

THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE LABOUR UNIONS AND THE STATE
IN TURKEY DURING 1946—1980 ERA

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of
Political Science
and
Public Administration
of

Bilkent University

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts

By

Burak Ali Karacan

September 1995

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
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Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun



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
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ABSTRACT

In this study, the relationship between the labour unions and the state in Turkey during 1946-1980 era is analysed with the help of the application of the corporatist model. By identifying the dominant model that emerged in this relationship as mainly a variant of state corporatism, it is proposed that radicalisation and instability of the pre-1980 era, especially of the 1970s, was related to state attempts to install corporatist structures, rather than excessive demands of the labour unions.

The inquiry begins with the summary of the theoretical concepts central to this study. In the first chapter, the major varieties of state and liberal corporatism that have been identified in the most important studies on corporatism is outlined and the conditions that have proposed to explain the rise and demise of different kinds of corporatist systems are summarised. In the following chapters, concepts presented by the corporatist theory are tried to be applied to Turkey while the development of Turkish unionism is examined historically.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, Türkiye'de 1946-1980 dönemi boyunca işçi sendikaları ve devlet arasındaki ilişki korporatist modelin yardımıyla incelenmektedir. Bu ilişkide ortaya çıkan hakim model devlet korporatizminin bir çeşidi olarak teşhis edilerek, 1980 öncesi dönemin, özellikle 1970'lerin istikrarsızlığı ve radikalleşmesinin işçi sendikalarının aşırı taleplerinden ziyade, devletin korporatist yapılar yerleştirme çabalarına bağlı olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

Araştırma, bu çalışmanın merkezini teşkil eden teorik kavramların özetiyle başlamaktadır. Birinci bölümde, korporatizm hakkında yapılan en önemli çalışmalarda belirlenen devlet ve liberal korporatizmin başlıca çeşitleri ortaya konmakta ve farklı korporatist sistem türlerinin yükseliş ve çöküşünü açıklamak için ileri sürülen koşullar özetlenmektedir. Müteakip bölümlerde ise, Türk sendikacılığının gelişimi tarihsel olarak incelenirken korporatist teorinin sunduğu kavramlar Türkiye'ye uygulanmaya çalışılmaktadır.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Why write a thesis on state-labour union relationship? The first reason is that many political institutions have been analysed but unions remain relatively understudied in Turkey. The second reason is that during the last decade, unions have enjoyed a very bad reputation and they were blamed for virtually every economic and political ill, and these kinds of attitudes are still continuing today to a certain extent. It is important to note that authoritarian solutions to the labour question after the 1980 coup were introduced in the name of correcting the extremes of past decades. Unions are not perfect, but they are certainly not the source of all evil, they are the products of the society in which they are situated, and this paper tries to place them in their right context.

As one of the major interest groups in any society, trade unions expand much of their energy to dealing with the state as the important actor in industrial relations. The reason for this is simple : the state is the source of legislation and is regarded as responsible for economic prosperity. Furthermore, the state is a significant employer in Turkey and its employees have joined unions in large numbers. Therefore, the form and substance of collective bargainings inevitably places the unions in a direct relationship with the state in Turkey.

Trade unions are basically industrial organisations and are reluctant to use industrial action for political purposes. The history of trade union politics in many systems shows that any union movement doing so risks massive state retaliation. However, any industrial action inevitably does have political consequences. For example, disputes in major industries can compel government intervention and changes in government policy, and strikes in the public sector challenge government policy directly. Thus, generally, governments perceive the power of trade unions as disruptive and try to establish a smooth relationship with them in order to avoid such disruption. On the other hand, unions seek co-operation with state in order to acquire organisational and material concessions while the state promotes co-operation out of a belief in the disruptive power of the unions.

It is the main thesis of this paper that the characteristic feature of this relationship was, a greater or lesser degree, of state corporatism in Turkey in the 1946 -1980 era. Regarding the universe of interest groups in general, it would be right to argue that Turkey had a heterogeneous, hybrid system of representation in which pluralist and corporatist structures have coexisted and competed for predominance and periodic shifts have occurred between pluralist and corporatist policies since the establishment of the Turkish Republic¹. It can be claimed, however, in the domain of labour-state relations corporatist arrangements predominated and persisted in the 1946-80 era. Concerning the types of corporatism operative in the era, it is thesis of this paper that the model emerged in the organisation of labour in Turkey remained as mainly a variant of state corporatism even though it involved some elements of neo-corporatism in the 1960-80 period. In other words, although the process involved neo-corporatist mechanisms of trade-

offs in terms of the state providing both constraints and inducements, because the labour sector was still structured from above, dependent upon and penetrated by the state, it is possible to characterise the structure of the model as an example of state corporatism having some inclusionary elements.

