DETERRITORIALISATION OF IMAGE:

MAPPING OUT NEW MEDIA

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

GRAPHIC DESIGN

AND THE INSTITUTE OF FINE ARTS

OF BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF FINE ARTS

By

Bican Polat

July, 2003

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.

…………………………..

Zafer Aracagök (Principal Advisor)

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.

…………………………..

Asst. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.

…………………………..

Asst. Prof. Andreas Treske

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.

…………………………..

Asst. Prof. Dr. Trevor Hope

Approved by the Institute of Fine Arts

…………………………..

Prof. Dr. Bülent Özgüç, Director of the Institute of Fine Arts

ABSTRACT

DETERRITORIALISATION OF IMAGE:

MAPPING OUT NEW MEDIA

Bican Polat

M.F.A. in Graphic Design

Supervisor: Zafer Aracagök

July, 2003

This study endeavours to elaborate the possibilities that new media would have within the practice of art. Diverging from the pre-existing media, new media emerges as being based on the idea of digitisation. Depending upon the principles of variability and modularity it retains the capacity to link documents, images, sounds and texts in a variety of non-linear paths. The study aims to elaborate on new media within the context of Deleuzian "logic of multiplicities".

Key words: New Media, Digitality, Digital Art, Deleuze

ÖZET

İMGENİN YERTSİZYURTSUZLAŞTIRILMASI:

YENİ MEDYAYI HARİTALANDIRMAK

Bican Polat

Grafik Tasarım Bölümü

Yüksek Lisans

Tez Yöneticisi: Zafer Aracagök

Temmuz, 2003

Bu çalışma yeni medyanın sanat pratiği içinde sahip olabileceği olanakların ayrıntılandırılmasını amaçlamıştır. Daha önceki medyanın biçimlerinden farklılaşan yeni medya sayısallaştırma fikri üzerine kurulu olarak belirir. Değişkenlik ve modülerlik ilkelerine dayanarak çok sayıda doküman, imge, ses ve metni lineer olmayan çeşitli yollarla bağlama yetisine sahiptir. Bu çalışma yeni medyanın Deleuze'ün "çokluklar mantığı" bağlamında geliştirilmesini amaçlamıştır.

Anahtar Sozcükler: Yeni Medya, Sayısallık, Sayısal Sanat, Deleuze

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, there appears a great deal of discussions about whether the 'new media technologies' create a space for art making or not. In other words, the question is: does the notion of 'new media' extend its limits to where it refers not only to design application or programming but also to a certain kind of artistic activity? All computerized processes, including internet applications, web sites, computer multimedia, digital imaging etc. offers a variety of handling, storing and manipulating images, texts and sound. But the question is whether this 'new terrain' with its multitude of techniques and freedom would provide us with the tools for artistic image production.

However, the question begs the other ones. First of all, in order to have a better understanding of theory and practice of new media, we should ask what the characteristics that determine the emergence of it in our era are. This question will eventually lead us to think the relevance of the 'new media' within the context of painting, photography and cinematography.

Painting, understood traditionally, aims at the representation of nature or human beings employing various techniques of figural composition, contour and color combinations. Photography seems to keep that representative nature while adopting a chemical process which is determined according to the contrast of light. In both practices, the image is determined by a single pose which serves as

an immobile section. Moreover, photographic image has been declared to capture 'reality'.

In the twentieth century, the emergence of cinematography provided the mobility of the image while maintaining its ability to represent that 'reality'. Employing the same chemical process of photography, cinema has also the capacity to record movement. And finally, in the second part of the century it can store and manipulate images with sound. Although new media puts into practice the various techniques from each, it has itself a genuine difference. That is the computable nature of any information it possesses.

In other words, new media is solely based on the principle of translating all existing media into numerical data. It provides the integration of data, text, images and sound within a single information environment. Technological developments such as fast microprocessors, high-resolution screens, audio and video digitising and compression techniques enabled new media to store and manipulate information of any kind. That is why, in "*The Language of The New Media*" Lev Manovich asserts that we are in the middle of a new media revolution. He defines this revolution as "the shift of all culture to computer-mediated forms of production, distribution and communication"(Manovich 19).

Thus, the key concept behind new media may be posed as digitisation. It is the conversion of image, text, and sound to numbers. From this it follows that all existing media forms can be translated into digits in order to be manipulated by a

computer. Seen from that aspect, new media seems to challenge our notions of 'reality', 'representation', 'space' and 'time'. Employing new techniques of obtaining and manipulating images or sounds, it attacks on the always-already pre-supposed opposition of 'the model' and 'the copy'. Unlike old media which works with the notion of 'original', new media deals with copies of information which can be reproduced infinitely.

What we are face to face is another level of reality, with its folded arrangements and complicated relations. This peculiar universe is no more like the one once we had. Hence, we are confronted with a new way of looking and interpreting the phenomena. For this reason, the first point of my thesis will be to interrogate in what ways 'new media' forces us to think and act differently.

Throughout the thesis, I will try to establish connections - but not interpretations - with Deleuzian 'logic of multiplicities'. According to him a multiplicity is not what has many parts, but what is complicated or folded many times. For Deleuze, then, to think in terms of multiplicities is to think with such complexity. And to think in terms of multiplicities is to connect. Hence, my aim will be to have a map of new media in terms of "plateaus into which conceptual pieces enter or settle along the web of their interrelations"(Rajchman 21).

The second point of the thesis will be to ask if it is possible to extract a certain kind of 'artistic language' from this ever-changing terrain of new media technologies. In other words, I will put into question the possibility of the work

of art within 'new media'. By contemplating on painting and cinematography, I will try to map out resonances and interferences which new media would have with these distinct fields.

In *Cinema: The Movement-Image*, Deleuze argues that, understood as a system of representation, cinema appeals to the conventional division of subject and object or spectator and image. However, he puts it forward as a plane of immanence on which image and thought merge. This is a virtual plane, which is composed of incorporeals, namely, events and singularities. Likewise, in *Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation* he discusses how Bacon, opposing the narrative and representative elements in painting, creates that plane of immanence in the canvas.

I will argue that, in a similar way, being relieved from the representation of the images of visible 'reality', 'new media' posesses the power to experiment and search for new possibilities of diverse forms. For Deleuze, to connect is to work with other possibilities, not already given. Hence, he would say that to think is to experiment. To experiment is to connect, and to connect is to affirm. Indeed, this is what Manovich thinks that Vertov did in cinema and that the new media artist have to learn: "how to merge database and narrative into a new form"(Manovich xxviii).

In both volumes of *Cinema*, Deleuze employs Bergsonian thesis about movement as a tool for extending his philosophy. The main point of Bergson in articulating this thesis was to outline a new ontology concerning the becoming of things.

However, Deleuze applied it to cinematography and redefined the cinematographic image within that conceptualisation. But still, Deleuze's interest was philosophical. In an interview which is published in 1986 *in Cahier du Cinema* he says "I was able to write about cinema, not because of some right consideration, but because philosophical problems compelled me to look for answers in the cinema…"(Flaxman 367).

Thus, besides being consisted of a taxonomy of images, the two volumes of *Cinema I-II* (1983-1985) traces a philosophical trajectory which is co-existent with Deleuze's oeuvre that can be traced back to *Bergsonism* (1956). Likewise, beside praising the paintings of Bacon, his aim in *Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation* (1981) is to work out the kinds of relations philosophy would have with art.

Similarly, I will try to extend his way of thinking to the terrain of new media. Investigating the possibilities of this terrain, I will contemplate upon Deleuzian logic of multiplicities. For to connect is to think and to think is to experiment. As Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta mention in the translation of Cinema II, The Time-Image: "philosophy itself is not a reflection on an autonomous object but a practice of creation of concepts, a constructive pragmatism" (*Cinema II* xv).

Throughout my thesis, I shall simply follow the trajectory of Deleuzian thought in order to evaluate the interest of cinematography, painting and finally 'new media'. As mentioned above, this paper has two distinct intentions, which will be

mapped out regarding the 'resonances' and 'interferences' they constitute with each other. To put it in other words, my main attempt will be to pose 'new media' as a terrain that the conditions under which something new, yet unthought, will arise. Once having put the new ways of thinking that accompany this terrain, we may now pose 'new media' as a space for art making - a space which is pregnant to new forces not already contained in it.

However, I will not attempt to give a historical account of new media technologies. Though it is highly important to map out how digital media developed from the old media within a historical course, in my thesis, I will limit my study to a specific extent, in which I will be developing some basic contemporary concepts. In this sense, instead of following the progress and innovations which took place within the last decade of the twentieth century, I prefer to adopt a synchronic approach that aims at a general view of contemporary digital media.

Also, I will not be investigating the technical aspects. Not only because that will require expertise and adequacy in computer science and engineering but also because of a right consideration in order not to lose the focus. Such an attempt will exceed the limits of this work which aims to end up in a philosophical survey rather than an utter disorder.

Since the scope of this rapidly expanding field shows a variety of applications from hypertext and multimedia systems, internet and on-line documentation to

information architecture, interface design, digital imaging, 3-D modelling etc., I will not be dealing with each one by one. For the sake of brevity and intensity, I will take some basic notions into consideration and elaborate them.

In the first chapter, which is called 'Cinema and Representation', I will discuss cinematography within a Deleuzian perspective. The first part of this chapter gives a brief account of Bergson's philosophy of becoming. According to Bergson, movement is distinct from the space covered. Moreover, he argues that movement cannot be reconstituted by adding immobile sections. Such an attempt will end up in illusion. Indeed, this is the reason why Bergson sees cinematography as reproducing the illusion.

The second part involves the transformation of Bergsonian account of cinema. Adopting the philosophy of becoming which is introduced by Bergson, Deleuze attempts to reconsider cinematic image. For Deleuze, cinema does not constitute movement by adding immobile sections. Instead, the cinematic image consists of mobile sections.

The third part is about the conclusions of this transformation. Deleuze argues that within that moving image, which is a concrete intermediary, we confront with a peculiar perception of time and its effects on thought. The cinematic image gives us a plane of multiplicities where events, forces and singularities emerge. Rather than being exposed to representation of bodies and things, we become acquainted with new ways of thinking about the reality of becoming.

The second chapter is about the painting's of Francis Bacon. I will discuss how Deleuze connects the art of Bacon to his own way of philosophising. In his attempt to escape from the figurative and representative elements of traditional painting, Bacon accomplishes to create the same plane of multiplicities in his canvas. By employing special techniques of asignifying traits and wiping-off, he ends up in Figure, the non-figurative deformed body.

The body, being isolated within the field, begins to lose its contour. It dissipates into the field. Hence, we are confronted with forces. Revealing the forces that are exerted upon this Figure Bacon takes us to the realm of sensations. This is where we become face to face with becomings and multiplicities. Similarly, within this plane we are granted with new ways of thinking about movement and transformation.

Finally, in the third chapter, I will discuss new media within this Deleuzian 'logic of multiplicities'. In the first part I will map out some basic tendencies within the topography of new media technologies. I will refer to Lev Manovich's book in order to set out some basic principles. Though, my attempt will not be to adopt these principles as absolute definitions. My aim will be just to map out some tendencies.

However, Manovich's fifth principle of cultural transcoding seems problematic. I will argue that it is based on the assumption of a duality between the real and the

virtual. Therefore, I will refer to Deleuze, in order to get rid of this dichotomy. Elaborating on how new media objects differentiate from the structural computer programs, I will try to display the rhizomic structure of new media.

