

THE CRESCENT, THE LION AND THE EAGLE: RE-ANALYZING
THE OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON
CORFU (1537) IN THE CONTEXT OF OTTOMAN-HABSBURG
RIVALRY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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January 2018

ELVİN OTMAN THE CRESCENT, THE LION AND THE EAGLE: RE-ANALYZING
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IN THE CONTEXT OF OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY

In Loving Memory of My Teyzoş

Şeyda Müezzinoğlu

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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ELVİN OTMAN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF
HISTORY
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

January 2018

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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE CRESCENT, THE LION AND THE EAGLE: RE-ANALYZING THE OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON CORFU (1537) IN THE CONTEXT OF OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY

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This dissertation produces a detailed historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537. Although the Apulian Campaign, a natural consequence of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, which characterized the sixteenth-century Ottoman policies and discourse of universal sovereignty, was originally planned as an Ottoman-French joint military operation, it remained as an individual Ottoman attack on the south eastern Italy since the French King did not offer his already promised military support during the campaign. The attacks of Andrea Doria and the Venetian captains on the Ottoman ships during the campaign changed the course of the initiative and Sultan Süleyman I ordered the attack on the island of Corfu, under Venetian control. The Ottoman attack were ended since the

season of war ended and the Ottoman army returned to Constantinople without having completed the conquest of Corfu.

This dissertation mainly argues that one could not understand why the Ottomans engaged in such a venture without analyzing the nature of the rivalry between the Ottoman and Habsburg dynasties in the sixteenth-century. The study defines the campaign as the Apulian Campaign and defends the argument that the Ottoman sought to establish some sort of suzerainty in south eastern Italy, bound to the Habsburg realm. Moreover, it asserted that the campaign should not be evaluated as the “Expedition of Corfu” by stating that Corfu was not the principal target of the Ottomans in 1537. The impact of the 1537 Campaign on the Ottoman-Venetian relations is also discussed in this study.

Keywords: Charles V, Diplomacy, Ottoman-Venetian Relations, Süleyman I, Universal Sovereignty

ÖZET

HİLÂL, ASLAN VE KARTAL: OSMANLI-HABSBURG REKABETİ BAĞLAMINDA OSMANLI'NIN APULYA SEFERİ VE KORFU SALDIRISINI (1537) YENİDEN İNCELEMEK

Otman, Elvin

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Paul Latimer

Bu tez Osmanlı'nın 1537'deki Apulya Seferi ve Korfu Saldırısı'nın tafsilatlı bir tarihsel anlatısını ortaya koymaktadır. On altıncı yüzyıl Osmanlı siyasetini ve evrensel hâkimiyet söylemini karakterize eden Osmanlı-Habsburg rekabetinin doğal bir sonucu olan Apulya Seferi temel olarak İtalya üzerine yapılacak bir Osmanlı-Fransız ortak askerî harekâtı olarak planlanmış olsa da Fransa Kralı'nın sefere vadettiği askerî desteği vermemesi sebebiyle güneydoğu İtalya'ya yapılan münferit bir Osmanlı saldırısı olarak kalmıştır. Sefer sırasında Andrea Doria ve Venedik kaptanları tarafından Osmanlı donanmasına yapılan saldırılar harekâtın seyrini değiştirmiş, Sultan I. Süleyman Venedik kontrolündeki Korfu Adası'na saldırı emri vermiştir. Osmanlı saldırısı savaş mevsiminin sonuna gelindiği gerekçesi ile Eylül ayında sonlandırılmıştır, Osmanlı ordusu Korfu fethini tamamlayamadan İstanbul'a dönmüştür.

Bu tez, temel olarak, on altıncı yüzyılda Osmanlı ve Habsburg hanedanları arasında süregelen rekabetin doğası tetkik edilmeden Osmanlı'nın neden böylesi bir sefere kalkıştığının anlaşılamayacağını ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma harekâtı Apulya Seferi olarak tanımlamakta ve Osmanlıların 1537'de Habsburg idaresindeki güney doğu İtalya'da bir nevi metbuiyet arayışında olduğunu savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, seferin “Korfu Seferi” olarak değerlendirilmemesi gerektiği de değerlendirilmesinin doğru olmadığı savı Korfu'nun Osmanlı'nın 1537'deki ana hedefi olmadığı tespitiyle desteklenmektedir. Çalışmada 1537 Seferi'nin Osmanlı-Venedik ilişkilerine etkisi de tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: V. Charles, I. Süleyman, Diplomasi, Evrensel Hâkimiyet, Osmanlı-Venedik İlişkileri

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASV	Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice
b.	<i>busta</i> (box/volume)
BNM	Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice
col.	column
DİA	<i>Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi</i>
EI ²	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition</i>
EI ^{THREE}	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam, Third Edition</i>
fil.	<i>filza</i> (folder)
İA	<i>İslâm Ansiklopedisi</i>
l.	<i>libro</i> (book)
no	number
p.	<i>parte</i> (part)
reg.	<i>registro</i> (register)
s.	<i>serie</i> (series)
TSMA	Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, İstanbul
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara
v.	volume
(eng.)	English
(it.)	Italian
(o.)	office

(ott.)	Ottoman
(r.)	reign
(sp.)	Spanish
(ve.)	Venetian

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1520, when Süleyman I of House of Osman succeeded to the Ottoman throne as the tenth sultan, he inherited almost a world empire, controlling a large amount of territory in three continents. His reign coincided the rise of another political figure in the west, Charles V of Habsburg, who had been elected as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. Thanks to his dynastical inheritance, formed mainly by cleverly arranged marriages of his ancestors, Charles V was able to take a large realm under his control as Süleyman. These two super-powers of the early sixteenth-century formed the Ottoman and Habsburg grand strategies of the time by which, they figured the politics of the European and Mediterranean world with their policies, military initiatives, and ideological discourses. Their almost life-long challenging with each other also led the crowned-heads and the states of the time to adjust their policies, according to their own political, military and financial interests and to position themselves in face to the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the early sixteenth-century.

Süleyman challenged Charles V through various military operations in Central Europe and in the Western Mediterranean from 1526 to 1535. Charles V's conquest

of Tunis in 1535 opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. In 1537, Süleyman initiated a new military campaign; this time the war theatre for the Ottomans was the Italian peninsula. Since it had been the center of the Roman Empire and Christendom, possessing Italy was an important matter of Ottoman politics, especially by the reign of Mehmed II. Following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman sultans had been claiming the inheritance both in the east and west. Conquering Italy, in particular the city of Rome, identified as the legendary *Red Apple*, was perceived by the Ottomans as the sign of the universal supremacy ordained to the Ottoman Sultan by God that would revive the Roman Empire under one rule and one faith.

On the other hand, the lack of political unity in Italy had already made the peninsula a war theatre of the Christian monarchs in the early sixteenth-century. Charles V and the French King, Francis I, had been struggling for inherence of the Duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of Naples by 1520s. Although, Charles V was crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor in Bologna in 1530 and was able to declare his authority over Italy, Francis I was not willing to give up his claims on possessing Milan and Naples. Thus the Italian peninsula remained as the main stage of war between these two Christian monarchs. Moreover, possessing Italy was perceived by both Charles V and Francis I as the stepping stone for political supremacy over the entire Christian world and for Charles V, dedicating himself to unite Christendom under his political rule was the most important goal of his imperial strategy.

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign of 1537, the direct outcome of Ottoman-Habsburg imperial rivalry, was planned between the years of 1535 and 1536, during the negotiations between İbrahim Pasha, the Grand Vizier of Süleyman and Jean de la Forest, the French ambassador to Constantinople. The French ambassador had

convinced the Pasha for an Ottoman-French joint attack on Italy by which, the French armies would penetrate into Lombardy and seize Milan, while the Ottoman forces would be invading the south eastern Italian region of Apulia, possessed by the Kingdom of Naples, bound to the Habsburg Emperor. The plan was set on a strategy of orienting the Habsburg forces into two different fronts in order to weaken their control in Italy. The French proposal gave the Ottomans an upper-hand for attempting a decisive intervention in Italy, which would also manifest Süleyman's being the sole decisive power in the politics of the time.

Ottoman invasion of Apulia in 1537 was initiated by mid-July, but the French did not show up in Italy while the Ottoman forces were penetrating into the region.

Therefore, the campaign remained limited to be an only Ottoman attack, rather than being a joint Ottoman-French invasion as it had already been agreed on by both parties. Moreover, by mid-August, the course of the campaign unexpectedly changed: Corfu, a key Venetian dominion that controlled the entrance of Adriatic, was attacked by the Ottoman forces. Despite the political tension between the Porte and the *Serenissima* by 1532 and the existence of the frontal and maritime conflicts, the Ottomans and Venetians had not encountered in a war theater since 1503.

Therefore, besides being a decisive Ottoman attack on a key Venetian dominion controlling the entrance of the Adriatic, the Attack on Corfu also meant the disruption of 34 years' Ottoman-Venetian peace. The Island was about to surrender, but in early September, Süleyman withdrew his forces.

Although the Ottoman maneuvers in 1537 have a multidimensional character, embracing almost all main themes of academic discussions of the sixteenth-century political history, such as the discourses of establishing the universal sovereignty and of the invasion of Italy, rivaling grand-strategies of the two leading dynasties, the

Ottomans and the Habsburgs and pragmatic political alliances between the crowned-heads of time, as well as the Ottoman-Venetian relations, the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu have not been comprehensively discussed in an individual study yet. Most of the studies on political, military and the diplomatic history on the age of Süleyman I, settle for briefly noting the events of 1537 and tend to evaluate the campaign as the “Corfu Expedition”. This approach mirrors Corfu as the principal military target for the Ottomans and fails to evaluate the campaign in a broader perspective and to decipher what the Ottomans really intended to achieve in 1537.

On the other hand, there are few scholars, opening new discussions on 1537: John Francis Guilmartin Jr.¹, Halil İnalçık² and Feridun M. Emecen³ evaluate the campaign as the Ottoman preparative for the invasion of Italy and explain that Corfu was intended to be conquered in order to facilitate the Ottoman penetration into the Italian peninsula. By using such a strategic island as a military base, the Ottomans also would have secured their future presence in Italy. In reference to the Ottoman claims to the inheritance of the Roman Empire and to the establishment of the world empire under the rule of Süleyman, İnalçık argues that the campaign was realized by Süleyman on the ground of dominating Italy and of capturing Rome. Although Guilmartin Jr. does not discuss the campaign within the framework of Ottoman-

¹ John Francis Guilmartin Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth-Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 264.

² Halil İnalçık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleymân”, *Süleymân the Second and His Time*, ed. by, Halil İnalçık and Cemal Kafadar, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), 59-92, 67-68; idem, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi, Fransa ve Osmanlı: Avrupa’da “Geleneksel Dostumuz Fransa Tarihine Ait Bir Olay”, *Doğu – Batı (Avrupa)*, no: 14, (February-March-April, 2001), 122-142, 123, 129-130; idem, “Akdeniz ve Türkler”, *Doğu-Batı (Akdeniz)*, no: 34, (November-December-January, 2005-2006), 133-169, 157, 160; idem; *Devlet-i ‘Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-I: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606): Siyasal, Kurumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişim*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 157.

³ Feridun M. Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 159-160.

French alliance, İnalçık and Emecen show the Ottoman-French agreement for a joint campaign in Italy as the main source of motivation for the Ottoman maneuvers in 1537 and note the French military support during the attack on Corfu.

Emrah Safa Gürkan, elaborates these analysis by emphasizing the strategic importance of Corfu for the Ottomans. Gürkan points out that by 1532, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry shifted to the western Mediterranean and dominating and controlling the Mediterranean and pushing the Habsburgs back to defense of their zones of influence became an important concern in the Ottoman grand strategy. According to Gürkan, to realize it, Ottomans needed to acquire a secure and fortified naval base for the imperial fleet, which would facilitate further maneuvers, especially against Sicily, Naples and the Iberian Peninsula. He evaluates the Ottoman Attack on Corfu within this perspective and argues that in 1537 Ottomans might have intended to conquer the island both to protect the shores of Adriatic and to prevent a possible counter attack that could arise when the imperial fleet was sent away, since the Island was so close to the coasts of Albania, being the stage of chronic insurrections against the Ottoman rule.⁴ By underlining that the imperial navy hosted a good number of Neapolitan *fuoriusciti*, Gürkan also argues that Ottomans might have also aimed to realize a subsequent attack on the Kingdom of Naples, after the conquest of Corfu.⁵

The aforementioned studies offer historians significant hints that would be helpful in deciphering the Ottoman plans in 1537 and in analyzing why Corfu might have been put in the Ottoman agenda of conquest. Indeed, Corfu might have facilitated

⁴ Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar’ın XVI. Yüzyıl’daki Akdeniz Siyaseti”, *Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası*, ed. by Haydar Çoruh, M. Yaşar Ertaş and M. Ziya Köse, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 11-50, 26-27.

⁵ Ibid, 27. Also see: Gürkan, *Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry*, Georgetown University, 2012, (unpublished Ph.D dissertation), 393.

subsequent operations towards Italy and been an important naval base for the Ottomans, considering the fact that Tunis had already been seized by Charles V in 1535. However, one should note that the Ottomans landed in Apulia in mid-July and Corfu was attacked by late-August. If the principal target was Corfu, to be used as a stepping stone for the invasion of Italy, why did the Ottomans attack Apulia first? The historical narrative of the 1537 Campaign clearly demonstrates that the invasion of Apulia and the Attack on Corfu were not initiated simultaneously. Moreover, the Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman, and the massive land army led by him encamped in Valona, which was the closest Ottoman dominion to Apulia. Furthermore, a good number of infantry and cavalry landed at the region in mid-July, under the command of the Third Vizier of Süleyman and the company of the Neapolitan nobles support that the Ottomans might have intended to achieve more than spoiling the region by swift attacks. These lead the historian to think that the Ottomans prioritized the invasion of Apulia, not Corfu and the campaign was beyond to be a preparative.

In accordance with the aforementioned assumptions, Svatopluk Soucek states that the immediate target of the Ottomans in 1537 was Apulia and Rome was a possible ultimate goal; they did not intended to attack Corfu at first. Soucek describes the Ottoman Attack on Corfu as a “fantastic project” that the Ottomans had initiated after attacking Apulia for a month and explains that Süleyman scuttled the victory by ordering the withdrawal. Soucek evaluates this decision, taken despite the oppositions of Barbarossa, as a significant moment for the future of Ottoman naval strategy. According to him, since Corfu might have been an efficient naval base for the Ottomans, it could have facilitated the conquests of Cyprus and Crete, which would be subsequently undertaken by the Ottomans in the following years, even without a shot fire. Soucek argues that this move of the Ottomans reveals the

inefficiency of the Ottoman decision making mechanisms to turn the Empire into a prominent sea power and of the ghazi-corsairs in convincing the sultans and the ruling elite for overseas expansions and in adjusting the imperial naval strategy accordingly in face of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry.⁶

Attacking Corfu meant a clear Ottoman declaration of war against the Republic of Venice, with whom Süleyman used to have amicable relations since his succession to the throne. Thus, the Ottoman decision to engage in such a “fantastic project” in 1537 needs to be discussed. Why did the Ottomans turn the fire against a Venetian territory after a month of attacking Habsburg dominated Apulia? What was the Ottoman justification for this venture? Without speculating on these questions, it is not possible to understand the Ottoman campaign of 1537 and to provide a comprehensive historical analysis of the events.

This dissertation presents a detailed historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu, in the light of new sources and evidences. It suggests that the Ottoman campaign of 1537 should not be evaluated as an isolated Ottoman military initiative, on the contrary, the campaign should be discussed within the framework of Ottoman grand strategy of the early sixteenth-century, grounded by the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry for universal sovereignty. Therefore, I intend to evaluate this military initiative in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, through a comprehensive discussion of the political dynamics of the time. . I argue that an analysis focusing on the attack on Corfu, instead of evaluating the Campaign of 1537 as the Apulian Campaign misleads the historian in deciphering the actual strategy of

⁶ Svatopluk Soucek, “Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete”, *Studia Islamica*, v. 98-99, (2004), 219-261, 229-233.

the Ottomans in 1537 and in determining its importance for the Ottoman political and military history at the time.

This dissertation mainly aims to interpret what the Ottomans intended to achieve in 1537. By reconstructing a narrative of the events that led to the attack and the campaign itself, through an examination of relevant sources and with the help of discussions provided by earlier studies, I will try to associate the Apulian Campaign to former Ottoman enterprises in Hungary and I will point out a possible fresh academic discussion by arguing that in 1537, the main motivation of the Ottomans was to establish some sort of suzerainty in Apulia, which would give an upper hand to Süleyman in his claims being the “sole inheritor of the Roman Emperors” and the “Distributer of crowns to the Monarchs of the World.”

Furthermore, the dissertation is specially focused on the Ottoman-Venetian political relations, in the early sixteenth century. It is intended to discuss how the political strategies of these two states, elaborated according to their interests and expectations from each other in face to the actual political conjuncture of the time, resulted in an Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537. I underline that, the evasion of Venice of assisting the Ottoman attempts in the Mediterranean, its inability to control Andrea Doria’s maneuvers and its insistence to be out of the French-Ottoman alliance convinced the Ottomans for the existence of a secret Venetian-Habsburg cooperation. Although the Ottomans put the Republic under diplomatic pressure to act according to the terms of existing *ahidnâme* several times before the campaign, the Doria’s and Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships in 1537 led an Ottoman-Venetian war after 34 years’ of peace. In that context, I argue that the attack on Corfu should be evaluated as an outcome of the 1537 campaign, an argument that challenges the earlier studies, pointing Corfu as one of the principal target of the Ottoman campaign in 1537.

Accordingly, this dissertation also focuses on the question of whether the Ottomans intended to conquer Corfu or not and the reasons behind Süleyman's decision of withdrawal, as well as stating how the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537 influenced the Ottoman-Venetian relations.

Finally, the dissertation employs the Ottoman and Venetian chronicles, produced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including the accounts of the eye-witnesses of the campaign, to complete the historical narrative and to support the main arguments. By a close reading of the Ottoman and Venetian narratives that discuss the campaign, I will also delineate both the Ottoman and the Venetian perceptions about the political developments of the time and introduce new sources to be used for further academic studies.

1.1. Historiography and Sources

This dissertation aims to reconstruct the information about the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the early sixteenth century, in the light of the earlier academic studies and new evidences. Along with the classical studies on the reign of Süleyman and on the sixteenth-century Ottoman history, recent scholarly publications covering various aspects of the Ottoman history and of the reign of Süleyman which are cited in the narrative are consulted extensively.

Numerous recent studies contributed significantly to the academic literature of the field by offering new interpretations on the reign of Süleyman I and the formulation of the Ottoman discourse of universal sovereignty. Among these, the works of Ebru

Turan⁷ and Kaya Şahin⁸ are important monographs that analyze how in the sixteenth-century, the Ottoman political discourse was formulated and reflected by the Ottoman bureaucrats, in face of new challenges forcing the Ottomans to re-position themselves in the political arena. Ebru Turan, in her work, discusses the role and influence of İbrahim Pasha in the formulation of the Ottoman imperial strategy. By focusing on the political developments up to 1526, Turan explains how the Ottomans created the discourse of universal sovereignty in reference to the sixteenth century expectations of a God-ordained monarch who would establish the world empire before the End Time. This present work also intends to contribute to Turan's analysis by underlining the role and the influence of İbrahim Pasha in the Ottoman military enterprises after 1526 and his policies towards the Republic of Venice and the French Kingdom. In this context, this dissertation evaluates the Apulian Campaign as a project of the Magnificent Grand Vizier of Süleyman I, which was realized following his execution.

For the use of historical and ideological motives for the image building for Süleyman I, the classical studies of Cornell H. Fleisher⁹ and Gülrû Necipoğlu¹⁰ are consulted. The latter's analysis on the representation of power during the German Expedition¹¹ of Süleyman in 1532 shows the historian how the Ottoman policy-makers were

⁷ Ebru Turan, *The Sultan's Favorite: İbrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Süleyman (1516-1526)*, University of Chicago, (March 2016), (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation).

⁸ Kaya Şahin, *Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar: Celalzade Mustafa ve 16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Dünyası*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2014).

⁹ Cornell Fleisher, "The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleymân", *Soliman le Magnifique et Son Temps*, ed. by. Gilles Veinstein, (Paris: La Documentation Française- Éditions du Louvre, 1992), 159-177.

¹⁰ Gülrû Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry", *The Art Bulletin*, v. 71. no 3, 1989, 401-427.

¹¹ *Alaman Seferi*.

familiar with the political and ideological discussions of the time and symbolisms of the Christian world, as well as their efficiency in using them to formulate and mirror the Ottoman political discourse.

As was mentioned above, the dissertation aims to correlate the Ottoman Apulian Campaign with the Ottoman enterprises in Hungary by 1526. In order to evaluate the imperial strategy towards Hungary, the studies of Pál Fodor¹², M. Tayyib Gökbilgin¹³, Rhodes Murphey¹⁴ and Ferenc Szakály¹⁵ that offer comprehensive discussions on both the Ottoman initiatives and on how Hungary became a war theatre of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry are consulted.

Although the emergence and the influence of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry have been discussed in numerous studies dealing with the political, military and diplomatic history Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth-century, only a few scholars have produced analytical works on the rivalry, its formulation and immediate impact on the political, diplomatic, military, socio-cultural mechanisms of Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Among those, the studies of Andrew C. Hess¹⁶, discussing the

¹² Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy towards Hungary", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, v. 45, no: 2/3, (1991), 271-345; idem, "The View of the Turk in Hungary: The Apocalyptic Tradition and the Legend of the Red Apple in Ottoman-Hungarian Context", *In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), 71-104; idem, *İmparatorluk Olmanın Dayanılmaz Ağırlığı*, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016). Fodor books also offers an interesting discussion for the historian on the concept of "Early Modern" and on the studies, intending to mirror the Ottoman Empire as an Early Modern state.

¹³ Gökbilgin, "Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'ın Macaristan ve Avrupa Siyaseti'nin Sebebi ve Âmilleri, Geçirdiği Safhalar", *Kanunî Armağanı*, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2001), 5-40.

¹⁴ Rhodes Murphey, "Süleyman's Eastern Policy", *Süleymân the Second and His Time*, 229-248; idem, "Süleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest Destiny of Delayed Reaction to Charles V's Universalist Vision", *Journal of Early Modern History*, v. 5, no: 3 (2001), 197-221.

¹⁵ Ferenc Szakály, "Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács (1365-1526)", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, no: 33 (1979), 67-85.

¹⁶ Hess focuses on the North Africa as the new stage of encounter between these two great powers of the period and discusses how the *Moriscos* in Spain acted as the secret agents of the Ottomans, challenging the Habsburg authority, by getting in alliance with North African corsairs. See: Andrew

role Ottoman-Habsburg relations in North Africa, the article of Paulino Toledo¹⁷ on the Ottoman and Habsburg perceptions of universal sovereignty, the article of Robert Finlay¹⁸ discussing how the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry was shaped by circling prophecies and the role of intermediary agents and diplomats were consulted together with the works of Özlem Kumrular¹⁹ that focus on the political history of the period and the reciprocal perceptions, providing the historian with the portrait of the rivalry between these two leading dynasties of the time and discuss how it was shaped by the complex political structure of the sixteenth-century along with its transformative effects on the socio-political and cultural history of the period.

The studies of the scholars mentioned above discuss the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry within political, diplomatic and socio-cultural frameworks, however, they do not discuss how the Ottomans formulated and applied an imperial strategy to face with the Habsburgs, in detail. In this regard, the article of Gábor Ágoston entitled “Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in

C. Hess, “The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain, *The American Historical Review*, v. 74, no: 1 (1968), 1-25; idem, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

¹⁷ Paulino Toledo, “Osmanlı-İspanyol İmparatorluklarında Dünya İmparatorluğu Fikri”, *İspanya-Türkiye: 16. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Rekabet ve Dostluk*, ed. by, Pablo Martín Asuero, (İstanbul: Kitap yayınevi, 2006); 15-30.

¹⁸ Robert Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Süleyman and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533-1534”, *Journal of Early Modern History*, v.2, no: 1, (1998), 1-31.

¹⁹ Özlem Kumrular, *Las Relaciones Entre el Imperio Otomano y la Monarquía Católica entre los Años 1520-1535 y el Papel de los Estados Satélites*, (İstanbul: Editorial Isis, 2003); eadem, *El Duello Entre Carlos V y Solimán el Magnífico (1520-1535)*, (İstanbul: Editorial Isis, 2005), eadem, “Kanuni’nin Batı Siyaseti’nin Bir İzdüşümü Olarak Türk İmajı, *Dünyada Türk İmgesi*, ed. by Özlem Kumrular, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), 100-128; eadem, eadem, V. Carlos’un Türkiye’deki İstihbarat Kaynakları, *İspanya-Türkiye*, 31-42; eadem “Orta Avrupa’nın Kaderini Değiştiren Savaş: Mohaç, Öncesi Sonrası ve Kastilya’da Yankısı”, *Belleten*, v. 71, no: 261, (2007), 537-574; eadem, *Türk Korkusu: Avrupa’da Türk Düşmanlığının Kökeni*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008); eadem, “XVI. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Orta ve Batı Akdeniz’de Üstünlük Mücadeleleri”, *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, 155-172. Kumrular also published a book in Turkish in which she puts her articles focusing on the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry together. See: Kumrular, *Yeni Belgeler Işığında Osmanlı-Habsburg Düellosu*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011).

the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry”²⁰ deserves a special attention. Ágoston evaluates the sixteenth-century Ottoman policies in the context of imperial “grand strategies” that requires a global vision of geopolitics and military, economic, and cultural capability. To Ágoston, the reign of Süleyman I witnessed the formulation of an imperial ideology and universalist vision, fed by efficient information-gathering, which helped the integration of the Ottomans into European politics and political culture, by the elaboration of the foreign policy and imperial propaganda, for which human and economic resources, as well as the imperial military power are mobilized. Ágoston argues that this imperial policy, formed by the claims of universal sovereignty could be evaluated as the grand strategy of the Ottoman Empire, which was applied very pragmatically and flexibly.²¹ By discussing how the Ottomans gathered information within and outside the imperial borders, the agents in the information-gathering networks and the meaning, the scope of the universal sovereignty in the reign of Süleyman and how the imperial strategy was dissolved in Central Europe, in accordance with the political and economic developments affecting these two great powers of the time, Ágoston presents a comprehensive analysis of the sixteenth-century.²²

Ágoston’s views on the formation of grand strategy mainly based on close observation of the ongoing developments that were linked to the efficient information-gathering mechanisms of the Ottomans have recently been elaborated by

²⁰ Gábor Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry”, *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. by, Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75-103.

²¹ The author also underlines that many elements of the Süleyman’s “grand strategy” were already present under his predecessors, however the rise of the Habsburg and Safevid threats required the required adjustments in imperial strategy. See: *Ibid*, 76-77.

²² See also: Ágoston, “The Ottomans: From Frontier Principality to Empire”, *The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present*, ed. by John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 105-131.

Emrah Safa Gürkan, focusing on the sixteenth-century Mediterranean. In the light of a wide range of Ottoman and European sources, Gürkan opens new discussions on how and why the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry transferred to the western Mediterranean by 1530s²³, the roles of Levantine corsairs in North Africa in the formulation of the sixteenth-century Ottoman naval strategy to face the rise of the Habsburgs²⁴ and displays a colorful portrait of the secret diplomacy held by spies, between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires that was one of the major components of the formulation and implementation of the imperial strategies of the states.²⁵ By discussing the differences between the Habsburg and Ottoman secret services, Gürkan argues that the Ottomans successfully developed a functional information gathering mechanism, which enabled the state to formulate its policies in the sixteenth-century. In the Ottoman mechanism, however, the responsibility of gathering information was delegated to high-ranking state officers, pashas and court favorites, who established their own intelligence networks that served to the masters' interests rather than of the state. Ottoman system, therefore, was quite different from the institutionalized and standardized secret services of the Habsburgs.²⁶ Gürkan's

²³ Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde".

²⁴ Gürkan, *Ottoman Corsairs in the Western Mediterranean and Their Place in The Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry (1505-1535)*, Bilkent University Department of History, 2006, (unpublished M.A. Thesis); idem, "The Center and the Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the Sixteenth Century", *Turkish Historical Review*, v.1, no:2, (2010), 125-163

²⁵ Gürkan, *Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean*.

²⁶ Apart for his Ph.D dissertation, Gürkan undersigned three articles and a book in Turkish on the theme. See: Gürkan, "The Efficacy of the Ottoman Counter-Intelligence in the 16th Century", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, v. 65, (2012), 1-38; idem, "Batı Akdeniz'de Osmanlı Korsanlığı ve Gaza Meselesi", *Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no: 33, (2012), 173-204; idem, "Mediating Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-betweens and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Constantinople, 1560-1600", *Journal of Early Modern History*, no: 19, (2015), 107-128; idem, Fooling the Sultan: Information, Decision-Making and the Mediterranean Faction (1585-1587)", *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, no: 45, (2015), 57-96; idem, "L'Idra del Sultano: Lo Spionaggio Ottomano Nel Cinquecento", *Mediterranea-Ricerche Storiche*, no: 38, (2016), 447-476; idem, *Sultanın Casusları: 16. Yüzyılda İstihbarat Sabotaj ve Rüşvet Ağları*, (İstanbul: Kronik Yayıncılık, 2017).

works are important to be consulted not only to see how the Habsburgs and Ottomans formulated their own imperial policies against each other by the flow of information about the actual developments, state intentions and plans carried by numerous agents including the agents of other European nations (i.e. Venetians) but also to decipher how the other European states positioned themselves in face to Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and to what extent the Ottoman strategies shaped the European political, diplomatic and economic history.

The Ottoman-French political convergence in the early sixteenth-century needs to be analyzed to contextualize the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537, since the Apulian Campaign was formed according to the French proposals. In this context, the work of Charrière²⁷, in which a wide range of correspondences between Francis I and his embassies in Rome, in Venice and in Constantinople, the French ambassadorial letters and the accounts of the French travelers are compiled, provides the researcher important evidences for both Ottoman-French relations in the sixteenth-century and international politics of the time.

The first academic publications on the Ottoman-French relations in the sixteenth-century were produced in the first decade of the twentieth-century by V.-L.

Bourrilly²⁸ and J. Ursu²⁹, whose works have been accepted as the pioneering studies

²⁷ Ernest Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant, ou, Correspondances, Mémoires et Actes Diplomatiques des Ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople et Des Ambassadeurs, Envoyés ou Résidents à Divers Titres à Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jérusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Géorgie, Crimée, Syrie, Egypte, etc., et Dans Les États de Tunis, d'Alger et de Maroc*, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848-60). The work offers a wide range of correspondences, travel accounts, copies of official documents, composed between the years of 1515 and 1589 and conserved in the French archives.

²⁸ V.-L. Bourrilly, "La Première Ambassade d'Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)", *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* (1899-1914), v. 2, no: 1, (1900-1901), 23-44 ; idem, "L'Ambassade De La Forest et De Marillac à Constantinople (1535-1538)", *Revue Historique*, T. 76, Fasc. 2, (1901), 297-328, ; idem, "Les Diplomats de François I^{er} : Antonio Rincon et la Politique Orientale de François I^{er} (1522-1541)", *Revue Historique*, tom. 113, (1913) 64-83, 268-308.

²⁹ J. Ursu, *La Politique Orientale de François I^{er} (1515-1547)*, (Paris : Honoré Champion, 1908).

of the field. These two scholars evaluated the agreement held between the French Ambassador Jean de la Forest and İbrahim Pasha, on diplomatic and commercial privileges granted to the French by Süleyman I in 1536, concluding the secret negotiations between these two for the Ottoman military assistance, needed by the French King to face Charles V. Their works were elaborated by D. L. Jensen³⁰ in 1985, who asserts that the French King was the first European crowned-head, abandoning the traditional idea of Christian alliance against the Ottomans by making them an active partner in his foreign policy. Jensen also discusses how the “scandalous alliance” of the French King with the Ottoman Sultan against their common enemy Charles V, gradually granted the French a long term commercial privileges, which would restore the economic order of the French Kingdom after the civil wars of the early seventeenth-century.

The first phase of the Ottoman-French diplomatic relations and political alliance are also discussed by İsmail Soysal³¹, Halil İnalçık³², Édith Garnier³³, and recently by Christine Isom-Verhaaren³⁴ within the context of Ottoman-French joint military

³⁰ De Lamar Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy”, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, v. 16, no: 4,(Winter 1985), 451-470.

³¹ İsmail Soysal, “Türk Fransız Diploması Münasebetlerinin İlk Devresi”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, v. 3, no: 5-6, (1953), 63-94.

³² İnalçık, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi”; idem, “Avrupa Devletler Denge Sistemi ve Osmanlı-Fransız İttifakı, 1524-44: Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa Fransa’da”, *Muhteşem Süleyman*, ed. by Özlem Kumrular, 9-24. In his studies, İnalçık underlines that the Ottoman-French alliance, its formulation and politically implementation shows how the Ottomans were active in the European politics in the 16th century, they even dominate it. The interference of the Ottomans according to the author led to the spring of European political concept of balance of power, in which the weak supported against the powerful in order to secure the political pluralism in the continent.

³³ Édith Garnier, *L’Alliance Impie: François I^{er} et Soliman le Magnifique contre Charles V*, (Paris: Éditions du Félin, 2008).

³⁴ Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Barbarossa and His Army Who Come to Succor All of Us”: Ottoman and French Views of Their Joint Campaign of 1543-44”, *French Historical Studies*, v. 30, no:3, (2007), 395-425; eadem, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century*, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

operations in the time of Süleyman against the Habsburg Emperor. Isom-Verhaaren elaborated the subject by a special emphasis on how the Ottoman-French alliance and joint operations was perceived in Europe, and how it was defined and legitimized by the French.³⁵

As stated above, this dissertation intends to decipher why and how an Ottoman-Venetian war took place in 1537 after a long period of peace. This requires a close consideration of the Venetian policies of the early sixteenth-century and of the Ottoman-Venetian political diplomatic and commercial relations. These works on the history of Venice are numerous.³⁶ On the other hand, the modern scholarly publications on Venice clearly demonstrate that the Republic was an important political power of the sixteenth-century thanks to its stabilized bureaucratic system, effective military apparatus, enriched by a good number of condottieri and its famous arsenal, making the *Serenissima* an unrivaled sea-power and its extensive commercial network in the Levant.³⁷ Active participation of the Republic into the

³⁵ About the perception of Ottoman-French alliance in Spain, Özlem Kumrular also penned an article within the light of Spanish documents and chronicles. See: Kumrular, “Avrupa’nın İnşasında Osmanlı Ektisi: Habsburg Gücüne Karşı Osmanlı-Fransız İttifakının Avrupa’daki Fransa İmajına Katkısı ve Fransa’nın Majestik Orbis Christianus İdeasının Çöküşündeki Rolü”, *Doğu-Batı. Osmanlılar II*, no: 52, (February, March, April, 2010), 25-46.

³⁶ For some examples see: Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Roberto Cessi, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, (Florence: Giunti Martello, 1981); John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice*, (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Alvise Zorzi, *La Repubblica del Leone: Storia di Venezia*, (Milano: Tascabili Bompiani, 2008).

³⁷ There is a large literature on Venetian history. Following studies are useful to be consulted for general information about the history, organization, state system, economic structure and bureaucracy of the Republic of Venice, from its formation up to the eighteenth century. See: Eliyahu Ashtor, “The Venetians Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-colonialism?”, *Journal of European Economic History*, no: 3, (1974), 5-53; Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Dennis Romano, *Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundations of the Venetian State*, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Manfredo, Tafuri, *Venice and the Renaissance*, (USA: MIT Press, 1989); Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); John Martin, Dennis Romano (eds.), *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797*, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Ivone Cacciavillani, *La Serenissima: Una Repubblica Burocratica*, (Venice: Corbo e Fiore Editori, 2003); Andrea Zannini, *Burocrazia e Burocrati a Venezia in Età Moderna: I Cittadini Orginari (Sec. XVI-XVIII)*, (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2003).

ongoing international politics, to secure its independence and economic prosperity thanks to overseas trade, facilitated the establishment of the effective Venetian diplomatic apparatus, fed by extensive networks of representation, communication and spying.³⁸

With the introductory article of Halil İnalcık³⁹, the works of Paolo Preto⁴⁰, Kenneth M. Setton⁴¹, the books undersigned by Carla Coco and Flora Manzonetto⁴², by Lucette Valensi⁴³, by Marrie F. Viallon⁴⁴, and by Eric R. Dursteler⁴⁵ provide the historian with comprehensive analysis on the Ottoman-Venetian political and diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the articles of Robert Finlay⁴⁶ help the researcher to analyze the how the Venetian foreign policy evolved to a defensive strategy based

³⁸ See: M. Armand. Baschet, *La Diplomatie Venitienne*, (Paris: Henri Plon, 1862) ; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955); Paolo Preto, *I Servizi Segreti di Venezia*, (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1994); Peter Burke, "Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication" *Venice Reconsidered*, 389-419.

³⁹ İnalcık, "An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations.", *Venezia, Centro di Mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente (Secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e Problemi*, ed. by, Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos Manoussacas, and Agostino Pertusi, vol. 1, (Florence: Olschki editore, 1977), 83-90.

⁴⁰ Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, (Florence: G.C. Sansoni Editore, 1975).

⁴¹ Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. 3, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984).

⁴² Carla Coco, Flora Manzonetto, *Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche dell'Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli*, (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1985).

⁴³ Lucette Valensi, *Venise et la Sublime Porte*, (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1987).

⁴⁴ Marie F. Viallon, *Venise et la Porte Ottomane (1453-1566): Un Siècle de Relations Vénéto-Ottomanes de la Prise de Constantinople à la Mort de Soliman*, (Paris: Economica, 1995).

⁴⁵ Eric R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Baltimore-Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). See also: Idem, "The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, v. 16, no:2, (2001), 1-30.

⁴⁶ Finlay, "Politics and Family in Renaissance Venice: The Election of Doge Andrea Gritti", *Studi Veneziani*, no:2, (1978), 97-117; idem, "Al Servizio del Sultano: Venezia I Turchi e il Mondo Cristiano, 1523-1538, *Renovatio Urbis: Veneto nell'Età di Andrea Gritti (1523-1538)*, ed. by, Manfredo Tafuri, (Roma: Officina Edizioni, 1984, 78-118; idem, "Fabius Maximus in Venice: Doge Andrea Gritti, the War of Cambrai and the Rise of Habsburg Hegemony 1509-1530, *Renaissance Quarterly*, v. 53, no: 4, (Winter 2000), 988-1031.

on the Republic's neutrality in the struggles between other states of the time in the sixteenth-century and the impacts of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Venetian politics.

In this dissertation, I used the studies of Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, who contributed to earlier studies by providing rich archival evidences, extensively. Especially her book, entitled *In Nome del Grand Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*⁴⁷, discussing the Ottoman representation in Venice from 1453 to 1645, delineates how the Ottomans pursued reciprocal diplomatic relations with the Republic of Venice. In contrast to the common perception that Ottomans did not send diplomatic representatives to Europe before the 18th century, Pedani points out that even in the 15th century the Ottoman Empire sent more than 175 delegates, ambassadors, envoys or messengers, to Venice.⁴⁸ Pedani's works on the Venetians in Constantinople and Ottoman merchants in Venice clearly demonstrate the close cooperation, confrontations and reciprocal relations between these two states during the sixteenth-century.⁴⁹ Recently, E.

⁴⁷ Maria Pia Pedani, *In Nome del Grand Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, (Venice: Deputazione Editrice, 1994). Pedani's book recently translated into Turkish by the edition of Nevin Özkan. See: Pedani, "*Osmanlı Padişahının Adına*". *İstanbul'un Fethinden Girit Savaşı'na Venedik'e Gönderilen Osmanlılar*, ed. by Nevin Özkan, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2011).

⁴⁸ Pedani's work is based on the Venetian documents and some Ottoman historical narratives. Therefore it is criticized to talk about the Ottomans from Venice without hearing their own voices. For a review of the study see: Eric Dursteler, "In Nome del Grand Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia della Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia, Review", *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 26, no: 4, 1995, 975-976.

⁴⁹ See: Pedani, "Veneziani a Costantinopoli alla Fine del XVI. Secolo", *Quaderni di Studi Arabi*, v.15, (1997), 67-84; eadem, Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy, *Turcica*, v. 32, (2000), 9-32; eadem, "Venetian Consuls in Egypt and Syria in the Ottoman Age", *Mediterranean World*, v. 18, (2006), 7-21; eadem, "Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterraneo in Età Moderna", *Mediterraneo in Armi (Secc. XV-XVIII)*, ed.by, Rosella Concilla, (Palermo: Associazione Mediterranea, 2007), 175-205; eadem, "Ottoman Merchants in Adriatic: Trade and Smuggling", *Acta Historiae*, v.16, no:1-2, (2008), 155-172, eadem, Pedani, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, (Bologna: Società Editrice il Mulino, 2010); eadem, "Ottoman Ships and Venetian Craftsmen in the 16th Century", *Seapower, Technology and Trade: Studies in Turkish Maritime History*, ed. by, Dejanirah Couto, Feza Guneroglu and Maria Pia Pedani, (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2014), 460-464.

Natalie Rothman⁵⁰ also contributed to the field by her noteworthy studies on the trans-imperial subjects between Venice and Constantinople such as commercial brokers, religious converts and official interpreters (dragomans). Rothman discusses the multiple connections, convergence, and how the Ottomans positioned themselves in the European politics and culture of the sixteenth-century.

In addition to the secondary sources, I also employ both Ottoman and Italian sources in this dissertation. The 58 volumes' compilation of Marino Sanudo⁵¹, the documents published by Ernest Charrière⁵², the *relazioni*⁵³ of the Venetian *baili*, published by Eugenio Albèri⁵⁴, some early chronicles in Italian and several Ottoman documents, pertinent to the main discussions, are cited in the text. The backbone of the dissertation is formed by the Ottoman and Venetian chronicles, composed in the sixteenth-century. To verify the gathered information and to exemplify how the events of 1537 echoed a hundred years later two Ottoman and Venetian seventeenth-century chronicles are also consulted. I will study these chronicles in

⁵⁰ E Natalie Rothman, "Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early Modern Mediterranean", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, v. 51, no: 4, October 2009, 771-800; eadem, *Brokering the Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

⁵¹ Marino Sanudo, *I diarii di Marino Sanuto (MCCCCXCVI-MDXXXIII) dall'autografo Marciano ital. cl. VII codd. CDXIX-CDLXXVII*, 58 vols. (Venice: F. Visentini, 1879-1903).

⁵² Eugenio Albèri (ed.), *Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante Il Secolo Decimosesto*, (Florence: Società Editrice Firoentina, 1840-1855), s. 3, v. 1-3. Albèri's compilation provides the historian the main texts of summaries of the *relazioni* of the Venetian ambassadors to Constantinople in the sixteenth century. Pedani contributed his compilation by publishing inedited *relazioni* on the Ottoman Empire, composed by the early sixteenth century up to 1789. See: Pedani (ed.), *Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato- Constantinopoli (1512-1789)*, v. 16, (Padua: Bottega d'Erasmus-Aldo-Ausilio, 1996).

⁵³ For *relazioni*, see: Donald E. Queller, "The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni", *Renaissance Venice*, ed. by, J. R. Hale (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), 174-196.

⁵⁴ Charrière, v.1.

two individual chapters. In Chapter Four, the accounts of Lütî Pasha⁵⁵, Matrakçı Nasûh⁵⁶, Celâlzâde⁵⁷, Mustafa Âlî⁵⁸, İbrahim Peçevi⁵⁹ and Kâtip Çelebi⁶⁰ and Seyyîd Muradî's *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*⁶¹ will be discussed. In Chapter Five, the chronicles of Andronikos Nountsios⁶², Paolo Paruta⁶³, Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni⁶⁴, Theodore Spandugino⁶⁵, Andrea Marmora⁶⁶, the report of Francesco Longo⁶⁷ and lastly an anonymous pamphlet published by Francesco Sansovino⁶⁸ will be delineated.

⁵⁵ Lütî Paşa, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Âmire, 1923).

⁵⁶ Davut Erkan, *Matrakçı Nasûh'un Süleymân-nâmesi (1520-1537)*, Marmara University Institute of Turkic Studies, 2005, (unpublished MA. Thesis).

⁵⁷ Celâlzâde Mustafa (Koca Nişancı), *Geschichte Sultan Süleymân Kânûnîs von 1520 bis 1557 oder Tabakât ül-Memâlik ve Derecât ül-Mesâlik*, ed. by, Petra Kappert, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1981).

⁵⁸ Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l Ahbâr*, Dördüncü Rûkn, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2009).

⁵⁹ Peçevî İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevî*, (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980).

⁶⁰ Kâtip Çelebi, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, ed. by, Svatopluk Soucek, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2011).

⁶¹ *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, ed. by Mustafa Yıldız, (Aachen: Verlag Shaker, 1993).

⁶² Nicandre de Corcyre, *Le Voyage d'Occident*, tras.by Paolo Odorico, (Toulouse: Anacharsis Éditions, 2002).

⁶³ Paolo Paruta, *Historia Vinetiana*, (Venice, 1703).

⁶⁴ Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, *Historia Venetiana Scritta Brevemente da Gio.Niccolò Doglioni delle Cose Successe dalla Prima Fondation di Venetia fino all'Anno Christo 1592*, (Venice, 1598).

⁶⁵ Theodore Spandounes, *On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors*, trans. and ed. by, Donald M. Nicol, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁶⁶ Andrea Marmora, *Della Historia di Corfu*, (Venice, 1672).

⁶⁷ Francesco Longo, "Decrizione della Guerra Seguita tra la Serenissima Republica di Venetia e Sultan Solimano Imperator de Turchi l'Anno 1537", *Commissiones et Relationes Venetae*, ed.by. Simeon Ljubić, v.2 in *Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium*, v.7, (Zagreb, 1877), 113-131.

⁶⁸ "I Fatti di Solimano Dopo la Presa di Rhodi Fino all'Anno MDXXXIII", *Historia Universale Dell'Origine et Imperio dei Turchi Raccolta da M. Francesco Sansovino*, (Venice, 1568).

1.2. A Chapter-by-Chapter Outline

This dissertation examines the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537 in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in four voluminous chapters.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two aims to draw the framework of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu. This second chapter analyzes the reasons of the Ottoman Apulian campaign and the root causes of the apparent mistrust that started to dominate Ottoman-Venetian relations by 1532. Firstly, the rise of Süleyman I and Charles V to power, the formulation of Ottoman and Habsburg grand strategies, based on the discourses of universal sovereignty and the main political actors, playing the prominent roles in the Ottoman and Habsburg policy and decision making mechanisms are reviewed. Besides, the Ottoman challenge of the Habsburgs in Hungary and in western Mediterranean is also briefly discussed and the Ottoman policy towards Hungary is delineated to evaluate the Ottoman Apulian Campaign in 1537 within the context of Ottoman gradual method of conquest. Secondly, this second chapter discusses the Ottoman-French convergence in the early sixteenth-century, which led the Ottoman-French alliance of 1536 for a joint campaign in Italy. Finally, this chapter examines the Ottoman-Venetian relations of the time and discusses how the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry created a political tension between the Porte and the Serenissima, with the aim of setting the ground for Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537.

The next chapter, Chapter Three, provides the historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537. First, I discuss the Ottoman-French alliance of 1536 and the position of the Republic of Venice. Here, I intend to demonstrate how the Porte diplomatically pressured the Serenissima to actively support the Ottoman initiatives against the Habsburgs. Secondly, the Ottoman

Apulian Campaign of 1537 is delineated. By discussing the course of the campaign, it is underlined that the main target of the Ottomans in 1537 was the region of Apulia and Corfu came out as a second one, in 1537, as the Sultan's response for the disingenuous Venetian policies concerning the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. In this context, I demonstrate that the Ottoman attack was the direct outcome of the existing political tension between these two states and was justified by the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during the campaign. In this regard, this third chapter challenges the previous studies which state Corfu as the principal target for the Ottomans in 1537. Finally, the chapter re-analyzes the Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu within the context of Ottoman "gradual method of conquest" and suggests an answer to the question of what Ottomans might have intended to achieve in 1537.

The fourth chapter focuses on the Ottoman chronicles, composed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and discusses the Ottoman point of views about the reasons, preparation, process and the efficacy of the campaign of 1537. It aims to set out how the Ottomans perceived and legitimized the military operations in Apulia and the subsequent attack on Corfu. Therefore, in this chapter I intend to support the main arguments of the dissertation asserted in the previous chapter. Before discussing each chronicle, I provide brief information about the authors/composers, the time of composition of the accounts and the genre, according to which each work is classified.

Chapter Five examines the Venetian chronicles, composed by Venetians or Corfiots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to provide a complementary analysis of the 1537 campaign. In this chapter, the Venetians' and Corfiots' evaluations and reflections of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and particularly the Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537 are discussed. As it is done in the fourth chapter, this chapter also

provides details about the origins of the authors, their positions, if they had, in the Venetian administration and their social status to assess the reliability of the source. The sources are also important in terms of portraying the cultural atmosphere of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Venice and provide more detailed information in comparison to the Ottoman sources. This fourth chapter also works as a check up for the information provided by the Ottoman chronicles and underlines similar and different views on 1537 events. By this chapter, I intend to complete the historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu, as well as introducing new primary sources for further studies.

1.3. Notes on the Languages Used for Names and Terms and on the Translations

The dissertation adopts commonly used English versions/names for most of the monarchs, kingdoms, cities, towns and islands. For the Ottoman sultans and pashas and officers Ottoman usage is preferred. For the Ottoman capital, Constantinople is used. The term *Serenissima*, meaning the most serene, is used to refer to the Republic of Venice, since the official name of the Republic was *Serenissima Repubblica di Venèta*. The historical coat of arms of the French Kingdom was the fleur-de-lis on a blue field, so the term *Fleur-de-lys*, used in the text refers to the French Kingdom.

For the titles and terms in Ottoman, Venetian /Italian and Spanish used in the chapters, I do not give the English equivalents in the text, if it is not so necessary to be explained in the narrative, to produce an easy-reading account. For the titles and terms, a glossary was added to the Apendices. (Appendix A)

The use of the term of “Turk” also needs to be clarified. In the narrative, I intentionally refrain from using “Turk” for the Ottomans since the Ottomans used this appellation in different meanings and called themselves as “Ottomans”.

However, in most of the contemporary Italian sources Ottomans were referred to as Turks. For that reason, especially in the Chapter Five, dealing with the Venetian sources the usage is secured but it is put in quotation marks.

Lastly, the translations from Ottoman, Italian and French throughout the text are mine if it is not cited in an individual work and not clearly mentioned in the footnotes. In the direct quotations from Ottoman Turkish, I adopted a simplified transliteration style showing the long vowels by (^) and *hemze* and *'ayn* are indicated by (') and (').

CHAPTER II

CONTEXTUALIZING 1537: OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY IN THE EARLY SIXTEENTH-CENTURY AND SURROUNDING STATES

In July 1537, when the Ottoman forces, commanded by his Third Vizier, Lütü Pasha, landed on the southeastern Italian coasts of Apulia, Sultan Süleyman I was manifesting that he was the only power attempting a decisive intervention in Italy. Earlier the site of an invasion by his ancestor, Mehmed II, the region of Apulia was carefully chosen to be the goal, since the region was part of the Kingdom of Naples, directly bound to the Spanish realm of the Habsburg Emperor, Charles V. The campaign had been already planned as an Ottoman-French joint venture in Italy in 1536 against the rise of the Habsburg Emperor, Charles V. However, by mid-August of 1537, the course of the campaign was changed: the Ottoman fire unexpectedly turned on Venetian Corfu. This was the first Ottoman-Venetian encounter in the reign of Süleyman, ending the period of 34 years of peace between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice.

This dissertation argues that the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu cannot be evaluated as isolated military maneuvers of the Ottoman Sultan. On the contrary, they were direct products of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the early

sixteenth-century, according to which other crowned-heads and states of the time needed to adapt, including, above all, the Republic of Venice. Therefore, to analyze the 1537 Campaign, one should first analyze the nature and scope of the rivalry between these two leading dynasties of the early sixteenth-century and the events of the time, along with the rivaling political discourses to understand the 1537 Campaign.

This chapter intends to contextualize 1537 and of discuss how these encounters had their source in Ottoman and Habsburg imperial strategies. In this regard, in order to decipher why the Ottoman attack on Apulia in 1537 took place, the political and ideological rivalry between Süleyman and Charles V needs first to be delineated to show how this rivalry resulted in numerous Ottoman-Habsburg military encounters in Central Europe and Western Mediterranean. Secondly, the Ottoman-French convergence that led to the 1536 Ottoman-French alliance for a joint campaign in Italy will be detected. Lastly, Ottoman-Venetian relations in the early sixteenth-century and Venetian political thinking in the face of the Ottoman-Habsburg alliance will be discussed. This will explain why suspicions and doubts arose between the Ottomans and the Venetians, setting the stage for the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537.

2.1. One World, Two Emperors: A Brief Analysis of the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry in the Early Sixteenth-Century

In 1520, when Süleyman (r.1520-1566)⁶⁹ succeeded his father Selim I (r.1512-1520), the Ottoman Empire already possessed a world empire. In the reign of his great-grandfather Mehmed II (r.1451-1481), the Ottoman State had become a *de facto*

⁶⁹ For a classical study on Süleyman, see: Roger Bigelow Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566*, (Cambridge & Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1944).

empire, with the conquest of the Byzantine capital Constantinople and consolidation of imperial rule both in Anatolia and Rumelia. In the late fifteenth-century, the Empire had expanded to the natural frontier of the Danube. Moreover, the imperial armies had started to penetrate into Central Europe and Italy. In 1456, Belgrade was besieged unsuccessfully, and between the years of 1468 and 1473 Ottoman raiders attacked Venetian Friuli in Northeastern Italy.⁷⁰ In May 1480, the Island of Rhodes was besieged and in June 1480, Ottoman raiders, led by Gedik Ahmed Pasha⁷¹, landed in Apulia and captured the city of Otranto. They also attacked on the towns of Brindisi, Lecce and Taranto.⁷² Although the Ottomans evacuated Otranto the following year, after the death of Mehmed II, this attack was an unforgettable trauma for the Italians.⁷³

With the reign of Selim I between 1512 and 1520, the Ottoman conquest changed its direction towards the Eastern territories. In 1516 and 1517, the Mamluk Sultanate was dominated and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were taken under the Ottoman control. Beyond the maritime periphery of Rum “[...] the conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1516-1517 extended the empire’s waterfront along the coasts of Syria and Egypt, and crossed the Isthmus of Suez to include the Red Sea, at whose

⁷⁰ For the Ottoman raids in Friuli, see: Maria Pia Pedani, “Turkish Raids in Friuli at the end of the Fifteenth Century”, *Acta Viennensia Ottomanica*, ed. by. M. Kohbach, G. Prochaska-Eisl and C. Romer, (Vienna: Im Selbstverlag des Instituts für Orientalistik, 1999), 287-291. For how the Ottoman invasion was reflected by the Papal and Venetian literary works: Mustafa Soykut, *Image of the “Turk” in Italy. A History of the “Other” in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), 54-59.

⁷¹ Gedik Ahmed Pasha was the Grand Vizier of Mehmed II. In 1477, he was removed from his office because of his reluctance for the future campaign over Albania. In the following year, however, he was appointed as the Chief Captain and the Governor of Valona. For detailed information, see: Hedda Reindl Kiel, “Gedik Ahmed Paşa”, *DİA*, v.13, 543-544.

⁷² Franco Cardini, *Europa e Islam: Storia di un Malinteso*, (Roma & Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli : 2008), 290.

⁷³ Ibid.

southern end conquest of Yemen pushed that waterfront to the shores of the Arabian sea [...]”⁷⁴. To secure the connection lines between Constantinople and newly dominated Syria, Egypt and the Holy Lands, the Ottomans stepped further to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean by preventing the penetration of the corsairs.⁷⁵ Hence, the Republic of Venice and other trading entrepreneurs, became dependent to the Ottoman ports and shipping lanes fanning out from them, also to the good will of the Sultan.⁷⁶ This transformed the Ottoman State, being a regional power, into a world empire controlling the crossroads of three continent and the isthmus between eastern and western seas.⁷⁷

The rule of this large empire was taken over by young Süleyman in 1520. Since he was the sole candidate for the Ottoman throne, he peacefully succeeded this father; but the empire that he took over was not so in peace: the Ottoman rule in newly conquered Egypt and Syria was not definitely consolidated. The insurrection led by Canberdi Gazali⁷⁸ in Syria was his first challenge to face. Furthermore, among the Ottoman ruling elite, Süleyman was not treated to be an influential and powerful

⁷⁴ Svat Soucek, *Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700*, (İstanbul: The Issis Press, 2015), 15. Andrew C. Hess evaluates the conquest of Egypt as a turning point in the history of the Mediterranean. According to Hess, the Ottoman conquest of Egypt brought about the economic prosperity to fuel further military expeditions and the new mean of legitimation to rule large population living within the Ottoman realm. According to Hess, this eased the Empire to struggle with politically divided Europe and Spain in particular, having continuous economic problems and gave the Ottomans in the Ottoman Habsburg rivalry in the sixteenth century. See: Andrew C. Hess, “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.4, no:1, (January 1973), 55-76.

⁷⁵ Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 19.

⁷⁶ Soucek, *Ottoman Maritime Wars*, 47.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 16.

⁷⁸ Following the death of Selim I, the Beylerbeyi of Damascus, Canberdi Gazali declared his independence entered in Aleppo. For detailed information, see: Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın, *Kanunî'nin Cülûsu ve İlk Seferleri*, (Ankara: TTK, 1961), 7-14; Feridun M. Emecen, “Canberdi Gazali”, *DİA*, v. 7, 141-143. For a recent study, introducing Venetian perceptions on Canberdi Gazali revolt, see: Turan, *The Sultan's Favorite: İbrahim Pasha*, 38-52.

emperor, comparing to his father, known as “the Grim”.⁷⁹ Not only the Ottomans, but also the Europeans suspiciously approached the young sultan. The death of Selim I, who had intimidated the Christendom by his exhausting aggressive policy, released the Pope⁸⁰ and led him to advocate for a new crusade against the “Turks”.⁸¹ Since he had not been active in world politics in the time of his father, Süleyman was perceived as an impotent successor, not able to threaten the Christendom. Italian intellectual and historian Paolo Giovio notes that “for everyone, it seemed that an aggressive Lion had left a meek lamb as successor”⁸² All they would realize soon that they had underestimated the young sultan and would give him the title of “the Magnificent”.

This atmosphere led Süleyman to build himself a sultanic image. His first step was re-orienting the Ottoman war machine against Christendom to show his power. In 1521, he conquered Belgrade, known as the gate opening to the Central Europe. His next step was the conquest of Rhodes in 1522. Besides having an ideological importance as the seat of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, the island was a strategic goal for Süleyman. Rhodes would serve the Ottoman Sultan as a police station, securing the sea-connection between Constantinople and Hijaz and as the

⁷⁹ Ebru Turan mentions that since Süleyman did not accompany his father in any campaigns, he could not show his military skills and his leadership qualities. For detailed discussion of the reaction of the Ottoman to Süleyman’s succession in the light of Ottoman and Venetian sources, see: Turan, *The Sultan’s Favorite*: İbrahim Pasha, 52-71.

⁸⁰ “[...] staremmo hora in pace et la cristianità potra star sicura.” Sanudo, v. 29, col. 343.

⁸¹ For the efforts of Pope Leo X to organize a crusade against the Ottomans between the years of 1517-1520, see: Setton, v.3, 172-193.

