THE WORLD IN-BETWEEN | Cinematography

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF GRAPHIC DESIGN
AND THE INSTITUTE OF FINE ARTS OF
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF FINE ARTS

By Nur Yavuz
January, 2000

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
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Assist.Prof.Dr. Nezih Erdogan (Supervisor)

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I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.

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ABSTRACT

THE WORLD IN-BETWEEN | cinematography

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November, 2000

And cinema. The importance of saying and... and...and.... Images neither starts nor ends, they occupy the in-between. Cinema and philosophy come together to show the power of the in-between. Images understood as such are neither psychoanalytic nor linguistic determinants. The immanent flow of images with its undetermined intervals is what enables us to contemplate on time and movement and memory and consciousness and percepts and affects... And philosophy.

Keywords: cinema and philosophy, time-image, movement-image, memory, interval, consciousness, perception.

ÖZET

ARALIKTAKi DÜNYA: sinematografi

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Ve sinema. Eşiği geçmeyi ya da doldurmayı değil, eşiğin kendisini sorunlaştıran ve...ve.. ve'ler silsilesi. Sinema ve felsefe ancak bu eşik ile birbirine bağlanabilir. Bir başlangıç ve bir sonu degil her zaman aralığı kollayan, yolundan çıkmış zamanın bir ürperme gibi üzerimize serdiği bir düşüncedir bu. İmge, beraberinde getirdiği imallarla bu aralıktan çıktıkca, psikanaliz ve dil biliminin dize getirme eylemlerine karşı ele geçirilemeyen bir kavramlar dizisine açacaktır kendini. Hafıza, bilinç, algı, duygu, ve hareket artık ne felsefenin ne de sinemanin sahip olduğu kavramlardır. Zaman, içinde mi dışında mı olduğumuzu bir türlı kestiremediğimiz zaman, hiç kimsenin olmayan ayni zamanda hiç olan bir aradaki dünyada bu imge-kavramlara işaret etmektedir. Düşünemediğimiz ama kimi zaman hissettiğimiz bu yeryüzü deliklerine.

Anahtar sözcukler: sinema ve felsefe, imge-süre, imge-devinim, algi, bilinç.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Of the image too it is difficult to speak rigorously.
Maurice Blanchot

Cinema has been a challenging form of art, influencing and influenced by many theoretical approaches from the beginning of our century. Concerning a before and an after, it has always been discussed as a turning point, a break within the traditional representational arts. As a result, it is, at all times compared to other art forms such as literature, painting, theater and for a greater extent to photography which has been seen as its predecessor, its germinating point.

Like photography, cinema has introduced a way of mediating reality through an apparatus, i.e. camera. Images, produced/reproduced by mechanical means had an objective status owing to the neutrality of the intervening medium. This objectivity had a twofold result concerning the status of mechanically (re)produced images in relation to natural perception: On the one hand, camera was regarded as an extension to the natural perception, enriching our field of perception with the various methods it offers, such as close-ups which bring things to a close proximity. In this manner, it widened our

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scope of the world since the capabilities of the medium was technically superior to the human eye. On the other hand, it was a threat to sustaining natural perception because it took the privilege of perception from the subject. The camera, thus, was a neutral 'seer' plunged into reality, more than our psychological and physiological capabilities allow.

However, the question concerning the reality effect in cinema has been interrupted by a shift in terms of the conceptualization of perception returning again to the mechanical abilities and limitations of the medium. Like in natural perception, the camera itself was a limitation, a framing. Even if the frame is not something concrete and has no materiality of its own, like our bio-logical frame that situates our perceptual field, both were dependent on a certain kind of selection, and a projection of this selection on a sensitive surface, which situates the grounds of what is visible and what is not, by tearing apart a certain moment from the flow of everyday life to build up a new thing with the captured instances of reality.

It was this stroboscopic effect[1] which provides the subject (cinematic and natural) with a position to see only through a hole. Through this hole - as if standing out of the cave - all one can see is a representation of the world, the projected reality, a torn apart instant, on the cave wall. The term illusion was to be found in the apparatus

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itself, as was the objective recording of reality. The complexity of terms in approaching cinema, thus, happens at the first time the camera is turned on; the movie camera is objective and illusionary at the same time.[2] Such two contradictory terms, immanent to the apparatus, created two camps in cinema, like that of Western philosophy. The cinematographic images were whether regarded as things in themselves independent of any mediation -in materialist approach-, or they were the mere reflections of an improper mediation (as it is in natural perception, sensation, consciousness) -in idealism-.

Realism in cinema has often been regarded as a temporary movement, a standpoint of the filmmaker or the critic through a specific understanding of the medium, and interpreted in terms of certain waves, such as New Wave and Neo-Realism. However, contemporary theories mostly characterize cinema as a form of illusion. In other words, while the reality effect that the camera introduces has been regarded as an artistic form, a certain approach, illusionary nature of the apparatus has become the underlying argument of main discussions. This characterization bears a certain resemblance to Plato's criticism of art in <u>The Republic</u>. Plato considers art as being essentially illusory. Rather than having the capacity to

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[1] A stroboscope being an instrument in the form of a revolving disk with holes around the edge through which an object is viewed or a rapidly flashing light that illuminates an object intermittently.

[2] The question of cinematographic apparatus does not only consist of the recording of the camera. It also involves directing and shooting the film; setting and actors; the montage phase and the viewing which happens in the movie theater. This complexity of cinematographic images is indeed more multifaceted.

master what we see, we are placed at the mercy of a viewpoint upon the world that is dictated to us by the artwork. We are outside the cave or we see through a hole. Furthermore Plato believes that art tends to indulge sensation at the expense of reason by undermining the self-control of the viewer. After all, art was the misapplications of thought to be banned from city. Illusionary as they were, cinematographic images were also producing a new form of representation, which had an apparent evocation in the twentieth century social milieu. The kind of deception that cinematic illusion endowed the film spectator with was a precise instantiation of the kind of deception wrought by the ideology upon the spectator. If we remember Jean Louis Baudry's application of Plato's cave metaphor to cinema, we see that, cinematographic images are equated with the shadows in the cave: "vacuous, degraded, and insubstantial projections that, by a kind of ideological-optical illusion, are mistakenly but avoidably taken for reality...." (Shaviro: 38)

This kind of an understanding of the relationship of cinematic experience to reality, I think, is the main root where psychoanalytic and structuralist approaches originate from. Both structuralist and psychoanalytic film theory in this context introduce the dominance of the "notion of representation" in film theory. If we consider psychoanalysis, and its ways of handling the spectator, it is important to map the psychological relations that have been drawn. The

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illusionism, promoted and achieved now and then in the movie theater, has been a basic discussion since, in cinema; the projective aspect was one of the most apparent issues (projecting projection). Furthermore, as Wills and Brunette state:

> ...Since much of Lacanian theory is based on the model of the mirror stage, the illusory fullness of the imaginary, and the problematizing of vision as the subject is introduced to castration and thus to the symbolic, Lacan's emphasis on the visual has seemed particularly appropriate to the study of the film. (17)

So, in embracing Lacan's account of the symbolic, cinema places brackets around Symbolic, and hence holds back from the affirmation of Lacan's initial proposal. If we remember Lacan's triad of Imaginary, Symbolic and The Real, the application of these stages to cinema theory has tended to forget The Real, at the first instant, because illusionary they were, Lacan's Real would have never existed in this Symbolic order of images. If in Lacan's conceptualization these stages are penetrating into one another, the application of these stages to cinema theory has regarded them as separate entities within boundaries and in chronological hierarchy. If we remember the application of mirror stage to cinema we see that the spectator follows the stages sequentially, at the end approaching to symbolic order. As transformed into terminological methodologies, this approach manifests itself only in terms of the Symbolic (in the exchange of phallus and in the forms of castration anxiety, or in

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Oedipal triangle), thus the Imaginary, like the Real, also, could only be understood in the symbolic orders of language.

If we remember Christian Metz's project, the "attempt to disengage the cinema-object from the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic" we see how these attempts merge with structural linguistics (Metz: 3). However as we could see the idea of representation does not only occur with the mechanical challenges of twentieth century introduced, considering what Jean-Luc Nancy directs our attention to: "...the West is precisely what designates itself as limit, as demarcation, even when it ceaselessly pushes back the frontiers of its imperium." (Nancy: 1) Thus, the imaginary possibilities of the medium could only be understood within the limits of the symbolic. The separation of images from the flow of the matter, thus their subordination to the symbolic order can be traced back to the Hegelian roots of modern thinking. According to the Hegelian principle of "sense-certainty", singular, immediate experience is radically impossible. One cannot designate a "this", cannot identify a "here" and "now" without already having assumed the universal forms of Subjectivity, Time and Space. Experience is not possible without a concept. Therefore there cannot be a particular, singular experience without a predefined context. In this connection, as Shaviro asserts:

> Indeed, my own stability as a subject is dependent upon
> my ability *to recognize* and order my impressions, to
> comprehend them in communicable things, and to refer

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them as to actual objects. I am able *to reflect and act* only in so far as I can both read my perceptions as non-immediate signs and identify them with things that are really there. 'Natural' perception is thus never raw or immediate: it is always already subordinated to a double articulation. (Shaviro: 47).

The notion of "double articulation" refers to the idea that there can be no perception or other experience without linguistic articulation. This idea dominated the main approaches to film theory. This is clear in the attempts of Christian Metz to problematize the cinematic image in such a form of linguistic double articulation. In fact, what is intrinsic to such attitudes is the common assumption that human and cinematic experience, therefore is originally and fundamentally cognitive. Here, the problem of perception is understood and handled under the question of knowledge and it is equated with the <u>reflective consciousness of perception</u>.

Already Hegel grasps essential knowledge –which will engender absolute knowledge- as this movement of arising and negating any representation given by this rising, as well as any representation of this rising. Hegel names this" the experience of consciousness". Thus the experience is traversal to the limits, traversal as knowledge, and no knowledge of the traversal if not formed by "traversing" itself. (Nancy: 2)

Thus the characteristic of representational thought is: to represent for itself, both itself and its outside, the outside of its limits.

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This is the consciousness _of_ outside that double articulation brings about. If traversing the limits is thought achieving itself is the main approach that defines a here, elsewhere a passage-to-unthought occurs throughout Gilles Deleuze's work. A thought is always yet to come, about to arrive, a thought not _of_ the outside but _from_ the outside.

The key point on the position of unthought, will be discussed in the second chapter of my thesis. Introducing the in-between, this chapter also brings forward the main theme of my problem .

It is useful, then, briefly to mention in further detail the main approach of my thesis regarding the role of unthought in Deleuzian philosophy in contrast to psychoanalytic and linguistic understandings of the term. If the train entering the station is a strong metaphor for cinema it is not for the reason that the train has already arrived at the station rather in arriving the train points out to empty stations: _they are inhabited with no one, there is not a certain arrival time, nor there is localizable stations._ Rather in waiting the non-arrival of thought-train we are faced with optical and sound situations-stations: all suggesting the relation of thought to cinema as a possibility opening :

If a philosopher says "I don't know" we are not faced with a personal statement. Maybe, there is no more a place to be

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reached with words or explanations, or maybe beyond the limits philosophy can reach, he or she is faced with a *'no man's land'* where the steps tremble, the words stutter, hopes are blinded, situations are undecidable, the known faces are fading. (Baker 22-23)

In this sense, the no man's land of the unthought becomes a series of forces, the land of percept and affects. The unthought for Deleuze always remains as a creative force. It cannot be considered as a dark place to be deciphered and understood. If things shatter in this land it is because nothing is clear yet. However, for psychoanalysis, the unthought disguised in unconscious is dark therefore should be understood and brought to light in the symbolic orders of language. Psychoanalysis defines a lack and then try to recover it. The same approach can be seen in attempts to recover time. Time shouldn't be lost but kept. It should be kept as a dead past therefore while remembering it could be cognitive and regained. Unless the blackness –illusory fullness of the imaginary- is seen from a distance there is no train in this equation. The train should enter the station otherwise all stations would be meaningless, imaginary holes in the surface of the world. If we don't see the train in Deleuze's situations it is only because the imaginary fullness of the train could not be understood as such.

My attempt to understand what Gilles Deleuze affirms in terms of cinema, would touch on issues that belong to the entire trajectory of

his writings, regarding cinema and philosophy. What Deleuze proposes in this sense, can be seen an opposite standpoint to determining conceptualizations of cinema, because he prefers to reach indeterminacy through indeterminacy, rather than determining a fixed center: the experiencing-traversing subject. This is also true when he deals with cinematographic images. As David Rodowick states: "the cinema produces images and signs as movement, that is, as movement-images. No static description can be adequate to the essential mobility of cinematographic images"(Rodowick: 39).