Afterwards, I will elaborate the principles of variability and modularity within the context of Deleuzian thought. I will discuss the notions of database, interface, algorithm and hypernarrative coextensively with Deleuzian notions, such as plane of immanence, body-without-organs, forces, events, multiplicities. Hence, new media appears as the actualization of universal transformation and change. It is in this sense that it may be seen as the affirmation of Deluzian philosophy of becoming.

Lastly, I will discuss the structure of web within the context of its non-hierarchical organization. I will put forward the open nature of the web as that which enables us to establish new connections and arrangements within the global network. Instead of being created by a single author, web applications appears as domains which involve collaboration and interactivity. Seen from that aspect, web emerges as a labyrinth with forking paths. Breaking with the linearity, it involves an open flow of ideas and information within the network.

2 CINEMA AND REPRESENTATION

In *Cinema: The Movement-Image*, Gilles Deleuze writes about three levels of Bergsonian thesis about movement. The main theme of the thesis is to distinguish between particular sets of things and the whole. According to Bergson, a set of things may contain very diverse elements but it is relatively closed or artificially limited. This is the first level. It concerns the sets or closed systems, which are defined by discernible objects and distinct parts.

But the whole is of a different nature. It ranges over all sets of things. It relates to time and for Bergson time is the Open. It is the whole, which is not any set of things but the passage from one set to another. It is what is constantly changing in nature. This is the third level, namely, the duration or the whole as a spiritual reality that constantly changes according to its own relations.

In between these levels there appears the second one. It is the movement of translation, which is established between these objects and modifies their respective positions. It is the transformation of one set of things into another. According to Deleuze, the Bergsonian thesis about movement is best understood in cinematography. "There are, as it were, three coexisting levels in cinematography: framing, which defines a provisional artificially limited set of things; cutting, which defines the distribution of movement or movements among the elements of the set; and then this movement reflects a change or variation in the whole, which is the realm of montage" (*Negotiations* 55).

For this reason, he thinks that it is an interesting coincidence that cinema appeared at the very time philosophy was trying to think motion. Hence, Bergsonian philosophy might have been trying to put motion into thought. In order to reveal the nature of this new way of thinking, I will elaborate some basic concepts of this thesis.

2.1 Bergsonian Thesis on Movement

2.1.1 Movement and Instant

Bergson's philosophy emphasizes the primacy of process and change rather than beings and things. He sees the objects as the snapshots of a flux, that is, duration. And this time or duration cannot be comprehended as dense set of instants. Similarly, change or movement cannot be posed as the world's being in different states at different instants.

According to Bergson, movement is distinct from the space covered. There is always a distinction between a movement and its trajectory. The movement is essentially unitary and indivisible. It cannot be constituted by adding instants to each other. Moreover, Bergson argues that movement is a qualitative whole and therefore it cannot be divided without changing qualitatively. The space covered is past and movement is present. This is why we may argue that the space covered is divisible while movement is indivisible. Deleuze states that "the spaces

covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, whilst the movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves" (*Cinema I* 1). Hence, the first part of Bergson's argument about movement is that it cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided.

According to the second part of the thesis, movement cannot be reconstituted with positions in space or instants in time. For Bergson, such an apprehension will be based on an illusion, that is, the assumption of an abstract idea of a succession, of a time that is mechanical and homogeneous. According to him, we can only achieve such a reconstitution by adding this abstract idea to the instants and positions. In other words, Bergson tries to assert that regardless of how much we divide space, movement will always occur in concrete duration.

"And thus you miss the movement in two ways. On the one hand, you can bring two instants or two positions together to infinity; but movement will always occur in the interval between the two, in other words behind your back. On the other hand, however much you divide and subdivide time, movement will always occur in a concrete duration (durée); thus each movement will have its own qualitative duration. Hence we oppose two irreducible formulas: 'real movement – concrete duration', and 'immobile sections + abstract time' (*Cinema I* 1)".

2.1.2 Movement and Change

According to Bergson, movement is the mobile section of duration, namely, the Whole. In other words, it is the change in duration or in the whole. He argues that each time there is a translation of parts in space, there is also a qualitative change in a whole. "When Achilles overtakes the tortoise, what changes is the state of the whole which encompassed the tortoise, Achilles, and the distance between the two. Movement always relates to a change, migration to a seasonal variation. And this is equally true of bodies: the fall of a body presupposes another one which attracts it, and expresses a change in the whole which encompasses them both" (*Cinema I* 8).

Moreover, Bergson thinks that, this duration or the whole is neither given nor giveable. It is not giveable because it is the Open. Hence, duration implies a whole which is changing and which is open somewhere. Its nature is to change constantly or to give rise to something new. And, the whole is defined by Relation. Relation is not the property of objects but what is external to its terms. Thus, we may say that, duration is the whole of relations. Through relations the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively.

Unlike the sets, which are artificially closed, the whole is that which is Open. Since real whole cannot be divided without changing qualitatively at each stage of division, it is an indivisible continuity. In other words, the sets are in space, and the whole is the duration itself. " 'Immobile sections plus abstract time'

refers to closed sets whose parts are in fact immobile sections, and whose successive states are calculated on an abstract time; while 'real movement-concrete duration' refers to the opening up of a whole which endures, and whose movements are so many mobile sections crossing the closed systems" (*Cinema I* 10).

Henceforth, Bergson would say that there are not only instantaneous images; immobile sections of movement but there are movement-images, which are mobile sections of duration. These mobile sections of duration are what constitute the essential element of reality. And intuition is the faculty that gives us this essential element of reality. Any other attempt that tries to constitute the movement with immobile sections will reproduce an illusion.

It is in this sense; Bergson argues that cinema gives us a false movement. It gives us an immobile section plus abstract movement. For this reason, he sees cinematography as the perfected apparatus of the oldest illusion about movement. According to Bergson, cinematography reproduces this illusion because it works with immobile sections, that is, twenty-four still images per second. He thinks that what we see in the screen is a continuous movement, which is constituted by adding an abstract succession to immobile instants.

2.1.3 Bergson and Cinematography

Bergson's philosophy is based upon the epistemological duality of intellect and intuition. According to him, everything in the universe is in constant flux. So "movement is reality itself" (*Creative Evolution* 169). In order to attain the essential knowledge about the universe we should apprehend things not in stability but in mobility, namely, in their becomings. And this reality can only be grasped by intuition. Only by intuition we can apprehend the essential element of reality, duration. Intuition is the faculty to understand the flux of reality. It is the process employed in order to study movement, change and becoming.

Intuition is the faculty, which is connected to life and duration whereas intellect is that which is connected to matter and spatialized time. For him, the intellect is a spatializing mechanism. It employs concepts, symbols, abstraction and analysis to acquire knowledge. It is best suited to the study of objects, immobility and being. Thus, it apprehends movement in static terms. It gives us a necessary but pragmatic grasp of reality. For this reason, Bergson employed cinematographical apparatus as an analogy for how the intellect approaches reality.

"Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is also that of our knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality. We may therefore sum up

that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind" (*Creative Evolution* 332).

Indeed, Bergson thinks that cinema is a mechanical representation of the world. It functions in a manner similar to the way the intellect takes the 'snapshots of reality'. The camera begins with a real movement since it attempts to record what is becoming. Then it breaks it down mechanically into a series of static frames. And it returns the movement through projecting. Since it employs a spatializing mechanism, cinema becomes incapable of representing real time or duration. It misses the movement itself by adding abstract time to immobile instants.

This is why, according to Bergson, cinema gives us a false movement. It produces an illusion while constituting movement. Hence, what we see in a film is a reconstituted illusion. Deleuze mentions that, for Bergson, this illusion about movement emerges in two different ways throughout the history of Western thought. "For antiquity, movement refers to intelligible elements, Forms or Ideas which are themselves eternal and immobile…movement merely expresses a 'dialectic' of forms, an ideal synthesis which gives it order and measure. Movement, conceived in this way, will thus be regulated transition from one form to another, that is, an order of poses or privileged instants, as in dance" (*Cinema I* 4).

But according to modern science movement is related to any-instant-whatever. "Although movement was still composed, it was no longer recomposed from

formal transcendental elements (poses), but from immanent material elements (sections)" (*Cinema I* 4). Within the Cartesian worldview the movement is redefined. And the dialectical order of poses is replaced by the mechanical succession of instants.

Hence, Deleuze writes: "It is in this sense that the cinema is the system which reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever that is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of continuity" (*Cinema I* 5). Seen from that aspect, cinema appears as the production of singular points which are immanent to movement. Thus, the cinematographic image emerges as the process where the production of singularities is achieved. Instead of the moments of actualisation of a transcendent form, the movement-image reveals the remarkable or singular points which belong to movement.

The ancients reconstitute movement through eternal poses and the moderns through immobile sections. According to Deleuze, the problem in both cases is that the Whole is already assumed. When the whole is given movement can no longer exist. Since the Whole is always Open it cannot be constituted. Duration is that which is always in becoming. Hence, it can never be assigned.

2.2 Deleuzian Transformation

Opposing Bergson, Deleuze argues that what we perceive in cinema is not the succession of instants but an indivisible intermediate. The movement belongs to this intermediate image as intermediate given. According to him, cinema does not give us an image to which movement is added, on the contrary, it immediately gives us a movement-image. It gives us a mobile section, not an immobile section plus abstract movement. Challenging the traditional view, which aims to constitute cinema by applying an abstract time to immobile sections, Deleuze offers a radical way of understanding that takes the movement-image as the mobile section of duration, and poses that image as the indivisible unit of cinema.

Keeping the core of Bergson's theory on movement and change, Deleuze attempts to show his misconception of cinematography. He tries to posit cinema as it is affirming and extending Bergsonian philosophy of becoming. As Boundas mentions "…Deleuze invites Bergson, the philosopher, to the movies in order to show him that his dismissal of the 'cinematographic illusion', that is, of reconstitution of movement on the basis of immobile slices or cuts, was in fact all too hasty. Cinema today, argues Deleuze, successfully meets Bergson's challenge, because the age of camera verifies the system of universal variation that Bergson tried to articulate" (Boundas 20).

Deleuzian transformation takes movement-image, the shot in cinema, as its starting point. The whole theory is built upon this concrete intermediary, which

acts as the movement of translation of a frame. The movement of translation is determined by a change in the respective positions of sets of things, that is, the objects and the characters in a frame. The movement-image has sub-categories such as perception-images, action-images and affection-images. The film emerges with the combination of these images with one another through montage, the open whole, in which all change takes place.

Deleuze asserts that there are three coexisting levels in cinematography. The first one is framing, which defines an artificially limited set of things. It constitutes a network of relations between those that are framed. The second one is cutting, which is determined by the distribution of movement among the elements of the set. And the last one is montage, which is defined by a change or variation that takes place in the whole.

2.2.1 The Closed Sets

The closed sets are artificial systems that include discernible objects and distinct parts. Deleuze puts the first level as framing in cinema. So, a closed system is what includes all that is in the present image, that is, props, characters and sets. These elements are the legible data that may be understood as an information system. Then, the frame has a function of recording visual information. The shot is subsumed by the set. And a set is more specific than a shot because a set may include subsets such as moving camera shots. Deleuze writes that framing is "the determination of a closed system which includes everything which is present in

19

the image"(*Cinema I* 12). According to him, frame serves as an opaque surface of information.

The frame has two tendencies. One is toward saturation and the other toward rarefaction. Rarefied images are produced when the whole accent is placed on a single object. Saturation can be attained when there appear secondary scenes in the foreground of a frame. "Frame serves as an opaque surface of information, sometimes blurred by saturation, sometimes reduced to the empty set, to the white or black screen" (*Cinema I* 13).