⁸² “*Et certamente pareva a tutti che un Leon arrabiato avesse lasciato un mansueto agnello per successore per esser Solimano giovane, imperito et di quietissima natura [...]*”. Paolo Iovio [Giovio], *Comentario de le Cose de’ Turchi*, (Rome, 1538), Hii, https://archive.org/stream/bub_gb_rvcZNdMyHLEC#page/n61/mode/2up, retrieved, on December 6, 2017.

principal Ottoman naval base in the eastern Mediterranean.⁸³ In a very short time after having ascended to the Ottoman throne, Süleyman was able to complete the project of his great grand father Mehmed II: two important dominions which would be also used by the Ottoman as the stepping stones for their further military operations were taken under the imperial control. It was officially declared that the young Sultan intends to follow the route of Mehmed II.

Secondly, the Sultan, was able to consolidate his supreme authority by eliminating all remnant bureaucrats from his father's administration, who were frequently acting as the channels of opposition. In his third year on the throne, he issued a surprising appointment: He gave the imperial seal to his close friend and servant, İbrahim. From that time onwards, İbrahim became the most important actor in the Ottoman politics after the Sultan; he gained the right of supervision over all the state units and played decisive role in the formulation and implementation of the domestic and international strategies of the Empire.⁸⁴ From 1523 to 1536, Süleyman and İbrahim would rule the Empire in harmony and establish an imperial strategy, which will also revive the projects of Mehmed II.

The rise of Süleyman coincided the rise of another powerful in the west monarch who would be perceived as Süleyman's "mortal enemy": Charles V, the Habsburg and the Holy Roman Emperor. When the young Duke of Burgundy, Charles of

⁸³ Soucek, *Ottoman Maritime Wars*, 48. For the conquests of Belgrade and Rhodes see: Yurdaydın, 15-44; Palmira Brumett, "The Overrated Adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman Naval Power", *The Historical Journal*, v.36, no:3 (1993), 517-541.

⁸⁴ İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, (London: Phoenix, 2000), 96-97. Sixteenth century Ottoman chronicler Kemal Paşa-zâde notes how influential was İbrahim over the Süleyman's political decisions even before having the imperial seal. See: Kemal Paşa-zâde, *Tevarih-i Âl-i Osman*, X. Defter, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), 159-163. For an interesting analysis on how Süleyman consolidated his authority and built a sultanic image for himself via İbrahim Pasha, see: Ebru Turan, *The Sultan's Favorite: İbrahim Pasha*.

Habsburg⁸⁵ (1500-1558), came to the Spanish throne in 1516, at the age of 16, perhaps a few contemporary believed that he would become one of the two protagonists in the sixteenth-century political theater. Thanks to the clever dynastic marriages of his ancestors, Charles inherited an almost world empire, as Süleyman did. Charles mother Juana was the third child of Isabella I of Castile (1451-1505) and Ferdinand II of Aragon (1442-1516); his father Philip, the Handsome, of Habsburg (1478-1506) on the other hand was the son of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I (r. 1508-1519) and Mary of Burgundy.⁸⁶ The unexpected death of his father and his grandfather offered him a large realm composed by the Burgundian inheritance, centered in Netherlands, the Habsburg dominions, including Austria within the Empire and Hungary outside it, the Franche-Comté, the entire peninsular Spain and its dominions in the North Africa, the Italian kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, Sardinia and the dominions in the New World.⁸⁷

Charles V also had to face challenges against his authority within his realm in his first years. In 1517, the Castilian Cortes recognized him as the king of Spain but the Spanish ruling elite secured their suspicions over the young monarch. For them, the best alternative for the Spanish crown had been Charles's brother Ferdinand, who was a Spaniard and had been also King Ferdinand's favorite.⁸⁸ Charles was an outsider of Spain, he did not even speak Spanish. His primary attempts to regularize

⁸⁵ Charles I, as King of Spain and Charles V, as the Holy Roman Emperor. See: Karl Brandt, *The Emperor Charles V: The Growth and Destiny of a Man and of a World Empire*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949); Pierre Chanu, Michèle Escamilla, *Charles Quint*, (Paris: Fayard, 2000); James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy International Finance and Domestic Policies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); William Maltby, *The Reign of Charles V*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Willem Pieter Blockmans, *Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558*, (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁸⁶ Maltby, 6-8.

⁸⁷ Henry Kamen, *Spain 1469-1717: A Society of Conflict*, (Harlow: Pearson-Longman, 2005), 67.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 66.

new tax codes and his failure of implementing parliamentary accords triggered the *comunero* revolt in 1520, when he left Spain to seek the imperial title.⁸⁹ The revolt paralyzed the government in Castile for over a year and could only be suppressed by 1522. From then, the Emperor made Spain his seat for 7 years; he learnt Spanish; reconciled the Castilian *Cortes* by reforming the court, reorganizing the administration and initiating a significant cultural revival.⁹⁰

Here, it should be underlined that the Charles' Empire was a mosaic of different states, having their own judicial and administrative mechanisms, with which the Emperor should act in harmony. He had to respect the local judicial privileges (*fueros*) and parliaments (*cortes*); moreover, he should recognize the authority of regional kings and dukes to guarantee vital revenues.⁹¹ For that reason, Charles could not fully consolidate his authority in his entire realm and established a centralized administration. Only in Castile, he was able to consolidate his authority. Even there, he governed through numerous administrative and advisory councils.⁹²

These different territories and styles of administrations were united only under the principle of obedience to the same dynastic ruler. However, this dynastic rule ought to face foreign challenges too. By his election as Holy Roman Emperor, he had already defeated his main rival, Francis I of Valois, the French King, who had been

⁸⁹ Ibid, 67-68. For the *comunero* revolt and how Charles V incorporated his political, administrative and financial politics into Spain and his policy of North Africa see: Aurelio Espinosa, "The Grand Strategy of Charles V (1500-1558): Castile, War and Dynastic Priority in The Mediterranean", *Journal of Early Modern History*, v. 9, is. 3-4, (2005), 239-283; idem, *The Empire of the Cities, Emperor Charles V, the Comunero Revolt and the Transformation of the Spanish System*, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2009)

⁹⁰ Kamen, *Spain 1469-1714*, 85-87.

⁹¹ Maltby, 14-16.

⁹² Besides the royal council of Castile, being the highest administrative body, there were also councils of Inquisition, military orders, and crusades. In 1523 a new council of finance (*Hacienda*) was created in order to manage the finances of the realm. See: Kamen, *Spain 1469-1714*, 87-88.

mainly supported by many of the German electors.⁹³ However, this election brought about a Habsburg-Valois rivalry, which would mainly staged as a power conflict in the Italian peninsula. The Protestant influence had been increasing among the German rulers and in the East, the Ottomans continued to expand their zones of control towards the Mediterranean and Central Europe. All these facilitated the formulation of the Habsburg imperial strategy of the early sixteenth-century and initiated an image building process for Charles V, which would not only form the politics of the time, but led the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry.

2.1.1. The New Caesar versus the Second Charlemagne: Rival Grand Strategies and the Discourses on Italy

As was stated above, in 1520s an imperial image was built for Süleyman. This process overlapped with the formulation of Süleyman's imperial strategy and they both sustained each other. According to Gabor Ágoston, in early 1520's, the Ottomans engaged in the establishment of a grand strategy involving the formulation of an imperial ideology and universalist vision of empire, which helped the integration of the Ottomans into European politics and political culture, mainly following the emergence of the Habsburgs and Safevids as the new and important rivals.⁹⁴ This strategy required the use of all human, economic and military resources of the empire for the realization of the foreign policy and large propaganda fed by the information about the outside world and current circumstances. Ágoston also mentions that the Ottoman grand strategy was advanced more effectively by Grand

⁹³ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 190-192.

⁹⁴ Ágoston, "Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power", 77.

Vizier İbrahim Pasha.⁹⁵ Pasha's main political advisor was a Venetian born in Constantinople: Alvise Gritti⁹⁶, the illegitimate son of the Doge of Venice.

İbrahim Pasha, deeply interested in ancient history and philosophy identified his master with Alexander the Great and was persuading him that he would revive Alexander's empire under his authority.⁹⁷ This was also announced to the Christian world, acting as the press office of the time: in one of his meetings with the Venetian *bailo*⁹⁸ to Constantinople, İbrahim told that when they were young, he and his master

⁹⁵ Ibid, 77-78.

⁹⁶ Alvise Gritti was one of the most colorful characters of the early sixteenth century and became an influential political figure thanks to his close relations with İbrahim Pasha. On Gritti, see: Francesco della Valle, *Una breve narrazione della grandezza, virtù, valore et della infelice morte dell'Illustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et General Capitano dell'esercito Regno, appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re Giovanni Re d'Ongaria*, (Venice, c.1525), BNM, Itt. Cl. 6. Cod. 122 (6211). This biography was published with the edition of Iván Nagy: Francesco Della Valle, *Una breve narrazione della grandezza, virtù, valore et della infelice morte dell'Illustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et General Capitano dell'esercito Regno, appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re Giovanni Re d'Ongaria*, , *Magyar Történelmi Társulat*, ed. by Iván Nagy v. 3 (Pest: 1857), 9-60. On Gritti, see also: Aurel Decei, "Aloisio Gritti au Service de Soliman Le Magnifique d'après des documents Turcs Inédits (1533-1534), *Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu*, ed. by Jean Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Christina Feneşan, v. 3 (1992), 1-103; Ferenc Szakály, *Lodovico Gritti in Hungary*; Özlem Kumrular, "Osmanlı Sarayında ve Avrupa Siyasi Sahnesinde Venedikli Bir Sınır Diplomati: "Mir-i Venedik Oğlu" Alvise Gritti." *Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 6, (Autumn 2007-Winter 2008), 39-59, Gizella Nemeth Papo, Adriano Papo, *Ludovico Gritti: Un Principe Mercante del Rinascimento tra Venezia I Turchi E La Corona D'Ungheria*, (Friuli: Edizioni della Laguna, 2002); Elvin Otman, *The Role of Alvise Gritti within the Ottoman Politics in the Context of "Hungarian Question" (1526-1534)*, Bilkent University, September 2009, (unpublished M.A. Thesis); eadem, "Beyoğlu'nda Bir "Bey Oğlu", *İstanbul Araştırmaları Yıllığı*, no:1, (2012),127-144. Contemporary Italian sources mention that Gritti became of the political advisor of İbrahim Pasha because the Pasha was inexperienced in political affairs. See: Albèri, s.3, v.1, 30; Benedetto Ramberti, *Libri Tre Delle Cose dei Turchi*, (Venice: 1539), 35v-36r.

⁹⁷ Ágoston, "Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power", 99. İbrahim Pasha could be evaluated as a good example of "versatile individual" in the Renaissance world. Apart from his political identity, he had keen interest in art and literature. His splendid palace, which was built upon the order of Süleyman at Hippodrome hosted numerous poets and artists, and he patronized a large network of Muslim and Christian intellectuals. For the term of "versatile individual", see: Jacob Burckhardt, *La Civiltà del Rinascimento in Italia*, (Rome: Newton Compton Editori, 2008), 112. For İbrahim Pasha's patronage of art and literature and his palace see: Nurhan Atasoy, *İbrahim Paşa Sarayı, (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Basımevi, 1975)*; Walter G. Andrews, Mehmet Kalpaklı, *The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society*, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2005), 238; Esma Tezcan, *Pargalı İbrahim Paşa Çevresindeki Edebi Yaşam*, Bilkent University, Department of Turkish Literature, June 2004 (unpublished M.A. Thesis).

⁹⁸ Pietro Bragadin.

Süleyman read a story in an ancient book in which it was narrated that a man named İbrahim, holding no office before would be appointed as the Grand Vizier and Beylerbeyi of Rumelia and in the time of this İbrahim the Ottoman sultan would achieve great success that none of his ancestors had been able to; he would conquer the Roman Empire by the will of God and then there would be only one faith, liberating everyone with peace and love.⁹⁹ Following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman sultans had already claimed to the inheritance of the Roman Empire defining themselves as the “*Kayser-i Rûm*”. This symbolism of being the new “Caesar”, reflecting the Ottoman claim to be the successors of the Roman Emperors, was in a sense enriched by the Grand Vizier and Süleyman was represented as the one who would establish a world empire from the east to the west, as the Alexander the Great had done in the antiquity. This claim was also visually displayed in the Ottoman social atmosphere. “Süleyman reintroduced Roman-style spectacle into Constantinople once again with spectacular displays on state occasions and triumphal processions in the hippodrome.”¹⁰⁰ The splendid ceremonies, celebrations and festivals, well-attended by the high ranking state officials, diplomatic missions and people, were preferential occasions for the sovereigns of the Renaissance Period to build and reflect the image and power of the potentate.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Sanuto, v. 41, col. 95

¹⁰⁰ Warwick Ball, *Sultans of Rome: The Turkish World Expansion*, (Northampton& Massachusetts, Olive Branch Press, 2013), 117. Also see: Christine Woodhead, “Perspectives on Süleyman”, *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, ed. by. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, (London & New York: Longman, 1995), 164-190, 169.

¹⁰¹ For detailed information, see: Edward Muir, *Ritual in Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Kaya Şahin notes that, Islamic Empires were also familiar with this tradition, strengthening the ideological and cultural ties between the emperor and its subjects. See: Şahin, *Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar*, 63. Here it is interesting to note that the very first example of those spectacles was the glorious festival held with the personal presence of the Sultan on the occasion of marriage of İbrahim Pasha. For detailed information about the marriage of İbrahim Pasha and its meaning in terms of building an imperial image for himself and for Süleyman, see: Ebru Turan, “The Marriage of İbrahim Pasha (ca. 1495-1536): The Rise of Sultan Süleyman’s Favorite to

Moreover, the information-gathering network was improved and enlarged. Local information was gathered via Janissaries acting like police force within the empire and the Ottoman officers in the border territories. To have a close contact with the outside of the empire, the Ottomans benefitted from the representatives of the European states, resident or visitor on occasion, intermediary agents and spies, along with the official envoys charged by the imperial administration.¹⁰²

The grand strategy was also decorated with messianic/apocalyptic prophecies, circulating around the early sixteenth-century world. The conquest of Constantinople had already furnished the Ottoman dynastic strategy with apocalyptic/messianic discourses: the military conflicts with Christians in the time of Mehmed II had been treated as signs of tribulations, preceding the End Time.¹⁰³ It had widely been believed that the Ottomans would eventually conquer the *Red Apple*, symbolizing the city of Rome.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, Rome was not the sole goal of the Ottomans

Grand Vizierate and the Politics of the Elites in Early Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, *Turcica*, v. 41, 2009, 3-36.

¹⁰² Ágoston, “Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power”, 78-92. Emrah Safa Gürkan comprehensively discusses the roles of spies and intermediaries in the information gathering and how they served for the formulation and realization of the imperial strategies of the both Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires in the sixteenth century. Gürkan, *Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean*. It is known that İbrahim Pasha and Alvise Gritti had close contacts with the information-gatherers, even they established their own networks. See: Ibid, 370-376.

¹⁰³ Şahin, 71. For the prophecies rooted from the conquest of Constantinople and reflecting Mehmed II as the apocalyptic warrior, see: Şahin, “Constantinople and End Time: The Ottoman Conquest as Potent of the Last Hour”, *Journal of Early Modern History*, v. 14, no: 4 (2010), 317-354.

¹⁰⁴ The *Red Apple*, narrated in the Turco-Mongolian legends symbolized the dreamed city of the tribes running away from the sand and snow storms. Cardini, 181. The legend was incorporated in the Ottoman culture and in the early fifteenth-century, and the city which would bring the eternal happiness and peace was defined as Rome. See: Kenneth M. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom*, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992), 32-35. On the other hand, Pál Fodor argues that the “Red Apple” symbolized the city of Constantinople before the mid-fifteenth century and took its origin from the symbolism of the statue of Justinian. Following the capture of Constantinople the “Red Apple” became a threefold symbol, referring first to the other cities, royal residences which were to be conquered, secondly to the ultimate and mystical place which would conclude the Ottoman conquests and thirdly the universal sovereignty. The author argues that the Ottomans had far a long time avoided defining the “Red Apple” which they placed it somewhere far in the Occident and only began to identify it with Rome in the second half of the seventeenth century. Pál Fodor, “The View of the Turk in Hungary: The Apocalyptic Tradition and the Legend of

according to the sixteenth-century contemporaries: since the Kingdom of Hungary that was defined as the “bulwark of Christianity” was the main rival of the Ottomans before the Battle of Mohacs, in 1520s, these prophecies were widely in circulation in Hungary. It was perceived the *Red Apple* of the Ottomans referred to Hungary and Transylvania, in particular to the city of Buda.¹⁰⁵ In the early sixteenth century, all these symbolisms, prophecies and predictions were articulated to the imperial character of Süleyman I. Thanks to the efforts of his Grand Vizier, İbrahim and to the general atmosphere of the time, both inside and outside of the Empire, Süleyman was displayed as the protagonist for a new world empire. He was even reflected as the Messiah, who would establish the eternal peace of Islam with his glorious conquests.¹⁰⁶

By the late fifteenth-century, Ottoman sultans tended to define themselves as *Pâdisâh-ı Rûy-ı Zemîn (Halîfe-i Rûy-i Zemîn of Hâlîfe-i Müslimîn) Zillullâh-i fî'l-'arz* (the sultan/ caliph of the whole World/ of all Muslims, the shadow of God's countenance on earth), claiming a position of supremacy in the Islamic world in reference to their glories in protecting and in expanding the domain of Islam against infidels that had never achieved by any other Islamic state. By the annexation of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Ottoman sultan also wore the title of the Servitor of

the Red Apple in Ottoman-Hungarian Context”, *In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), 71-104, 96.

¹⁰⁵ Fodor, “The View of Turk in Hungary”. Ebru Turan states that by the time of Bayezid II, the Ottomans were aware that the Hungarians were playing active role in conceiving crusading plans and carrying them out. For that reason, they came to identify the Hungarians as “Blond Races”, the people would appear in the Last Days and attack the Muslims to destroy them. This made Hungary a target for the Ottomans, defining themselves as the champions of Islam and especially in the reign of Süleyman, the war against Hungary was perceived as the war for “Red Apple” which would grant the universal sovereignty. For detailed information on how the Ottomans elaborated the messianic discourse in the literary and historical works of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, see: Turan, *The Sultan's Favorite: İbrahim Pasha*, 325-335.

¹⁰⁶ See: Cornell Fleisher, “The Lawgiver as Messiah” 159-177.

the two Holy Sanctuaries, (Mecca and Medina).¹⁰⁷ İnalçık notes that “Süleymân took this title in all seriousness as the basis of his claim to universal caliphate and declared that it was his prime duty to keep the pilgrimage routes to the Holy cities open for all Muslims in the world.”¹⁰⁸ According to İnalçık, this set the ground for the establishment of an aggressive policy against the European expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Indonesia and Africa and Eurasian steps and it was the extension of the earlier frontier ghaza policy.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, these claims were strengthened by another title, attributed to Süleyman. Besides his being the Messiah of the End Time, he started to be called as *sâhib-kırân* (the master of the auspicious conjunction), who was thought to be mighty and politically fortunate, which was first used by Timur.¹¹⁰ In the first years of the Süleyman’s reign, the Ottomans deployed this title for Süleyman and used it against the Habsburg claims of universal sovereignty.¹¹¹

Süleyman’s discourse of universal sovereignty was multi-dimensional: the ideologically decorated grand-strategy comprehended a wide-range military plan to both secure the imperial territories against any actual or potential threat and to enlarge the Ottoman influence over the Christendom and the Muslim East. This opened Süleyman various theaters to perform his political ideals and military

¹⁰⁷ İnalçık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, 68.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 68-69.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 69.

¹¹⁰ The term had been used to define individuals who had been born under the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn and had its roots in early Ottoman, Safevid and Mughal cultures, as an amalgamation of apocalypticism and prophecies circling around the Iran, Eastern Anatolia, and Mesopotamia in the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Şahin, *Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar*, 72. The term symbolized the political-religious universal sovereignty.

¹¹¹ Ibid. 73. See also. Barbara Flemming, “Sâhib-kırân und Mahdî: Türkische Endzeiterwartungen im ersten Jahrzehnt der regierung Süleymâns”, *Between the Danube and the Caucasus*, ed. by Györy Kara, (Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1987), 43-62.

capacity, including the Indian Ocean and Caucasus, along with the Central Europe and the Mediterranean, where he met a rival, having interests and ideals, similar to his: Charles V of Habsburg, the Holy Roman Emperor.

As was done for Süleyman, in his first years as the new King of Spain, an image building process was also initiated for Charles V, in which another influential statesman of the sixteenth-century, Mercurino di Gattinara, Charles V's Grand Chancellor, played an important role.¹¹² Di Gattinara's political vision was based on the incorporation of the Roman Catholic vision with the Italian humanism into the political requirements of the time. He advocated that the establishment of the world empire under an able and powerful emperor had already be promised in the Holy Bible. In 1516, he undersigned a prophetic book, entitled *Supplicatory Oration Including a Dream of the Last World Monarchy and the Triumph of Christianity, Broadly Stated, With the Means of Accomplishing It*, directed at the King Charles.¹¹³ In this book, di Gattinara underlined that the universal world empire could/should be formed by a talented potentate who would be able to unite all independent kingdoms and states under his authority, and by securing their rights and acquisitions with the implementation of a just system of law and administration, he would have their consent to be under his authority. This would be the last world monarchy before the apocalypse.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Mercurino di Gattinara was an Italian, Roman Catholic humanist and scholar of jurisprudence. He acted as the advisor and diplomatic delegate of Margaret of Savoy, the daughter of Habsburg Emperor Maximillian I, until 1518. Following the coronation of Charles as the King of Spain, Maximillian appointed him as the Grand Chancellor for his nephew. For detailed information see: Rebecca Ard Boone, *Mercurino di Gattinara and the Creation of the Spanish Empire*, (London& New York: Routledge, 2016).

¹¹³ Ibid., 30.

¹¹⁴ Charles succeeded the Kingdom of Spain in 1516. For detailed information about the book, which was considered as an example for the literature of the "mirror for princes", see: Ibid., 30-41; John M. Headley, "Rhetoric and Reality: Messianic Humanist and Civilian Themes in the Imperial Ethos of

Di Gattinara's discourse was the reproduction of the existing prophecies on the apocalypse and on the establishment of the worldly empire, circulating in Italy by the late fifteenth century. Especially after the Ottoman invasion of Otranto, in 1480, the prophecies about the "Turks" coming into the heart of Christianity started to be circulated and the image of the powerful monarch, was to liberate the entire Christendom was created. This monarch would be the "Second Charlemagne", victor over both Europe and Asia, who would end his life on the hill of cavalry for the liberation of Christendom.¹¹⁵ This prophecy modified and Charles V was reflected as the expected Second Charlemagne by di Gattinara.

For di Gattinara, who had portrayed himself as the prophet setting the ground for the last emperor¹¹⁶, the universal world empire would be established by Charles, designated by Jesus Christ, the Jews and Pagans would be converted to Christianity in his time and he will initiate the millennium.¹¹⁷ This was also a part of the Charles' imperial propaganda. Charles was mirrored as a devoted worrier of Christendom against the "Turk". In his public address to the German ambassadors in 1519, announcing Charles' election as Holy Roman Emperor, di Gattinara announced that the election of Charles was divinely inspired and the Emperor will restore the *Sacrum Imperium*, with the recovery of the Holy Land, Jerusalem.¹¹⁸

Gattinara", *Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period*, ed. by Marjorie Reeves, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1992), 241-269.

¹¹⁵ Ottavia Niccoli, *Prophecy and People in Renaissance Italy*, (Princeton & New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 172-173. Niccoli notes that there were numerous prophecies about the "Turks", converting to Christianity after having seized Italy.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ágoston, "Information, Ideology and the Limits of Imperial Power", 97.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 97-98.

The grand strategy of Charles V had two main components, the suppression of the Protestant threat, shaking the Habsburg inherited territories and the consolidating the authority of the Emperor over the Christendom, by which all Christian monarchs would accept his political authority. The strategy was designed basically according to the actual needs of Charles V, struggling with the Protestants and the French King, Francis I of Valois, who had also been a candidate for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire and claiming the right of inheritance over Milan and Naples, bound to realm of Charles V. Thus, in the Habsburg imperial strategy, designed mainly by di Gattinara, the pacification and liberation of Italy by Charles V, reflected as the “*Defensor Fidei*”¹¹⁹ was vital. Italy would be the most important stepping stone for the eternal victory since the pacification of the peninsula, shaken by the Italian Wars¹²⁰ from the late fifteenth century would not only end the Habsburg-Valois struggle in Italy but also herald the Emperor, the desired universal sovereignty by the revival of the Roman Empire under his authority and the opportunity to restore the Christian faith in the traditional Roman lands.

As was briefly discussed above, the roles attributed to Süleyman I and Charles V, which were also warmly hugged by themselves, formed the Ottoman and Habsburg imperial strategies of the early sixteenth-century. The conflicting claims of the Sultan

¹¹⁹ Defender of the Faith.

¹²⁰ The Italian Wars were grounded by the Venetian expansion towards Milan. In order to prevent a Venetian attack, the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza invited the French King, Charles VIII to invade Italy, claiming the inheritance of the Kingdom of Naples. The course of struggle changed with the intervention of the Italian States and the Holy Roman Emperors and in the sixteenth century the wars turned into a Habsburg-Valois struggle over Milan and Naples. The wars grounded also the formation of leagues and alliances, in which the Papacy and other Italian states needed to position themselves according to their interests. In the sixteenth century, by the rise of Charles V, the Habsburg-Valois struggle for the domination of Italy reached a new momentum. The struggle would only be concluded by 1559, with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, by which the French would renounce all the claims on Italy. For detailed information about the Italian Wars, see: Francesco Guiccardini, *Storia d'Italia*, ed. by, Silvana Siedel Menchi, 3 vols., (Turin: Einaudi, 1971). For a recent study, see: Michael Mallett, Christine Shaw, *The Italian Wars, 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe*, (London & New York: Routledge, 2014).

and the Emperor inevitably transferred the ideological rivalry to a military one which would be staged in various theatres of war that these super-monarchs of the time tried to settle their accounts. Süleyman challenged the Emperor by initiating military campaigns in Hungary and by attacking on the traditional Habsburg center of Vienna, the Austrian borders and on Tunis. Before discussing the Ottoman military campaigns realized between the years of 1526 and 1535 which laid the groundworks of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign in 1537, two colorful scenes reflecting both Charles V's and Süleyman I's imperial discourses and self-representations are intended to be briefly delineated to help the researcher to observe how the ideological rivalry between these two sovereigns were materialized; the coronation of Charles V in 1530 and Süleyman's response to in his German Expedition of 1532. Forcing the French King to abandon all his claims on Italy by the end of 1528, Charles V was able to consolidate his rule over the Italian peninsula. On February 24, 1530, he was crowned by the Pope, Clement VII, as the Holy Roman Emperor in Bologna. Three months before the ceremony, the Pope with his court came to Bologna from Rome to meet the Habsburg Emperor when he reached the Papal States.¹²¹ On December 6, 1529, Charles V entered Bologna.

Every resource of the Renaissance had been enlisted to do him honour. Every statue and façade in the wealthy town was hung and garlanded. Triumphal arches spanned the streets, enriched with symbolic sculptures, depicting with a wealth of classical allusions the whole history of land and people.¹²²

Charles V, with his vassals and some imperial electors¹²³, entered the city from the periphery, from western city gate at San Felice, and stopped by the city-center. This

¹²¹ Konrad Eisenbichler, "Charles V in Bologna: The Self-Fashioning a Man and a City", *Renaissance Studies*, v.13, no: 4, (December 1999), 430-439, 430.

¹²² Brandi, 283.

¹²³ For detailed information see: Ibid., 288.

was the ancient Roman practice of the imperial entries.¹²⁴ The Emperor was presented to public not so much a Habsburg but as a Roman Emperor like Caesar, Octavian, Titus and Trajan, with whose figures the triumphal arch of the gate San Felice was decorated.¹²⁵ People watching the parade were shouting as “*Cesare, Cesare, Carlo, Carlo, Imperio, Imperio*”.¹²⁶

On February 22, Charles received the iron crown of Lombardy and two days later he was crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor by the Pope¹²⁷ in the Basilica of San Petronio. “For the last time in history, the world saw two highest dignitaries of Christendom, Emperor and Pope in the full splendor of their ceremonial robes [...]” After Charles V, no Holy Roman Emperor would be crowned by the Pope¹²⁸ and his coronation would be “depicted a hundred times in fresco on the walls of churches and town halls over all Italy”¹²⁹. The Christendom was then a “papal” approved leader. This would be challenged by the leader of the Islamic World, only two years later.

¹²⁴ Eisenbichler, 432.

¹²⁵ “Caesar, Caesar, Charles, Charles, Empire, Empire”. See: Ibid., 432-433.

¹²⁶ Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power”, 410.

¹²⁷ Clement VII crowned Charles V in 1530 but he was not so eager to do this. The growing influence of the Habsburg Emperor in Italy was a threat for the Papacy; moreover, three years before the imperial armies had sacked Rome and taken the Pope as prisoner. G. de Gramont, the Bishop of Tarbes narrates the ceremony as follows: “[...] the Pope tried to show him the best cheer possible, giving him the sword, and putting the first crown on his head; but I think he never in his life performed a ceremony which touched him so near the heart, nor of which less good is likely to come to him. For, several times, when he thought no one saw him, he heaved such sighs that, heavy as his cope was, he made it shake in good earnest.” See: “The Letter of G. De Gramont, Bishop of Tarde to Brion on February 25, 1530”, Henry VII, February 1530, 16-27, in *Letters and Papers, Foreign, Domestic, Henry VIII, v.4, 1524-1530*, ed. by J. S. Brewer, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1875, 2791-2811, 2806. British History Online, <http://www.british.history.ac.uk/letters-papers-hen8/vol4/pp2791-2811>, retrieved on December 5, 2017. The words of the Bishop clearly points out that the alliance between the Habsburg Emperor and the Pope was desperately needed by both parties. The Pope needed the Emperor for his acquisitions and security and the Emperor needed the papal approval for his legitimacy in his struggles both with the French King and with the Protestants.

¹²⁸ Eisenbichler., 431.

¹²⁹ Brandi, 288.

The coronation of Charles V by the Pope as the Holy Roman Empire was replied by Süleyman with a splendid power display in his German Expedition in 1532, in which he challenged the Habsburgs in Hungary and in Austrian border territories. The military campaign was also enriched with an ideological representation of power, mainly planned by İbrahim Pasha. Pasha had already presented to Süleyman a regalia, produced by his own enterprise. In the regalia there was also golden helmet having four crowns.¹³⁰ It bore a striking resemblance to Papal tiara. İbrahim Pasha had already announced the Venetian *bailo*, Pietro Zen, that he had acquired the helmet-crown because it was a trophy of Alexander the Great.¹³¹ Besides the golden helmet, a jewel decorated throne and scepters, ceremonial canopies, horse furnishings were presented by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan to be displayed in the German Expedition.¹³²

Along with the *regalia*, the Ottomans designed another triggering response to Charles V: İbrahim Pasha, assured the foreign delegates in the imperial camp, including the envoys of the Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand I, who was the brother and lieutenant of the Emperor, to witness the parade of the Ottoman armies in the city of Nis.¹³³ The grandiose parade of the Sultan with high commanders and soldiers

¹³⁰ For the details about the regalia, the process of its production and cost and used symbolisms see: Otto Kurz, "A Gold Helmet Made in Venice for Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent", *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, Année 111, v. 84, (Paris-New York, 1969), 249-258. In the *regalia* there were also a golden throne, decorated with pearls and jewels, an ornamented saddle and a royal purple brocade caftan. See: Necipoğlu, 401.

¹³¹ Sanudo, v.57, col. 634.

¹³² The regalia was produced by a consortium of Venetian goldsmiths, merchants and artists in Venice and most of them were in the network of Alvise Gritti. See: Ibid, 405-408.

¹³³ Celalzâde Salih Çelebi notes that the envoys watched the parade of the army with great admiration and seen the might of the Ottoman Sultan, which was not compatible to any Christian monarchs'. See: Celalzâde Salih Çelebi, *Târih-i Sefer-i Zafer-Rehber-i Alaman [Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'ın Alaman Seferi (1532)]*, ed. by Fatma Kaytaz, (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım-Yayın, 2016), 29-34. Otto Kurz notes that the crown-like helmet was also displayed to the Ferdinand's envoys. After having been waited for a long time in the imperial camp, on July 5, 1532, they were admitted to kiss the sultan's hand, sitting

will be echoed in the accounts of the diplomats and announced to the European palaces.¹³⁴

According to Gülrû Necipoğlu, the aforementioned enterprise was the outcome of a very clever plan to show the magnificence of the Sultan, to all crowned-heads, especially to Charles V and the Pope Clement VII by using their own tools of representation of power in the rivalry of universal supremacy right after two years from the coronation of the former as the Holy Roman Emperor.¹³⁵ The splendid regalia was displaying the Süleyman's claim to be the sole emperor, uniting all political and spiritual power in his personality and the military parade was the Ottoman response to the Charles V's entrance into Bologna, where he had been greeted as the "Caesar". Necipoğlu notes that "this event marked the beginning of an Ottoman preoccupation with Western emblems of sovereignty as a means to challenge European rivals [...]"¹³⁶.

The helmet was a clear challenge for Charles V's claims to be the world emperor, especially after his coronation in Bologna, two years ago. His emperorship was never appreciated by the Ottomans; neither Sultan, nor İbrahim Pasha called him as "emperor". İbrahim Pasha, in his diplomatic contacts with Venetian and Habsburg embassies always underlined that there was one empire and one emperor in the world; and there was no one than his master, Süleyman could claim to it.¹³⁷ Charles V was always called as the "King of Spain" by the Ottoman court, not the Emperor.

on a golden throne. In the tent, there was also a special chair for displaying the imperial helmet. See: Kurz, 256.

¹³⁴ For the accounts, see, Necipoğlu, 409.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 410-417.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 411.

For the Ottomans, the sole legitimate emperor was Süleyman, himself. This perception set the political and ideological grounds for Süleyman's military challenges against the Habsburgs.

2.1.2. Süleyman's Responses to Charles V: Ottoman-Habsburg Military Rivalry in Hungary.

The first theatre of war for Süleyman's imperial strategy for universal sovereignty was Hungary. The Kingdom of Hungary had been the only influential power resisting the Ottoman advance in the Balkans from the fifteenth century. Thus, along with Rome, the Hungarian Kingdom, in particular the city of Buda was perceived by the Ottomans as another *Red Apple*, heralding the universal sovereignty.¹³⁸ Hungary, considered to be the "bulwark of Christianity" and prone to ally with the Habsburg Emperor, was a threat for the Ottomans to be eliminated. Moreover, the Kingdom was indirectly bounded to the realm of the Habsburg Emperor, since the King, Lajos II, was married to the sister of Charles V and had no heir to succeed him. This made the Kingdom open to the direct Habsburg possession. The conquest of Belgrade had already facilitated the Ottomans to enter into the Central Europe and taking the Kingdom of Hungary under the Ottoman control became an important concern of the Ottoman imperial strategy.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Fodor, "The View of Turk in Hungary", 94-103. For another interesting study on how the Ottomans were perceived by the Hungarians in relation to prophecies, rumors and military conflicts and its reflection via poetry see: Ágnes Drosztmér, *Images of Distance and Closeness: The Ottomans in Sixteenth-Century Hungarian Vernacular Poetry*, Central European University, 2016, (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation).

¹³⁹ It should be noted that following the conquest of Rhodes, the Ottomans started to consider a campaign against the Hungarian Kingdom. In his *relazione*, dated to April 8, 1522, Marco Minio, the Venetian Orator, mentions that the Ottomans decided to attack Hungary. Albèri, s.3, v.3, 75-76. For further information about the Ottoman-Hungarian relations before the Battle of Mohacs, see: Ferenc Szakály, "Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare".

In August 1526, the Ottoman forces, situated in Belgrade, marched towards the plain of Mohacs. The forces of Lajos were harmed in a day and the King himself was killed. Following the Battle of Mohacs, the Ottomans conquered the city of Buda, the royal center of the Hungarian Kingdom.¹⁴⁰ To replace the King Lajos having no heir to succeed, the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian Estates, known as the opponents of the murdered King, elected, Janos Szapolyai, the Voivode of Transylvania, as the new King of Hungary. This election seems to be organized or supervised by Ottoman Sultan, who was intending to take Hungary and Hungarian King under Ottoman vassalage and eliminate a possible Habsburg claim on the Hungarian throne.¹⁴¹

However, Ferdinand I of Habsburg, the Archduke of Austria and brother and lieutenant of Charles V, did not recognize this election by claiming his right of inheritance over the Hungarian Kingdom. He seized Buda and he was crowned as the king of Hungary on November 3.¹⁴² This would start an active diplomatic traffic between Süleyman, Szapolyai and Ferdinand. In order to consolidate their authority

¹⁴⁰ About the Battle of Mohacs, see: Géza Perjés, *Mohaç Meydan Muharebesi*, ed. by, Şerif Baştav, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992); Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Süleyman’ın Macaristan ve Avrupa Siyaseti’nin”; Kumrular, “Orta Avrupa’nın Kaderini Değiştiren” For military conditions and the comparison of Ottoman-Hungarian forces, see: Feridun M. Emecen, “”Büyük Türk”e Pannonia Düzlüklerini Açan Savaş Mohaç, 1526”, *Muhteşem Süleyman*, ed. by. Özlem Kumrular, (İstanbul. Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 45-92.

¹⁴¹ It is possible to think that the election was realized under the Ottoman supervision. The Ottoman Sultan and İbrahim Pasha had the idea of replacing King Lajos with Szapolyai before the Battle of Mohacs. The letter of Alvise Gritti sent to the Venetian Senate dated to February 4, 1526, reveals that during the preparations for the campaign, Szapolyai was perceived as the new authority in Hungary by the Ottoman Porte: “[...] *se mettiamo in hordine per andar in canpo et iudicho che per tutto el futuro mese se metteremo a chamino per andar in sochorso del re Zuane [...]*”; “[...] we are preparing us to go to the campaign and I say that altogether in the next month we will hit the road to go to the aid of King Zuanne”. Letter of Alvise Gritti to the Senate, February 4, 1526, ASV, Dispacci degli Ambasciatori al Senato, f. 1-A. Here it is important to note that in the letter the year was written as 1525. However, the Venetian documents were dated according to the Venetian calendar, *more veneto*, in which the new year started on March 1. To find the exact dates, one should add one year to the years noted on the documents concerning the months of January and February.

¹⁴² Ferenc Szakaly mentions that most of the supporters of Janos Szapolyai changed side and started to act with Ferdinand after the return of the Ottoman army. Szakaly, 42.

in the Hungarian territories, both Szapolyai and Ferdinand would initiate negotiations with the Ottoman Porte via their representatives. In the meetings, closely followed by İbrahim Pasha, Alvise Gritti would play a very active role first as the intermediary for Szapolyai's delegate, then as an Ottoman representative charged for strengthening Szapolyai's authority.¹⁴³

On the other hand, Süleyman reached his aim. The Kingdom, shaken with the political turmoil would never be a threat for the Ottoman borders. Moreover, the rivalry between Szapolyai and Ferdinand would give the Sultan the legitimation for entering into Central Europe and challenge the Habsburg authority. Furthermore, Constantinople would become the center of negotiations, where the Ferdinand's and Szapolyai's delegates would defend the causes of their sovereigns. This would make the Sultan, and his other-self İbrahim Pasha, the primary figure in the sixteenth century politics and diplomacy.

Following long negotiations of his envoys with the Ottoman government, Janos Szapolyai agreed to be the vassal of the Ottoman Sultan and invited Süleyman to restore his authority in 1529. On August 18, the Szapolyai met with Süleyman I on the Mohacs steps and marched into the city of Buda. Following the re-conquest of Buda, in the late September, Vienna was besieged, for 20 days. The strong resistance of the Habsburg soldiers intercepted the Ottoman capture of the city. The war became a defense of Christendom: Even Martin Luther, changed his mind on war

¹⁴³ Gritti appeared in the diplomatic negotiations as the Hungarian orator. Then he was appointed by İbrahim Pasha as the Ottoman orator for the Hungarian issues. When he was killed in 1534, he was the Governor General and Treasurer of Hungary. For detailed information about the role of Alvise Gritti in the Hungarian Question, see: Szakály, *Lodovico Gritti in Hungary*, Barta "Gritti Ludovicus'un Macar Valiliği"; Otman, *The Role of Alvise Gritti*.

against the Turks and invited his followers to resist.¹⁴⁴ Besides the strong resistance, the lack of provisions and the climate conditions changed the course of war. The war season had already passed, heavy rains had started to harm the Ottoman forces and Vienna did not surrender. Having no significant gain, Süleyman ordered the withdrawal. The armies headed to Buda.

The Siege of Vienna was the first Ottoman attempt to challenge the Habsburg in their main and key territory; it was the first clear demonstration of the imperial plan, claiming universal supremacy. However, the attempt resulted in a real fiasco. Süleyman, then, would desperately need an ally in Hungary. Hence, after his return to Buda, he crowned Szapolyai as the King of Hungary.¹⁴⁵ The Sultan, also wearing also the title of “Distributor of Crowns to the Monarchs of the World”,¹⁴⁶ re-accentuated his supremacy in world politics by granting the crown of St. Stephen, to

¹⁴⁴ Martin Luther, in his first orations, declared that to wage war against the Turks meant to challenge the Divine will since the Turks were sent by God to punish the Christians for their sins. However, when the Ottoman threat approached to Vienna he invited his followers to resist the enemy to secure the Christianity. See, Soykut, 63-64. Another triggering factor for the Protestant assistance to Ferdinand was the declaration of Charles V, accentuating that decisive imperial action would be against the Protestants if they failed to support the Archduke in his hour of need. See: Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 65. Fischer-Galati clearly demonstrates that the Ottoman-Habsburg wars in Central Europe offered the Protestants to demand concessions and facilitated the consolidations of Protestantism in Germany. For the Ottoman impact on Protestantism, see also: C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus*, (New York: New York University Press, 1972). For the perception of the Ottomans on Protestants, challenging the “Spanish King”, see: Isom-Verhaaren, “An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V”, *Turcica*, no: 28, (1996), 299-318.

¹⁴⁵ İnalçık, *Classical Age*, 35-36. Peçevî notes an interesting detail about the Hungarian crown. He narrates that, via his envoys Szapolyai sent the royal crown, symbol of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom to the Sultan since Süleyman had conquered Buda. The crown was taken, registered to the imperial treasury and sent back to Szapolyai. The one chosen by Süleyman for such a symbolic ceremony, was Alvise Gritti. See: Peçevî, 138-139.

¹⁴⁶ Necipoğlu, 416. The Sultan use the aforementioned title even before the Hungarian campaigns. In his letter to Francis in 1525, the Sultan had defined himself as the “*tâc-bahş-i hüsvân-ı rûy-i zemîn*”. See: Annie Berthier, “Un Document Retrouvé : La Première Lettre de Soliman au François Ier (1526)”, *Turcica*, v.27, (1995): 263-266., 264. In 1538, after his Moldavian campaign, in the Bender inscription he would accentuate that he had taken the land and the crown of the Hungarian king and had granted it to one of his humble servants. See: İnalçık, “State and Sovereignty”, 68.

his vassal. This was the clear declaration of Süleyman of his being the sole authority over Hungary and a symbolism curtaining the inefficiency of the 1529 Campaign.

Following the Siege of Vienna, and the coronation of Charles V of Habsburg as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1530, the Ottoman again turned its attention to Hungary and Austria. İbrahim Pasha convinced Süleyman I to force Ferdinand I to abandon all his claims on Hungary and face with Charles V with a new expedition towards the German territories.¹⁴⁷ In the campaign of 1532, known as the German Expedition, the Ottoman forces captured the Castle of Güns, in which the key of Vienna was conserved; Süleyman invited Charles V, being in Lintz into the battlefield.¹⁴⁸ A branch of the army besieged the Castle of Esztergom with the Sultan's order. By this, it was intended to divide the Habsburg forces into two different branches and break the resistance.¹⁴⁹ In accordance with the land forces, the Ottoman navy sailed to the Port of Preveza, to take precaution for any possible attack from the sea. As it was discussed above the campaign was also enriched with a splendid power display, challenging the coronation of Charles V two years before.

However, the campaign was another military fiasco. Neither Süleyman, nor Charles V assumed the risk of a battle. Vienna could not be captured and beside the attacks on Austrian border territories and castles, Ottomans could not achieve any fruitful gain. On the other hand, the spread of Protestant uprisings in Germany prevented the Emperor to transfer his forces to assist Ferdinand. Instead, he advised his brother to negotiate with Sultan upon Hungary as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Ottoman eastern borders were heated by the Safevid penetrations. Accordingly,

¹⁴⁷ For İbrahim Pasha's anti-Habsburg policy, see: Gökbilgin, "Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'ın", 8.

¹⁴⁸ Gökbilgin, "Kanun'î Sultan Süleyman'ın", 22.

¹⁴⁹ Kumrular, "Orta Avrupa'nın", 59.

Süleyman ordered the retreat by emphasizing that the war season ended and Charles V had no show in the battlefield. The campaign had no fruitful outcome for the Sultan; but it resulted in with a significant loss, which would change the war theatre of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry:¹⁵⁰ Following the retreat the Ottoman armies, Andrea Doria, who had been waiting in Sicily during the entire summer season occupied Corone, considered as a key point in the Morea.¹⁵¹ The loss of such an important strategic island alerted the Ottoman court to strengthen the imperial armada and have a serious naval strategy. This event marked the opening of a new war theatre: by 1532, the rivalry between Süleyman and Charles V would be staged in Western Mediterranean and this would introduce a new actor in the sixteenth century Ottoman politics, a clever, opportunist and aggressive corsair, which would be the Grand Admiral of the Sultan: Hayreddin Barbarossa.

Before discussing the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the western Mediterranean, here, one should briefly analyze the Ottoman policy towards Hungary, which would also help the historian to evaluate the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537. The significance of the Kingdom of Hungary for the Ottomans was briefly stated above. Besides being a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Habsburg realms, Hungary was perceived to be used as a stepping stone for further Ottoman penetration into the Central Europe. However, the Battle of Mohacs and the subsequent Ottoman campaigns in Hungary in 1529 and in 1532 clearly demonstrate that the Ottomans refrained from taking the Kingdom into the direct imperial control; instead they sought some sort of suzerainty over Hungary. This policy led to the

¹⁵⁰ Finlay, "Prophecy and Politics", 13-14.

¹⁵¹ Although Süleyman sent 60 galleys to recapture the island, Andrea Doria had an upper hand. Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti", 24.

constant power struggles between Szapolyai and Ferdinand I made the Hungarian territories a theatre of war for the Ottomans, until 1541.¹⁵² The long-lasting and exhausting struggle over Hungary would result in the division of the kingdom into three zones of influence and the Ottomans would eventually settle for having the central part, including Buda under direct control.

In this context, the question of why the Ottomans did not aimed to control the entire Hungary should be discussed. It can be argued that the main intention of the Ottomans in the early 1530's was to apply the traditional Ottoman method of conquest in Hungary, which they had successfully implemented in the Balkans before. In his article, entitled "Ottoman Methods of Conquest"¹⁵³, Halil İnalcık re-evaluates the Ottoman policy of *istimâlet*¹⁵⁴, derived from the Seljukid political tradition, with a new concept of a gradual conquest. İnalcık asserts that the Ottoman conquests had two distinct stages, which were applied almost systematically: The Ottomans firstly sought to establish some sort of suzerainty over the states that they intended to dominate. The states were taken under the political and military protection of the Empire, against domestic and foreign threats and a branch of Ottoman garrisons were situated to assist the local governors, securing their position. These tributary vassal states both created buffer zones between the main territories of

¹⁵² See: Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy towards Hungary".

¹⁵³ Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica*, v. 2, 1954, 103-129.

¹⁵⁴ *İstimâlet* means gaining good-will. The policy based on gaining the confidence and loyalty of the non-Muslim subjects of the newly conquered territories by granting them religious freedom and favorable taxation. The policy was successfully implemented in both Anatolia and the Balkans. See: Mücteba İlgürel, "İstimâlet", *DİA*, v. 23, 362-363. For recent studies discussing the theme, see: Murat Tuğluca, "Osmanlı Hukukunun Yeniden Üretiminde Balkan Fetihleri ve İstimâlet Politikası", *Studies of the Ottoman Domain*, v.4, no:6, (February 2014), 21-38. Tom Papademetriou, *Render unto Sultan: Power, Authority and the Greek Orthodox Church in the early Ottoman Centuries*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 54, 63-106;

the Empire and *Dârü'l- Harb* and were utilized as the stepping stones for the further Ottoman expeditions. In the second phase, these vassal states were gradually taken under the direct control of the Empire, by the elimination of local dynasties and by the establishment of the *timar* system.¹⁵⁵ From that point of view, instead of controlling the entire Hungarian territory, the Ottomans preferred to create a vassal buffer zone between the Austrian Habsburg and Ottoman realms, which they would use as a military base for future Ottoman maneuvers to Central Europe and to gradually incorporate it into the Ottoman realm. It should be noted that in this policy the Ottomans preferred to use Alvise Gritti, the political advisor of İbrahim Pasha, who became an influential figure in the Ottoman policy towards Hungary by 1526, as an Ottoman agent to control and limit the Ottoman vassal king Szapolyai and set the grounds for Ottoman direct control over the region in the following years.

According to Pál Fodor, this strategy displays that the real intention of the Ottoman Sultan was not entirely possessing Hungary; instead Süleyman engaged in a personal rivalry with the Habsburg Emperor on the Habsburg lands, which would be beyond the limits of Ottoman war machine.¹⁵⁶ Logistical limitations did not ease Süleyman to manage long-lasting campaigns in Austria and it became obvious in 1532 that the Hungarian question could not be solved by capturing Vienna¹⁵⁷ and with the swift of the warfare from Central Europe to the western Mediterranean, the Ottomans missed the opportunity for the entire control of Hungary and making it an important military

¹⁵⁵ İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", 103-104.

¹⁵⁶ Fodor, "Ottoman Policy", 333. Fodor also notes that upon the Sultan's desire challenge Ferdinand in Vienna, İbrahim Pasha warned him uttering that he would not be able to get food with a large army like that. However the Sultan aimed at showing his capability to Ferdinand. See: Ibid, 285.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 298.

base and defense line for the Empire.¹⁵⁸ In this context, Fodor evaluate the imperial strategy as partly rational in itself but immature to prioritize the actual needs and reasonable gains of the Empire.¹⁵⁹

2.1.3. A New Theatre in the Western Mediterranean: The Ottoman-Habsburg Struggle over Tunis (1534-1535)

The Ottoman-Habsburg transferred to the western Mediterranean, especially after the Habsburg Grand Admiral Andrea Doria's occupation of Corone, following the German Expedition in 1532. Actually, western Mediterranean became more important for the Ottomans after the conquests of Syria and Egypt in 1517. From then, eliminating any possible threat of the Christian corsairs at sea, shaking the Ottoman authority in its sphere of influence became one of the major items in the Ottoman political agenda.¹⁶⁰ Palmira Brummett, in her book entitled *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, states that at the turn of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans firmly and decisively set out to use the naval power as an avenue to the world hegemony.¹⁶¹ By the reign of Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512), in which a powerful navy, capable of defending and supplying the empire, had been built up, the Ottoman Empire became a seaborne empire, acting on

¹⁵⁸ Pál Fodor, *İmparatorluk Olmanın Dayanılmaz Ağırlığı*, 101. Fodor argues that by 1532, with new war-fronts in western Mediterranean, the Empire had to be present in various fronts and this led a severe economic burden and resulted with no significant gain.

¹⁵⁹ Fodor, "Ottoman Policy", 284-285.

¹⁶⁰ Andrew C. Hess, "The Moriscos", 19.

¹⁶¹ Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, (Albany: State University of New York Press), 90.

the eastern Mediterranean in the world history.¹⁶² The Empire, possessing a large territory, had a significant advantage -in comparison to other states of time- in terms of material and human sources for the production of sizeable armada in a relatively short time, which were directly organized and controlled by the central government, although it required a serious budgeting. In the building process, the government did not hesitate to take the technical support from the foreign specialists; especially experienced Venetians.¹⁶³ On the other hand, the lack of skilled and trained seamen to staff the armada was one of the most important problems that the government had to figure out. For that reason, in times of war, the Empire incorporated the fleets of Levantine corsairs into the imperial naval forces, acting with the permissions of the Sultan, either temporarily or permanently.¹⁶⁴

The political rivalry in the early sixteenth-century facilitated the corsairs to enlarge their sphere of activity and to incorporate themselves as important political agents into the rivalries between the leading states of the time. “They developed independent political bodies and preserved their autonomy even when they were operating under the aegis of empires, North African corsairs under that of the

¹⁶² Brummett evaluates that the need for a powerful navy was not only related with defending and supplying the empire. To combat with Venice, leading the Mediterranean and to face with new actors at sea such as France and Portugal pushed the imperial government to organize a compatible naval force. For the discussions for the need of a powerful navy, building and financing processes, the measures taken by the Ottoman government and the engaged operations. See: Ibid, 90-121.

¹⁶³ For example, by the end of 1503, three galleys were constructed by an Italian ship-builder Andrea Dere. See: Ibid, 93. In 1531, Giovan-Francesco Guistinian was unofficially sent to Constantinople by the Venetian Republic to advise the Ottoman administration to engage in war with the Portuguese on the Red Sea. Gusitianian, having the favor of the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, was charged to build new galleys and he became the advisor of the Ottoman arsenal and worked there until at least 1534. See: Alberi, s.3, v.1, 19-20, 23; Alain Servantie, “Giovan-Francesco Giustinian: Osmanlı Donanmasına Venedik Teknik Yardımı (1531-1534)”, *Türkler ve Deniz*, 147-162.

¹⁶⁴ Brummett, 95-96. İdris Bostan mentions that the activities of the corsairs in Mediterranean lied to early 15th century. İdris Bostan, “Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği”, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 13-32, 24.

Ottomans and the Knights of St. John and the Uskoks¹⁶⁵ under that of the Habsburgs.”¹⁶⁶ Emrah Safa Gürkan pointed the Ottoman collaboration with the Levantine corsairs in the turn of the sixteenth century, should be evaluated as similar the former policy of the employment of irregular military units (*akıncı*) to facilitate the penetration into the Balkans, made in the fifteenth century.¹⁶⁷ The Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the early sixteenth-century facilitated the employment of another generation of the Levantine corsairs, operating in North Africa.¹⁶⁸ This maneuver enlarged the Ottoman sphere of operation through western Mediterranean and opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry¹⁶⁹, especially with the rise of

¹⁶⁵ Uskoks were Christian refugees settled in Croatian mountainous territories following the Ottoman conquests of Balkans. They were supported by the Habsburgs to engage in wars in the Ottoman borderlands. Their mainle based in Senj. Uskoks also operated corsary in Albania. The raids of Uskoks were dangerous both for the Ottomans and Venetians, having possessions in Albania and became a problem between two states since the Ottomans used to consider that Uskoks were supported by the Venetian Republic. Uskoks also acted as spies for the Habsburgs. About the Uskoks, their activities and relations with Venice and the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, see: Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Venice and the Uskoks of Senj: 1537-1618”, *The Journal of Modern History*, v. 33, no: 2, 1961, 148-156; Philipp Longworth, “The Senj Uskoks Reconsidered”, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, v. 52, no: 3, July 1979, 348-368; Catherine Wendy Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); İdris Bostan, *Adriyatik’te Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler, 1575 -1620*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009) .

¹⁶⁶ Gürkan, *Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean*, 111. Corsairs should not be confused with pirates, whose operations were not supported by a legitimate political authority. The presence and the activities of the corsairs were legitimized by the aegis of the states and corsairs should operate according to the existing rules and traditions of navigation and the international treaties between the states. See: Bostan, “Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği”, 24; Gürkan, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Korsanlığı”, 174.

¹⁶⁷ Gürkan, “The Center and the Frontier”, 128.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ A discussion on the spring and the activities of the Muslim corsairs in North Africa, their relations with the Ottoman Empire and the process of incorporation exceeds the limits and scope of the present study. For that reason, the author needs to settle for citing the recent studies of Emrah Safa Gürkan, discussing in detail the role of corsairs in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century in the light of the political conjuncture of the time and within the perspective of holy war against Christendom. See: Gürkan, *Ottoman Corsairs in Western Mediterranean*; idem, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Korsanlığı”; idem, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, idem, “The Center of Frontier”.

one of the most famous corsairs of the time as the new Grand Admiral of Süleyman by 1533: Hızır Hayreddin Reis¹⁷⁰, *alias* Hayreddin Barbarossa¹⁷¹.

A native of Mytilene, Hızır was one of the four sons¹⁷² of Yakub, an Ottoman cavalry in the region. In his youth, he engaged in trading between Mytilene, Salonica and Euboea, by his own ship and occupied with the navigation in the Aegean Sea with his brother Oruç, under the aegis of the prince Korkud, of Sultan Bayezid II. In the reign of Selim I, Oruç and Hızır enlarged their sphere of influence in North Africa and started to use the port of *Halkü'l- Vâd*, La Goulette¹⁷³ by entering the service of the Sultan of Tunis, Abu Abdullah Muhammed of Hafsid dynasty. In 1516, Barbarossa brothers engaged in wars with Spanish Habsburgs dominating the region, controlled Algiers, and Oruç was declared as the Sultan of Algiers. Following the death of Oruç, Hızır had to leave Algiers and sought the aegis of Sultan Selim in 1519, who would name him Hayreddin¹⁷⁴ and appoint him as the *Beylerbeyi* of Algiers. Barbarossa became the vassal of the Ottoman Sultan and therefore, Algiers became, nominally, a part of the Ottoman realm.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁰ For some modern studies and biographical information about Hayreddin Barbarossa, see: A. Galotta, "Khayr al-Din (Khidir) Pasha, EI²; Şerafettin Turan, "Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha", *DİA*, v.5, 65-67; Daniel Panzac, "Barbaros Hayreddin", EI^{THREE}; Soucek, "Remarks on Some Western and Turkish Sources Dealing with the Barbarossa Brothers", *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, is. 1, 1973, 63-76; idem, "The Rise of the Barbarossas in North Africa", *Turcica*, v.7, 1975, 238-250; Nicolas Vatin, "Comment Êtes-Vous Apparus, Toi et Ton Frère?": Note Sur Les Origines des Frères Barberousse", *Studia Islamica*, v. 106, no: 1, (2011), 77-101

¹⁷¹ *Barba rossa*, red beard in Italian. The epithet was originally used for Oruç, the elder brother of Hızır Hayreddin Pasha and after the death of Oruç, his epithet started to be used for his brother Hızır. Soucek, "The Rise of the Barbarossas", 249.

¹⁷² İshak, Oruç, Hızır and İlyas.

¹⁷³ La Goletta (it.); la Goleta (spa.)

¹⁷⁴ Hayr'üd-dîn means favorite of the faith.

¹⁷⁵ Gürkan, "The Center and the Frontier", 130.

However, the Ottoman cooperation with Hayreddin was limited before 1533.

Hayreddin had to face with local oppositions and a new wave of Spanish penetration into the North Africa. In 1520, he had to leave Algiers. On the other hand, in 1520's the Ottomans the main objectives of the Ottomans were to secure the communications between Constantinople and newly conquered Syria and Egypt and to consolidate the Ottoman authority over Hungary.¹⁷⁶ However, the reinforcement of the Habsburg navy by the *volte-face* of Andrea Doria from the French to the imperial camp in 1528, the military failures in 1529 and in 1532 and the Doria's attacks on the Ottoman coasts and his conquest of Corone changed the primary concerns of the Ottoman imperial strategy.¹⁷⁷

This would be a new phase in the carrier of Hayreddin Barbarossa: the famous corsair, was called to Constantinople by the Sultan and following his meetings with İbrahim Pasha, being in Aleppo for the Ottoman Campaign against Safevid Persia, he was appointed as the *Kapudân-ı Deryâ*, Grand Admiral and the *Beylerbeyi* of Mediterranean Islands¹⁷⁸ on February 1534.¹⁷⁹ The famous corsair, was charged of

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 132. According to Gürkan the lack of interest of the Ottoman administration on the western Mediterranean prevented the spring of a fruitful alliance, between Hayreddin and other corsairs such as Aydın Reis and Sinan Reis, recruited by Barbarossa to facilitate the Ottoman domination in the western Mediterranean, which would have been an upper hand for the Ottomans in their rivalry with the Habsburgs.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 132-133.