In this study, the single-party regime of Turkey is not examined in detail, because it was assumed that until 1946, the model applied by the state had no relation with any variants of corporatism, but it was monism determined by paternalistic state approach.² Similarly, since the policy of the government has been to de-unionise rather than to corporatise the organised labour, the post-1980 era is excluded too.³

I. CORPORATISM AND PLURALISM AS ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION

Different authors have defined corporatism differently. There is a plurality of conceptual approaches, because the traditional concept of corporatism has been taken up in the decades after the Second World War by many authors independently of each other. In the corporatist literature, Schmitter's typological distinction between " corporatism " and " pluralism " seems to be the best conceptualization which could serve as the basis for building a model of interest representation.⁴ Therefore, in understanding corporatism and pluralism as alternative models for

structuring systems of interest representation , Schmitter's definition of these concepts will be used. He states : " Corporatism can be defined as a system of representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. " ⁵

As an alternative model ; " Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories. " ⁶

Schmitter's definition of corporatism combines two dimensions: recognition and control by the government on the one hand, and the structure of the system of interest representation on the other.⁷ However, the focus is on the latter, since the distinction between " corporatism " and " pluralism " is essentially based on the characteristics of the individual organisation in terms of whether or not they are compulsorily or hierarchically ordered, and on the system of organisations as to whether or

not it is defined as a representational monopoly or a singular and non-competitive system.

However, another approach to corporatism concentrates on changes in industrial relations in terms of growing government intervention in wage formation and related matters. For example, Colin Crouch places " corporatism " not only in opposition to " market liberalism ", but also to " liberal collectivism " which is characterised by the " industrial relations compromise " based on free " collective bargaining ".⁸

Lehmbruch stresses Schmitter's first dimension - recognition and control by the government - together with industrial relations. He defines a fully " corporatized " polity by the following characteristics : ⁹

1.a) Interest organisations are strongly coopted into governmental decision-making (as measured by their inclusion in advisory committees, procedures of consultation and other appropriate indicators)

b) Large interest organisations (in particular, labour unions) are strongly linked to political parties and take part in policy formulations in a sort of functional division of labour.

2. a) Most interest organisations are hierarchically structured and membership tends to be compulsory.

b) Occupational categories are represented by non-competitive organisations enjoying a monopoly of representation.

3. Industrial relations are characterised by strong "concertation" of labour unions and employers' organizations with government. It implies that labour unions refrain from strongly employing the strike weapon or highly conflictual tactics.

As it is mentioned above, the defining principles of corporatism diverge from the basic pluralist assumption of "interest group autonomy" and "multiplicity and quality in the competitive strength of interest groups". Instead, the concept of corporatism emphasises non-competitiveness, bureaucratisation and state control over them.¹⁰ Then the question is why corporatism emerges. Schmitter suggests that the corporatization of interest representation is related to certain structural imperatives of capitalist development. He also argues that historically the emergence of different varieties of corporatism are related to "differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages of the institutional development and international context of capitalism".¹¹ Accordingly, Schmitter distinguishes between two corporatist sub-types : societal corporatism and state corporatism.¹² He suggests that state corporatism has been characterised by associations that are created from above, depended upon and penetrated by the state, whereas societal corporatism has included associations that emerge spontaneously, retain considerable autonomy and themselves penetrate the state.¹³

" When viewed statically, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity. However, when viewed in motion, they appear as products of very different political, social and economic processes and

serve as vehicles for different power relations. Societal corporatism is found embedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units, open, competitive electoral processes and party systems. It appears to be the concomitant, if not the component, of the post-liberal, advanced capitalist, organised democratic welfare state. On the other hand, state corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power, elections are non-existent or plebiscitary, party systems are dominated or monopolised by a single party, authorities are ideologically exclusive and political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language or regionalism are repressed. Therefore, state corporatism seems to be the defining element of the anti liberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neo-mercantilist state."¹⁴

Schmitter states that the demise of incipient pluralism and its replacement by state corporatism seems closely associated with the necessity to enforce " social peace ", not by coopting and incorporating, but by repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands. It takes place in a situation where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and/or short of resources to respond effectively and legitimately to these demands within the framework of the liberal democratic state. On the other hand, " the decay of pluralism and its gradual displacement by societal corporatism can be related primarily to the necessity for a stable, bourgeois dominant regime, due to the process of concentration of ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalisation of decision making within the

state to incorporate subordinate classes or groups more closely within the political process."¹⁵ In short, the core of Schmitter's speculation about structural conduciveness rests on the problems generated by the delayed, dependent capitalist development and non-hegemonic class relationship in the case of state corporatism, and advanced, monopoly or centralised capitalist development and collaborative class relations in the case of societal corporatism.