Thus, double articulation is not only a principle condition of linguistic systems, but of all forms of what Deleuze and Guattari calls stratification in everyday life; the hierarchical ordering, coding and territorializing of previously multiple and heterogeneous forces. The alternative between presence and mediation, or phenomenological immediacy and linguistic deferral, is therefore a misleading one: in both instances experience is at once distanced and anchored in a living present. The essential thing, on the other hand, is the degrees of the fluidity among images, while structural linguistics totally denies such fluidity. In order to open new ways to approach images we have to supply a theoretical ground that would approach cinematographic experience in terms of "continuous, immanent variations" rather than trying to render it to linguistic forms.

For these reasons, in the beginning of the first chapter I will try to clarify the relation between language and cinema, as Deleuze problematizes in his cinema books. Rather than contributing to the notion of the double articulation in this discussion, Deleuze defines matter i.e. images as flow, following Bergson's trajectory. Pointing out the most specific "technical" aspect i.e. movement, we can trace this irreducible difference if we continue on the relation between cinema and photography.

The mechanical (re)production of reality with the film camera was not simply same as the one that photography introduces. Although the chemical process of tracing of light onto a light sensitive surface is a similar process in two media, unlike photography, cinema was adding another element "an abstract idea of time" in which the initial given "instantaneous sections"[3] of the photography is set to pass consecutively which at the end produces an illusion of movement. And this is what differentiated it from the photography, however still maintaining a version of it:

> Cinema, in the beginning, was only considered, as being
> able to do what photography cannot do, it was nothing
> more than an innovation, which enables one to record

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[3] Although I use 'instantaneous section" as the still image at this instant, it is clear that we never see a cinematographic image still enough.

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movement. For this reason, it was only considered as a living photograph. (my trans. Pudovkin: 310)

In cinema the still photographs were being presented consequently, thus the spectator was faced with a movement effect. Matter is moving, nobody objects to this assertion. However in moving, images bring to light the question of how the movement is represented in cinema. As Pudovkin states, this was the major tendency of the first films; to capture movements of the world: "...the movement of a train, the movement of the crowds on a street, a view from the window pane of a moving train..." (my trans. Pudovkin: 310) That is why at the beginning of cinematic experience, we were shown a train approaching the station, and for a long time it has been a metaphor for cinema, as we have discussed. However, we cannot simply limit the relation of movement to cinema as an initial amazement of the innovation. It touches essentially on the relation of philosophy to cinema as Deleuze concentrates in the two volumes of his writings on cinema. The problem of reconstitution of movement in cinema calls us to see not only modernity's most mechanical images, but it also involves the disfiguring logic of the image in philosophy. In these two volumes his interests does not depend only on the fact that cinema depends on movement; rather it is because movement itself challenges the conventional notions of perception. For Deleuze, a philosopher is not someone who produces notions; rather, he only becomes a philosopher, by creating new kinds of perceptions.

Perception will no longer reside in the relation between a subject and an object, but rather in the movement serving as the limit of that relation, in the period associated with the subject and object. Perception will confront its limit: it will be in the midst of the things, throughout its own proximity, as the presence of one haecceity in another, the prehension of one by the other or the passage from one to the other. Look only at the movements. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 282)

At this point, it is necessary - particularly in understanding the terminology utilized in the first chapter of my thesis, about movement-image and also in anticipation of what Deleuze will bring about the new set of contradictions in time-image - to mention the notion of movement in cinema for elaborating on our problem. In the first chapter of Movement-Image, Deleuze talks about the reconstitution of movement, in terms of time and space referring to Bergson's three theses on movement in <u>Creative Evolution</u>. The first thesis questions two givens of cinema: instantaneous sections (images-photograms) and an abstract idea of time which is in the apparatus and makes images to pass consecutively, therefore creating an illusion of movement, through an understanding of space as indivisible and time as divisible. Movements are passing through the space, but the time is a given, subordinated to space in this thesis.

Second thesis defines this misconception in two ways: that of the antiquity and modern science. Modern science, consists in relating

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movement to any-instant-whatever, but not to privileged instants as in antiquity and dance, the instant of ideal postures. So that modern science can be defined as to take time as an independent variable. Cinema seems the last descendent of this lineage, which Bergson traced, where the camera emerges as the generalizing equivalent of translating movement to any-instant-whatever. This is a function of equidistant instants selected as to create in the illusion of movement, an impression of continuity. Muybridge's sequential photography as always discussed as a generic gesture through cinema can be seen as an example. Reconstituting movement with immobile sections of it: by recording action in any-instant-whatever of the mechanical time and positions in space. The discussions concerning the illusion in cinema seems, in fact, to have stemmed from the stroboscopic effect which we have mentioned earlier: The projection in cinema is like a stroboscope presenting before our eyes immobile sections, passing in a certain speed and creating an illusion of movement.

According to Deleuze, however, on Bergson's third thesis, you cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space and instants in time: by immobile sections. If it is only possible if you add to these immobile sections the abstract idea of time, which is mechanical homogenous and identical for all movements it should be questioned. Because in this equation you would miss the movement in a way that even if you bring two instants and two positions together, the

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movement would always occur in the interval between the two. So Bergson proposes a <u>real movement</u> which is beyond the discussions on cinematographic illusion, real movement occurring in duration, and relates the parts to a whole which changes, and thus expresses the changing of the whole in relation to the parts and is itself a mobile section of duration. This is the profound thesis, in <u>Creative Evolution</u>, according to Deleuze:

> 1) There are not only instantaneous images, that is immobile sections of movement; 2) There are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration; 3) There are finally, time-images, that is, duration-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images, which are beyond movement itself. (Deleuze, 1989, 11)

At this point, I believe it is important to elaborate more on the concept of duration, since it evolves as being an important term in Bergson's conceptualization. Duration is not a factor of human activity, belonging to lived acts; at the same time it is not anonymous. How Deleuze explains it, is in terms of slowness and fastness, a combination of these terms creating different rhythms. Duration cannot be understood as having one rhythm, i.e mechanical time. In fact, one is tempted to conceive of duration by measuring it by the one that is lived by consciousness, and making it a function of a homogenous Time. However, such tendencies would always fail to grasp the real duration, which is a compound of relaxations and tensions. Such conceptualizations on movement and time constitute

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the main framework in which the arguments of this thesis will take place.

The relation between photography and cinema does not only occur in representing the objects of a world, therefore separating them, but also in our relation to time. Unlike the discussions on how photography and cinema has brought about a fundamental shift in the relation between the original and the copy, the world and its representation, eliminating from the work of art its temporal aspect, I will try to clarify images in time and thus in their relation to memory. This is not as one relates to images as mnemonic souvenirs of the past as generally understood, and as a preservation of pasts as documents. However, it is clear that after a cinematic decade, we are assumed to have already received all the postcards, from the past as they are, already stamped into the office of memory. In this assumptious approach, cinematographic apparatus has perfect analogical resemblances with the memory of modern subjectivity. Having the same nature with the photographic image, cinematic images always signifies something that took place in the past and disappeared at the moment of viewing. No matter how short this temporal gap is, the retrospectivity cannot be overcome. As Andre Bazin and Roland Barthes pointed out, photographic and cinematographic images are substantial shadows of the past, which prove the existence of their

object of depiction at a certain past moment, which had disappeared.

The accumulation of photographic and cinematographic images throughout the whole twentieth century constructs a kind of social memory in this sense. One remembers, or has a possibility of recalling every single event that took place after "the train entered the station" through the cinematographic memory. Our cinematographic memory keeps in reserve not only all the major events like world wars, Olympic games, establishment of nation states, but also recorded the everyday moments of metropolitan life; the factories, the crowds in the streets, fashion shows, entertainments, etc. The cinematographic apparatus also recorded the images of cultures, which does not possess such a memory, images of others, such as Flaherty's and Rouch's "uncivilized" tribes. One remembers, that had happened and existed once. Since we possessed our mechani/chemical memory, we remember correctly and we will remember forever, this is the cruelty of memory according to Chris marker in Sans Soleil: "after all stories of man out of his memory, here is a story of a man who is out of forgetting…"

We are completely helpless when faced with such an understanding of memory; being exposed to the images which certainly belong to the past, which prove their existence in some prior moment that cannot be inhabited once more. Cinematographic

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memory will signify such a loss forever. As long as we remember through the cinematographic apparatus we recall such a loss in the first instance. The lightened darkness is where structuralism and psychoanalysis relates to cinema, in this originary loss. However, for Bergson if there is memory, it is not the accumulation of optical or psychological time, rather it is an accumulation of past, present and future in their endless relation. Because, memory is not optical or psychological but temporal, as Bergson debates on. The scientific/mechanical/optical thought introduces the memory and time in the automatism of the production of images and the inverse is also true, meaning that memory can be and has been produced by the mechani/chemical process that cinema is. This theme has also been discussed by Walter Benjamin, in a way that, the ambiguity of reproduction techniques lies in is relation to automatic movement of the medium; automatic movement of the camera recording, automatic manner the projector reeling and therefore producing the automatic relation of the masses to this movement:

> Mass reproduction is aided especially by the reproduction of masses. In big parades and monster rallies, in mass sporting events and the war, all of which today are conducted in front of the cameras and sound equipment, the mass looks itself in the face. This process, whose significance need not be stressed, is intimately connected with the development of techniques of reproduction and photography. Mass movements are

usually discerned more clearly by a camera than by a gaze... this means that mass movements, including war, represent a form of human behavior that particularly favors the apparatus. (stated in Cadava p.55)

It is this production of images, which produces the automatic manner and which substrates human productions, that enables a mass to see itself in the face. If we remember Leni Riefenstahl's film The Triumph of the Will, we see how masses become visual blocks overwriting the screen. However, for Deleuze, this relation should be discussed, because in cinema the production of images, in these case memories, is not only automatic, on the contrary they introduce the movement and memory in its proper ontology after the Second World War. If for Bergson the question lies in its relation to time, it inverses completely all the discussions of technical positions for it is not the movement represented, rather it is the time for delaying, all detour, all waiting thus all indetermination. The technologies of time, in augmenting the possibility of memory and conserving time, improve our capability to act, always opening new possibilities. However, if the action brings about neutralizations, if it extends into habitual memory, or if it conserves the past in automatic mechanism, it should be questioned at once because for Bergson, memory cannot be interiorized as such. For Bergson all conscious signifies first of all memory. All consciousness is preservation and accumulation of past in present, retention of before in an after. This capacity of conserving

time in time is also the capacity of creation and production of affective forces. Time, thus in this discussion does not present us chronological determined dimension, as Bergson shows the time is where the creation continues in unforeseeable unpredictable reorderings.

Following this trajectory, in the third chapter, I will point out how these arguments effected cinema after two world wars, as Deleuze discusses how the orders of movement and time went through a transformation, after this period.

So I will start with another genealogy of faculties and configuration of forces, which provide the necessary grounds to construct an account of cinema without rigidizing its possibilities. Bergson elaborates the conceptual instruments, which enable us to understand the relation between the world and man through images. Bergson approaches the question of this relation in the limit situation. First of all, he gives a description of natural perception, neither as a psychological state anchored to a subject nor as discussed within the double articulation but as a relation between images: different flows, and different rhythms therefore different durations. This relation has also been functionally ensured in Bergson, by his approach to conscious, image, memory, concept, each operating as veritable interfaces, rather than creating analogical references between cinema and memory, cinema and perception... These interfaces are

discussed as the same interface as cinema. It is the relation, which is based on the affective force, which means the capacity to act. Bergson gets away from the problematic of the visible in approaches to cinema, because the visible, too, has always been a function of the capacity to act. Thus it leaves us the space to ask the mere question, a question, which in its simplicity plunges into multiplicity and heterogeneity within the heart of cinema: What is cinema capable of?

Following this line of thought, my aim in this thesis is to explore cinematic images in terms of time and movement. The generative logic behind these discussions will be the argument that art, in a broader realm, does not preserve mnemonic pasts but affects and percepts. Tracing the line of arguments which Deleuze sets forth in his two books, i.e. "Cinema 1: Movement-Image" and "Cinema 2: Time-Image" on Bergson, what I offer is one possible way of reading of this endless process.