¹⁷⁸ The province, put under the administration of Barbarossa, was named as *Cezâyir-i Bahr-ı Sefîd*, the Islands of the Mediterranean Sea. The word *cezâyir* is the plural form of the Ottoman word of *cezîre*, meaning island. Since, Algiers is also named in Ottoman and modern Turkish also as *Cezayir*; Barbarossa was wrongly referred to be as the *Beylerbeyi* of Algiers by some scholars. For detailed information about the province see: Bostan, "Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefîd Eyaletinin Kuruluşu (1534)", *Tarih Dergisi*, is. 38, (2003), 61-77.

¹⁷⁹ Bostan, "Barbaros Hayreddin: İlk Deniz Beylerbeyi (1534)", *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. by İdris Bostan and Salih Özbaran, v.1, (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi Müdürlüğü, 2009), 143-154, 145-148.

re-organizing the imperial arsenal, supervising the renovation of the Ottoman ships and of facilitating the building of new ones.¹⁸⁰

The first sphere of military maneuver in the Western Mediterranean, in which the Ottomans and Habsburgs would settle their accounts was the city of Tunis. Tunis had been put on the service of the Ottoman Sultan in the first decades of the sixteenth-century by Hayreddin Barbarossa and his brother Oruç; however, it was not taken under the direct Ottoman control, in spite of the use of the port La Goulette, as a base for wintering for the aforementioned corsairs serving to the Sublime Porte.¹⁸¹ The appointment of Barbarossa as the Chief Admiral by the Ottoman Sultan in 1533, made Tunis a target for the naval operations with the intention of creating a strong naval base to secure the Ottoman sea frontiers and orienting the struggle to the ones of the Habsburgs, which would facilitate the Ottomans to take the future military initiatives into their own hands.¹⁸² In summer 1534, Barbarossa took Tunis under Ottoman control.

The expedition of Tunis, operated by Hayreddin Barbarossa was the first Ottoman attempt to dominate the Western Mediterranean.¹⁸³ Indeed, it was an opening salvo for an upcoming extended operation into the Italian peninsula. Tunis, controlling the Gulf of Sicily, the passage between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, especially the port of La Goulette, would be an important port for the Ottomans, was

¹⁸⁰ The appointment of Barbarossa to the command of the imperial Ottoman navy was related to the “inexperience” of the Ottomans in navigation and their “fear” of Christian fleets by the contemporary Venetians. For being a corsair, Barbarossa was perceived as “unaware” of the traditions of navigation and in a sense “incapable” to have the risks for further maneuvers at sea in face to Christian navies commanded by “noble” seamen. The Venetians would soon realize that they lapsed in their first evaluations. See: Albèri, s.3, v.1, 18; Paruta, p.1, l.7, 336-337.

¹⁸¹ Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 23.

¹⁸² Ibid, 25.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

enabling to reach the Habsburg territories in a night-time.¹⁸⁴ Before sailing to Tunis, Barbarossa reached first Naples and Calabria; he destroyed numerous coastal castles and towns; plundered them and took prisoners.¹⁸⁵ Then, he sailed through Messina; he attacked Sperlonga¹⁸⁶, where he took 10.000 prisoners, plundered Sardinia, turned and sailed towards the port of Bizerte in Tunis.¹⁸⁷

Tunis was experiencing political struggles at the mentioned time: the kingdom was under the control of the King Hasan of Hafsid Dynasty, since 1526. His brother Raşid had already gone to Constantinople with Barbarossa to ask the alliance of Süleyman in order to restore his kingship against his brother, creating insecurity among the Tunisian people. Barbarossa, being aware of the political situation there and intending to obtain a strong naval base for the future Ottoman expeditions in the Mediterranean, directed to La Goulette by declaring that Raşid was in his company to take the support of the local people. The King was routed and fled and leaving the castle of La Goulette, Barbarossa entered the city of Tunis. The people discovering the absence of Raşid started to resist to the Admiral's forces; however, with the assistance of reinforcement troops coming from Algiers by the order of Barbarossa, the Admiral could be able to control the city in the summer of 1534.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Barbarossa's forces attacked the towns of Calabria, namely San Lucido and Cetraro, where the Papal galleys were situated, Procida in Naples and bombed Gaetà of today's Lazio. Guglielmotti, v.1, 384. Guglielmotti, mentions that the real motivation of Barbarossa was to go into Rome. He also adds Barbarossa entered into the city of Fondi to kidnap Gulia Gonzaga, the Countess of Fondi, known by her beauty. However, the Countess escaped in a night.

¹⁸⁶ Coastal town in southwestern Italy being about half way between Rome and Naples.

¹⁸⁷ Kâtip Çelebi, 93-94. Katip Çelebi notes that the main intention of Barbarossa was to expedite towards Malta. After having plundered the coasts of Italy, the Admiral intended to sail towards Algiers and because of the inconvenient winds, he reached the coasts of Tunisia.

¹⁸⁸ See for the details: Ibid, 94-95. For an analysis of Barbarossa's expedition of Tunis in 1534 in the light of Spanish and Italian sources, see: Kumrular, "İspanyol ve İtalyan Arşiv Kaynakları Işığında

Emrah Safa Gürkan points out that the expedition of Tunis was decided personally by Barbarossa, it was not an imperial strategy. The main motivation of the sea-expedition leaded by him was to find a secure fortified naval base for the Ottoman fleet for the future initiatives over Italy.¹⁸⁹ As the other navies of the sixteenth century, the main component of the Ottoman armada was galley. However, the galleys, carrying large crew and having little hulls had to touch the shore often in order to replenish the stocks of food and water for their large crews.¹⁹⁰ So a galley was unable to operate at sea for extended periods without having necessary supplies. Thus, in the sixteenth-century, the galley fleets of the sixteenth-century needed well-fortified secured naval bases from which they could operate.¹⁹¹ For that reason, Barbarossa was also in search for a naval base, enabling him to operate in western Mediterranean easily.

Barbarossa first attacked the costs of Naples. Since he could not be able to find a convenient nearby base, he turned his face to Tunis. Gürkan also points out that if Barbarossa had intended to seize Tunis as a main target, he would have taken Raşid, having claims on the Tunisian throne and being in Constantinople at that time, with him and would pretend to be accompanied by him.¹⁹² The Admiral, experienced deeply in sea matters seems to be eager to have an upper hand instead of Habsburg naval forces, taking into consideration the strategical importance of the region. The

Barbaros'un 1534 Seferi, *Türkler ve Deniz*, ed. by Özlem Kumrular, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2007), 187-200.

¹⁸⁹ Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde", 26.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 14-15; idem, "The Center and the Frontier", 133.

¹⁹¹ See: Guilmartin Jr., *Gunpowder and Galleys*, 96-97.

¹⁹² Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde", 26. See also: Soucek, *Ottoman Maritime Wars*, 51-52. Kâtip Çelebi notes that Barbarossa had already have the idea of taking Tunis under the Ottoman control and convinced the Ottoman Sultan to take it into the imperial agenda. See: Kâtip Çelebi, 94.

conquest of Tunis was the direct response of the Admiral to Andrea Doria's capture of Corone following the German Expedition in 1532 and a threat for Italy and Spain. Just for that reason, the Habsburgs did not fall behind to reply.

The Habsburg Emperor, Charles V, was alerted by the fall of Tunis, since Sicily and Naples became open to the Ottoman attacks.¹⁹³ With all his forces, he engaged a sea expedition over Tunis. The Papacy, Genoa, Portugal, Tuscany and Malta also sent their forces under his command.¹⁹⁴ A gigantic armada, about 300 vessels, sailed out with the Emperor himself on May 30, 1535. Charles V was the supreme commander, Andrea Doria, held the naval command and the Marquis del Vasto was the commander of the troops; the target was La Goulette.¹⁹⁵

The siege of La Goulette continued about 30 days. Barbarossa had already strengthened the Castle and sent numerous soldiers¹⁹⁶ to defend it. The defense, mainly commanded by Aydın and Sinan Reis¹⁹⁷, was broken in the mid-July and the Emperor entered Tunis on July 21. On August 8, Hasan, the overthrown King of Tunis came to the camp of Charles V, kissed his hand and accepted to be his vassal with an annual tribute of 12.000 ducats, six Moorish horses and 12 foals; thereby his authority was restored. Charles V, actually had to chance of marching towards Algiers; however, he preferred to deal with the struggles in Italy and came Rome through Naples to celebrate his victory.

¹⁹³ See: Guglielmotti, v.1, 398.

¹⁹⁴ Guglielmotti, v.1, 415. For the Italian and Spanish Dukes participated into the expedition of 1535, see: Alfonso Villosa, *Vita del'Invittissimo e Sacratissimo Imperator Carlo V*, (Venice: Botteghe d'Alba, 1575), 137a.

¹⁹⁵ Soucek, *Ottoman Maritime Wars*, 53.

¹⁹⁶ Guglielmotti, v.1, 417. Villosa gives the number of the Barbarossa's soldiers as 6000. Villosa, 138a.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

The conquest of Tunis was projected as a legendary victory, to enable the future conquests of Constantinople and Jerusalem, to revive the spirit of crusade against the Ottomans by Charles V and the Papacy. The existence of tapestries, romances, gravures and portraits¹⁹⁸ reflecting the scenes of war and Charles V, himself, proves that the conquest was used as a mean of propaganda by Charles V for his claims to be the leader of Christendom and universal supremacy. The propaganda, indeed, curtailed the genuine political intentions.¹⁹⁹ The conquest was actually a part of the strategy of forward defense against the Ottomans. Charles V never intended to conquer the entire city, or the entire country, instead he turned his face to Europe. According to Soucek, “Charles V’s main concerns were dynastic, territorial and religious affairs on the European continent.”²⁰⁰ For that reason, he lost the chance of making Tunis a strong Habsburg naval base.²⁰¹

In the new course of encounter in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean, in the early sixteenth century, Charles V attempted to maintain his own possessions in the face of Ottoman hegemony in the Maghreb.²⁰² Tunis, to be a Habsburg possession until 1574, was the only Spanish acquisition in North Africa of any significance; however, the conquest did not go beyond to create a vassal

¹⁹⁸ See: Ceciliq Paredes, “Du Texte à l’Image: Les Tapisseries de la Conquête de Tunis et les Gravures des Mœurs et Fachons des Turcs”, *L’Empire Ottoman dans l’Europe de la Renaissance*, ed. by Alain Servantie, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), 123-150. The conquest of Tunis was also echoed in Spanish romances. See: Kumrular, “XVI. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında”, 168.

¹⁹⁹ For a detailed analysis about the conquest of Tunis, its initiation and reflections see: Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, “L’Expédition de Tunis (1535): Images, Interprétations, Répercussions Culturelles”, *Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance*, ed. by Bartolomé Bennassar and Robert Sauzet, (Paris: Champion, 1992), 75-132.

²⁰⁰ Soucek, *Ottoman Maritime Wars*, 56.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Devereux, 286.

kingdom.²⁰³ The conquest initiated the Emperor's cautious defense strategy in the Mediterranean against the Ottoman attacks.²⁰⁴

The loss of Tunis in 1535 opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry: As he did earlier, Süleyman would respond Charles V with a decisive military campaign. This time the war theatre would be the Italian Peninsula. The military failures in Vienna and Austrian border made apparent that the Ottomans had no chance a decisive victory against the Habsburgs in Central Europe. Moreover, the loss of Corone alerted the Ottoman government about the possible cooperation of the Christian subjects of the Ottomans in Albania and in Morea with the Habsburg Emperor. The next campaign would also intend to consolidate the Sultan's authority in these regions and the Ottoman war machine would turn against Apulia of the Kingdom of Naples. While Süleyman would revive his ancestor's project, he would also attack his "mortal enemy" by underlining that he was the sole emperor, the real Caesar, who would decide on Italy.

2.2. Footsteps towards 1537: Ottoman-French Convergence in the Early Sixteenth Century, Directed against Charles V

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign in was the product of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the early sixteenth century. As it was briefly discussed above, the Ottoman-Habsburg imperial claims and military encounters between the years of 1526 and

²⁰³ Colin Imber mentions that the Spanish Habsburgs never wholeheartedly carried the reconquest in North Africa but occupied only a few points on the coasts. The preoccupations about the European mainland dominions inevitably turned their attention away from North Africa by the end of the sixteenth century. According to him, North Africans preferred to cooperate with the Ottomans, since they were Muslims and the enterprises of the corsairs weakened the Habsburg influence in the region. Imber, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent", 223.

²⁰⁴ Espinosa, "The Grand Strategy", 276.

1535 grounded a new military enterprise in Italy, by which Süleyman would intend to challenge Charles V, in one of the politically and ideologically important dominions of his realm in 1537. However, neither the Apulian Campaign nor the earlier military initiatives in Central Europe and western Mediterranean could be evaluated as an isolated Ottoman moves from the actual political competitions of the time; on the contrary, the Ottoman maneuvers were the products of the complex political conjuncture of the early sixteenth century, in which the crowned-heads and states of the time needed to position themselves accordingly. The competition between the sovereigns and the states both gave the Porte a legitimate ground for the implementation of its imperial policy and in a sense, invited the Ottomans to intervene with the politics of Christendom. The most important one was the Habsburg-Valois rivalry over Italy.

2.2.1. Habsburg-Valois Rivalry in Italy

The rivalry between the Habsburg and Valois dynasty of France had already been initiated by the ancestors of Charles V and Francis I on the domination of the Duchy of Milan and Kingdom of Naples and made the politically fragmented Italian Peninsula a war theater. The possession of Milan was the essential issue for both Francis I and Charles V. “For Francis it meant escape from encirclement and the door to Italy and Naples, for Charles it was once the preservation of an imperial fief and the maintenance of a line of communication between Spain via Genoa and Germany.”²⁰⁵ In 1515, Francis I had taken Milan by force. To break the influence of

²⁰⁵ Hayward Keniston, “Peace Negotiations between Charles V and Francis I (1537-1538), *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, v. 102, no: 2 (April 30, 1958), 142-147, 147.

Francis I, not willing to give up his claims over Milan and Naples and not recognizing the election of Charles V as the Holy Roman Emperor, the Emperor sent his imperial troupes to Milan in 1521. Francesco Sforza was restored as the Duke of Milan, hope to be a client of the Habsburg Emperor. The French response came three years later: Francis I marched to northern Italy in October 1524 and seized Milan.

The first encounter between Charles V and Francis I re-started the Italian Wars and forced the Italian states to enter unsteady alliances for the sake of their independent states. The Republic of Venice perceived the rise of Habsburg as a threat for its independence. The Emperor had already possessed Austria and Naples; if Milan would be controlled Charles V, the Republic would be caged. On the other hand, the Papacy had concerns on Charles V. The imperial project based on the unification of Christendom could also threaten the independence of the Papal State. In November 1524, the Pope signed a treaty with the French King against the Emperor, in a month the Republic of Venice also joined into the alliance.²⁰⁶ However, Charles V did not quit the war theater: the imperial troupes attacked on the French camp in Pavia, destroyed most of the French army on February 25, 1525 and the French King Francis I was taken captive.²⁰⁷

2.2.2. The *Fleur-de-Lys* at the Porte: The Ottoman-French Relations (1525-1534)

²⁰⁶ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 223-228.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 229.

Francis' defeat at Pavia and rising influence of Charles V in Italy did not only lay ground the establishment of the League of Cognac²⁰⁸, but also invited the Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman to the war theatre: Louis of Savoy, the mother and regent of Francis I, opened a new diplomatic traffic with the Ottoman Sultan to ask his assistance for the release of his son. Simultaneously, Francis I sent his own envoy to Constantinople to inform the Sultan about the ongoing circumstances. Two French envoys were sent to the Porte; only one, could safely arrive.²⁰⁹ Jean Frangipani, the French envoy, presented two letters to Süleyman and with one another, addressing the French King, he returned to France. In his letter, Süleyman declared Francis as the following:

[...] Now, it is not something to be amazed about for the kings to be defeated and taken prisoner. Keep your spirit up and do not be sad. Under these conditions our great ancestors [...] never refrained from expeditions to always repulse the enemies and to conquer countries. We also on their course and are always conquering countries and precipitous fortresses. Day and night, our horses are always saddled and we carry our swords at our waists.²¹⁰

The letter was announcing that Süleyman would appear at the theatre soon to help the French King. One year later he defeated the Hungarian King, Lajos II at the Battle of Mohacs and conquered Buda. As it was discussed above, the Ottomans had already planned the invasion of the Kingdom of Hungary. However, the French seek for assistance offered the Sultan a legitimate ground to engage in an imperial

²⁰⁸ The League was establish on May 22, 1526 by the Kingdom of France, The Republics of Venice and Florence and the Duchy of Milan, against the Habsburg Emperor. Three months later the Papacy also joined the League. Ibid, 241.

²⁰⁹ Charrière, v.1, 112-113. For the letter of Francis, see: Ibid, 119-121.

²¹⁰ “[...] İmdî padişâhlar sınımak ve habs olunmak ‘aceb değildir, gönlünüzü hoş tutup azürde-hatır olmayasız. Eyle olsa, bizim âbâ –yi kirâm ve ecdâd-i izâmımız [...] def’-i düşmân ve feth-i memâlik için seferden hâli olmayub biz dahi anların tarîkine sâlik olub her zamanda memleketler ve sa’b ve hasîn kaleler feth eyleyüb gece gündüz atımız eyerlenmiş ve kılıcımız kuşanılmıştır.” Cited in: İnalçık, *Turkey and Europe in History*, (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2006), 155-156. Charrière gives the French and Ottoman version of the letter, see: Charrière, 116-119. The letter was published in French also by Annie Berthier. See : Berthier.

campaign. In 1526, Süleyman did not only pursue a holy war against an important Christian dominion, but also position himself as the leader of the anti-Habsburg league in the early sixteenth century. From then, Francis I would be one of his partners in his almost life-long rivalry with Charles V and the French would be a protégé of the Ottoman Sultan. This initiated the political Ottoman-French political rapprochement against the Habsburg Emperor in the following years, which would be resulted in an alliance for a joint attack on Italy in 1537.

Before 1525, the diplomatic relations between the Porte and the French Kingdom used to be handled by the intermediary agents.²¹¹ With the office of Frangipani, the French King could be able to set the direct contact with the Ottoman government. In 1528, another French envoy, Antonio Rincon²¹² was sent by the French King to Sultan via Hungary. The mission of the ambassador was to facilitate the restitution of the Christian Church in Jerusalem, which had been converted to a mosque and to ratify the commercial privileges, to be granted by the Sultan, for the French merchants.²¹³ However the hidden agenda of these meetings was to encourage the Sultan to engage further military operations against the Habsburg Emperor.²¹⁴ Thus,

²¹¹ V.-L. Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest", 297.

²¹² Antonio Rincon, born in Medena del Campo, Spain used to be in the service of Charles V, as a military commander. He revolted again Charles V in 1520 and the following year he escaped to France. After having entered the service of the French King he acted as counselor and chamberlain. He was murdered in Italy in 1541 by Charles V's troupes, while on diplomatic mission for the French King to the Ottoman Sultan. See: Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 63. As a qualified diplomat, he undertook numerous missions in Hungary, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Before his meetings within the Ottoman Port, he went to Hungary, to Transylvania and Poland; encouraged the Transylvanian potentates and King Sigismund for military operations against the Austrian Habsburgs, by the request of Francis. For the first diplomatic mission of Rincon, see: V.-L. Bourrilly, "La Première Ambassade d'Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)", *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* (1899-1914), v. 2, no: 1, 1900-1901, 23-44.

²¹³ Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest", 297-298. Süleyman did not accept the restitution of the Church but confirmed the privileges granted to the French merchants in Egypt before. See: Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks", 453.

²¹⁴ Bourilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest", 298.

the Ottoman initiative in 1529 was evaluated in Italy and in the Habsburg *milieux*, as the French call of Turkish threat within Europe.²¹⁵

2.2.3. The French Invite the Sultan into Italy

The Ottoman military failure in Vienna alerted the French King. By 1529, he had already lost his Admiral Barbarossa to Charles V and forced to abandon all his claims over Milan and Naples in favor to the Habsburg Emperor. The Siege of Vienna clearly demonstrated that the Ottoman war machine was not capable to seize the traditional Habsburg territories and to break the defense. Even the Protestants started to resist the Ottoman invasion. For Francis, a further Ottoman attack on Hungary or Austrian lands was no more beneficial. In order to restore his control over Milan he needed to orient the Ottoman fire directly to Italy. In 1532, Antonio Rincon was charged once more to negotiate with the Ottoman Sultan and was sent to Constantinople. His mission was to persuade the Sultan to invade Italy. However when he came to the Ottoman capital, the Sultan had already initiated the German Expedition.²¹⁶ He could not be able to persuade the Sultan for an invasion of Italy in 1532; however, he successfully communicated the message to the Ottoman government.

The Ottoman-French plans for a joint attack on Italy started to be uttered even in 1532. As it was mentioned above, the German Expedition was designed as the

²¹⁵ Ibid. Rincon was in the imperial camp during the Siege of Vienna and returned to France with precious presents granted by the Ottoman Sultan, in 1530. See: Jensen, 454.

²¹⁶ Bourrilly notes that the French King intended to encourage Süleyman via his diplomat to engage in a campaign against Italy, by declaring that Charles V had a more vulnerable position there. This would also grant the King the dominions on which he claimed the right of inheritance. See: Bourrilly, ““L’Ambassade De La Forest”, 298-299.

Sultan's response to the coronation of Charles V by the Pope. This had been already announced to Venice by İbrahim Pasha, stating that they would ruin both Charles V and Clement VII, who had agreed to ruin the Ottomans.²¹⁷ The clear declaration of the Grand Vizier was swiftly announced to Italy via Venice. The Papacy was deeply worried about an Ottoman attack to Bologna or directly to Rome. The rumor was put on a solid ground by the French King: Francis I announced the Venetian ambassador that the Sultan hates the Emperor and the Pope; he would make a naval expedition and would enter in Rome to prove his being the real Caesar.²¹⁸

This would have been a joint Franco-Turkish attack on Hapsburgs, for which the grand vizier requested access to Venetian ports through Alvise Gritti. It was believed that after this coordinated attack, the sultan would take Italy under his protection, making Francis the legitimate sovereign of north Italy, and appointing a vassal king to south Italy- a post thought to be destined for Alvise Gritti. İbrahim Pasha confidently told Pietro Zen that after conquering Rome, he would come to visit "the nobles of Venice who love the Sultan so much".²¹⁹

The aforementioned passage clearly demonstrates that even by 1532 an Ottoman-French joint attack on Italy had been negotiated and the region of Apulia was shown as a target for the Ottoman fire. By 1532, the French started to loudly utter the Ottoman intervention in Italy. In order to pursue the Ottoman government, the French King also initiated negotiations with Hayreddin Barbarossa. In 1534, it is known that Barbarossa met a French ambassador in Modone and he accompanied the Admiral to Tunis. Moreover, Francis I did not hesitate to send logistical support to the Ottomans: Özlem Kumrular points out that, when Charles V entered La Goulette in

²¹⁷ Necipoğlu, 411.

²¹⁸ Ibid.; Finlay, "Al servizio", 92-93.

²¹⁹ Necipoğlu, 411.

1535, it was noticed that numerous arms, used against the Spanish forces were decorated with the coat of arms of French arsenals.²²⁰

It could be argued that the Ottoman military failures in 1529 and in 1532 led the Porte to take the French King's proposal more seriously. The loss of Tunis to Charles V was also a triggering factor. The Sultan responded the Charles V election with the Battle of Mohacs, his coronation with the German Expedition. The conquest of Tunis, under his personal command would be responded by the invasion of Italy, by a campaign personally leaded by Süleyman and the French would officially assist the Sultan. The "Distributer of the Crowns" had also a say on the Italian crowns and the campaign would show that Süleyman, as the sole inheritor of the Roman Emperors would decide on Italy. The plan, which had been already announced by the French King to the Venetian ambassador in 1532, would be restructured and realized in 1537, as an important step of the Ottoman imperial strategy of the early sixteenth century. However, in this process, Süleyman would like to see another *protégé* of his with himself; the most favorite Italian state for the Ottomans: the Republic of Venice.

2.3. Walking on a Tightrope: The *Serenissima* and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry

The rise of Charles V claiming to establish universal sovereignty, was not only disturbing for the Ottoman Sultan; but also for the Venetians. Among the Italian states, it could be argued that in the early sixteenth century, the most powerful one was the Republic of Venice, possessing also the Dalmatian Coast from Istria to

²²⁰ Kumrular, "Avrupa'nın İnşasında Osmanlı Etkisi", 43.

Albania and Ionian Islands controlling the Adriatic and Western Mediterranean, apart from the Venetian lagoon.

Besides the territorial supremacy, Venice was also advantageous in economic and military terms in comparison to the other Italian powers. Thanks to the long distance commerce, especially with the Ottoman Empire and the oriental ports, by which the Republic prospered in wealth, Venice could supply an effective military power composed of great numbers of *condottieri* and an unrivaled navy to secure its independence²²¹ until the late eighteenth century. Although Venice was a Catholic state, the religious affiliations were not the primary determinants of its policies. Venice, for centuries, unlike the other states of the Peninsula, was a great power, independent during most of its history; which was tightly linked with the Eastern World rather than the Western political powers.²²² To secure its political independence and its territorial integrity, along with the economic prosperity, the Republic established close contacts with first the Byzantine²²³ and then the Ottoman Empires and became a major political actor in the Christendom, resisting the authority of the Holy Roman Empire, intending to unite the Christian European states under a sole political umbrella.

Since the Levantine trade was the *raison d'être* of the Venetian economy, for the Republic, establishing good relations with the Ottoman Porte was always an important matter of policy. Cooperating with the Venetians was also important for

²²¹ See: Robert Finlay, "The Immortal Republic: The Myth of Venice during the Italian Wars (1494-1530)", *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, v. 30, no: 4, Winter 1999, 931-944.

²²² Adda B, Bozeran, *Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancient Near East to the Opening of the Modern Age*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 457-459.

²²³ For the Venetian-Byzantine relations and how the Republic was influenced by the traditional Byzantine Diplomacy, see: Donald M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations*, (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

the Ottomans. Venice was also politically supported, since it was the sole Italian state resisting the rising hegemony of Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. In this regard, the Republic was perceived as a useful agent, preventing the political unification of the Christendom, which would threaten the Ottoman presence both in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. In the reign of Mehmed II, several lucrative commercial and diplomatic privileges were given to Venetian merchants and residents within the Ottoman realm.²²⁴ The *ahidnâmes*, given to the Republic were renewed by each successor of the Ottoman throne.²²⁵ Even after the Ottoman-Venetian war between the years of 1499 and 1503, the Republic immediately initiated diplomatic negotiations with the Ottoman administration and could be able to have an extensive *ahidnâme*.

Parallel to the commercial relations, diplomatic relations between the *Serenissima* and the Ottoman Empire had also peculiar characteristics. By 1454, the Venetians were privileged to have a resident *bailo* in Constantinople, and established consulates in key commercial ports. Beside the official representation of the Republic, the *bailo* in Constantinople was responsible to protect the rights and interests of Venetians and secure the ongoing trade.²²⁶ This led the establishment of a wide-range Venetian communication and information-gathering network within the Ottoman Empire, in which numerous spies, trans-imperial agents and state officers played important

²²⁴ Halil İnalcık, “İmtiyazat”, *El*², v.3, 1179; Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, “Ahidnâme”, *DİA*, v.1, 536-540.

²²⁵ For brief information about the *ahidnâmes* given to Venice, see: Metin Ziya Köse, *1600-1630 Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik: Akdeniz’de Rekabet ve Ticaret*, (İstanbul: Giza Yayınları, 2010), 64-67.

²²⁶ For the Venetian *baili* and their role in Constantinople, see: Carla Coco, Flora Manzonetto, *Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta*; Şakiroğlu, “Venedik Cumhuriyeti’nin İstanbul’daki Temsilcileri”, 44; idem, “Balyos”, *DİA*, vol. 5, 43; Gino Benzoni, “A Proposito dei Baili Veneziani a Costantinopoli: Qualche Spunto, Qualche Osservazione”, *Studi Veneziani*, no: 30, (1995), 69-77; Eric R. Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps”; Tommaso Bertelè, *Venedik ve Konstantiniyye: Tarihte Osmanlı Venedik İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012). For the consulates, see: Maria Pia Pedani, “Venetian Consuls in Egypt and Syria”; eadem, “Consoli Veneziani nei Porti”.

roles, besides the official diplomats.²²⁷ The bailate of Constantinople, especially after the mid fifteenth century, was the center where the information was gathered, analyzed, evaluated and spread and worked as a press office announcing the news about the Ottoman Empire to Europe via Venice and also the agent of information for the Ottomans informing the Porte about the developments in the West.²²⁸ The information gathered in the Ottoman capital were directly orientated to Venice in forms of letters, dispatches, notes and reports mostly by the Venetian *baili* and their *famiglie*. These reports created an important collection of *relazioni*²²⁹, reports written by Venetian *baili*, or other delegates and read before the Venetian Senate, following their return to Venice. These reports, with the auxiliary sources of letters, dispatches, notes, orders or travel accounts, can be considered as one of the most important sources of information about the Ottoman socio-political, economic, financial and cultural world.²³⁰

2.3.1 Defending the *Serenissima*: Venetian Policy in the Early Sixteenth Century

By the late fifteenth century, Venice pursued an aggressive expansionist policy in Italy. The first phase of the Italian Wars was the product of the Venetian expansionism towards Milan and led the establishment of an anti-Venetian league,

²²⁷ See: Preto, *I Servizi Segreti di Venezia*; Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects*.

²²⁸ Henry J. Kissling, “Venezia come Centro di Informazioni sui Turchi.”, *Venezia Centro di Mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente, Secoli XV-XVI: Aspetti e Problemi v.1*, ed. by, Hans Georg Back, Manoussos Manoussacas and Agostinio Petrusi, (Florence: L.S. Olschki editore, 1977), 97-109; Peter Burke, “Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information”.

²²⁹ See: Queller, “The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni”, 174-196.

²³⁰ See: İnalçık, “An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations”; Şakiroğlu, “The Importance of the Venetian Archives for Turkish-Arab Studies”, *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations*, no: 2, (1987), 91-94.

by which the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, intervene in the Italian affairs. Consequently, the defeat of Agnadello²³¹ in 1509 opened a new phase in the Venetian politics: by having to quit its aggressive expansion policy in Italy, the Republic started to focus on defending its own possessions. The Venetian policy of the early sixteenth century was based on two main principles: fortifying the defense of Venetian dominions, including the lagoon city, and preventing any foreign attack by using the Venetian diplomatic network extensively. According to these principles, the Republic did not hesitate to take its part in entangling alliances, and supporting the rivalry between other political actors. The architect of this policy was Andrea Gritti, elected as Doge in 1523, who would tend to follow a Pro-French and Pro-Ottoman policy during his office.²³²

Under the reign of Süleyman, the Ottoman-Venetian relations gained a new momentum. As was mentioned above, Venice acted as the press office of the early

²³¹ The Republic was the unrivaled Italian sea power. In the early sixteenth century, Venice started to follow an expansion policy towards the Po Valley, to make the Republic the most important territorial power of the Peninsula. However, the Venetian imperialism was considered more dangerous than a foreign invasion. The allied forces of the League of Cambrai (Papal, Habsburg, Mantuan, Ferrarese, Milanese and Spanish), organized by the Papacy ruined the Venetian army in Agnadello and Padua. The defeat was a traumatic event for the Venetians and deeply influenced the Venetian politics. Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli points out that in Agnadello “[...] in only one day Venetians lost what they had conquered in eight hundred years with enormous efforts”. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, (Milan: Pillole Bur, 2006), 135. For the defeat of Agnadello and its impacts on the Venetian politics, see: Lester J. Libby Jr., “Venetian History and Political Thought after 1509”, *Studies in Renaissance*, v.20 (1973), 7-45; M. E. Maller, J. R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1984), 221-222; Edward Muir, “Was There Republicanism in the Renaissance Republics?: Venice after Agnadello.” *Venice Reconsidered*, 137-167.

²³² Andrea Gritti was perceived a hero by the Venetians thanks to his efforts for the peace negotiations with the Ottoman Porte following the Ottoman Venetian war between 1499 and 1503 and for the recovery of the Venetian *terraferma* after the defeat of Agnadello. As a residing merchant in Constantinople, using his extensive network Gritti conducted the peace negotiations with the Ottomans and sent as the ambassador for the ratification. Not only the Venetians but also the Ottoman administration appreciated Gritti. After Agnadello, he undertook various offices; he served as *Provveditore Generale* and as *Procuratore di San Marco*. In 1514 he acted as the *Capitano del Mare* and recaptured Brescia and Verona in 1517, completing the recovery of Venetian *terraferma*. He wore the cap of Doge upon the death of Antonio Grimani and conducted his office until his death in 1538. For Andrea Gritti, see: Niccolò Barbarigo, *Vità del Serenissimo Andrea Gritti, Principe di Venezia*, (Venice, 1686); Finlay, “Fabius Maximus in Venice”; idem “Politics and the Family in Renaissance Venice”, 97-117. For the *relazione* of Andrea Gritti, dated to 1503 see: Albèri, s.3, v.3, 1-44.

sixteenth century: The succession of Süleyman was announced to Europe via Venice. The Republic was also able to renew the *ahidnâme*, in 1521²³³ and secure the favorable positions of the Venetians in the Ottoman realm. The appointment of İbrahim Pasha to the Grand Vizierate and the rising influence of Alvise Gritti, who was the son of the *Doge* and became an influential political figure of the time, gave the Republic an upper hand to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Sultan. İbrahim Pasha, known as the “friend of the Venetian government”²³⁴, during his office, followed a pro-Venetian policy that “[...] gave the Venetians unconditional protection both in Ottoman domains, including sometimes even sparing them from the wrath of other pashas and also in international politics.”²³⁵ Alvise Gritti, on the other hand, was used as an agent by the *Serenissima* to announce the ongoing struggles in Italy and the needs of Venice and he became the major actor of the Ottoman-Venetian alliance against Charles V.

On the other hand, securing the peace with the Habsburg Emperor was also vital for the Republic’s interest. While informing the Ottoman Sultan about the developments in Italy, the Republic did not forget to congratulate the Habsburg Emperor for his great victory at Pavia.²³⁶ The main logic of this reciprocal disingenuous policy was

²³³ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 199. For the text of *ahidnâme*, see: ASV, Documenti Turchi, Busta 14 (b.1, fasc.2, pezzi 3), s. 1, Capitulatione, in Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler”, 42-46. For the *ahidnames* given to Venice, see: Metin Ziya Köse, *1600-1630 Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik: Akdeniz’de Rekabet ve Ticaret*, (İstanbul: Giza Yayınları, 2010), 64-67.

²³⁴ Albèri, s.3, v.3, 101. Since he was born in Parga, an earlier dominion of the Republic, contemporary Venetians related the sympathy of İbrahim Pasha towards Venice with his origin. For an example, see: Sanudo, v.35, col.259.

²³⁵ Turan, *The Sultan’s Favorite: İbrahim Pasha*, 273.

²³⁶ “The Venetian ambassador Gasparo Contarini offered him [Charles V] the Republic’s congratulations as well as his own, “which ended with a wish that he might ere long, be crowned at Constantinople.” In thanking Contarini for his kind words, Charles assured him “that I (have) never had any other wish but to pacify Christendom and turn my forces against the infidel.” Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 229.

provoking these two rivals to engage in a battle, keeping them away from Italy and the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Venetian territories could be secure from any possible foreign invasion. The first attempt was successful; the Ottoman army, under the command of Süleyman, himself, marched towards Buda, the heart of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1526. The Republic also played an important role in the Ottoman Campaign of 1529. The Habsburg imperial forces had sacked Rome in May 1527 and by the end of 1528, Francis I had been forced to sue for peace with the Emperor by abandoning all his claims.²³⁷ The Republic of Venice, on the other hand, hoped for the Ottoman victory at Vienna.²³⁸ In his letters to his son Alvise, Gritti mentioned the desperate situation of the Republic and asked him to inform İbrahim Pasha accordingly. In the letters, the Doge also notes that the Venetian ports could be opened to the Ottomans and the fleet could assist them, if needed.²³⁹ The Republic hoped for the Ottoman advance in 1529; however, the Siege of Vienna resulted in a military fiasco.

2.3.2. Suspicious Neutrality

By 1529, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry became dangerous for the sake of the Republic, despised as the “concubine” of the Ottoman Sultan, in Spain.²⁴⁰ The Republic could no longer resist the Habsburg authority in Italy: In the absence of a definite Ottoman victory against the Habsburgs, the Republic, caged by the Habsburg

²³⁷ Setton, v.3, 222-223.

²³⁸ Ibid, 223.

²³⁹ Andrea Gritti’s letters to Alvise (1529), ASV, Miscellanea Ducali ed Atti Diplomatici, Busta 22.

²⁴⁰ Preto, *I Servizi Segreti*, 117.

Emperor, who had consolidated his authority in the Italian Peninsula, by defeating French and by being crowned by the Pope, started to pursue a more pro-Habsburg foreign policy not to trigger Charles V to attack Venice for its being in alliance with the Ottoman Sultan. In December 1529, the *Serenissima* came to terms with Charles V. In order to persuade the Emperor, for Venice's sincerity in not cooperating with the Ottomans against him, the also declared Charles V that despite he was the son of Doge Gritti, Alvise Gritti only served serving Szapolyai and the Ottoman Sultan in Hungary.²⁴¹

Accordingly, apart from informing the Ottoman government, mainly İbrahim Pasha, about the deeds of Charles V, in 1532 the Republic did not play an active role in 1532. For a possible attack on the Venetian dominions, the Venetian government reorganized and strengthened its defense ranks and sent 60 armed galleys to Corfu under the command of the Captain General Vincenzo Capello. The Senate ordered him to stay completely neutral and never intervene in any confrontation of the two parties, unless the Venetian forces were directly attacked by any of them.²⁴²

Moreover, the Venetian fleet did not assist the defense of Corone and Andrea Doria could easily operate with no Venetian opposition.

The Venetian policy of neutrality in face to the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry by 1532 blurred the Venetian image in the eyes of the Ottomans and Venice started to be suspected to be in secret alliance with Charles V. Especially, Andrea Doria's occupation of Corone was evaluated in the Ottoman court as the connivance of the Venetians. The Ottoman *Nişancı*, Celâlzâde mentions in his chronicle that Corone

²⁴¹ Sanudo, v. 53, col. 362.

²⁴² Paruta, p. 1, l. 7, 327-328.

was captured by the Venetians.²⁴³ Venetian presence at the Gulf of Corfu with well-armed galleys could cause such an illusion, however, as Emrah Safa Gürkan underlines, without Venetian cooperation, the Habsburgs could not take initiatives for free sail across the waters under the Ottoman control.²⁴⁴ Accordingly, in December 1532, Dragoman Yunus Bey, was sent to the *Serenissima* both to announce the conquests and victories of the Ottoman Sultan²⁴⁵ and to warn the Republic to act according to the Sultan' demands.²⁴⁶ Following the loss of Tunis to Charles V, the suspicions about Venice started to be uttered more loudly. Venice did not trigger the Emperor but its policy of neutrality was not welcomed by the Ottomans. From then on, the Republic, would be paralyzed between two fires and had to adjust its policy towards the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, which would set the ground for an Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537, to be discussed in the following chapter of the present study.

²⁴³ Celâlzâde Mustafâ, *Geschichte Sultan Süleyman*, 284b-285a.

²⁴⁴ Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde", 16-17.

²⁴⁵ See: Sanudo, v.43, cols.51-52; v. 52, cols. 370-372 and vol. 57, cols. 330-331. Traditionally, *fetihnâmes*, letters describing the conquests and successes of the Ottoman sultans were sent via Ottoman envoys to Venice. By them, the Ottomans intended both to inform the Republic, considered to be an Ottoman ally and *protégé* about the victories of the Sultan and to challenge the Christian sovereigns of the time, by using Venice, being the center of information in the sixteenth century, as an Ottoman spokesman. Following the Battle of Mohacs, the Campaign of 1529 and the German Expedition in 1532 *fetihnâmes* sent to Venice. For detailed information, see: Maria Pia Pedani, "Ottoman Fetihnames: The Imperial Letters Announcing a Victory", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, v.13, no:1, (1998), 181-192.

²⁴⁶ Bilgin Aydın, "Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanları ve Osmanlı Kültür ve Diplomasisindeki Yerleri", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no: 29, 2007, 41-86, 49. Venice was reminded that Venetian subjects jumped to the Habsburg galleys in the course of war and the Republic was warned to control its subjects well in order not to harm the Ottoman possessions. See: Paruta, p.1, l. 7, 332.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the formulation of the Ottoman and Habsburg imperial strategies, based on the sixteenth century expectations for a powerful God-ordained monarch who would establish the universal peace and the Ottoman-Habsburg military encounters in Central Europe and in the western Mediterranean from 1526 to 1535, to contextualize the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537. It had been stated that the imperial claims of Süleyman I and Charles V led to the rivalry between these two potentates and the other crowned-heads and the states of the time adjusted their policies accordingly.

It was clearly demonstrated that the Habsburg-Valois rivalry for the domination of Italy and for the political leadership of the Christendom paved the way to the Ottoman intervention into the struggles between Christian powers. The French demands of assistance gave Süleyman a legitimate ground for his desired projects over Hungary and Italy and by emphasizing his being the real Caesar and the “Distributer of the Crowns to the Monarchs of the World”. Sülyeman pursued a policy against the rising influence of Charles V and tried to create vassal states for his own to enlarge the Ottoman sphere of influence. The joint French-Ottoman attack to Italy, though to be discussed behind closed doors in 1532 would elaborated in the following years and in 1537 Süleyman would again try to establish some sort of suzerainty this time in Italy.

The chapter has stated that the Ottoman maneuvers both in Hungary and in the western Mediterranean were characterized as responses to the deeds of Charles V. Süleyman responded to Pavia with the Battle of Mohacs, the sack of Rome with the Siege of Vienna, the coronation of Charles V with the German Expedition, turned

into a splendid power display and Andrea Doria's occupation of Corone with Barbarossa's conquests of Tunis. The Habsburg conquest of Tunis, by the personal command of the Emperor, would be replied by an Ottoman campaign, personally led by Süleyman in 1537. On the other hand what made the Italian Peninsula as the new theatre of war for the Ottomans was both the Ottoman imperial claims over Italy and the military failures in Vienna and that of the German Expedition.

It was demonstrated that in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, the Republic of Venice played an important role. According to its policy of defense and neutrality by not triggering any foreign power against Venice, the *Serenissima*, which was caged by the Habsburg threat secretly supported an Ottoman-Habsburg war outside Italy and provided the Sultan with information about the deeds and plans of Charles V. In the mentioned period, the Ottoman Court, especially the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha intended to secure the Ottoman-Venetian peace and to use it as an Ottoman agent in Italy. Thanks to the favor of Pasha and the cleverly formulated Venetian foreign policy, these two states never encountered at a war theatre before 1537. However, the absence of a definite victory in 1529 and 1532 would push Venice to follow a more pro-Habsburg foreign policy and to stay neutral in Ottoman-Habsburg encounters in the western Mediterranean. Hence, especially after the loss of Corone and Tunis, the Republic would be accused of being in secret alliance with Charles V by the Ottoman administration, since it did not prevent the enemy's penetration and it did not assist the Ottoman fleet in its operations. This would ground the Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537.

This chapter has discussed the grounds of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 to replace it the Ottoman military initiative within the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the early sixteenth century. Next chapter will focus on

1537 campaign, its formulation and realization with a special focus on Ottoman-Venetian relations between 1532-1537 to decipher the main intentions of the Ottomans in 1537 and to discuss in detail the Ottoman diplomatic pressure over Venice and why an Ottoman attack of Corfu took place.

CHAPTER III

THE CRESCENT AGAINST THE EAGLE AND THE LION: THE OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON CORFU (1537)

A new phase in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry opened in 1537 with the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the subsequent attack on Corfu. In the previous chapter of this dissertation, the political developments and military maneuvers, influenced by the discourse over the universal sovereignty between the years of 1526 and 1535 were discussed in detail to frame the Ottoman military initiative in 1537. This chapter aims to offer a new historical narrative of 1537 to evaluate the Ottoman campaign and to analyze it in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Accordingly, the prelude of the campaign, its formulation and realization with a special focus on Ottoman-Venetian relations to state why and how the Ottoman fire turned against a Venetian dominion and how the campaign changed the course of Ottoman-Venetian relations by 1537 will be discussed. The chapter also aims to reveal what the Ottomans really intended to achieve in 1537 and to challenge the former studies, evaluating the campaign as the Corfu Expedition.

In this context, the prelude of war is first taken under examination. Under the first subtitle, the author discusses the establishment of the Ottoman-French alliance, finalized in 1536, for a joint venture in Italy against Charles V to argue that the 1537 Campaign was the direct outcome of Ottoman-French alliance. Secondly, the author intends to discuss why and how the Ottoman-Venetian relations were wounded by 1532 and how the Ottoman administration placed the *Serenissima* under pressure to choose its side in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Accordingly, the reasons behind the Ottoman perception of a secret alliance between Venice and Charles V is elaborated in the light of new evidence. The author argues that the Venetian insistence on staying neutral in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry intensified anti-Venetian approaches within the Ottoman government and paved the way for an Ottoman attack on Corfu.

Secondly, the chapter discusses the campaign in detail. The Ottoman march to Albania, the war preparations in Italy, especially in Venice, the invasion of Apulia, commanded by Lütü Pasha are narrated, along with the Venetian and Andrea Doria's attacks on the Ottoman ships and the subsequent Ottoman attack on Corfu. By discussing the details of the campaign the author argues that the attack on Corfu was the direct consequence of the existing tension between the Porte and the *Serenissima*, and of the Venetian attacks on Ottoman ships.

Thirdly, the author aims to re-analyze the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu and its effects on the Ottoman-Venetian relations. In this context, the author offers to evaluate the Apulian Campaign as a venture to establish a vassal state in Apulia, which would enable the future Ottoman domination in Italy, just as they had intended to establish a vassal state in Hungary.

3.1. Moving towards 1537: The Ottoman-French Alliance and Tension between the Porte and the *Serenissima*

It was obvious that Süleyman would respond the Charles V's conquest of Tunis with a new campaign. In 1529 and with the subsequent German Expedition of the Ottoman Sultan had made no significant break in the Emperor's authority. On the contrary, Charles V had consolidated his authority over Italy. This led the Ottomans to engage in a new strategy, in which the French King would have an active role.

3.1.1. My Enemy's Enemy is My Friend: The Ottoman-French Alliance for a Joint Operation in Italy (1533-1536)

It will not be an exaggeration to argue that the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 was the direct outcome of the Ottoman-French convergence against the rise of Habsburg power in the early sixteenth-century. Before 1525, the diplomatic relations between these two states had been handled by intermediary agents.²⁴⁷ The previous chapter has briefly discussed how the French King, Francis I, sought the assistance of Süleyman after his defeat at Pavia²⁴⁸ as well as the subsequent Ottoman Campaign in Hungary in 1526. As was mentioned before, this was the first implication of the Ottoman-French convergence against the Habsburg Emperor, Charles V. After 1525, Francis I started to establish direct contacts with the Porte. In 1528, Antonio Rincon²⁴⁹ was sent by the French King to the Sultan Süleyman via Hungary. The

²⁴⁷ V.-L. Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest et De Marillac a Constantinople (1535-1538), *Revue Historique*, T. 76, Fasc. 2, 1901, 297-328, 297.

²⁴⁸ Remember the mission of Frangipani. See: Chapter Two.

²⁴⁹ Antonio Rincon, born in Medena del Campo, Spain used to be in the service of Charles V, as a military commander. He revolted against Charles V in 1520 and the following year he escaped to France. After having entered the service of the French King he acted as counselor and chamberlain. He was murdered in Italy in 1541 by Charles V's troupes, while on diplomatic mission for the French

mission of the ambassador was to facilitate the restitution of a church in Jerusalem, which had been converted to a mosque and to ratify commercial privileges for the French merchants.²⁵⁰ However the hidden agenda of these meetings was to encourage the Sultan to engage in military operations against the Habsburg dominions.²⁵¹ For that reason, the Ottoman initiatives in 1529 were evaluated in Italy and in the Habsburg *milieu*, as the result of French encouragement of Turkish threats within Europe.²⁵² In 1532, Rincon was charged once more to negotiate with the Ottoman sultan and was sent to Constantinople. However when he came to the Ottoman capital, the sultan had already been in Belgrade, in contrast to the desire of the French King, who aimed to orient the Sultan to Italy.²⁵³

The military initiatives in Hungary and Germany were not totally unsuccessful for the Ottoman Empire, but they did not bring about a definite victory either. Moreover, the loss of Corone, occupied by Andrea Doria in 1532, had already alerted the Ottoman administration to follow a serious towards over the Mediterranean; resulting

King to the Ottoman Sultan. See: Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*, 63. As a qualified diplomat, he undertook numerous missions in Hungary, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Before his meetings within the Ottoman Port, he went to Hungary, to Transylvania and Poland; encouraged the Transylvanian potentates and King Sigismund for military operations against the Austrian Habsburgs, by the request of Francis. For the first diplomatic mission of Rincon, see: V.-L. Bourrilly, "La Première Ambassade d'Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)", *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* (1899-1914), v. 2, no: 1, 1900-1901, 23-44.

²⁵⁰ Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest", 297-298. Süleyman did not accept the restitution of the Church but confirmed the privileges granted to the French merchants in Egypt before. See: Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks", 453.

²⁵¹ Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest", 298.

²⁵² Ibid. Rincon was present in Vienna during the Ottoman Campaign and returned to France with precious presents granted by the Ottoman Sultan, in 1530. See: Jensen, 454.

²⁵³ Bourrilly notes that the French King intended to encourage Süleyman via his diplomat to engage in a campaign against Italy, by declaring that Charles V had a more vulnerable position there. This would also grant the King the dominions on which he claimed the right of inheritance. See: Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade De La Forest", 298-299.

in the appointment of Hayreddin Barbarossa as the Chief Admiral.²⁵⁴ This also accelerated French-Ottoman contact; the Ottomans were finally persuaded to take Francis' s proposals more seriously.

The main reason for the French-Ottoman convergence was the idea of reducing Habsburg authority. From the French point of view, the alliance was more than necessary because the King had lost the support of Henry VIII, the Pope and the German Princes in his struggle with the Habsburg Emperor. For the Ottomans, on the other hand, France was perceived as an important agent who could exhaust the Habsburg forces on various fronts. As was mentioned before, in the loss of Corone to Andrea Doria in 1532, the Ottomans started to question the sincerity of the Venetian Republic, the friend, partner and the most important political ally of the Ottoman Empire. The Republic, following a policy of neutrality in Ottoman-Habsburg confrontations, did not give the upper hand to the Ottomans in their initiatives. For that reason a new partnership with the French King seemed to be favorable. This idea would be echoed in the Ottoman capital and communicated to the Sultan by a new actor in the Ottoman administration, who intended to limit the Republic's influence within Ottoman politics: Hayreddin Barbarossa.

Barbarossa sent his envoys to Le Puy in France in July 1533.²⁵⁵ In November 1534, another embassy from Barbarossa met with Francis I at Châtellerault and accompanied the King to Paris. In the negotiations apart from the matter of commercial privileges for the French merchants, an effective military plan against the Habsburgs was also negotiated and a petition sent to Süleyman by Barbarossa

²⁵⁴ Halil İnalcık, "Avrupa Devletler Sistemi", 129.

²⁵⁵ "Because of this embassy when Hayreddin captured Tunis in 1534 the Spanish claimed that he had done so with the encouragement of François [Francis I]." Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 117.

communicating the articles dealt with the French King.²⁵⁶ In February 1535, Francis sent his first official French diplomatic mission to Barbarossa and then to the Ottoman Sultan, the ambassador Jean de la Forest.²⁵⁷ The mission of the ambassador was to propose to the Sultan a joint French-Ottoman campaign against Italy, the Kingdom of Naples in particular. De la Forest would thank Barbarossa for his help and communicate that the French King would march towards Genoa, of which he demand the rights of inheritance, the following year and would send 50 vessels to join the admiral's forces for his operations, as well as the necessary food and munitions. The French King asked the Admiral to persuade the Sultan to engage in a naval campaign against Italy while he would make a land expedition towards Genoa, to assist the French King for restoring his authority in Sicily and Sardinia. Francis also demanded for a financial support about 1.000.000 ducats for the aforementioned operations which would, according to him, realize the universal peace. In response, the King guaranteed his life-time friendship to the Sultan. The admiral would also be asked to facilitate the safe travel of de la Forest to Constantinople.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ Ibid; Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 300.

²⁵⁷ Jean de la Forest was born in Auvergne in the late fifteenth century was a knight of the order of St. John and the apostolic pronotary and abbot of Saint-Pierre-le-Vif-Lis-Sens. See: Jensen, "The Ottoman Turks", 455. De la Forest studied in Italy and he had the opportunity of being in Rome, Florence and Venice before. He was familiar with the Ancient Greek and Italian languages. In his appointment his competency in the Renaissance culture, politics and diplomacy could have played an important role according to Bourrilly. See: Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 302.

²⁵⁸ The main demand of the French King was to persuade the Sultan to directly attack the Kingdom of Naples instead of Hungary, where the Austrian Habsburgs could have the support of the German princes. In that aspect, even the Sultan would refuse to give financial aid, he should be persuaded to engage in campaign. Asking that, the ambassador also warned the Admiral about Andrea Doria who had been planning to attack Tunis. For the instructions given by Francis I to Jean de la Forest, see: Charrière, v.1, 255-263; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 392-393, 400. See also: Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 303-305.

Jean de la Forest, with his cousin Charles de Marillac, the advocate of the French Parliament, Guillaume Postel²⁵⁹, the humanist scholar, and his numerous companions came to Constantinople in May 1535. Since the Sultan and the Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha was on campaign against Persia, he sent one of his attendants to İbrahim Pasha in order to communicate the preparations of Charles V.²⁶⁰ The capture of Tunis by Andrea Doria, in July 1535 and the death of Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan made the French offer more favorable for both sides.

In February 1536, Jean de la Forest was able to negotiate a treaty with İbrahim Pasha. The treaty was presented as a commercial pact between the two countries but indeed it was the document of a secret alliance against the Habsburg Emperor.²⁶¹ By the treaty, free trade between the countries was arranged under the guarantee of the two sovereigns. The French King would be allowed to send a resident ambassador to Constantinople, who would deal with the judicial issues of the subjects of the King, the enslaved subjects of the two sovereigns would be set free, the French and Ottoman ships would salute each other when they met. Besides these, a joint

²⁵⁹ Guillaume Postel accompanied the French ambassador to Constantinople to purchase rare objects for Francis I. Postel is known with his studies on mathematics and oriental languages. He worked at the Royal College as professor. In 1550's, he published several books but he was forbidden to teach because of his unorthodox beliefs. He, then, travelled to Italy. There, the Inquisition declared him to be insane and imprisoned him for 4 years. He published a book on the Ottoman Empire, entitled, *De La Republique des Turcs* in 1560. After his return to France in 1562, he was placed under home arrest until 1581, when he died. See: Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 167-168. Postel evaluates the Ottoman-French alliance in 1536 as the first step in obtaining the universal peace. His work demonstrates that he had positive views about the Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman, especially in terms of his justice on the state and international politics. He declares that the French was devoted to establish the world peace and the Turks were triggered to be a part of it. He also underlines that the Turks would convert to Christianity eventually. For detailed information about Guillaume Postel and his works, see: William Bouwsma, *Concordia Mundi: The Career and Thought of Guillaume Postel (1510-1581)*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

²⁶⁰ Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 306-307.

²⁶¹ Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 117.

campaign was also agreed; the King would attack Lombardy and the Ottoman Sultan would engage in a campaign against Naples.²⁶²

The Ottoman-French cooperation in the Mediterranean became visible right after the official contacts. In the summer of 1536, the Spanish fortification of Cazaza in North Africa controlled by the Muslim corsairs and a coalition of thirteen French and eight Ottoman galleys attacked the Catalan coast near Barcelona. The coalition plundered Ibiza in August and French pirates captured a Spanish ship containing gold bullion from Peru.²⁶³ The attacks of the corsairs would result in an official military expedition towards Italy in 1537.

In a broader sense, the alliance accord, agreed between Jean de la Forest and İbrahim Pasha, was important in terms of officially inviting the Ottoman Sultan to join a struggle in Christendom for the first time invited by a Christian crowned-head. According to De Lamar Jensen, this “scandalous” alliance laid the foundation for a long term cooperation between a Christian and a Muslim country that seemed to have nothing in common other than their hatred and fear of the Habsburgs.²⁶⁴ On the other hand, the French King and his ambitious policy were harshly criticized in European circles, emphasizing that “the most Christian King’s” initiatives knifed Charles V’s discourse of *Pax Christiana*. Here, the comment of the Habsburg Emperor deserves a special attention: “During my entire life, I worked to bring an end to religious

²⁶² For the details of the treaty, see: Charrière, v.1, 283-294. The treaty was dated as February 1535 in Charrière. Here it should be underlined that the New Year in the French calendar did not begin until Easter. For that reason, the date should be corrected as February 1536 according to the Gregorian calendar. See: Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 455.

²⁶³ For detailed information, see: Espinosa, “The Grand Strategy of Charles V”, 276.

²⁶⁴ Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 453.

conflicts and to protect Christendom from the Turkish threat. Francis I gave his all to strengthen the Turks and to extend the religious conflicts though.”²⁶⁵

As was mentioned above, the Ottoman-French Treaty of 1536, besides the commercial privileges offered to the French and the right of representation at the Ottoman Capital, is widely evaluated as solid proof of Ottoman-French political cooperation against the Habsburg advance. According to the articles, on which both sides agreed, Jean de la Forest stayed in Constantinople as the first French resident ambassador. His cousin, Charles de Marillac returned to France, for the ratification of the agreement, right after the meetings with Ibrahim Pasha.²⁶⁶ However, because of the death of the Grand Vizier, executed in March 1536, the treaty was not ratified by Süleyman.²⁶⁷ The first extended commercial privileges, known as capitulations, which would hide again a political agenda on the eve of the campaign against Cyprus, would be given to France in 1569, by which all Europeans, except the Venetians, would trade with the Empire under the French flag.²⁶⁸

Here it should be underlined that the validity and the authenticity of 1536 treaty is a matter of discussion in modern studies. Gaston Zeller points out that the terms of the treaty did not resemble the privileges given by the Ottoman Sultan, in accordance with the other forms of *ahidnâmes* and the capitulations; instead the text has the nature of a bilateral agreement, showing two sovereigns as equals to each other. The absence of a manuscript document either in Paris or in Constantinople leads Zeller to

²⁶⁵ Gertrude Schwarzanfeld, *Carlos V, Padre de Europa*, (Madrid: 1958), s.266 cited in Kumular, “XVI. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında”, 168.

²⁶⁶ Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 456-457.