What Schmitter contributes here is the outline of a model for analysing periodic fluctuations between pluralist and corporatist associational policies with reference to underlying economic change.¹⁶ Bianchi suggests a more explicit statement of Schmitter's model involving four distinct phases incipient pluralism, state corporatism, advanced pluralism and societal corporatism, and he tries to apply this scheme to Turkey.

In the remaining part of this chapter, the major varieties of state and societal corporatism that have been identified in the most important studies on corporatism will be outlined and the conditions that have been proposed to explain the rise and demise of different kinds of corporatist systems will be summarised. It is hoped that this will help to characterise the nature of Turkish corporatism in the following chapters.

II. VARIETIES OF STATE CORPORATISM

In an attempt to understand and analyse the new form of authoritarianism in Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell tries to explain the diversity of varieties of state corporatism in terms of the changing imperatives of dependent capitalist development.¹⁷ Like Schmitter, he places greater emphasis on economic conditions than political ones in explaining the emergence of different varieties of corporatism. He identifies two varieties of state corporatism. He regards them as different kinds of elite responses to political and economical crises caused by different stages of dependent capitalist development. He distinguishes between the "incorporating corporatism" of the authoritarian-populist periods and "exclusionary corporatism" of new type of state, the "bureaucratic-authoritarian".¹⁸ While he associates the first variety of state corporatism with the early phase of import substitution, he associates the second variety with more recent efforts to restructure domestic industry and strengthen its ties with international capitalism.

O'Donnell explains the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes as a reaction of dominant social groups to a series of economic and political crises. He regards these crises as a legacy of earlier populist authoritarian efforts to win lower-class support by granting new political and economic concessions. He states that Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies of populist governments necessitated the expansion of the domestic market and real increases in the purchasing power of workers. Hence, workers received important material benefits

and support for unionisation as an organisation in exchange for their political support against the previously dominant export elites.¹⁹

However, populism was also corporatist: It permitted the political activation and social incorporation of lower class groups while carefully controlling their demands by the imposition of vertical relationship subordinating the unions to the state.²⁰ In the later stages, however, populism entailed a crucial increase in the political and economic weight of the popular sector. The urban popular sector was given its first chances to have some effective say in national politics, and its leaders were able to participate in bargaining within the populist coalition.²¹ Above all, the recognition of the unions' right to represent the working class before the bourgeoisie, the codification of the right to strike, and important improvements in the statutes regulating security of employment all emerged together with corporatisation. These concessions encouraged industrialisation in its early stages but later created an obstacle to transition to a more advanced stage. Hence, in O'Donnell's view, the more co-optative and incorporating policies of the earlier corporatist regimes, the more repressive and excluding policies of recent corporatist regimes were.

In the later stages of ISI, the domestic market for simple manufactured products was satisfied and opportunities for industrial expansion became more limited. Rising inflation and balance of payments deficits as well as foreign indebtedness led to a zero-sum economic situation. This was the end of the horizontal-extensive industrial growth based on ISI. As the initial pace of industrialisation and growth of the

market lessened and gave way to the crises already mentioned, the populist state began to crumble, opening way for mass praetorianism.²² The weakened state could do little to contain the growing activation of the popular sector. The negative or zero growth undermined the economic gains made by the urban middle and working classes and hence eroded the viability of the populist coalitions on which these regimes were based.