CHAPTER 1:

THOUGHT IN MOTION

The writings of Gilles Deleuze, in his two books on cinema, Cinema-1: Movement-Image and Cinema-2: Time-Image, is a writing process that, by delivering itself up to cinema, breaks with the constitution of a restful place (of the critic and analyst). It refers back to a familiarity that is all the more displacing and strange in not allowing us to keep on it. Certainly, cinema, too, is not simply a mechanic way to creation, insofar as it touches creation as belonging to an outside always to come. The fascination of Deleuze with cinema, in this sense, does not lead to the preconceptions but becomings. Like thought, it is a movement of approaching, which does not end. In these sense, I will try to clarify the main points of convergence that Deleuze finds between philosophy and cinema in this chapter, which in turn questions both contemporary theories of cinema and history of philosophy.

1.1 Language and Cinema

However, to approach and to keep on approaching, does not by the same token refer to a distancing, as does analytic thought. In the latter, one has to keep a certain distance from the thing under investigation, has to differentiate it from himself in order to attain knowledge. That is why Deleuze problematizes the clichés and pre-established norms surrounding theories of cinema. Deleuze points this out, starting from the labeling of cinema with the norms of psychoanalysis and structural linguistics applied, which derives from their historical parallel evolution. Such methods of approaching cinema assume a distance between the critic and the image right from the start. On the contrary, according to Deleuze, if an evolution there be, "Creative Evolution" is what we need, in terms of freeing cinema from what it is not. By bringing the concepts that Bergson and Peirce had put forward, Deleuze shows us a way to consider images in themselves, rather than enslaving them to double articulation.

Deleuze points out the relationship between cinema and language, tracing the Peircian semiotics throughout the first volume but concentrates more on it in the second chapter of second volume. For the mistake should not be repeated, Deleuze names this chapter as "Recapitulation of the Images and Signs". Not to capitulate but to recapitulate from capitulation. Not to continue the questions as they quickly establish their answers, but to ask new questions is the very Deleuzean method in this chapter.

Deleuze's choice of Peircean semiotics seems to be decisive here, because Peirce "conceives of signs on the basis of the images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which are already linguistics". This does not mean that Deleuze denies the existence of linguistic features in cinema, rather he points out that cinema can not be analyzed only through syntagmatic and paradigmatic frameworks. Recognizing that something being presented in film cannot be articulated within the symbolic, Deleuze moves to a discussion of cinematographic image not as a linguistic determinant but as a philosophical concept. For him, cinema is a plastic mass: there is not an enunciation; images are not utterances. "It is an utterable"(1989b: 29). Instead of dominating images and signs by utterances, which, in turn refer to a language system and carries out the discussion to syntagms and paradigms, he needs to define cinema as 'not semiology but semiotics', as the system of images and signs independent of language in general: "Cinema is neither a language system nor a language" (1989b: 29).

In this sense, the question that is put by Christian Metz as "In what conditions can cinema be considered as a language?", according to Deleuze, defines the problem in a wrong way: the historical fact that cinema has been considered as a narrative form, according to him, leads to an approximation which reduces sequence of images even a single image to a unit of language, that

is, to the smallest narrative utterance. But this point where the cinematographic image has been reduced to utterance, means the capitulation of images and signs to language, is the main problem of the problem. According to Deleuze:

> From that point on, this narrative utterance necessarily operates through resemblance or analogy, and, in as much as it proceeds through signs, these are 'analogical signs'. Semiology thus needs to have a double transformation: on the one hand the reduction of the image to an analogical sign belonging to an utterance; on the other hand, the codification of these signs in order to discover the linguistic underlying these utterances. (1989b: 27)

Cinema even with its verbal elements, cannot be understood in terms of utterance, because the utterance can be found in the image itself, but not as a given. Metz's initial question in this sense assumes that all cinema is narrative, and if so cinematic narrative is linguistic. Although all the cinema theories, that Deleuze finds reductionist, define their realms as the mainstream narrative cinema, or a criticism of it, in turn, establish an improper circle where one is led to create synthetic oppositions. It is the first rule in Bergsonian method that we can evaluate our discussion: "Apply the test of true and false to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of problems" (Deleuze, 1988: 17). We are not seeking for truth, but in order to understand the logic of this

capitulation, one has to rethink and recapitulate the questions themselves.

I think, Deleuze first of all tries to underline that the way cinema has proceeded in narrative direction is not necessarily its own possibility, even when it is so, the narrative in the film does not necessarily require images to be utterances. Deleuze clarifies this by explaining the inherent structure of movement-image, which is more than an analogy, unlike the conception of utterance grounding analogy as a problem. Thinking in terms of analogy fails as soon as we think the grounding factor of the cinematic image as movement, because through movement we are no longer able to assign an analogy or resemblance of the image to the object. As Bergson shows in Matter and Memory, the construction of analogy is only possible if the movement is taken out from the moving body. Because, movement is the most visible characteristic of the image and when it is taken out, the image is left in a false appearance, a representation, an utterance. However in moving, the object is its image par excellence, and there is nothing left to it to resemble.

> The objects of reality have become units of the image, at the same time as the movement-image has become a reality, which speaks through its objects (Bergson, 1988: 28).

1.2 Image and Movement

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In order to approach this "image=movement" assertion we need an extended detour, enabling us to consider the role of the image in Bergson, where Deleuze grounds his discussion on cinema. Bergson approaches the question of the image, in the first sentences of the introduction of <u>Matter and Memory.</u> He postulates that in order to approach the questions of philosophy we have to start with a set of images and images alone, because in Bergson's philosophy, everything is an image and the universe is an aggregate of images. Furthermore there is never one image which can be seperated from the rest. Even the natural perception is an image among others. All the tendencies that Western thought has with its instances of materialism or idealism is thus problematized through images. Since, for Bergson the duplicity of the image and the world cannot be overcome easily, as Deleuze articulates in <u>Bergsonism</u>, Bergson needs to point out and even further to emphasize the abyss between these two philosophical misconceptions, which creates this duplicity. This is the main difficulty of starting with images:

> These difficulties are due, for the most part, to the conception, now realistic, now idealistic, which philosophers have of matter. The aim of our first chapter is to show the realism and idealism both go too far, that it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception that we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they. Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of

"images". And by "image" we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which realist calls a thing -an existence placed halfway between the "thing" and the "representation". (Bergson 1988: 9)

The confrontation of materialism and idealism, according to Bergson, occurs in their relation to image. Debating to account for a possible change in the comprehension of image i.e. matter, Bergson turns to the philosophical effort to articulate a common ground where combatants may meet. In this sense, Bergson initiates from the point that, by definition, we can only grasp things in the form of images. If in materialism, an image, related only to itself, possesses an absolute value, in idealism it belongs to the world of consciousness where all the images depend on the subject as the central image. Thus, in materialism, we see the reconstitution of consciousness with pure material movement of the universe, whereas in idealism the universe is reconstituted in consciousness. This is the main obstacle for Bergson: the duality of the image and movement, consciousness and the thing. By stating, "all consciousness is something", Bergson questions the duplicity in the phenomenological statement that "all consciousness is consciousness of something". According to Deleuze, the latter statement is the means of "anchoring" of the perceiving subject in the world. The question involving cinema is the same regarding consciousness and perception, even it forces this relation: "The cinema can, with impunity, bring us close to things or take us away

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from them and revolve around them, it suppresses both the anchoring of the subject and horizon of the world" (1989a: 57). The cinematic movement, in this sense, enables a "drawing close to" the perceived and perceiver, the world and perception. Thus the relation of perception of the world, to the consciousness of the subject shows similarities to the always already perceiving and perceived cinematic apparatus as a consciousness itself. However, in not fixing conscious as a center of determination, it brings out new questions.

If we remember, Merleau-Ponty's account of the visible, we see that vision is never empty, because it is intentional; it is an act towards an object. It is always the seeing-*of*-a-some-thing-that-is-seen. Thus consciousness is always consciousness <u>of</u>, indicating a separation between consciousness and the objects, just as seeing is also seeing <u>of</u>. Perception thus is anchored to a perceiving subject i.e. camera and human. Bergson in this sense makes a radical shift, by saying, "consciousness <u>is</u> something", as he indicates the consciousness and the things belong to the same plane.

Such a parallelism between cinema and natural perception in regard to consciousness, as we have discussed, points out to the illusionary aspect of both. For Bergson, too, the cinema is an illusion, but it is so as the natural perception is. This, in Bergson, is due to that the model for cinema is not natural perception but flowing-matter. By introducing this concept, which would constantly change and where

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a point of anchorage or a center of the subject is not even the concerns of the discussion, Bergson defines the problem in the aggregate of images. Because if perception were problematized at the beginning of the discussion, it would be easily defined as fixed instantaneous views, and according to Bergson this would be reducing both natural and cinematographic perception. It would stabilize the forces inherent to their structure. Thus according to Deleuze, Bergson's argument here, "instead of going from the acentered state of things to centered perception, it would go back up towards the acentered state of things and get closer to it" (Deleuze, 1989a: 58).

However the question remains the same: how can we conceive matter as an aggregate of images? How can we link the consciousness and the thing? I think, Deleuze's statement is an adequate answer concerning such problems: matter is moving:

> We find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a world where IMAGE=MOVEMENT. Let us call the set of what appears 'Image' we cannot even say that one image acts on another or reacts to another. There is no moving body, which is distinct from executed movement. There is nothing moved which is distinct from received movement. Everything that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions, this is universal variation... every image acts on others an reacts to others, on 'all their facets at once' and 'by all their elements' all the truth is that the movements of matter are

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very clear, regarded as images, and that there is no need to look in movement for anything more than what we see in it. An atom is an image which extends to the point to which its actions and reactions extend. My body is an image, hence a set of actions and reactions. My eye, my brain are images, parts of my body. How could my brain contain images since it is an image among others? External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement. How could be images in my consciousness since I am myself an image, that is movement. And can I even, at this state, speak of 'ego', of brain, of body? Only for simple convenience: for nothing yet can be defined in this way. It is rather a gaseous state. Me, my body, are rather a set of molecules and atoms which are constantly renewed. Can I even speak of atoms? They are not distinct from worlds, from interatomic influences. It is a state of matter too hot for anyone to be able to distinguish solid bodies in it. It is a world of universal variation, of universal undulation, universal rippling: there are neither axes, nor center, nor left, nor right, nor high, nor low...(Deleuze, 1989a: 58)

These infinite series of images constitute a kind of plane of immanence. The image exists in itself on this plane. According to Bergson, this being in-itself of the image is matter. Matter, in contrast to the phenomenological understanding of the term is not behind the image, but it is the absolute identity of the image and movement. Matter is movement-image and movement-image is the flowing-matter. However if the movement-images there be in the plane of immanence, they are not immobile and instantaneous sections, rather

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they are mobile and temporal. According to Deleuze, this temporal section is the bloc of space-and time. "Not mechanism but machinism", adds Deleuze, because cinema is not a mechanic, closed system, consisting of immobile images coming next to each other, rather it is an infinite series of such blocs of space and time. The material universe or the universe as cinema in itself is the machinic assemblage of movement-images.

The nodal point of what movement problematizes in terms of our understanding of images, is a dispersing one. In this sense, when we say movement, we are already in the ground of action-reaction, consciousness, memory, perception, duration. What is perhaps most troubling, in fact, is that, Bergson's attribution seems to work in reverse, these concepts cannot be understood as separate entities, as some terminologies we have been discussing throughout the history of philosophy. But also because once these concepts encounter one another neither remains the same, they experience rather a continual transformation.