²⁶⁷ See: Halil İnalcık, “İmtiyâzât”, *DİA*, v.22, 245-252, 248.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

suggest that the ambassador personally invented the treaty. Moreover, the draft of the 1536 agreement was brought to light for the first time in 1777 by Count François de Saint-Priest, French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, editing the important documents of French diplomacy and it was published a hundred years later from the documents found by him in the *Library of the King*.²⁶⁹ On the other hand, De Lamar Jensen argues that “the text of the agreement itself reads very much as we would expect it to as a unilateral grant of privilege from the sultan alone.”²⁷⁰ In that respect, the author evaluates the articles of 1536 as the predecessors of the ones in the 1566 Capitulations. By showing two imperial edicts indicating the privileges given to the French, which were written to *Sancakbeyis* and *Kadıs* of Jerussalem, in July 1536 and May 1549, Joseph Matuz shows the validity of the articles of 1536.²⁷¹ Although Zeki Arıkan indicates that these two imperial edicts do not prove the validity of the Treaty of 1536, the indications in the 1569 Capitulations proves that the articles agreed on 1536 were put in practice by the Ottoman administration.²⁷²

Apart from the discussions as to what extent the commercial privileges granted by the Sultan were put into practice and the official ratification of the Treaty, issued by İbrahim Pasha and Jean de la Forest, it could be argued that the meetings in 1536 and

²⁶⁹ Zeller points out that the absence of a long preamble enumerating the powers and dominions of the Sultan in the text should lead the researcher to question the document about its authenticity. For that reason, the author prefers to define the 1536 Treaty as the legend of “pseudo capitulations”. See: Gaston Zeller, “Une Légende qui a la Vie Dure: Les Capitulations de 1535”, *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, v.2, no: 2, April-June 1955, 127-132.

²⁷⁰ Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks”, 455-456.

²⁷¹ Joseph Matuz, “À Propos de la Validité des Capitulations de 1536 entre l'Empire Ottoman et la France”, *Turcica*, no: 24, 1992, 183-192.

²⁷² Arıkan evaluates how 1536 privileges were evaluated by the historians of the Turkish Republic in his paper presented in the 8th International Congress of the Social and Economic History of Turkey held by Uludağ University, in Bursa, on June 18-21, 1998. According to him the aforementioned imperial edicts refers to the commercial privileges granted to the French in 1528 for Egypt, not the agreement of 1536. See: Zeki Arıkan, “Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve 1536 Kapitülasyonları”, *Papers-VIIIth International Congress on the Economic and Social History of Turkey*, (Morisville: Lulu Press, 2006), 145-156, 149-152.

the bilateral agreement, concealed by the treaty based on commercial privileges, on the French-Ottoman military alliance against the Habsburg Emperor in Italy prepared the ground for the Ottoman Campaign of Apulia in 1537. This would be the first Ottoman-French joint venture against the Habsburgs. The French attacks in Northern Italy, the presence of the ambassador de la Forest within the Ottoman imperial camp in Valona²⁷³ and the participation of the forces of the Baron of Saint Blancard in the Ottoman armada, to be discussed in detail in the following pages, support this argument. The Treaty, or accord of alliance with the French King in particular is evaluated as the last political enterprise of Ibrahim Pasha, playing the most important role in Ottoman policymaking until 1536. The strategy designed by Ibrahim Pasha, on the other hand, would be realized by his successors, mainly by Hayreddin Barbarossa.

3.1.2. The Lion between Two Fires: (1534-1536)

While the Ottomans were negotiating with the French, Ottoman-Venetian relations entered a new phase. In the previous chapter the Venetian policy of neutrality in the face to the struggles of great powers was discussed. As stated before, Venice, after the defeat at Agnadello, had already started to strengthen the defense of the lagoon and the Venetian dominions and to use diplomatic channels extensively. The policy required an alliance with the Ottomans, in terms of both securing the gains of the ongoing commerce and having the political support of the Ottoman Sultan to face with any possible threat against the territorial integrity of the Republic. While keeping its relations with the Ottoman Empire, the Republic had been also evading

²⁷³ Vlora/Vlorë (alb.)

any confrontation with the Habsburg Emperor, whereas consolidating his authority in the Italian Peninsula. When the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry reached a higher level following the German Expedition in 1532, Venice needed to follow a more cautious policy and finally came to terms with Charles V.

The suspicions about Venice, about its willingness to maintain the peace with the Ottoman Sultan brought another challenging question forward: was the Republic in secret alliance with Charles V? The Corone incident laid the groundwork of the question. The conquest of Tunis by Andrea Doria in 1535 made this suspicion more apparent though. Here it should be underlined that, here, the French ambassador, Jean de la Forest, played a principal role: Before Doria's conquest the ambassador was able to convince the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats, especially İbrahim Pasha, that the Venetians were in a secret alliance with Charles V, and they would unite their forces with the Emperor's to attack the Sultan's dominions in Greece.²⁷⁴ In addition to this suspicion, the ongoing conflicts on sea between Ottoman and Venetian commercial ships augmented the Ottoman diplomatic pressure over the Republic.

In March 1535, by a letter sent to the *Doge*, Andrea Gritti, by the Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha²⁷⁵, after having shared the information about the victory in Iraq and Safevid territories, Venice was informed that the next Ottoman military initiative would be by sea, to be commanded by Barbarossa. Moreover, the Republic was

²⁷⁴ Paruta, p. 1, l.7, 343.

²⁷⁵ ASV, Documenti Turchi, Sala Regina Margherita, Turchia Firmani, s. 4 XXXVI, n. 6, in, M. Tayyib Gökbiçgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler", *Belgeler*, v. 6-8, no. 9-12, 1968-1971, 1-152, 54-56. The letter was sent from Bagdad. İbrahim Pasha was there because of the Ottoman expedition of Iraq at that time. In the letter, Pasha used the title of "*serasker sultan*", "commander-in-chief sultan" for himself. This choice of title would be used to convince the Sultan about the Pasha's intention of replacing himself by his opponents and be a strong argument in his murder in the following year.

asked to act with the Ottomans, as the old-established friendship between the states and the existing *ahidnâme* required. İbrahim Pasha addresses the Doge, as following:

[...] it is required that according to your old-established friendship and to the *ahidnâme*, you may also warn and confirm your men in your own ships to move in cooperation; to act in a good accordance and alliance with the aforementioned Hayreddin Pasha, [and you may] be in good alliance and accord in terms of seizing the ships of pirates and corsairs, related to the enemy when [they] sailed at sea. [...] it is required that you may never omit to communicate the accurate news about the enemy and various parties, [you may not] to hold back constantly announcing [them] to the house [of the Sultan], being the door of happiness.²⁷⁶

Thus the Republic was asked by the Porte to act in alliance with the Ottomans and to inform the Empire about the maneuvers of the “enemy”. However, the Republic did not totally meet that requirement. Another letter of İbrahim Pasha dated in May 1535 to the Doge reveals that news about the arrival of the “Spanish King” into the German lands had reached the imperial capital but since the *Serenissima* had remained silent about the issue, the Ottoman government did not properly relieve it. İbrahim Pasha reminded the Doge and other Venetian nobles in the government that according to the existent peace, Venice should have informed the Ottoman government about the actual state of affairs before any other agent and asked for the Venetian response on whether the news is accurate or not and the details about the actions of the “seditious king”.²⁷⁷ A couple of months later, in November 1535

²⁷⁶ “[...] *gerekdir ki, siz dahî kadîmi dostluğunuz üzere ve ‘ahdnâme mücebince kendü gemilerinizde olan adamlarınıza tenbih ve te’kid idesiz ki müşarünileyh Hayreddin Pâşâ deryâ yüziüne çıkdukda sizin gemileriniz dâhî anlar ile böyle olub, yek-dil ve yek-cihet olub, düşmâna müte’alik olan harâmî ve korsân gemilerini ele getürmek bâbında hüsn-i ittifâk ve ittihâd üzere olasız [...] gerekdir ki dâimâ düşmân câniblerinden ve sâir etrâfve cevânibinden sahîh olan haberleri eksük itmeyüb muttasıl âsitâne-i sa’âdet-i âşiyânelerine î’lâm eylemekten hâlî olmayasız.*” Ibid, 55. In the same passage, İbrahim Pasha mentions that in addition to the forces of Barbarossa, it is agreed that an auxiliary fleet would be sent from Constantinople too and under the command of the *Sancakbeyi* of Euboea, Mehmed Bey. The Republic should act in accordance with these ships too.

²⁷⁷ ASV, Documenti Turchi, Busta 7, s. 8, fasc. 29, pez. 4, in, M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyyatında Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri”, *Belgeler*, v. 1, no. 2, 1964, 119-221, 156.

another letter of reproach and warning was sent to Andrea Gritti by the Grand Vizier. In that letter, İbrahim Pasha underlined that the Sultan had sent Hayreddin Barbarossa and his forces to help Venice and the Kingdom of France against the Habsburg threat. However, when the Ottoman sea forces were faced with the attacks of the enemy, the Habsburgs, in the campaign in North Africa, the Republic only settled for informing the Ottoman government about the circumstances; it did not offer any kind of help and assistance to Barbarossa. This was against the nature of the existent friendship and peace between the two states. The Ottoman government was capable of defining this via various sources; therefore, as a friend and ally, Venice should have done more. It should have assisted the Ottoman sea forces since the presence of the Ottomans in the mentioned zones was indeed a real guarantee of the serenity and welfare of the Republic.²⁷⁸

The letters of the Grand Vizier clearly demonstrate that the attitude of the Venetian government had already started to trouble the Ottoman administration concerning Venice's sincerity.²⁷⁹ In the last years of his grand vizierate, İbrahim Pasha started to change his tune and tried to force the *Serenissima* to participate in the Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburg Emperor. The change in his attitude was echoed too in a *relazione* of 1534. In the earlier reports, Venetian representatives referred the Pasha with the title of "*il magnifico*", like Sultan Süleyman and praised him. However, the *relazione* of Daniello de Ludovisi dated to 1534, described

²⁷⁸ ASV, Documenti Turchi, Busta 7, s. 1, fasc. 28, pez. 3, in, Gökbilgin, "Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri", 162.

²⁷⁹ Besides the uncovered expectations, between the years of 1534 and 1536, the documents reveal that the Ottoman and Venetian commercial ships had also conflicts at sea. Some of the Ottoman ships were attacked by the Venetian commanders and corsairs, thought to be sailing by the consent of the Republic and seized. Corsairs, authorized by the Porte, also attacked Venetian ships and enslaved the crew inside. In this respect, the Ottoman administration issued several orders to the local governors to decrease the tension and to prevent a possible chaos between the states. For some examples for the conflicts, see:, Ibid, 142-143, 182, 184, 186-190 and Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar", 14-15, 18-20, 70-71, 75,80, 88.

İbrahim Pasha as a devious character who did not hesitate to eliminate all talented bureaucrats and soldiers in the state government just to secure his own authority also alleging that he misled the Sultan about the military power of the Empire and invited the lack of discipline and quality in the army just so as to be the sole actor in the government.²⁸⁰ Ludovisi also emphasizes that in this situation the Pasha asked the friendship of the Republic because he was aware that any confrontation would dissolve the system and the state would experience a great chaos.²⁸¹ The report shows a clear change of perception about İbrahim Pasha. Here, one should keep in mind that in the mentioned period, İbrahim Pasha was subject to strong criticisms of the Ottoman high ranking bureaucrats because of his decisions and initiatives and attitude. For that reason, Ludovisi could only reflect the views of the Ottomans. However, it is highly possible that the threatening warnings of the Grand Vizier in the face of Venetian maneuvers and his political pressure exerted to the Republic, could also change the perceptions of the Venetian.

In any case, the peace with the Ottoman Sultan was favorable for the Republic. However after 1535, not triggering the anger of the Habsburg Emperor against Venice became more crucial for the Venetian government. The tough political situation created a dilemma for Venetian politics too. A group of senators insisted on being at peace with Charles V.²⁸² After the conquest of Tunis, the Habsburg Emperor

²⁸⁰ See: Alberi, s.3, v.1, 10-13.

²⁸¹ Ibid, 13.

²⁸² The idea of making an alliance with Charles V was not the product of 1535; among the Venetian nobles, there were numerous names favoring the alliance with the Habsburg Emperor in the earlier years too. For instance, in his aforementioned report, Ludovisi announced Venetian Senate that the land army of the Ottoman Sultan could never be superior to the German armies and the Ottomans were not experienced in the affairs of sea since they were not active in commerce. Their armada was not strong enough, even Hayreddin Barbarossa had strengthened it. Therefore, a strong Christian armada under the command of Habsburg Emperor would easily defeat the Ottomans. Ludovisi notes that informing Charles V about the actual situation of the Ottoman State might be the Senate's decision. See: Ibid, 17-19; 26-28.

suggested to the Venetian Senate that entering into the league, organized by the Papacy against the Ottomans was more beneficial for the interest of the Republic.²⁸³ After a detailed consideration, the Senate replied to the Emperor that Venice always worked for Christendom, but the conditions of the Republic were not suitable for them to in a war with any state.²⁸⁴

The Ottoman administration was not satisfied with the neutrality of Venice; the Sultan desired to have a clear answer as to which side Venice would position itself in face of the new encounter planned to be realized in 1537. The French ambassador in Venice tried to persuade the Senate to join the Ottoman-French alliance and to let the Ottoman armada to penetrate into the Adriatic and to attack Apulia.²⁸⁵ In the fall of 1536, Yunus Bey was sent once more as Süleyman's ambassador to Venice to force the Republic to join the Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburg Emperor.²⁸⁶ The Republic was stranded: Alvise Gritti, the son of the *Doge*, working for Süleyman had already died in 1534; the Grand Vizier, known for his favor to the Republic had just been executed by the Sultan; the influence of Barbarossa, apparently utilizing a discourse against Venice was rising; in other words, Venice had lost all its supporters at the Ottoman Porte.²⁸⁷ The Senate explained to the ambassador that Venice had no intention of disrupting the peace with the Ottoman Sultan, but since the Republic had to sign a peace with Charles V in 1529, it ought to send military forces to Milan and Naples against Francis I, in case of the Emperor's call. Besides that the Republic

²⁸³ At the same time, Charles V forced the Pope Paul III to excommunicate the French King, since he had allied with the Ottoman Sultan. Taking into consideration the rise of Protestantism in Germany, harming the Papacy, the Pope refused to do that. See: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 401.

²⁸⁴ See: Paruta, p. 1, l.7, 344-347.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 1, l.8, 352; Ursu, 101.

²⁸⁶ For the details of the mission of Yunus Bey, see: Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 407-410.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, 407-408.

respected the French King in all his deeds. However, the Republic could not be in an alliance against the Habsburg Emperor; being at peace with all sovereigns was the sole policy to be followed by the Venetian administration. The Senate also asked Yunus Bey to communicate the desire of the Republic to renew the peace with the Ottoman Sultan. This was not the reply that the Ottoman Sultan desired to have. Yunus Bey left Venice on January 1537 promising that he would do his best to meet the requests of Venice. However, the Republic had already realized that the war was at door.²⁸⁸

On November 1536, the Venetian Senate voted to increase its navy of 27 galleys to 50, since the Ottoman Sultan, the French King and the Habsburg Emperor had already started to increase the numbers of their own naval forces.²⁸⁹ On the other hand, the Republic informed the Papacy about the war preparations of the Ottomans, and called for the Pope to do his best to secure Christendom since the Ottomans would definitely attack Italy²⁹⁰, as well as asking financial support. In the meantime, like the French King and the Ottoman Sultan, Charles V also pushed the Republic to choose a side in the upcoming confrontation. In April 1537, a Habsburg ambassador sent to Venice informed the Senate that the Emperor could send Andrea Doria in case of an Ottoman attack to a Venetian possession. To inform the Admiral, the Emperor wanted to have a clear answer to his offer. After long discussions in the Senate, through expressing appreciation for the generous considerations of the Emperor for Venetian interests, the government replied to the ambassador that the

²⁸⁸ Ibid, 409-410.

²⁸⁹ The Senate also proposed to maintain galleys at Candia, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Venice and in Dalmatian waters. See: Ibid, v. 3, 402.

²⁹⁰ The Republic also sent to the Pope Paul III the copies of 25 letters about the Ottoman preparations, sent from Constantinople to show how the situation was serious via his ambassador. Ibid.

Republic should proceed prudently in order not to run headlong into the blows and perils that the Republic was about to encounter.²⁹¹

The above mentioned discussions prove that on the eve of 1537 campaign, taking into consideration the recent circumstances and tension with the Ottoman government, the *Serenissima* realized that it should not blindly trust in peace with the Ottomans. The policy of neutrality, basically formulated and well-implemented by the *Doge* of Venice, Andrea Gritti, would not keep the Republic away from fire, since Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry had entered a new phase, which might force Venice to choose a side. The government was aware this Venetian attitude was not welcomed by the Ottoman Sultan and that suspicions about Venice, had begun to be voiced among the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats, especially after the death of İbrahim Pasha. By ordering his execution in 1536, the Sultan demonstrated that he would overthrow anyone trying to misuse his trust. Although the Republic did not directly ally with the Habsburg Emperor against the Ottomans and the French, the needle of Venetian policy was tilting slightly closer to the side of Charles V. The Ottoman-Venetian encounter in 1537 would complete that process.

3.2. The Crescent against the Eagle and the Lion: The Ottoman Campaign of 1537

The accord for a joint campaign against Charles V mobilized both the French King and the Ottoman Sultan. For a land and naval expedition for 1537, war preparations were accelerated. The Ottoman fleet would be one of the most important actor in the plan: Hayreddin Barbarossa was charged to supply and strengthen the Ottoman fleet.

²⁹¹ Ibid. 423-424.

It was also known that the Sultan even personally observed the arsenal in Constantinople.²⁹² The French King, on the other hand, did not wait for the Sultan's move. Surprisingly, in February 1536, Francis I moved his land armies towards Milan, following the unexpected death of Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan.²⁹³ The French troops, with the participation of the Swiss soldiers too, quickly invaded Savoy and marched on Turin.²⁹⁴ However, in July, the French initiative was answered by Charles V²⁹⁵ with a disastrous invasion of Provence.²⁹⁶ Simultaneously with the Habsburg invasion of Provence, Barbarossa attacked and raided Calabria in September. Barbarossa's attack was not a part of a joint operation, but it was obvious that his presence weakened the hand of Habsburg Emperor and clearly showed the Ottoman-French coordination and cooperation against him.²⁹⁷ These events were the vivid *ouverture* for the summer of 1537, when the Crescent would encounter with the Eagle and the Lion.

²⁹² Bourrilly; "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 313.

²⁹³ Francesco Sforza had no heir. For the claims of Francis, I and Charles V over Milan at the mentioned time, see: Tracy, 158-159.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ The Habsburg Emperor also tried to mobilize the Papacy to call a league against the Ottomans and the French allying with them. The French initiative was against the terms of peace on 1529. However, Pope Paul III preferred to be neutral in the French-Habsburg confrontation in 1536, since the war preparations of the Ottomans, echoed in the Holy See had been worrying the Pope. See: Paolo Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo di Mons. Paolo Giovio da Como, Vescova di Nocera-Seconda Parte*, (Venice: Al Segno della Concordia, 1608), l. 35, 399.

²⁹⁶ By September, Charles V ordered the retreat. The invasion was indeed a fiasco. The Lombardian troupes of the Emperor had some gains in Piedmont and attacked Genoa. But, Aix could not be controlled as it had been desired and the French army marching back to Avignon, could not be defeated. Moreover, most of the soldiers suffered great hardships and illness. See: Brandi, 380; Tracy, 160-162.

²⁹⁷ Jean de Monluc, a French ambassador in Rome, claimed that Barbarossa realized the attacks according to the will of the French King. See: Charrière, v.1, 327. However, Ursu mentions that despite the existence of his letters, there is no clear evidence supporting Jean de Monluc. Ursu, 99. On the other hand, the Admiral's attack of a Southern-Italian region, while the French King had been marching into Piedmont could be evaluated as a limited rehearsal of the 1537 Campaign and a clear demonstration of Ottoman-French cooperation.

3.2.1. Initiating the Campaign: The Ottoman Move on Valona

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign commenced in May 1537: the armada, composed of 160 galleys and 60 large vessels and carrying Ottoman troops, sailed from Constantinople towards Valona in May under the command Lütü Pasha, the Third Vizier of Süleyman I. Hayreddin Barbarossa, the Chief Admiral, also participated into this naval expedition with his own forces.²⁹⁸ Following the armada, on May 17, Sultan Süleyman, with his two sons Mehmed and Selim, set out with his land army from Constantinople to Albania, which had been considered as the western frontier of the Ottoman realm, following the route of Çatalca, Adrianople, Plovdiv²⁹⁹, Skopje and Elbasan.³⁰⁰ With the participation of the Rumelian army, the Ottoman land army was thought to be composed of 200.000 soldiers.³⁰¹ While these numbers cannot necessarily be believed, it was obviously a very substantial force. The French ambassador Jean de la Forest also accompanied the army.³⁰² The navy reached the

²⁹⁸ Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 314-315. Lütü Pasha was appointed as the head-commander of the Ottoman navy and the soldiers and Hayreddin Barbarossa was the Chief Admiral. During the expedition they were ordered to act in accordance to each other. See: Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 423; İdris Bostan, "Corfu", *DİA*, v. 26, 201-202, 201; İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, v.2, (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945), 192-193.

²⁹⁹ During the Sultan's stay in the city, the representative of the Hungarian King Szapolyai visited the imperial camp and presented the King's loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Danişmend, 193.

³⁰⁰ The *rûznâme*, diary of the 1537 campaign gives all details about the Ottoman voyage and camps on the route of Valona. See: Ahmed Feridun Bey, *Mecmu'a-ı Münşeat*, v.1, 598-602.

³⁰¹ Ibid, 192. The number of the soldiers was also stated as 200.000 by the contemporary, Paolo Giovio. See: Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l.36, 423.

³⁰² Jean de la Forest had the chance of directly observing the Ottoman campaign and continued to send informative letters to the King and French authorities. The ambassador, however, could not keep himself away from the plague epidemic and died in Valona in September 1537, before the culmination of the Ottoman campaign. Following his death, Charles de Marillac replaced him. In 1538, Francis I would send Antonio Rincon as his ambassador to Constantinople. See: Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 324; Jensen, 457. For Antonio Rincon, see: V. -L. Bourrilly, "Les Diplomats de François I^{er} : Antonio Rincon et la Politique Orientale de François I^{er} (1522-1541)", *Revue Historique*, tom. 113, 1913, 64-83, 268-308.

port of Valona two days before the land army, on July 11, an impressive feat of coordination.³⁰³

Albania, especially Valona, was not a random choice for the imperial center for operations of the 1537 Campaign. Valona had been a *sancak* of Ottoman Rumelia since 1417 and Albania was mostly under the Ottoman control. The port of Valona, situated opposite of Brindisi, was the nearest Ottoman dominion from which to cross to Apulia and beneficial for the armada in terms of supplying the necessary food, munitions and auxiliary forces. Moreover, Albania was an item on the Ottoman policy agenda since chronic local unrest especially in the mountainous countryside,³⁰⁴ had been shaking the control of the Ottoman governors.³⁰⁵ The Ottomans overrun northern Epirus by the late fourteenth-century however the regions close to the Adriatic shores were not under the strict Ottoman control. The towns like Himara³⁰⁶ and Buthtotum³⁰⁷, opposite Corfu from the mainland, were controlled by the local authorities being in close contacts with the Venetians, as well as the Habsburgs. Thus, in order to consolidate the imperial rule in the entire Albanian territory and to suppress the insurrections, the Ottomans needed to limit the sphere of influences of the local authorities. In that context, the maneuver of the Ottoman

³⁰³ Danişmend, 193.

³⁰⁴ Mainly the insurrections and attacks headed by Uskoks.

³⁰⁵ Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 25. See also: Machiel Kiel, “Avlonya”, *DİA*, v.4, 118-120; idem, “Avlonya” *EI*^{THREE}, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-of-islam-3/avlonya-COM_23858, consulted online on November 13, 1017.

³⁰⁶ Himara (Himera) was the name of the ancient city in southern Albania, situated between Ceraunian Mountains and the Ionian Sea. The people of the city, after the Ottoman control over the region, refused to pay taxes to the Ottoman government, escaped to the high mountainous regions and organized as small bandit groups. See: Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 425-426. Setton, v. 4, 903. The city is called as Cimara or Cimera in the Italian texts.

³⁰⁷ Buthrotum (*Butrinto* (it)) was an ancient Greek and Roman city in Epirus, which is situated in the Vlorë County in Albania, close to the Greek border. The city was the closest point tying Corfu to the mainland.

Sultan had two main dimensions: the navy would reach Apulia via Valona, as had been agreed with the French delegate in 1536, and with the presence of the Sultan, the region would be intimidated and totally controlled by the Ottoman land forces.

The Ottoman land army and the naval forces met at Valona in mid-July and there, the Sultan called together his court to plan specific military maneuvers.³⁰⁸ Accordingly, Süleyman ordered Lütfi Pasha³⁰⁹ to take the lead of the Ottoman armada, carrying the high-ranking commanders of Rumelia and numerous Janissaries and cavalrymen to attack Habsburg possessed Apulia. Thereby, although southern Italian regions were used to experiencing numerous attacks by the Ottoman corsairs, even Barbaossa's as it was briefly discussed above, for the first time after 1480, Apulia would be the stage for an organized Ottoman campaign. In other words, Süleyman would revive the plan of Mehmed II, his great-grand father.

3.2.2. "The Turk" in Italy: Reactions to the Ottoman Campaign and the Military Maneuvers in Apulia

Thanks to the information-gathering networks and the efforts of the diplomatic mission, the *aviso* on the Sultan's organization of a campaign in the Italian Peninsula had already been disseminated throughout Italy and the Habsburg Empire. The fear of a possible Ottoman attack had resulted in the neutrality of the Pope in Habsburg-

³⁰⁸ Before the Sultan's arrival at Valona, a letter by Yunus Bey was sent to Venice, in which the Republic was asked to send an ambassador to the imperial camp to salute the Sultan. The *bailo* of Venice, Tommaso Mocenigo was on his way of return; thus, the Senate charged Valerio Orsini. Orsini would reach Valona when the campaign had already initiated. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 424.

³⁰⁹ Most of the sources discussing the Ottoman attack of Apulia in 1537, Hayreddin Barbarossa is noted as the commander of the armada, directly participating into the attacks. However, the accounts of Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa, consulted by the author of the present study, clearly demonstrate that the famous Admiral was in charge of watching over the sea-front and the Ottoman navy during the Apulia campaign. The reader may find the details in the following chapter, discussing how the Ottoman sources evaluate the Campaign of 1537. See: Chapter Four.

Valois encounter in 1536. The defense of Italy was vital for the Holy See. In the light of some of the news voiced by the French diplomats in Rome.³¹⁰ Pope Paul III even considered evacuating Rome.³¹¹

Venice was also on alert: especially after the death of İbrahim Pasha, relations with the Ottoman Empire entered a new phase. The refusal of the Venetian Senate to ally with the French King and the Ottoman Sultan to attack the Habsburg dominions increased political tension. The Republic had been accused of being in secret alliance with the Habsburg Emperor by the Ottomans. Süleyman had already declared to the Venetian *bailo* in Constantinople via his pashas that the attitude of the Republic in terms of favoring the Habsburg Emperor and assisting him, apparently or in secret, had been noticed by himself and he would directly declare war on Venice if the Republic insisted on violating the rules of the existing *ahidnâme*.³¹² The Republic, as usual, tried to deal with these problems diplomatically; but in 1537, most of the channels were blocked. Therefore, the Republic strengthened the defense of Venetian possessions. The number of galleys was increased to 100 and Girolamo Pesaro was appointed as the Captain General of the Venetian armada. 10 galley-captains, elected by the *Consiglio dei Dieci*, would also assist Pesaro, who would be in full command of all matters of navigation, discipline and the administration of justice.³¹³ The

³¹⁰ A possible Ottoman attack to Rome was also speculated. For detailed information see: Charrière, v. 1, 330-340.

³¹¹ Ibid; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, v. 2, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 546.

³¹² Ursu, 100-101.

³¹³ Paruta, p.1, l.8, 355. The Venetian Senate invested full authority to Pesaro concerning the Ottoman Campaign of 1537. The General was authorized to open all letters sent to the Venetian government to take necessary measures in time. Pesaro should confer with Alessandro Contarini and Francesco Pasqualigo, other *provveditori* of the fleet but in all matters related to navigation, discipline and the administration of justice he was in full command. He was given the authority of punishing anyone, even to capital punishment. Pesaro was responsible for the food and munition supply for the fleet and

extensive power given to Pesaro by the Venetian government reflects how seriously the Republic evaluated the actual situation. In the summer of 1537, Venetian galleys would head to the Adriatic and Pesaro would sail for Corfu.³¹⁴

Another close observer of the Ottomans was Andrea Doria. In response to the call of the Papacy, Charles V agreed to put Andrea Doria in charge of the defense of Italy. In the summer of 1537, Doria, with his forces, sailed towards Corfu. In his letter to Minister Figuerda, dated July 14, 1537, Andrea Doria informed the Emperor that the Ottoman armada was followed by supply ships and ships carrying many armed soldiers sent from Alexandria. The Admiral also states that after having checked and organized his forces, he would leave the port of Corfu.³¹⁵ His presence in the Adriatic would change the course of war.

As was noted above, the target of the Ottoman armada was Apulia. Instead of well-fortified Brindisi or Otranto, the Ottoman forces landed at Taranto first³¹⁶, eight miles from Otranto. From Italian chronicles and further studies discussing the Ottoman Campaign of 1537, it seems that this advice was gathered from an Italian attendee of the Ottoman armada: Troilo Pignatello, a noble of Naples, whose brother had been beheaded by the Viceroy of Naples, Pietro di Toledo. According to the

in case of necessity he would remind the commander of the Ottoman fleet that Venice had the right of custody over Naxos and other islands in the Archipelago, according to the existing peace with the Ottomans. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 423.

³¹⁴ Doria's use of the port of Corfu might have annoyed the Ottomans considering that thanks to their efficient information gathering networks they most probably got informed about the Venetian permission for the use of their main naval base. It might be also considered as a proof for Habsburg-Venetian alliance by the Ottomans. Next chapter of this present study will discuss how the Ottomans viewed the Habsburg-Venetian cooperation in 1537. See: Chapter Four.

³¹⁵ Muzaffer Arıkan and Paolino Toledo published the correspondences of Andrea Doria and Spanish Generals conserved in the Spanish archives. See: Muzaffer Arıkan, Paolino Toledo, "Türk Deniz Tarihi ile İlgili Belgeler V: III. Barış Arayışı: Andrea Doria ile Hayrettin Paşa Arasındaki Müzakereler (1537-1540)", *OTAM*, No.6, 1995, 387-407. For the Doria's letter mentioned in the text see: *Ibid.*, 391.

³¹⁶ The town had been the possession of Mercurino Gattinara, died in 1530.

story they narrate, Pignatello came to Constantinople with his men and applied to the Ottoman Sultan to restore his authority in Naples in 1533.³¹⁷ His presence with the Ottoman armada was thought to be important so as to have the support of local people and opponents of the Viceroy, which would give the Ottomans the upper hand in trying to control the region.³¹⁸ Approximately 10.000 Ottoman soldiers moved then to Castro and Otranto. Numerous small fortresses were captured, the towns were burned and plundered and many people were captured, including women.³¹⁹ Giovio notes that “[...] such that from Taranto to Brindisi, the entire territory of Otranto was troubled by fear and great danger [...]”³²⁰.

The attacks on Apulia were realized by a relatively small branch of the Ottoman imperial army, recruited for 1537. According to Kenneth M. Setton, the attack on Apulia may have been a diversion, or an exploratory thrust to observe whether the French forces were ready to attack Piedmont, as had been agreed, upon the forces of Charles V in the Po Valley.³²¹ However, in April and May 1537, Francis I moved his

³¹⁷ Iacomo Bosio mentions that Pignatello was a brave and opportunist Neapolitan warrior. He persuaded the Sultan by announcing that the forces of Charles V had been in Piedmont, dealing with the French, and he could easily invade Naples, since the Neapolitans were suffering from the high taxation pursued by the Emperor they would revolt against him following his invasion. Iacomo Bosio, *Dell’Istoria della Sacra Religione et Illustrissima Militia di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano*, p.3, l.9, (Rome, 1602), 169. As the commander of light cavalry, Pignatello had also participated into the Italian wars and fought with Papal and Habsburg forces in Vicenza in 1516 and in 1521. See: Sanudo, v.22, cols. 81, 226; v. 31, col.232.

³¹⁸ See: Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 424; Villosa, 147b-148a; Guglielmotti, v.1, 434. The story of Pignatello was also discussed in the Venetian accounts on Ottoman Campaign of 1537, which will be discussed in the Chapter Five. Here, it should be noted that in the Ottoman chronicles, consulted for this study, there is no reference to Troilo Pignatello.

³¹⁹ Danişmend, 194; Zinkeisen, 546; Renzo Sèrtoli Salis, Muhteşem Süleyman, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), 152.

³²⁰ “[...] talche da Taranto fino a Brindisi, tutta terra d’Otranto era travagliata da paura e pericolo [...]”. Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l.36, 425.

³²¹ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 431.

forces to Picardie and Artois in northern France.³²² By late July, the Ottomans were now in southeastern Italy but there was no sign of the French in the northern Italy. When the Ottoman land army came to Valona, the French Ambassador, Jean de la Forest, received a letter from Francis I announcing that despite the fact that he had captured most of Flanders, after having been informed that the Ottoman Sultan had set out on campaign in accordance with the plans made a year before, he left the region; returned to Lyon and was waiting for the army that he would use to attack Italy. The French King also mentioned that he had ordered his fleet, composed of 30 galleys, 12 *bastardas* and a number of *barcas* and cogs to proceed to meet the Ottoman armada.³²³ However, the operations in Piedmont could not be initiated simultaneously with the Ottoman attacks. Even the aforementioned French fleet, sent to operate with the Ottoman armada, under the command of the Bertrand d'Ornezan, Baron of Saint-Blancard did not sail east from Marseilles until August 15.³²⁴

The Ottoman-French joint venture of 1537 was indeed a fiasco: The French King could not send his army to Italy in July because Charles V had counterattacked at Th rouanne in northern France. When Francis left for Italy³²⁵, it was too late to coordinate his campaign with the campaign of the Ottoman Sultan.³²⁶ The French

³²² Ibid, 430; Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 118.

³²³ "Report of the news sent from king of France to his ambassador", TSMA, E. 2990 cited in Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 118. For brief information about the differences between the ships, see: Appendix A.

³²⁴ Ibid. For the Baron of Saint-Blancard, see: Pierre Grillon, "La Croisi re de Baron de Saint-Blancard, 1537-1538" *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, vol. 15, no : 4, 1968, 624-661.

³²⁵ The fire between the Habsburg and French forces stopped after the Peace of Bomy, dated July 31, 1537. Grillon, 628.

³²⁶ Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 119.

fleet, on the other hand, met with Hayreddin Pasha near Prevesa on September 9.³²⁷ Baron de Saint-Blancard reached the Ottoman imperial camp, but he was not able to persuade the Ottoman Sultan to plunder not only Apulia but Sicily and the Marches of Ancona as well. French forces would invade Italy and recapture Piedmont only in October 1537 after the Ottoman campaign had ended.³²⁸ The absence of the French also changed the course of Ottoman campaign. The attacks in Apulia could not go beyond a substantial plundering expedition.³²⁹

3.2.3. All Il Roads Lead to Corfu?: Encounters at Sea and the Ottoman Siege of Corfu

As was mentioned in the previous pages, the gigantic armada sent to the Adriatic and the large army led by the Sultan alarmed the Papacy, the Republic of Venice and the Habsburg Emperor. However, Ottoman military machine prevented each party to engage in any attack on Ottoman forces, which might orient the Ottoman fire to their own territories. Instead, not only the Habsburgs, but also the Venetians and Papacy preferred to be in defense for any possible Ottoman attack. For that reason, all forces were watching the circumstances and trying to position themselves accordingly.

Venice had to act cautiously: the suspicions of the Ottomans about Venice could easily change the target of the campaign to a Venetian dominion. Therefore, when the *Serenissima* sent its forces to watch over the Ottoman maneuvers and to defend the strategical Venetian dominions, the Captain General of the Venetian armada

³²⁷ Grillon, 639.

³²⁸ Isom-Verhaaren, *Alliance with the Infidel*, 119.

³²⁹ Actually, if the Ottomans had actually landed an army in the Marches of Ancona, the Habsburg situation would have been much more serious. Apulia was always a strategically bad target for any real cooperation because of the geographical limitations.

Girolamo Pesaro was clearly warned not to disrupt the peace, by engaging in an open conflict with any of the belligerents, which would overturn the neutrality of Venice. However, the personal initiatives of the Venetian captains changed the course of the campaign of 1537. The Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships, followed by Doria's attacks. While the Ottomans were ravaging Apulia and capturing towns and castles, the maritime theatre suddenly heated up.

3.2.3.1. Violating the Peace: Ottoman-Venetian Encounters in Adriatic and the Role of Andrea Doria

The Ottoman armada reached the Port of Valona in mid-July through the Gulf of Corfu, where a number of Venetian galleys under the command of Pesaro had been positioned to watch the events and to assist in the defense of the Venetian dominions and the Adriatic, without any Venetian opposition: the Ottoman and Venetian ships had saluted each other according to sea custom and to the requirements of the peace between the states.³³⁰ However, the commander³³¹ of the galley of Zadar took an aggressive stance against the Ottoman cargo ships, *schirazzi*³³², coming from Alexandria and carrying provisions for the campaign, on July 13.³³³ This was not acceptable to Süleyman: Venice should act according to the requirements of the existing peace and promptly recompense the loss.

³³⁰ Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l.36, 424.

³³¹ *Sopracomito* (it.)

³³² *Schirazzo* (it.), *schriazzi* (pl.)

³³³ Guglielmotti, v.1, 436. Giovio, on the other hand, noted that the attack was realized by Andrea Doria, sailing around Cefalonia. See: Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 425.

To pass the aforementioned request of the Sultan, Yunus Bey was sent to Admiral Pesaro at Corfu, by two galleys and a *galeotta*. However, Venetian captains securing the Channel attacked the Ottoman ships. The galley of the Ottoman ambassador was chased and landed at Himara. The majority of the crew in the galleys were killed and the rest of them, including Yunus Bey, were imprisoned.³³⁴ General Pesaro, after having noticed the incident, sent Francesco Zeno to rescue the ambassador by paying ransom to the Himarans and to send him back to the Valona.³³⁵ Venice tried to apologize by punishing the actors in the attack severely and corresponding with Giacomo da Canale, Venetian ambassador in the Ottoman imperial camp at Valona, to persuade the Sultan of the Republic's willingness to secure the peace with him.³³⁶

However, the Venetian captains could not be totally controlled: during the course of campaign Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships continued and caused the loss of soldiers and a significant amount of provisions. In addition to the Venetian attacks, Ottoman ships came under Doria's fire in late July: on July 22, Andrea Doria met 12 Ottoman galleys, left behind by the main body of ships at night, while he was sailing around the Diapontia Islands.³³⁷ The forces of Doria attacked the galleys; plundered them and in the conclusion of a bloody battle most of their crews either died or jumped into the sea.³³⁸ In his letter to Charles V, dated to July 29, 1537, the Admiral

³³⁴ Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 425-426; Guglielmotti, v.1, 437-438.

³³⁵ Giovio reflect this attack also as a deed of Andrea Doria. See: Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l.36, 425-426. Following the incident, Pesaro wrote to Venetian Senate to ask the permission of punishing the responsible of such a provocative venture. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. 3, 425.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Diapontia Islands are island complex in the Ionians Sea, in the northwest of Corfu. (six km. to Corfu) One of the main islands among them is the island of Ereikoussa, Merlera in Italian. In the contemporary Italian texts, the islands are called as the Islands of Merlere (*isole Merlere*).

³³⁸ Paruta, l. 7, 369. Alfonso Villosa and Paolo Giovio mention that the attacks were commanded by Antonio Doria, cousin of Andrea Doria and add that the Admiral frustrated in face to such an event since it could trigger Barbarossa, being closer to the Doria's forces. See: Villosa, 148b; Giovio, *Delle*

pointed out that despite he had the chance of capturing all the Ottoman galleys by the extraordinary efforts of his forces, Ottomans had left his galleys in a very vulnerable position. To protect his forces, he had to retreat to Messina. Doria also adds that he needed to stay there to secure his forces and to offer his best for the Emperor as required.³³⁹

The aforementioned encounters at sea during the Ottoman Campaign convinced the Sultan, and his commanders that Venice was in secret alliance with the Habsburg Emperor and his admiral, Doria, and had broken the peace with the Ottoman sultan. In addition to the attacks, the Barbarossa's men had captured two letters written by Andrea Doria to the Venetian captain general, Pesaro.³⁴⁰ In his study of the history of the Ottoman Empire, Zinkeisen, who consulted mainly the records of the Venetian Senate and correspondences between the ambassadors and state officers, argues that Doria intentionally transmitted the letters into the hands of the Ottoman couriers in the course of struggles, to provoke the Ottomans against Venice. By this tactical maneuver by the Admiral, the Apulian territories would be secured from the Ottoman

Istoria del Suo Tempo, l. 36, 426-427. Antonio Doria was a Genovese captain who had officially joined the Habsburg Imperial fleet and become a vassal of Charles V in 1533. He also undersigned a work narrating military and political events taking place in the reign of Charles V. His account was composed on 1560's, and first published in 1571. Antonio Doria, *Compendio d'Antonio Doria delle Cose di Sua Notitia e Memoria Occorse al Mondo nel Tempo dell'Imperatore Carlo Quinto*, (Genoa: Bellone, 1571). For further information about Antonio Doria and a detailed analysis of *Compendio* in comparison to other contemporary Italian narratives about the theme within the context of the concept of "universal Empire", see: Matteo Salonia, "Charles V's Universal Empire in the *Compendio* of Antonio Doria", *Renaissance Studies*, (first published online, August 19, 2017), DOI: 10.1111/rest.12324, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rest.12324/epdf>, accessed on November 18, 2017.

³³⁹ "Letter of Andrea Doria to the Emperor", Muzaffer Arıkan, Paolino Toledo, "Türk Deniz Tarihi ile İlgili Belgeler", 392. Giovio and Villosa also note that the Admiral first sailed to Paxos and, after having noticed that Barbarossa was coming on his forces, Doria retreated to Messina. Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 426-427; Villosa, 148b.

³⁴⁰ Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de la Forest", 324.

threat by redirecting it to the dominions of the Republic, which had been trying to secure the peace with the Ottoman Sultan at any cost.³⁴¹

Such an analysis based on the official attitude of the Republic, seems to be consistent at first sight; however, one should keep in mind that in the process of war, communication between the commanders, watching out for the same threat, could not be regarded as so strange. Taking into consideration that the Venetian Captain General Pesaro, had been already authorized to open all letters sent to the *Serenissima* to take necessary measures, and given the supreme authority in naval operations by the Venetian government, his sharing of intelligence about the moves of the Ottomans with the Habsburg Admiral would not be totally impossible. The presence of Andrea Doria, so close to Corfu is meaningful too. Although the Venetian forces were ordered not to be a part of struggles between Habsburg and Ottoman forces, Pesaro's ineffectiveness in preventing such an encounter near Corfu should be evaluated beyond his limited foresight: Venice was also at peace with the Habsburg Emperor and the Republic ought to share information with the Habsburgs as well. Any confrontation with the Habsburgs might have put the Republic in another difficult situation, hard to be faced.

As was mentioned above, the Republic had already been accused of being in secret alliance with the Habsburg Emperor by the Ottoman government. The Venetian attacks on Ottoman ships, the capture of Yunus Bey, coupled with the deeds of Doria in July 1537, when the Ottomans were in an offensive against the Habsburg Emperor in Italy, were seen as breaking of the existing peace and as a *casus belli* by the Ottoman Sultan, advised in this mainly by Barbarossa. The war against Charles V

³⁴¹ Zinkeisen, v.2, 549. Pierre Grillon also agrees with that hypothesis. Grillon, 638.

turned against Venice and the island of Corfu became the new stage: this would be the end of 34 years of peace between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire.

3.2.3.2. The Crescent Attacking “a Crescent”: The Ottoman Siege of Corfu

The Island of Corfu, possessed by the Venetians since 1386, became the new target of the Ottoman campaign, in August 1537. The question of whether the crescent form of the island, being under the Christian cross, was another motivation for the Ottomans is open to speculation, though with no actual evidence. However, besides its being the closest Venetian dominion, which could easily be reached by the Ottoman forces, in the course of 1537 Campaign; the strategical importance of the island and its meaning for the *Serenissima* made it obviously an important target for fire. Corfu, thanks to its position, was perceived as one of the most important Venetian dominions, watching over the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and the sea route to and from the lagoon city. For that reason, the island was well-fortified against attacks by the Venetian government. Even before the Ottoman campaign in 1537, as was discussed earlier, the defense of the island had been strengthened and the captain general of Venice had been sent to Corfu to watch the moves of the Ottomans. In that context, the loss of Corfu to the Ottomans and the consolidation of Ottoman power in the Adriatic would have created vulnerability for Venice, as well as for the entire Italian Peninsula.

Here, it should be underlined that the island was not initially on the Ottoman agenda for 1537 though the strategic position of Corfu had already been observed almost a century ago. Following the conquest of Modone in 1499, Corfu started to be

considered as the key the Adriatic by the Ottomans, opening the route to the Gulf of Venice. Even in the time of Sultan Bayezid II, the Ottomans had an eye on Corfu with a view of breaking the hegemony of the Venetians in the Mediterranean.³⁴² The *relazione* of Pietro Zen, the Venetian orator and vice *bailo* in Constantinople, dated to 1524, demonstrates that the former Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha and other Ottoman pashas had also plans for Corfu. Since the Grand Vizier was in the Ottoman campaign in Egypt in 1524, Zen could have been able to consult with the Third Vizier of Süleyman, Mustafa Pasha. Zen informed the *Serenissima* that although İbrahim Pasha was intending to secure the peace existing between Venice and the Ottoman Sultan –since the Ottoman armada was not powerful enough- he and other pashas in the government who had an eye on Corfu, perceived the island as a stepping stone to reach all that the Ottomans desired to have. Zen also underlines that he was advised by Mustafa Pasha to warn the Republic to act according to the will of Sultan, by taking into consideration the aforementioned desire of conquering Corfu and by remembering the fact that the Sultan had already conquered Belgrade and Rhodes, by which Süleyman had showed his power to realize his desires. His conversations with the Pasha led Zen to advise the Venetian Senate to take necessary measures for Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia, already in 1524.³⁴³

The Third Vizier might have intended to intimidate the Venetian ambassador by “revealing” the imperial plans over Corfu and Venetian possessions in general, in

³⁴² In the famous book of Pîrî Reis, *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye*, it is mentioned that the famous Admiral of Bayezid II, used to point out that Venice had two eyes; the left one being the castle of Modone and the right one being the Island of Corfu and by taking his advises the Sultan engaged in a campaign for the conquest of Corfu but he could not have accomplished it because of the end of the sea season for war. Bostan, “Korfu”, 201. Maria Pia Pedani also cites the related passage in her article. See: Pedani, “Ottoman Merchants in Adriatic”, 156. Katip Çelebi, whose work on Ottoman Maritime Wars, which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter of this study also notes the statements of Pîrî Reis. See: Kâtip Çelebi, 50-51.

³⁴³ See: Alberi, s.3, v.3, 93-97, 96-97. The Venetians had been afraid from a possible Ottoman attack to Corfu even in 1533. See: Sanudo, v. 58, col. 12.

order to force the Republic to act according to the will of the Sultan. However, the statements of Mustafa Pasha, noted by Pietro Zen also reveal that possessing Corfu was a matter of discussion within the Ottoman government. The policy-makers of the Ottoman Empire were the high-ranking state bureaucrats and one should remember that in the sixteenth-century they were closely following developments and formulated their strategies accordingly.³⁴⁴ In that context, the strategical importance of the island as a naval base³⁴⁵, which was needed by the Ottomans for their future plans could not have been overlooked by the Ottoman government, especially by İbrahim Pasha, formulating the “grand strategy” of the early sixteenth-century.

However, what motivated the Ottomans to attack Corfu was the disappointing venture of Apulia and Doria’s and the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during the Ottoman campaign in 1537. In mid- August, the Ottoman campaign was far from its actual targets: the French army had not shown itself in northern Italy; thus the Ottomans did not transport the rest of its soldiers to the Peninsula. The attacks on Apulia remained as *ad-hoc* expedition of pillage. The Ottomans had been in Valona with a gigantic land army. Their only meaningful success was the suppression of the rebellious Albanians by the efforts of the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha and the Second Vizier Mustafa Pasha, while the armada was in Apulia.³⁴⁶ Such a great campaign, designed to be a display of power to Charles V needed to be concluded with significant gains. For that reason, the attacks of Venetians and Andrea Doria created the pretext for the Ottomans to open a new front in the course of campaign: it would be also a punishment for Venice for its betrayal.

³⁴⁴ Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 14.

³⁴⁵ Remember the discussions on galley warfare in the sixteenth-century and on the need for secured fortified naval bases for the galley fleets of the states. See: Chapter Two.

³⁴⁶ See: Chapter IV

According to the Italian chronicles, the one who wholeheartedly advocated the attack on Corfu was Hayreddin Barbarossa.³⁴⁷ Following the return of the armada headed by Lütü Pasha to Valona³⁴⁸, Süleyman ordered the Pasha and Barbarossa to attack Corfu; he moved, with the land army, to the city of Buthrotum, opposite Corfu on the mainland.

The Venetian Senate, at that time, was desperate to prevent the war, using its well-known diplomacy. In a letter dated to August 23, the Senate writes to the *bailo* Alessandro Orsino, being in the imperial camp of Süleyman, as following:

[...] having received the present letter you should go to the magnificent pashas to whom you will insist beginning with such general and affectionate words as shall seem best to your prudence [...] that our *Signoria* has felt and feels the greatest displeasure and distress at the disorders that have occurred, which are truly events (*succesi*) contrary to our expectation and desire, which is firmly and immutably fixed upon observing inviolably the peace which we have the most serene Grand Signore [...]³⁴⁹

However it was too late: two days later, the Ottoman Attack on Corfu commenced.

On August 25, 25.000 soldiers and 30 cannons were transferred to Corfu by the Ottomans.³⁵⁰ Four days later Ayas and Mustafa and Mehmed Pashas- the latter was the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia- with their forces joined the attack.³⁵¹ During the first assault, a commercial ship of a Corfiote merchant was also captured and the merchant sent to the city center to ask for the surrender of the island, to secure the

³⁴⁷ Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, l. 36, 427; Villosa, 148b. Zinkeisen points out that the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha insisted on securing peace with the Venetian Republic but Barbarossa was able to convince the Sultan that the Venetian should be punished for their deeds. Zinkeisen, v.2 550.

³⁴⁸ August 14 See: Feridun Bey, *Mecmu'a-i Münşeat*, 600.

³⁴⁹ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 425.

³⁵⁰ Danişmend, 195; Bostan, "Korfu", 202.

³⁵¹ İdris Bostan mentions that in order to transfer the soldiers and the munitions, the ships were probably bound each other and created a bridge between the main land and the coast of the Island. According the Bostan, the total number of the soldiers, landed on Corfu was 50.000 and the bombardment was conducted by 50 cannons. Bostan, "Korfu", 202.

lives of the local people and their properties. However, the Corfiots reacted to the Ottomans with a bombardment. This was the start of the bloody events.

Ottoman cannons bombarded the castles; the walls were partly destroyed, by which time the soldiers started to penetrate inside. The villages, houses and the market of the Island put under fire; local people had to enter into the well-strengthened castles; the rest were captured by the Ottoman raiders. According to Villosa, 16.000 Corfiots were taken prisoner by the Ottomans, among them there were also women and children.³⁵² The Ottomans were almost in the city center; all the forts were destroyed except the Castle of Sant' Angelo. The Venetian officers, commanding the defense of the Island, Luigi da Riva and Simon Leone, were worried because the food and munitions supply of the island would not be sufficient for a long resistance.³⁵³ The Corfiots needed assistance against the Ottomans.

The defense of Corfu was desperately important for Venice. Under such a threat, the Venetian Senate asked the Pope and Andrea Doria to assist in the defense of the Island, for the sake of Christianity by underlining that if Corfu fell into the hands of the Ottomans, their next step would be Brindisi and Messina.³⁵⁴ The Senate wrote to the local governors of Corfu that food and the fleet were on their way to their relief.³⁵⁵ Captain General Pesaro had already been ordered to proceed to Brindisi in order to unite all Venetian ships and the fleet of the Papacy. The Republic also increased the size of its naval armament; but no plans were made for a direct attack

³⁵² Villosa, 149b.

³⁵³ Giovio, *Delle Istoria del Suo Tempo*, 1.36, 429.

³⁵⁴ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. 3, 426.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 425-426.

upon the Ottoman fleet and soldiers on Corfu.³⁵⁶ Moreover, instead of joining the Venetians, Andrea Doria sailed to Genoa for any possible attack by the French. The Corfiots were alone against the Ottomans.

Not the Habsburg Emperor, but the Ottoman Sultan aided the Corfiots: although the Ottoman soldiers penetrated into the island and almost all castles were destroyed the Sultan ended the expedition, on the grounds that the season for war had already concluded and heavy rains and epidemics had started to harm the Ottoman soldiers. Although Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa tried to persuade him against this by saying that the conquest was about to be completed, on September 6 the attacks ended and in nine days all forces were evacuated from Corfu.³⁵⁷

The liberation of Corfu, the “most important and loveliest” dominion of the Venetian Republic, from the Ottoman threat was enthusiastically celebrated in Venice. On the morning of September 29, Venetian senators gathered at the Piazza San Marco with the “greatest concourse” of the citizens to render thanks for the news of the Süleyman’s failure in Corfu. The Senate wrote a rhetorical letter of appreciation to the local government of Corfu for heroically resisting the Ottoman attacks.³⁵⁸ The wholehearted defense of the Corfiots and the return of the Ottoman forces back to Constantinople also relieved the Papacy. Pope Paul III invited the Venetian ambassadors in Rome to dinner to celebrate the victory.³⁵⁹ He also had stamped a

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 427.

³⁵⁷ Feridun Bey, *Mecmu’a-i Münşeat*, 601.

³⁵⁸ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v.3, 427.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

symbolic medallion representing a dolphin that overwhelmed a serpent, in memory of the victory of Christianity.³⁶⁰

3.3. Re-Analyzing the Ottoman Campaign of 1537

Did the “dolphin” really overwhelm the “serpent”? Was the Ottoman withdrawal from Apulia and Corfu a turning point for the history of Italy and that of Christianity? Apulia was severely ravaged, as was the island of Corfu, many people died in battles and the peace between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire was breached after 34 years. If there was a victory who had the greatest part of it? What was the significance of the 1537 campaign for Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and for Ottoman-Venetian relations? The narrative of 1537 gives the historian relevant information about the Ottoman campaign and how the Ottomans turned their arms on Venetian Corfu. However, in order to analyze and place the campaign within the Ottoman-Venetian-Habsburg relations of the early sixteenth-century, the historian needs to discuss the aforementioned questions.

The ones who celebrated victory in 1537 were not only the Pope and the Venetians; the Ottomans too perceived the campaign as successful. Eyyûbî, a sixteenth-century Ottoman poet, describes the Ottoman campaign as a great conquest that the hearts of the “infidels” were fired.³⁶¹ Taking into consideration the destruction of the cities and

³⁶⁰ Guglielmotti, v.1, 445.

³⁶¹ “[...] *Asıl Polya’da olmuştur temâşa/Yakup yıkdukda anı Lütî Paşa/ Esir oldu anun hep cümle vâri/ Oda yandı anun deyr ü diyârı/ Ki andan geldi Körföz’e donanma/ Diyeyim sana anı dinle amma/ Yakub başdan başa yakdılar anı/ Esir oldu anun pîr ü civânı/ Donanma hod denizde kimi buldı/ Döge döge anı hep cümle aldı/ İşidicek bu fethi cümle küffâr/ Belâ vü rence oldular giriftâr/ Didiler bize yakın geldi âfet/ Yüreklerinde şimdi bu cerâhat.*” Eyyûbî, *Menâkıb-ı Sultan Süleyman (Risâle-i Pâdişâh-nâme)*, ed. by. Mehmet Akkuş, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991), 90. For detailed information about Eyyûbî and his work see: Robert Anhegger, “Eyyûbî’nin Menâkıb-ı Sultan Süleymanı”, *İ.Ü Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, v.1, no: 1, (1949), 119-138.

towns in Apulia and the Ottoman penetration into Corfu, the respectable amount of booty, numerous captives, the subordination of the Albanians and the attempts of Barbarossa to take the other Ionian Islands under Ottoman control on his return journey were enough to give at least partial satisfaction to both the Sultan and his soldiers. However, what the Ottomans got in 1537 was hardly what they intended to achieve.

The narrative of the Campaign clearly demonstrates that the main intention of the Ottoman Sultan was to invade Apulia in 1537. The campaign was planned to be a joint Ottoman-French attack to Italy. If the French had penetrated into Lombardy, the Habsburg and Italian defense would have been divided into two separate fronts, thus the Ottoman could have easily controlled the region. However, the French had not arrived in Lombardy by mid-July when the Ottoman soldiers landed at Apulia. After having been informed about a possible Ottoman attack to Italy, the Kingdom of Naples had already strengthened the defense lines and auxiliary Spanish corps had been already located in the region to assist its defense.³⁶² Therefore, the Ottoman invasion could not result in a complete control of the region; the attacks remained as merely an Ottoman display of power, not different than the previous attacks of Barbarossa.

Here, it is necessary to discuss why the Ottomans intended to invade Apulia in 1537. Was it an attempt to invade Italy and to capture Rome? According to Halil İnalcık, the actual plan was set on the conquest of Italy, in particular of Rome.³⁶³ Although,

³⁶² See: Mambrino Rosea, Tommaso Costo, *Del Compendio Dell'Istoria del Regno di Napoli-Seconda Parte*, (Venice, 1591), 82b-83a. Sicily also assisted the defense of the region. The Sicilian parliament gave financial support to the Emperor and sent 10.000 soldiers to assist the defense. See: Gioseppe Buonfiglio Costanzo, *Prima Parte dell'Historia Siciliana*, (Venice: Bonifacio Ciara, 1604), 449.

³⁶³ İnalcık, "State, Sovereignty and Law", 68; idem, "Avrupa Devletler Sistemi", 129-130; idem, "Akdeniz ve Türkler", 160.

there is no clear evidence to prove this argument, beside some addresses attributed to Süleyman in the Italian sources, the historian should keep in mind the imperial policy of the Ottomans in the sixteenth-century, based on the claims of universal sovereignty, to be achieved by the conquest of “Red Apple”.³⁶⁴ The author argues that the 1537 initiative was formulated against the rising power of Charles V in Italy and in the western Mediterranean. As was discussed in the previous chapter, following his coronation in Bologna, Charles V had personally commanded in Tunis and was able to overthrow Ottoman control by restoring the authority of the Hafsid Dynasty, to be his vassal and his victory was celebrated in Italy as a victory of Christendom, as a new crusade against the “Turks”. His conquest was a decisive maneuver for the defense of Spain and southern Italy, but more importantly it assured his image as “world emperor” and as “defender of the faith”. In this context, it would not be wrong to believe that Süleyman might have intended to respond –like he did in 1526, 1529 and in 1532- in a region that Charles V would have considered his inherited realm, in the center of Christianity. Moreover, the reports of the French ambassador in Venice, suggests that the Ottomans had already planned an attack on Italy, even in 1532. The reports of the Venetian *baili* in Constantinople also prove that Italy was a main item in the Ottoman agenda of conquest.³⁶⁵ Taking into consideration all these elements, it could be argued that in 1537, the Ottomans only began to put into operation a plan that they had already made.

³⁶⁴ See: Chapter Two.