Since the framing is a limitation it also implies an outside. This is the out-of-field. It refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present. When a set is framed, there is also a larger set with which the first forms a larger one. The out-of-field is that which forces the frame to extend itself into a larger set. It is the way that the closed system communicates. The out-of-field functions in two ways. Firstly, it constitutes actualisable relation with other sets by giving rise to a new unseen set. And secondly, it constitutes a virtual relation with the whole by opening the closed system into a duration. Deleuze summarises the analysis of the frame as follows:

"Framing is the art of choosing the parts of all kinds which became part of a set. This set is a closed system, relatively and artificially closed. The closed system determined by the frame can be considered in relation to the data that it communicates to the spectators: it is 'informatic', and saturated or rarefied.

Considered in itself and as limitation, it is geometric or dynamic physical. Considered in the nature of its parts, it is still geometric or physical and dynamic. It is an optical system when it is considered in relation to the point of view, to the angle of framing: it is then pragmatically justified, or lays claim to a higher justification. Finally, it determines an out-of-field, sometimes in the form of a larger set which extends it, sometimes in the form of a whole into which it is integrated" (*Cinema I* 18).

2.2.2 The Movement of Translation

However, there is always a thread that links a closed system to the open whole. Deleuze writes: "The whole is therefore like the thread which traverses sets and gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily realised, of communicating with another, to infinity. Thus, the whole is the Open, and relates back to time or even to spirit rather than to content and to space" (*Cinema I* 17). Hence, we see that a closed system is never absolutely closed. It is connected to both other closed systems and finally to concrete duration. This connection is what refers to the second level.

The second level is the shot, which can be seen as an intermediary between the two levels. According to Deleuze, it is the movement-image. It is the relationship between parts and its affection of the whole. On the one hand, a shot modifies the respective positions of the parts of a closed set. On the other it is itself the mobile section of a whole whose change it expresses. It is both the translation of the

parts of a set that spreads out in space and the change of a whole, which is transformed in duration. Deleuze argues:

"...the shot, of whatever kind, has as it were two poles: in relation to the sets in space where it introduces relative modifications between elements or subsets; in relation to a whole whose absolute change in duration it expresses…The shot in general has one face turned towards the set, the modifications of whose parts it translates, and another face turned towards the whole, of which it expresses – or at least a – change. Hence, the situation of the shot, which can be defined abstractly as the intermediary between the framing of the set and the montage of the whole, sometimes tending towards the pole of framing, sometimes tending towards the pole of montage" (*Cinema I* 20).

In cinematography, the shot is the movement of translation, which "reunites objects and sets into a single identical duration. It continuously divides duration into sub-durations which are themselves heterogenous, and reunites these into a duration which is immanent to the whole of the universe" (*Cinema I* 20). Thus, the shot is the movement-image. It is the concrete intermediary between a whole and a set. Seen from that aspect, it is the mobile section of a duration that acts like a consciousness, which carries out the divisions of duration and the reunion of objects. "it traces a movement which means that the things between which it arises are continuously reuniting into a whole, and the whole is continuously dividing between things" (*Cinema I* 20).

2.2.3 Duration

Movement is a translation in space. But while there is a translation of parts in space, there is also a qualitative change in the whole. This change in the whole refers to concrete duration. Deleuze writes "…each time we find ourselves confronted with a duration, or in a duration, we may conclude that there exists somewhere a whole which is changing, and which is open somewhere" (*Cinema I* 9). Since it is open, the whole is neither given nor giveable. Its nature is to change constantly and to give rise to something new. Hence, it is clear that the world or the universe is that which is open. It is not a closed system. A closed system will inevitably become an artificially closed set.

"The whole and the 'wholes' must not be confused with sets. Sets are closed, and everything that is closed is artificially closed. Sets are always sets of parts. But a whole is not closed, it is open; and it has no parts except in a very special sense, since it cannot be divided without changing qualitatively at each stage of division" (*Cinema I* 10). Thus, the whole appears as an indivisible continuity. To define this continuity we should apply the notion of Relation. Since it is through relations the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively, duration itself becomes the whole of these relations.

Respectively, in cinema, this whole equals to montage. The montage may be posed as the operation that bears on the movement-images in order to release the whole from them. This whole gives us an indirect image of time. It is

apprehended indirectly because this time or duration is deduced from movement-images and their relationships. However, Deleuze argues that the montage does not come afterwards, it should be presupposed. It is the determination of the whole by means of continuities and cutting.

In a conversation with Pascal Bonitzer and Jean Narboni, Deleuze mentions that "cinema's always played upon these coexisting levels, each great auteur has its own way of conceiving and using them. In a great film, as in any work of art, there's always something open. And it always turns out to be time, the whole, as these appear in every different film in very different ways" (*Negotiations* 56). For Deleuze, cinema appears as a plane that makes us think this relation between time, the whole and openness.

The main point is to distinguish between particular sets of things and the whole. The whole is not the set of all sets. A set is closed and limited even if it contains very diverse elements. But the whole is of different nature. It is what changes constantly. It is not any set of things. It is the translation of one set of things into another. It is also that which stops the sets to become completely closed. Henceforth, it is the Open. That is the duration, in which all sets are embedded. In other words, it is the Time which acts as a ceaseless passage from one set to another.

According to Deleuze, in cinema there are two distinct types of time perception. The first one is the indirect image of time, which is constituted by montage. It is

obtained through the successive arrangement of movement-images. Within such a system time is subordinated to movement. The perception of time is determined indirectly by the combination of these movement-images. The second one is the direct image of time that finds its actualisation in the time-image. Breaking with the indirect representation of time, a time-image is what gives us the pure image of time. Hence, it creates a reversal in the relation between time and movement. Movement becomes subordinated to time. In order to evaluate the significance of this time-movement relationship, we should better glance at the distinction that Deleuze makes between classical cinema and modern cinema.

2.3 Becoming and Cinematography

2.3.1 Movement and Time

Deleuze distinguishes between two types of cinema. The former cinema, which is predominated before the World War 2, is dependent on movement and action. The characters in the movies of this period are placed in narrative positions. They act and react consciously to the events around them. "The cinema of action depicts sensory-motor situations: there are characters, in a certain situation, who act, perhaps very violently, according to how they perceive situation. Actions are linked to perceptions and perceptions develop into actions" (*Negotiations* 51). This period is determined by the movement-image. Time is subordinated to movement. It is indirectly represented in so far as it derives from movement-images.

After the World War 2, a reversal has happened in the time-movement relationship. Time is no longer subordinated to movement. A direct time-image has been formed. Deleuze continues: "Now suppose a character finds himself in a situation, however ordinary or extraordinary, that is beyond any possible action, or to which he can't react. It is too powerful, or too painful, too beautiful. The sensory-motor link is broken. He is no longer in a sensory-motor situation, but in a purely optical and aural situation. There is a new type of image" (*Negotiations* 51). We are no longer in the same type of space. Having lost its motor connection space becomes disconnected.

In modern cinema, characters find themselves in situations where they are unable to act and react in a direct, immediate way. Rational temporal links between shots gives way to incommensurable, non-rational links. Because of these non-rational links between shots vacant and disconnected spaces begin to appear. Deleuze writes: "Everything perhaps suddenly appears in a shattering of the sensory-motor schema: this schema, which had linked perceptions, affections and actions, does not enter a profound crisis without the general regime of the image being changed. In any case, the cinema has undergone a much more important change here than the one which happened with the talkie" (*Cinema I* ix).

According to Deleuze, the movement-image is regulated by the sensory-motor action that responds to the demands of perception. Time-image is disconnected from the pragmatic needs of pure images that lead to a breakdown in the sensory-

motor schema. Characters become unable to act and react in an immediate way and action becomes paralyzed. While there appear pragmatic necessities of narrative movement in the movement-image, the rational composition of narrative action breaks down in the time-image.

According to Deleuze, there can be possible transformation and combinations between the movement-image and the time-image. No one is more important than the other. Yet, it is necessary to assess the difference.

The movement-image constitutes time in its empirical form. It creates a successive present in relation of before and after. Hence, the past becomes a former present, and the future becomes a present to come. It also gives rise to an indirect image of time. In this case it employs the present as empirical progression. Time is no longer measured by movement but it becomes the measure of movement. This is the metaphysical representation of time.

Deleuze argues, "…from either aspect, time is distinguished in this way from movement only as indirect representation. Time as progression derives from the movement-image or from successive shots. But time as unity or as totality depends on montage that still relates it back to movement or succession of shots. This is why the movement-image is fundamentally linked to an indirect representation of time, and does not give us a direct presentation of it, that is, does not give us a time-image" (*Cinema II* 271).

However, in modern cinema the time-image is neither empirical nor metaphysical. It presents itself in the pure state. It is no longer time, which is derived from movement; it is movement as false movement, which now depends on time. The break of the sensory-motor link can be seen as the main factor of this shift from classical to modern cinema. "What brings this cinema of action into question after the war is the very break up of the sensory-motor schema: the rise of situations to which one can no longer react, of environments with which there are now only chance of relations, of empty or disconnected any-space-whatevers replacing qualified extensive space" (*Cinema II* 272).

Henceforth, in modern cinema there appears pure optical and sound situations, in which the character does not know how to respond. He finds himself wandering along the abandoned spaces in which he ceases to experience. However, Deleuze mentions that the character "…has gained in an ability to see what he has lost in action or reaction…this is no longer a sensory-motor situation, but a purely optical and sound situation, where the seer has replaced the agent" (*Cinema II* 272).

2.3.1 Deterritorialized Image

Hence, we are presented with pure and direct images of time. Perception becomes purely optical and aural. Cut off from its motor development, an actual image comes into relation with a virtual image. Linear development leaves its place to a circular one. Real and imaginary become indistinguishable. The actual image and

its virtual image crystallize. Thus, there appears crystal image. Deleuze describes the consequences of this crystal image as follows:

"In the first place, you see Time, layers of time, a direct time-image. Not that movement has ceased, but the relation between movement and time has been inverted. Time no longer derives from the combination of movement-images (from montage), it is the other way round, movement now follows from time. Montage does not necessarily vanish, but it plays a different role, becomes what Lapoujade calls 'montrage'. Second, the image bears a new relation to its optical and aural elements: you might say that in its visionary aspect it becomes more 'legible' than visible…Finally, image becomes thought, is able to catch the mechanisms of thought, while the camera takes on various functions strictly comparable to propositional functions" (*Negotiations* 52).

Seen from that aspect, what is framed in a film is constituted via the representation of objects in present time. The camera shot includes bodies and their relation with each other within a single framework. These bodies are in present and made up of instants. However, what we experience is not merely the represented bodies. We are confronted with a plane of immanence that renders change and transformation visible in screen. The screen becomes a plane of multiplicities, which are weaved through intensities and forces. Under a diverse perception of time we are introduced a peculiar way of thinking. Deleuze argues:

"Narrative in cinema is like the imaginary: it is a very direct product of motion and time, rather than the other way around. Cinema always narrates what the image's movements and time make it narrate. If the motion's governed by a sensory-motor scheme, if it shows a character reacting to a situation, then you get a story. If, on the other hand, the sensory-motor scheme breaks down to leave disoriented and discordant movements, then you get other patterns, becomings rather than stories" (*Negotiations* 59). Hence, cinema becomes the expression of life prior to what individualizes us. The screen is invaded by the multiplicities, in which events and singularities merge. Seen from that aspect, the levels concerning cinematography may be articulated within the context of Stoic philosophy, which aims to posit a difference between an incorporeal event and a corporeal body.