In these sense, if for Bergson the thing and the perception of the thing are the same, they are related to each other in a way that, the thing is the image as in itself, and relates to other images, on the ground of action and reaction. The perception of the thing is related to another image that is my consciousness, but my consciousness *is* something, which acts and reacts, too. My perception is an image,

but imaging perception as a photographic view of things in a representational way, as if it is the projection of something to the office of brain, is the most distant understanding of the term. The reason for such misconception is that for Bergson, neither perception nor memory is simply mental or duplicates the physical. Referring to materialist, idealist and scientific conceptions of the terms, he establishes a common basis. Because all three regard perception and memory as being rather a useless duplication of the reality or simply immobile reflection of a material construction, which dismisses the relation of perception to action or memory to conduct. Rather in Bergson, it is the radical questioning of perception: "but is it not obvious that the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart of the things and at all the points of space?" (Bergson, 1988: 38). I think, this means that the photographed exists as a photograph even before the work of any camera, i.e., consciousness, showing that perception begins in photography, however it is photography before photography as we know it. It is a convergence of thinking about photography; it suggests an irreducible link between consciousness and photography. If it indicates a metaphor, it is only in the sense that by means of infinite snapshots, taken at the intervals of its flux, we will discover "the cinematographic instinct of our thought" (Bergson, 1944: 342). In Bergson's writing, one can trace the metaphorical connotations related to cinematographic and photographic medium. The reason

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for those to occupy a quite central position is that Bergson's philosophy itself is guided by the principles of cinematographic perception. It works like a camera attempting to capture and fix the relation between memory and experience. However, the relations, whom he aims at capturing, occur in a world composed solely of images. The mobility of images and their constant transformation make them impossible to be fixed in themselves. As Bergson says the complete image would vanish when motor activity tries to fix its outline. The accuracy of images of people, events, objects that the camera provides us with only increases the common belief that they are perfect analagons. Bergson's criticism in this point is that photographs, being "images of idle fancy or of dream" can only show what is always already a photograph. If it pictures by immobilizing the image, which is essentially mobile, what is perceived in the photograph is not the image it shows but something, which has absented itself from the scene. The photographer and the camera in this scene, does not appear either, because "if photograph there be, is already taken". This is one of the main questions in the problematization of images, whether they are in the apparatus, i.e. mind, or not:

> Every image is within certain images and without others; but of the aggregate of images we cannot say that they are within us or without us, since interiority and exteriority are only relations among images. To ask whether the

world exists only in our thought, or outside of our thought, is to put the problem in terms that are insoluble, even if we suppose them to be intelligible. (Bergson, 1988: 25)

In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari clarify this insoluble equation in terms of transcendence. The illusion of transcendence for him is thinking in terms of interiority and exteriority of images in relation to a subject. The relative horizon of the subject functions as a limit in this equation, thus the limit is something "which changes with an observer and encloses the observable states of affairs" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 36). Merleau-Ponty defines this limit with the intentionality of the subject:

Nothing prevents us from crossing the limits with the movements of the look, but this freedom remains secretly bound; we can displace our look, that is transfer its limits elsewhere. But it is necessary that there be always a limit; what is won from one side must be lost from the other (Merleau-Ponty: 100).

On the other hand, immanence does not belong to a subject, rather it is "the horizon itself that is in movement: the relative horizon recedes when the subject advances, but on the plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon" (Deleuze, 1994: 38). We are dwelling on this question of the limit for a simple convenience, because the relative horizon of the camera, defines what is in the frame and what is out-of-field. However for Deleuze, the limit is not dependent on the natural perception nor camera although

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they always seek for it 'we head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we turn with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind... take Michaux's plane of immanence for example, with its infinite, wild movements and speeds" (Deleuze, 1994: 41). This infinite and wild movements towards the horizon, as the movements of Don Quixote, for us means the instances of cinema i.e. films, each defining their own plane of immanence. Thus they don't define a limit; on the contrary, they always intervene with the outside. The film does not construct an inside rather it is this infinite questioning of the limit, i.e. film. It is an infinite movement towards the horizon: the passion. This passion for making films can be seen when Fassbinder does not sleep for 3 days, may be because he does not want to come back soon, or when Godard preferring 15 minutes for shooting the film and the rest of the day for thinking on it. They head for the horizon but they do not define it. The eye, the camera, thus becomes thought in its relation to the limit. The relation to visual exhibited by contemporary theorizations of cinema thus interrupted, because it is mediated and reinforced by their relation to the realm of thought. This passage of eye in becoming thought, also can be found in the indications found in the methodology of Bergson. It is not fundamentally psychology or phenomenology of the eye, nor it defines the photographs in the mind or memory, rather it is the power to act, power to film, being in the movement of the world. It is how we understand the cinematic body as Bergson clearly questions in regard to our bodies:

Here are external images, then my body, and, lastly the changes brought about by my body in the surrounding images. I see plainly how external images influence the image that I call my body: they transmit movement to it. And I also see how this body influences external images: it gives back movement to them. My body is, then, in the aggregate of images, receiving and giving back movement, with, perhaps, this difference only that my body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives. (1988: 19)

1.3 Perception-Affection-Action-Image

Certain questions can be raised here: What does a body refer to? What is cinema? What is it capable of? According to Bergson, our body, i.e. cinema is first of all an instrument of action. That is, it is an agent of transferring a received movement to reaction, "my body an object destined to move other objects, is then, a center of action: it cannot give birth to a representation" (Bergson, 1988: 20). This is what Deleuze means by action-image.

In this sense, what happens asks Deleuze, in this acentered universe, in the plane of immanence where everything reacts on everything else? How can we talk about a body? In telling us of the absence of any determining point that would identify consciousness, of any marker that might serve to celebrate it, Deleuze reveals, what Bergson has already told us by stating that what happens is "at any point whatever of the plane an interval appears —a gap between the

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action and the reaction" (Deleuze, 1989a: 61). For Bergson everything is movement only if it includes the interval between movements. However, this phenomenon of the interval is only possible if the plane of immanence includes time. Thus, living image is not a center of determination, rather, the living image is differentiated from the rest by virtue of the interval; reaction is not immediate but delayed. <u>Because for the reaction, it is impossible to be a received excitation for living image.</u>

> By virtue of the interval, these are delayed reactions, which has the time to select their elements, to organize them or to integrate them into a new movement which is impossible to conclude by simply prolonging the received excitation. (Deleuze, 1989a: 62)

This is sufficient to define one type of image among others: living images or matters. If we can consider other images acting and reacting by all their facets and all their parts, living images only receive actions on one facet or certain parts and execute reactions by other parts. Thus the living image will be "an instrument of analysis in regard to the movement received, and an instrument of selection in regard to the movement executed" (Deleuze, 1989a: 62). Because they only owe this privilege to the phenomenon of a gap, or an interval between a received and executed movement, living images will be "centers of indetermination", which are formed in the acentered universe of movement-images" (Deleuze, 1989a: 62).

According to Deleuze, the second point where we can talk about the differentiation of the living images from the rest occurs in luminous aspect of the plane of matter. For Deleuze, the living image provides the black screen, which the plane lacked and which prevented the influencing image (photo) from being developed. Unlike other images, which diffuses and propagates the movement received directly to execution of it, this time, the light faces an obstacle, that is an opacity, which will reflect it. The image reflected, in its isolation from others is what Deleuze calls perception-image. Deleuze, in relating light to perception, I think, reconvenes to the cinematographic connotations that we come up to in <u>Matter and Memory</u>. In this book, Bergson suggests a definition of perception closely linked to issues concerning light and representation. Perception is a kind of <u>framing</u>, because certain actions that are undergone are themselves isolations that enables perceptions. However executed actions are not immediate to the action, which is undergone. The action is always unpredictable and brings forth new reactions.

According to Deleuze these two aspects of defining living images as "centers of indetermination" and "black screen" is followed by the existence of a double system. The first system concerns all the images acting-reacting each other as a function of each other. But to this structure, another system where living images are singular and act as the aggregate of images, acts and reacts as framer:

The thing and the perception of the thing is one and the same thing, one and the same image, but related to one or other of two systems of reference. The thing is the image in itself, as it is related to all the other images to whose action it completely submits and on which it reacts immediate. But the perception of the thing is the same image related to another special image which frames it, and which only retains a partial action from it, and only reacts to it immediately. (Deleuze, 1989a: 63)

If we define perception on the same ground with the thing, we can conclude that there is nothing more in the perception than what there is in the thing. On the contrary, there is less, according to Deleuze, because we have already defined perception as a framing. We frame according to our interests, thus we perceive the thing but we subtract which does not interest us. This is the first material movement of subjectivity: it is subtractive. According to Deleuze, the thing then itself presented in itself as a complete immediate, diffuse perception.

The thing is image and, in this respect, is perceived itself and perceives all the other things inasmuch as it is subject to their action and react to them on all its facets and in all their parts... in short things and perception of the things are prehensions, but things are total objective prehensions, and perception of things are incomplete and prejudiced, partial, subjective prehensions. (Deleuze, 1989a: 64)

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Again, for Deleuze this discussion shows us why we cannot take natural subjective perception as a model for cinema. Rather, Deleuze defines perception-image, which shows us the double regime of perception. At once the camera is in things and it occupies the objective perception as Vertov might call it, and it is also distinguished from the rest by the simple elimination or subtraction of the framing. This is how Deleuze defines perception as unicentered subjective perception, because it is related to a center of indetermination.

However, we cannot conclude that the whole operation is subtraction. Because as soon as we define everything as movement-images and the living matter as a special image among others, the universe is incurved and organized to surround it. And if so, this is already from the point of view of the action, from which perception is inseparable. By incurving, perceived things become an excitation for the living matter by offering their unstable facet towards us and at the same time as our delayed reaction, which has become action, learns to use them.

> Perceiving things here where they are, I grasp the "virtual action" that they have on me, and simultaneously the "possible action" that I have on them, in order to associate me with them or to avoid them, by diminishing or increasing the distance. It is thus the same phenomenon of the gap, which is expressed in terms of time in my action and in terms of space in my perception. The more the reaction ceases to be immediate and

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becomes truly possible action, the more the perception becomes distant and anticipatory and extracts the virtual action of things. (Deleuze, 1989a: 65)

Thus this is the second avatar of the movement-image, the second aspect of subjectivity. It is no longer an elimination in terms of framing, but the incurving of the universe "which simultaneously causes virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things" (Deleuze, 1989a: 64). But the interval cannot only be defined by clearing out the perceptive and active faces which belongs to the other side of the interval. Rather there is an in-between and affection is what occupies the interval "without filling it in or filling it up"(1989a, 65).

It is there between a perception and a hesitant action. It is the coincidence of object and subject, which finds its explanation in the subject which perceives itself, or feels itself from the inside. Because it does not revert to the other objects of perception or the act of subjects, rather they mark the coincidence of object and subject in its pure quality. This is what Deleuze calls affection-image.

This is absorption of the action and reaction rather than being a reflection of it. It becomes an effort, a tendency that replaces action, which has become momentarily immobile. Affection-image however shouldn't be understood as a neutralization of perception and action-image, rather it establishes the relation from the beginning.

That is why the face is the affection-image par excellence for Deleuze, because the face "with its relative immobility and its receptive organs, which brings to light this movements of expression while they remain frequently buried in the rest of the body" (1989a: 66). The face reveals expression (action), perception (sense organs), and the affection (interval). However, it does not actualize such virtual affects in a particular person. It provides them with a body, while effacing itself from the scene as belonging to an individual. The strength of close-up shots, according to Deleuze, lies precisely in this: forcing the face to the point of inhumanity. The desubjectivization of the face offered by the close-up points to the becomings, the constant displacement and dissolution of a fixed identity. Thus each of us is a complex system of these three sorts of images, perception-image, action-image and affection-image, a consolidation of it. The sensory-motor link is the automatic relationship of perception-image, action-image and affection-image.

More fundamentally, we find the original source of this relation, from the point of view of affect: it is the capacity to both affect and get affected. In effect, for affections Bergson should presuppose a force very profound which makes all of the images that Deleuze defines in terms of movement-images and time-image sensible, it puts them in relation: duration and succession, a multiplication of points and unforeseen instants, memory and forgetting. But only through the

interval it opens up. Because the question is if one image starts when the other finishes, or if they buried in the interval itself therefore exploding every time one starts? What makes possible this relation of time to cinema?

CHAPTER 2:

CEASURA

Boneyard of names, heads never empty.
Maurice Blanchot

CAESURA. – history comes to a head in the moment of disaster, in the time of the disaster that structures the danger of history. In the almost-no-time of the disaster, thinking comes to a standstill. It experiences itself as interruption. (Cadava: 59)

Deleuze's efforts to analyze cinematographic images as a negotiation of time and movement cannot be thought without historical references. According to him there was a time, a history, about which we can no longer speak. The unspeakable but also unescapable time of the death camps is the unforgettable and unrecallable at the same time. The question, in this sense, Resnais confronts when he tries to make a film about death camps was not a question of a standard documentary where one captures the logic of the event, on the contrary, it was a challenge of capturing on film the enormity of the horror. As Deleuze states it is not a simple question of conveying the idea of horror: "when the violence is no longer of the

image and its vibrations, but of the represented, we move to a blood-red arbitrariness" (1989b: 164). Thus for Deleuze, thinking about the death camps does not consist of prolonging the suffering in a complaint as if the event can be represented in images, rather through the logic of disaster, the obscurity of the disaster, one can carry the light to the images. In his film Night and Fog, Resnais tells us "and there are those of us who look concernedly at these ruins as if the old concentration monster were dead in the rubble, those of us who pretend to hope before this distant future, as if the plague of the camps had been wiped out, those of us who pretend to believe that all this happened long ago and in another country, those who never look around to see and hear...." If Deleuze defines concentration camps as a break in history of man, cinema confronts with this break and this break is the sole thing that makes someone to see and hear the impossibility of not seeing and hearing.

