the campaign re-produced traditional socio-political as well as cultural conflicts in Turkish history. The campaign that referred to the protestors using violence and trying to frame Gezi as an identity movement rehearsed demarcating distinctions. Regarding Gezi as bearing the potential to create an alternative socio-political culture to precarious politics of AKP regime, this research assessed encounters of those bodies and how past histories came into effect and emotionally reproduced dissident bodies, and leading to a clash of different dissident cultures or Gezi within Gezi, so to speak.

5.2 Afterword on post-Gezi

Murder of Özgecan Arslan

Four years passed since the beginning of the protests, Gezi is still a far-reaching phenomenon in the contemporary political history of Turkey and remain to be so in the social and political milieu. On February 11, 2015 a young university student Özgecan Arslan was murdered in Mersin after she resisted a rape attempt. She was attacked and murdered by the driver of the public transportation vehicle. Two days after her murder, her burnt body was discovered. Just like culture of impunity, violence against women is a structural problem in Turkey that shapes the living experiences of women from various subjective positions. Women's movements took to the street and used social media in responding to her death (Aykaç, 2016, p. 112), and used technological means to raise awareness on violence against women and impunity enjoyed by men in these 'incidents'. While feminist and LGBT+ activists were politically active before the Gezi protests in raising awareness, organising lectures and protests, offline as well as online campaigns to show that the violence against women and queer individuals is a structural and hence a political problem. With Gezi the idea of personal is political became a familiar notion in thinking about political demands and civil action. Before Gezi, only a small group of activists would remember Özgecan, she would be reduced to a footnote upon her death. #Sendeanlat (You tell it too), a hashtag was promoted in Twitter after Özgecan's murder to show that the incidents of violence against women are more frequent than imagined and that it happens to women of various subjective positions on a daily basis. Gezi effect helped the victims of violence against women become visible, rather than remaining yet another nameless and faceless victim.

While this is only a small step in efforts to raise awareness on structural, namely gendered and racial dimensions of violence against women; the case of Özgecan shows that while Gezi polity missed out on the possibility of creating an alternative socio-political culture to challenge hegemonic forms of power, Gezi paved the way for some social and political transformation in Turkey.

Post-Coup Attempt & State of Emergency

On June 15, 2016 Turkey experienced a coup-attempt allegedly orchestrated by the Gülen movement led by Fethullah Gülen, a preacher living in exile in the United States. On June 20, 2016, AKP declared a state of emergency to remove members of the Gülen movement, FETÖ-PDY (Fethullahist Terror Organization-Parallel State Structure). Apart from the trial against the so called FETÖ-PDY, AKP sought a witch hunt against members of that terrorist organisation entrenched in the public institutions. The witch hunt after the coup attempt led to the dismissal of nearly 5,000 academics and 125,000 people from armed forces and judiciary from their posts (Pamuk and Toksabay, 2017). However, the purge and the mass arrests also included Kurdish MP's, leftist public officials and leftist as well as Kurdish academics. Those academics included people who signed the petition by the Academics for Peace (BAK). The petition drafted in January 2016 was against the ongoing human rights violations including mass civilian deaths and mass displacement of people, in Kurdish provinces under state of emergency: "We, as academics and researchers working on and/or in Turkey, declare that we will not be a party to this massacre by remaining silent and demand an immediate end to the violence perpetrated by the state" (Kural, 2016). Among those dismissed from their

post, academic Nuriye Gülmen started a sit-in protest in Ankara, Yüksel street. Yüksel is a space of dissidence for leftist groups and student unions in Ankara and was a crucial space for assembly during Gezi. On March 9, 2017 Nuriye and teacher Semih Özakça, whom also dismissed from his post and joined Nuriye in Yüksel protests, went on a hunger strike. On the 75th day of their hunger strike, Nuriye and Semih were detained on the grounds that “the protests could evolve to a death fast and may trigger events like Gezi resistance” (“Nuriye Gülmen, Semin Özakça on Hunger Strike Detained,” 2017). Incidents such as BAK petition, increased mobilisation of people from diverse subjective positions of age, race, gender, class and ideology for causes of environmental, social, economic and political justice in the increasingly authoritarian regime of AKP shows that while Gezi failed in creating a sustainable alternative socio-political culture, it sowed the seeds for social and political transformation in Turkey.

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