The first level, closed sets, seems to resonate with the Stoic conception of bodies and the state of affairs in Logic of Sense. Deleuze states that there are bodies with their tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions, and the corresponding state of affairs. The mixture of bodies determines the state of affairs, actions and passions. There are no causes and effects among bodies. All bodies are causes in relation to each other. However, the effects are not bodies. They are not physical qualities and properties but rather incorporeal entities. They are events. They do not exist, but they subsist or insist.

Deleuze states that "only bodies exist in space and only the present exists in time" (*Logic of Sense* 4). Hence, this is one of the two simultaneous readings of time. It

is the living present in which bodies act and acted upon. The other one is the entity infinitely divisible into past and future, and into the incorporeal effects. In other words, past and future insist in time and divide each present infinitely. The events or incorporeal entities "...are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions. They are 'impassive' entities – impassive results. They are not living presents, but infinities: the unlimited Aeon, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present" (*Logic of Sense* 5).

Mixtures determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs. This happens in two ways. A body penetrates another and coexists with it, or a body withdraws from the other. Hence, we see two planes of being: on the one hand there is real being, that is, things or bodies, on the other hand there is a plane of facts. The former consists of substances and the latter consists of events. This plane of effects is constituted by an endless multiplicity of incorporeal beings.

"Thus in a sense movement has two aspects. On the one hand, that which happens between objects or parts; on the other hand that which expresses the duration or the whole. The result is that duration, by changing qualitatively, is *divided up* in objects, and objects, by gaining depth, by losing their *contours*, are united in duration"(Cinema 11, my emphasis). Regarding this last sentence, we may constitute a relationship between what Deleuze is figuring out here and what he wrote elsewhere about transcending the figurative painting.

3 BACON AND THE FIGURE

In *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze mainly attempts at freeing both subject and object from sensation. He insists that in order to fulfil this task Bacon employs a certain kind of technique. This is a technique that consists in isolating the figure. "In his effort to escape the figurative and representative modes of narration and illustration and also the abstractness of pure form, Bacon aims at the liberation of the figure through iconic isolation. Through iconic isolation, that is, the neutralization of the background and the enclosure of figures in well defined spaces, it prevents the figure from telling a story or from representing forms external to the canvas" (Boundas 19).

Deleuze argues that by employing such a technique Bacon manages to escape from the figurative. This allows him to reveal sensations in his paintings. Sensation is what is related not to forms but to forces. According to Deleuze, Bacon's painting aims at the capturing of the force. And sensation, like force, brings things together in the very process of separating them. Indeed, sensation is both things at once. The same body gives and receives it. This body is both subject and object.

Hence, within such a conceptualisation, we are again face to face with multiplicities, events and singularities. As in *Cinema* books, Deleuze attempts to get rid of the notions of representation, narration and deep-rooted opposition of

subject and object, by substituting this plane of stability with a mobile one that consists of intensities, forces and 'matters of fact'. So again, we are following the same route, but in order to have a better understanding of sensations we should look for a detailed analysis of Deleuze's oeuvre on Francis Bacon.

3.1 The Figure and the Field

Bacon draws circles in order to delimit the place. These are special techniques for isolating the figure. They "do not consign the Figure to immobility, but on the contrary, render a sensible kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure within the place, or upon itself" (*Francis Bacon* 6). Deleuze argues that being isolated in such an operative field the Figure becomes an image. Hence, the painting becomes an isolated reality. Deleuze writes, "Painting has neither a model to represent nor a story to narrate. It has two possible ways of escaping from the figurative: either toward pure form, through abstraction; or toward the purely figural, through extraction and isolation" (*Francis Bacon* 6).

To conclude, we may say that there are two possible ways of escaping from the figurative painting. One is abstraction and the other is isolation. Bacon employs the latter in order to leave the figurative behind for the sake of Figure. And by isolation, he also breaks with representation, disrupt narration and escape illustration. Instead of intelligible relations of object and ideas he prefers matters of fact. Hence, by sticking to the fact Bacon liberates the Figure. This attempt constitutes a relationship between distinct figures without narration. Deleuze

continues "What fills the rest of the painting will be neither a landscape as the correlate of the figure, nor a background from which the form will emerge, nor a formless chiaroscuro, a thickness of colour on which shadows would play, a texture on which variation would play" (*Francis Bacon* 7).

According to Deleuze, Francis Bacon has two distinct ways of escaping from the figurative. The first one is 'asignifying traits' that are devoid of any illustrative or narrative function. These are the involuntary free marks lining the canvas. The second one is the technique of 'local wiping'. This is a special technique in which the thickness is spread out over a nonfigurative zone by using a rag, handbroom or brush. Employing these two techniques, Bacon gets rid of the relation of depth or distance between the figure and the field. Also, there appears incertitude of light and shadow. This leads to a certain blurriness in Bacon's painting. This blurriness occurs in two ways:

"In the first case, the blur is obtained, not by indistinctness, but on the contrary by the operation that 'consists in destroying clarity by clarity' as in the man with the pig's head in the Self-portrait of 1973, or the treatment of crumpled newspapers…In the other case, the blur is obtained by the techniques of free marks or wiping, both of which are also among the precise elements of the system" (*Francis Bacon* 8).

Bacon distinguishes three fundamental elements in his paintings. These are the material structure, the circular contour and the raised image. The field and the

figure constitute a peculiar relationship in the canvas. What appears is the correlation of two sectors on a single plane. This correlation or connection is provided by the ring or circle, which is the common limit of both the Figure and the field. The figure functions as a background and the Figure functions as a form. The coexistence of these two adjacent sectors constitutes an absolutely closed and revolving space.

3.2 The Body Escaping From Itself

Deleuze argues that in Bacon's paintings the contour is the place of an exchange in two directions: between the material structure and the Figure, and between the Figure and the field. He writes, "If painting has nothing to narrate and no story to tell, something is happening all the same, which defines the functioning of the painting" (*Francis Bacon* 11). What is happening is not a representation. There are no spectator or spectacles in Bacon's paintings. The waiting Figures and 'attendants' are not spectators. Deleuze would say that Bacon needs the function of a witness, which is not a spectator but part of the figure. He writes:

"In this attempt to eliminate the spectator, the Figure already demonstrates a singular athleticism, all the more singular in that the source of the movement is not in itself. Instead, the movement goes from the material structure, from the field, to the Figure" (*Francis Bacon* 12). This is the first form of derisory athletics in Bacon. The field imprisons and envelops the Figure. It is caught up in

a movement that forms itself into a cylinder. This extreme confinement of the bodies excludes the spectator. "The material structure curls around the contour in order to imprison the Figure, which accompanies the movement of all the structure's forces. It is the extreme solitude of the Figures, the extreme confinement of the bodies, which excludes every spectator: the Figure becomes a Figure only through this movement which confines it and in which it confines itself" (*Francis Bacon* 12).

Coexisting with the first, the other movement is the movement of the Figure toward the material structure, toward the field of colour. The body is not simply waiting for something from the structure but it is waiting something from the structure. Since it is within the body that something is happening, the body becomes the source of movement. Deleuze would say "The body exerts itself in a very precise manner, or waits to escape from itself in a very precise manner. It is not me that attempts to escape from my body, it is the body that attempts to escape from itself by means of…in short, a spasm"(*Francis Bacon* 12).

The entire series of spasm in Bacon consists of the body attempting to escape from itself through one of its organs. The body-figure exerts an intense motionless effort upon itself in order to escape. This effort leads to an extraordinary pose beyond the strength of the body. For example, the scream is the operation that the entire body escapes through the mouth. According to Deleuze, this is Bacon's approximation of horror and abjection. "'To pass through the eye of a needle', trivializes the very abomination or Destiny. A scene of

hysteria. The entire series of spasms in Bacon is of this type: scenes of love, scenes of vomit and excrement, in which the body is attempting to escape from itself through one of its organs in order to reach the field or material structure" (*Francis Bacon* 13).

There is also a second direction of the exchange in Bacon's paintings. It is no longer the material structure that curls around the contour in order to envelop the Figure. Hence, the Figure wants to dissipate into the material structure. This is the second form of derisory athletics. The body, either contracts itself by going through a whole or stretches itself out in the mirror. In both cases the Figure is deformed. The Figure is not simply the isolated body, but also the deformed body that escapes from itself. Sometimes it is contracted and aspirated and sometimes stretched and dilated.

What is happening in the canvas is immediately related to the Figure. And also the deformations are immediately transferred to the Figure. Deleuze writes, "In the 1973 Self-portrait of the man with the pig's head, the deformation takes place on the spot. Just as the effort of the body is exerted upon itself, so the deformation is static. An intense movement flows through the whole body, a deformed and deforming movement that at every moment transfers the real image onto the body in order to constitute the Figure" (*Francis Bacon* 14). Thus, Deleuze argues that either by contracting itself by going through a whole or by stretching itself out in the mirror, the body returns to the material structure and dissipates into it.

3.3 Becoming-Animal

In Bacon's paintings the body appears as the material of the Figure. Deleuze insists that this material of the Figure should not be confused with the spatializing material structure. Moreover, the body does not have a face. It has the head. According to Deleuze, there is a big difference between the two. "For the face is a structured, spatial organization that conceals the head, whereas the head is dependent upon the body, even if it is the point of the body, its culmination. It is not that the head lacks the spirit; but it is a spirit in bodily form, a corporeal and vital breath, an animal spirit. It is the animal spirit of man..." (*Francis Bacon* 15).

Throughout Bacon's work, the bone seems to belong not to the head but to the face. Head appears as the non-localized power of the meat. This power of non-localization turns all meat into a head without face. What Bacon tries to constitute when he is painting Pope is that intense relationship between head and meat. Deleuze writes that "the scream that comes out of the Pope's mouth, and the pity that comes out of his eyes, have meat as their object" (*Francis Bacon* 17). What is revealed in the canvas is a head without a face. Hence, the mouth is no longer a particular organ. It becomes a hole through which the body escapes.

Thus, Bacon's attempts can be seen as a determined way of rediscovering the head. The deformations which the body undergoes are rendered by techniques of wiping and brushing. The face is disorganized by losing its form and the head emerges from beneath the face. The wiped-off parts reveal the traits of animality

in Bacon's paintings. Thus, employing these techniques Bacon constitutes 'a zone of indiscernibility, of undecidability between man and animal'.

"Sometimes an animal, for example a real dog, is treated as the shadow of its master, or conversely, the man's shadow itself assumes an autonomous and indeterminate animal existence. The shadow escapes from the body like an animal we had been sheltering" (*Francis Bacon* 15). However, what is painted in the canvas is not the combination of two forms. Deleuze calls it a 'common fact'. This zone of indiscernibility reveals the common fact of both man and animal.

Within this zone of indiscernibility the bones of the body appears as the spatial structure of the body. It is just the flesh and meat what is displayed in the canvas. For Bacon, there is a distinction between flesh and bone. Deleuze argues that "the body is revealed only when it ceases to be supported by the bones, when the flesh ceases to cover the bones, when the two exist for each other, but each on its own terms: the bone as the material structure of the body, the flesh as the bodily material of the Figure" (*Francis Bacon* 16). Furthermore, this zone of indiscernibility creates a tension between flesh and bone. Meat is that which realizes this tension. In meat, the flesh descends from the bone. And the bones rise up out of the flesh.