Further development required the 'deepening' of industrialisation through the domestic manufacture of intermediate and capital goods. However, this could not be achieved without the collaboration of international capital. This necessitated the creation of an environment favourable to the activities of transnational corporations. The uncertainties and apparent risks associated with praetorianism had made international investors wary, and their confidence had to be regained in order to attract capital for an advance towards deepening.²³

This problem had inevitably political implications. In order to solve the economic problem, effective collaboration between the entrepreneurial state and its international partners was necessary, which in turn, required a high degree of "future certainty" of social peace and political stability, instead of "acute uncertainty" created by mass praetorianism.²⁴ As a result, branches of multinational corporations and various sectors of the national bourgeoisie together with the armed forces agreed on the necessity of ending the crisis before it became uncontrollable. The growing political activation of the popular sector encouraged the view that "excessive" and "premature" demands for political and economic participation were the principle cause of

uncertainties. According to O'Donnell, all of these events mentioned above caused a defensive reaction, that is the implantation of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" state which is based on exclusion of the popular sector.²⁵ The result is the emergence of a new kind of corporatist state with expanded coercive capabilities and entrepreneurial functions which has tried to restructure civil society and made it more predictable in order to attract new inflow of foreign investments.

Similar views to that of O'Donnell have been expressed by Alfred Stepan. He distinguishes "two policy poles" within state corporatism.²⁶ An "inclusionary pole" for policies aimed at integrating lower-class groups within a new economic and political order, and an "exclusionary pole" for policies that rely heavily on coercive measures to deactivate and then restructure lower-class groups.

Although he makes a distinction between these poles, he recognises that any attempt to install a regime using corporatist mechanisms often does combine inclusionary and exclusionary policies.²⁷ Therefore, the label "inclusionary" or "exclusionary" when attached to corporatist systems refers to the dominant policy orientation of the state elite.

As it is obvious from the terminology he has used, there is much in common between his approach and O'Donnell's. Like O'Donnell, Stepan regards "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" corporatism as distinct types of authoritarian responses to crises that have arisen at different stages of economic development. He thinks that inclusionary

corporatism is more likely in the earlier stages of import-substitution industrialization, where modern elites and urban working classes perceive significant room for populist multiclass coalitions.²⁸ On the other hand, in his view, exclusionary corporatism is more likely to be attempted " if, after the import-substitution phase, the pattern of industrial development begins to stagnate, the political and economic struggle intensifies, and politics is increasingly perceived in zero-sum terms ".²⁹

In spite of the similarities between their approaches, when compared to O'Donnell, Stepan places much greater emphasis on the political conditions rather than on the common economic problems that have promoted state corporatism. O'Donnell tends to restrict, and to link casually, the emergence of " excluding " systems to the economic requirements of highly modernised, dependent capitalist systems. While Stepan, too, accepts this as frequently important, his use of " exclusionary " also covers " elite exclusive motivations that are largely political " and " a context not as explicitly tied to the crisis of import-substitution in highly modernised dependent economies ".³⁰ Stepan is primarily interested in explaining why authoritarian elites in different countries employed such different levels of coercion when attempting to install state corporatist regimes. He argues that the variety of corporatist installation attempts must be examined in terms of the responses of the already organised segments of civil society that constituted either potential sources of resistance or potential bases of support.

After distinguishing between inclusionary and exclusionary varieties of state corporatism, Stepan specifies conditions that are

"facilitating" or "inhibiting" the successful installation of such regimes.³¹ The two variables that he regards as indispensable conditions for both types of state corporatism are the state elite's organizational strength and ideological unity and its coercive, economic, and symbolic resource capacity in relation to the effective demands made on the state by civil society.³² Concerning the characteristics of civil society, he suggests three other variables which determine the relative suitability of inclusionary and exclusionary strategies. The third variable that he points out is the degree of development of autonomous parties and interest groups.³³ He assumes that the relative autonomy, strength, and number of organisations already structured along non-corporatist lines in civil society affects the potential resistance and opposition to both inclusionary and exclusionary installation attempts. The fourth variable is the degree of societal polarisation.³⁴ He regards a high degree of political and ideological polarisation as a favourable condition to exclusionary strategies, because it is seen as creating a justification for repression. However, he considers the same condition as unfavourable to inclusionary strategies, because it is seen as undermining the elite's ability to coopt already committed sectors. The final variable that he considers as central to inclusionary corporatism but less critical for exclusionary corporatism is the degree to which social welfare and other social reform programs have been elaborated prior to the installation attempts.³⁵ He regards the low degree of prior social welfare legislation as favourable to inclusionary strategies, because it gives the elite a substantial "reform space" for incorporating lower class groups by initiating redistributive measures and benefits on the acceptance of new state controlled associations.