The logic of the disaster is everywhere. "Things just go on", and have gone in this way 'this is the catastrophe" says Benjamin. "Catastrophe is not what threatens to occur in any moment but what is given in any moment" (Benjamin, qtd. in Cadava: 59). The radical difference between Deleuze's affirmations of how cinema has been affected by the Second World War and the analogy constructed through a parallelism between cinema and historicism lies here. Deleuze's point of view cannot be seen as a historicism and therefore

be defined as drawing parallels to history of man. Because instead of historicism which presents an eternal image of the past, Deleuze's claim can be seen as a setting into motion an experience with time original to every present. In this sense, if he marks the concentration camps as a turning point within the history, it is not for humanizing the incomprehensible horror, of making it comprehensible and therefore diminishing it, rather it is because being incomprehensible, it blasts shattering any idea of continuum. If Deleuze draws parallels between the blast in Hiroshima or the suffering in concentration camps, it is for a simple reason: the disaster takes care of everything:

> To think would be to name (to call) the disaster the way one reserves, in the back of one's mind, an unspoken thought.

> I do not know how I arrived at this, but it may be that in so doing I struck upon the thought which leads one to keep one's distance from thought, for it gives that: distance. (Blanchot, 1995: 4)

Thus the temporality of the cinematographic images, in Deleuze, relates with this unpassable distance within the movement of thought. If Blanchot problematizes a question of writing through the logic of disaster, it is not because he writes about the disaster rather he writes with disaster, he approaches disaster every time he starts writing and the disaster writes in him. He faces a time as unthought. It is not the time of the event represented, rather it is the impossibility of

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philosophizing that time within the memory of the event: "know what has happened and at the same time you will never be able to". (Smock, in Blanchot, 1995: Viii) For Deleuze, too, cinema testifies such a relation to thought: "the impossibility of thinking that is thought" (1989b: 166). In this sense, according to Deleuze, Blanchot tries to give a fundamental question about how we think:

> What makes us to think is "the impower of thought", the figure of nothingness, the inexistence of a whole which would be thought. What Blanchot diagnoses everywhere in literature is particularly clear in cinema; on the one hand the presence of an unthinkable in the thought, which would be both its source and barrier; on the other hand presence to infinity of another thinker in the thinker, who shatters every monologue of a thinking self. (1989b: 168)

That is why, in the second volume on cinema, The Time-Image Deleuze concentrates on the fissure within the heart of cinema. For Deleuze what is conveyed in the films before the Second World War was a construction of the whole as a film, and the whole as a subject. The whole in this sense was being continually made -in cinema, by internalizing the images and externalizing the whole through the images- thus the whole was open. If we consider the films of Eisenstein every image internalized in a film was chosen in a way that with the preceding one it be put in to contrast therefore showing the power of the contrast, which externalizes a thought as shock. A thought is the

action-thought, which indicates a relation between man and the world within the boundaries of sensory-motor unity. Everytime it was being made within the motor action-reaction chain, even conveyed through the shock, the images was subsequent to each other in an intellectual automatism.

However, after the war, the virtually infinite relations that are condensed in a film cannot be called a whole, without everytime shattering with a blast. Because for Deleuze if any whole is constructed in cinema it is the whole as the outside:

> When we say 'the whole is the outside' the point is quite
> different. In the first place, the question is no longer that of
> the association or attraction of images. What counts is on
> the contrary the interstice between images, between two
> images ' a spacing' which means that each image is
> plucked from the void and falls back into it. (1989b: 179)

Here and Elsewhere. In Godard's Here and Elsewhere the problemiztization of images coming next to each other is ultimate. Here a French family watches news from elsewhere where the Palestinian war goes on. Unlike, the Badrillardian assumption that the war has not happened because it has been represented through images, the war really happens in Godard's film and there are real people watching it. The relation among images is important here, it is not a association –in this case association through televisual flow- rather the interstice between here and elsewhere. There is not a continuity between the French family and the group of fedayeen. Rather the interaction of the two, traces a frontier which belongs neither one nor the other. An interrupted chain of images, like a

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silence which is not an act in order to continue talking but where words fall in, it is the radical calling into question of the images being slave to the next.

> It is the method of BETWEEN, 'between two images', which does away with all cinema of the one. It is the method of AND, 'this and then that', which does away with all the cinema of Being=is. Between two actions, between two affections, between two perceptions, between two visual images, between the sound and visual: make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible. (1989b: 180)

The direct presentation of time thus occurs in the fissure, questioning every possibility of continuity. The chronological continuity of the conceptualization of time shatters, and becomes rather a stratography of what was once called a singular layer of reality. The power of the outside passes into the interstice.

The present is always already shattered with the logic of the disaster and the critical part of Deleuze's distinction between movement-image and time-image lies in questioning the presentness of the cinematographic image. If we remember what we have discussed in the first chapter -explaining how Bergson questions action and perception defining that our actions are responses to how we perceive the world- the presence of a motor-unity that constructs the movement-images, is similar in the way we relate one image to another, assuming ever greater presents following each other. For Deleuze, the laws of action-perception account not only for the force

of images upon each other in a time where things just go on, but it also coincides with unity of the moments i.e presents and the interval between them.

This is the manifestation of the movement-image, which make the interval the motor-part of the images Deleuze puts forward. Subsequently emphasizing that, instinctively cinema at the beginning of its trajectory, presented bodies that are influencing each other in a chain of action and reaction. It is a chain of all expected events: the telephone rings, a man picks up the receiver, then we see the man on the other hand of the line, the first man says he is coming, hangs up, walks out the door, down the stairs, gets into the car, drive through the parks, streets, parks his car in front of a building, goes in, climbs the stairs, rings the bell... And, of course, someone opens the door. However, this infinite action-reaction chain is not enough to conceive of movement of images, because the automatic manner in which they chase each other is only one part of what Bergson offers us by equation of image=movement. Because when we consider living images in relation to the rest of the bodies, we see that it is not simply in action-reaction establishes itself, rather it is the very interruption that time and thought brings forward. That is why, affection-image is in a certain sense is an opening way to time-image. Introducing an interval within the subject, affection makes possible for Deleuze to conceive

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time. Interval along with the before and the after is what constitutes the fracture in the I.

The movement-image pretends to be in the present. It supposes an empirical course of time consisting of successive moments, where present could only be understood in relation to a before and after so that the past is only a former present and future a present to come. Time understood as such is a representation of movement. In time-image on the other hand time is no more empirical, it is out of joint, where it presents itself in the pure state. Time-image no longer derives from movement but as wild movement it reveals time. Time is out of joint. For Deleuze this is the main theme to explain what he means by the empty form of time:

> The joint, cardo, is what ensures the subordination of time
> to those properly cardinal points through which pass the
> periodic movements which it measures (time, number of
> the movement, for the soul as much as the world). By
> contrast time out of joint means demented time or time
> outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its
> overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which
> made up its consent, its relation to movement overturned;
> in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form.
> Time itself unfolds (that is apparently ceases to be a circle)
> instead of things unfolding within it (following the overly
> simple circular figure). It ceases to be cardinal and
> becomes ordinal, a pure *order* of time... We may define
> the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the
> unequal in the function of the caesura. (1968: 88-89)

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CHAPTER 3:

TO REMEMBER FORGETFULLY: TIME

The thought of the other, the other as thought.
Maurice Blanchot

3.1 Optical and Sound Stations

My reading from this point onwards would try to attend to the way in which Deleuze's anticipation upon the nature of time-image cinematographically affirm, in the very era after the Second World War, through the transformation of essential cinematic elements in cinematic movements, such as character constructions, objects and settings, indiscernibility between real and imaginary, and orderings of time.

If the disjunction that characterizes the relation of time-image and movement-image corresponds to the <u>caesura</u>, Deleuze's move toward the very particular movements, singular films, and directors within the history of cinema in turn, disjoints any idea of a whole. Deleuze suggests conditions of approaching cinema with its specific instances, without rendering them into methodologies. It is obvious when Deleuze asserts that in the post-war cinema movements like Neo-Realism and New-Wave reality becomes something that is not to be represented but something "that is aimed at"(1989b, 1). Instead of defining Neo-Realism as a post-war movement which criticizes, realizes

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or represents the after war reality, or New Wave as a new form of intervening with reality, he redefines the question in cinema's relation to thought. If movement-image went into an outbreak, it is because a new element that is to prevent perception being extended into action in order to put it in contact with thought has been born. Instead of the subordination of images to sensory-motor schemata, which orders the world in a reasonable way –automatism- gives way to pure optical-sound situations, which is always already an intervention with the caesura that is not the motor-part of the images. Instead of defining what Deleuze means by optical sound situations I will try to trace them back marking out the transformations that cinematographic images went through.

3.1.1 Characters

From now on, says Deleuze, the character became a viewer. The sensory-motor scheme that he discusses, in the first volume of his work, The Movement-Image, is now broken. The character, being out of the motor situation is no longer "a subject of action", but he shifts, runs and hesitates in vain. The situation that he faces exceeds his motor capacities to respond and act, only leaves him in position of seeing and hearing.

In this context, the main character of this new cinema is like a child; just like a child never knowing what to do and how to react, is continuously affected by a certain motor helplessness. But, just as a

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child, this allows him to be more capable of hearing and seeing. Nevertheless, what he sees and hears is a world in ruins that never allows him in.

In Rosselini's film, Germany Year Zero, the child protagonist, in Deleuze's words "dies from what he sees" (1989b: 2). The child hopelessly tries to find a place in this world, during the war: when he fails to bring money to home, he steals; in an attempt to help his father he kills him (to free him from pain of his sickness and the war). When he runs from home, he tries to join the street kids but is not accepted then he creates a game for himself, kicking the stones in the ruins. Finally he climbs to an abandoned building still trying to play, he looks to the cityscape, which is all in ruin, jumps to his death.

Schlondorff, I think, also puts this traumatic situation of the child character, into question. The child, in Tin Drum does not want to grow; he does not want to join the adult world and its rules because what adult world means, in this film, is taking part in the approaching war and rising fascism. Schlondorff's child also, in this sense, being not able to find himself a future as becoming adult, traumatizes himself to remain as a child. While his polygamic family breaks apart, while Nazis get into power, he simply witnesses the events wit a naked eye, he simply tries to continue to play his tin drum, which is the means of his refusal. And whenever the adult world intervenes between him and his tin drum he stands still, stiff and paralyzed, yells out his destructive cry.

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He stands still against the world of action, against the world of masses becoming a subject; he remains as an exception through his aberrant movement.

"Hitler as filmmaker" says Deleuze, "shows us the relation between the cinematographic image and art of the masses" (1989b: 264). Referring to Benjamin's article "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" he describes how the art of mechanical movement was itself to coincide with the automization of masses. So, in this film we see how the "movement-image and an art of the masses become subject was broken off, giving way to the masses subjected as psychological automaton, and to their leader as spiritual automaton" (1989b: 264).

However, even if in these limit-situations we are shown the filmic characters' (as a child) motor helplessness, we need to add that for a child there is never an equilibrium of stimulus and response, in daily life too. In 400 Blows, the child neither belongs to the school nor to his family, in the banality of daily life and its pre-established norms. Rather he prefers to roam around the city; he sees the city during the night to which he has never been allowed to.

3.1.2 Objects and Settings

Another aspect that Deleuze discusses in regard to post war cinema movements is that "the objects and settings take on an

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autonomous, material reality which gives them an importance in themselves" (1989b: 4). It is in this sense, not only the viewer but the character, the children in the films I have mentioned above, invest the settings and the objects by their gaze, that they see and hear the things and the people, in order for action or passion to be born, releasing from a pre-existing life.

Between the reality of setting and that of action, it is no longer a sensory-motor link which is established, but an immediate affection which can be felt through liberated sense organs through dreamlike connections. In contrast to any-instant-whatever of the mechanical time, through time space becomes something else: "Any-space-whatever" becomes the pure optical sound situation, because the characters find themselves in emptied and dehumanized spaces, exploring its limits. Unlike the spaces of sensory-motor situations which only leave them a space for presupposed steps, they do not disclose the characters. But any-space-whatever, whether disconnected or emptied, becomes itself a pure optical-sound situation, like the solitude or the incommunicability of the characters.