This tension between flesh and bone creates a movement which Deleuze calls 'the acrobatics of the flesh'. "Well beyond the apparent sadism, the bones are like a trapeze apparatus upon which the flesh is the acrobat. The athleticism of the body

is naturally prolonged in this acrobatics of the flesh" (*Francis Bacon* 16). However, he argues that although meat, retaining all the sufferings of the body, appears as the chief object of Bacon's pity it also manifests this acrobatics and delightful invention. Meat is not the dead flesh. It is the common zone of man and the beast. And it is in this sense, Deleuze states that every man who suffers is a piece of meat.

He continues by declaring that this common zone does not lead to a resemblance but a deep identity. This zone of indiscernibility constitutes a deep identity of man and the beast. Hence, the man who suffers is a beast and the beast that suffers is a man. This is why Deleuze states that "this discarded meat is we ourselves and the spectator is already in the spectacle" (*Francis Bacon* 17). For him, this is the reality of becoming.

3.4 Sensations

The Figure is the sensible form linked to a sensation. Abstract form acts upon brain whereas the Figure immediately acts upon nervous system. Deleuze argues that sensation has two faces. One is turned towards the subject and the other towards the object. It is the same body that both gives and receives the sensation. "As a spectator, I experience the sensation only by entering into the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensation and that which senses it, the unity of the sensing and the sensed" (*Francis Bacon* 23). Deleuze insists that sensation is in the body, it is what is painted. So, according to Bacon, to paint the sensation is to

record the fact. Thus, what is painted is no more a representation of a body. It becomes the sole experience of the sustained sensation.

The idea of such an experience has some resonances with the notion of duration in Bergson's theses on movement. It also interferes with the direct image of time in cinematography. As we have mentioned, what we see in screen is not only the represented objects which is framed by the cinematographic apparatus but also a peculiar perception of time or duration, which is haunted by singularities, sensations and multiplicities. Thus, what Deleuze attempts to pose in *Cinema* is just another way of looking at that 'reality of becoming'.

For Bacon, in figurative painting the form is related to an object that it is supposed to represent. Indeed, this is the essential nature of figuration. However, in Bacon's works the form is related to the sensation. Sensation avoids the detour and boredom of conveying a story. It is transmitted directly. It passes from one level to another. In this respect, Deleuze asserts that figurative and abstract painting acts indirectly. "They pass through the head, they do not act directly upon the nervous system, they do not attain the sensation, they do not extract the Figure – all because they remain at one and the same level. They can implement transformations of form, but they cannot attain deformations of bodies" (*Francis Bacon* 24).

Each painting is a shifting sequence. It is constituted by the different orders of the same sensation. Each sensation exists in different levels. Deleuze asserts that

"...there are not sensations of different orders, but different orders of one and the same sensation. It is the nature of sensation to envelop a constitutive difference of level, a plurality of constituting domains. Every sensation, and every Figure, is already an 'accumulated' or 'coagulated' sensation, as in a limestone figure" (*Francis Bacon* 24). The idea presupposes that each sensation has several levels and there is a synthetic unity between them.

3.5 Levels of Sensation

According to Deleuze, the synthetic unity of sensation can be explained in compliance with four diverse hypothesis. However, the first three consists of elements that lead to figuration and representation. The first hypothesis takes the figured thing as the source of this unity. In other words, the idea implies that the represented object itself creates the synthetic unity of sensation. However, since the Figure intends to break with the figurative, the sensation must have nothing of the nature of a represented object.

Deleuze argues that the violence of sensation is opposed to the violence of the represented. Although it is inevitable to break with the figuration completely "Bacon has not ceased trying to eliminate the 'sensational', that is, the primary figuration of things that provoke a violent sensation...The Pope himself sees nothing, and screams before the invisible. Thus neutralized, the horror is multiplied because it is inferred from the scream, and not the reverse. And

certainly it is not easy to renounce the horror or the primary figuration" (*Francis Bacon* 25).

The second hypothesis confuses sensation with feelings. So when we assert that there are different levels we seem to cause ambivalence. For Deleuze, an ambivalence in the Figure refers to the feelings it experiences in relation to the represented things. However, there are no feelings in Bacon. His attempt is not to create a multitude of ambivalent feelings or to record different levels of feeling in one image. Bacon paints sensations, namely, affects. Deleuze continues:

"There is a third, more interesting, hypothesis. The levels of sensation would be like snapshots or momentary instants of movement, which would recompose movement synthetically, in all its continuity, speed, and violence, as in synthetic cubism, futurism, or Duchamp's Nude Descending a Staircase" (*Francis Bacon* 26). This is the same problem that Bergson poses when he asserts that movement cannot be reconstituted by adding immobile instants under the conception of an abstract time.

Deleuze would say that movement does not explain sensation. On the contrary, movement is explained by it. Sometimes there appears a movement of translation that is caused by the action of invisible forces upon the body. For this reason, Deleuze argues that it is the levels of sensation that explain what remains of movement. "According to the law of Beckett or Kafka, there is an immobility beyond movement: beyond standing up, there is sitting down; beyond sitting

down, there is lying down; and beyond that, one finally disappears. The true acrobat is one who is consigned to immobility inside the circle" (*Francis Bacon* 26).

And finally Deleuze asserts the last hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes an originary unity of senses in relation to a Figure that is multisensible. "The levels of sensation would be actual domains of sensation that refer to the different sense organs; but every level or domain would have a way of referring to the others, independent of the represented object they have in common. There would be an existential communication between a color, a taste, a touch, an odor, a noise, a weight, which would constitute the "pathic" (nonrepresentative) moment of the sensation" (*Francis Bacon* 25).

The unity of the senses is actualized with a presupposition of a vital power which exceeds every domain. For Deleuze, this power is Rhythm, which appears as a nonrational, noncerebral 'logic of senses'. Thus, the idea behind the synthetic unity of sensation and diverse levels or domains of one and the same sensation is explained by this relation between rhythm and sensation. Deleuze concludes:

"This rhythm flows through a painting just as it flows through a piece of music. It is diastolic-systolic: the world that takes me in by closing around the ego, the ego that is open to the world, and the open itself. Cézanne, it is said, is the one who put a vital rhythm into the visual sensation. Could the same be said of Bacon, with his coexistent movements, when the field closes in around the Figure, and

when the Figure contracts or, on the contrary, stretches out in order to get back to the field, until it merges with it?" (*Francis Bacon* 27).

3.6 Going Beyond Organism

According to Deleuze, the rhythmic unity of the senses is discovered by going beyond organism. At the limit of the lived body and beyond organism we confront with a diverse kind of body. That is the notion of 'body without organs', which Deleuze quote from Antonin Artaud. It stands amid where the levels of sensation conjoin. It acts like a plane where sensation and rhythm passes through. "The body without organs is opposed less to organs than to that organization of organs that we call organism. It is an intense and intensive body. It is traversed by a wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to the variations of its amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds and levels" (*Francis Bacon* 27).

Deleuze asserts that the Figure in Bacon is the body without organs. It is just flesh and nerve. A wave flows through this body and it traces levels upon it. When the wave encounters the forces acting on this body a sensation is produced. "When sensation is linked to the body in this way, it ceases to be representative and becomes real; and cruelty will be linked less and less to the representation of something horrible, and will become nothing other than the action of forces upon the body, or sensation (*Francis Bacon* 27).

For Bacon, organism is what imprisons life. Therefore, the Figure in his works appears as a whole non-organic life. "No mouth. No tongue. No teeth. No larynx. No esophagus. No belly. No anus". According to Deleuze, it is similar to the notion of powerful non-organic life in Gothic Art. The Gothic Art is opposed to the organic representation of Classical Art. "Classical Art can be figurative, insofar as it refers to something represented, but it can also be abstract, when it extricates a geometric form from the representation. But the pictorial line in Gothic painting is completely different, as it is geometry and figure…It is a geometry no longer in the service of the essential and eternal, but a geometry in the service of 'problems' or 'accidents', ablation, adjunction, projection, intersection" (*Francis Bacon* 29).

Body without organs lacks the particular organization of organs. Hence, it appears as an indeterminate organ. This indeterminacy emerges for the sake of provisional presence of determinate organs. In other words, when the wave flows through the body, an organ is determined depending on the force it encounters. The organ will change its function and structure if the force itself changes. This is why the body without organs is defined by the temporary and provisional presence of determinate organs. For Deleuze, this process is one way of introducing time into painting. This is how Bacon put time inside the Figure.

The body without organs can be articulated as the hysterical reality of the body. The organs become temporary and transitory. The same organ acts differently under the action of different forces. Organ loses its determinate character and

becomes transitory. It is determined according to the levels of sensation or according to the forces that are exerted upon it. "It is no longer my head, but I feel myself inside a head, I see and I see myself in the body that I see, and I see myself in this naked body when I am dressed…and so forth" (*Francis Bacon* 30).

This is the way the body escapes from itself. "It escapes from itself through the open mouth, through the anus or the stomach, or through the throat, or through the circle of the washbasin, or through the point of the umbrella. The presence of a body without organs under the organism, the presence of transitory organs under the organic representation" (*Francis Bacon* 31). According to Deleuze, within such a composition a hysteresis is breaking off the work each time. Challenging the notions of before and after and intensifying the excessive presence of the Figure, the hysteresis interrupts the figurative course of the work.

But what is this hysteresis? And what is the relation between hysteria and presence? Deleuze argues that "the hysteric is at the same time someone who imposes his or her presence, but also someone for whom things and beings are present, too present, and who attributes to everything and communicates to every being this excessive presence" (*Francis Bacon* 31). For Deleuze, in Bacon the whole painting is hystericized. The figure and the whole painting is caught up in an excessive presence. In the canvas, there is a presence acting directly on the nervous system, which makes representation impossible.

"There is a special relation between painting and hysteria. It is very simple. Painting directly attempts to release the presences beneath representation, beyond representation. The color system itself is a system of direct action on the nervous system. This is not a hysteria of the painter, but hysteria of painting. With painting, hysteria becomes art. Or rather, with the painter, hysteria becomes painting" (*Francis Bacon* 31). Painting is what converts hysteria. It makes presence immediately visible. It liberates not only lines and colors from their representative function but also the eye from its adherence to the organism. Hence, the eye is no more fixed and qualified organ. It becomes a polyvalent indeterminate organ.

"This is the double definition of painting: subjectively, it invests the eye, which ceases to be organic in order to become a polyvalent and transitory organ: objectively, it brings before us the reality of a body, of lines and colors freed from organistic representation. And each is produced by the other: the pure presence of the body becomes visible at the same time that the eye becomes the destined organ of this presence" (*Francis Bacon* 32). The Figure appears within the identity of an already-there and an always-delayed. This identity is situated in an interminable presence. Indeed, it is the body without organs that acts as a pure presence, in the lack of any permanent determination. This notion of pure presence will certainly take us to the plane of Deleuzian haecceities.

The painting is no longer a collection of objects that is represented but rather a plane in which incorporeal events merge. It is composed of infinities, which are

always in a state of becoming. Unlike the traditional painting that is based on representation and figuration of things and beings, Bacon's work aims at constituting a multitude of domains that is composed of affects or sensations, namely, events. The Figure insinuates a movement that is caused by the invisible forces exerted upon itself. The multiplicity of incorporeal beings and forces acting upon them constitutes a field of becoming. This is where sensations merge.

The things and facts exist in time. But events rather subsist or insist. They are incorporeal effects that are coextensive with the unlimited Aeon. The infinitely divisible event is both that which has just happened and that which is about to happen at once. Moreover, it is neither active nor passive. It is in between. It is the common result of both. The event is in a state of becoming rather than a state of stasis or being.