³⁶⁵ See: Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics”, 12. The relazione of the Venetian *bailo* Marco Minio could exemplify this perception: “[...] *il Signor voleva far tre imprese l’una di Rodi, l’altra di Ungheria, le quali ha fatte, la terza manca a far, la qual non può esser altro che Italia.*” (“[...] the Signor wanted to make three conquests, one of Rhodes, the other of Hungary, which he had realized, the third, which could not be other than the conquest of Italy, is waiting for to be realized.” See: Albèri, s.3, v.3, 116

Here it should be also underlined that the campaign, designed here to be a joint Ottoman-French maneuver in both northern and southern Italy was a reproduction of the Mehmed II's maneuvers in the late fifteenth-century. Similarly, Mehmed II had tried to penetrate into Venetian Friuli by swift attacks of Ottoman raiders and the Ottoman fleet had invaded Otranto in 1480. The former attack was not a simultaneous coordinated Ottoman operation. The invasion of Otranto was realized almost seven years after the raiders' attacks into Friuli, the death of the Sultan in the imperial camp prevented the successful culmination of the campaign. In 1537, by a simultaneous attack, this time simultaneously with the French forces, Süleyman might have intended a swift and successful result.

In that context, the question of why the Sultan engaged in a joint operation with the French King needs to be discussed. As was discussed above, the complex political conjuncture of the early sixteenth century had already laid the milestones for the Ottoman-French convergence against the common enemy, Charles V. The Ottoman-French alliance did not appreciate in the Christian milieu; but for the Ottomans it was more than beneficial. The French King had planned to force the Emperor to engage in multiple expeditions in Italy. Moreover, he also provided for the Ottomans a legitimate base for their intervention in the struggles between these two Christian monarchs promising some local support in the Kingdom of Naples.³⁶⁶ As was mentioned before, the German expedition the Sultan was reflected by İbrahim Pasha as an attempt for securing the French and Protestants, who were facing the persecutions of Charles V, who had even destroyed Rome.³⁶⁷ From that perspective,

³⁶⁶ Ursu, 33.

³⁶⁷ Finlay, "Prophecy and Politics", 12.

the Sultan was presented as the protector of the oppressed Christians by his supreme power and authority. Rhoads Murphey notes the following:

Süleyman was astute enough not to risk alienating his numerous Christian subject population by engaging in a frontal attack against Christian Europe until, and unless, the provocation and justification for adopting such a stance were apparent. His main policy adviser in the period between 1523 and 1536 was the Grand Vizier, “Frenk” İbrahim Pasha, who skillfully steered the sultan away from acts unprovoked aggression against the West that would tarnish his domestic image and reputation as protector. [...] Furthermore, in spite of the exaggerated rhetorical claims voiced by political advisers representing both sides, the conflict between Charles V and Süleyman, rulers of the two great superstates of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean world was never simple or straightforward as a battle between cross and crescent. Because of their global interests and multiple as well as widely dispersed strategic positions both rulers were forced into co-operative agreements and alliances that paid little heed to the niceties of doctrinal purity or pious claims of their image makers.³⁶⁸

One should remember that the plan of 1537 was first discussed and elaborated during the Grand Vizierate of İbrahim Pasha. In this regard, it is possible to argue that the campaign was designed cleverly by the Pasha upon the French request as an assistance for the French King to restore his authority in Lombardy and in Naples as well as to display the power of Süleyman, being the “*Kayzer-i Rûm*” and the “*Pâdişâh-ı Rûy-i Zemîn*” as the sole authority to decide on Italy.³⁶⁹

The campaign was elaborated upon the French request; however, Francis I was not the only person seeking Ottoman assistance against the Emperor. Emrah Safa Gürkan notes that “Neapolitan nobles in exile allied themselves with the Ottomans as a part of Ottoman-French alliance that would relieve Naples from the Habsburg rule.”³⁷⁰

Gürkan mentions that in 1537 the Ottoman armada hosted a good number of Neapolitans including Prince of Melfi, his son, the Duke of Soma and the Count of

³⁶⁸ Murphey, “Süleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary”, 199.

³⁶⁹ For İnalçık’s analysis overlapping with the interpretation above, see: İnalçık “Akdeniz ve Türkler”, 157; Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset*, 159-160.

³⁷⁰ Gürkan, *Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean*, 393.

Nicastro.³⁷¹ The Italian chroniclers, consulted for this dissertation, highlight the name of Troilo Pignatello, also thought to have encouraged the Sultan to attack Apulia guaranteeing that the anti-Habsburg nobles suffering from heavy taxation would rebel against the Habsburg rule in face of the Ottoman invasion, as it was stated above. The Neapolitans gave Süleyman the second mean of justification. The Ottomans would march into Apulia to rescue the Neapolitans from the Habsburg “tyranny”.

Thus, this dissertation argues that the Ottoman Apulian Campaign could be discussed within the framework of the Ottoman gradual method of conquest. There is no evidence to suggest that Süleyman intended to immediately conquer Rome, but in the light of the above information, gathered from various sources, it could be argued that Ottomans intended to establish some sort of suzerainty in Naples, through Apulia. In comparison with the former Ottoman attempts in Hungary, it could be argued that the 1537 Campaign might have intended to create a second Hungary for the Ottomans in Apulia, where French King would act as the second Szapolyai, protecting the Neapolitans in the name of Süleyman. In this regard, it could be argued that the Ottomans aimed to use these *fuoriusciti* to get the consent and support of the Neapolitans. Therefore, both Süleyman could challenge the Emperor’s authority in Italy and by creating a satellite state in southern Italy, the Ottomans could acquire a significant naval base in the western Mediterranean for further Ottoman offensives against Spain. Here the information given by Gülrû Necipoğlu should be

³⁷¹ Ibid. Also see: Gürkan, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde”, 27. In this article, the author argues that the presence of the Neapolitan *fuoriusciti* with the Ottoman fleet proves that the Ottomans intended to invade Naples, following the “Corfu Expedition”. However, one should keep in mind that, the Ottomans attacked Apulia in mid-July and the Ottoman Attack on Corfu was initiated by mid-August.

remembered.³⁷² Even in 1532, İbrahim Pasha had announced to the Venetian ambassador, Pietro Zen, an upcoming Ottoman-French attack on Habsburgs to make Francis I the legitimate sovereign of north Italy and to appoint a vassal king to south Italy.³⁷³ This joint attack on Italy was realized in 1537. In the Apulian Campaign, Süleyman most probably intended to realize the plan uttered by his former Grand Vizier and the Neapolitans in exile, who had asked the Sultan's assistance would be used as the Ottoman agents in Apulia. Since the Ottomans could not take Apulia under the imperial control for a long time because of the logistic limitations and possible counterattacks of the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor, the region would be given to the French supervision considering the fact that Francis had claims of inheritance on the Kingdom of Naples. This would also enable the indirect Ottoman supervision over the region and their penetration into Italy. However, the plan was severely wounded when the French King delayed his support in Lombardy.³⁷⁴ Because of the absence of the French forces in Lombardy in the summer of 1537, the Ottoman invasion of Apulia could not go beyond being a destructive attack. Apulia could not be transformed into a second Hungary, but became a second Vienna for the Sultan in 1537.

If the main target of the campaign was Apulia, why did the Ottoman fire turn on Venetian Corfu? Was the attack on Corfu a part of the military plan? Previous studies discussing the Ottoman campaign of 1537 state that the main intention of the

³⁷² See: Necipoğlu, 411.

³⁷³ Ibid. At that time this post had been thought to be destined for Alvise Gritti.

³⁷⁴ İnalçık and Emecen state that the French forces assisted the Attack on Corfu. See: İnalçık "Akdeniz ve Türkler", 157; Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset*, 159. However, the French sources, cited above, demonstrate that the fleet under the command of the Baron of St. Blancard sent by the French King in July was able to reach the Port of Prevesa by early September and it did not participate in the Ottoman operation.

Ottomans was to conquer the island of Corfu to facilitate the invasion of Italy.³⁷⁵

Emrah Safa Gürkan points out that by invading Corfu, the Ottoman might have intended to protect the Adriatic coasts and confront a possible counter-attack that could arise when the fleet would be sent away, since the Island was so close to the Albanian shores, an area of chronic insurrections against the Ottoman rule.³⁷⁶

Gürkan's analysis clearly demonstrates that Corfu was not a random choice for the Ottomans. As was discussed in the previous pages of this chapter, Corfu had already entered into the Ottoman agenda of conquest as a target because of its strategic location. When the Ottomans accepted to challenge the Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean by 1532, the need for a secure and fortified naval base changed the priorities of the Empire. As was demonstrated with the example of Tunis, the first attempts of Barbarossa, becoming the key figure in the formulation of Ottoman naval strategy, should be evaluated within this context. Therefore, Corfu might have been perceived by the Ottomans as a fruitful gain. However, one should keep in mind that the attacks commenced by mid-August, following the invasion of Apulia. Moreover, the Ottoman fleet reached Valona via Corfu without any Venetian opposition. The Sultan prioritized the invasion of Apulia, not the attack on Corfu. Moreover, the imperial camp was in Valona, having a clear view of the Apulian coasts of Apulia. Valona, in a sense, was used as both a departure port and shelter in the campaign. These demonstrate that Corfu was not the principal target of the Ottomans in 1537.

The author of the present study argues that the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537 was the direct outcome of the tension between the Porte and the *Serenissima* and the

³⁷⁵ See: Guilmartin Jr., 264; İnalcık, "State, Sovereignty and Law", 68; idem, "Avrupa Devletler Sistemi", 129-130; Emecen, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Siyaset*, 159.

³⁷⁶ See: Gürkan, "Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekâbeti Çerçevesinde", 27.

Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during the Apulian Campaign. As was discussed above in detail, by 1532 the Republic started to pursue a more pro-Habsburg policy and did not participate into the Ottoman-French alliance. The suspicions about a secret Venetian-Habsburg alliance became apparent for the Ottomans in the course of the campaign because of Doria's and Venetian attacks on the Ottoman naval forces. This was used as the justification for the Ottoman attack on a Venetian dominion, since it was thought that Venetians had already broken the peace. Corfu, strategically important for the Ottomans, was the best and closest alternative for an Ottoman offensive. Moreover it might have also been a significant naval base for the future operations. Without Corfu, the Ottomans would not be able to establish a longlived control in the coasts of Apulia. The attacks also showed that the Ottoman fleet desperately need Corfu to secure the Ottoman presence in Apulia since without having a close naval base, the Ottoman forces would be open to a counter-attack. Moreover, one should keep in mind that in Albania, the Ottomans intended to suppress the local insurrections and strengthen the Ottoman rule. The establishment of the *sancak* of Delvina should be evaluated within this perspective. Therefore, the author agrees with Gürkan on that the conquest of Corfu might have been initiated to protect the Adriatic shores and to confront a counter-attack in Albania. Therefore, that might have been an aim to prevent possible Venetian and Habsburg penetrations into the region, where the Ottomans intended to consolidate their authority.

However, the attack on Corfu was not successful either. Although the Ottoman soldiers penetrated in the island and the main castle was mainly destroyed, the Sultan ended the expedition on grounds of inclement weather, despite the opposition of Hayreddin Barbarossa. Svatopluk Soucek, evaluates the decision of Süleyman in

1537 as proof of the weakness of the Ottoman naval strategy in the sixteenth-century. According to Soucek, this weakness was camouflaged during the first three quarters of the sixteenth century by two important factors, namely the success of the Ottoman ghazi corsairs and the disunity of the European states in the face of the Ottomans. Ottomans might have used this disunity to their advantage; however the Ottoman naval strategy did not evolve from an *ad hoc* policy, limited to short spurts of conflict and raids, to the strategy of overseas expansion, since the Empire focused more on land campaigns.³⁷⁷ Soucek notes as follows:

In contrast to the unrealistic and wisely aborted campaign to conquer Italy, its subsequent target, Corfu, made perfect sense if conceived of in strategic naval terms. [...] It would be hard to exaggerate the significance of this moment for the fate of Ottoman sea power. While Tunis had the potential of becoming a key base for an Ottoman seaborne empire, Corfu could have functioned as a base from which to definitively eliminate Venice as a naval power. In comparison with this self-inflicted defeat, the Ottoman victory at Prevesa the following year (1538) loses much of its significance. [...] Had Süleyman allowed his admiral to take Corfu, and used the genius of this finest seaman of the age to let him establish there a Turkish base from which to control the Adriatic, the next two targets, [...] Cyprus and Crete, would have fallen like ripe fruit, perhaps even without a shot fired, into the lap of the Ottoman Empire.³⁷⁸

As seen above, Soucek evaluates the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the island by the order of Süleyman as a real failure. Here, asking him a question may help the historian to analyze why the Sultan decided on ending the attacks: did Süleyman really intend to conquer Corfu? The sources consulted for this dissertation do not give a clearly affirmative answer to this question. Besides all the importance, strategic, economic and political, the author of the present study argues that Süleyman did not aim to bind the island to the Ottoman realm. The sources led her to assume that Ayas Pasha, replacing İbrahim by 1536, did not advocate an

³⁷⁷ Soucek, "Naval Aspects", 229-232.

³⁷⁸ Ibid, 230-231.

Ottoman-Venetian encounter either.³⁷⁹ It seems that the attacks were realized to punish the Venetians for misbehaving in the face of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and to intimidate the Republic to position itself as an active power supporting the Sultan's enterprises against Charles V. Thus, the Sultan settled for the damaging Corfu and in order not to waste his soldiers and resources, ended the expedition by early September. This intention to secure the Ottoman-Venetian peace could be also observed in the light of his letter, penned right after the attack. Even before he returned to Adrianople, from Didymoteicho³⁸⁰, he informed the Venetian Doge that the gates of Constantinople were open to his envoys for peace negotiations.³⁸¹

The Ottomans intended to pressure the *Serenissima* to act in harmony with the Sultan against the Habsburg Emperor; but the attack brought about an unintended consequence: As was noted above, right after the Ottoman attack, the Republic initiated negotiations with the Pope for the establishment of a league against the Ottomans. For the first time after the Ottoman-Venetian peace of 1503, Venice came to terms with the Papacy and the Habsburg Empire against its main political and commercial ally, the Ottoman Empire. Although, Hayreddin Barbarossa would overwhelm the allied forces at Prevesa the following year and the Republic would restore peace with the Ottomans by the *ahidnâme* of 1540, Venice would gradually lose its influence in Ottoman politics in favor of the French. The Ottoman-French

³⁷⁹ See: Zinkeisen, v.2, 550; Soucek, 230. The Ottoman chronicles also assert that the attacks were concluded by the advices of Ayas Pasha. See: Chapter Four.

³⁸⁰ Dimetoka (ott.)

³⁸¹ The letter reveals that the Venetian *bailo* in Constantinople (Tommaso Mocenigo) sent an envoy to the Ottoman imperial camp before, to declare the Republic's demand for sending an envoy to Sultan. "[...] *hâliyâ mahrûse-i İstanbul'da bulunan baylosun südde'-i sa'âdetime âdemisin gönderüb senin tarafından yüce dergâhıma ilçi gelmek istediği i'lâm idüb ol bâbda izin ve icâzet taleb eylemiş idi, benim ulu âsitânem dâimâ açıktur, kimesnenin gelmesine ve gitmesine red ve mâni' yokdur [...]*" ASV, DT, Busta 3.I 40.4, XVII, in Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki", 152.

political alliance would provide the basis for further joint attacks against the Habsburgs and the French would become as the most important Christian ally of the Ottoman Sultan, economically privileged and favored as the active representative and protector of the rights of Christians residing within the Ottoman realm.

Indeed, the Campaign of 1537 brought about fruitful outcomes for neither the Ottomans, nor the Venetians and the French. The ones, who benefitted from 1537 were the Pope and the Habsburg Emperor. Italy was rescued from an Ottoman invasion; the Pope could finally convince the Republic of the need for an offensive against the Ottomans, though this would be a short-lived alliance. Moreover, without wasting his forces by engaging a direct war with the Ottoman fleet, Andrea Doria was able to redirect the Ottomans against the Venetians by his attacks. The Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu did not end the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the sixteenth-century though; it only opened a new phase in which the two potentates would challenge each other on various fronts with exhausting battles, which would lead both empires to bankruptcy.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a historical narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 by arguing that the campaign was the outcome of the Ottoman-French alliance aimed at a joint offensive against the Habsburg dominions in Italy, elaborated in 1536. In this context, in order to decipher why and how the Ottoman offensive turned against Venetian Corfu, the author has discussed Ottoman-Venetian relations between the years of 1534 and 1537 in order to contextualize the attack on Corfu, asserted to be caused by the existing tension

between the Porte and the *Serenissima*, as well as by the maritime conflicts near Corfu during the Ottoman attacks on Apulia in 1537.

The chapter has argued that in Apulia, the Ottomans might have sought to establish some sort suzerainty, as they had already had in Hungary. In this regard, the author has evaluated the campaign within the context of the Ottoman gradual method of conquest and the existing discourses concerning the ultimate aim of Rome, “Red Apple”, incorporated into the Ottoman grand-strategy of the sixteenth-century, as the basis of an ideological justification. The author has also asserted that the campaign did not intend to a complete invasion of Italy or the immediate conquest of Rome; instead by creating new spheres of influences, the Ottomans might have aimed to taking part in the Habsburg-Valois power struggle in Italy, emphasizing the Sultan’s claim to be the decisive factor in the future of the peninsula.

Secondly, the author has challenged former studies that have tended to regard the campaign as the “Corfu Expedition”, in the light of the narrative of the campaign, offering new evidence. The attack on Corfu was contextualized as the Ottoman response to the Venetian Republic, suspected to be in secret alliance with the Habsburg Emperor in a break of the current agreement with Süleyman. In this context, the author argued that the attack might have been intended to intimidate the Republic’s administration to adjust its policy according to Ottoman expectations; not primarily to conquer Corfu, even though the latter could be an important naval base for the Ottoman fleet.

This chapter has offered the historian a new analysis of the 1537 campaign. The next chapter will focus on the Ottoman sources to decipher how the Ottoman chronicles of

the sixteenth and seventeenth century narrate and legitimize the campaign, to offer new evidence supporting the arguments and the interpretations of the author.

CHAPTER IV

THE OTTOMAN VIEW: THE APULIAN CAMPAIGN AND ATTACK ON CORFU ACCORDING TO THE OTTOMAN CHRONICLES

This chapter will have a closer look at the Ottoman perception about the campaign and the Attack on Corfu to discuss how the Ottomans defined, narrated, reasoned and legitimized the campaign and the encounter with Venice, in the light of the Ottoman literature. By a deeper analysis of the Ottoman chronicles, the author intends both to substantiate her arguments and to produce a comprehensive historical narrative by incorporating the Ottoman view.

To detect the Ottoman perception, the author intends to analyze the histories written by the Ottomans who personally participated in the campaign of 1537 and also the chronicles produced in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The works are classified according to the identity of the authors and their positions in the Ottoman government, if they had them, and the genre of the works and their time of composition. In these discussions, the author provides the reader brief information

about the authors of the chronicles and their positions in the Ottoman administration or cultural *milieu* to evaluate better the reliability in the accounts.

Lastly, the author will attempt to compare and contrast the narrations of the eye-witnesses/actors of the campaign and of the subsequent historians, derived from the earlier documents or existing texts. For that reason, the story, narrated by each chronicle, is intentionally portrayed in detail, except for the views shared by all the chronicles.

4.1. Voices from the Front: The Actors in the Theatre of War

As was mentioned before, the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 was not a single Ottoman military enterprise against Christian dominions. The campaign was mainly designed to be challenge for Süleyman's "mortal enemy", Charles V and evolved to an Ottoman-Venetian encounter. To analyze why the Ottomans engaged in this campaign, how they decided to attack a Venetian dominion and how they evaluated the circumstances, first, it is important to analyze the accounts of two commanders being in the theatre of war in 1537, who had played influential roles in Ottoman decision making: Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa.

Born in Albania, near Valona c1488, Lütü Pasha, was an important Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrat in the early sixteenth-century, who became the grand vizier in 1539.³⁸² He entered in the imperial palace in the reign of Bayezid II. Following his service and in palace education, he undertook several offices in the Ottoman palace.

He acted as the *Sancakbeyi* of Karaman, participated in the Süleyman's campaign of

³⁸² For detailed information about Lütü Pasha, see: M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Lütü Paşa", *İA*, v. 6, (Istanbul: ,1970), 96-101; Colin H. Imber, "Lutü Pasha", *ET*, v. 5, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), 837-838; Mehmet İpşirli, "Lütü Paşa", *DİA*, v. 27, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003), 234-236.

Rhodes in 1522 and was appointed as the *Beylerbeyi* of Karaman in 1534. Two years later, he was appointed as the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia and the Third Vizier. Following the death of Ayas Pasha in 1539, he was charged as the Grand Vizier of Süleyman and until 1541, he acted a decisive role in the modification of domestic and international politics.³⁸³

Apart from administrative offices, Lütü Pasha is also known as an important man of letters producing noteworthy works discussing the Ottoman history and the state system. After his dismissal from the Grand Vizierate in 1541³⁸⁴, he produced his famous *Âsafnâme*, known as one of the earlier example of the *nasihatnâme*³⁸⁵ genre, to introduce the Ottoman state system from its origin and its practices to the subsequent bureaucrats. His *Âsafnâme* also discusses the problems and misbehavior of the bureaucrats.³⁸⁶ He also wrote a pamphlet, in Arabic, on the incorporation of the Islamic Caliphate to the Ottoman Empire.³⁸⁷ This chapter will discuss one of his prominent works, namely *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*³⁸⁸, The History of the Ottoman Dynasty, focusing on the Sultans and events in the Ottoman history up to year of 1553.

Lütü Pasha, during his offices, found the chance of observing the military initiatives and political issues, held in the early sixteenth-century. Therefore, his *Tevârih* based

³⁸³ Imber, “Lutü Pasha”, 837; İpşirli, 234.

³⁸⁴ For the reason of his dismissal, see: İpşirli, 234.

³⁸⁵ Mirror for the Princes.

³⁸⁶ Ibid, 235-236. For detailed information about *Âsafnâme*, see: Mehmet İpşirli, “*Âsafnâme*”, *DİA*, v.3, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1991), 456.

³⁸⁷ İpşirli, “Lütü Paşa”, 235. Also see: H. A. R. Gibb, “Lutü Pasha on the Ottoman Caliphate”, *Oriens*, v. 15, 1962, 287-295.

³⁸⁸ *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* is also name of the Ottoman histories from the rise of the Empire to the time of their composition, or noted events or Sultan. See: Abdülkadir Özcan, “*Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*”, *DİA*, v. 40, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2011), 479-581.

on his personal observations and experiences along with the former histories produced by the earlier Ottoman scholars,³⁸⁹ provides the historian an extended portrait of the Ottoman history, especially for the sixteenth-century. Since, he was a member of the imperial council by 1536, the Pasha also presents important details about the political and diplomatic discussions and decisions of the Empire, as well as the competitions among the military figures.

In 1537, Lütî Pasha was the Third Vizier of Süleyman and he was charged of commanding the soldiers in the attacks on Apulia. For that reason, in this chapter, the author analyses first how 1537 was discussed by Lütî Paşa in his *Tevârih*³⁹⁰, to decipher the reasons behind the campaign and its realization, as well as to portray how the campaign was perceived by the imperial administration in the eyes of one of the most important eyewitnesses, the commander of 1537.

Lütî Pasha, opens the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 to discussion by underlining the letter of the French King, Francis I to the Sultan.³⁹¹ According to the Pasha, French King communicated by the latter, the following:

The request from Sultan Süleyman, the Padishah of Islam is the following: Spain, of cursed religion, troubled and harmed [me,] your sincere friend so much. Thus, [...] if the imperial armada via sea, and the land army, with the Padishah of Islam, by land come to the Port of Valona and then to Apulia, our galleys, [between the number] of 40 and 50, [will] sail [towards there], as it is decided.³⁹²

³⁸⁹ For his sources, see: İpşirli, “Lütî Paşa”, 235-236.

³⁹⁰ In the present study, the text corrected and edited by Âli Bey is consulted. See: Lütî Paşa, *Tevârih*.

³⁹¹ “[...] ve bu yılda França vilâyetlerinin kralı olan Françeşko pâdişâha mektûb ile âdem gönderüb[...]”, ibid, 358.

³⁹² “[...] İslâm pâdişâhı Sultân Süleymân’dan temennâ budur ki, bu muhibb-i bî-riyânızı İspânya dîn-i me’lûn hayli bî-huzûr idüb incitdi. Şöyle ki denizden donanmâ-ı hümayûnu pâdişâh-ı İslam sa’adetle karadan Avlonya iskelesine gelüb dahî Pûlyâ vilâyetine ve denizden dahî kırk elli pâre kadırgalarımız dahî gelmek mukarrerdir.” Ibid.

Lütfi Pasha notes that the aforementioned letter encouraged the Sultan for engaging in a campaign against Spain. For this campaign, a powerful armada was prepared. Pasha underlines that before that, the Empire never composed an armada such that great in number. Along with the new constructed and repaired ships, numerous soldiers from almost every region of the Empire with their military commanders were called to duty. Hayreddin Barbarossa also joined the imperial fleet with his forces, household and the volunteers under his command.³⁹³ The Pasha emphasizes that the navy, carrying the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia and the Rumelian army, as well as Hayreddin Pasha, his forces and numerous Janissaries, artillery and munitions were put under his command. The navy from Constantinople to the ghaza of Mediterranean³⁹⁴ and came to the Port of Valona, passing Preveza and Corfu. Simultaneously, Süleyman, with the land army composed of the soldiers of Anatolia and Rumelia headed fro Valona from Constantinople, on May 17, 1537.³⁹⁵

Lütfi Pasha continues that when the Sultan arrived at Valona, on July 9³⁹⁶, he ordered him the Pasha and the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia, Mehmed Pasha, the invasion of Apulia. He underlines that with the company of potent cavalry, he was able to ravage more than 360 villages and captured 30 castles erected between Otranto and Gallipoli.³⁹⁷ The villages were put on fire, they were ruined and sacked by the Ottoman soldiers, who took numerous slaves.³⁹⁸ While Lütfi Pasha is narrating his

³⁹³ Ibid, 359.

³⁹⁴ “[...] ve Lütî Pâşâ bunların cümlesine baş ve buğ ta’yîn olunub Akdeniz gazâsına gönderdi.” Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ “[...] ve tarîhin tokuz yüz kırk dördünde muharremü’l-harâm ayının evâhîrinde Avlonya’ya varıcak [...]”, ibid.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. Gallipoli was near to Lecce.

³⁹⁸ Ibid, 359-360.

“brave and successful” campaign in Apulia, he also notes- a grouse, perhaps- that when he landed in Apulia, Hayreddin Barbarossa did not join the imperial fleet; instead he sailed back towards the coasts of Epirus, such as Preveza and Modone³⁹⁹, which were situated on the way of Constantinople. So, he got devoid of such a ghaza and impressive booty.⁴⁰⁰

In the course of campaign, the Pasha also notes an Ottoman-Venetian encounter. He states that in a night, numerous Venetian galleys attacked on the Ottoman ships. Lütfi Pasha, with the ships and soldiers under his command, responded to the Venetians. In the conflicts, four Venetian galleys were captured; the rest sailed towards Corfu. Lütfi Pasha mentions that he stayed in Apulia for almost a month and informed the Sultan about his victories and the booties that had been gathered.⁴⁰¹ The Sultan who satisfied with the expedition called him back to Valona, by mentioning that the Venetians broke the peace and rebelled.

In his *Tevârih*, Lütfi Paşa also gives brief details about the operations of the land army in 1537. He points out that when the imperial army was attacking on Apulia, Sultan Süleyman ordered the soldiers to suppress the obstinate Albanians, refusing the authority of the Sultan. Albanians, having noticed the Sultan’s arrival, fled to high mountains.⁴⁰² On the other hand, he notes that during the Ottoman campaign in Apulia, with the request of the Spanish King, Charles V, Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, sent his troops of 25.000 infantry and 20.000 cavalry, to besiege the castle of

³⁹⁹ Modone (ve.)

⁴⁰⁰ Lütfi Paşa, 360.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

Osijek, as a responsive maneuver.⁴⁰³ Hüsrev Bey, the Governor of Bosnia, and Mehmed Bey, the Governor of Semendre, whose forces were disadvantageous in number, stayed inside the castle. In order not to stay under the Ottoman bombardment, the Habsburg troops attacked on the villages and small castles in the region; ravaged them, instead of attacking on the main castle. Thanks to the heavy rains disabling them to move, while they had been on the way of Belgrade, the Habsburg soldiers withdrew. Some soldiers, left behind the main corps, were killed by the soldiers of Hüsrev and Mehmed Bey. Numerous horses and artillery, so special that no one had never seen before, were also captured. These events and the courage of his soldiers were appreciated by Süleyman and he awarded the commanders with precious dresses, swords and horses, as well as promoting them.⁴⁰⁴

These details given by Lütfi, Pasha are noteworthy. But his views on Hayreddin Barbarossa that he states right after this discussion are noteworthy:

Even when the soldiers, accompanying the Sultan, refuge of the World came this much at the Albanians, the name and the sign of Hayreddin Pasha was unknown. After a long time, he also came with his vessels, joined the imperial armada and the soldiers aided by God.⁴⁰⁵

Pasha's sentences reveal that Hayreddin Pasha came to Valona, right after him. However, the question of where Barbarossa and his vessels were during the Apulia Campaign was not clearly mentioned by Lütfi Pasha.

⁴⁰³ Ibid, 362.

⁴⁰⁴ For detailed information about the confrontations, see: Ibid, 263-264.

⁴⁰⁵ “[...] ve pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh hazretleri yanında olan ‘asker Arnâvudlara bu kadarleşker idüb dahî Hayreddin Pâşa’nın nâm ve nişânı nâ-malûm idi. Niçe zâmandan sonra Hayreddin Pâşa dahî gemiler ile gelüb donanmâ-ı hümayûna ve ‘asakîr-i mansûreye mülhak oldu.” Ibid, 361.

According to Lütfi Pasha, Sultan Süleyman ordered the Attack on Corfu, following the return of Barbarossa to Valona.⁴⁰⁶ Lütfi Pasha with the soldiers under his command and Hayreddin Barbarossa with his attendees, went to Corfu. The attack was a punishment for the disloyalty of Venetians. The Sultan, on the other hand, came to a town opposite Corfu.⁴⁰⁷ Lütfi Pasha reports that, after a long and exhausting bombardment, the main castle of the island was destroyed but since the cold was untimely started, the attack ended by the order of Süleyman. Soon after, the Sultan and the he land army headed towards Constantinople. The rest, returning by vessels attacked and pillaged the Venetian islands, captured the girls, boys and women. Some islands were put under the Ottoman tribute.⁴⁰⁸

The account of Lütfi Pasha clearly demonstrates that the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 was realized to face the Habsburg Emperor, the Spanish King as the Ottomans called him that had been encouraged by Francis I of France. Valona and Otranto were also showed by the French King as targets to the Ottomans, according to the author. However, Lütfi Pasha does not give any detail about the French participation into the Ottoman campaign, although Francis I had promised to do so in his letter cited by the Pasha. The attack on Corfu, on the other hand, was described as the Sultan's response to the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman forces during the campaign.

The notes in *Tevârih* about the attacks of Ferdinand's troops is also noteworthy. Although, they were faced by the local Ottoman military forces, the attacks might have resulted in a chaos and in a loss of munitions for the Ottomans. Since Lütfi

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Buthrotum.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid, 361-362.

Pasha does not mention when attacks on Osijek was started, it will be only a speculation to argue that the Habsburg initiative facilitated the Ottoman withdrawal from Apulia. The Pasha only mentions that the Sultan was announced about the Habsburg attack and the victory of his soldiers in Osijek after the Ottoman withdrawal from Corfu. On the other hand, these events can be evaluated as the Habsburg response to the Ottoman attack on Apulia.

It is clear that Lütfi Pasha criticizes Hayreddin Barbarossa for being absent in the important phases of the military initiatives of 1537, except the Attack on Corfu. To compare and contrast the information given by Lütfi Pasha, here, it is critical to listen to the second important actor of the campaign, Hayreddin Barbarossa. In the previous chapter of the present study, the life and the rise of Barbarossa in the Ottoman military and bureaucratic history was briefly discussed. To remind the reader his position in the Ottoman military affairs and decision making, here, it should be underlined once more that the Pasha was appointed as the *Beylerbeyi* of *Cezâyir-i Bahr-ı Sefid*, and the Grand Admiral in 1533.⁴⁰⁹ On May 1537, Sultan, Süleyman, ordered Barbarossa to sail with the imperial armada through Valona, with Lütfi Pasha. For that reason, as an eyewitness and the commander of the imperial armada, Barbarossa's notes on the campaign could also enlighten the historian to decipher both the Ottoman motivations in 1537 and the personal views of one of the leading sea warriors of the early sixteenth-century about the ongoing struggles between the Ottomans, Habsburgs and the Venetians.

⁴⁰⁹ For the brief discussion about Barbarossa and his rise in Ottoman military and bureaucracy, see: Chapter 3.

The memories of Hayreddin Barbarossa was collected in the *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*⁴¹⁰, considered to be composed first in 1541, which was directly dictated by Barbarossa to Seyyid Muradî Reis⁴¹¹, contemporary sea-warrior in Barbarossa's network. It is considered to be the sole original source on Barbarossa and his campaigns.⁴¹² The work is considered to be one of the prominent examples of the *gazavatnâmes*⁴¹³ that discusses the life and campaigns of Barbarossa.⁴¹⁴

On the other hand, Emrah Safa Gürkan underlines that *Gazavât* should be evaluated as a work of propaganda, which were composed to introduce the corsairs as ghazi warriors and to legitimize their deeds in the context of ghaza.⁴¹⁵ This can also be observed in the memories of Hayreddin Barbarossa: in *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, Barbarossa was portrayed as a victorious warrior having mystical powers ordained by God. The events are not discussed chronologically; victories, miracles and personal successes of Barbarossa are highlighted and the author refrains from giving

⁴¹⁰ There are several published editions of the *Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, composed in verse and in prose. For detailed information, see: Aldo Galotta, "Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa", *DİA*, v.13, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1996), 437-438. In the present chapter, Mustafa Yıldız's edition of the text in prose will be consulted. *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, ed. by Mustafa Yıldız, (Aachen: Verlag Shaker, 1993). For recent simplified versions of the text in modern Turkish, also see: Seyyid Muradî Reis, *Kaptan Paşa'nın Seyir Defteri: Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, ed. by Ahmet Şimşirgil, (İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2003); Seyyid Muradî Reis, *Kaptan-ı Derya Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa'nın Hatırları*, (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2014).

⁴¹¹ Seyyid Muradî Reis, raised in Ottoman navy, was a poet of sixteenth century Ottoman Empire. He was in the service of Hayreddin Barbarossa. He wrote Barbarossa's memories directly from his words during his service. The first part of the book was composed in 1541 and the second part in 1546. For detailed information, see: Galotta, "Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa", 437.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ *Gazavatnâme* is the general name of the accounts discussing the wars with the enemy. Along with the narration of the campaigns and wars, engaged against the enemy, the accounts generally contains epic stories and glorifications. The accounts could be composed as the wars and campaigns of the Sultans or important high-ranking bureaucrats or commanders. For detailed information and examples of *gazavatnames* in Islamic and Ottoman literature, see: Mustafa Erkan, "Gazavatnâme", *DİA*, v. 13, 439-440. See also: Kuşat Şamil Şahin, "Gazavatnâmeler Üzerine Yapılan Çalışmalar Hakkında Bir Bibliyografya Denemesi", *Turkish Studies*, v.7/2, Spring 2012, 997-1022.

⁴¹⁴ Galotta, "Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa", 438.

⁴¹⁵ Gürkan, "Batı Akdeniz'de Osmanlı Korsanlığı", 178-180.

historical background, reasons and consequences of the discussed events. Gürkan states that the account was the product of the rivalry between the Admiral and the Ottoman ruling elite.⁴¹⁶ By this book the Grand Admiral intended to show his power and victories to the Ottoman bureaucrats challenging him and to aims to consolidate his position in Constantinople. For that reason the book should not be considered as a chronological and accurate historical narrative.⁴¹⁷

The views of Barbarossa on the Ottoman campaign of 1537 discussed in the *Gazavât* supports the analysis of Gürkan. In the *Gazavat*, the campaign of 1537 is presented as the “Expedition of Valona”. Barbarossa underlines that in early spring of 1537, the Sultan called himself to his presence and declared him that he would engage in an expedition to Valona in spring. Barbarossa does not explain the reasons for the decision of the Sultan. On the other hand, it is mentioned that since he had already enhanced the imperial fleet right after his appointment as the Chief Admiral, made repaired the old vessels and built thirty new in the form of his own galley, the fleet was ready for such a great campaign.⁴¹⁸ He notes that the *Beylerbeyis* of Anatolia and Rumelia⁴¹⁹ sent 80.000 soldiers for the campaign and the fleet sailed from Constantinople to Valona under his command.

⁴¹⁶ For the rivalry between the corsairs and Ottoman ruling elite, see: Gürkan, “The Center and the Frontier”, 147-149.

⁴¹⁷ Gürkan, “Batı Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Korsanlığı”, 179.

⁴¹⁸ *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, ed.by Mustafa Yıldız, 220.

⁴¹⁹ In the text, the name of the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia is indicated as Hüsrev Pasha. However, the Pasha was appointed to the office in 1538. In 1537, he was the *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolia. Since, Muradî, wrote down the memories in 1541, he might get confused about the titles. See: Abdülkadir Özcan, “Hüsrev Paşa, Deli”, *DİA*, v.19, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1999), 40-41, 41.

After having arrived at the port of Valona, Hayreddin Pasha narrates that he was called to collaborate in the land battles in Albania, by the *Beylerbeyis* of Anatolia and Rumelia. However, the Pasha refused to do so by underlying the following:

The Sultan, my majesty, did not charged me to the land; he appointed me to the armada at sea. Now, I will touch on land by leaving the armada unattended, this is not a maritime custom. Who knows, this is sea, everyone get to occupy with his own duty.⁴²⁰

Barbarossa points out that he refused to join the land army because he had to be ready to face any possible attack on his forces considering that the Venetians had 36 vessels ready to move, in the Gulf of Corfu. He emphasizes that the following events proved that he had foreseen the danger: According to him, Albanian rebels were in close contact with the Venetians and they falsly informed the Venetian Captain General that the Ottoman fleet was vulnerable since Barbarossa had joined the land army. Accordingly, the Venetian ships sailed towards Valona.⁴²¹ Barbarossa notes that he did not respond quickly when he saw the Venetian ships coming. He deceived Venetians getting closer to the Porte. Therefore the well-armed Ottoman ships was able to circle the Venetian ships, attacked them like a hungry wolf in the ship flock. 16 ships were taken, 14 sank, and 6 of them fled away. Barbarossa mentions that one of these was the ship of the Venetian Captain General.⁴²² His great success encouraged the land army to take the Albanian region under control and all high-

⁴²⁰ “*Beni şevketlü pâdişâhum karaya ta’yîn eylemedi, deryâda donanma-yı hümayûn üzere ta’yîn eyledi. İmdi ben donanmayı boş bırağam da karaya çıkmak deniz yolu değildir. Kim bildün deryâ hâlidür her kes me’mur olduğu hizmetin üzerinde mukim olmak gerekdir [...]*”, Ibid, 220. He also points out that the Pashas resented him because of his negative reply.

⁴²¹ Here, it is interesting to note that Barbarossa notes his dream that he had before the maneuver of Venetians. In his dream, he had been riding on a red-sorrel horse towards the enemy, holding a baronet by which he killed 30 men. He made the dream interpreted, to his preacher and he foresaw that Barbarossa would gain a great victory soon, since the red-sorrel horse signed victory and divine help. See: Ibid, 220.

⁴²² Ibid, 220-221. In the text Barbarossa also points out his own thought about what Venetian General had said about him: “Barbarossa was praised to be an intelligent men; [but] this seems to be the work of an animal; I will never debark my soldiers on land not the give the enemy the change of sinking me. Even a man being never at sea in his lifetime can distinguish profit from damage.” See, Ibid. 221.

ranking officials, including the two aforementioned Pashas, appreciated his genious in warfare.⁴²³

The account of Barbarossa concludes with the note that in 1537, the Ottomans had fruitful gains both in land and at sea. They took Valona entirely under Ottoman control; the rebels were suppressed. Following the return of the land army, he notes that he returned to Constantinople, with his forces and the 16 ships taken from the Venetians, after a simple repair by his sincere efforts. On his way, he captured numerous islands, sacked and put them under taxation.⁴²⁴ Here, it is interesting to note that, after his return, Barbarossa narrates that Sultan Süleyman congratulated him for his great victories and mentioned that he should re-organize the fleet for next spring since the Venetian Captain General could attack Barbarossa as a revenge for this victory.⁴²⁵

The account of Barbarossa completes, in various aspects, the *Tevârîh* of Lütî Pasha. These two accounts clearly show that Barbarossa and the forces under his command, did not take part in the attacks on Apulia. It seems that Barbarossa was charged of securing the Adriatic and the Gulf of Corfu to prevent and to face a possible attack on Ottoman ships and that on Valona. The transportation of numerous soldiers, the army of Rumelia with the *Beylerbeyi* and the artillery to Apulia was left to Lütî Pasha. This also supports Süleyman might have intended an immediate control of the region; not an attack limited to pillaging. For that reason, Barbarossa might have

⁴²³ Ibid., 220-221. He also quotes that so-called sentences of the Pashas: "It was seen that Hayreddin Pasha has not been strolling unconsciously like us." See: Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., 222.

⁴²⁵ "Göreyim seni gâzî Hayreddin lâlâm in-şâ'a-llâh evvel-i bahara kadar gemileri çek çevir. Venedik keferesine 'avn-i Hakk ile mikdârın bildürelim zirâ ceneralı olan köpek "Barbaroşo beni kancıkladı, ben ana adam kancıklamayı göstereyim" diyü öğünür imiş. İmdi siz dahî basiret üzere olasız didü." Barbarossa also tells the stories about the jealousy and enmity of other Pashas, against him, since he has the favor of the Sultan. See, Ibid.

been charged of the supervision and defense of the imperial fleet rather than joining the attack. The story about his refusal of joining the land army in Albania, which was criticized by Lütfi Pasha as well, also shows the character of his duty in the 1537 Campaign. As Lütfi Pasha, Barbarossa also underlines the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman forces. Since he mentions that that he was at the Port of Valona when the Venetian ships attacked the Ottoman forces, it can be argued that the Venetians opened the fired on the Ottomans in two different fronts, Apulia and Valona. However, as was stated above, Barbarossa's notes need to seriously be controlled not to lapse in stating this.

Barbarossa's silence on Corfu is interesting though. In the *Gazavât* there is no mention of the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537. His reluctance of discussing it can be in the context of Gürkan's analysis briefly discussed above: It seems that Barbarossa intended to narrate his personal victories only. Since the attack on Corfu was not concluded with the conquest of the island, or with a definite success such as putting the island under Ottoman tribute, Barbarossa might have put it aside and focused on his success in face of the Venetian attacks, as well as the Ionian Islands that he captured. His choice of referring the 1537 Campaign as the "Expedition of Valona" can also be evaluated within this perspective.

4.2. From the Campaign to the Future: *Süleymânnâme* of *Matrakçı Nasûh* and *Tabakâtü'l-Memâlik fî Derecâtü'l-Mesâlik* of Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi

The two aforementioned accounts of the two important commanders of the 1537 Campaign help the historian to analyze how the military initiative was planned, contextualized, realized and legitimized by the Ottomans. However, the accounts were

limited with the knowledge and views of the Pashas. Therefore, to understand deeply the Ottoman point of view about the campaign, the accounts of other eyewitnesses of 1537, the ones who are thought to be participated in the campaign, are worth to be analyzed. In this context, the chronicles composed by Matrakçı Nasûh and Celâlzâde Mustafa in the sixteenth-century deserves a special attention.

Matrakçı Nasûh, one of the versatile personalities of the sixteenth-century, was a well-known an Ottoman knight, mathematician, calligrapher, painter and historian. It is assumed that he was born in Bosnia in the late fifteenth-century.⁴²⁶ Since he was called with his father's name⁴²⁷, it is thought that he was a son of a devshirme. In the reign of Sultan Bayezid II (r.1481-1512), he entered in the imperial palace and studied in *Enderun*. In 1517, he wrote his first book on the *Divan* numerals that were used in the Ottoman finance and accounting to introduce and teach them to the Ottoman scribes.⁴²⁸ In the same period, he also came into prominence as a good man-at arms. For that reason, by 1520, he was sent to Egypt by Sultan Süleyman to compete with Arab knights in the games of combat.⁴²⁹ His competency in the use of

⁴²⁶ For detailed information about Matrakçı Nasuh, see: Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, *Matrakçı Nasûh*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963); idem, "Matrakçı Nasuh", *DİA*, v. 28, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003), 143-145, Salim Aydüz, "Nasuh Al-Matrakî, A Noteworthy Ottoman Artist-Mathematician of the Sixteenth Century", <http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/nasuh-al-matrak%C3%AE-noteworthy-ottoman-artist-mathematician-sixteenth-century> , retrieved 3.10.2017.

⁴²⁷ *Nasuh bin Abdullah*, Nasuh son of Abdullah. In the works he is also cited as *Nasuh bin Abdullah el Priştevi* (from Pristina) or *el Bosnevi* (from Bosnia). He also used the epithet of his father, Karagöz, in his works. Yurdaydın, *Matrakçı Nasûh*, 17.

⁴²⁸ For the *Divan* numarals, see: Halil Salihlioğlu, "Divan Rakamları", *DİA*, v. 9, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1994), 433-435. Nasuh's book on *Divan* numerals are composed of two separate booklets namely *Cemâlü'l-Küttâb* and *Kemâli'l Hüssâb*. A copy of the book is conserved in the İstanbul University Library. For detailed information, see: Yurdaydın, "Matrakçı Nasuh", 144.

⁴²⁹ His competency was also rewarded by Sultan Süleyman in 1529 with a *berat*, an imperial decree, stating that he was an unrivaled knight. See: Yurdaydın, *Matrakçı Nasûh*, 10-11.

arms, especially in the military lawn games of *matrak*⁴³⁰, gave him the title of *Matrakçı*⁴³¹. In this period, he also began his career as a historian. Besides working on the translations of the famous Arab histories, in 1533, he participated in the Ottoman campaign of Iraq and he wrote the history of it while painting the townscapes of the imperial camps, in which the army stopped during the expedition.⁴³² “He also described every city visited on the route from Istanbul to Baghdad via Tabriz including those cities captured from the Safavids. [...] The distance between each encampment was given in miles instead of hours of travel.”⁴³³

One of the most important works of Nasûh was his *Süleymânnâme*, discussing the deeds and the conquests of Sultan Süleyman⁴³⁴. His account covers the Süleyman’s reign till 1561.⁴³⁵ He prefers to narrate the events in separate fascicules differently entitled. The events between the years of 1520 and 1537 are discussed in the first part of his *Süleymânnâme*, entitled *Matla’-ı Dâsitân-ı Sultân Süleymân*⁴³⁶, which is assumed to be composed between 1537 and 1538. After 1538, he continued his

⁴³⁰ *Matrak* literally means cudgel or stick. In the games of *matrak*, the players use wooden tenpin-shaped cudgels, instead of swords and try to hit the head of the competitor. The main purpose of the widely-known game was to train the soldiers for war.

⁴³¹ The one, playing *matrak*. Since he was even a musketeer, he was also called as *el-Silâhî*, gunman.

⁴³² See: Nasûh’s *Silâhî* (*Matrakçı*), *Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn*, ed.by. Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, (Ankara: TTK, 2014). In the introduction part of this edition, Yurdaydın extensively discusses the life and the works of Nasuh as well.

⁴³³ Aydüz.

⁴³⁴ *Süleymânnâmes* were the books discussing the events and conquests happened in the reign of Sultan Süleyman (1520-1566). The *Süleymânnâme* of Bostan Çelebi can be considered as a good example of the genre. For detailed information about the genre and the works, see: Abdurrahman Sağırlı, “Süleymannâme”, *DİA*, v. 38, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2010), 124-127.

⁴³⁵ Yurdaydın, “Matrakçı Nasuh”, 144.

⁴³⁶ *Matla’-ı Dâsitân-ı Sultân Süleymân* means the Rise of the Epic of Sultan Süleyman. The manuscript of the work is conserved in the Library of Topkapı Palace Museum in İstanbul, see. TSMK, Revan Köşkü, no. 1286. The manuscript was transcript into the Latin alphabet and published by Davut Erkan. Davut Erkan, *Matrakçı Nasûh’un Süleymân-nâmesi (1520-1537)*, Marmara University Institute of Turkic Studies, 2005, (unpublished master’s thesis).

studies in different fields, he penned numerous chronicles, as well as completing his *Süleymânnâme*.⁴³⁷ He also consulted earlier studies. For example, for his *Süleymânnâme*, it is thought that he used the history of Kemalpaşazâde, anonymous histories on the Ottoman Dynasty, the history of Celâlzâde that will also be discussed in this chapter and the *Süleymânnâme* of Bostan Çelebi.⁴³⁸ When considered the time of composition of his works and the events discussed, it is assumed that he died after 1561.

As was stated above, the first part of Nasûh's *Süleymânnâme* is assumed to be composed between the years of 1537 and 1538. The account concludes with the narration of the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537. At the end, Nasûh lists the names and describes the towns in which the Ottoman army camped in its way of return. Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, who studied extensively on Nasûh and his works, argues that he might have participated into the Ottoman campaign of 1537, considering that he left spaces between the names of the towns. According to him, this show that he had planned to draw the towns later.⁴³⁹ On the other hand, in his Master's thesis on the first part of Nasûh's *Süleymânnâme*, Davut Erkan mentions that there is no clear evidence supporting Nasûh's personal participation in the campaign, but it is known that his son Mehmed was a member of the infantry corps.⁴⁴⁰

The campaign is narrated by Nasûh, right after his notes on the execution of İbrahim Pasha in 1536. The author discusses the subject as the departure of the Ottoman

⁴³⁷ For the list of the works of Nasûh and brief information about them, see: Ibid, xxviii-xliv.

⁴³⁸ Davut Erkan demonstrates that Nasuh, in the some parts of his account, directly quoted from previous sources. See, ibid, xlii-lvii.

⁴³⁹ Nasûh's Silâhi (Matrakçı), *Beyân-ı Menâzil*, 11.

⁴⁴⁰ Erkan, xxii. In his Master's thesis, Davut Erkan offers the researchers a full transcription of the first part of Nasûh's *Süleymânnâme*. In this chapter his transcription will be used to discuss the views of Nasûh on 1537 Campaign.

Sultan in the direction of Corfu for the conquest of the provinces of Spain that had lapsed from the true faith.⁴⁴¹ He mentions that Sultan Süleyman ordered to execute an expedition towards Apulia, in which the King of Spain, known by his sinfulness and enmity towards the Muslim religion, had castles and charged Hayreddin Pasha, the *Beylerbeyi* of Algiers, who were always engaging in wars against the Frenks, of commanding the Ottoman fleet.⁴⁴² By the order of the Sultan, the fleet departed with the help of convenient winds and on May 17, 1537, the Sultan with the land army left Constantinople in the direction of Corfu.⁴⁴³ The first stop of the Sultan and the army was the city of Adrianople. Nasûh states that there the Sultan convened the imperial court for two days, listened to the complaints of his subjects and got information about the provisions of the province.⁴⁴⁴ During the imperial camp in Adrianople, the Sultan also got informed about the ongoing circumstances at sea. Nasûh narrates as following:

[...] and there, the messengers came from the sea front and reported [the Sultan] that since Spain [of the] cursed religion had a great armada at sea, might the Sultan of the soldiers of Islam, with the help of God, reach Valona by stopping once instead of twice [on the route]. [The Sultan being] the emperor of the world and the zenith of the saints of the time departed by [his] fortunate desideration and blissed magnificence, on the eighteenth of the aforementioned month⁴⁴⁵, from Adrianople to Plovdiv.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴¹ Ibid, 191.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ “[...] *sene-i selase ve erba’in ve tis’a mi’e Zi’l-hiccesinün yedinci günü [...] Konstantiniyye’den [...] Korfos cânibine azimet gösterdi.*” Ibid, 192.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. Nasuh also mentions that in Adrianople, also the levy of Transylvania was conceded to the imperial treasury.

⁴⁴⁵ The dates are given according to the Islamic lunar calendar. 18 zilhicce 943 falls on May 28, 1537.

⁴⁴⁶ “*ve deryâ cânibinden ulaklar gelüp, İspânya-i dîn-i la’înün deryâda ziyâde tonanması var padişâh-ı islâm asker-i nusret-ecnâmla iki menzili bir idüp gelüp Avlonya’ya irişmek üzere olsunlar deyü haber virdiler. Hudâvend-i cihân ve kutb-ı dâ’ire-i zaman hazretleri yümn ü ikbâl ve sa’âdet ü iclâl ile Edirne’den Filibe cânibine mâh-ı mefsûrun on sekizinde azîmet gösterdi.*” Ibid.

According to Nasûh, the army stopped in Plovdiv for five days and there Hüsrev Pasha, the *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolia also participated in the expedition with the forces under his command and informed the Sultan about the trouble created by Diyak Mihal, the custodian of the castle of Valpovo, in the region of Srem⁴⁴⁷ that was taken under control by his forces.⁴⁴⁸ From Plovdiv, the army marched into Skopje. There, the Sultan got informed via the messengers that in Bagdad, the Safavid Shah was creating disturbances. Therefore, the imperial orders were sent to the governors in Diyarbakır and Bagdad to take necessary measures.⁴⁴⁹ After having listened to the complaints and demands of his subjects and controlled the provisions of the province, the Sultan left the city and reached Valona. The imperial fleet came to Valona one day after. The Sultan called the imperial court then and after the meeting Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Pasha (Barbarossa) were charged for attacking the castles of the Spanish King, in Apulia, for destroying them and for capturing his subjects.⁴⁵⁰ These two Pashas departed for Apulia, on July 12 1537. They were accompanied by the soldiers of Rumelia commanded by Ayas Mehmed Pasha.⁴⁵¹

Four days later, the vizier Mustafa Pasha, with his household, and Hüsrev Pasha with the soldiers of Anatolia were ordered to attack Albania.⁴⁵² Nasûh mentions that in Albania, the rebels fled to high mountains. The roads and passages were too narrow and impenetrable, not easy even for ants and snakes to pass. For that reason, the

⁴⁴⁷ The region between Serbia and Croatia. It was taken under the Ottoman rule by 1521. See: Nenad Moacanin, "Srem", *DIA*, v.37, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009), 423-424.

⁴⁴⁸ Erkan, 193-194.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid, 194.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid, 195.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid, 196.

soldiers were not able to control the region; even the talented horses, compatible with the horse of the Prophet, perished. Many soldiers were killed by the bandit groups. The branch of the army returned to the imperial camp without having a significant success.

Nasûh continues his account by giving information about the attacks on Apulia. He states that Lütî Pasha destroyed the castles of Castro and Otranto; the commanders and people within the castles could not resist to the heavy attacks and ran away. The Ottoman soldiers sacked and put under fire 80 villages in the region, as well as capturing many people. On the other hand, numerous ships of the Spanish King were also attacked, harmed and pillaged. After having devastated the region of Spain and its ships, Nasûh notes that the armada gloriously returned back to Valona.⁴⁵³

[...] then there occurred the betrayal of the infidels of the Castle of Corfu and even their alliance with Spain, their lie and strife, and it was realized that they intended to harm the imperial armada with numerous galleys, thus aforementioned Lütî Pasha, Hayreddin Pasha and Mehmed Pasha, the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia were sent [and they] engaged into the siege of the castle and confrontation with the unbelievers inside it.⁴⁵⁴

Simultaneously with the fleet, the Sultan, himself, also moved to Delvina and camped in a town opposite the island, mentions Nasûh. Moreover, the Sultan sent Salih Reis and his men towards Apulia and Messina to control the Spanish, Papal and Venetian⁴⁵⁵ fleets.⁴⁵⁶ Nasûh notes that they reported to the Sultan that close to

⁴⁵³ Ibid, 196-197.

⁴⁵⁴ “[...] *ba ‘dehû Korfos kal ‘asınun keferesiniün hıyâneti ve öte İspânya ile ittifâkı ve hîle vü nifâkı opu dahi nice pare kadırğa ile donanma-ı hümayûna zarar irişdirmek sevdâsında oldukları ma ‘lûm olunup ol sebebdan mûmâ-ileyhüm Lütî Paşa ‘yla Hayreddin Paşa ve Rûmili beglerbegisi Mehmed Paşa irsâl olunup varup muhâsara-i hisâra mübâşeret içindeki bî-dinlere mübâdaret idüp durdılar.*”, Ibid, 197.

⁴⁵⁵ In the text, Davut Erkan transkripted the sentence as “[...] *İspânya kralının, pâpâs-ı makruhun ve Ferendik-i mahzûlun donanmalarının ahvâlini ma ‘lûm idinmek için [...]*”. In the light of the context and the using the adjective *mâhzûl*, meaning distraught, it is assumed that the Nasûh referred Venice. Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid, 197-198.

Apulia, Andrea Doria was ready with 55 galleys to collaborate with the Venetians and the Christian Kings were preparing numerous ships, since they had allied to attack the Ottoman fleet and Muslim territories.⁴⁵⁷ When this information was echoed in the imperial camp, the army was attacking Corfu. According to Nasûh, the battles continued from August 16 to September 28, the soldiers attacked each side of the main castle of the island. Ayas Pasha was able to ruin some of its bastions. Nasûh notes that although numerous Ottoman soldiers were killed during the attack, the viziers and the commanders, accepting even to sacrifice their lives, devoted themselves to conquer the Island.⁴⁵⁸

According to Nasûh, the course of the attack on Corfu was changed by the aviso of Salih Reis. Salih Reis watching the maneuvers at sea informed the Sultan that the Venetian and Papal fleets were close to Corfu. After having learnt this, the Sultan decided to postpone the conquest considering the fact that the season for war was about to end. Following the imperial order, the artillery and the soldiers were embarked into the ships and left the island.⁴⁵⁹ The day after, the Sultan called the *Divân*, and awarded the Pashas, the captains of the fleet, the cavalry and the Janissaries for their achievements. He took the road of Constantinople on September 30.⁴⁶⁰ Nasûh concludes narrating the event, as well as the first part of his *Süleymânnâme*, with listing the names of the towns in which the Sultan camped on his way of return and briefly describing them.⁴⁶¹ The account ends with the following

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid, 198.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid, 199.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid, 199-206. Nasuh also mentions the date in which the Sultan arrived at each town.

sentence: “thereby, the first part of the epic of the world-sheltering sultan ended with the aforementioned expedition of Corfu”.⁴⁶²

Another important personality, thought to be present in the campaign with the Sultan, is Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi⁴⁶³, the “*Koca Nişancı*”⁴⁶⁴ of Sultan Süleyman. Celâlzade, born in near 1491, was the elder son of *Kadı Celâleddin*. By using his family network, he entered in the Ottoman bureaucracy in 1516 as the scribe of the imperial council. In the first years of Sultan Süleyman, he also participated in the expeditions of Belgrade and Rhodes between the years of 1521 and 1522.⁴⁶⁵ He went to Egypt with the Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha in 1524. He devotedly worked for the regularization of the Egyptian code; this offered him both the favor of the Pasha, for his life time and the office of *Reisü'l-küttâb* in the following year. He also participated in the expeditions against the Safevids in 1534. The favor of İbrahim Pasha facilitated his rise in the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was appointed to the office of *Nişancı* in 1534 and continued his office for twenty three years, until 1557, when he resigned. In the last expedition of the Sultan, following the death of his successor, Eğri Abidzâde Mehmed Bey, he was re-appointed and work for thirteen months until his death in 1567.