Wenders' hotel rooms where characters find themselves in incommunicable loneliness, generates stories. In <u>The State of Things</u> when the film in the film can no longer be shot, another film starts, by the convergence of the hotel rooms from being the setting of the film to the realm of affections that characters find themselves when they

are not in the film.   In the film <u>News from Home</u>, too, Chantal Ackerman, sending images to her mother from New York, converts New York, her home to any-space-whatever. The film, instead of locating a central city, becomes a dream of time. As in Bresson's <u>Pickpocket</u> the protagonist's say "I hate the idea of going home", even home becomes any-space-whatever.

3.1.3 Indiscernibility

Deleuze inserts a general characteristic of optical and sound situations that can be found in the indiscernibility of the imaginary and real, physical or mental, objective or subjective. In terms of the object, he clears out this point. If traditional realist description presupposes the independence of its object therefore a discernibility of the imaginary and real, by referring to Robbe-Grillet's understanding of description in nouveau-roman, Deleuze states that in the pure optical-sound situations we are no longer able to discern what is imaginary from the real.

> Since it replaces its own object, on the one hand it erases
> or destroys its reality which passes into the imaginary, but
> on the other hand it powerfully brings out the reality which
> the imaginary or the mental create through speech and
> vision. (1898b: 7)

In Godard's <u>Two or Three Things I Know about Her</u>, the cuts between a woman's face and a cup of coffee give us a description among others. By consistently zooming-in to the cup, coffee becomes a visual description, consisting of black and white surfaces, whereas the woman's face is also forced to become a description. Concentrating on the city images throughout the film, Godard also problematizes how one can present the images of the city, replies with a city made out of detergent boxes. Here, the object of the detergent boxes both erases the necessity of traditional realistic description, and creates a pure optical city, when the image starts to fade out, we can no longer discern a city made out of buildings and a city of detergent boxes. This is the pure optical situation, the optical drama of the city, where we can no longer differentiate the imaginary from the real. Nothing other than giving descriptions is Godard's way of always returning to zero.

This indiscernibility can also be seen between objective and subjective situations. Whereas previously the camera meant to establish the objective view and the characters, director to play the subjective role, in pure optical-sound situations the very objective situations can not be discerned from subjective ones. Deleuze points out this between Antonioni and Fellini. In Antonioni's films, the most objective situations such as deserted places, stock markets, roads are not formed without becoming mental, and going into strange invisible

subjectivity, where as in Fellini the subjective world of crowds becomes inseparable from an objective view. If we consider Antonioni's L'Eclipse we see that the stock market of the capitalist state becomes any-space-whatever, taking a subjective role in the love affair. The cold stones can not be differentiated from he blank faces it conceals. If we consider Fellini's Satyricon we see that the whole subjects of the mythological time, takes on an objective standpoint in love. Godard's critical objectivism in this sense was already completely subjective, because in place of the real object he put the visual description, "and made it go 'inside' the object and subject" (1989b: 12).

The indiscernibility of the physical and mental can be clearly seen in Alfred Hitchcock's films. None of the murders he shows remain without starting a mental relation. In a sequence, which he never shot, he imagines Gary Grant and one of the factory workers as they walk a car assembly line:

> They might for instance, be talking about one of the foremen. Behind them a car is being assembled, piece by piece. Finally, the car they've seen being put together from a simple nut and bolt is complete, with gas and oil, and all ready to drive off the line. The two men look at it and say; "isn't it wonderful!" then they open the door to the car and out drops a corpus. (Truffaut: 195)

Where has the body come from? It is obvious that it was not in the car since they've seen it start at zero. The corpse drops out of

nowhere. Neither from a physical place it comes from nor a physical body that is. Rather it is the mental assembly of the images in Hitchcock.

> In short, pure-optical and sound situations can have two poles -objective and subjective, real and imaginary, physical and mental. But they give rise to opsigns and sonsigns, which brings the poles into continual contact, and which, in one direction and the other, guarantee passages and conversions, tending towards a point of indiscernibility (and not of confusion). (Deleuze, 1989b: 9)

3.1.4 Still and Moving

In this sense, what enables us to see pure optical sound situations can be redefined in Japanese director, Ozu's films. The camera's objective movement has been broken in Ozu, the less and less camera movements reveals before us a pure situation of what the character is and what he says, the action-image disappears in favor of the purely optical and sound situations. Unlike the empty spaces of the war as we have given as an example, what we see in Ozu is still life which is defined by the presence and composition of objects becoming their own container. Still life for Deleuze is a means to understand time-image, because cinematographic still life is totally different from pictorial or photographic ones. If it is the basis that cinematic image most directly confronts the photo, it also becomes most radically distinct from it. "The still life is time" mentions Deleuze,

because the still life in cinema is the radical conversion of image in movement, in continuity. Ozu's still life images are the duration that becomes perceptible.

> In everyday banality, the action-image and even the movement-image tend to disappear in favor of pure optical-sound situations, but these reveal connections of a new type, which are no longer sensory-motor and which bring the emancipated senses into direct relation with time and thought. This is the very special extension of the opsign: to make time and thought perceptible, to make them visible and of sound. (Deleuze, 1989b)

Because the cinematic images themselves are movement, unlike the other arts which are restricted to demand, cinema converts into potential what was once a possibility. What Deleuze affirms by problematizing the still-image in cinema, which does not simply stand still, is the point where cinema converts itself in a way that in moving-still it presents time and thought as a potential. Cinematographic still-images do not simply differentiate cinema from photography but it shows us the relation between movement-image and time-image in cinema.

3.1.5 Power and Weakness

Whether limit-situations or everyday banality, the images have become something else, something that is too powerful, too unjust, or

too beautiful. Deleuze, talking about the sequence from Godard's <u>Les Carabiniers</u>, where a militant girl is captured and waiting to be killed recites a slogan and where the soldiers cover her face with a handkerchief, states that it is too much because she is too beautiful to be killed. The image is too beautiful that you can no more stand to see it.

Of course, such tendencies are not remained without being attacked by Marxist critics, "for being too passive or negative, in turn bourgeois and marginal, for having replaced modifying action with a 'confused' vision" (Deleuze, 1989b: 19). But according to Deleuze, this is not the weakness of the characters rather it is the very weakness of motor-linkages. In fact, this motor-break can be seen throughout Blanchot's writing, where we see characters who do not reply when their names are called (i.e. in <u>Thomas the Obscure</u>), or they do not remember how a woman has entered their room, and for how long she has been there (i.e. in <u>Death Sentence</u>). So the weakness is a new kind of reaction, which finds its expression in waiting, or tiredness. For Blanchot the moment of fascination is the moment your sensory-motor links are broken.

The image in its weakness is the image that stays away from the clichés, for Deleuze, a cliché is a sensory-motor-image of the thing. Rather the pure optical and sound situations are readable and thinkable images.

3.2 Habitude and Memory

Deleuze clears out the relationship of sensory-motor schemata to how we perceive and recognize the world and how we respond to it. Because the primary function of perception is precisely to continue through a series of changes, thus extending our capabilities to act. This is what Bergson calls "élan vital". Deleuze exposes recognition in the direction of what has not been sufficiently understood in terms of the principle articulation of memory, which traces a frontier with habitude. For Deleuze and Bergson, if memory affects our capability to act it is only possible when perception does not extend into recognition habitually. Since in recognizing the world, experience becomes a motor-part of the image, a habitude.

We can trace difference in the distinction of habitual and attentive recognition. Habitual recognition is the extension of perception into recognition is automatic. All recognitions happen on the same plane, from one object I know to other one I construct a single plane. However in attentive recognition, the extension of perception to recognition is not possible. There is no extension but always getting back to zero.

> My movements revert to the object, return to the object, so as to emphasize certain contours and take a 'few characteristics and feature' from it. And we begin all over again when we want to identify different features and

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contours, but each time we have to start from the scratch. (1989b: 44)

Description again. Instead of adding up different objects into the same plane, the object remains the same but only passing through different planes. The relation between the description and reality is thus a provisional one, questioned, displaced every time one starts.

> In the first case what we have perceived is the sensory-motor image of the thing. In the other case, we constitute a pure optical and sound image of the thing, we make a description. (Deleuze, 1989b: 44)

But what is the distinction to call a cinematographic image not as an utterance but a description? First of all, there is a distinction between organic description and inorganic one. The organic description works like an utterance. It associates with the thing different things that resemble it in the same plane but in terms of an interest of the character in the film. "It is grass in general that interests the herbivore" (Deleuze, 1989b: 45). The sensory-motor schema is again an agent of abstraction, as in utterance the language becomes a motor-part of the image. Conversely in inorganic description the thing does remain the same, but through different images it becomes singular in each turn. "Here is a gun". And here is another one. There is the pistol of a gun. The character to be described in very singular image does not know how to react to the

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situation, the thinness or the restraint of the image in showing single descriptions each time, points out an inexhaustibility. Endlessly referring to other descriptions, it creates images' own works rather than separating an image and a thing.

The importance of description, thus, is the problematization of the link between perception-image extending into an action-image. The sensory-motor image is completely different from the pure optical image: because through descriptions the perception-image does not automatically extend to a movement, but enters in a relation with "recollection"-image that it calls up.

3.2.1.Recollection-image

A zone of recollections, dreams or thoughts correspond to a particular aspect of the thing: Each time it is a plane or a circuit, so that the thing passes through an infinite number of planes or circuits which correspond to its own 'layers' or aspects (Deleuze, 1989b: 46).

This interminable process can be found in any event which problematizes two related terms, and yet run after each other. Two of the same: two perceptions, two moments, past and present. Deleuze, by joining the idea of description with recollection, points out to disintegration of memory. If to recollect, is to inhibit time as a collectible, through repetitions it is not possible to refer to one as being first and important, rather it is the indiscernibility of the terms which distances perception to fall into recollections.

The notion of recollection image becomes visible and concrete in the case of 'flash-back". Flashback has always been used for referring to a past image throughout the history of cinema, but the cinema itself took the form of time-image, flashbacks have started to be use not as a form of "quotation of the past" but as a part of the flow of narrative (Deleuze, 1989b: 48). Deleuze mentions Mankiewicz in this sense; the flashbacks used as such, as an integral part of the narrative, in the same plane with the chronological flow of the narrative results in the fragmentation of its linearity, and therefore causality. Time forks rather than taking a chronological aspect. "It is not space but time which forks, web of time which approaches, forks ... embracing every possibility" (Deleuze 1989b: 49). Therefore, what Mankiewicz problematizes is that 'memory could never evoke and report the past if it had not already been constituted at the moment when the past was still present, hence in an aim to come" (Deleuze 1989b: 52).

But even attentive recognition has its dangers to fall back into sensory-motor schemata. Although the attentive recognition is a disruption of the moment between stimulus or response, when it succeeds, the sensory-motor flux takes up its temporarily interrupted course, because it ends up being a recollection-image which can be a motor image for automatic recognition.

Because the problem for Deleuze is to know more precisely what is capable of playing the role of virtual image. Virtual is the force in itself, and when it is actualized it registers a lived experience, where the force adhere to the bodies. And recollection image is the first circuit for him to understand virtual image, however insufficient: because the recollection-image is not virtual, but it actualizes a virtuality. As Bergson defines pure-recollection as the past in itself, past thinking itself, recollection-image is the actualization of it and the reverse is not possible. This is why the recollection-image does not deliver past to us but only represents the former present that past was. "The recollection-image is an image which is actualized or in process of being made actual, which does not form with the actual, present image a circuit of indiscernibility" (Deleuze 1989b: 54).

If recollection-images become a series of collection of the pasts that were present, it falls back to sensory-motor schemata, to automatic recognition. However for Deleuze attentive recognition breaks with the sensory motor schemata when it does not work. It is the moment when we can no longer remember, all extensions remains suspended to open up into virtuality, as deja vu or pure past. "In short, it is not the recollection-image or attentive recognition which gives us the proper equivalent of the optical-sound image, it is rather the disturbances and the failures of recognition" (Deleuze, 1989b: 55).

3.2.2 Dream-Image

We start to open up to another circuit here, from failures of the recognition and recollection, amnesia, hallucination, the visions of dying, nightmare and dream becomes the main themes in cinema. In all of these patterns the memory-based recognition fails, and perception-image does not end up with an actualization of the virtual rather it involves a larger circuit where each image actualized becomes virtual in the second, and it continues like this. This is due to the fact that perception in dreams is never in present, and not present, it cannot refer to a past.