Deleuze argues that the Stoics discovered the surface effects. Instead of depths and heights of Platonic tradition they prefer surfaces. Seen from that respect, the most concealed becomes the most manifest in Stoic terminology. "Everything now returns to the surface. This is the result of the Stoic operation: the unlimited returns. Becoming-mad, becoming unlimited is no longer a ground which rumbles. It climbs to the surface of things and becomes passive. It is no longer a question of simulacra which elude the ground and insinuate themselves everywhere, but rather a question of effects which manifest themselves and act in their place" (*Logic of Sense* 7).

The surface effects in Bacon emerge with the help of special techniques in Bacon. Employing the techniques of a-signifying traits and wiping-off Bacon attempts to get rid of the figurative givens and probabilities that occupy and preoccupy the canvas. In order not to represent an object or narrate a story, he creates 'diagrams'. Deleuze exemplifies: "It is precisely these givens that will be removed, whether wiped, swept, or rubbed, or else recovered, by the act of painting…the head: part of it is cleared away with a brush, a broom, a sponge, or a rag. This is what Bacon calls a 'graph' or a Diagram" (*Francis Bacon* 55). Stretching or elongating some part of the body in a painting creates a diagram. Being removed from the figurative givens the canvas turns out to be a plane of incorporealities.

According to Deleuze, shattering the optical sovereign organization Bacon transforms his work into a catastrophe. What is painted, turns out to be a chaos. The canvas is full of accidental marks and one can no longer see anything. "These traits are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are non-representative, non-illustrative, non-narrative. They are no longer either significant or signifiers: they are a-signifying traits. They are traits of sensation, but of confused sensations" (*Francis Bacon* 55).

Therefore, Deleuze argues that the diagram in Bacon functions as an operative set of a-signifying and non-representative lines and zones, traits and patches. The function of the diagram is to be suggestive. To be suggestive means to introduce possibilities of fact. Although these accidental and involuntary marks create

possibilities of fact they do not constitute a fact. They should be utilized. "To be converted into a fact, to evolve into a Figure, they must be re-injected into a visual whole; but it is precisely through the action of these marks that the visual whole will lose its optical organization, and will give the eye another power, and at the same time an object that will no longer be figurative" (*Francis Bacon* 56).

Deleuze argues that it is the diagram, being a catastrophe, a violent chaos in relation to the figurative givens, which unlocks areas of sensation in the paintings of Francis Bacon. Being wiped, swept or rubbed with involuntary, accidental marks and a-signifying traits, the Figure always appears as a deformed body escaping from itself. The body returns to the material structure and dissipates into it. Hence, by losing its contours it integrates into something. This 'something' may be seen as concrete duration, namely, the whole.

This ever-changing whole is where the multiplicity of forces acts. Bacon's painting aims at capturing forces not forms. Forces exist as intensities. These intensities are where the tension appears. This tension produces sensations. Boundas argues that "now we understand what allows Deleuze to think of sensation in terms of different orders and levels: it is the fact that forces are intensities and therefore qualified as either high or low. Intensity permits us to talk about the multiplicity of sensation without having to appeal to many sensations" (Boundas 19).

Indeed, it is the reality of becoming, which is unceasingly integrated into the whole. This process refers to opening of a whole which endures, and whose movements are so many mobile sections crossing the closed systems. This is where the levels of sensation appear. In Bacon's paintings everything seems restrained. But it is something that is going to happen. The tension is always there. This tension is the movement. And through that movement the whole is divided up into objects and objects are re-united in the whole.

4 NEW MEDIA

The scope of new media technologies ranges a broad sphere which consists of web sites, virtual worlds, virtual reality, human-computer interfaces, multimedia, interactive installations, computer animation, computer games, digital video, cinema, internet, digital imaging, 3-D modeling and information architecture. Covering all these fields new media somehow lacks a compact definition. The question 'What is new media?' always seems problematic.

This is, perhaps, because that we are in the beginning of a new age, in which new media technologies start to challenge our very notions of knowledge, information and communication. New media tends to transform not only the way we look and interpret phenomena, but also the way we act, work, play, communicate, and consume. Indeed, new media aims at a transformation of many fundamental parts of life. Within a decade it even changed the way we think about our personal and collective identities.

Thus, new media appears as an ongoing discovery for us. Nevertheless, it is possible to attain some salient tendencies. At first glance, new media seems to involve complex integration of hardware, software and existing media elements into a single application. It employs elements from broadcasting, publishing, entertainment, telecommunications and information technology. Combining audio and video elements with text, graphics and animation, new media offers integration of a variety of applications that existing media could hardly handle.

Throughout the following part, rather than analyzing a particular application of new media, I will try to address a general view of it. My aim will be to determine some basic characteristics, that is, essentials of new media technologies. I will mostly refer to Lev Manovich's book, *The Language of New Media*. That will give us a comprehensive account of the underlying principles of new media. However, in some parts I will oppose Manovich's arguments. Yet, it will be necessary to put on a critical approach while elaborating the issues concerning Manovich's text.

4.1 Salient Tendencies

According to Manovich, new media represents a convergence of two separate trajectories. These are computing and media technologies. "Both begin in the 1830s with Babbage's Analytical Engine and Daguerre's daguerreotype. Eventually, in the middle of the twentieth century, a modern digital computer is developed to perform calculations on numerical data more efficiently; it takes over from numerous mechanical tabulators and calculators widely employed by companies and governments since the turn of the century. In a parallel movement, we witness the rise of modern media technologies that allow the storage of images, image sequences, sounds, and text using different material forms – photographic plates, film stocks, gramophone records, etc." (Manovich 20).

Therefore, new media emerges via the synthesis of these two histories. It is based on the translation of all existing media into numerical data. Manovich proposes five principles in order to differentiate new media from the old one. These principles are: numerical representation, modularity, automation, variability, and cultural transcoding.

4.1.1 Numerical Representation

The principle of numerical representation reveals the formal character of new media objects. Accordingly, we may assert that all new media objects are composed of digital code. Thus, they can be described mathematically. They are subject to algorithmic manipulation, which renders media programmable. Manovich exemplifies: "for instance, by applying appropriate algorithms, we can automatically remove 'noise' from a photograph, improve its contrast, locate the edges of the shapes, or change its proportions" (Manovich 27).

We can also convert various forms of old media into the form of new media, that is, numerical representation. This process is called digitization, and it involves transforming analog data into digital data. Digitization consists of two parts. "First, data is sampled, most often at regular intervals, such as the grid of pixels used to represent a digital image. The frequency of sampling is referred to as resolution. Sampling turns continuous data into discrete data, that is, data occurring in distinct units: people, the pages of a book, pixels. Second, each step

is quantified, that is, it is assigned a numerical value drawn from a defined range (Manovich 28).

4.1.2 Modularity

According to the principle of modularity, each new media object maintain it separate identity within every process it undergoes. Any new media object can be combined to larger objects without losing its independence. In other words, a new media object has the same modular structure throughout. Each new media object consists of independent parts, which can be represented as collections of discrete samples.

The structure of an HTML document can be given as a good example of modularity. An HTML text consists of a number of separate elements. GIF and JPEG images, Flash movies, MPEG movie clips and/or text are all stored independently. Yet, by the execution of the page all seems to combine and work in a unity. Also, the World Wide Web is an example of modular structure. It consists of various web pages each consisting of separate media elements. Though these elements are stored independently as fractal structures they can all be assembled into larger systems. These modular parts can be accessed, modified, or substituted without affecting the overall structure. Manovich asserts:

"…Deleting parts of new media does not render it meaningless. In fact, the modular structure of new media makes such deletion and substitution of parts

particularly easy. For example, since an HTML document consists of a number of separate objects each represented by a line of HTML code, it is very easy to delete, substitute, or add new objects. Similarly, since in Photoshop the parts of a digital image usually kept placed on separate layers, these parts can be deleted and substituted with a click of a button" (Manovich 31).

4.1.3 Automation

The third principle is automation. It can be seen as a consequence of the two previous principles. It is the self-generated ability of a computer-controlled device to assemble information from databases and format it using generic templates and scripts. Put differently, it is the self-automated process of computer-based technologies for employing various algorithms to data structures. Manovich distinguishes between two types of automation. The first one is the low-level automation. Programs of word processing, presentation, web creation and image editing employ diverse levels of low-level automation.

The second type is the high-level automation, which is determined by the capacity of a computer to understand the meanings embedded in the objects being generated. This type of automation is mostly employed in projects of Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life. "Other computer programs can automatically generate 3-D objects such as trees, landscapes, and human figures as well as detailed ready-to-use animations of complex natural phenomena such as fire and

waterfalls. In Hollywood films, flocks of birds, ant colonies, and crowds of people are automatically created by AL (artificial life) software" (Manovich 32).

4.1.4 Variability

Variability is the fourth principle. This also appears as a consequence of the first two principles: numerical coding of media and the modular structure of a media object. It is the most crucial principle within the context of this thesis. Yet, I will give a general account of it in accordance with Manovich's text and leave the discussion to the next part of this chapter.

Manovich asserts "Old media involved human creator who manually assembled textual, visual, and/or audio elements into particular composition or sequence. This sequence was stored in some material, its order determined once and for all. Numerous copies could be run off from the master, and…they were all identical. New media, in contrast, is characterized by variability. Instead of identical copies, a new media object typically gives rise to many different versions" (Manovich 36).

Hence, a new media object is not something fixed once and for all. It can exist in potentially infinite versions. The elements of new media maintain their separate identities while they are assembled into numerous sequences. The new media object exist not as a material object but as a discrete sample of data that can be sent through wires at the speed of light. The application of customized web pages

that are immediately assembled by the main server can be seen as an example to the variability principle of new media. Furthermore, according to Manovich, we can trace particular cases of this principle almost in every application of new media technologies. I will discuss some of these implementations.

Elements of new media are stored in a media database. A media database is a collection of structured data. A variety of end-user objects can be generated from this database. Indeed, creating a work in new media can be understood as the construction of an interface to a database. The interface is that which provides access to the underlying database. Seen from that aspect, we may argue that a number of different interfaces can be generated from the same data. In old media, there is no separation such as the interface and the database. Since the level of an interface did not exist, the work and the interface were the same. However, with new media, the content of the work and the interface are separated. Thus, it is possible to create different interfaces to the same material.

Another implementation of variability principle is customization. "Information about the user can be used by a computer program to customize automatically the media composition as well as to create elements themselves. Example(s)…web sites use information about the type of hardware and browser or user's network address to customize automatically the site the user will see…" (Manovich 37).

Menu-based interactivity can be seen as a particular case of this customization. It is also called branching-type interactivity. "When the user reaches a particular

object, the program presents her with choices and allows her to choose among them. Depending on the value chosen, the user advances along the particular branch of the tree" (Manovich 38). Hypermedia can be seen as another implementation, which is similar to the branching-type interactivity. In hypermedia, the multimedia elements are connected through hyperlinks. The World Wide Web is a particular application of hypermedia throughout a global network.

Manovich puts scalability forward as the most basic cases of variability principle. It is based upon the idea that different versions of the same media object can be generated at various sizes and levels of detail. "The metaphor of a map is useful in thinking about the scalability principle. If we equate a new media object with physical territory, different versions of this object are like maps of this territory generated at different scales. Depending on the scale chosen, a map provides more or less detail about the territory" (Manovich 38). Full-size image and its icon in Adobe Photoshop, full text and its shorter version in Microsoft Word, different versions of a web site that is chosen according to the connection speed of Internet. All these can be seen as examples of variability principle.