⁴⁶² “Eyle olsa, padişâh-ı âlem-penâh hazretlerinin dâsîtan-ı evveli bu zikr olunan Korfos seferi ile tamâm oldu.” Ibid. 207.

⁴⁶³ For detailed information about Celâlzâde, see: Mehmet Şakir Yılmaz, “*Koca Nişancı*” of Kanuni: Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Bureaucracy and “Kanun” in the Reign of Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Bilkent University Department of History, September 2006.

⁴⁶⁴ He was known with the title meaning the Great *Nişancı* in the Ottoman milieu. For encyclopedic information about Celâlzâde, see: Celia J. Kerslake, “Celâlzâde Mustafa Çelebi”, *DİA*, v. 7, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1993), 260-262.

⁴⁶⁵ For the critics of his perception of the aforementioned expeditions and how they were reflected by Celâlzâde, see: Şahin, *Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar*, 45-59.

As a principal member of the imperial council, Celâlzâde, had the opportunity of both witnessing the state decisions, plans and strategies directly, recording them in regular basis, codifying the law and regulations, and participating into the important military initiations with the Sultan himself. Celâlzâde also chronicled his erudition and penned important works on ethics and history. He also translated Persian works into Ottoman language. Like most of the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats, he was interested in classical poetry and had a *divan*, personal cahier of poetry.⁴⁶⁶

In this chapter, to analyze how Celâlzâde evaluates the Ottoman campaign of 1537 and the subsequent attack on Corfu, in his famous chronicle entitled *Tabakâtü'l Memâlik fi Derecâtü'l Mesâlik*⁴⁶⁷, in which Celâlzâde discusses the socio-political, administrative and international issues of the Ottoman State in the reign of Sultan Süleyman until 1555 will be discussed. The studies on the author mentions that the work was composed first in 1534 and the final chronicle was composed in his retirement. *Tabakât* is classified as an example of *Süleymânnâme*, discussing the important events, conquests, bureaucrats, scholars, military organization, financial situation and administrative and social structure of the Ottoman Empire, in the reign of Süleyman I. The work was composed of 30 *tabakas*, chapters and 275 *dereces*, subtitles. It is generally assumed that since he was a high-ranking bureaucrat,

⁴⁶⁶ Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, *Kanunî'nin Tarihiçisinden Muhteşem Çağ: Kanunî Sultan Süleyman-Tabakaâtü'l Memâlik ve Derecâtü'l Mesâlik*, ed. by. Ayhan Yılmaz, (İstanbul: Kariyer Yayıncılık, 2011), 9-10. Ayhan Yılmaz adds a simplified edition of the *Tabakât* in this edition. The book is useful to be consulted since the original Ottoman composition is difficult to understand taking into consideration the complex explanations and definitions of Celâlzâde. However, the author seems to err in some translations in terms of simplifying and paraphrasing the long sentences. This may mislead the researcher to understand the main statement. In the present chapter some of them will be demonstrated in the foot notes. Therefore, it is strongly suggested to check the original Ottoman edition before stating major arguments.

⁴⁶⁷ In this chapter the edition of Petra Kappert will be consulted. Celâlzâde Mustafa (Koca Nişancı), *Geschichte Sultan Süleyman Kânûnis von 1520 bis 1557 oder Tabakât ül-Memâlik ve Derecât ül-Mesâlik*, ed. by, Petra Kappert, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1981). Kappert offers the researcher the facsimile of the copies of the *Tabakât*, conserved in the State Library of Berlin, Natinal Library of Wien and the Library of Istanbul University.

Celâlzâde reflects his own views, witnessing and experience, enabling himself to portrait the soul of the time that he lived.

Celâlzâde discusses the Ottoman Campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu under the subtitle of “[...] the ghaza of the Corfu Island, being a strange-consequence”⁴⁶⁸.

Celâlzade starts with a large description of Venice and its dominions. He underlines that Venetians have a fertile, prosperous country. Their state had border to Bosnia and to Herzegovina that were under the Ottoman rule. He underlines that Venetian having unlimited ships were powerful at sea and had numerous islands in the Mediterranean. Celâlzâde continues his description as the following:

[...] however, although they represent themselves as the friends [of them], they harmed the Muslims. It is often noticed that they have been in alliance with the enemies of the faith; they are known with their despicableness of infidelity; they are hypocrites [so] they ameliorate [their relations with] the Muslims because it is compulsory [for them]. In the affairs of Modone and Corone, their accord is decided; their alliance with the cursed Spain is certain. They revolted and disobeyed.⁴⁶⁹

The aforementioned statements are important both to understand how Venice was perceived by the Ottomans, indeed by the Ottoman administration, and how the author tries to explain the background of the Ottoman-Venetian confrontation following the Apulian Campaign. Celâlzâde continues with the vivid description of Apulia⁴⁷⁰, which was under the rule of the infidels despite the fact that it had been

⁴⁶⁸ “[...] sefer-i ‘acayîb-eser olan Körfos gazâsı beyanındadır.”, Ibid. 284b.

⁴⁶⁹ “[...] ammâ ‘Âl-i İslâm’a zararları dûstlık şeklinde, â‘dâ-i dîn ile ittihâd ve haberleri eksik olmayub, küfr-i zalâletde sâbıklar, ehl-i İslâm ile iltiyâmları zarûrî olub, münâfıklardır. Motôn ve Korôn hâdiselerinde ittifâkları mukarrer, İspânyâ-ı lâ‘în ile ittihâdları muhakkakdır. ‘İsyân ve tuğyân eylediler.”, Ibid, 284b-285a.

⁴⁷⁰ Celâlzâde mentions that Apulia is very near to *Sancak* of Valona. “*Memâlik-i Mahrûse-i Pâdişâhî’den Avlonya sancağı ki leb-ideryâda vakî’ olub, memâlik-i küfriyeden ânâ karîb Pulyâ vilâyeti ma‘mûr olub [...]*”. Ibid, 285a. Ayhan Yılmaz, editing and simplifying the original text demonstrates Apulia as a Venetian dominion: “*Yeşil Deniz’in (Adriyatik) kuzeyinde Venediklilere ait olmak üzere Dalmaçya’ya bitişik, Pulya (Pula) adlı meşhur bir vilayet vardır.*” Furthermore, the author reads all the definitions of the author on Venice, as the picture of Apulia. See: Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, *Kanunî’nin Tarihçisinden Muhteşem Çağ*, 221. This statement may lead the

captured by Gedik Ahmed Pasha in the times of Mehmed II. He mentions that since its entire control of the region could not be completed because of the unexpected death of Mehmed II, in 1537, Sultan Süleyman decided to engage in a campaign towards Apulia.⁴⁷¹ Accordingly, numerous ships of different forms were prepared and Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa were charged for commanding the imperial fleet, carrying a crowded army composed by Janissaries, cavalries led by some *Sancakbeyis* of Rumelia and Anatolia.⁴⁷²

He states that with the company of his princes Mehmed and Selim, the Sultan, with his soldiers left Constantinople for the campaign on May 17. First destination was Adrianople.⁴⁷³ Then, the Sultan reached Plovdiv, Skopje and Elbasan, where the Sultan engaged in hunting with their companies.⁴⁷⁴ On July 14, the Sultan stopped by Valona.⁴⁷⁵

Celâlzâde mentions that Valona had been already taken under the Ottoman rule; however, it was the theatre of many insurrections wounding the Empire. The Albanians often revolted against the state and mistreated the Muslims living there, killed and captured them and pillaged their goods. Furthermore, the author underlines that the attitudes of some of the high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats also led the troubles happening there. *Beylerbeyis* and even viziers of Albanian origin used to

researcher to assume that the Ottomans aimed principally to attack a Venetian dominion, rather than a Habsburg territory.

⁴⁷¹ See: Celâlzâde Mustafâ, *Geschichte Sultan Süleyman*, 285a.

⁴⁷² Ibid, 285a-285b.

⁴⁷³ Ibid, 286a. Celâlzâde states that, there the Sultan stayed for five days. On the other hand, the Sultan and the army were welcomed by the people of the city enthusiastically. However, the strong rain falls affected the ceremonies. The banner holder of the tailor's guild lost his life by a stroke of lightning. See. Ibid, 286a-286b.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, 286b-287a. Celâlzâde narrates the hunting of the Sultan and his companies as Nasûh does.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, 287a.

curtain the ongoing insurrections, mistreatments of Albanians and did not take the necessary measures. They even mislead the Sultan about the current situation. These enable the rebels to ally with the enemies of the Sultan. Celâlzâde underlines that the power vacuum in the region led the Albanian rebels to cooperate with the “infidels”, who was able to land in the coasts easily.⁴⁷⁶

According to Celâlzâde, Ayas Pasha, his Albanian origin Grand Vizier, advised the Sultan Süleyman to engage in an expedition to face the rebellious Albanians.⁴⁷⁷ The Pasha emphasized that the presence of the Sultan in Albania and his new measures would prevent insurrections in future and the alliance of the Albanians with the enemy, threatening the borders of the Empire. In the course of the expedition, Ayas Pasha was able to suppress the rebels and the people having share in the rebellions were condoned by the Sultan. Therefore, the peace was reestablished in the region. Moreover, Delvina became an Ottoman dominion and by the establishment of the *sancak* system there, the region was taken under the direct control of the Empire.⁴⁷⁸

Right after the discussions on the achievements of the Ottoman land forces in Albania, Celâlzâde notes the information about the Apulian Campaign, held simultaneously. The Ottoman soldiers under the command of Lütî Pasha and Barbarossa captured many villages and castles, took numerous prisoners and goods in Apulia. However, the author undelines that twelve Ottoman galleys commanded by Ali Reis, the chamberlain of the captains of Gallipoli, encountered the famous corsair of the

⁴⁷⁶ See: Ibid, 287a-287b.

⁴⁷⁷ “*Vezîr-i â ‘zam âyâs Pâşâ ol tâ ‘îfeden olub aslâda Avlônîyâ hâkînden imiş. Hazret-i Hüdâvendigâr-ı ‘âlem-I kendü vatanları tarafına tahrîk [idüb] [...]*”, ibid, 287b.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid, 287b-288a.

“infidels”, Andrea Doria, and the Venetian ships near Corfu.⁴⁷⁹ The enemies attacked on the Ottoman ships. He notes that although the Ottoman crews fought bravely, the ships sank and many of them died. This event led the Sultan to call the imperial fleet back to Valona and to order the Attack on Corfu.⁴⁸⁰ The attack commenced on August 14. The walls of the main castle in different sides were destroyed. However, the changing weather conditions prevented a definite Ottoman conquest. The Sultan, closely observing the conditions, decided to stop the fire. The army took the road of Constantinople, on September 12.⁴⁸¹

Celâlzâde notes that Süleyman arrived at Adrianople on October 25 and stayed there for a while to celebrate the success of the campaign. On November 25, Arslan *Bey*, the son of the governor of Semedre (Bosnia) came to his presence and declared that the forces of his father defeated the Habsburg guards commanded by Johann Katzianer.⁴⁸² He notes that the Sultan was very glad to hear that and appointed the Governor of Semendire, Mehmed Bey, as the *Sancakbeyi* of the region. Celâlzâde concludes his notes on 1537 Campaign by noting that the Sultan arrived at Constantinople on November 22.

The accounts of Nasûh and Celâlzâde unanimously state that the Ottoman campaign of 1537 was not primarily designed to be an Ottoman attack on a Venetian dominion; instead they both underline that the Sultan engage in an expedition to the region of Apulia, dominated by Charles V. In that respect, the Attack on Corfu is reflected as a

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid, 288b.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid, 289a

⁴⁸¹ “[...] *hevâya şiddet ü bürüdet müstevlî olmağın fermân-ı cihân-muta ile hisârdan ferâgat olunub[...]*”,ibid.

⁴⁸² For detailed information see: 289b-290b.

response of the Ottoman Sultan to the Venetian alliance and cooperation with the Habsburgs. Celâlzâde's statement of "strange-consequence" for the attack on Corfu, shows that the main target of the Sultan was not Corfu but the events that the Ottomans had faced during the campaign led the Ottoman-Venetian encounter at Corfu.

However, these two authors give different reasons for Süleyman's motivation for the attack on Corfu. Nasûh mentions that information carried by Salih Reis about the crowded Spanish and Venetian fleets in sea persuaded the Sultan on the Habsburg-Venetian alliance and led the Attack on Corfu in 1537. On the other hand, Celâlzâde underlines that Andrea Doria's attack on the ships commanded by Ali Reis urged the Sultan to attack Corfu as a response, since he thought that this event could not be happened without a Venetian assistance considering the fact that the galleys were so close to Venetian Corfu. In this regard, it can be asserted that Celâlzâde agrees with Lütü Pasha. Although they both indicate the end of the war season as the reason of the Ottoman withdrawal from the island, Nasûh highlights that the aviso came to the Sultan about the Christian fleet, coming towards Corfu persuaded Süleyman on stopping the attack. In the light of information given by Nasûh, it can be argued that the Sultan might have decided on the withdrawal not to put the fleet and the soldiers in danger in face of an allied Christian forces coming to assist the defense of Corfu. Thus, the Ottoman attack did not result on the conquest of the island: instead, the soldiers were satisfied with booty and numerous slaves and Süleyman showed his power to the "disloyal" Venetians

Nasûh and Celâlzâde have also different views about the land operations in Valona. Nasûh states that the Sultan's arrival at Valona was upon the request of the messengers, informing him that there had been numerous Spanish ships in the sea.

Nasûh portrays the Ottoman initiative in Albania as partly an unsuccessful attempt since the Albanians fled to high mountains and exhausted the Ottoman soldiers aiming to suppress them to prevent their future alliance with the enemies of the Sultan. On the other hand, Celâlzâde narrated the expedition of Albania was one of the principal motivations of Süleyman in 1537 and emphasized the role of Ayas Pasha persuading the Sultan on engaging in such an operation. Unlike Nasûh, Celâlzâde evaluates the Ottoman initiatives against the Albanian rebels successful, underlining the establishment of the *sancak* of Delvina.

It can be asserted that Celâlzâde's accounts overlaps with the accounts of Lütü Pasha's more than the ones of Nasûh's. This resemblance could be related with their position in the Ottoman administration. As two important members in the state politics, they seem to have detailed information about the formulation of the campaign and the current events. For instance, the Habsburg response to the Ottoman campaign as the Siege of Osijek is not mentioned by Nasûh. In this context, Celâlzâde's silence about the Ottoman-French alliance is interesting. The question of why he does not tell anything about it is a matter of speculation. The absence of the French in Lombardy, as it had been planned, and the redirection of the Ottoman forces to Corfu without having a definite success in Apulia might have led the author not to mention the French encouragement for a joint Ottoman-French operation against the Habsburgs and to reflect the 1537 Campaign as an individual Ottoman military initiative against the "infidel".

4.3. The Reverberations of the Campaign: 1537 in the Books on Ottoman

History

To make the picture drawn by the actors and eyewitnesses of 1537 clearer and to answer the question of how the Ottoman Campaign of Apulia and the attack on Corfu in 1537 was narrated in the Ottoman historiography, the question of how the Ottoman military initiative is echoed by the other chronicles composed in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries need for further discussion. It is known that the early modern chroniclers were prone to use earlier studies, as well as the works of their contemporaries. Hence, it can be assumed that the sources, to be discussed below, most probably mainly consulted the accounts of Lütü Pasha, Hayreddin Barbarossa, Celâlzâde and Nasûh. This fact should not be evaluated as only a repetition of what had been narrated by the predecessors; indeed, by comparing and contrasting the existing sources in the light of the subsequent developments, the chronicles discussed under this subtitle evaluate the Ottoman Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537 within a broader perspective. In this context, here the author of the present study intends to consult two examples of the books on Ottoman history, such as the chronicles of Mustafa Âlî, and İbrahim Peçevî.

One of the important books of history in the Ottoman literature is the comprehensive account of Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l- AHBâr*, which was composed as a detailed world history discussing the events from the creation of the universe up to the year of 1596.⁴⁸³ Mustafa Âlî, born in 1541 in Ottoman Gallipoli, was an important Ottoman bureaucrat and historian. He entered into state service in the imperial palace in the

⁴⁸³ Since Âlî was born in Gallipoli, he is also known as “Gelibolulu Âlî”, Âlî from Gallipoli. *Künh'ül AHBâr* means the Essence of History. For detailed information about *Künhü'l- AHBâr*, see: Jan Schmidt, “Künhü-l AHBâr”, *DİA*, v.26, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2002), 555-556.

reign of the Sultan Selim II. He worked as the scribe of the imperial council. The studies on him mention that his great ambition to get a high position in the Ottoman bureaucracy disabled him to get the support of the sultans, Süleyman and Selim II. He was first worked as scribe in Aleppo, Yemen and Bosnia. He desired to be appointed as *Nişancı* in the late sixteenth-century, but he was refused. He then became the *Sancakbeyi* of Amasya and *Defterdar* of Rumelia. In his last years, he was appointed as the *Sancakbeyi* of Jeddah, where he died c.1600.⁴⁸⁴ Besides his administrative positions, he also engaged in literary studies and penned numerous works on poetry, politics and ethics.⁴⁸⁵

The *Künhü'l- Ahbâr* of Âlî was composed of four parts. The first part deals with the creation of the universe, the mountains, seas, waters and climates; the second discusses the history of Islam and Arabs and the third narrates the histories of Turks and Mongolians. The fourth part of the work discusses the history of the Ottoman Empire, from its rise to the year of 1596 and the biographies of the prominent statesmen, scientists and poets of the mentioned period.⁴⁸⁶ The account is chronologically divided under the name of the sultans and discusses the events and important developments happened in each sultan's reign.⁴⁸⁷ Before discussing the views of Âlî on the Ottoman campaign of 1537, the views of Cornell H. Fleischer, published a comprehensive book on Âlî, over the atmosphere of the time of

⁴⁸⁴ See: Bekir Kütükoğlu, “Âlî Mustafa Efendi”, *DİA*, v.2, (İstanbul, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989), 414-416, 414.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid, 414-416. For further information about Mustafa Âlî and his works consult the prominent studies on him: Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)*, (Princeton & New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1986); Mustafa İsen, *Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî*, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988).

⁴⁸⁶ Kütükoğlu, “Âlî Mustafa Efendi”, 415; İsen, *Gelibolulu Musfata Âli*, 11-13.

⁴⁸⁷ In the present study, the printed version of the original text is consulted. See: Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l Ahbâr*, Dördüncü Rûkn, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2009).

composition that figured Âlî's perception and the style Künhü'l- Ahbâr should be remembered:

At the very start of the year 1000 of Hijra, Âli began to write a history of the world and the Ottoman Empire. The millennium marked the end of an era, an end that many thought world would usher in the apocalypse. But the apocalypse did not arrived, and so the year of 1000 also inaugurated a new age. It was a time for retrospection and perhaps introspection. Âli mediated on the society, he had served as a man of learning, a bureaucrat, and a soldier for all his adult life. He saw it to be in the grip of a moral apocalypse, a cultural and political crisis, a decline from an ideal order that had existed in fact but a few decades before. This retrospective perspective led Âli to articulate in his history and social commentaries, the ideals that lay at the heart of Ottoman society at its height; he had to enunciate what he saw as the central distinguishing features of the Ottoman system in order to analyze their corrosion and failure.⁴⁸⁸

The Ottoman campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu is discussed by Âlî in the fourth book, under the title of “the 35th incident”. Âlî names the event as “the expedition for the conquest of the Corfu Island”.⁴⁸⁹ He gives detailed information about the preparation of the imperial armada for the expedition, the types of ships⁴⁹⁰, the qualities of the commanders and soldiers. He also mentions that before the departure of the Sultan, his sons Mehmed and Selim, and the land army, on May 17, 1537 and the imperial fleet led by Lütî Pasha sailed towards Mediterranean. The forces commanded by the Great Admiral, Hayreddin Barbarossa also moved to follow the fleet.⁴⁹¹ Âlî notes that the main target of the Ottoman fleet the shores of Apulia.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁸ Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 7-8.

⁴⁸⁹ “*Korfos cezîresi fethine tevecchüh-i hümâyûnlarıdır ki [...]*” Ibid, 305b.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ “[...] *Lütî Pâşa tonanmây-ı hümâyuna serdâr ve kapûdan[...]* mücâhid-i cezâyîristân Hayreddin Paşa ânlar kele-i- hidmet-i feth-i teshîre] *fermân [...]*”, ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 305b.

In the following passages, Âlî gives information about the route of the land army, the hunting game performed by the Sultan, his sons and the soldiers in Elbasan, Albania.⁴⁹³ The next destination was decided to be Valona, thus, the Sultan ordered the imperial fleet to reach to the port of Valona after having attacked and conquered Apulia. According to Âlî, the choice of Apulia was not an unexpected decision. The Republic of Venice had already signed an *ahidnâme* with the Ottoman Empire to pursue the ongoing trade and eliminate the fear of a sudden attack.⁴⁹⁴ However, Venetians breaking the terms of the peace were secretly in alliance with the Spanish King⁴⁹⁵ and they had been harming some ships of Muslim merchants. That situation created an insecurity about them in the eyes of the Sultan. According to him, it was also known that the Venetians used the region of Apulia, dominated by the Spanish Kingdom, as a base in cooperation with the Spanish.⁴⁹⁶ Therefore, taking the region under the Ottoman control was thought to be both a punishment for Spain and Venice allying against the Ottoman Sultan and the re-initiation of the plan of Süleyman's great grand father, Mehmed II, on conquering Apulia, which had been failed because of his unexpected death.⁴⁹⁷

According to Âlî, the course of the campaign was changed by an unexpected attack of the Spanish Admiral, Andrea Doria and of the Venetian forces situated in the port of Corfu. The ship of Sinan Kethüda, sent as an envoy to Valona by Lütî Pasha, was attacked by the allied forces. Besides this event, twelve Ottoman galleys under the

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 305b-306a.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid, 306a.

⁴⁹⁵ “[...] ve yine hafıyyen İspânya krallarıyla nifâkda ittifâk idüb [...]”, ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ “[...] bu tâ’îfey-i hafıyeye tâ’bî Polya yakaları [...]”, ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

command of Ali Kethüda that had stayed behind the imperial fleet on the way of Apulia, were put under fire by them. The battles were bloody; Muslim soldiers resisted and damaged the Christian forces, but they were not able to survive. Most of them were killed and the rest was taken as slaves.⁴⁹⁸ A soldier, named Ahmed rejected to live as a slave; jumped at sea. With the help of God, he could hang on a wood piece and reach a running Ottoman ship. Ahmed immediately informed Lütü Pasha about the attack.⁴⁹⁹ These two attacks were accepted as *casus belli* by Süleyman and led him to order the Pashas the attack on Corfu.⁵⁰⁰

Âlî also gives information about the maneuvers of the land army in Albania: while the fleet was dealing with Apulia and struggling with the Christian attacks, the land army was able to take Albania under the Ottoman control, notes the author. He points out that the region had been in a turmoil since the Albanian rebel groups disobeying the Ottoman rule and frequently supported by the Venetians created unrest in towns. According to Âlî, the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha and the Ottoman statesmen of Albanian origin had an important share in these insurrections, since they covered the incidents, winked at the power of the regional elites and misinformed the Sultan about the ongoing situation.⁵⁰¹ Therefore, the military measures taken in Valona was evaluated as an important maneuver to prevent a future chaos by Âlî.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid, 306a-306b.

⁴⁹⁹ Âlî mentions that, Ahmed was noticed by the people of a *Karamürsel* ship of the Ottomans, patrolling the coasts and ported to Lütü Pasha. Ibid, 306b.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid 306b.

⁵⁰¹ The author mentions that the attacks of the Ottoman ships proved the betrayal of the Venetians. “[...] *Venedik küffârının hıyânetlerinde şüphe kalmadı*[...]”. Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid, 306b-307a.

The author narrates that right after having issued the imperial order for the attack on Corfu and his victory in Valona, Sultan Süleyman came to a town having a clear view of Corfu to supervene the attacks of the imperial fleet. The castle of the island was severely damaged by the fire opened from the fleet and the soldiers got close to conquer it. However, the author indicates that in the meantime, autumn rains started to fall and heavy thunderstorms damaged the soldiers and the caissons.⁵⁰³ Moreover, fire opened the Ottoman soldiers by the Corfiots started to harm the army. In one bombing four Ottoman infantry soldiers died. All these pursued the Sultan on ending the attacks. In addition to this, the season for war for the Ottomans was about to end. Considering all these, Süleyman sent Ayas Pasha to Corfu to inform Lütî Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa that the Sultan ordered the retreat of both the land and sea forces from the island and the withdrawal of the conquest.⁵⁰⁴ Upon this, according to Âlî, Lütî Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa insisted on that the conquest was about to be concluded and the efforts of soldiers should not be wasted. However, Süleyman uttered as follows: “[...] I do not exchange my one ghazi for a thousand such castles [...]”⁵⁰⁵.

Thereby, the Ottoman forces retreated and the imperial fleet contended itself with attacking and pillaging the island of Cephalonia on the way return. The Sultan reached Adrianople on October 25. Âlî concludes his account on the campaign by mentioning that in Adrianople, *fethnâmes* were written and sent to all governors of the Empire to announce the victory of the Ottoman army in the campaign. The Sultan returned to Constantinople on November 22, 1537.

⁵⁰³ Ibid, 307a.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ “[...] *ben bir mücâhid kulum bin böyle hisara değüşmezük buyurulub [...]*”, *ibid.*

Here, it is useful to discuss another important example of the Ottoman books of history, the chronicle of historian Peçevi İbrahim *Efendi*. İbrahim *Efendi* was an important Ottoman chronicler, born in Pecs in 1574.⁵⁰⁶ He studied in Bosnia and in Buda when he was a child. Upon the death of his father, he entered in the household of Lala Mehmed Pasha, acting as *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolia and Rumelia to be appointed as the Grand Vizier of Sultan Ahmed I and lived over many years in Hungary. He acted as scribe for Pasha. For that reason, he could find the chance of participating in some Ottoman expeditions, especially to Austria, with the imperial army and get the information about the Ottoman state decisions at the first glance. Following the death of Lala Mehmed Pasha, he returned to Constantinople and undertook several offices in the financial bureaucracy and in the imperial government. In 1631, he was appointed as *Defterdar* of Anatolia, and started to be called with the title of Pasha. His last office was the *Defterdar* of Timișoara⁵⁰⁷, in Romania. After 1641, he was discharged from his office because of his age. Although the date is unclear, it is known that he died c. 1648.⁵⁰⁸

In 1640, he devoted himself to write his chronicle, comprehending the wars of Süleyman I. Later, with the recommendation of the *Beylerbeyi* of Buda, Musa Pasha, he developed the chronicle with the discussions preceding events up to his age and the details of war treaties. He did not give a special name to his history, so the account has been known as the *History of Peçevi*. He extensively consulted numerous books of history, written before, including the accounts of Celâlzâde and

⁵⁰⁶ For that reason he was called as *Peçûyî*, from Pecs. In time, the epithet turned into *Peçevi*. Peçevi's mother was from the famous Sokollu family, whose members held high-ranking positions in the Ottoman administration.

⁵⁰⁷ *Temeşvar* in Ottoman use.

⁵⁰⁸ Erica Hancz, "Peçûylı İbrahim", *DİA*, v. 34, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 216-218, 217.

Mustafa Âlî, which was discussed above.⁵⁰⁹ For the details of the war treaties, he also used the Hungarian chronicles and documents.⁵¹⁰ Another interesting point about the work is that Peçevi indicates the names of the Ottoman chroniclers, consulted by him in the text, unlike the other Ottoman scholars of the time. The author also narrates some anecdotes or short stories in the text. By its comprehensiveness and accuracy, the History of Peçevi, was used by numerous subsequent Ottoman chroniclers, even it was translated and published in Hungary.⁵¹¹

In the History of Peçevi⁵¹², the Ottoman campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 is discussed under the title of “the Extract of the Imperial Campaign to the Island of Corfu and the Departure of the Sultan”.⁵¹³ Peçevi starts the story with the description of the city of Venice and characteristics of the Venetians. He underlines that most of the Venetian dominions, except the lagoon city, were close to the borders of the Ottoman dominions. Thus, Venetians had to follow a disingenuous policy towards the Ottomans in order to satisfy their needs, such as food supplies, and to ally with the Ottoman Sultan to be safe from a possible Ottoman threat against his dominions.⁵¹⁴ The author mentions that Venice was “[...] an enemy bay, friend in appearance because of the necessity. They are the enemy of the faith among the

⁵⁰⁹ For details about the sources that the author consulted, see: Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, 217-218.

⁵¹¹ Ibid, 218.

⁵¹² The History of *Peçevi* had several editions. In 1968, Murat Uyaz adopted the text in modern Turkish. See: İbrahim Peçevî, *Peçevî Tarihi*, v.1-2, (İstanbul: Neşriyat Yurdu, 1968). In the present study, the 1580 edition of the original text, in Ottoman script, will be used. Peçevî, *Tarih-i Peçevî*.

⁵¹³ “İcmâl-i Sefer-i Hümâyûn be Cezîre-i Korfos ve ‘Azîmet-i Hümâyûn”. Peçevi İbrahim, 194.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

infidels, [having] aggravated hostilities.”⁵¹⁵ The Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman, knew their hostility and he sent the imperial fleet under the command of Lütü Pasha and the Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa to attack the region of Apulia.⁵¹⁶ As Mustafa Âli, the author evaluates the Sultan’s decision by pointing out the former expedition in the late fifteenth-century, realized by Gedik Ahmed Pasha. Since, the death of Mehmed II prevented the entire control of the region, Süleyman, intended to complete the conquest by reconquering the towns captured by Gedik Ahmed Pasha.⁵¹⁷

The *History of Peçevi* discusses the campaign in two separate parts. In the first part, the author narrates the voyage of the Sultan leading the land army.⁵¹⁸ According to Peçevî, the ongoing insurrections caused by the Albanian bandit groups motivated the Sultan to expedite on Valona. He notes that since the region had not been taken under the direct control of the Ottoman State yet, the insurrections within the region could not come to an end and this gradually harmed the Ottoman government.⁵¹⁹ Moreover, he underlines that thanks to its geographical position, the port was also used by the enemies supporting by the rebellions against the Ottomans.⁵²⁰ Peçevî asserts that the Grand Vizier Ayas Pasha convinced the Sultan on marching towards Valona⁵²¹ and he mentions that by the efforts of the Ottoman commanders, the rebels

⁵¹⁵ “[...] bi’l zarûrî dostlûk suretinde bir düşman koydur. Sâ’ir kefereden ‘adâvetleri müştâk dîn düşmanlarıdır.” Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ The author narrates in detail that the Sultan hunted in the mentioned town. However, the animals were wretched, some of them are domesticated and friendly to people. For that reason, Süleyman banned the hunt in the region. See. Ibid, 195-196.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid, 196.

⁵²⁰ The author, here, mentions the Venetians.

were punished, the city was taken under the direct control of the Ottoman State by the implementation of the *sancak* system. There, the *Sancak* of Delvina was established and its governor and *kadı* were appointed.⁵²²

In the second part, Peçevî narrates the sea expedition in 1537. He mentions, the region of Apulia was attacked and destroyed by the forces of Lütî Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa. Peçevî narrates the stories of Ali and Bostan Kethüda, as Mustafa Âlî does in his account, to show how the campaign was redirected to Corfu. He mentions, twelve galleys of Ali Kethüda⁵²³, fell behind the main corps of the fleet, were attacked by the forces of Andera Doria⁵²⁴ which had been at the port of Corfu.⁵²⁵ Subsequently, the galley commanded by Bostan Kethüda⁵²⁶ who sent by the Ottoman Sultan to Corfu was captured by the Venetians.⁵²⁷ Lütî Pasha informed Süleyman about these attacks and accordingly, the Sultan ordered the attack on Corfu. The fleet massively bombed the main castle in the island and the land army was able to open breaches to penetrate in Corfu.⁵²⁸

Peçevî also relates the Ottoman withdrawal from Corfu with the inconvenient weather conditions. He notes, when the Sultan moved from Valona to a town

⁵²¹ “[...] vezir ‘âzam olan Ayas Paşa kendüsi dahî cinslerinden olmağla sa ‘âdetlû pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâhı ol sefere tahrik idüb nefsü’l emrde ol memlekete gelünmekle nice fevâ’id ve naf’i ve a ‘vâid tahsil olunmağa ba ‘is ve bâ ‘di oldular.” Ibid.

⁵²² Peçevî, 196.

⁵²³ Ibid, 196-197.

⁵²⁴ Peçevî calls him as the famous corsair of the infidels. Ibid, 197.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ He also worked as a chamberlain of the imperial shipyard of Gallipoli.

⁵²⁷ Here, it is interesting to note that Peçevî narrates the story of an Ottoman slave, jumping at sea and rescuing from death by holding a piece of wood, exactly in the same way and words with Mustafa Âlî. See: Ibid 197.

⁵²⁸ Ibid, 197-198.

opposite Corfu, because of the massive rains and thunderstorms, there were no tent, horse or man remained uninjured.⁵²⁹ According to author “there was neither the capacity for [preventing] the failure, nor time for the expedition”⁵³⁰ All these were interpreted as the signs, offering the delay of the expedition, by the Sultan. He sent Ayas Pasha to the island to declare the commanders the imperial order. Although Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa tried to convince him by saying that the conquest was about to be completed, and asked the Pasha two more days, the death of four warriors in a bombardment led the final decision of the Sultan: Sülyeman said that he would never exchange one of his warriors to thousand of such a castle.⁵³¹

Here, it should be noted that Peçevî underlines that he had this passage from the history of Mustafa Âli. However, he also indicates that he did not believe in that story, since ghaza also required martyrdom and adds that the sultans could have uttered these kinds of sentences for having the favor of the soldiers and solacing them.⁵³² He concludes his story by mentioning the attacks of Barbarossa on Cephalonia.⁵³³

⁵²⁹ Ibid, 198.

⁵³⁰ “[...] *ne akâmete kâbiliyyet ve ne sefere müddet kaldı.*” Ibid.

⁵³¹ Ibid, 198.

⁵³² Ibid, 198-199.

⁵³³ Ibid. 200.

4.4. A History of the Maritime Subjects for the Great Ones: Katip Çelebi

Narrating 1537

Along with the aforescussed books on Ottoman History, comprehending the entire history of the Ottoman Dynasty, from its rise to the date of the composition of the accounts, the Campaign of 1537 was also discussed by *Katip Çelebi* in his account on the maritime issues of the Ottoman Empire. Katip Çelebi is a widely known Ottoman scholar and geographer in the seventeenth-century, who penned numerous works on history and geography.⁵³⁴ Since his father was among the Ottoman military class, he had found the chance of education in the palace school; he became a member of the households of the important Ottoman high ranking bureaucrats, including the Grand Vizer of Sultan Murad IV, Hüsrev Pasha and observed the Ottoman campaigns.⁵³⁵

One of his prominent works is *Tuhfetü'l Kibâr fî Esfâri'l Bihâr*⁵³⁶ offering the researcher important details about the Ottoman naval warfare, till 1656.⁵³⁷ “The *Tuhfetü'l- Kibar* consists of two parts (*kısım*): the first part is narrative, the history proper; the second part is topical, covering various aspects of naval matters.”⁵³⁸ It is

⁵³⁴ Orhan Şaik Gökyay, “Kâtib Çelebi”, *DİA*, v.25, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2002), 36-40, 38-40.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid*, 36-37.

⁵³⁶ Gift to the Great Ones on the Subject of Maritime Campaigns. The original text was translated into English in 1831 by James Mitchell. Haji Khalifeh, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, trans.by. James Mitchell, (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1831). In the present, the edited, corrected and expanded version of this translation of Svatopluk Soucek will be used. Kâtip Çelebi, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, ed. by, Svatopluk Soucek, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2011).

⁵³⁷ Kâtip Çelebi, also known as Hacı Halife, see: *Kâtip Çelebi: Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İncelemeler*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.)

⁵³⁸ Kâtip Çelebi, *The History of the Maritime Wars*, 7.

know that the author consulted the works of Hoca Saadeddin⁵³⁹, Hayreddin Barbarossa, Piri Reis⁵⁴⁰ and Seydi Ali Reis⁵⁴¹ extensively.⁵⁴² Although, the main focus of the author was the wars in the Mediterranean, the book of Kâtip Çelebi is considered one of the most important books discussing the Ottoman seafaring.

In *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr*, Kâtip Çelebi gives interesting descriptions of the island of Corfu and he emphasizes that Kemal Reis had already recommended to Sultan Süleyman the capture of Corfu at first place:

It is hundred and fifty miles in circumference, is a celebrated and well-populated island, and has a strong fortress built in the sea, but connected on one side with the land. In former times this island passed by right of inheritance from one of the Christian princes who governed Albania into the hands of a woman, but in A.H. 803 (A.D. 1400), the Venetians becoming victorious, succeeded to stratagem in wresting it from her, and having fortified the castle, they made it a guard island for the Gulf, and a general rendezvous for their army and navy. Near to it, in the mouth of Gulf, is a watch-tower, and Kemal Reis observing that the Venetians had their eye upon it, repeatedly suggested the late Sultan Soleiman Khan the necessity of capturing it; in consequence of which in 943 of the Hejra (A.D. 1536), the illustrious emperor proceeded thither by sea and land, and completely besieged it.⁵⁴³

⁵³⁹ Hoca Saadeddin was the Grand Vizier and prominent historian of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century and wrote *Tâcü't- Tevârih*, the Crown of the History, discussing the history of the Ottoman Empire from his rise to 1520. For detailed information see: Şerafettin Turan, "Hoca Sâdeddin Efendi", *DİA*, v. 18, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998), 196-198.

⁵⁴⁰ Pîrî Reis, the Ottoman admiral, commander and cartographer of the sixteenth century, is widely known by his *Kitâb-ı Bahriye*, Book of Navigation and his accurate charts showing the important ports in the Mediterranean and the Oceans. For encyclopedic information, see: İdris Bostan, "Pîrî Reis", *DİA*, v.34, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 283-285.

⁵⁴¹ Seydi Ali Reis, was the Ottoman admiral and navigator, who also commanded the imperial armada in the Battle of Preveza in 1538. He was known with his travel book *Mirâtü'l Memâlik*, Mirror of the Countries, composed in 1557, discussing the places that he saw in his return from India to Constantinople. He also studied on astronomy and its effects on navigation. For detailed information see: Mahmut Ak, "Seydi Ali Reis", *DİA*, v.37, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009), 21-24.

⁵⁴² Kâtip Çelebi, 4-5.

⁵⁴³ Ibid, 50-51.

The aforementioned passage cited from Kâtip Çelebi's chronicle is the statements of Piri Reis. By noting his accounts on the Ionian Islands, Çelebi copies the passages from *Kitab-ı Bahriyye* by giving reference and adds his own explanations.

The castle of Corfu, as described in Bahria, [...] is a very strong fort, and has within it and in the suburbs about eighteen thousand houses. Within the walls the Venetians have built, upon two hills, two towers of stone with a subterraneous passage between them, so that when necessary they are able to render assistance to each other. Its walls are surrounded by the sea, and it has also a harbor, into which the smaller vessels enter, but the galleys lie outside. Between this island and the coast there is a small strait, by which when necessary an army may pass.⁵⁴⁴

These passages are cited from the first chapter of the book. The Ottoman campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu is discussed by the author, on the other hand, in one of the subsequent chapters entitled "Sultan Süleyman's Expedition to Corfu". As the motivation for this expedition, the author highlights Süleyman's desire for conquering Apulia that had been subdued firstly in the reign of Mehmed II, by his Grand Vizier Gedik Ahmed Pasa and for controlling the territories of Valona and Delvina that were important border zones in Albania, opposite Apulia.⁵⁴⁵ The author underlines once more the Kemal Reis' recommendation of the capture of Corfu. This demonstrate that he reasons the subsequent attack on Corfu with the Kemal Reis' advices.

He notes that on May 1537, Lütü Pasha commanding the imperial fleet, and Hayreddin Barbarossa sailed for the Mediterranean with 280 pieces of ships, 135 galleys and other vessels and the Sultan, with his sons, left Constantinople on May

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid, 51.

⁵⁴⁵ Kâtip Çelebi, 99.

17 for Valona. According to Kâtip Çelebi, “never before had so large a fleet sailed.”⁵⁴⁶ 30.000 sailors had been collected from all parts of the Empire.⁵⁴⁷

According to Kâtip Çelebi the main motivation of the Sultan in Albania was suppressing the Albanian rebels who had been plundering inhabitants of the region and allying with the “enemy” of the Sultan. Since the region of Valona was bounded on the west by the sea, the natives and rebellious groups had close contacts with the ships of the “infidel”. Considering this fact, the region was entirely subjugated; the rebels in Delvina were suppressed. Moreover, the *sancaks* of Valona and Delvina were established.⁵⁴⁸

Kâtip Çelebi notes that during the Ottoman attacks on Apulia, Hayreddin Barbarossa sailed to watch over 60 vessels carrying provisions from Egypt. He notes 40 Venetian vessels observing the move of Barbarossa assumed that the imperial fleet withdrew from Apulia and took the route of Constantinople. They immediately moved towards Corfu to meet other Venetian ships of the main fleet. However, they were circled by the forces of Lütü Pasha. Two of them was captured, two sank and the rest was able to flee to Corfu. After having brought the provisions and munitions from Egypt to the port of Prevesa, Barbarossa’s forces also joined the imperial fleet which had been assembled at Valona.⁵⁴⁹

Çelebi also gives interesting details about the Venetians and their relations with the Ottoman Porte:

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid, 100.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

The Venetian infidels are a people famous for their great wealth, their extensive commerce, and their deceit and perfidy in all their transactions. Having by treachery taken most of the islands in their possession from the Hungarian princes, and these islands being on the borders of the Ottoman dominions, and deriving their subsistence and trade from them, the Venetians from necessity maintain a show of friendship, but in reality the most inveterate of all the enemies of the faith.⁵⁵⁰

Kâtip Çelebi also narrates the stories of the Ali and Bostan Kethüda, and the attacks of Andrea Doria collaborating with the Venetians that are also discussed by Mustafa Âlî and Peçevî.⁵⁵¹ Similarly, he relates the Ottoman declaration of war against Venice and the Attack on Corfu with these events triggered by the Venetians. Kâtip Çelebi notes that Corfu was surrounded by sea also attacked by land for 43 days and nights.⁵⁵² The warriors were able to destroy the walls of the main castle, but the season change started to disable the Ottoman soldiers. Heavy rains, extreme cold that fell suddenly were evaluated as the signs for the retreat by the Sultan. Moreover, the death of four Ottoman soldiers by a cannon ball, pushed the Sultan to stop the fire.⁵⁵³ Kâtip Çelebi also quotes the sentence of Süleyman: “I would never exchange one of my brave warriors for a thousand such castles”.⁵⁵⁴ According to him, Lütî Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa did not consented on the withdrawal since the conquest seemed to be so close, but they obeyed the imperial order. On September 30, the Sultan, the land army and the forces of Lütî Pasha took the road of Constantinople.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., 100-101.

⁵⁵² Ibid., 101.

⁵⁵³ Ibid, 101-102

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., 101-102.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid, 102.

Kâtip Çelebi notes that subsequently Hayreddin Barbarossa engaged in the conquest of Greek islands. He attacked Cephalonia; plundered the island and took massive booty. Then he conquered Kythira, Aegina and after four days of siege, Kea, Paros and Naxos was controlled. Six small islands were put under annual Ottoman tribute. Pasha was able to gather important amount of gold and clothes, including capturing numerous girls and boys.⁵⁵⁶ Çelebi concludes his account on the campaign by noting the arrival of Hayreddin Barbarossa in the presence of the Sultan. The morning after his arrival, the Pasha, with a great ceremony, kissed the hand of the Sultan and was presented with splendid, precious robes and “received highest marks of honour; for never at any period had any capudan done such signal service”⁵⁵⁷.

4.5. Conclusion

Although at first glance, the Ottoman chronicles composed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that were discussed in this chapter seem narrating the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 similarly, by a detailed analysis the historian encounter various different points of view, especially on the reasons for the campaign and why an Ottoman-Venetian encounter took place. Therefore, to state the main motivations of the Ottomans in 1537, the nature of the military initiative and the reasons for the attack on Corfu, one should compare and contrast the information given by the Ottoman chronicles, taking into consideration the positions of the authors, their roles in the campaign and the date of the composition of the accounts.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid, 103.

The chapter reveal that almost all sources discussed above unanimously indicate that the Campaign of 1537 was designed as an attack on Apulia, bound to the realm of the Habsburg Emperor, who was called by the Ottomans as the “King of Spain”. On the other hand, most of the sources mention that Süleyman also intended to suppress the insurrections in Albania that had been threatening the Ottoman influence in the region and enabling the Albanian cooperation with the enemies of the Sultan. As stated before, Valona being opposite Apulia was the closest Ottoman dominion to Apulia. This shows that the Ottomans intended to use the Port of Valona as the military base for the 1537 Campaign. For that reason, the suppression of the local unrest there became crucial for the Ottomans to not only consolidate the Sultan’s authority in Albania, but also to secure the Ottoman moves towards Apulia. In this regard, it should be underlined that the 1537 Campaign had two principal targets; Apulia and the Albanian towns that had not been taken under Ottoman control yet. On the other hand, the numbers of the ships and soldiers, given by the sources prove that Süleyman did not plan a military expedition for only showing his power to his enemies and for suppressing the Albanian rebels. Such a fleet, great in number and the crowded army, mentioned by all sources, should have been mobilized for a more complex military plan.

In this context, the statements of Lütü Pasha about the request of the French King stand out: The French promise of military alliance on the condition that the Sultan agreed to expedite towards Valona mirrors that the behind the choice of Apulia and Valona, there was the French encouragement. Taking into consideration his position in the Ottoman government, it could be argued that the account of Lütü Pasha reflects the state policies more than its equivalents discussed in this chapter. The silence of the other chronicles about the Ottoman-French alliance, encouraging the

Ottoman campaign, especially that of the former studies using Lütü Pasha's account is noteworthy though.

The sources also reveal that Barbarossa did not personally participated in the attacks on Apulia. He was mainly charged to observe the circumstances, patrol the Ottoman operation from the sea, protect navy and to secure the transportation of the provisions from Egypt. He also kept an eye on Venetian and Habsburg moves. His duty was more defensive than offensive. The Ottoman initiative in Apulia was mainly commanded by Lütü Pasha and realized a large branch of the Rumelian army. Although the chronicles do not give significant evidence for Sultan's intention of invading Italy, in most of the accounts the attacks on Apulia in 1537 were related with the attacks of Gedik Ahmed Pasha occurred in the reign of Mehmed II and Sultan Süleyman was reflected as completing his ancestor's desired project. Since the invasion of Apulia did not bring about fruitful outcomes, except the booty and slaves taken from the region and the Ottoman display of power, the chroniclers are silent about the details of the attacks. However, their emphasis on Gedik Ahmed Pasha's former initiative proves that one of the most important factors motivating the Sultan for engaging in such a campaign was his desire of declaring that he had a say on the future of Italy, as his great grand father.

All chronicles indicate that Venice, showing itself as the friend of the Ottoman Empire, was in secret alliance with the Habsburg Emperor and they never hesitated to harm the Ottomans, ships, territories and Muslims in any cases. In the insurrections in Albania, Venetian were thought to have played major roles. Celâlzâde clearly accuses Venetians for being in betrayal in the losses of Modone and Corone during the German Expedition in 1532. For that reason, the sources highlighted that behind the Sultan's decision for the suppression of the Albanian

rebels was also an intention of preventing a future Venetian-Albanian cooperation against the Ottomans and of strengthening the western borders of the Empire. The disingenuous policy followed by the Venetian government was interpreted as the betrayal and it was shown as the principal reason for disrupting the peace between these two states. This clearly demonstrates that the Attack on Corfu was the outcome of the political tension between two states and gained its grounds by the Doria's and Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during 1537 Campaign that are narrated in detail in all chronicles, consulted for this chapter.

In that context, the account of Kâtip Çelebi offers the researcher a different aspect: He mentions that before the Campaign, Kemal Reis, a well-known Ottoman captain, recommended the Sultan that Corfu should be attacked at first place. However, other accounts do not show any evidence supporting this information. In any case, as a well-known Venetian controlling the Adriatic, Corfu might have been targeted by the Ottomans considering that they needed for a secured and fortified naval base for the further operations of the imperial fleet in the western Mediterranean. However, in 1537, there is no clear evidence proving that the Empire principally intended to conquer the island. Considering the fact that the attack on Corfu commenced after the Apulian Campaign, it can be asserted that Corfu was not the immediate target of the Ottomans in 1537; indeed the attack was the outcome of the Ottoman-Venetian confrontations at sea during the Ottoman attacks on Apulia.

For the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the Island, the authors unanimously show the end of the season of war as the main reason. However, the "failure" in Corfu, continuing approximately 40 days according to the sources, seem to be related with the strong defense of the island and the lack of sufficient provisions, since the Campaign endured almost for four months. Here, the statement of Nasûh,

underlining the move of the allied Spanish and Venetian ships towards the island is also interesting. In that respect, the Sultan seems to stop the fire not to lose more time, men, as well as for preventing a possible Christian attack on the Ottoman forces. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Attack on Corfu could not go beyond a show off of the Sultan, an Ottoman challenge to the Venetian misbehavior.

As was demonstrated, the Ottoman chronicles treated the 1537 Campaign as a successful military initiative of Süleyman. The promotion and rewarding of the participants of the campaign by the Sultan, the *fethnâmes* penned right after the army's return and the notes of the authors about the satisfaction of the Sultan show that the Ottomans celebrated the campaign. Considering the fact that Süleyman displayed his power in Italy and established the imperial control in Albania by the establishment of the *sancak* system in Delvina, the 1537 Campaign can be evaluated as a successful attempt of the Ottomans. However, one should keep in mind that the Campaign was designed to be an Ottoman-French joint operation in Italy and primarily aimed an immediate Ottoman invasion of Apulia. In this context, it will not be wrong to argue that the Ottomans settled for the attacks of plundering and for the reconquest of Albania. The success displayed by the Ottomans was only a camouflage for the break of the original plan. Here, the historian should also remember how the Siege of Vienna in 1529 was treated by the Ottoman sources: it is known that the Ottomans celebrated their victory in 1529, sent a *fethnâme* to Venice to inform the Senate about the victory of Süleyman. The German Expedition in 1532 was also treated as a decisive victory of the Sultan. However, all these expeditions did not result in fruitful outcomes for the Ottomans concerning the Ottoman grand-strategy of the early sixteenth-century. This also reveals the fact that to understand the meaning and the importance of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on

Corfu in 1537, the historian should deeply analyze the political structure of the time and the imperial discourse on the universal sovereignty, contextualized by Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that most of the chronicles discussed in this chapter narrated the 1537 campaign as the Sultan's "Expedition of Corfu". This misleads the researcher to decipher the real motivation of the Ottomans in 1537, by reflecting the outcome as the target. In this context, it can be asserted that earlier studies treating the 1537 campaign as the "Expedition of Corfu" might have primarily relied on the Ottoman sources. As was stated before, to produce a detailed narrative and a clear analysis of the campaign, the researcher should also consult other complimentary sources. Since the 1537 Campaign resulted in an Ottoman-Venetian encounter, the views of the Venetians are worth to be discussed to draw the extended portrait of the Ottoman initiative. This also helps the reader to decipher how the Venetians perceived the Ottoman initiative in 1537 that disrupted 34 years of peace between the Empire and the *Serenissima*. Next chapter will analyze the Venetian chronicles produced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to control the information gathered by the Ottoman sources and to find persuasive answers for the questions, on which the Ottoman chronicles keep their silence.

CHAPTER V

ECHOES IN THE SERENISSIMA: THE OTTOMAN APULIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1537 AND THE ATTACK ON CORFU ACCORDING TO THE VENETIAN CHRONICLES

The Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the subsequent attack on Corfu in August 1537, can be evaluated as a turning point in the Ottoman-Venetian relations in the sixteenth century since it disrupted the peace between these two states, which had been carefully sustained for a period of 34 years. As stated in the previous chapters, although the Republic of Venice had taken all necessary measures in order not to face an Ottoman aggression towards Venetian dominions, the Apulian Campaign in 1537 resulted in an Ottoman attack on the Venetian Corfu. The Island of Corfu, the key Venetian base in the Adriatic, had to resist to the devastating Ottoman attacks and heavy bombardment. The Island was spoiled and ruined by the Ottoman forces; many Corfiots died and a significant number of them needed to flee to Venice. This would not only be a sorrowful experience to be lamented by the Corfiots, even by the next generations, but also a turning point in Venetian foreign policy concerning the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, encouraging the government of the *Serenissima* to ally

with the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor Charles V against the Ottomans in the following year.

The previous chapter has examined Ottoman chronicles discussing the Apulian Campaign of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu. This chapter intends to decipher the views of the Venetians and to delineate the war and how it was reflected in the light of the equivalent Venetian accounts. It should also be underlined that Venetian chronicles give significant hints about the actual politics of the time concealed in the Ottoman equivalents and also mirror the sixteenth-century cultural atmosphere in Italy, helping historians produce a detailed narrative of 1537.

The accounts to be discussed in this chapter were all produced either by Venetian citizens or by Corfiots and they were all published first in Venice. Since Venice was considered to be the center of information, thanks to its being a crossroads of the time and to its communication network fed by diplomatic missions, merchants and spies, the accounts discuss the policies of states and the military conditions of the period, as well as the political controversies among the politicians and decisions of the Venetian government in detail. Furthermore, the initiatives of the Venetian decision makers and the captains of the *Serenissima*, who were in the theatre of war in 1537 were clearly stated. In this regard, it would not be wrong to argue that the Venetian accounts are crucial for analyzing the significance of the Ottoman campaign for both Ottomans and Venetians, but also for understanding the general socio-political and cultural conjuncture of the sixteenth-century. In this context, this chapter also aims to introduce some new primary materials, which will be useful for researchers in this field.

5.1. Witnessing the War: The Ottoman Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in the Eyes of Contemporaries

To begin with it will be useful to listen to a Corfiot, Andronikos Nountsios, right in the theatre of war. Andronikos, known as Nikandros Noukios of Corfu⁵⁵⁸ was a Corfiot of Greek origin, who experienced the Ottoman attack in 1537. Since he was one of the less known and studied personalities of the early sixteenth-century the findings about his early life are sparse. It is assumed that he was born in Corfu in the first decade of 1500. Studies show that he, with his family, left Corfu after the Ottoman attack in 1537 and moved to Venice, as many other Corfiots did. Although his family moved back to the island right after the danger was over, Andronikos preferred to stay on in Venice.⁵⁵⁹

In his first years in Venice, Andronikos edited and translated Greek works into Italian, having close contacts with people of Greek origin, settled in the city like himself, who introduced the Corfiot into the intellectual life. “From at least 1541 to 1543, he appears as a Reader in the Greek Church of St George as well as an active member of the Greek community and the Secretary of the Greek Brotherhood.”⁵⁶⁰ In the same years, he entered into the service of Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Spanish ambassador to Venice, known as a famous private collector of Greek codices of the time, as a copyist of Greek manuscripts by the recommendations of his close

⁵⁵⁸ For detailed information about Andronikos and his work see: Evro Layton, *The Sixteenth Century Greek Book in Italy*, (Venice: Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, 1994).

⁵⁵⁹ Maria Kostardiou, “*Hodeporicon, Periegesis, Apodemia*: Early Modern Greek Travel Writing on Europe”, *Balkan Departures: Travel Writing from Southeastern Europe*, ed. by Wendy Bracewell and Alex Drace-Francis, (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 25-46, 27.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

friends.⁵⁶¹ Between the years of 1542 and 1545, he worked as an editor and corrector of the Greek press, *Damiano di Santa Maria*, specially focused on the production for the Greek audience.⁵⁶²

The year of 1545 symbolizes a turning point for the life of Andronikos: Charles V sent Gérard van Veltwyck, a well-known humanist and member of the private council of the Emperor, as ambassador to the Ottoman Porte to negotiate the terms of armistice and peace with Sultan Süleyman about the Hungarian Question.⁵⁶³ Van Veltwyck, on his way to Constantinople, had to stop in Venice, where he met with Andronikos.⁵⁶⁴ Andronikos asked him to enter his household. There is no information how and with which title he participated in Van Veltwyck's *equipe* but it's clear that in the summer of 1545 he left Venice with the Spanish ambassador until 1547.⁵⁶⁵

Andronikos came to Constantinople with Gérard von Veltwyck on September 7, 1545 via Ragusa and the Balkans. He returned in the following autumn via Germany. He travelled extensively through Europe; he even reached the British Isles by crossing the English Channel. His long and adventurous journey encouraged him to write his own travel accounts after 1547, which would be turned into his *Apodemiai*⁵⁶⁶, to be discussed here. His primary aim was to produce a continuation of

⁵⁶¹ Ibid, 11; Nicadre de Corcyre, *Le Voyage d'Occident*, 11.

⁵⁶² Kostardiou, 27-28.

⁵⁶³ For detailed information about the mission of van Veltwyck, see: Şahin, *Kanuni Devrinde İmparatorluk ve İktidar*, 121-122.

⁵⁶⁴ Kostardiou, 28.

⁵⁶⁵ Nicandre de Corcyre, 11-12.

⁵⁶⁶ *Apodemiai* come from the Greek word *apódēmos*, which means away from one's people, going abroad. The term defines the travel writings of the author.

ancient Greek travel writing. Accordingly, as a Greek intellectual in touch with Renaissance thinking and style, he also changed his personal signature from Andronikos Nountsios to Nikandros Noukios in reference to ancient Greek spelling.⁵⁶⁷

The *Apodemiai* of Andronikos, composed in Greek in the original, does not give details about his voyage to Constantinople and his sojourn in the Ottoman capital. Instead, he focuses on his journey to Europe and describes Switzerland, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the British and French Kingdoms, their people, their habits including the socio-political conditions of the countries and the international relations of the time. The account is divided in three books, which discusses different stages of the travel and each of them was composed in the form of long letters to a friend whose name was never announced. Andronikos also reflects his personal feelings and views about the themes discussed; in a sense, he also narrates his personal voyage as well.⁵⁶⁸

Although it could be considered an important literary production of sixteenth-century Europe, it should be underlined that the *Apodemiai* of Andronikos could not reach a large audience. The second book, discussing the voyage in British realm was published in English in 1841 by J. A. Crammer. For that reason, Andronikos could be partly visible, only to researchers familiar to English language.⁵⁶⁹ The modern full-text edition in Greek was undersigned by J. A. Foucault in 1962.⁵⁷⁰ However, since the modern edition was still in Modern Greek, it could not be widely consulted.

⁵⁶⁷ Nicandre de Corcyre, 12.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid, 12-13 ; Kostadiou, 29-30.

⁵⁶⁹ Nicandre de Corcyre, 6.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

To introduce Andronikos, and his valuable *Apodemiai*, to a considerably large audience, in 2002, Paolo Odorico published the French translation of the full-text with the notes and comments of Joël Schmapp, which is used by the present study as well.

In the third book of *Apodemiai*, focusing on the Kingdom of France and Italy, Andronikos discusses the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 and the attack on Corfu. He starts the book with a vivid description of the French Kingdom, the regions and the towns, the city of Paris and the characters of King Francis I, Andrea Doria, and Hayreddin Barbarossa within the perspective of the desires and projects of the French King in the early sixteenth-century. Andronikos mentions that the deeds of Francis I turned often “into a demoniac intervention and sometimes a divine punishment”, which fell upon the unfortunate Greek people.⁵⁷¹

Andronikos mentions that in order to have the support of the Ottoman Sultan against Charles V, the French King sent an envoy and numerous presents to the Ottoman Sultan. This was the initiation of the Ottoman-French alliance. Andronikos notes that these two states agreed on a plan to be realized in 1537: the French King would attack the Italian cities with his powerful army and the Sultan would invade Illyria as well as attacking the region of Apulia and the Italian Peninsula by moving on the city of Valona under the Ottoman control.⁵⁷² He also adds that the Sultan, accepted to leave the Italian coastal cities, possessed by the Emperor under the domination of the French King. According to Andronikos, the impulse behind such a plan by the Ottoman Sultan was the French King.