It is the dreamer who lives in the sleeper, dreams at the same time sleeping. Thus the dream-images are not grasped in themselves, but in a becoming which can be by right continue to infinity between imaginary and real. So in Bunuel, the razor cuts the eye, but in turn becomes clouds moving through the sun. The virtuality of the clouds makes the razor actual. Hence, the dream-image obeys a rule where indiscernibility of the imaginary to real is not guaranteed, like the recollection-image. In such an example, the imaginary belongs to the dreamer, and the awareness of the dream (the real) belongs to the viewer.

3.2.3 World-image

Circuits open up to others. For Deleuze, the musical films points out to an indiscernibility of imaginary and real, where dancers, through their depersonalized movement, outlines a dreamlike world. "The cinematographic act consists in this: that the dancer himself begins dancing as one starts to dream" (Deleuze, 1989b: 67), where the dreamer dances, only in accordence to the movement of the world. World-images shows, through movement, the body of a man/woman entirely cut off from his/her consciousness "possesses an infinite consciousness" (Deleuze, 1989b: 61). The action of the moving body is not an automatic one, creating and connecting any space whatever plunges into the movement of the world. "The road is not slippery without sliding on itself" (Deleuze, 1989b: 69). In Alice in the Cities, the house in the photograph that the child carries cannot be found unless the road itself becomes a series of photographs. And when it is found, it is already of the road. This circuit as the largest one occurs in the virtual movement of the platform, road or the world. The cinema in this sense does not only present images but it surrounds them with a world.

3.3 Orders of time

3.3.1 Virtual Sheets of Past

Why circuits? All this discussion on recollection-image, dream-image and world-image, displays a complex relationship to Bergson's cone in matter and memory, where he explains virtual image.:

> The point S is clearly the actual present; but it is not strictly speaking a point, since it already includes the past of this present, the virtual image which doubles the actual image. As for the AB, A'B'... sections of the cone, they are not psychological circuits to which recollection-images correspond; they are purely virtual circuits, each of which contains all our past as this is preserved in itself (pure recollection). Bergson is quite unequivocal in this respect. Psychological circuits of recollection images or dream-image are produced only when we 'leap' from S to one of these sections, to actualize some virtuality of it which must then move to a present S'. (Deleuze, 1989b: 294)

So the larger and larger circuits lead the actual sound and optical images to relate again virtualities, whereas for Deleuze the question remains the same. How can the cinematographic image be in the present and relate itself to the virtual? Instead of leaping from points AB or A'B' to point S, we should take the smallest circuit where the object first of all differs from itself, it becomes its own virtual image: point S It is again a question about description that we come up with. Our initial theorem that the object remains the same and the

perception runs through different circuits and planes now questioned. How is it possible for the object to remain the same? If we refer to Bergson with the idea of the virtual the thing first of all differs from itself first and immediately. Whereas in Hegel the thing first of all differs from what it is not, and this has the effect of making difference into contradiction. In 'Bergsonism' Deleuze maintains this idea very clearly:

> It is difference that is primary in the process of actualization -the difference between the virtual we begin and the actuals at which we arrive, and also the difference between the complimentary lines according to which actualization takes place. In short, the characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in order to be actualized. (1991:97)

Deleuze emphasizes that the optical and sound images are the names for the actual image which is cut off from the motor extension and then formed large circuits with recollection-image, dream-image and world-image. But for him the genetic element can be found when the actual optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image, on the smallest circuit, this is the crystal-image, which gives us the key of opsigns and their compositions. Where as recollection, dream and world-images are 'nothing other than slivers of crystal-images'. It is like Foucault's pirate ship; if they define an inside it is only through opening to virtuality of the outside. And there is a ship with its dark side in the

sea, a ship from above, crystals. Thus, it is a mutual image where exchange continues. But what is virtual image in relation with the actual one, and how mutual can the relation be?

Deleuze seeks the answer in Bergson's reply; in time's abyss. This is the problem of the continuity of time as we naturally think of it: the actual is always a present, but then the present passes when a new present replaces it. But this is meaningless, according to Bergson, because unless present being is also passing how can it become past and let other presents arrive? Thus the image has to be present and past, *still present and already past*, at once and at the same time'. Paramnesia again reveals this point perceptible, where in <u>Oh Woe is Me</u>, Godard structures the whole film on this: the recollection of the present is the contemporary to present itself. It is like an actor, says Deleuze, listening to himself and beholding himself playing.

> Bergsonism makes possible a whole pathology of duration. In an outstanding article on "paramnesia" (false recognition), Bergson invokes metaphysics to show how a memory is not constituted after present perception, but it is strictly contemporaneous with it, since at each instant duration divides itself into two simultaneous tendencies, one of which goes forward the future and the other falls back into the past. He also invokes psychology, in order to then show how a failure of adaptation can make memory invest the present as such. Scientific hypothesis and metaphysical thesis are constantly combined in Bergson in the reconstitution of complete experience. (1991: 118)

The virtual image does not obey the role of chronological succession or the failure of it. It is pure recollection. Unlike recollection and dream-images which are actualized in relation to a new present, virtual image is not defined by a present which would relatively become past, but with the actual present in which the past is also embedded. Thus, pure virtuality establishes an infinite circuit with the actual image rather than being actualized. The virtual image, than is in time and not in consciousness, because when we recall:

> Just as we perceive things in the place they are and have
> to place ourselves among them in order to perceive
> them, we go to look for recollection in the place where it
> is, we have to place ourselves with a leap into the past in
> general, into these purely virtual images which have been
> constantly preserved through time. (Deleuze: 1989b: 80)

It is not the consciousness of time rather time is the only subjectivity: The virtual image is the past as it is preserved in itself. Thus, the actual optical and sound image goes into a small circuit with its virtual expanding to the virtualities in the deep circuit. At every moment time splits into two, the present running towards future and a past accumulated and preserved. This dissymmetrical exchange is the mutual image.

> The crystal reveals a direct time-image, and no longer an
> indirect image of time deriving from movement. It does
> not abstract time; it does better: it reverses its
> subordination in relation to movement... what the crystal

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reveals or makes visible is the hidden ground of time, that is, the differentiation into two flows, that of presents which pass and that of pasts which are preserved. (Deleuze: 1989b: 98)

The past, we need to say again, should be differentiated from the recollection-images which actualize it in us, rather it is preserved in time: we penetrate into virtual element to look for pure recollections. The past in this sense appears as being already there, independent of our recollections. The present then is the coexistence of sheets of past which contains everything at the same time.

3.3.2 Peaks of Present

But as we separate pure past from recollection-images we need to separate the present from its actual quality. The actual present stops being present and is replaced by something else. Past, present, future in succession, replacing each other. We are passing through events, which are filling presents that are in succession. The event is in preparation, arrives and it is over. However, for Deleuze, the event is not to be confused with the place or actual present it takes place, rather it is 'the time of the event comes to end before the event does, so the event will start again at another time... the whole event is as it were in the time where nothing happens'. Whereas chronos is the time of measures that situates things, persons and develops a form, covers events there is an abyss in time:

Aeon: the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that only knows speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened. (Deleuze, 1987b: 262)

And it is in empty time that we anticipate recollection, break up what is actual and locate the recollection once it is formed. On this occasion there is no future, present, past in succession, in accordance with the explicit passage of presents which we make out: there is rather a present of the future a present of the present and a present of the past, which Deleuze calls as peaks of present.

3.4 Crystalline Regime: Indiscernibility Again

Indiscernibility, undecidable alternatives between circles of past and inextricable differences between peaks of present is what constitutes the chrystalization of time. This discussion, problematizes the images as being neither naturally in the present nor simply referring to past.

The crystalline regime, according to Deleuze, can be considered in four points in contrast to organic regime of the image, firstly concerning that of the description that we discussed above. Organic regime, which separates the image and object in a way that the camera gives a description independent of the description it creates, looks to a pre-existing reality. In crystalline regime by contrast

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stands for its object, both creating and erasing it, thus creating its own object and refer to purely optical sound situations, which is detached from their motor extensions. The second point is the difference between the real and the imaginary, is as we have discussed through time, and concerns the relation between them. In organic description the real is assumed to be recognizable by its continuity, thus with successions simultaneities and permanencies. It creates logical and motor connections that even we see recollections, dream or the imaginary we see them only in contrast. However in crystalline description the imaginary is no more discernible from the real, the real being cut off from its motor linkages, and the virtual being cut off from its actualizations, start to be valid for itself.

> The two modes of existence are now combined in a circuit where the imaginary and the real, the actual and the virtual, chase after each other, exchange their roles and become indiscernible. It is there that we may speak the most precisely of crystal image: the coalescence of actual image and its virtual image, the indiscernibility of the two distinct images. (Deleuze, 1989b: 127)

The third point concerns narration and not the description. Organic narration is a consequence of sensory-motor schemata where characters disclose a situation, answering all questions in a truthful manner, according to the goals, obstacles, means and detours of the narration. This is the economy of narration according to Deleuze, appears in action-image, and Euclidean space which

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requires and abstract notion of movement. In the crystalline description, on the other hand, since the motor schemata has broken and given way to pure optical and sound situations, the image is no longer a consequence of action but it presents itself as a condition. The space is disconnected, purely optical, sound or tactile. The movement rather tends to zero in a fixed shot or is exaggerated, incessant.

> Now what characterizes these spaces in their nature cannot be explained in a simply spatial way. They imply non-localizable relations. These are direct presentations of time. We no longer have an indirect image of time, which derives from movement, but a direct time-image from which movement derives. We no longer have a chronological time which can be overturns by movements which are contingently abnormal; we have a non-chronological time which produces movement necessarily 'abnormal, essentially 'false'... if time appears directly, It is in de-actualized peaks of present and virtual sheets of past. (Deleuze, 1989b: 129-130)

The fourth point, that Deleuze discusses, is directly derived from this third point. Because time puts truth in question, not in terms of different epochs have their own truths but time is the force, which enables us, discusses truth's truth. Giving the famous paradox of contingent futures that Leibniz discusses, Deleuze clarifies how the conception of time might change our relation to conception of truth.

If it is _true_ that a naval battle _may_ take place how are we to avoid one of the true consequences: either the impossible proceed from the possible (since, if the battle takes place, that is no longer possible it may not take place) or the past is not necessarily true (since the battle could not have taken place)...the naval battle may or may not take place, but that is not in the same world, and this two worlds are possible but are not 'compossable' with each other. (1989b: 130)

Thus Deleuze refers to Borges directly, as we always see in Borgesian stories all these incompossible worlds, which is derived from the labyrinth of time. You can meet with your father who is younger than you in a world, you can sit on a bank with your older self in an other world. However, Deleuze states through the falsifying narration, where time forks, passing through <u>incompossable presents</u>, returning to <u>not necessarily true pasts</u> these worlds can be compossable. In this narrations the force of time and the power of the false work together, description becomes its own object (stops presupposing a reality) and narration becomes temporal and falsifying at the same time. Like the reality aimed at in Neo-realism, the truth no longer revealed, achieved but created, which points not to the cinema of truth but to the truth of cinema.

3.5 Powers of the False

In these conditions, the relationship between object-subject, that of the seen and the seer becomes variations through eternity, from the point of view of the veracity of the every possible story.

> The story no longer refers to as ideal of true which constitutes its veracity, but becomes a "pseudo-story", a poem, a story which simulates or rather a simulation of the story. Objective and the subjective images lose their distinction, but also their identification, in favor of a new circuit where they are wholly replaced, or contaminate each other, or are decomposed and recomposed. (Deleuze, 1989b: 149)

Deleuze creates a displacement of terms of reality and fiction, because for him the ideal of the true is the most profound fiction. When the ideal of truth applied to real itself, things starts to change, the story-telling function starts to destroy every model of truth so as to become creator and producer of truth, as when "he himself becomes another, when he becomes to tell stories without ever being fictional" (Deleuze, 1989b: 150).

In Godard's France Tour Detour Deux Enfants, the narrator states every time another story begins "him before the story after, or him after and the story before". This method according to Deleuze can be seen throughout Godard's films, the method of knowing what they (the camera, the characters, film-maker etc) were before being placed in the film, and after, at the point where the story telling function is set into motion.