4.1.5 Cultural Transcoding

The last and the most substantial principle of new media according to Manovich is cultural transcoding. In the context of new media, to transcode something is to translate it into another format. Hence, transcoding in new media implies the

translation of diverse processes between algorithms and data structure into 'user-friendly' arrangements, or vice versa. Seen from that aspect, such a translation is supposed to bridge two diverse types of organization. Manovich argues:

"While from one point of view, computerized media still displays structural organization that makes sense to its human users – images feature recognizable objects; text files consist of grammatical sentences; virtual spaces are defined along the familiar Cartesian coordinate system; and so on – from another point of view, its structure now follows the established conventions of the computer's organization of data. Examples of these conventions are different data structures such as lists, records, and arrays; the already-mentioned substitution of all constants by variables; the separation between algorithms and data structures; and modularity" (Manovich 45).

According to Manovich, transcoding also appears as a conceptual transfer from computer world to culture. It leads to a transformation of cultural categories and concepts. Furthermore, within this new context of new media technologies, computerized images, sounds, texts and graphics had to be reconceptualized. Manovich elaborates the structure of a computer image:

"On the level of representation, it belongs on the human side of culture, automatically entering in dialog with other images, other cultural 'semes' and 'mythemes'. But on another level, it is a computer file that consists of a machine-readable header, followed by numbers representing color values of its pixels. On

this level it enters into dialog with other computer files. The dimensions of this dialog are not the image's content, meanings, or formal qualities, but rather file size, file type, type of compression used, file format, and so on. In short, these dimensions belong to the computer's own cosmogony rather than to human culture" (Manovich 46).

Since computerization turns media into computer data this should have been done in compliance with a principle. For Manovich, such a principle should be based upon an established dialogue between humanity and computerized machinery. There should be a necessary and essential way of transcoding between the human users and the computers. Only by adopting this way of transcoding, it becomes possible to assemble a coordination between human culture and computerized media technologies.

4.2 The Dichotomy

I propose that Manovich's argument on transcoding seems problematic in two ways. At first glance, the problematic issue appears within the boundaries of new media. Manovich opens a split within new media by positing it as consisting of two distinct layers. These are the cultural layer and the computer layer. The categories of cultural layers can be exemplified as plot, composition, point of view, etc. Examples of categories in the computer layer are processes and operations that are based on computer language, algorithms and data structure. Then he adds that these two layers influence and transform each other.

He argues, "because new media is created on computers, distributed via computers, and stored and archived on computers, the logic of a computer can be expected to significantly influence the traditional cultural logic of media; that is, we may expect that the computer layer will affect the cultural layer" (Manovich 46). This way of affection is what he calls transcoding. Seen from that aspect, Manovich tries to resolve the opposition by inserting the notion of cultural transcoding, which occurs between these two distinct layers.

However, a second and more attentive look will reveal that the first opposition of the cultural layer and the computer layer, in fact, depends upon another one, which exceeds outside of new media. This is the inevitable dichotomy between the real world of us and the virtual world of computers, which is presupposed by Manovich's approach. The dichotomy is inevitable in the sense that the very language of *The Language of New Media* is weaved by notions such as 'computer's own cosmogony', 'computer's ontology', 'computerized representation of reality', etc. In other words, Manovich's text is based upon the duality of the human world and the computer world.

Manovich's conceptualization of new media resembles the notion of root-book, which is articulated by Deleuze and Guattari in 'Rhizome', the magnificent overture of *A Thousand Plateaus*. Deleuze puts the root-book as the classical book which is noble and signifying. He argues "the book imitates the world, as art imitates nature: by procedures specific to it that accomplish what nature cannot or

can no longer do. The law of the book is the law of reflection, the One that becomes two. How could the law of the book reside in nature, when it is what presides over the very division between the world and book, nature and art? (Deleuze and Guattari 5).

In fact, Manovich attempts to assign a language to new media by employing concepts that are originated by the reflection of new media itself upon the outer reality. What he calls the computerization of culture is the assimilation of this language via cultural transcoding. He defines how computerization of culture accomplishes this transcoding: "Cultural codes and concepts are substituted, on the level of meaning, and/or language, by new ones that derive from the computer's ontology, epistemology, and pragmatics. New media thus acts as a forerunner of this more general process of cultural reconceptualization" (Manovich 47).

I propose that Manovich's attempt to attain a language and/or meaning for new media is motivated by a drive to capture the phenomena, which is in a state of constant flux. Such an attempt involves a process of translation, which employs new media to organize, store, transmit and transform meaning into digits and codes. And such an approach will eventually end up in a computerized version of the 'oldest illusion'. Again, we miss the movement, change and transformation for the sake of abstraction, analysis and immobility.

Yet, new media gives us also a chance to think again the nature of becoming and change. An unstructured, non-hierarchical and open model of new media seems to create a plane of immanence that consists of multiplicities, singularities, and body without organs. In this sense, it emerges as the affirmation of Deleuzian thought with its rhizomic structure, in which new connections and arrangements are constructed and deconstructed unceasingly. In order to elaborate the issue, I will discuss the notions of database, algorithm, web and hypernarrative coextensively with rhizomic structures, forces, body without organs, events and singularities.

4.3 Becoming and New Media

Dealing with new media, we first encounter with the notion of digitization. It is the process of converting analog data to digital data. Secondly, we confront the notion of common code. Attaining a common code for every application, different media can be combined into a single digital file. And lastly, numerical representation turns media into computable data and makes it programmable.

Programmability involves a sequential process run through algorithms. An algorithm is that which specifies the sequence of steps to be performed on any data. This data is stored in a media database. And access to this underlying process is provided by the interface. All the processes and applications of new media are obtained by the integration of these three elements with each other. Manovich exemplifies this collaboration as follows: "…For instance, when the user applies a particular Photoshop filter to an image, the main Photoshop

programs invoke a separate program that corresponds to this filter. The program reads in the pixel values, performs some actions on them, and writes modified values to the screen" (Manovich 121).

Data structures and algorithms are software objects that are complementary to each other. Algorithm is the final sequence of simple operations that a computer can execute in order to accomplish a given task. A data structure is the data organized in a particular way for efficient search and retrieval. According to the principle of modularity, individual elements always retain their individual identity. Retaining such individuality, they can be wired together into more than one object.

Moreover, new media objects are constituted as variables rather than constants. In compliance with the variability principle, we may assert that a computer substitutes every constant with a variable. Manovich adds: "In designing all functions and data structures, a computer programmer tries always to use variables rather than constants. On the level of human-computer interface, this principle means that the user is given many options to modify the performance of a program or a media object, be it a computer game, Web site, Web browser, or the operating system itself" (Manovich 44).

Size, shape, color, format and degree of detail are all variables. They can be modified in accordance with a specific application. Furthermore, they keep their independence and separate identity in every process they undergo. Seen from that

aspect, a new media object appears as that which resists any absolute identification. Instead of being confined to a single identity, a new media object retains a potentially open and unstable identity.

Therefore, new media objects act like unique individuals that are employed and operated through provisional organization. Put differently, new media consists of temporary organizations, which are generated from indeterminate variables. The diverse elements are processed and organized without losing their separate identities and independence. Hence, it appears as a plane of immanence, in which new arrangements and connections are established unceasingly.

The elements in new media do not possess any determinate function. It is in this sense that they act like body-without-organs, which lack any particular organization. They are like bodies that lose their determinate character and become transitory. Just like the organs act differently under the action of different forces, the elements of new media acts in accordance with the algorithm performed. Hence, various operations that are based on algorithms can be seen as forces traversing bodies, namely, indeterminate data.

4.3.1 Database

A database is the structured collection of data. It is the collection of items on which various operations can be performed. There are different types of databases: hierarchical, network, object-oriented, etc. Each uses a different model

to organize data. "For instance, the records in hierarchical databases are organized in a tree-like structure. Object-oriented databases store complex data structures, called 'objects', which are organized into hierarchical classes that may inherit properties from classes higher in the chain" (Manovich 218).

However, navigating a database of a new media object we experience an unstructured collection of images, sounds, texts and data. Such an experience is different from the one we have when we are reading a book or watching a film. Manovich argues, "after the novel, and subsequently cinema, privileged narrative as the key form of cultural expression of the modern age, the computer age introduces its correlate – the database" (Manovich 218).

Indeed, new media, instead of a sequential narrative we are presented with a database of images, sounds, texts and graphics which can be navigated in a variety of ways. Therefore, offering alternative ways of expression, new media breaks down the hegemony of linear narrative structures. "Many new media objects do not tell stories; they do not have a beginning or end; in fact, they do not have any development, thematically, formally, or otherwise that would organize their elements into a sequence. Instead, they are collections of individual items, with every item possessing the same significance as any other" (Manovich 218).

Seen from that aspect, within that unstructured and non-narrative organization, a new media object may seem to be composed of rhizomic arrangements. Retaining

its own individuality and significance, every item acts like a machinic structure that can be rearranged within different operations. As Deleuze and Guattari argue: "A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines. You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed" (Deleuze and Guattari 9).

Thus, database appears as a territory of information in which all data exists in a continual present. It becomes a plane of immanence where events, singularities and endless juxtapositions between indeterminate data occur.

4.3.2 Logic of the Web

Web pages appear as collections of separate elements which are located within a network. Elements such as texts, sounds, graphics, images and also links to other pages are edited in such a way that they preserve their separate identities while they are composited together into a single object. Seen from that aspect, a web page appears as a sequential list of these separate elements that can be edited and rearranged in potentially infinite ways.

This is what Manovich calls the 'open nature of the web'. Since it is always possible to add new elements to the list, a web page is that which cannot be closed or concluded. Thus, it appears as a plane that is open and always in a state of change and transformation. Manovich argues " the open nature of the Web as a

medium means that Web sites never have to be complete; and they rarely are. They always grow. New links are continually added to what is already there. It is easy to add new elements to the end of a list as it is to insert them anywhere in it. All this further contributes to the anti-narrative logic of the Web. If new elements are being added over time, the result is a collection, not a story" (Manovich 221).

Hence, in particular applications of new media, we see that the linear narrative, as the old way of expression, leaves its place to another type of narrative. It is the hypernarrative. It depends upon interactivity. The user plays an active role in determining the order in which already generated elements are accessed. A hypernarrative emerges as the sum of multiple trajectories through a database whereas the linear narrative is only one among many other possible trajectories.

Seen from that aspect, we are confronted with multiplicities with their folded arrangements and assemblages. It creates a realm that is always in a state of flux. And every quantitative change concerning the numbers of connections and arrangements leads to a qualitative change in the whole. The whole is determined by the relations of parts in the web. And it appears as that which is open and which is in an endless transformation. Deleuze and Guattari write:

"Multiplicities are rhizomatic…A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature…An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as

it expands its connections. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines" (Deleuze and Guattari 8).

4.3.3 New Ways of Thinking

Structural computer programming involves a collaboration of various programs that are constituted by small and self-sufficient modules, which employs various functions or scripts. Each module has its own function, but it is also in direct relation to the whole program. For instance, scripts are the mechanisms that control various repeated actions in an operation. Besides its peculiar function each script is employed by the larger scripts it is assembled. However, such structural models lack the type of modularity that new media objects retain. If a particular module of the program is deleted, the program will not run. This is the way that structural programs operate.