⁵⁷¹ “[...], tantôt d’une intervention démoniaque, tantôt d’une punition divine qui s’est alors abattue sur notre malheureux peuple grec.”, Ibid, 193.

⁵⁷² Ibid, 216.

To realize the aforementioned plan, Andronikos notes, the Sultan organized an armada of 300 vessels, including ships for transportation and provision, and appointed Lütü Pasha as the commander in-chief of the campaign.⁵⁷³ Hayreddin Barbarossa was charged with participating in the expedition with his forces, as the Grand Admiral. Lütü Pasha, who was charged with the execution of the campaign and with the command of embarked soldiers would meet with Barbarossa at Valona and was strictly warned by the Sultan that he would not engage in any military operation without having the consent of Barbarossa.⁵⁷⁴

Andronikos mentions that simultaneously with the armada, a land army of approximately 70.000 soldiers, led by the Sultan himself, left Constantinople for Valona, crossing Thrace and Macedonia. At the same time, Süleyman ordered some of this troops to attack the city of Himera, to capture all the inhabitants of the Ceraunian Mountains and the lands of the Molossians⁵⁷⁵ as well as capturing the castles and powerful villages. However, the Ottoman initiative could not have a remarkable result, since the Ottomans did not know the region well. Andronikos points out that the soldiers were pushed back from the mountainous regions and they returned to the imperial camp with dishonor.⁵⁷⁶

The author underlines that the Ottoman navy, after having left Constantinople and having met the rest of the naval forces at Gallipoli, sailed into the Aegean Sea, passed around the Peloponnese via Cephalonia, Crete, other Greek Islands and

⁵⁷³ The author refers to Lütü Pasha as the “admiral” of the campaign. See: Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ The Molossian tribe was one of the Ancient Greek tribes living in the region of Epirus. Even in the Roman period, Molossians were famous with the dogs they bred, named Molossus which has been generally accepted as the ancestor of mastiff-type dogs in Europe. See, Nicadre de Corcyre, 217.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

Corfu, dominated by the Venetians and reached the coast of Valona. Andronikos emphasized that the Ottoman ships met no opposition at sea, since the Republic of Venice was at peace with the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁷⁷

Andronikos also gives information about the Habsburg Emperor and Venice. He notes that Charles V, at that time, was in Spain and did not prefer to organize an armada to confront the Ottomans. However, he charged his admiral Andrea Doria to watch every single movement of the Ottoman ships. Moreover, the fortifications of the coastal cities and the defense capacity of the Spanish army was strengthened.⁵⁷⁸ Following the order of the Emperor, Doria sailed with his 27 galleys⁵⁷⁹ into the Ionian Sea. Doria did not directly attack the Ottoman navy; instead, watching the circumstances, he laid ambushes for small groups isolated from the main body.⁵⁸⁰ The Republic of Venice, on the other hand, put a redoubtable armada under the command of Girolamo Pesaro and sent it to Corfu. The Republic ordered Persaro to reinforce the defenses around the city of Corfu and not to engage in any movement against the belligerent parties.⁵⁸¹

The course of the Ottoman initiative changed after the following according to the author: Doria attacked 10 Ottoman vessels⁵⁸² and captured those on them. However,

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid, 217-218.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid, 218.

⁵⁷⁹ *Trirèmes* (fr.). *Trirèmes* were larger galleys, having three banks of oars rowed by three oarsmen on each bench. Thus they could carry more soldiers and guns to the desired targets. See: Theresa M. Vann, "The Fifteenth-Century Maritime Operations of the Knights of Rhodes", *The Military Orders-Volume 4: On Land and by Sea*, ed. by, Judi Upton-Ward, (England & USA, 2008), 215-220, 217.

⁵⁸⁰ Nicadre de Corcyre, 218.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid. 219.

⁵⁸² In the text, Andronikos first notes them as 100 vessels. In the following pages, by narrating the same story he corrects the number as 10. Joël Schnapp who adds historical notes for the consulted edition mentions that considering the rest of the account and other sources discussing the topic, 10 attacked vessels seem to be more logical. See, Ibid.

the Ottomans, for the attack of Andrea Doria, accused the Venetians with assisting him. The Sultan sent Yunus Bey, with two galleys, as ambassador to Pesaro to ask whether this attack was made by his initiative or not, since he should normally be in alliance with the Ottomans against the enemy according to the existing peace. Yunus reached the port of Corfu; met the Venetian galleys securing the Island and to reach Pesaro boarded a boat with his men. Andronikos mentions that the crews of the galleys, with great stupidity and silliness, attacked them. Yunus, with his men, returned to his galleys and, in order to report the event to the Sultan, headed to Valona, but on the road he met with the vessels of Doria.⁵⁸³ They could not get past and eventually beached their galleys below Himara.⁵⁸⁴ Most of the people accompanying the ambassador were killed by the people of the region; some of them died while they were defending themselves. The ones remaining in the galleys were beheaded by the swords of Doria's soldiers. Yunus Bey had to reveal himself and his duty, to save himself. After his identity was learned he was liberated and sent to the Ottoman Sultan with many apologies. Yunus Bey reported all that happened to the Sultan and underlined that the Venetians were responsible for the attacks.⁵⁸⁵

This vivid scene of maritime conflicts continues in the text with a third shocking event. After the capture of the galleys carrying the Ottoman ambassador, Andrea Doria was informed that 12 Ottoman galleys were sailing behind the main armada in the Ionian Sea. He immediately sailed to the neighborhood of Corfu and, performing a strong attack in the morning, sunk the Ottoman galleys. The crew, soldiers and people in the vessels were killed. Soon after the attack, Doria sailed to Messina with

⁵⁸³ Ibid, 219-220.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid, 220.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

the vessels that he had with him.⁵⁸⁶ When Hayreddin Barbarossa noticed the bloody struggle, he immediately moved his forces to meet Doria but he was not able to find him. Then he sailed to Apulia. There, the Ottoman galleys met the Venetian forces. Contrary to the existing peace conditions and tradition, one of the well-armed Ottoman galleys coming from Gallipoli did not salute the Venetian forces and was attacked by Alessandro Contarini, their commander-in-chief. The crew, swimming away, were killed and Contarini returned to Corfu. Hayreddin reported all that had happened to the Sultan to convince him to punish the Venetians with good reason.⁵⁸⁷

Andronikos does not give details about the deeds of the Ottoman forces in Apulia. He only mentions that, after all that had happened, Hayreddin met Lütü Pasha in Apulia and they engaged in the siege of a small city named Castro. The Ottomans sacked the castles and the villages, killed or enslaved the inhabitant and pillaged the region greedily.⁵⁸⁸ Meanwhile, the Venetian galleys were in the Adriatic. According to the author, because of the inexperience or mostly the “stupidity” of the Venetian individual commanders, the galleys could not find the shortest route to return Corfu, the main Venetian naval base and when the night fell, they encountered the forces of Hayreddin moving from Apulia.⁵⁸⁹ Some of them were able to flee, including the one carrying Pesaro and reached Corfu. However, the forces of Barbarossa captured 4 Venetian galleys coming from Corfu, Cephalonia, Zakynthos and Venice. Their

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid, 221.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid, 221-222.

crews were either killed or enslaved and the galleys were taken.⁵⁹⁰ This would be the starting gun of the upcoming Ottoman-Venetian war.

Andronikos narrates the rest of the story with great sorrow: He points out that following the forementioned incidents, Sultan Süleyman ordered his admirals to attack Corfu and he personally set out from Valona with the land army. The Corfiot laments as “Allas! My country”⁵⁹¹. The land army marched into the villages of Epirus. “At the same time the inhabitants of the fortified castle of Butrothum learned of the arrival of Süleyman; their governor and the “Turks” of his entourage asked for asylum and fortunately they reached it.”⁵⁹² On the other hand, Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa took the lead of the naval forces and directed them to Corfu.⁵⁹³

In the first assault, the Ottoman soldiers easily penetrated the zone outside of the city called, “Bazaar” since it was a vast space full of houses, not surrounded by strong city walls.⁵⁹⁴ The people living in the city, instead, ran into the fortresses and bastions, closed the gates and prepared themselves for the siege.⁵⁹⁵ The ones who did not know where to escape, ran to the Cape of Isidore, east of the city. However

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid, 222.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² “*Au même moment, les habitants du château fort de Bouthrôto apprirent l’arrivée de Soliman; leur chef et les Turcs de son entourage demandèrent asile, et, à leur grand bonheur, l’obtinrent.*” Ibid, 222. Buthrotum (*Butrinto* (it)) was an ancient Greek and Roman city in Epirus, which is situated in the Vlorë County in Albania, close to the Greek border. It is just the closest point to pass into the Corfu Island. For that reason, the Ottomans might prefer to move the land army and the imperial camp to that city.

⁵⁹³ Andronikos notes that Barbarossa also transported an important number of the land soldiers, came in Buthrotum, to Corfu. See: Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid, 223.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

almost all of them met the Ottomans, just coming from the mainland with no mercy.⁵⁹⁶

The Ottoman intrusion into the Island was a tragedy for Andronikos, hard for him to relate. He continues his account as following:

But how could I remember without tears the tragedy that fell upon you, o my sweet country? How could I write these events down that I saw with my own eyes? Please, God, I wish I would have never seen them! I would not have this much sorrow if I had learned them from another person; now, I oblige myself, to tell the tragedies of my country, grief-stricken as how I am and even I am far away, abroad. It would be absurd to keep silent to the events worth to be remembered, which were related with our history, so in my account I talked about what happened to the other peoples.⁵⁹⁷

The statement above clearly shows that the Ottoman attack on Corfu and the circumstances under fire deeply affected the author. On the other hand, in the text Andronikos does not accuse only the Ottomans for the damage, but also Venetians and Italian mercenaries, charged with assisting the Corfiots for the defense. These are also matters of sharp criticism, for facilitating the Ottoman attack, even in some cases for being actors in it. He points out that the Venetian admiral in Corfu, Pesaro, left the island and sailed into the Adriatic Gulf to meet the other Venetian captains coming from Dalmatia, after having learnt that Süleyman would attack the Island.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁷ “*Mais comment pourrais-je sans larmes rappeler à la mémoire le malheur qui s’est abattu sur toi, ô ma douce patrie ? Comment pourrais-je mettre par écrit ces événements que j’ai vus de mes propres yeux ? Plaise à Dieu que je ne les eusse jamais vus ! Je n’aurais pas autant de chagrin si je les avais appris de quelqu’un d’autre ; cependant je m’empresse de raconter les malheurs de ma patrie, accablé de chagrin comme je le suis, et bien que je me trouve au loin, à l’étranger. Il serait absurde de taire des événements dignes de mémoire qui ont trait à notre histoire alors que, dans mon récit, j’ai parlé de ce qui était advenu à d’autres peuples.*” Ibid, 223-224.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid, 222-223. The Venetian admiral, Pesaro, was not the sole person who quitted the island before the Ottoman pillage. Some of the Corfiot families, including the family of Andronikos as well, left their homelands and went to Venice right before the Ottoman invasion of the island, taking into consideration of two omens spreading around: According to the author, right before the pillage, a wise, pious villager, known by his honesty and affability, had told that he saw a big, appalling serpent, wearing a golden crown decorated with brilliant stones. The serpent had been followed by small ones and left his imprints on soil. The author notes that only few people believed the wise man and saw the

He narrates the corruption of the Italian mercenaries in a separate part by accentuating that he could not understand how people, having the same faith, believing the same God, could have been as cruel as the “barbarians” against the Corfiots. He mentions that they were not pleased with the money they received; they always asked more money from the people, while running away to a safer place. They took all the money and gold on the people asking to enter their own houses. Instead of helping the people, trying to secure their lives as well as the country, the mercenaries exploited the food stocks, abused the helpless women, and locked the doors of the fortresses. They took advantage of the people’s misery.⁵⁹⁹

Andronikos points out that the attack started with the fire opened by the Ottoman cannons. The Ottoman vessels were situated near the small island in front of the west of the city center. The refugees situated on Cape Isidore were under heavy Ottoman bombardment: “this was an insupportable tragedy”⁶⁰⁰ notes the author. People, contrained in a small space and not having enough food and clean water to drink were left to die while seeing the death of their loved ones.⁶⁰¹ The Ottoman soldiers burnt all that they found, the houses and the market places, a strong wind fanning the flames.

imprints. However, he states, another omen convinced the Corfiots: a convict whose eyes had been burst out in public had started to walk around the city with new, fresh eyes, saying that the God of Seas had replaced his eyes. All these had been the signs of a misfortune approaching to the Island. Therefore, many people immediately decided to leave Corfu. These omens revealed their real meaning with the Ottoman attack: the big serpent was Süleyman, himself, followed by small ones, his cruel soldiers. For the omens narrated by Andronikos, see: Ibid, 231-233.

⁵⁹⁹ For detailed discussions about the Italian mercenaries and their activities during the Ottoman attacks on Corfu, see: Ibid, 226-227.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid, 227.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

The Ottomans set the city on fire and sacked the island but they were not able to conquer it. Winter had already started. Above all, Andronikos underlines, Andrea Doria, whom the Ottomans intended to encounter, did not come to the Venetians' aid. Moreover, the army was exhausted by the long operations as well as by epidemics. Lütfi Pasha and other commanders; having different opinions from these of Hayreddin Barbarossa and being jealous of the familiarity and benevolence, the Sultan showed towards him, convinced the Sultan to stop the attack and leave the Island.⁶⁰² They underlined that they had ruined the city, had put it under fire and blood; just a revenge for the faults of the dishonored Venetians and the Sultan would be able to ravage the Island on a different occasion later.⁶⁰³ Therefore, Süleyman ordered Lütfi Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa to stop the fire and return to Constantinople, authorized the soldiers to pillage the city as much as possible and ordered the navy to attack all Venetian possessions on their road of return⁶⁰⁴ and he returned to Constantinople with the land army.

Andronikos continues his account with a touching description of the pillage: He mentions that the Ottoman soldiers penetrated onto the Island, got all they found that was precious to take, including, prisoners, women of different ages and animals, especially well-trained white horses.⁶⁰⁵ They killed the wounded and ill people; launched all dead people and animals into the sea, which turned into a remittable

⁶⁰² Ibid, 227-228. For Ottoman pashas' the jealousy of Barbarossa, see Barbarossa's *Gazavât* and Lütfi Pasha's *Tevârîh*, discussed in the previous chapter of the present study. See: Chapter Four. Andronikos' notes on the different opinions and clash of interests among the Ottoman high-ranking officers, especially criticisms on Barbarossa's initiatives and thoughts support that the Ottoman Admiral was not warmly welcomed to the decision-making mechanisms by the Ottoman ruling-elite even in his fourth year as the Grand Admiral and this was closely observed by the Venetians.

⁶⁰³ Ibid, 228.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid, 228-229.

cemetery. Andronikos also notes that the Ottomans did not damage the vineyards, fruit trees and other plants, situated near the Bazaar and adds: “[...] because, I think, they did not have the time to do so since Sultan’s order to leave the island came suddenly.”⁶⁰⁶

Andronikos concludes his account of the Ottoman attack on Corfu with his notes on how the Ottomans sacked the island and how the Corfitos ought to leave their homelands to save their lives. The author mentions that although the island did not surrender to the Ottoman “menace”, the Ottoman threat on the Venetian dominions did not end by the withdrawal of the Ottoman soldiers from Corfu. On his way back, Hayreddin Barbarossa, in accordance with the order of the Ottoman Sultan, attacked Cephalonia and Zakynthos and took numerous prisoners. He, then sailed round the Peloponnese and occupied all the small Aegean islands possessed by the Venetian Republic except for Tenos and Mykonos. Then, he obliged the governor of Naxos to pay tribute to the Ottomans. He got many prisoners and much booty from the islands that he had attacked. He finally sailed to Constantinople via the Dardanelles.⁶⁰⁷

Andronikos continues his story with the Ottoman-Venetian conflicts in the following years and the peace in 1540 in his following pages.

As was discussed above in detail, the *Apodemiai* of Andronikos draws a finely embroidered portrait of the Ottoman military initiative in 1537 and how it turned into the attack on Corfu. As he was a Corfiot, and finding a chance of observing the changes in circumstances, it would not be wrong to argue that Andronikos mirrors the Ottoman deeds in Corfu as a tragedy, not a surprise. In the account, it is clearly

⁶⁰⁶ “[...] *parce que, je crois, ils n’en eurent pas le temps, tellement l’ordre du sultan de quitter l’île était arrivé soudainement.*”, Ibid, 230.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid, 233.

shown that the Ottomans, at first, did not intend to invade the island or to fight with the Republic of Venice. He underlines that the Ottoman Sultan was moved by the French King to engage in the original campaign. The actual motivation of the Sultan was to attack the possessions of Charles V in Apulia and to leave the region under the French control upon the King's request. The author evaluates the Ottoman initiative as a response to a French request for assistance. He directly accuses the French King of inviting the Ottomans into the Adriatic. According to him, the poor Corfiots, themselves, paid the cost of his demonic and impractical plans.⁶⁰⁸

According to Andronikos, the Venetians, though perhaps not the Venetian Republic as a state, were also equally responsible for the Ottoman attack on Corfu. The random attacks of the Venetian admirals on Ottoman vessels created a hostile atmosphere. Andrea Doria's initiatives were attributed to the Venetian commanders by the Ottomans. The capture of the Ottoman ambassador Yunus Bey and the suspicions about the Venetian assistance to Doria motivated the Ottoman Sultan to attack a Venetian possession. Corfu was the nearest one. Furthermore, Venetian admirals, charged with defending the island, remained unable to face the enemy; they even escaped and left the people to face the enemy. The notes about the Italian mercenaries also emphasises that Andronikos has the impression that, although it had been an important Venetian possession, Corfu was first made a target and then was abandoned to its fate.

Here, listening to a Venetian, a member of the Venetian government gives the historian the chance of visualizing how the events, narrated by Andronikos in detail, were echoed in Venice and the responses of the Republic and its policies. In this

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid: 193-194.

context, the brief account of Antonio Longo, thought to be composed right after the Ottoman-Venetian peace in 1540, is a good example.

Antonio Longo was a Venetian noble, a member of the Consiglio dei Dieci who died in 1582. He registered the events, discussions and decisions taken by the Venetian government in form of a diary.⁶⁰⁹ His elder son, Francesco, combined and edited his accounts after 1551⁶¹⁰ and copied the memories of his father about the war of 1537 under the title of *Decrizione della Guerra Seguita tra la Serenissima Republica di Venetia e Sultan Solimano Imperator de Turchi l'Anno 1537*.⁶¹¹ In the account, the author discusses the Ottoman-Venetian war that started in 1537 and concluded with the Venetian-Ottoman peace in 1540, with details about the conversations in the Venetian Senate, the reports and letters of the ambassadors, commanders, and nobles and decisions of the Venetian government. Longo focuses more on the establishment of the League against the Ottomans, in which the Republic joined right after 1537 and the war in the Adriatic in 1538, followed by the new Ottoman-Venetian convergence. Francesco Longo respected the accuracy of the events registered by his father, and diligently reported Antonio's opinions, which had been sometimes shaped by his personal feelings.⁶¹²

Longo starts his accounts mentioning that the rivalry between Charles V and Francis I for the domination of Milan, as Andronikos did. He notes that according to the terms of peace in Naples in 1535 between Venice and Charles V, the Republic was

⁶⁰⁹ Marco Foscarini, *Della Letteratura Veneziana*, v.1, l.2, (Padova: Stamperia del Seminario, 1752), 180.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Francesco Longo, "Decrizione della Guerra", 113-131.

⁶¹² Foscarini, 180.

obliged to send 6000 infantry in case of need for Milan. In 1537, Charles V had intended to march into Milan against the French King but he needed to deal with the turmoil in Florence. Charles V decided that such an initiative could put Naples, Genoa and Florence at risk and he did not ask Venice to send the infantry.⁶¹³ Against Charles V, the French emperor encouraged the Ottoman Sultan, who regarded the enemies of the Habsburg Emperor as his friends.⁶¹⁴ The main motivation of the French King was to distract Charles V with the Ottomans to create a power vacuum in Milan. Accordingly, the Ottoman Sultan initiated an expedition to Valona for the conquest of Apulia.⁶¹⁵

Longo notes that Sultan Süleyman asked the Republic to cooperate with him; however, after careful consideration the Venetian government refused the Ottoman request with cautious words. The reply of the Venetian Republic to the Sultan's request and French persuasions changed the attitude of the Sultan toward Venice.⁶¹⁶

The Republic, to watch the moves of the Ottomans and secure its dominions, launched an armada of 200 galleys; 40 of them would sail to the waters of Corfu. Girolamo Pesaro was charged to command those galleys and the rest were put under the command of Giovanni Vitturi. On the other hand, the Sultan organized an army of 100.000 soldiers and his armada was composed of 400 ships, including galleys, and other vessels, carrying munitions under the command of Lütü Bey and Hayreddin Barbarossa.⁶¹⁷ Longo notes that, before leaving Constantinople, the

⁶¹³ Longo, "Descrizione della Guerra", 113-114.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid, 114.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid, 114-115.

pashas of Süleyman told the Venetian ambassador Tommaso Mocenigo, sent to congratulate the Sultan for his conquests in Persia, that the Sultan would maintain the peace with the Venetians. The captains, sailing near Corfu, repeated that to Pesaro too.⁶¹⁸

However, as Longo narrates, the Himarans⁶¹⁹ killed two Ottomans, on a galley and captured the galley. That incident created the opinion that the subjects of the Venetians, who created that annoyance, should similarly be punished.⁶²⁰ After having been informed about the ongoing circumstances, the Venetian government ordered all its generals to avoid from encountering the “Turks” and in case of an inevitable encounter, to show signs of friendship.⁶²¹ In contrast to the intention of the Venetian Republic on securing peace with the Ottoman Sultan and its clear declaration to Venetian commanders in charge, there occurred several adverse events changing the course of war. Longo explains them, as follows:

At first, a galley of Zadar encountered a Turkish ship going to Valona that had been loaded with munitions and sank it, since it did not want to lower its sails, as it ought to do so for being inferior; this [incident] made the Turkish Signor extremely upset, and [he] Yunus Bey, his dragoman, with two galleys to [the presence of] Pesaro, who had been in Corfu, in order to say him [his] complaint and ask him for compensation, and as that was the case, an evil came up because of something different that these aforementioned two galleys encountered our [galleys] and were driven out by Sir Zusto Gradenigo⁶²², individual commander, [who] was commanding, at that time other galleys that he had, thus the aforementioned two [Turkish] galleys stroke ground in

⁶¹⁸ Ibid, 115.

⁶¹⁹ *Cimerioti* (it.)

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Giusto Gradenico.

the land of Casopo of Himera and were captured by Himarans, who were the enemies of the Turk.⁶²³

After having had the news about the incidents and informed about the resentment of the Sultan accusing him of inefficiency, Pesaro immediately sent another Venetian captain, Francesco Zeno, to rescue Yunus Bey and others, imprisoned by the Himarans with a ransom of 500 ducats.⁶²⁴ However, after his safe return to Valona, the Dragoman told the entire story to the Sultan and accused the Venetians.

Süleyman called Giacomo da Canal, *bailo* present in the imperial camp and asked his justification for destroying the peace. He also ordered to arrest and punish the offenders involved severely before sending him to Pesaro.⁶²⁵ The *bailo* sent Alessandro Orsino to Corfu to inform Pesaro that the Ottoman Sultan would declare war on Venice, unless the Venetians showed their respect and provided compensation for their deeds.⁶²⁶

However, Longo notes, the waters did not cool down: Pesaro had already taken all measures to prevent any possible confrontation at sea. He immediately sailed from Corfu, to unite all Venetian galleys in the Adriatic when he learnt that Barbarossa sailed from Zakynthos to meet and protect the ships coming from Constantinople, loaded with provisions and munitions. He had taken all measures not to encounter Barbarossa's forces. However, he could not prevent a new Venetian offensive;

⁶²³ “*Il primo fu, ch'una galea Zarentina s'incontrò in un naviglio turco, il quale andava all'Valona carico di vettovaglie; et perche non li volse calar le velle, come doveva fare per essere inferiore, lo getto a fondi, di che si mostrò sommamente alterato il Signor Turco, ed expendi Gianusbei suo dragomano con due galee a Pesaro, che era in Corfu, per far secco querella e domandargli rifacimento, et come avvine, che un male va dietro all'altro fece, che le dette due galee s'incontrono nelle nostre, et furono fugate da Meser Zusto Gradenigo sopra comito, al quale toccò quel giorno comandare alle altre sue conserve, di maniera che dette due galee diedero in terra su la Cimera di Casopo et furono fatti prigionieri dall' Cimeriotti, quali si trovavano esser nemici del Turco.*”, Ibid.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ Ibid, 116.

Alessandro Contarini, *Provveditore* of the Venetian armada, encountered an Ottoman galley, left behind by the main naval corps on the way to Valona, and opened fire. Pesaro ordered all forces to return to Corfu but the Venetian armada was blocked by 120 Ottoman galleys. The armada was able to return to the island but four galleys were taken by the Ottomans.⁶²⁷

Longo narrates that all these events created great disappointment in the Venetian Senate, though. By a letter, the Senate ordered Pesaro to put Contarini and Giusto Gradenico, whose name was noted by Longo as the one who had attacked the galleys carrying Yunus Bey to Corfu, in chain and to immediately send them to Venice. The Captain General was also asked to send Alessandro Orsino to the Ottoman camp to explain to the Ottoman Sultan that the Republic had never intended to destroy the peace. Meanwhile, the Senate started to negotiate with the Papacy for the establishment of a league for the defense of Italy and Corfu. However, all these efforts were fruitless: on August 26, the Sultan ordered the attack on Corfu.⁶²⁸

When the war became inevitable, Longo notes that the Venetian government ordered all captains of the naval forces to be on alert, sent soldiers to Zadar and Naples, called the Dalmatian tribal leaders to help the Venetians and ordered them to declare that the Uskosks could freely turn to piracy at sea.⁶²⁹ To conduct the war, the Republic was also in need of military and financial support. The negotiations of the league with the Pope was far from a fruitful attempt. The Republic turned its face to the Venetian nobles and local governors. Pietro Badoer and Albertino, the Doctor, was asked to pay 4000 ducats, to be paid back in a couple of years at a favorable

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

⁶²⁹ Longo, "Descrizione della Guerra", 116.

interest. Camilio Orsino, the Governor of Zadar, was asked to send 300 infantry and 500 light cavalry. 17.000 ducats were requested from the Duke of Urbino.⁶³⁰

The actual plan of the Venetian government, according to Longo's account, was to unite all Venetian and Papal naval forces at Brindisi, by also having the assistance of Charles V and Francis I with the establishment of a Christian league against the Sultan and to assist the defense of Corfu. Accordingly, the Government had already ordered Pesaro, who had left Corfu before the Ottoman attack, to reach the Gulf of Korcula⁶³¹, uniting with the forces under the command of Francesco Pasqualigo and reach Corfu. While the Republic was conducting the negotiations for the league via his agents in Rome and in Germany, on September 10, the Ottoman attack on Corfu ended. He ordered the armada to return to Constantinople via Preveza. The French Captain Brancadoro⁶³² also participated in the armada with his 12 galleys.⁶³³

Longo states that the Ottoman attack had also changed the dynamics of Venetian policies: the traditional policy based on securing peace with the Ottoman sultan started to be questioned among the Venetian senators. The *bailo* in Constantinople was ordered to start the peace negotiations with the Grand Vizier, upon his request. However, most of the senators were arguing that the Republic should participate in the Christian league, headed by the Papacy. After long discussions, the Venetian ambassador in Rome was authorized to conclude the treaties for the establishment of a league, despite the fact that the conditions offered by the Ottomans were more

⁶³⁰ Ibid, 117.

⁶³¹ *Curzola* (it.). A Croatian island in the Adriatic Sea.

⁶³² Baron of St. Blancard. See : Chapter Three.

⁶³³ See, Longo, "Descrizione della Guerra", 116-117.

favorable for the Republic.⁶³⁴ This decision would ground the next Ottoman-Venetian encounter in the following year, discussed in detail by Longo in the subsequent pages of his account.

The aforementioned discussions, portrayed by Longo, mostly overlaps with Andronikos' account. Longo also makes clear that the real motivation of the Sultan, in the beginning of the campaign, was not to attack a Venetian dominion. The Ottoman armada focused on Apulia and the reason behind the choice of Valona for the imperial camp was the city's strategic position, facilitating the transportation of the troops. The author argues that the conflicts between the Venetian captains and the attacks of Andrea Doria motivated the Sultan to attack a Venetian dominion to punish the Republic for misbehaving. Longo underlines that the Venetian attacks were not made with the consent of the Republic. Pesaro, head of the Venetian armada, was often warned to act according to the peace terms and after the attacks, the Republic tried to compensate for the damage and to persuade the Sultan of the Republic's loyalty to him.

Contrary to Andronikos, Longo disputes the argument that the Republic left the island alone when the war became inevitable. He notes that during the attack on Corfu, besides having ordered all Venetian commanders to help Corfu, the Republic sought the assistance of the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor to fight the Ottomans. With that mind, the Venetian ambassadors engaged in negotiations for the establishment of a league.

⁶³⁴ Ibid.

5.2. Historians at Work: 1537 in Venetian Historiography

The accounts of the eyewitnesses of the war and its political ramifications in 1537, discussed above, draw the general portrait of the Ottoman campaign and the Ottoman-Venetian encounter. These were also discussed in the books on the history of Venice produced in the sixteenth-century. These were important to be analyzed to understand how the data provided by the contemporaries of the discussed events was viewed by the Venetian intellectuals. Considering the aim and the scope of this study, here, two chronicles from the late sixteenth century will be analyzed, as examples of the genre.

The first example is the account of Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni. Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, a chronicler and notary born in 1548, was a member of a Venetian patrician family. He studied in Venice and Padova.⁶³⁵ After having survived the plague that devastated Venice in 1576, he worked as the chancellor of mines and was a consultant to the *Consiglio dei Dieci*.⁶³⁶ In these years, he focused on historical studies and engaged in writing a universal history up to 1594, discussing the events chronologically.⁶³⁷ He also published a book on the history of Hungary⁶³⁸, which had been partially ignored by his predecessors. He was known for his publications about cosmology and the calendar reform of Pope Gregory XIII in 1582.

⁶³⁵ Marco Foscarini, *Della Letteratura Veneziana*, v.1, l.3, (Padova: Stamperia del Seminario, 1752), 277.

⁶³⁶ Maria Romanello, “Doglioni, Giovanni Niccolò”, *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, v. 40, (1991), from the online access: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovanni-niccolo-doglioni_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/, retrieved, 23.09.2017.

⁶³⁷ In the present study, his edition of 1601 was consulted. Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, *Compendio Historico Universale di Tutte Le Cose Notabili Già Successe nel Mondo dal Principio della Sua Creatione Fin' hora di Gio. Niccolo Doglioni, di Nuovo da Lui Medesimo Riveduto, Corretto & Ampliato con aggiunto fino all'Anno 1600*, (Venice, 1601).

⁶³⁸ Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, *L'Ungheria Spiegata*, (Venice, 1595). See also: Foscarini, v.1, l.4, 366.

The *Historia Venetiana*⁶³⁹ of Doglioni, evaluated as an early example of the “general history of Venice” composed in the sixteenth-century. The source examines the history of the Venetian Republic from its foundation till the year of 1597 and it was first published in Venice in 1598. Doglioni divided his work into 18 books, chronologically discussing the phases of the history of the Republic in relation to the international politics and diplomacy. Beside the historical narrative, Doglioni, in the last book, also gives the reader important data about the administrative system of Venice, the duties of the offices and officials and the structure of the state.

Doglioni narrates the Ottoman campaign of 1537 in the thirteenth book of his chronicle.⁶⁴⁰ Unlike the previous authors discussed above, Doglioni interestingly notes that the Ottomans engaged in such a campaign in Italy, with consideration to the ongoing political chaos within the Italian states. He mentions that what motivated Süleyman for the invasion of Italy was the political turmoil in the peninsula. He underlines that the Republic of Florence was shocked by the assassination of Alessandro di Medici, the Duke, who was married to the daughter of Charles V by his cousin Lorenzino di Medici. This created a chaos in Florence, suppressed only after the succession of Cosimo di Medici. Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Naples also became a theatre of a political conflict: the Viceroy of Naples killed the brother of Troilo Pignatello, a distinguished Neapolitan nobleman. Pignatello, with great sorrow and indignation, applied to Süleyman, always willing to dominate Italy, and encouraged him to initiate a campaign against Naples.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁹ Giovanni Niccolò Doglioni, *Historia Venetiana*.

⁶⁴⁰ The Ottoman military campaign of 1537 was also discussed by the author in his *Compendio Historico Universale*. See: Doglioni, *Compendio Historico Universale*, p.5, 531-532.

⁶⁴¹ Doglioni, *Historia Venetiana*, 680.

Using this opportunity, Süleyman sent his armada to Italy under the command of Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa, and he personally marched into Valona. Doglioni mentions that Pignatello also accompanied the Ottoman armada, during the attacks on Otranto, Taranto and on Castro.⁶⁴² Violating all faiths, the “Turks” sacked the region and imprisoned many Christians, who would be liberated by Süleyman later.⁶⁴³

At that time, Doglioni notes, Alessandro Contarini of Venice met “Turkish” galleys, sailing by not saluting him, which meant the violation of the rules of the actual convention, fought with them and destroyed two galleys. Soon after, other individual Venetian commanders also took two “Turkish” galleys. Simultaneously, Doria met many *schriazzi*, carrying provisions from Alexandria for the camp of Süleyman and fought with 12 galleys left behind near the Island of Ereikoussa.⁶⁴⁴ All these events encouraged Süleyman, believing that Venice was responsible for the attacks, to declare war against the *Serenissima*. Accordingly, he called his armada back from Apulia, and ordered the attack on Corfu, governed by Simon Leone and Luigi Ripa at that time. The Captain General of Venice Girolamo Pesaro, had already predicted a possible Ottoman attack and had fortified the Island by laying in soldiers and munitions.⁶⁴⁵ Since the defense could not be broken, Süleyman stopped the invasion soon not to waste his soldiers anymore and returned to Constantinople, concludes Doglioni.⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Ibid, 681.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid. The author uses the Italian name, *Merlera*. The island is in the northwest of Corfu.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

The information gathered by the account of Doglioni could be elaborated in the light of *Historia Vinetiana*, a detailed history of Venice, which embraces the years 1513 to 1551. The work was requested by the Venetian government, as the continuation of Pietro Bembo's narrative, from the Paolo Paruta.⁶⁴⁷ Paolo Paruta was born at Venice in 1540 and from his youth, was devoted to literature, philosophy and poetry. He also participated in the political life of the Republic. In 1562 he accompanied the ambassador Michele Suriano to the Court of Maximilian II of Habsburg, the King of Bohemia who would be crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1564. He held the office of the official historiographer of the Venetian Republic.⁶⁴⁸ Then he was made Savio di Terraferma, and became a senator. Between the years of 1590 and 1592, he acted as the Governor of Brescia. Until 1595, he was the ambassador at Rome. Following his return to Venice, he was appointed as the *Procuratore di San Marco* in 1596.⁶⁴⁹

During his administrative offices, he started to compose *Historia Vinetiana*, one of his masterpieces.⁶⁵⁰ The distinguishing feature of the work is that Paruta consulted many documents beside the accounts of his predecessors. Dispatches, *releazioni*, and other registers detailed and enriched the text; furthermore, he gives researcher the chance of following the discussions in current Venetian politics, as well as the

⁶⁴⁷ Umberto Benigni, "Paolo Paruta", *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, (New York: Robert Appton Company, 1911), 510a-512a, accessed through, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11510a.htm>, retrieved 23.09.2017.

⁶⁴⁸ During his office he performed a funeral oration for the victims of the battle of Lepanto in 1572. See: Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ For his works, see: Ibid. Here, it is important to note that Paruta wrote another book on the war of Cyprus, as a continuation of this history of Venice, which could be evaluated as an important source for the researchers. See: Paolo Paruta, *Guerra Fatta della Lega dei Principi Christiani Contro Selino Ottomano per Occasione del Regno di Cipro*, (Venice, 1599).

international relations of the time. Umberto Benigni, in his biography, mentions that Paruta's works reflect the thoughts Macchiavelli about the Italian equilibrium.⁶⁵¹ Accordingly, the author's inclination towards the unification of the Italian powers against common threats could be detected by the reader in numerous chapters. His history was composed of 12 books and discussed events up to 1551. The book was published in Venice in 1605, after the death of the author in 1598.⁶⁵²

Paolo Paruta evaluates the Ottoman military campaign of 1537 and the attack on Corfu in the eighth book of the first part of his *Historia Vinetiana*. After having discussed the rivalry between the King of France and Charles V before, he starts the book by underlying that the King Francis sought new alliances against the Emperor in 1536. The Republic of Venice, though, was known to follow a policy of neutrality in the conflicts of other princes. Therefore, King Francis sent Monsignor Rodes to address to the Venetian Senate, in order to ask for the cooperation of the Republic in his war against Charles V. The King of France was at peace with the Ottoman Sultan, as was the Republic of Venice. So, the Republic should act in accordance to the French needs in order to secure the peace with the Ottomans, which was crucially important for the Venetian interests.⁶⁵³ The French demand was clear: the Venetians would let the Ottoman navy safely reach Apulia and the other dominions of Charles V. Thereafter, benefitting from the weakened defense caused by the threat in the south, the French armies would enter Milan easily.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵¹ Benigni.

⁶⁵² Ibid. For Paruta's biography, also see: Arturo Pompeati, "Per la Biografia di Paolo Paruta", *Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana*, n. 45, 1905, 48-66; Marco Gianni, *Paolo Paruta: Il Lessico della Politica*, Scuola di dottorato in Scienze Umanistiche, Università Ca' Foscari, 2011, (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation).

⁶⁵³ Paruta, *Historia Vinetiana*, p.1, l.8, 351-352.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid, 352.

In accordance with the aforementioned project, King Francis sent another ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan in succession to Jean de la Forest, Don Serafino di Gozi Ragusero, with new requests and large promises.⁶⁵⁵ In his meetings with the important Pashas, having great authority, Ragusero suggested an Ottoman expedition towards the Kingdom of Naples, which was under Spanish control to decrease the power of Charles V.⁶⁵⁶ The Ottoman armies would pass to Apulia from Albania. Ragusero found the chance of discussion with Lutfi Bey and Ayas Pasha, having great reputation as the Grand Vizier. Paruta underlines that the Ottoman viziers, especially after the death of İbrahim Pasha, were keen on an expedition against Christians.⁶⁵⁷ For that reason, the proposal of the French ambassador encouraged them to convince the Sultan to engage in the conquest of Italy once more, following the example of his ancestor Mehmed II, who had acquired the city of Otranto and had sacked Apulia.⁶⁵⁸ Now, Sultan Süleyman had more power to make Ottoman conquest a reality. Moreover, the wars in Persia and in India were not obstacles; they were treated as insignificant ventures. For the dignity of the Sultan and the reputation of his forces, such a great expedition against the Christians would be much more effective and meaningful.⁶⁵⁹

According to Paruta, on that point the French ambassador also underlined that the Republic of Venice should definitely leave the league of Charles V.⁶⁶⁰ In the

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid, 353.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

meantime, Yunus Bey was sent to Venice by the Ottoman Sultan. His mission was to declare to the Venetian Senate that the Sultan had asked the Republic to ally with himself and his ally, the King of France, in that case. Paruta states the response of the Senate as the following:

[...] It has been dearest to be in peace for the Republic with all Princes and principally with the Ottoman Signors with whom it has been conserving the friendship for a long time with a free and useful commerce between the subjects: that same desire continues now, so constant and steady, which does not need another major declaration.⁶⁶¹

According to the author, the real intention of the Sultan was to fight against Charles V. Since he was aware of the potential and the weaknesses of his naval forces, an attack against Venice was never planned. However, the course of the Ottoman campaign changed and the fire turned against Venice because of the misbehavior of the Venetian officials who did not respect the dignity of the Sultan and the utility of the Venetian-Ottoman peace.⁶⁶²

According to the author, in order to have more information about the upcoming Ottoman initiation, the Venetian Senate sent Tomaso Mocenigo as the ambassador of the Republic to Constantinople. As an ordinary task, the ambassador would congratulate the Sultan for his victories in Persia and his return to Constantinople.⁶⁶³ Mocenigo had the chance to meet Ayas Pasha too and got the information that the

⁶⁶¹ “[...] *carissima essere stata sempre alla Republica la pace con tutti i Prencipi & principalmente con i Signori Ottomani, con i qualli s’haveva lungamente conservata l’amicitia con un libero & utile commercio tra’ sudditi : continuare hora la medesima volontà, cosi costante & ferma, che non faceva bisogno d’altra maggiore dichiarazione.*”, Ibid.

⁶⁶² Here, Paruta gives details about the Venetian commercial ships creating problems during their visit the Ottoman lands. According to the author the violation of the peace conditions by the Venetian ships created an atmosphere in the Ottoman government about the Venetian cooperation with the Habsburgs. See: Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Ibid, 354.

Sultan desired to secure the existing peace with the Republic although the next Ottoman campaign would be against a Christian territory.

Paruta notes that the news coming from Mocenigo and the other agents of the Venetian information gathering network in the Ottoman Empire did not comfort the Senate though; on the contrary, the rumors about the target of the Ottoman campaign created great suspicions. The Senate was aware that, in Constantinople, many people were saying that the target of the Ottoman armada would be the coasts of Apulia or the Gulf of Venice, the latter possibility of worse alarming. Paruta also notes an interesting detail that has not been mentioned in the aforementioned chronicles: according to him, some intelligence suspected that Hayreddin Barbarossa was planning an attack on Corfu.⁶⁶⁴

All these urged the Senate to strengthen the Venetian strategic fortifications. A number of 800 infantry were hired and ships were immediately repaired in the arsenal working with extraordinary diligence.⁶⁶⁵ However, that urgent and extraordinary preparation needed to be financed. Thus, the Republic collected extraordinary taxes, asked financial contributions from the Venetian nobles in the government, even of the Papacy, since fighting with the “Turks” meant fighting for the Christianity.⁶⁶⁶

The war preparations of the Ottomans also urged Charles V to strengthen his dominions. Paruta notes that he sent a great number of Spanish infantry to his dominions in Italy, especially to Sicily and Naples.⁶⁶⁷ Charles V, struggling with the

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid, 354-355.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid, 355.

⁶⁶⁶ For further information see, Ibid, 355-357.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid, 356.

French armies, charged Andrea Doria with organizing the imperial armada and leading it against the Ottomans in case of an attack.⁶⁶⁸

When the Ottomans appeared at Valona, the Ottoman military machine frightened the Venetians, since where they would attack was still unclear. Doria, unable to have the assistance of the Papal galleys had returned to Messina after having left a number of vessels to observe the enemy. The Republic of Venice was anxious about the ongoing situation. Pesaro was already in Corfu; Giovanni Vetturi, commanding the galleys of Dalmatia was charged with checking the Ottomans. Meanwhile, the French King, Francis I, sent another ambassador, Guido Rangone, to Venice to ask the Republic's support for his war against Charles V, by guaranteeing the Serenissima its claims over Milan and Naples.⁶⁶⁹ In front of a possible Ottoman threat towards Venetian dominions, the *Collegio* and the Venetian Senate debated this proposal extensively. In the following pages, Paruta quotes two orations of the members of *Collegio*, namely Marc Antonio Cornaro, *Savio di Terraferma*, and, Lunardo Emo, *Savio di Consiglio*. The orations are interesting to analyze, as they show how the Venetian government tried to keep the balance via its policies in order to secure its own territories. In his address, quoted by Paruta, Cornaro advocates that the Republic should secure the balance between Charles V and the Ottoman Sultan; it should definitely refrain from any intervention in the ongoing military conflicts, and from the proposal of Francis I since allying with one party could result in the loss of Republic's independence. The victory of Charles V against the French King could open his way towards the Venetian lagoon, since he already controlled Italy. On the

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid. Doria would command of the Spanish armada was enriched with the forces of Sicily, Naples and the Cavalries of the Hiyerosolymitan Order.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid, 359.

other hand, facilitating the Ottoman authority in Italy was even more dangerous and almost impossible to justify in the eyes of the Christianity.⁶⁷⁰ Contrary to Cornaro, Emo favored the alliance with the French King, reminding the Senate that the French Kingdom had assisted the Republic in recovering Verona. According to Emo, preventing the increasing authority of Charles V in Italy, in conjunction with mighty French and Ottoman forces, would be more beneficial for the Republic, considering the fact that the major commercial partner of the Venetians was already the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁷¹

In addition to these discussions, the debates among the Venetian nobles about sending letters to the Ottoman Sultan, accentuating the *Serenissima's* friendship and desire of securing peace⁶⁷², are also noted by Paruta in the following pages. These demonstrate how the Venetian government experienced a dilemma on how to position itself according to the actual circumstances. However, the conflicts at sea would force the Republic to choose a side.

Paruta notes that the Ottoman armada safely sailed through the Channel of Corfu; saluting the fortresses, thus observing the military customs. At first, there was nothing extraordinary. However, the attack of Simeone Nassi, commander of the galley of Dalmatia, on an Ottoman ship carrying provisions, for not lowering its sails, increased the tension between the Republic and the Ottoman Government.⁶⁷³ In response to that incident, Sultan Süleyman and his Pashas decided to send Yunus Bey, the Dragoman, to Pesaro to ask for an indemnity of 30.000 ducats, with 2

⁶⁷⁰ For the details of the oration of Cornaro, see: Ibid, 360-364.

⁶⁷¹ For the oration of Emo, see: Ibid, 354-366.

⁶⁷² See: Ibid, 367.

⁶⁷³ Ibid, 368.

galleys and a *fusta*.⁶⁷⁴ However, they too were attacked by Venetian commanders such as Guisto Gradenico, Michele Grimani, Giacomo di Mezzo and Girolamo Michiele, who were charged to secure the Channel.⁶⁷⁵ The majority of the crew died and the few of them, including Yunus Bey, who reached the lands of Himara, were imprisoned. As soon as he noticed the incident, Pesaro sent Francesco Zeno to rescue the ambassador by paying tribute and sent him back to the Sultan.⁶⁷⁶

These frustrating incidents raised doubts about the Venetians in the Ottoman camp. Paruta notes that the Venetian *bailo*, in Valona at that time, was sent by the Ottoman Sultan to Corfu in order to report his discontent about the Venetian deeds, which had definitely broken the peace between two states. It was asked that Pesaro should immediately explain the main reason behind the attacks, and to inform the Venetian Senate that the Sultan was more than ready to shelve the friendship and peace.⁶⁷⁷

However, the chaos continued: while the Ottoman armies had been marching into Apulia and attacking Otranto, Branditto, Taranto and Castro⁶⁷⁸, 28 Ottoman galleys, carrying provisions to Valona from Alexandria, were attacked by the Venetians. Then, the forces of Alessandro Contarini, composed of 15 galleys met an imperial galley, under the control of Bostan Reis. The Ottomans, on board, provoked the Venetian crew *viva voce*.⁶⁷⁹ The captains of the galley did not enter into conversation; however Contarini, “because of his indignation or as a definite zeal of

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid. For the differences between a galley and a *fusta*, see: Appendix 1.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid. Paruta notes that the Venetian commanders did not know the title and office of Yunus Bey.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid, 368-369.

⁶⁷⁸ Paruta notes that Castro had been under the possession of Mercurino Gattinara. Ibid, 369.

⁶⁷⁹ The author mentions that the galley was for the personal use of the Sultan. Ibid, 369-370.

honor”⁶⁸⁰, notes Paruta, opened fire. The galley sunk, more than 300 people died. A few days later, the Ottomans captured four Venetian galleys; but most importantly, they intercepted a letter, written by Andrea Doria to Pesaro, identifying the locations and travel routes of the Ottoman armada. The letter showing the intelligence-sharing between Doria and the Venetian captain, persuaded the Ottomans, mostly the Sultan, that the betrayal of the Republic was clear.⁶⁸¹

Paruta’s history also portrays the reaction of the Venetian government to the deeds of the individual commanders. He notes the arrest of Giusto Gradenico, which had captured Yunus Bey and the appointment of Alessandro Orsino as bailo to the Ottoman camp to persuade the Sultan of the good intentions of the Republic for securing the peace, which were cited in Longo’s account in the previous pages, as the last maneuvers of the government to prevent the war.⁶⁸² According to Paruta, the Venetian Government knew that the deeds of the Venetian commanders had provoked war against the Republic. The incidents were the initiatives of the opposing patricians, preferring the alliance with Charles V. Paruta mirrors the general opinion in Venice, as following:

These incidents were generally perceived in Venice with great sorrow, as a hard serious thing [to handle] the imprudence and the temerity of the minority disturbed the peace of the majority by conducing to a greatly serious and dangerous war with the operations, which were fully in contrast to the intention and decision of the Senate, [...] the Princes only knew well to impute often the faults, of themselves own, to their ministers.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ “ò da sdegno,ò da certo zelo di honore”. Ibid, 370.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² For this important duty, Vincenzo Grimani was elected by the Senate. Ibid, 372.

⁶⁸³ “Furono questi succesi à Vinetia generalmente intesi con grandissimo dispiacere, parendo duro, & grave cosa, che l'imprudenza & temerità di pochi doveste turbare la tranquillità di tutti, dando occasione con operationi tanto contrarie all'intentione, & alla deliberatione del Senato, ad una gravissima, & pericolosissima guerra, [...] sapersi benissimo essere soliti i Prencipi di gettare molte volte ne'ministri qualle colpe, che sono le sue proprie,[...]” Ibid.

Paruta underlines that there was a dichotomy among the Ottoman governors too. Lütü Pasha and Hayreddin Barbarossa returned to Valona. In order to take the decision for war against Venice, the Sultan called his commanders and asked their own opinions. Ayas Pasha, advised that securing the peace with the Venetians would be more beneficial because in case of a Venetian alliance with the forces of Doria and the Papacy, the Ottoman forces would most probably be ineffective in war, taken into consideration that the season for war was about to finish and the army needed more provisions. On the contrary, Hayreddin Barbarossa advocated war, citing the harm given by Doria to his forces, which had been facilitated by the Venetians in alliance. The Venetians should and could have prevented the attacks, but they had not. They also established an intelligence network with Doria. The peace had already been broken on their part. After having considered all opinions, Sultan Süleyman decided to declare war on Venice.⁶⁸⁴ The target would be the Island of Corfu.

Venice was entirely alone against the Ottomans: when the Venetian ambassador asked for the assistance of the papal forces, the papacy required the Republic to participate in the league with Charles V. It was desperately accepted, but Doria was at Naples and replied that he needed to watch developments and secure Genova.

Paruta notes that if the forces could have united against the Ottoman armada Corfu would not have been a war zone, but the Christians left the island to its own limited defense in order to secure their own forces, reputation and interests.⁶⁸⁵

Paruta notes that Süleyman moved to Buthrotum, adjacent to Corfu, with his army on August 26, says the author. Barbarossa, with a part of the armada, transported around

⁶⁸⁴ For the details about the Ottoman discussions on war, see: Ibid, 372-373.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid, 375-377.

1000 cavalry⁶⁸⁶, 25.000 soldiers and 30 pieces of artillery to the island.⁶⁸⁷ The Ottomans cruelly attacked the fortresses of the Island, cut the trees, ruined the houses, plundered the animals and seized many people to serve themselves. The Corfiots, deprived of food and clean water, needed to run away into the castles, mainly to Sant'Angelo, to save their lives. Lots of people starved to death. Heavy rains started right after the Ottoman attack and worsened the situation.⁶⁸⁸

On the other hand, the Ottoman could not entirely break the defense of the Island. During the siege of the main castle, Ayas Pasha came to the island twice and observed the battles. After having seen that the army needed more time and provision to seize the island entirely, he recommended the Sultan to end the war. Most importantly, the winter had just began and the army had lost many soldiers already.⁶⁸⁹ The Venetian *bailo*, in the Ottoman camp, was called and charged to inform the Republic about the response of the Sultan to the deeds of the Venetians during the expedition. The Republic was also asked to send a *bailo* to Constantinople to restore the peace, in the following days.⁶⁹⁰ Shortly after, the Sultan set off back to Constantinople with his forces. On the other hand, Hayreddin Barbarossa, with the entire armada together with 12 French galleys of Baron of St. Blancard, who had joined the Ottoman forces at Valona during the attack, sailed to Prevesa.⁶⁹¹ Paruta concludes the story by saying that the news about the liberation of Corfu from the

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid, 373.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid, 377.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid, 378.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid, 378-379.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid, 379.

danger raised the spirits of the Venetians, abandoned by Doria. The virtue of the defenders caused the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the Island and broke the reputation of the Sultan as well. Venice, every part of the city, celebrated this great victory.⁶⁹²

The aforementioned two examples of Venetian histories, discussed in detail, proves the argument that the Venetian Republic perceived the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 as a result of the Ottoman-French alliance against Charles V and its transformation into an attack on the Republic as a consequence of the conflicts at sea between the Venetian commanders and the Ottomans. The accounts also reveal the request of Pignatello of Naples for the Ottoman attack to Apulia, different from the accounts of the eyewitnesses. Paruta's underlining of the death of İbrahim Pasha as a factor in the Ottoman war on Christians is also noteworthy.

While Doglioni keeps quiet about the French moves during the procedure, Paruta mentions that the French Kingdom, via its ambassador in Venice, encouraged the government to ally with Francis I and the Ottoman Sultan. Moreover, Paruta also noted that the French ambassadors played important roles in convincing the Ottoman Sultan about the Venetian alliance with Charles V. In that context, beside the deeds of Venetian commanders, the French persuasion of the Ottoman Sultan is reflected as the reason for the Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537, by Paruta. His notes about the league with the Papacy also differ from the notes of Longo. According to him, the Papacy forced the Republic to enter into the league with the Emperor, and this was not a policy the Venetians sought.

⁶⁹² Ibid.

5.3. Studying the Ottomans: Discussions of 1537 in Venetian Books on Ottoman History

In the sixteenth-century, numerous books and pamphlets about the Ottomans were produced and published in Venice. As well as the works introducing the customs of the Ottomans to the Venetians, books on the Ottoman Sultans and their deeds reached a wide audience.⁶⁹³ The Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu in 1537 are also discussed in those accounts.

Among these works, the account of Theodore Spandugino has a distinguished place. Spandugino is an interesting character: he was a member of a Byzantine refugee family who had settled in Venice after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. His mother, who had moved to Italy before the fall of Constantinople, was from the Byzantine Kantakouzenos family⁶⁹⁴, well-known to be one of the distinguished imperial families in the history of Byzantium, and his father, Matthew Spandounes or Spandugino served as a *stradioto*, Greek cavalymen in the service of Venice.⁶⁹⁵ Donald M. Nicol, studied extensively on the Kantakouzenos family and on Spandugino, points out that Theodore Spandugino was probably born in Venice and, following the death of his father by 1511, he was sent to be a ward of his great-aunt Mara or Maria, given in marriage to the Ottoman Sultan Murad II and was

⁶⁹³ See, Bassano da Zara.

⁶⁹⁴ For detailed information about the Kantakouzenos family and his members shaping the Byzantine History, see: Donald M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100-1460: A Genealogical and Prosopographical Study*, (Washington D.C. : Dumbarton Oaks Studies, 1968); idem, "The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos: Some Addenda and Corrigenda", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, v.27, 1973, 309-315. Donald M. Nicol also published the biography of Joannes Kantakouzenos, known as John VI, Emperor of Romans in Constantinople between the years of 1347-1354. See: Nicol, *The Reluctant Emperor: A Biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and Monk, c. 1295-1383*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁶⁹⁵ Spandounes, *On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors*, ix-x.

living as a wealthy widow at that time in eastern Macedonia.⁶⁹⁶ Here, Theodore learnt some Turkish and “acquired his interest in the history and customs of the Ottoman people and their rulers.”⁶⁹⁷ He probably visited Constantinople in 1503 to help his brother Alexander, engaged in commerce in the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁹⁸ This helped Spandugino a lot to have more information about the Ottomans and their culture. This would create the base of his treatise.

Spandugino never lost his Greek origin but he lived more as a devout Christian than a Greek patriot. Donald M. Nicol points out that his patriotism “is not in doubt; but it was a patriotism for the whole Christian world, east and west alike, Roman as well as Greek.”⁶⁹⁹ Greece for him symbolized Europe⁷⁰⁰ and it should not be left to the Ottomans for many generations like Anatolia.⁷⁰¹ As a Greek scholar born in Venice, he felt bound to alert the Christians in the west to the danger of the Ottomans ruining Byzantium and he undertook to compose an account about the Ottoman Empire to evoke them to struggle against it. His religious persuasion oriented him to the Roman Church and he could have strong connections with the Popes, and princes tied to the Papacy, as well as their envoys and ambassadors.⁷⁰² He served as a confidante and

⁶⁹⁶ After the death of Sultan Murad II, Mara was granted her freedom by Mehmed II. Mehmed II was very attached to her a mother figure according to Nicol and in the end he settled her on her estate at Jezevo in Macedonia, near the city of Seres. The author mentions that the ambassadors from Venice and elsewhere in the west would often visit Mara to seek her advice and support considering her affinity to Mehmed II. Ibid, x. For detailed information about her see: Nicol, *The Byzantine Lady. Ten Portraits, 1250-1500*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110-119.

⁶⁹⁷ Spandounes, x.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid, x-xi.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid, xi.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Ibid, xi-xii.

advisor to Popes Leo X, Clement VII and Paul III between the years of 1513 and 1549⁷⁰³.

Spandugino wrote his account in Italian. The first version of Spandugino's treatise was sent to the French King Louis XII and to Pope Leo X before the 1520s. Its Spanish version was dedicated to Charles V and was published as early as the 1520s. Spandugino edited and finalized his account in 1538 and sent it to Henry of Valois, who would be crowned as King Henry II of France in 1547. The account was published in Lucca in 1550 and in Florence in 1551. In 1556, Francesco Sansovino edited and published the account in Venice.⁷⁰⁴ The modern edition of the full text was published by Constantine N. Sathas in 1890.⁷⁰⁵ The account was re-edited and translated into English by Donald M. Nicol in 1997. In this study, the views of Spandugino will be mirrored via Nicol's edition.

According to Spandugino, the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 intended the invasion of the Kingdom of Naples⁷⁰⁶, as underlined by other sources discussed in the previous pages. Sultan Süleyman prepared a great expedition by land and sea. Lütü Bey, captain-general of Gallipoli, was in command of the naval forces and the Sultan accompanied by his prince son and the land army headed to the Albanian lands. The imperial camp was near the city of Valona. On the other hand, Barbarossa was charged with carrying supplies to the imperial camp with his ships from Negroponte.⁷⁰⁷ In accordance to the plan of the expedition, Lütü Bey sailed for the

⁷⁰³ Ibid, viii.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid, xiii, xxv.

⁷⁰⁵ Constantine N. Sathas, "*Documents Inédits Relatifs à l'Histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge*, v.9, (Paris : 1890), 133-261.

⁷⁰⁶ Spandoune, 75.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

Kingdom of Naples and reached Otranto without any considerable opposition.⁷⁰⁸

From there he went on to Castro, Tre Case and other Neapolitan towns in Apulia, which were surrendered after some resistance.⁷⁰⁹

Spandugino mentions that at the same time the Republic of Venice was on the alert:

The Venetian Senate appointed two captains-general of the sea: Girolamo Pesaro,

being at Corfu with 44 galleys and Giovanni Vetturi, being at the Gulf of Kotor with

approximately 50 ships.⁷¹⁰ Venetians did not open fire against the Ottomans at first.