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In this sense, I see Resnais' work as an attempt to construct a purely mental-space and time, perhaps or of memory those of any affective life without worrying too much about the traditional relations of cause and effect, or about a chronological time sequence in the narrative. However in Resnais even if the story becomes less reassuring, than a linear narrative with logical developments, we are introduced with another story through the powers of the false. The story skips certain passages, preserves an exact record of unimportant details, it repeats and doubles back on itself. And this mental time with its peculiarities, its gaps, its obscure areas is the line that interests us since it is the temporality of emotions preserved. It is reached among a perfect labyrinth of time, introducing false tracks, variants, failures and repetitions.

A stranger wanders from one salon to another alternately full of elegant guests or empty, bumps into mirrors, follows endless corridors. His ears convey snatches of phrases, his eyes shift from one nameless face to another. But he insistently returns to the face of a young woman. And he offers her the impossible, what seems most impossible in this labyrinthine where time is apparently abolished, and become direct. He offers her a past, a future and a freedom. He tells her that he and she have already met the year before, that they had fallen in love, that he has now come to a rendezvous she herself had arranged and that he is going to take her away with him from the real that her

husband presents. But the story the stranger is telling assumes ever-greater reality becomes more and more coherent, increasingly present and irresistibly true. Present and past are finally intermingled, while the growing tension between the three protagonists creates fantasies of tragedy.

> Stranger: I first saw you in the gardens at Fredericksbad.
> Woman: I don't think it was me. You must be mistaken.
> Man: Actually, it wasn't so extraordinary after all. He had started the whole thing himself, so he knew all the possibilities in advance.
> Laughter.
>
> Others: Oh well then... if that's it... That explains everything!.. Still, it's funny that... etc.

The other guests too are nothing more than the guests in a huge hotel cut off from the outside world as if they are in a prison. What do they do when they are elsewhere? Nothing! Elsewhere they do not exist. As for past the hero introduces by force into this sealed, empty world, we sense that he is making it up as long as it goes. There is no last year and Marienbad is no longer to be found in any map. This past, too, has no truth beyond the moment it is evoked with sufficient force; and when it finally triumphs, it has merely become the present, as if it has never ceased to be so. The power of the false becomes the force generating the story. If Hiroshima Mon Amour was a false documentary, then Marienbad is a true fiction. In other words, it is about storytelling. This startling material, truth of cinema, is apparently

what attracted Robbe-Grillet to the medium in the first place. As a practitioner of the 'nouveau roman' in the fifties he had been involved in an aesthetic struggle to clear away the reign of opinion from the landscape of the novel, to give it validity in itself. Then the truth of memory or fiction would be equal to the truth of experience, which in turn would be equal to the truth of invention and creation. This is what would happen to time in the novel Robbe-Grillet conceived:

> From the novel to cinema, Robbe-Grillet's work testifies to the power of the false as principle of the production of images. This is not a simple principle of reflection or becoming aware... it is a source of inspiration. The images must be produced in a way that the past is not necessarily true, or that the impossible comes from the possible...we see that the power of the false is also the most general principle that determines all the relationships, in the direct time-image. In one world two characters know each other, in another world they don't know each other, in another... contrary to what Leibniz believed, all these worlds belong to the same universe and constitute the modifications of the same story. Narration is no longer a truthful narration which is linked to real (sensory-motor) descriptions. Description becomes its own object and narration becomes temporal *and* falsifying at exactly the same time. (Deleuze: 1989b: 131-132)

The whole cinema becomes a free indirect discourse operating in reality, and this differs from what we discussed before, in terms <u>of order of time</u>, that is, the coexistence of relations or the

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simultaneity of the elements internal to time. According to Deleuze, through the discussion begin with truth we come to the problematization of time, which brings the before and after in a becoming, instead of separating them: its paradox is to introduce an enduring interval in the moment itself, in the series of time.

In talking they become something else, says Deleuze, for the great directors, they become philosophers or theoreticians, whereas Godard talks about Ingmar Bergman as if Deleuze is talking about Godard:

> At the precise instant. Bergman, in effect, is the filmmaker of the instant. Each of his films is born of the hero's reflection on the present moment, and deepens that reflection by a sort of dislocation of time -rather in the manner of Proust- to become a vast, limitless mediation upon the instantaneous. An Ingmar Bergman film is, if you like, one twenty-fourth of a second metamorphosed and expanded over an hour and a half. <u>It is the world between two blinks of eyelids, the sadness between two heart-beats, the gaiety between two handclaps.</u> (Godard: 77)

We return to zero again.

CONCLUSION

The young man will smile on the canvas for as long as the canvas lasts. Blood throbs under the skin of this woman's face, the wind shakes a branch, a group of man prepare to live. In a novel or a film, the young man will stop smiling, but he will start to smile again when we turn to this page and moment. (Deleuze, 1994:163)

What is preserved in art, has become independent of its model, its creator and also of whoever is involved in its experience, from the very start, if it starts it is from the zero. It is always already detached from these determinants to preserve itself in itself. If cinema preserves blocs of times and space, it is not because it shows time and space but it distills sensations from them. Tati's Mon Oncle, with its terribly impractical modern house dismantling with any interference of the users will stand up as long as the film stands. "Standing up alone does not mean having a top and bottom or being upright (for even houses are drunk and askew); it is only the act by which the compound of created sensations are preserved in itself" (Deleuze, 1994: 164). Time is not recovered, it is obliterated in Marienbad. What it preserves, thus, what it, itself is a "bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects" (Deleuze, 1994: 164). Here, the distinction between percepts and perceptions, affects and affections, is of prime importance. While the latter terms are subject oriented, the

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former ones exist in themselves as passages. If affection refers to a state of the body affected and therefore implies an affecting body, affect is the passage from one state to another. Of course taking into acoount the variation in the affecting bodies. Affect being " purely transitive, and not indicative and representative" involves the difference between two states therefore pointing out the duration that extend between two affections. (Deleuze, 1988: 49).

Artistic creation does not consist of the act of reflecting upon something, recalling instances from memory, but it is produced in the event of dissolving in the thing, that is an event of becoming. It only stands up by itself when human perceptions and affections are brought to make a compound of impersonal, non-human percepts and affects. Such anonimity related to percepts or affects, should not be understood as a transcendental value attributed to them. The desubjectivity, here, implies a singularity that lies beneath all that is apparent. Furthermore, art does not actualize these affects, but keep them appearing.

In cinema, one does not have signs ready for disposal. To put it in other words, films are not compounds of signs with static referents. The mistake of interpretative approaches to cinema stems from this basic misapprehension that images consist of signs waiting to be dechiphered, and thus to reveal their truth. ... when the encounter with the signs takes place, it forces one to think, not to think what had

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been, but what is not yet thought, not interpretation but creation, not appearance but appearing:

> The work of art is born from signs as much as it generates them; the creator is like the jealous man, interpreter of the god, who scrutinizes the signs in which the truth betrays itself. (Deleuze, 1972: 163)

It is in this sense that signs do not refer to a fixed identity; it is rather the embodiment of differences and forces. Thus, interpretation, taken as the direct meaning of the word, fails to grasp the multiplicities inherent in the sign. However, multiplicities, again, are not initial givens to be discovered but to be produced along the process. One cannot assign objects to signs as their referent; what they refer is other signs. The sign is an image which stands for another image (its object). According to Deleuze, they can either be affections, that is "state of bodies" or affects, that is "variations of power." And the order that connects one sign to another is purely based on chance encounters. Thus "Signs are effects of light in a space filled with things colliding with each other at random" (Deleuze, 1997: 141). And when signs coincide time, when they directly open to iat, they can be perceptible by senses.

A work of art, whether it is a piece of music, a painting, a novel, film, etc. lasts as long as its material is capable of lasting. This should not be understood as a mere materialism. What is suggested here is that the work itself is written, filmed, painted sensations. The

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material does not only exist to give physicality to sensations: the smile is not on the canvas, it is the canvas, the oil smiling. In other words, whatever is brought forward in the work of art is not the reflection of some ideas, or a representation of the prior existence of some objects, things, people, etc. It is not imagination as well, it is imaginary. The material never eliminates itself from the scene; it does not end giving way to sensations. It is the body of the work that the sensations refer to. It is not an "obstacle", as Deleuze says, "that separates thought from itself, that which it has to overcome to reach thinking" (Deleuze, 1989b: 189). It is not devaluation of the body, rather the unknown of the body is as important as the unthought of thought. At the same time sensations and bodies differ from each other and cannot be reduced to one another. The material preserves sensations and extracts percepts from a perceiving subject, affects from affections belonging to certain states of things. Again for Deleuze, no matter how short the material lasts, "it will give sensation the power to exist and be preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this short duration" (Deleuze, 1994: 166). The material changes, differs, mixes with other materials, even, at times, vanishes, and what is left is the bloc of sensations, optical and sound-situations, percepts and affects that carry along with them not only the present but also the pure past, which is independent of the subject that had experienced it.

Memory fails to grasp this pure past directly, because it always relates the past to the order of sequential presents. It tries to apprehend past relative to different presents. According to Deleuze, this kind of thinking misses the "past's being *as past*", because it constitutes the past only if a new present arrives to replace this one. Absolute past does not stand for some priory present moment in relation to the actual present. It preserves itself in itself, as Deleuze points out, as past and present at the same time. An important question that can be raised here is that how this absolute past becomes available to us without its being actualized as such. The argument Deleuze makes on this point is that, it is the role of the involuntary memory in Proust, whose aim is not to reveal the truth of a certain moment in the past, but to bring two moments together, that share a common quality in the duration that extends between them. Past, not relative to the moment it had been present, nor to the lived present, but as immanence.

> The essential thing in involuntary memory is not resemblance, nor even identity, which are merely conditions, but the internalized difference, which becomes immanent. (Deleuze, 1972)

It is the unpredictable encounter of two moments, that do not necessarily resemble each other in terms of analogy, but reminds us of resemblance, nor have a common identity, producing a sensation. What distinguishes this from the principles of voluntary memory is that,

the latter involves a retrospective look to the past from the present moment. However, in Proustian involuntary memory, past is not an archive of collected moments to be regained. It emerges as a non-analogical relation between two moments, a relation which is one of difference, a quality that cannot be identified or belong to either of them. Thus, what is revealed, is not the truth of a particular past moment, but what is unexperiencable about it, its essence. The absolute past is saved in the coexistence of two moments, in the sensation or the image that emerges when they meet, then again, out of the reach of both.

> Time, in order to become visible, seeks bodies and everywhere encounters them, seizes them to cast its magic lantern upon them. (Proust qtd. Deleuze, 1972:18)

In cinema, one is confronted with the past not in the form of an image that shows the past in its actuality, but with blocs of space and time that provides a possibility for an encounter with the absolute past in its virtuality. The presentness of the image, therefore always circles with this absolute past. The image is neither present nor past. In passing, it is an encounter. Each encounter, like the movement of the horizon, redefines and redefined in indissernibility of virtual and actual. In passing from one to another moment, i.e image, it is duration. Duration is what happens in-between, it can not be reduced to one or the other, therefore it can nor be reduced to anything. It can't be thought, but only sensed.

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Becoming-other is a process that cannot be reduced to the act of imitating the way something behaves. It is not identifying oneself with the other. In Deleuze's words, "becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance, or on the contrary, in the distance of a light that captures both of them in a single relation." (1994: 173). Becoming-other is not a passage from one state to another. It can only be understood through sensations. It speaks of a zone of undecidability, where all identity dissolves. Proust becomes not the writer of the all memories, rather he writes anti-memory within time. Anti-memory, is not preserving the pasts, through infinite repetitions it caries along differentiation. Difference is what happens between two repetitions.

The world of representation, on the other hand, can be characterized by its inabilty to conceive of difference itself, therefore repetition itself. The "I think" of Cogito replaces becoming, difference becomes an object of reprsentetion. Difference understood as such, could only be conceived in relation to the identical, similar, analagous or opposed. Repetition in the same statement can only be grasped by recognition, reproduction, resemblance and remembrance. I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember, I perceive are the companinions of "I think therefore I am".

The internalization of thought within the branches of Cogito as such, which also identify a dialectical outside, can no more define the

confrontation of an inside and outside independent of distance. If theory of cinema does not bear on cinema, but on the concepts, images, events of cinema which are themselves related to other concepts, images having no privilege among others, like one object relates to another it is the practice among images which calls for an outside of thought. If cinema is a practice of producing images and concepts, philosophy too is a practice of creating. Philosophy, in this sense, is no more abstract than cinema. When we say philosophy _and_ cinema it is no more cinema philosophized but an interference which enables new images, concepts and events.

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