Although most new media objects are based on various applications of structural programming they attain some other characteristics that differentiate them from structured computer programs. Deleting parts of a new media object will not collapse the whole application. Likewise, adding new parts will not end up in confusion or disorder. Possessing a non-hierarchical structure, new media gives us a multitude of possibilities to link documents, sounds, graphics or images in an potentially infinite variety of non-linear paths.

Similarly, World Wide Web as a non-hierarchical structure actualizes such a model through the network. Moreover, Web involves a peculiar collaboration between the users of the network. Instead of being created by a single author, links could be written by anyone participating the system. Hence, there emerges an open flow of ideas and information between the collaborators of the network.

Furthermore, with the integration of the hypertext and hypermedia applications new media begins to support mind's process of free association. Manovich writes: "…interactive computer media perfectly fits this trend to externalize and objectify the mind's operations. The very principle of hyper-linking, which forms the basis of interactive media, objectifies the process of association, often taken to be central to human thinking. Mental processes of reflection, problem solving, recall, and association are externalized, equated with following a link, moving to a new page, choosing a new image, or a new scene" (Manovich 61).

Thus, decentered and non-hierarchical models of new media produces a realm in which we leap from one image, text, graphic or idea to the next in a series of juxtapositions that present alternatives to conventional hierarchies. We find ourselves within a multidirectional web of different voices, ideas and perceptions. Hence, we discover previously undetected connections and arrangements between things, images, and/or bodies. Confronted with the non-linear and non-representative ways of thinking, we become suspicious of pre-established ways.

72

Indeed, these models produce a plane of immanence in which we perceive becoming of phenomena rather than its stabilized snapshots, that is, objects or beings that are represented. Going beyond the traditional definitions of time and space, we are introduced to a realm of events that appear in the form of endless juxtapositions.

5 CONCLUSION

In *Matter and Memory* and *The Creative Evolution*, Bergson attempts at apprehending becoming with a new tool, which he calls intuition. He aims to grasp the nature of movement and duration within that method of intuition. The method involves apprehending phenomena not in stability but in mobility. According to Bergson, any model, which attempts to constitute movement by immobile sections, will fall into an illusion. It is in this sense that he sees cinematography as 'the perfected apparatus of an oldest illusion'.

However, for Deleuze, cinematography becomes "the organ for perfecting the new reality". Opposing what Bergson once said about cinematographic image, he insists that cinema does not attempt to constitute a false movement with immobile sections. In other words, cinema does not give us an image to which movement is added. He argues that cinema immediately gives us a movement image. Thus, it does give us a mobile section, not an immobile section + abstract movement.

This mobile section is the concrete intermediary between a whole and a set. It is the movement-image, which constitutes the relationship between parts and its affection of the whole. On the one hand, a shot modifies the respective positions of the parts of a closed set. On the other it is itself the mobile section of a whole whose change it expresses. A movement-image reunites the represented objects in a frame into a single duration. This single duration is the open whole.

To put it differently, we may say that since that open whole is neither given nor giveable, its nature is to change constantly and give rise to something new. And this whole appears as an indivisible continuity. It is through the relations of bodies in space, the whole is transformed. And according to Deleuze, duration is the whole of these relations.

It is the montage in cinema. When we watch a film we are confronted not only with represented objects or bodies moving in space, but with a virtual plane that is composed of incorporeals, events and singularities. Hence, breaking the hegemony of representation, cinema produces a plane of immanence on which image and thought merge.

Therefore, the cinematographic language appears as a new way of handling the phenomena, which reveals itself in its ever-changing flux. It opens the possibility of constructions in experience prior to subjects and objects. It exiles us from a familiar conceptual terrain. By employing the movement-image and the time image it opens the possibility to deterritorialisation of ourselves. It encourages us to think in terms of multiplicities and singularities rather than identities and propositions.

Deleuze says in the interview of *Cahier du Cinema* "I liked the authors who demanded that we introduce movement to thought, 'real' movement (they denounced the Hegelian dialectic as abstract movement). How could I not discover the cinema, which introduces the 'real' movement into the image"

(Flaxman 366). It is in this sense that cinematography becomes 'the organ for perfecting the new reality' instead of being 'just the perfected apparatus of the oldest illusion' (*Cinema I* 8). And according to Deleuze, this is where the power of cinematography lies.

Similarly, extracting the body from organistic representation Bacon's painting does the same. It employs 'a logic of sense and event' rather than 'a logic of predication and truth'. Transcending the figurative painting, Bacon mainly attempts at freeing both subject and object from sensation.

Being isolated via special techniques, the Figure always appears as a deformed body escaping from itself. There occurs a movement from the Figure to the field, and vice versa. Losing its organistic representation, the body turns into a body without organs. It appears as an indeterminate organ. The organs lose their determinate character and become transitory. They are determined according to the forces that are exerted upon them.

By losing its contours, the body integrates into something. This 'something' may be seen as concrete duration, namely, the whole. This ever-changing whole is where the multiplicity of forces acts. The whole emerges as a plane of intensities and forces at work. Hence, the painting becomes a plane of incorporealities rather than a collection of represented objects.

The multiplicity of forces that are exerted upon bodies creates a field of becoming. This is a plane, in which tension appears. This tension produces a multiplicity of sensation. Seen from that aspect, this multiplicity of sensation is related to forces rather than forms.

Indeed, it is the reality of becoming that is unceasingly integrated into the whole. This process refers to opening of a whole which endure, and whose movements are so many mobile sections crossing the closed systems. Hence, we are face to face with forces and intensities rather than represented objects. This is a place where the levels of sensation appear.

Everything seems restrained. But it is something that is going to happen. The tension is always there. This tension is the movement. And through that movement the whole is divided up into objects and objects are re-united in the whole.

Indeed, this is what new media does and should achieve, in order to get away from the representation in thought. To create sensations in which the whole is divided up into the whole and the objects are re-united in the whole. To produce singularities prior to the world determined by predicates. To map out multiplicities which are determined by the forces and intensities. To create planes of immanence in which these multiplicities merge. Then, to connect and reconnect these planes unceasingly.

Although an unstructured and non-hierarchical model of new media employs various operations of structural computer programs that work with binary logic, it makes its own rupture, its own line of flight. It constitutes a map rather than a tracing. "What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real…It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency…The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification" (Deleuze and Guattari 12).

Such a decentered and non-hierarchical model appears as a map that has multiple entryways. It acts like a web of multiple threads. Like rhizome, it has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle from which it grows. "In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by circulation of sets" (Deleuze and Guattari 21).

Seen from that aspect, certain types of new media tend to be the 'line of flight' of the structural computer programming. A decentered model of a new media object makes its own rupture and deterritorializes the very arborescent structure of it. Deleuze and Guattari write: "The wisdom of plants: even when they have roots, there is always an outside where they form a rhizome with something else – with

the wind, an animal, human beings" (Deleuze and Guattari 11). Such a model, defying the laws of programming, forms a rhizome with life and art. It establishes connections and arrangements that are infinitely forking.

However, this relation between art and life is no longer based on imitation or representation. Within the context of these unstructured, rhizomic and non-hierarchical models of new media, art ceases to be the mirror of life. It is no more reflecting the *outer* reality. Hence, we witness the blurring of the boundaries between life and art, the personal and the mediated, the real and the virtual. What emerges is a plane of immanence that excludes any kind of duality or dichotomy. "There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another. This is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad…Good and bad are only the products of an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed" (Deleuze and Guattari 9).

From this point of view, art and life seem somehow connected. One is caught up in the other. Art, with its multiple modes of interaction, becomes part of life. Life, with its manner of becomings, expands and intensifies art. The relation in-between is determined by interlinking of the two becomings. "…The book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of

the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world" (Deleuze and Guattari 11).

However, new media objects may exist in the form of both rhizomic and arborescent structures. Within an certain application we may confront semiotic chains, organizations of power or stratifications instead of deterritorializations. Moreover, the possibility of reterritorialization never ceases to exist. "You make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute subject" (Deleuze and Guattari 9).

In other words, new media may emerge either in the form of hierarchical, structured, author-centered media or in the form of rhizomic, interactive and the collaborative one. The former provides tools for the social construction of meaning and communication. These are arborescent structures, which are centered models that aim at signifying and codifying meaning in order to establish hierarchies between subjectified units.

However, the latter has a character that is against codified complexes of meaning. This plane is composed not of units but dimensions and directions in motion. This is where rhizomic structures defy the arborescent ones. In this plane of immanence, we are confronted with neither subjects nor objects, but rather linear multiplicities with n dimensions. "Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between points and biunivocal

relationships between positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: the line of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature" (Deleuze and Guattari 21).

To assign a language and/or meaning to this ever-changing terrain of multiplicities is to limit its possibilities. A non-hierarchical, open and collaborative model is that which resists definitions. The definitions are contingent and confining. Seen from that aspect, such a model acts like a dictionary or encyclopaedia that is under a ceaseless construction. Defying the codified complexes of meaning, it appears as a tool that could extent our mental capability. To put it in Deleuzian words, it may be seen as the 'organ for perfecting reality'. The reality of becoming.

To conclude, I argue that although new media objects employ structured database systems, they somehow include the capacity to transform the structured and restricted experience into an open and deterritorialized one. Challenging the traditional categories, these unstructured and rhizomic arrangements of particular new media objects open a passage to deterritorialization of both the image and ourselves. Hence, what we see in an image, or what we hear in a sound block is not only the representation of objects, narration of a theme or illustration of beings but also the variation or expansion of pure becoming, which is connectable and modifiable in many parts.

Therefore, such a deterritorialized application of new media appears as a terrain, which is in the state of constant transformation. Again, we are confronted with a plane of immanence which gives us a chance to think the nature of becoming and change. It is a plane, in which events and singularities take place in the form of juxtapositions. Indeed, this is also a chance to think the connection between art and life. Via the blurring the boundaries, the practice of art is redefined. Hence, art does not have to imitate or represent nature in order to be celebrated. By establishing new connections and arrangements within an unceasing flux, it becomes what we call life. Hence, it becomes what celebrates life. Life within the course of its becoming.

6 REFERENCES

Bergson, Henri. *Matter and Memory*. Translated by N. M. Paul and W. S.
Palmer. New York: Zone Books, 1988.

___. *Creative Evolution*. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. London:
MacMillan and Co., 1911.

Bogue, Ronald. *Deleuze and Guattari*. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.

Boundas, Constantin. *The Deleuze Reader*. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Bergsonism*. New York: Zone Books, 1988.

___. *The Logic of Sense*. Translated by M. Lester with C. Stivale. Edited by C.
V. Boundas. London: Athlone Press, 1990.

___. *Negotiations*. Translated by M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995.

___. *Cinema: The Movement-Image*. Translated by H. Tomlinson & B.
Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

___. *Cinema: The Time-Image*. Translated by H. Tomlinson & B.

   Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

___. *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. Unpublished Translation.

   Translated by D. W. Smith.

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus*. Translated by B.

   Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

Flaxman, Gregory (ed). *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of

   Cinema*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

Hardt, Michael. *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*. London:

   UCL. Press, 1993.

Manovich, Lev. *The Language of New Media*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The

   MIT Press, 2000

Marks, John. *Gilles Deleuze Vitalism and Multiplicity*. Sterling, Virginia:

   Pluto Press, 1998.

Massumi, Brian. *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Cambridge,

   Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992.

Rajchman, John. *The Deleuze Connections*.   Cambridge,

    Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.

Smith, Daniel. ""A Life of Pure Immanence": Deleuze's "Critique et Clinique"

    Project." *Essays Critical and Clinical*. London: New York: Verso, 1998.