However, Barbarossa, with his cargo ships and provisions on his way to Valona,

encountered Andrea Doria in the Adriatic. Doria followed Barbarossa's forces and

seized 17 of his vessels. Barbarossa pressed on to Zakynthos and from there he sailed

to Corfu with his cargo ships. Since the Venetians were not at war at that time,

Barbarossa did not face any opposition during his sail but "off Corfu one his small

craft was sunk when the Venetian galley called Zarantina opened fire."⁷¹¹ Barbarossa

was able to reach to Valona with the supplies but this attack caused great indignation

in the Ottoman camp.⁷¹²

Spandugino repeats the fact that Sultan Süleyman sent Dragoman Yunus Bey as

ambassador to Pesaro in order to demand compensation for the loss of the goods in

the sunken ship⁷¹³ and for the Venetian attack on the ambassador's galleys with the

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid. The names of the towns were deciphered by Nicol as Virento and Galatole.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid, 76.

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

⁷¹² Ibid.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

forces of Andrea Doria.⁷¹⁴ The story of the capture of Yunus Bey, by Himarans and his rescue in return for an indemnity of 500 ducats by Pesaro was mentioned by Spandugino too.

About the Sultan's declaration war on Venice, Sapndugino narrates as follows:

As a consequence Suleiman again declared war on Venice. He ordered his army which had been fighting in the Kingdom of Naples to report forthwith at Valona, which they did, though not before they had done considerably more damage in the region of Otranto. For this Suleiman had their four leaders arrested and executed at Valona. In anticipation of the Turkish attack on Corfu, Pesaro made for Cephalonia. Suleiman brought his troops by land down to Butrinto; and on 27 August 1537 his fleet sailed over Corfu. There they created havoc; but after eighteen days they gave up the struggle and sailed off to Constantinople taking with them 20.000 prisoners.⁷¹⁵

Spandugino does not give details about the Ottoman attack on Corfu, what happened in the island or why the Ottoman Sultan decided to end the war. The question of why Spandugino did not give the details of the Ottoman attacks on the island needs to be speculated, however. Taking into consideration that the text was formulated nearly in 1538, the author seems to be partly aware of the details of the Ottoman attack, as well as the other accounts discussing them.⁷¹⁶ He mentions that he narrated all that happened before he left Venice.⁷¹⁷ On the other hand, he concludes his account by announcing that the Pope had finally arranged a peace settlement between Charles V and Francis I. As he clearly mirrors in the text his advice on the necessary unification of the Christians against the Ottoman advance, this agreement seems to be a crucial point for Spandugino. For that reason, he may also intentionally avoid discussing the damage created by the Ottomans in 1537. The lack of a mention of the Ottoman-

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid, 76-77.

⁷¹⁶ For a brief discussion about the sources consulted by Spandugino, see: Ibid, xvii-xxv.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid, 79.

French alliance should also be evaluated from that perspective. Since he was in Venice in the relevant period, he should have been aware of the French-Ottoman negotiations, known in the Venetian atmosphere. However, the author prefers to show the French in alliance with the Papacy and the Emperor in the text.

Another example of a treatise on the Ottomans, discussing the incidents of 1537 is a chapter in the book entitled *Historia Universale Dell'Origine et Imperio de Turchi*⁷¹⁸, collected by Francesco Sansovino, famous scholar and man of letters born in Rome in 1521, who moved to Venice after the sack of Rome by Charles V in 1527. The title of the chapter is “The Deeds of Süleyman after the Conquest of Rhodes to the End of the Year of 1533”.⁷¹⁹ Despite the title, the chapter reveals important details about the Ottoman attack on Corfu in 1537. The author of the chapter is unknown. Although at first sight one could easily think that the chapter had been written by Sansovino, himself, the names of the authors in titles of the other chapters were directly mentioned, including Sansovino himself. So, the aforementioned chapter is thought to be anonymous, copied from another contemporary source and reorganized at the time of collection and/or publication since the content of the chapter extended to the year of 1538, asynchronous with the original title. Since Sansovino conducted his work in Venice, this study assumes that the chapter was written by a Venetian, most probably.

After having discussed the first military attempts and conquests of Süleyman, his close relation with the former Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha and his attitude towards Hungary and Charles V, the text gives brief information about the Ottoman military

⁷¹⁸ Sansovino (ed), *Historia Universale Dell'Origine*.

⁷¹⁹ “I Fatti di Solimano Dopo la Presa di Rhodi Fino all’Anno MDXXXIII”, *Historia Universale Dell'Origine*, l. 2, 267a-273b.

initiation of 1537. The author mentions that the target of the Sultan was both Valona, which had been the center of Ancient Macedonia and the region of Calabria⁷²⁰, which was under the rule of the Kingdom of Naples, attached to the Spanish Habsburgs. The Ottomans, with a troop composed of 30.000 soldiers, landed in the city of Barletta⁷²¹ and conquered the province by violence.⁷²² This triggered Emperor Charles V to send an enormous armada and Spanish soldiers to the region. The “Turks”, noticing the Emperor’s response, did not want to wait for the Spanish and with dishonor, retreated and abandoned the capture.⁷²³

The failure in Italy provoked the Ottoman Sultan to break the peace with the Republic of Venice, according to the author. Süleyman sent an armada of 400 vessels into the Channel of Corfu in July 8, 1537.⁷²⁴ Moreover, he took his land army through the village of Riglia⁷²⁵, which was also fundamentally ruined by the Ottoman soldiers.⁷²⁶

At that time, the Venetian armada was situated at the shores of Paxi.⁷²⁷ The Venetian government, for security, decided to send two ships, one of Zara and one of Candia,

⁷²⁰ Sansovino, 269b. Calabria is the name of the southwestern region of the Italian Peninsula, generally defined as the “toe” of the boot shaped territory.

⁷²¹ Barletta is a city of southeastern Italy, in the region of Apulia, which was located in the Adriatic coast. See , Ibid.

⁷²² Sansovino, 269b.

⁷²³ Ibid.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Ibid. Riglia is a small village of Stoupa, a village in the southern Peloponnese.

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

⁷²⁷ Ibid. Paxi Islands are the smallest island groups within the Ionian Islands. Paxo is the name of the largest island of the group.

to meet the Ottoman armada.⁷²⁸ In the course of sailing, those Venetian ships encountered three Ottoman galleys. As a result of a battle between them, one Ottoman galley was able to escape and the other two were sunk by the Venetians.⁷²⁹

The text informs the researcher that after that incident, on July 13, near Parga, Andrea Doria attacked ten Ottoman *schirazzi*, in the gulf in front of Parga. The ships were seized, some of them were sunk; the “Turks” were captured and some of them were killed. This drew the Ottoman Sultan into great sorrow since he lost important munitions and the backbone of his armada.⁷³⁰ Five days later, the forces of Andrea Doria, composed of 22 well-armed galleys, found two Ottoman ships, one galley carrying Yunus Bey, the ambassador of the Sultan and a *galeotta*, smaller *fusta*, following him. Although, they tried to defend themselves, these two ships were controlled without fire and Yunus Bey was taken on the land of the Himarans. After being imprisoned Yunus Bey was sent to Venice.⁷³¹ On July 22, Andrea Doria, found twelve Ottoman galleys between Parga and Riglia. After a bloody combat, 11 Ottoman ships were destroyed and numerous people died –the sea became red because of the dead bodies- and the captain of the galleys, Ali Reis, was captured. Since, the galleys had been in charge of carrying an important amount of money to pay the soldiers, munitions and necessary goods to the Ottoman camp, that incident

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Ibid, 270a.

⁷³⁰ Sansovino, 270a.

⁷³¹ Sansovino, 270a.

distressed the Ottoman Sultan as much as the destruction of the *schirazzi*.⁷³² By his great virtue, Andrea Doria also liberated the Christian slaves in the galleys.⁷³³

In the course of these naval conflicts, Venetian Provveditore Alessandro Contarini, commanding a Venetian galleon and three galleys, came across an Ottoman galleon followed by three other galleys which had been coming from the Sancak of Gallipoli.⁷³⁴ The fire between the forces led to the capture of two Ottoman galleys and great casualties among the “Turks”.⁷³⁵

The text also reflects the general panorama of the Venetian armada. The author mentions that the Venetian ships came altogether near Otranto in the last days of July and targeted the Ottoman naval force. However, the Ottoman armada had the advantage: the Venetian armada had 40 galleys but the Ottomans had more than 270. Considering that and the need to protect their own forces, the Venetian galleys reoriented to the Island of Corfu to watch the manoeuvres of the enemy.⁷³⁶

⁷³² Ibid.

⁷³³ Ibid.

⁷³⁴ In the text, the author narrates that the “*selisguir*” of Gallipoli was in the Ottoman galleon. “[...] *su la qual veniva Selisguir Sangiacco di Galipoli* [...]” In the course of the present research, I could not be able to decipher what the aforementioned word means or represents which name or title in Ottoman. The context of the story makes me think that the author refers to the captain of the Gallipoli ships, however, the term needs to be clarified. See: Ibid.

⁷³⁵ The author also mentions that the aforementioned “*selisguir*” that was captured alive told Contarini that most of his people were killed. Ibid.

⁷³⁶ The author narrates another interesting story too: On August 1, Andrea Doria captured another Ottoman galley, carrying an imperial astrologer who was one of the favorites of Sultan Süleyman. The man was a Christian renegade of Dalmatian origin, converted to Islam and raised in the imperial palace in the time of Mehmed II. He had found the chance of studying in Athens and Adrianople. What is attractive in the story is that the astrologer revealed to Doria that Sultan Süleyman was about to die or to be imprisoned before the year 1559 and following that the Christian princes would unite and enter into Greece by having the support of the Greek people against the “Turks”. See: Ibid, 270b. The text does not reveal what happened to the astrologer after capture but the short passage discussed above is thought to be a good example of prophecies floating over the Christian world about the unification of the Christians for the collapse of the Ottomans that which were briefly discussed in Chapter Two of the present study. See: Chapter Two.

Following the conflicts at sea, the Sultan was also informed that, in the East, the Safevid Shah was about to attack the Ottoman borderline and kill numerous soldiers with the help of Spanish and Italian contingents. These soldiers were paid by the Shah and helped him a lot with their more advanced techniques.⁷³⁷ This encouraged the Sultan, for the conquest of the Island of Corfu and victory in the West would compensate the failure in the East.⁷³⁸

After having noted the names of the Ottoman commanders in charge and the number of the ships and soldiers participating in the attack, the author mentions that after three days of raids on the island, the “Turks” started to withdraw back to their armada. However, the Venetian cavalry and infantry, who were in charge of guarding the city did not let the “Turks” go in this way. The city had already been fortified with munitions and provision for two years by the Republic of Venice and letting the “Turks” go with an advantage was not acceptable. The author narrates the reaction of the Venetian as follows:

[...] [The Venetian soldiers] followed and pressed the Turkish [soldiers] during their retreat, killed most of them by fighting so bravely and shouting Marco, Marco, kill [them], kill [them] and when the dark night fell, they retreated to the city; the Venetian armada, itself, did the same, it did his own part of harming the enemy.⁷³⁹

According to the author, during the conflicts many “Turks” died: while 12.000

“Turkish” soldiers died, only 200 Christians lost their lives. This led Sultan

Süleyman to engage in a second, more destructive attack by two bands which would

⁷³⁷ Sansovino, 271a.

⁷³⁸ Ibid.

⁷³⁹ “[...]seguitando i Turchi diede lo incalzo et ne ammazzò molti di quelli, combattendo valorosamente, et gridando Marco, Marco, ammazza, ammazza, et poi sopravendo l’oscura notte si ritiravano alla città, facendo il medesimo l’armata Venetiana, la quale anchora essa haveva fatto la parte sua, di danno negli nemici.”, Ibid.

be greater and more vigorous.⁷⁴⁰ However, the second attack was not successful either and in order not to lose more time, the Sultan decided to withdraw his forces.⁷⁴¹ Here, it is interesting to note that the author underlines that Sultan Süleyman, before declaring his decision of retreat, convened a meeting with all his pashas and captains, aware of the importance of this conquest and explained his reasoning in details. Pages 271b and 272a are left to the assumed speech of Süleyman told by the author firsthand as if he had listened to it or had it in writing. The direct translation of the entire part was intentionally avoided so as not to drag the reader into strenuous reading; however, some parts and the basic motives accentuated by the author will be paraphrased here to detect the perception of the author on 1537.

By the sentence “I have no doubt, my friends and brothers, that none of us knew and understand the strength of our enemy [...]”⁷⁴², the Sultan opens his speech according to the author. The main concern of the Sultan is the power of the Emperor Charles V and the other Christian potentates allying with him. The author narrates from the lips of the Sultan that the Christians had a united armada composed of more than 400 ships opposed to the 200 ships of the Ottomans.⁷⁴³ Moreover, the Pope, the Emperor,

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid, 271a-271b.

⁷⁴² “*Non dubito punto amici e fratelli miei, che ogni uno di noi non sappia et intenda la potenza de gli nemci nostri [...]*”, Ibid., 271b.

⁷⁴³ The author interestingly gives the numbers of the galleys and ships of the Christian potentates as if the Sultan had listed to his audience. According to him, the Kingdom of Catalonia (in the city of Barcelona), had 30, the Spanish Kingdom had 14, Andrea Doria, referred as his mortal enemy by the Ottoman Sultan vocalized by the author, had 15, Genoa had 10, the Papacy had 10, the Kingdom of Sicily had 10, the Kingdom of Naples 12, the Knights of St. John had 8, Antonio Doria had 5, Palermo had 4 galleys. With the galleys of the other Christian princes, in total, the Christians had 130 well-armed galleys and many big vessels including with an important amount of munition and provisions. In addition to them, the Venetians had 100 galleys in order and many *fuste* and vessels. See, 271b-272a.

the King of France and the Italian potentates had just come together in a league against the Ottomans.⁷⁴⁴ In the East, the Safevids had started once again to harm the Ottomans. For that reason, the Sultan recommends to retreat to Greece and to focus on defense of the Ottoman lands instead of insisting on the conquest of Corfu.⁷⁴⁵ Moreover, the winter time was ahead. He concludes his speech admitting as follows: “There was a time that the Christians were afraid of us, but right now it is the contrary [...]”⁷⁴⁶.

The author narrates that, after having listened to the speech of the Sultan to the Ottoman pashas and captains, they consented that withdrawing from the attack would be the best solution to secure the remaining military force, and also the Ottoman territories in Greece. They pointed out that only in Corfu, more than 20.000 soldiers, with the casualties in Calabria, more than 30.000 soldiers in total, died that year besides the vessels and galleys attacked by the enemy⁷⁴⁷. They left the final decision to the will of the Sultan and Süleyman “not to lose more time, decided to raise immediately the attack on Corfu, where they left without harassing the Christians for some days and let the Venetian Seniors live in peace, and to take the route to Constantinople with his forces, with disappointment that they had never had.”⁷⁴⁸

With the aforementioned comment, the author concludes the story of 1537 and starts to discuss the Ottoman-Portuguese confrontation in the Indian Ocean and the Diu

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid., 272a.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁶ “*Gia fu il tempo che i Christiani havevano paura di noi, ma hora è al contrario [...]*”, Ibid.

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid., 272a-272b.

⁷⁴⁸ “[...] *per non perder piu tempo si levò subito d’attorno Corfu et andò alla rotta di Constantinopoli col suo essercito, ove stete quieto senza molestar i Christiani per alcuni giorni, lasciando viver in pace i Signori Vinitiani, da’ quelli niun dispiacere non ricevè mai.*” Ibid., 272b.

Expedition of 1538⁷⁴⁹, the final subject discussed in the chapter. The author mentions that the failure of the Ottomans both in Calabria and then in India was not related with the Sultan's fear of Charles V. With all their forces, well-composed and organized, the Ottomans had been able to march into Hungary, even to Vienna, but, with the help of God, they had not been successful. The author underlines that that was a sort of message from God, a notice, for the Christian potentates to awaken and consolidate their powers instead of fighting with each other in their territories.

However, the author does not discuss the Ottoman expedition to Wallachia and the success at Prevesa, in autumn 1538. This leads the researcher to conclude that the text could be composed just before the war. On the other hand, the author could also remain intentionally blind to that since it refutes his arguments about the superiority of the Christians. Therefore, the author seems to insist on alerting the Christian milieu against the possible Ottoman attack in the future and to emphasize the importance of unifying their forces, probably under the command of Charles V, reflected as the most powerful rival of the Ottoman Sultan.

It can be argued that both the account of Spandugino and the anonymous chapter published by Sansovino use the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 and the attack on Corfu as a matter of propaganda for the unification of the Christian states against the Ottomans. Both of them offer the reader limited information, in some cases fantasies and rumors, about the events but portrait a glorified Christian success. The silence of the sources about the Ottoman-French alliance should also be evaluated within that perspective.

⁷⁴⁹ For further information about the expedition and the Ottoman initiatives towards the Indian Ocean, see: Salih Özbaran *Ottoman Expansion towards the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth Century*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), 80-92.

5.4. The Voice of a Seventeenth-Century Corfiot: Andrea Marmora and *Della Historia di Corfu*

To understand how the Ottoman military initiative of 1537 and the Attack on Corfu was evaluated in the Venetian atmosphere, it is important to listen to the story narrated by another Corfiot in the late seventeenth-century, who wrote the first book on the history of Corfu from the earliest times to the loss of Crete by Venetians to the Ottoman Empire in 1699: Andrea Marmora.⁷⁵⁰ Andrea Marmora, came from a noble Greek family, whose ancestors had been rewarded with governorships in Peloponnese early in the times of the imperial Byzantine Family of Komnenos. It is known that the family settled in Corfu in the late fifteenth-century and, by participating in governmental and military affairs in the island, it gradually became one of the most prominent Corfiot families in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although we don't have satisfactory information about the early life of Andrea Marmora, thanks to the brief chapter written by Cretan Vincenzo Mazzoleni about the Marmora family⁷⁵¹ we understand that he was well-educated and, as a noble Corfiot, he also undertook some governmental and military duties and obtained titles besides his dedication to literary works. He was also defined as an intellectual of his time.⁷⁵²

⁷⁵⁰ Andrea Marmora, *Della Historia di Corfu*.

⁷⁵¹ The short chapter about the Marmora Family written by Vincenzo Mazzoleni was published in the introduction of the book of Andrea Marmora. See, Marmora, x-xvi.

⁷⁵² Giuseppe Baretti, *The Italian Library Containing An Account of the Lives and Works of the Most Valuable Authors of Italy*, (London, 1757), 156.

Encouraged by his deep patriotism, Andrea Marmora undersigned his *Della Historia di Corfu* and offered it to the *Doge* and the Senate of the Venetian Republic. The book is composed of 8 separate books, chronologically discussing the historical periods of the Island from Antiquity to the seventeenth century. By evaluating the history of Corfu, Marmora intended to show how the Island, an ancient territory of the Eastern Romans, gradually became a loyal dominion to *Serenissima* and its being a key point in the Adriatic, between Latin West and Greek East or Venice and the Ottoman Empire due to its geographical position. In the book, Marmora demonstrates how Corfu was transformed into the new capital of the Venetian Levant after the Ottoman conquest of Crete in 1699. He tries to underline the ties between the Byzantine Greeks and Venetians and deals with the heroic, honored deeds of the Corfiot governing class. The book also contains a map of Corfu, a list of Corfiot noble families and several illustrations.

There is no accurate information about the sources that the author had consulted; however, taking into consideration his social status and ties with the local government of Corfu, including his desire for learning, it can be assumed that he was aware of the existing works on history, beside his personal knowledge coming from his family and traditions. On the other hand, Marmora's style of writing, his tendency towards inventing some details about the discussed subject and his intention of glorifying the Venetian Republic were criticized by subsequent authors.⁷⁵³ "But his work is quaintly written and he thoroughly reflects the feelings

⁷⁵³ Miller, 212. For example, Frances Maclellan notes the following: "I wish you understood Italian, were it only that you might read this book and amuse yourself with the simple, confiding character of its author. Do not you admire the manner in which he frequently breaks off the thread of his history, to apostrophize his heroes? Very often, too, he gives us, not only their speeches *that* any one might do, but even their very inmost thoughts." Frances Maclellan, *Sketches of Corfu: Historical and Domestic; Its Scenery and Natural Productions: Interspersed with Legends and Traditions*, (London: Smith, Elder and Co. Cornhill, 1835), 377.

of his class and era.”⁷⁵⁴ For that reason, the account of Marmora should be evaluated as an important source not only to follow the history of Corfu, and of Venice as well, but also decipher how it was being perceived and reflected in the late seventeenth century Corfiot/Venetian cultural atmosphere from the eyes of the nobility, the natural component of the administration.

The fifth book of *Della Historia di Corfu* deals with the consolidation of Venetian rule, the transformation of the administration and the establishment of Venetian aristocracy on the island. Concluding the discussion Marmora mentions that he briefly narrated this long period to settle the scene for the year of 1535, from when some deplorable catastrophes, which he was in great sorrow to remember, had started.⁷⁵⁵ Following such an impressive entry, Marmora introduces the most prominent political actors of the time: Süleyman, the Emperor of the Orient and Charles V, the Emperor of the Occident.⁷⁵⁶ He briefly notes the political and military rivalry between them, the struggle for Hungary, the Ottoman capture of Corone, Andrea Doria’s participation in the Habsburg forces and the Venetian desire of securing peace with the Ottomans, shaping the politics of the *Serenissima*.⁷⁵⁷ The author interestingly relates the events of 1537 with the death of İbrahim Pasha. Marmora defines the Pasha as “Turk” in appearance but internally Christian since he had been born among the Greeks and favored the things about the Christians. His death instigated the Ottomans and caused damage to the Christians.⁷⁵⁸ Another triggering factor underlined by the author is the conquest of Tunis by Andrea Doria.

⁷⁵⁴ Miller, 212-213.

⁷⁵⁵ Marmora, 286.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid, 287.

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid, 288.

Therefore, the Ottoman Sultan decided to initiate a campaign against Valona and Naples and then attacked the Island of Corfu.⁷⁵⁹

In the last pages of the fifth book, Marmora discusses the measures taken by the Venetian government, intending to remain outside the rivalry of the two potentates, for a potential attack. The defense lines of the Island were fortified and Girolamo Pesaro was charged with commanding the armada and he put two Corfiot galleys between Corfu and Cephalonia in order to observe the maneuvers of the Ottomans.⁷⁶⁰ He concludes the book by underlining that the Turks devastated and pillaged the island, but they could not be able to conquer it. Corfu should be perceived as a key point on the route to and from Venice and if, he points out, the Ottomans had been able to conquer the Island, they most probably would have entered into the Venetian lagoon.⁷⁶¹ By mentioning that, Marmora leads the reader to the sixth book, discussing the details of the war and “the cruelty of a mighty barbarian”.⁷⁶²

The sixth book starts with the Ottoman initiatives in Albania during the military campaign of 1537. The first deed of the Ottoman Sultan, camping in Valona, was to suppress the Himarans and conquering the lands they possessed.⁷⁶³ However, most of them escaped to the mountainous zones to secure themselves, and attacked the

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid, 289-290.

⁷⁶¹ Ibid, 291.

⁷⁶² Ibid.

⁷⁶³ Ibid, 293.

Ottoman soldiers leaded by Ayas Pasha and the Head of Janissaries: The result would not satisfy the Ottoman Sultan.⁷⁶⁴

While the land army was in Albanian territories, the Ottoman armada sailed into the Mediterranean. The vessels passed by the Riviera of Corfu, without facing with any difficulty or attack. The Venetian and Ottoman ships friendly saluted each other in a friendly fashion. He says, at first, nothing was abnormal; but no one could deeply trust in the peace, since the “barbarians” were generally unpredictable.⁷⁶⁵ Marmora points out that the armada of Süleyman was in the command of Lütü Pasha and the famous corsair Hayreddin Barbarossa. The armada reached the beaches of Otranto towards Taranto and disembarked soldiers for the siege of Castro, which was encouraged by Troilo Pignatello.⁷⁶⁶ They ruined the city and enslaved the citizens without respecting their ages, though they were liberated later by the Sultan.⁷⁶⁷

During the Ottoman attacks in Albania, Marmora underlines that an Ottoman ship, carrying munitions and not hauling the sails down, met a Dalmatian ship and because of the beardedness of the cannon of Corfu, the ship made sunk.⁷⁶⁸ The Ottoman government accused Venice about the incident, since the forces of Republic should control the ships on sea and guarantee the security of the Ottoman vessels according to the existing peace with the Porte.⁷⁶⁹ Marmora’s explanation about the Venetian

⁷⁶⁴ For the details about the Ottoman struggles with *Cimmeriotti*, see: Ibid, 293-294. Dealing with the subject, Marmora narrates an interesting story about a *Cimmerioto* spy, named Damiano, who penetrated through the Ottoman camp at night. Damiano was captured by the Ottomans and executed. Marmora mirrors him as a hero to be remembered by the *Cimmeriotti*. See: Ibid, 294-295.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid, 293.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid, 295.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid, 295-296.

attacks by the Venetian galleys and the capture of Yunus Bey, sent by the Sultan to Corfu after the aforementioned incident, echoes with the accounts of Longo and Paruta, discussed above.

Marmora also narrates the attacks of Andrea Doria, similar to Longo and Paruta: Andrea Doria, the “falcon of the sea” says the author, met 12 Ottoman cargo ships, coming from Alexandria. Following a bold and bloody conflict the ships were destroyed; only two of them ran away.⁷⁷⁰ “The events, supported by the Venetians though, since [they] had happened in their seas and near their lands, convinced Süleyman that the Republic had colluded with Doria and consequently with the Christian Emperor.”⁷⁷¹ Moreover, an Ottoman galley, under the command of Hasan Reis was asked to pay tribute and after the refusal, was attacked by the forces of Alessandro Contarini; 300 Janissaries died.⁷⁷²

On the other hand, the author mentions that Andrea Doria tried to convince the Republic to cooperate several times but his offers were refused by the government. During the conflicts at sea, a letter written by Doria to Admiral Pesaro offering the unification of the forces against the forces of Süleyman, was intercepted and deciphered by the Ottomans. This urged the Sultan to initiate the attack on Corfu.⁷⁷³

According to Marmora, the “Turks” attacked, burned and pillaged the lands of Naples, but they were not able to conquer the entire territory. Beside the aforementioned incidents, their incapability in Apulia also motivated the Sultan to

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid, 297.

⁷⁷¹ “*Avvenimenti, che, benché non fossero spagleggiati da’ Veneti, per esser fatti ne’ loro mari, e vicini a’ loro paesi, persuasero Solimano, che la Repubblica se l’intendesse co’l Doria, e in conseguenza con l’Imperator Christiano.*”, Ibid, 297.

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ Ibid, 298.

attack another territory of the Christians.⁷⁷⁴ Hayreddin Barbarossa first sought Doria and his forces, returning back to Messina; then turned back to Valona and encouraged the Sultan to attack the Venetians. Marmora interestingly underlines that Yunus Bey and Ayas Pasha had different opinions about breaking peace with the Venetians but Barbarossa affected the Sultan and after 3 days of political discussions Süleyman decided to attack the Island of Corfu, belonging to the Republic of Venice.⁷⁷⁵

At the same time, the island was prepared for the attack: five galleys were disarmed in order to fortify the castles and more than 300 houses were torn down to prevent the entrance of a land army. Not only the crew, but also the Corfiot men and women participated into the defense of their lands. They were organized under the command of noble colonels. Giacomo Novello, the captain, and Luigi da Riva, *provveditore straordinario*, were in charge of leading the military forces.⁷⁷⁶ The troops were led by Simone Leone and the sea fortresses were defended by Andrea Faliero. Moreover, Andrea Doria sent a letter to Pesaro and the Venetian Senate to unite the forces against the Ottomans. The Republic, in desiring the peace with the Ottoman Sultan, finally accepted that project in order to defend the Island.⁷⁷⁷ According to the plan, Pesaro near Corfu and Doria near Cephalonia would meet the Ottoman ships. The Dalmatian forces under the command of Giovanni Vitturi would also participate them.⁷⁷⁸

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid, 299.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid, 300.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid, 301.

However, the plan could not be realized, noted Marmora. The Venetian and Habsburg imperial forces got never united and faced the Ottomans. On August 25, the forces commanded by Hayreddin Barbarossa reached the shores of Corfu and the soldiers landed on beaches. The author expresses his wonder at why Pesaro did not assist the defense of the Island. According to him, with the imperial forces, the Christians would have the advantage in number and power; furthermore, the season had been complicating the camping of the Ottomans. Following his narration, one could easily understand that Marmora criticizes the attitude of the admirals leaving the island to their own struggle:

I want to persuade myself that they waited for the new reinforcements from Venice, or, they had been repairing the ships that had recently suffered the long resistance in the waters and the encounter with the galleys of the infidels, [...] I could not imagine laziness in a Captain, whose fame flatters on being determined in his magnanimous ventures.⁷⁷⁹

Marmora continues his narration with a vivid visualization of the Ottoman attacks: the forces of the Hayreddin Barbarossa were strengthened by the Sultan with the imperial ships located at Valona. Ayas Pasha was charged to command the attack and 25.000 Ottoman soldiers started to ruin the Island. The city and the Castle of Sant' Angelo were destroyed. Here the author accuses the Corfiot Governor of not effectively using the provisions and defending the castle.⁷⁸⁰ The city center was on fire and many people died. The author underlines how the Corfiots, men, women, even the children bravely participated in the defense of their own lands. Some of them were taken captive by the "Turks", but even in that condition, they refused to

⁷⁷⁹ *“Voglio persuadermi ch’egli aspettasse da Venetia nuovi rinforzi, ò che fusse astretto à racconciare i legni, c’havean patito non poco per la lunga dimora dell’acque, e nell’incontro con le galee infedeli, [...] non potendo immaginarmi pigrizia in un Capitano, cui la fama vanta di risoluto nelle sue magnanime imprese.”* Ibid, 301-302.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid, 303.

convert to Islam to secure their lives.⁷⁸¹ The Venetians did the same too. The defense of the island increased the tension and the “Turks” villainy stormed the city, cut the fruit trees, set all the houses on fire and captured all people of any age and sex that they had found.⁷⁸² During the siege of the main castle, people in the Church of Sant’Angelo had found a chance of rest and reorganization. Soon after they started to attack the Ottoman soldiers.

The defense was entirely commanded by Simon Leone and Luigi da Riva. Admiral Pesaro, although he had to move, did not assist the Corfiots. The author mentions that Pesaro declared that the Ottoman ships had already been in front of the island in order and fighting with them would be dangerous for the sake of his forces.⁷⁸³ Moreover, he should think of the Republic’s future and independence and other Venetian dominions such as Cyprus, Crete and Dalmatia. In case of defeat, they could have been under threat from the Ottomans. Marmora notes that the loss of Corfu to the Ottomans would both have opened the way for the Venetian lagoon and *terraferma* and been a new Ottoman base to attack Naples. His sentences clearly show that he criticizes the Venetian Admiral for his wrong, narrow-minded decision.⁷⁸⁴

Marmora related the defense and the Ottoman decision to withdraw, along with the brave, eager and honorable efforts of the Corfiots. Since the Ottomans could not easily finalize the conquest as they had envisioned, the change of the season and the

⁷⁸¹ Ibid, 304.

⁷⁸² Ibid, 305

⁷⁸³ Ibid, 306.

⁷⁸⁴ For further information about the reasoning of Pesaro and the criticisms of Marmora, see: Ibid, 306-307.

fatigue of the soldiers forced the Ottoman commanders to recommend to the Sultan to conclude the expedition. Especially Ayas Pasha, who had already opposed such a venture, asserted that the army should not waste more time. However, the Sultan did not want to retreat. Marmora quotes his sentences as following:

Could you say, from your heart, what the Christians will say? Süleyman was defeated by the Corfiots! I, [looking at] the face of Charles, took Buda, will I run away from Corfu? My glories sailing floods of praise, in one obstacle, will have broken, made you such a low failure? Will a small island have the praise of defeating the Signor of a world?⁷⁸⁵

According to the author, the principal reason for the Ottoman failure in Corfu was the defense of the Corfiots who did not surrender to the “Turkish menace”.⁷⁸⁶ The Ottomans had neither compassion nor fear; they were not afraid of the league, which united the Papacy, the Habsburg Emperor and the Venetians.⁷⁸⁷ However, they were not be able to take Corfu. A decisive attack of 15 days was just a simple show of the failure, itself. Taking into consideration that 15 years before the Ottoman Sultan conquered Rhodes, a stronger island in comparison to Corfu, one should admit that the Corfiots had a good reputation among other Christian in those years defending their fate.⁷⁸⁸ Here, the interesting point is that the author expresses all his comments through the oration of Ayas Pasha to Süleyman in order to convince him to return to Constantinople. Accordingly, he mentions that after having listened to Ayas Pasha, the Sultan decided to withdraw his forces from the island.⁷⁸⁹ Marmora concludes the

⁷⁸⁵ “*Che diranno, potea dir nel suo cuore, I Cristiani? Solimano vinto da 'Corciresi! Io, che in faccia di Carlo hò preso Buda, fuggirò da Corcira? Mie glorie, che solcaste un mare di lodi, in uno scoglio rompendovi, faceste così vile naufragio ? Un Isoletta si vanterà di havere fronteggiato il Signore di un mondo ?* » Ibid, 308-309.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid, 311.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid, 310-311.

⁷⁸⁹ For the details about the so-called address of Ayas Pasha to the Ottoman Sultan evaluating the Ottoman deeds in Corfu, which is voiced by Marmora, see: Ibid, 309-311

part about 1537 by discussing the reorganization of the city, new regulations and the trauma faced by the islanders. Moreover, he gives a list of the Venetian nobles having offices and houses in Corfu.

It can be argued that Andrea Marmora, the author of the first history of Corfu composed in the late sixteenth century, re-pronounced and, in a way, approves the views of Andronikos, witnessing the events. Marmora, using the advantage of his position within the political *milieu* of the Republic, seems to have gathered more data about the actual situation of the Venetian government, the measures taken, and the correspondences during the Ottoman attacks.

On the other hand, as Andronikos as did Marmora puts the Venetians under question by taking individual, narrow-minded decisions without considering the sake of Venetian subjects, facing the danger, more than the citizens in the lagoon. He clearly mentions that the island was made an open target of Ottoman fire, by the Venetian initiatives, which had encouraged the Sultan to attack a Venetian dominion, though he had not planned to at the very beginning. In that context, Girolamo Pesaro, not engaging into the defense of Corfu is sharply criticized.

Not only the Venetians, but also the Papacy and Andrea Doria, triggering the events with his deeds are criticized by the author. Doria is mentioned as he betrayed the Christianity, not only the Venetians, by not assisting the defense of the island. On the other hand the author is silent about the Ottoman-French alliance and the role of Francis I, in the outbreak of the wars in 1537, different than his former compatriot Andronikos.

Marmora, in his account, emphasises the importance of Corfu for Venice; according to him fall of Corfu would have brought about the fall of the lagoon. For that reason

he evaluated the defense as a victory, saving Venice too. As a Corfiot, Marmora deals with the events of 1537 in a more sentimental way than other sources. Both in his analysis, and in the scenes about the Ottoman attacks, it is possible to argue that the author incorporates his feelings in his studies.

5.5. Conclusion

The Venetian sources, deeply evaluated in this chapter, give detailed information about the Ottoman military initiative and attack Corfu of 1537. First of all, the sources provide the researcher with empirical data that can be verified by other examples and the documents of the time. From the numbers of soldiers and ships possessed by the forces to the main themes and balances in the actual politics, the authors draw an extended framework within which, to analyze the events. In that context, the Venetian sources fill in the blanks of the Ottoman narratives, especially in the analysis of international relations, and look at the events from a different angle.

On the other hand, the sources have some controversies. The numbers of vessels and soldiers possessed by the Ottoman Sultan differs in the accounts. As was demonstrated in the examples of the anonymous chapters and Marmora, in order to draw the reader's attention, the authors sometime invent stories about the events under discussion. For that reason, they should be compared and contrasted with each other and evaluated in the light of complementary materials.

Here, it should also be underlined that the identities and the socio-political positions of the authors shaped their accounts. The Corfiots, Andronikos and Marmora, discuss the events of 1537 while reflecting their feelings about their country and people. In

these texts, the criticisms of the authors concerning the Venetian politics and actors in the war come out clearly. On the other hand, as it was seen in the examples of Longo and Paruta, the sources, produced by Venetian citizens participating into the administration of the Republic give the researcher a more comprehensive analysis of the Venetian policies and the approach of the government to the current developments.

It is important to note that the accounts consulted in this chapter unanimously mention that the main motivation of the Ottoman Sultan in 1537 was to initiate a campaign against Apulia, under the domination of Charles V and against Albania, not against the Venetian Republic. The reason behind that decision was, by most of the authors, regarded as the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the sixteenth-century and Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburg. The Ottoman ideal of conquering Italy and the attempts in the past was also discussed in some sources. These support the main arguments of this dissertation.

As with the Ottoman sources, the Venetian accounts do not give details about the Ottoman deeds in Albania; it is only noted that a branch of the land army struggled with Himarans and Molosians, opposing the authority of the Sultan. The choice of Albania for the military camp of the Ottoman army was related by the authors with the region's vicinity to Apulia: Valona was the closest city to Apulia where the land army could reach, and from there the Ottomans aimed to realize the transportation of the soldiers into the Italian Peninsula on ships.

The sources are also silent about the French, during the campaign. The question of why the French did not initiate a campaign towards Milan, in accordance with the terms of alliance was not answered by the authors. Only Longo, Doglioni and Paruta

underline that in the process of the campaign a French captain participated with his forces in the Ottoman armada at Valona, only when the Ottomans were about to withdraw the attack. Therefore, as the Ottoman sources do, the Venetian sources confirm that the French forces had no role in the Apulian Campaign and in the Attack on Corfu, contrary to the claims of former academic studies on 1537.

The sources clearly demonstrate that the Venetians perceived the Ottoman Attack on Corfu as the direct result of the conflicts at sea between the Venetian and Ottoman ships. They indicate that the attacks of Doria were also perceived by the Ottomans, as the violation of the peace by the Venetians, since the Venetians ought to have secured the waters near to its possessions and assisted the Ottomans, by giving even necessary intelligence. In this regard, it has been stated that Doria's free moves within the Adriatic was evaluated as being with the connivance of the Venetians, allying with the Habsburg Emperor. The sources underline that that perception, reflected to the Sultan by his officers, especially by Barbarossa, persuaded him of the Venetian betrayal. In that context, it should be mentioned that the Venetian sources overlap with the Ottoman narratives.

The accounts of Longo, Doglioni and Paruta, on the other hand, display the presence of the discussions in the Venetian government on allying with the Emperor Charles V, rather than securing the peace with the Ottoman Sultan. However, all sources underline that the Republic had no intention, nor made any decision to break peace with the Ottomans. The orders of the government sent to the admirals and individual commanders about not violating the terms of peace could be shown as a proof of that argument. However, the Republic avoided from agitating the Habsburg Emperor as well; the sources unanimously agree on that reflecting the difficult position the Venetians found themselves in.

The chronicles portray neither the Ottomans nor the Venetians as having gained a victory in 1537. According to the authors, the successful defense in Corfu, not letting the Ottoman invasion succeed, made the Ottoman initiative an ineffective and misdirected adventure of the Ottoman Sultan, unable to read the conditions and power of his forces accurately. Most of them show Hayreddin Barbarossa as the chief protagonist of the invasion of Corfu, by manipulating the Sultan in terms of punishing the Venetians for their betrayal. On the contrary, Avas Pasha, the Grand Vizier, was reflected as a wiser commander, taking into consideration that the majority of sources indicate that the decision to withdraw was taken through Ayas Pasha's persuasion of Süleyman to limit further harm to the Ottoman army. The notes in the sources about the different opinions of Hayreddin Barbarossa and other Ottoman ruling elite about the war against the *Serenissima* and some authors' emphasizing on Barbarossa's "hate" of the Venetians are noteworthy too. In this context, it can be argued that the Venetian sources supported the argument that Barbarossa played the crucial role in convincing Süleyman for an attack on a Venetian key dominion and Corfu became a target by his recommendation. Although the Venetian sources did not indicate a concrete victory in 1537 for any war party, as they underline that the liberation of Corfu from the Ottoman invasion was celebrated in Venice as a victory. This shows that the Venetians found themselves successful as did the Ottomans, considering the course of the 1537 events.

The Venetian chronicles also demonstrate that the Ottoman Attack on Corfu created an atmosphere that supported the Venetian alliance with Charles V and the unification of the Christians against the Ottomans. As was seen in the accounts of Paruta, Spandugino and the anonymous chapter of Sansovino's book, the Ottoman attack was also portrayed as a sign for Christian states to unite against the common

enemy. These were also supported by some circulating prophecies, which portray the early-sixteenth century cultural atmosphere. The participation of the Serenissima in the league with the Papacy and Habsburg Emperor to re-encounter the Ottomans the following year should be evaluated as the direct outcome of the 1537, which led the Republic to re-position itself with the Christian powers against its traditional Muslim political and commercial partner.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has reconstructed the Ottoman military initiative of 1537, including the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and the Attack on Corfu, in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. By a comprehensive analysis, it is tried to demonstrate that the 1537 campaign should not be evaluated as an isolated Ottoman enterprise against Christian lands. On the contrary, the campaign was designed and perceived by the Ottoman administration as a significant step within the Ottoman grand strategy of the early sixteenth-century, grounded in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry over universal sovereignty. To decipher the significance of the campaign for the Ottomans, for the Habsburgs and for the Venetians, it is necessary to understand the origins and evolution of the rivalry between the first two, and how the third accordingly had to position itself. This dissertation contributes to earlier academic studies in the field by offering a detailed historical narrative of the 1537 Campaign, a task which has not been undertaken before, and by re-placing it into the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry as an important turning point in early sixteenth-century politics.

It has been demonstrated that the early sixteenth-century expectations of a political and spiritual renewal under the rule of a powerful monarch, ordained by God, and the prophecies about the End Time, circulating both in Muslim and Christian *milieux*, contributed the rise of Süleyman I and Charles V as protagonists for establishing a world empire, which would revive the Roman Empire under one faith and one rule. The imperial claims of both sovereigns made the Italian Peninsula, traditional center of the Roman Empire a target, heralding the universal supremacy for both of the sovereigns. Undertaking almost identical processes of consolidating their authority within their own realms and of building of the imperial images to justify their political and military deeds in their first years of reign, these two sovereigns appeared at several war theaters, challenging each other, as well as other states, to secure their political, territorial and economic interests. The almost life-long rivalry between Süleyman I and Charles V led to a complex political conjuncture, in which all crowned-heads and states of the time needed to enter entangled alliances with each other.

Accordingly, the Ottoman-Venetian relations and Ottoman-French political convergence in the early sixteenth-century has been evaluated as an Ottoman attempt to form an anti-Habsburg league, which would give Süleyman an upper hand for his personal struggle against his “mortal enemy”, Charles V. In this regard, it has been argued that the existing political, diplomatic and commercial relations between the Porte and the *Serenissima* gained momentum in the studied period, since the Republic of Venice was perceived by the Ottoman administration as the only state of the Italian peninsula resisting the Habsburg hegemony. Therefore, the Republic was politically supported and favored. The Venetian documents portray that the Ottomans even offered military support to the Republic against the Habsburg threat in the first

decades of the sixteenth-century. The Ottoman-French alliance should also be evaluated within this perspective. The rivalry between Charles V and Francis I, preventing an alliance against the Ottoman realm was beneficial to be supported in terms of the Ottoman imperial strategy. Moreover, the dissertation has asserted that the wars between two crowned-heads for the political domination in Italy gave Süleyman I an opportunity to interfere in the rivalry between Christian powers to further his claim to be the *Padişâh-ı rûy-ı zemîn* and *Zillullâh fi'l 'arz*. Thus, Süleyman, claiming to be the only monarch who would decide on the states and identifying himself as the sole inheritor of the Roman emperors, found a solid and legitimate ground for intervening the political turmoil in Italy.

By a brief discussion of the Ottoman policy towards Hungary and Ottoman initiatives against Austria, I have intended to delineate the Ottoman challenge to the rise of Charles V, by 1526. The invasion of Hungary, also perceived as the *Red Apple* by the Ottomans, gave the Sultan an upper hand for his desired world domination and by establishing suzerainty over Hungary, Süleyman intended both to create a buffer zone between Ottoman and Austrian Habsburg realms and to strengthen his image of Distributors of Crowns to the Monarchs of the World. The dissertation shows that the Hungarian campaigns of Süleyman were generally planned as responses to Charles V's deeds and were grounded by the French or Szapolyai's demands of assistance against Charles V or Ferdinand I. It should be also mentioned that, in each campaign the discourse of Sultan's being the only political and religious authority in the world was emphasized, as it has been observed by the example of the splendid regalia and display of power, decorated by the imperial symbolisms during the German Expedition of Süleyman in 1532. This also supports that in the early sixteenth-century, the Ottoman imperial strategy was not

alienated from the discourses, perceptions, symbolisms of the west; on the contrary, it was an amalgamation of Islamic, Near Eastern and Roman traditions and challenged the Habsburg Emperor by using the power representation and imperial symbols of his world.

On the other hand, it has also been stated that the priorities of Süleyman I and Charles V were different from each other. Unlike Süleyman I's aggressive policy of expansion in his early years or reign, Charles V prioritized suppressing the French and Protestant challenge, breaking his authority in his hereditary lands in the Italian peninsula and in traditional Habsburg territories of Austria and Germany. The pacification of Italy was crucial for the Emperor to consolidate his authority. Therefore, the discourse of a new crusade against the Ottomans to restore the Christian rule in Constantinople and in Jerusalem was mainly used as a mean of propaganda. His conquest of Tunis in 1535 strengthen his image of *Defensor Fidei* and revived the hopes of Papacy for a new crusade. However, it has been claimed that his initiative was merely defensive, realized to secure the Italian and Iberian shores from further Ottoman attacks. His reluctance, or inability, to resist the Ottoman initiatives in Hungary, which had even threatened Vienna, supports that, for Charles V, facing the challenges within Christendom was more important than a direct struggle with the Ottoman threat.

I have argued that the Ottoman military initiative against Italy was led by Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and it was realized in 1537 because of the unsuccessful Ottoman attempts to invade Vienna and to secure Tunis as an important naval base for further moves. Vienna was targeted to challenge Charles V in the traditional lands of his dynasty and it was perceived to be a stepping stone for Ottoman penetration in Italy.

The Ottoman failure in Vienna, and Andrea Doria's occupation of Corone transferred the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry to the western Mediterranean from Central Europe and led to the incorporation of the Ottoman corsairs into the Ottoman imperial navy, as well as to the rise of another important figure, who would play instrumental role in the Ottoman decision making processes: Hayreddin Barbarossa. Ottoman collaboration with the corsairs operating in North Africa and the rise of Barbarossa should be evaluated as the requirements of the Ottoman imperial strategy focusing on dominating the Western Mediterranean.

In this context, the dissertation also examined the nature of the galley warfare. As was stated before, galley, carrying soldiers and guns to the targeted zones, was the most important component of the sixteenth-century navies. Considering its operation capacity and logistical needs, galleys need to touch shore frequently. This required a secure and fortified naval base, close to the desired targets, for the galley fleets of the states. Accordingly, the dissertation has underlined that the shift of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry to the Western Mediterranean grounded the need for a fortified and secure naval base for the imperial fleet, which would also facilitate further imperial enterprises in the Mediterranean and in Italy against the Habsburgs. Therefore, Barbarossa's earlier attempts of attacking on Apulia and Tunis should be evaluated as the natural consequence of the requirements of the galley operations.

As discussed, the military failure in 1529 and in 1532 and the loss of Tunis led the Ottomans to prioritize a new project in which they would cooperate with another anti-Habsburg political figure, Francis I, the French King. The Ottoman-French alliance for a joint campaign in Italy, on which both parties had agreed in 1536, mainly planned to be an invasion of the Charles V's territories in Lombardy and

Apulia. By such an operation, the French would have the opportunity to control Milan, over which Francis I had been claiming to inheritance and the Ottomans would penetrate into the Neapolitan realm of Apulia that they had already invaded in 1480. The joint campaign, proposed to the Ottoman Sultan by the French King, intended to divide the Habsburg defense in Italy into two separate fronts and would challenge the Emperor's authority in Italy. Furthermore, the Ottomans could have also control a naval base in southeastern Italian shores, facilitating further initiatives. It has been also demonstrated that the Apulian campaign was planned as a military initiative, directly led by Süleyman, himself, which would be the Sultan's response for the Habsburg conquest of Tunis in 1535 that was personally commanded by Charles V.

Furthermore, the dissertation has offered new interpretation on the question of why the Ottomans agreed on the aforementioned plan, proposed by the French King. It have been suggested that evaluating the Apulian Campaign in the context of Ottoman grand strategy of the early sixteenth-century helps the researcher to decipher the main motivation of the Ottomans in 1537. Therefore, the dissertation has correlated the Apulian Campaign with the Ottoman policy towards Hungary and has asserted that Süleyman mainly intended to establish some sort of suzerainty in Apulia, like he already did in Hungary, to facilitate further operations in Italy, which would give the Ottomans an upper hand to enlarge its sphere of influence in the peninsula. The Neapolitan *fuoriusciti*, hosted by the imperial navy in the course of campaign and the use of an effective number of soldiers during the invasion support this argument. Considering the French claims of inheritance to the Kingdom of Naples, it has also been argued that, by having the support of the aforementioned Neapolitans, suffering from the Habsburg taxation and seeking the Sultan's assistance, Süleyman might

have intended to control the region and to leave it under the control of Francis I, who would be forced to act as an Ottoman vassal king in Italy. The dissertation has argued that the Ottomans, knowing well their military and financial resources, as well as the logistical capacities and the current socio-political conditions of the time, might have been aware that they could not control Apulia for extended periods; therefore, collaborating with the French might have been more beneficial for the Empire.

In this context, it was evaluated that the Apulian Campaign in 1537 turned to another military fiasco for the Ottomans, since the French had no show in Italy contrary to the original plan and the Ottomans were not able to control Apulia by breaking the strong defense, as it had intended. Moreover, by indicating that the French fleet, under the command of Baron of St. Blancard reached Valona by early September, the dissertation has also challenged earlier studies arguing that the French fleet assisted the Ottoman forces in 1537. The dissertation has shown that the absence of French changed the course of the Ottoman campaign. The Habsburg defense could not be divided into two different fronts and the Ottomans were not be able to establish the French in Apulia as an Ottoman vassal. Moreover, the struggles at war between the Ottoman, Doria's and Venetian ships resulted in losses of a significant amount of provision and munitions for the Ottomans. As revealed by the contemporary chronicles, the Habsburgs were also able to open a new war theater in Bosnia. Instead of the Habsburgs, the Ottomans had to struggle with the attacks in different fronts. Therefore, the Ottoman attacks in Apulia remained as the attempts of spoiling and plundering, instead of being a permanent invasion of the region.

The narrative of the campaign clearly demonstrates that, in 1537, Charles V pursued again a defensive policy. The Habsburg forces did not initiate an offensive to the ones of the Ottomans. Even Doria's attack was a sneak night raid on the Ottoman forces alienated from the main corps of the fleet. The sources also show that the attack was not intended by Doria himself, it was merely realized by his cousin Antonio. Moreover, apart from supporting the region's defense by more Spanish soldiers, Charles V did not personally intervene with the defense of Apulia. The defense was left to the local governors of the Kingdom of Naples and in order not to harm the imperial armada, Doria preferred to wait at Messina. On the other hand, I have argued that this wait and see tactic and the clever timing for an attack on the Ottoman ships resulted in a significant success for the Habsburgs: the Ottomans turned the fire towards Venetian Corfu, accusing them for letting Doria to harm the Ottoman forces. This was perceived by the Ottomans a clear evidence for the secret alliance between the *Serenissima* and the Habsburg Emperor. While the Ottomans were intending to divide Habsburg forces into two fronts of struggle, by the attacks, the Habsburgs were able to change the course of war, led the Ottoman-Venetian encounter and secured their Neapolitan realm.

I have argued that the 1537 Campaign targeted mainly Apulia. Broadly, it has also challenged the former studies on 1537 Campaign, tending to reflect the main target of the Ottoman military initiative as the Venetian Corfu by taking into consideration the island's strategic location for being a secure and fortified naval base for the Ottoman fleet and to evaluate the attack as a preparative for the invasion of Italy. It has been stated that, even the strategic importance of Corfu had already been recognized by the Ottomans, the Attack on Corfu in 1537 was not specifically designed as a preparative for the invasion of Italy and was not intended to be

captured by Süleyman I even in the eve of the campaign. On the other hand, I have evaluated the Attack on Corfu as the direct outcome of the tension between the Porte and the *Serenissima*. By discussing the Venetian politics in face to the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, I have discussed that, especially after 1532, the Republic started to pursue a more cautious policy towards the Ottomans and pro-Habsburg advocates became more visible and effective within the Venetian government. Venetian neutrality in face to Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and its refusal to take an active part in the Ottoman-French alliance created suspicions in the Ottoman administration and Venetians were perceived as being in secret alliance with the Emperor. Although the suspicions did not result in a military encounter before 1537, the Venetian attacks on the Ottoman ships during the campaign led the Ottoman Attack on Corfu in 1537, which was perceived by the Ottoman Sultan and the ruling-elite as the Ottoman response for “misbehaving” of the Venetians. Accordingly, I have underlined that Corfu was not the main target of Süleyman in 1537 and I have supported this argument with the information given by the Ottoman and Venetian contemporaries and their views on 1537.

Accordingly, the dissertation has also delineated how the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu were narrated in both the Ottoman and the Venetian chronicles, to not only support its main arguments, but also reveal the perceptions of both parties, in two individual chapters. It has been stated that the Ottoman and the Venetian chronicles complete each other. The chronicles also reflect the political tension between the states. On the other hand, Venetian chronicles insistently note the Venetian government’s desire of securing peace with the Ottoman Sultan and evaluated the Venetian attacks on Ottoman ships in the course of the Apulian Campaign as the personal initiatives of individual commanders who transgressed the

strict orders of the Republic's government. In this context, the ones, who put Corfu in the Ottoman fire are reflected by the Venetian sources as the disobedient captains, not the Republic's policies.

I have argued that the Attack on Corfu should be evaluated as an important turning point in the Ottoman-Venetian relations since the Ottoman attack supported the pro-Habsburg tendencies in the Venetian administration and led the establishment of the Venetian alliance with the Papacy and the Habsburg Emperor against the Ottomans, for the first time after the Ottoman-Venetian peace of 1503. Although, Hayreddin Barbarossa would overwhelm the allied forces at Prevesa, the following year and the Republic would restore the peace with the Ottomans by the *ahidnâme* of 1540, Venice would gradually lose its influence in the Ottoman politics in favor of the French. This process would enter in a new phase with Ottoman-French further joint attacks against the Habsburgs and the French would rise as the most important Christian ally of the Ottoman Sultan, economically privileged and favored, as well as being the active representative and protector of the rights of Christians, residing within the Ottoman realm. In this context, I have asserted that the Ottoman Attack on Corfu meant more for Ottoman-Venetian relations, besides being a spark kindling 34 years of peace.

This dissertation has produced a comprehensive narrative of the Ottoman Apulian Campaign and Attack on Corfu in 1537 in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and has offered new interpretations of the Ottoman policies in the early sixteenth-century. However, it should be underlined that this dissertation has been framed mainly by Ottoman and Venetian chronicles and has intentionally focused on only the Ottoman deeds in Apulia and the Attack on Corfu. The Ottoman initiatives in

Albania, the socio-political factors leading the Ottomans to take measures to consolidate the imperial control in the region exceed the scope and the limits of the present work. Therefore, the arguments stated and supported in this dissertation need to be elaborated by further archival evidence and also by investigating chronicles that reflect the Habsburg and French points of view. Moreover, a comprehensive study on the Ottoman Albanian policy might also merit further research to complete the portrait drawn by this dissertation.

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APPENDICES

A. Glossary

Ağa (ott.): Civil or military leader. Head of Janissaries. (*Yeniçeri Ağası*)

Ahidnâme (ott.): The letter of privileges and safe conducts granted by the Sultan to a non-Muslim community or state.

Bailo¹ (ve.): Venetian resident ambassador in Constantinople. Beside his diplomatic mission, the *bailo* was also the official head of the Venetian community living in Constantinople, responsible to protect the commercial and judicial rights of the Venetians.

Bailo² (ve.): Venetian governor in the Venetian dominions of the Ionian Islands.

Barça (ott.)/ Barca-Barza (ve.): War ship usually needed to be accompanied by transports composed or larger units for logistical purposes.

Bastarda (it.): Larger galleys reserved for the fleet's commander.

Bey (ott.): Title used for ones having offices in the administration or governors of the Ottoman districts.

Beylerbeyi (ott.): Governor-general of Ottoman provinces.

Capitano Generale del Mare (it.): Chief Commander at Sea, charged to command the entire Venetian naval forces at war.

Condottiere (it.): Mercenary captain/commander hiring a group of soldiers. Most of the Italian states enriched their military forces with *condottieri*.

Consiglio dei Dieci (it.): Council of Ten. Venetian governing body responsible from the security of the Republic.

Çavuş (ott.): Military officer.

Corte (sp.): Council.

Dârü'l-Harb (ott.): The territories not under the rule of Islam, which the Ottomans would introduce the Muslim rule by conquests.

Divân-ı Hümayûn (ott.): Ottoman Imperial Council.

Doge (ve.): Duke. The head official of the Republic of Venice, who was elected for life.

Enderûn (ott.): The palace school situated in Topkapı Palace

Fetihnâme (ott.): Imperial letters announcing a conquest of war success.

Fuoriusciti (it.): Neapolitan rebels, against the Habsburg authority, in exile.

Fusta (it.): Narrow, light and fast ship with shallow draft/small galley.

Galiotta (it.): Small galleys, mostly preferred by corsairs.

Kethüda (ott.): Chamberlain

Nişancı (ott.): Court calligrapher or sealer and the original duty of the nişancı was to seal royal precepts. Nişancı is a high post in the Ottoman bureaucracy.

Moriscos (sp.): Iberian Muslims forced to convert to Christianity.

Oratore (it.): Orator. Extraordinary envoys sent for a specific mission.

Reisü'l-Küttâb (ott.): Head of Scribes. It was a high post in Ottoman Bureaucracy.

Sancak (ott.): Ottoman province.

Sancakbeyi (ott.): Governor of Ottoman sancak.

Schirazzo (ve?): Small cargo ship with rectangular sail, used in 16th century.

Serenissima (it.): The Most Serene. The term is used to refer to the Republic of Venice since its official name was *la Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia*.

Stato da Màr (ve.): Venetian colonies of the Ionian Islands.

Presidios (sp.): Spanish garrisons in North Africa.

Procuratore di San Marco (it.): The second important office in the Venetian administration, responsible from the administration of St. Mark Basilica.

Provveditore (it.): Governor.

Provveditore Generale (it.): Supreme Governor.

Relazione (it.): The reports of the Venetian baili on the states, where had been stayed for their diplomatic missions. The reports were read before the Venetian Senate.

Reis (ott.): Captain of galley, or a personal fleet.

Terraferma (it.): Venetian territories outside of the lagoon city of Venice.

Vezir (ott.)/Vizier (eng.): Sultan's minister, being the member of the Ottoman Imperial Council. The Grand Vizier was the most important authority after the Sultan, heading of the Imperial Council, by the name of the Sultan.

B. Map 1



C. Map 2