David and Ruth Collier have proposed an alternative framework for distinguishing varieties of state corporatism on the basis of an analysis of the relationship between the state and organised labour in Latin America.³⁶ They identify wide range of corporatist techniques that have been used for controlling the labour movements. They think that the relationship between the state and interest associations, to a substantial degree, formalised in the legal system. Therefore, according to them, examination of the formal legislation that regulates state-group relations is a useful point of departure in order to distinguish different varieties of corporatism.³⁷ They restrict the focus of their analyses to the relationship between the state and organised labour, because they consider state-labour relations as a particularly crucial aspect of corporatism. They classify corporatist labour laws in terms of "inducements" to win the co-operation and/or political support of the labour leaders and "constraints" to impose direct control over labour organisations and labour leaders.³⁸ In this context, they view corporatism as involving an interplay between inducements and constraints. Like Stepan, they seek to explain the historical diversity of state corporatism not in terms of the changing imperatives of the dependent capitalist development, but in terms of the "give-and-take of politics". They observe a relationship between the larger political context and different patterns of inducements and constraints.³⁹ They argue that the relative importance of inducements and constraints in particular corporatist arrangement has been determined by two important features of the political context the extent to which the authoritarian rulers have depended on the political support of organised labour and the previous strength and autonomy of the labour movement itself.⁴⁰

Though they distinguish between inducements and constraints, the Colliers state that both of them serve as mechanisms to influence the behaviour of labour movement.⁴¹ While constraints are seen as producing compliance by the application, or threat of application of negative sanctions, by contrast, inducements involve the application of advantages. Yet, they also view inducements as mechanisms of co-optation that lead to social control. These inducements may, like constraints, finally lead to state penetration and domination of labour organisations for at least three reasons.⁴² First, an inducement such as monopoly of representation is by its nature offered to some labour organisations and withheld from others. This provision is used to undermine radical unions and promote those favoured by the government. Second, unions receiving inducements must commonly meet various formal requirements in order to receive them. Finally, "the grant of official recognition, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership, or subsidy by the state may make the leadership dependent on the state, rather than on union members, for the union's legitimacy and viability. This dependency accelerates the tendency for labour leadership to become an oligarchy less responsive to the needs of the workers than to the concerns of state agencies or the political elite with which the leaders interact."⁴³

The Colliers operationalise inducements and constraints by analysing in greater detail specific corporative provisions that generally characterised state-labour relations in Latin America.⁴⁴ Under the heading of inducements, they include provisions regarding registration, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership, and subsidy ; and under the

heading of constraints included provisions regulating collective bargaining and strikes, controls in demand-making, control of leadership and provisions for state monitoring and intervention in internal union affairs.

On the basis of an analysis of labour law provisions as an indicators of the relationship between the state and organised labour in Latin America, the Colliers identify four different varieties of state corporatism which they place along a continuum of "constraints oriented" and "inducements oriented" arrangements.⁴⁵ The Colliers distinguish between systems of "pure constraints" and systems of "pre-emptive co-optation" on the constraints side of the continuum. In the pure constraints type of the system, governments are extremely antilabour and they avoid seeking even passive support of organised labour. Instead, by repressive attempts they try to deactivate already strong and politically mobilised labour movements. This variety of state corporatism tends to appear in a context in which the primary concern of the government is with control. Rather than relying on co-optation, this control is based primarily on direct constraints on unions and is backed by considerable force and repression. In the pre-emptive co-optation type of the system which is the second variety of state corporatism on the constraints-oriented side of the continuum, elites exercise influence over the development of nascent labour movements in order to preempt the emergence of autonomous unions that are not dependent on the state. By gradually increasing both inducements and constraints they encourage the co-operation of the weak union leaders. This allows the state to retain

effective control growing labour movements without widespread and sustained coercion.

On the more inducements side of the continuum, the Colliers distinguish between two types of "populist" arrangements in which the government seeks to gain or retain the political support of labour and in which unions are relatively powerful and/or autonomous.⁴⁶ In the first type, labour is an essential support group, but it is still weak and disorganised. Thus, the government is able to use inducements to create labour movements from above. In the second type, populist elites are confronted with previously existing and already powerful labour movements. In this case, labour has a greater capacity to resist the imposition of constraints and/or the state has a greater need to extend inducements in order to gain the support and cooperation of labour. They provide critical assistance in installing new regimes and have a strong capacity to resist imposition of greater constraints. The Colliers characterise government-labour relations in these systems as "most inducement oriented" corporatist arrangements. In both cases the outcome is the elite's clear dependence on the political support of relatively strong working - class organisation. The Colliers' findings clearly indicate that a higher level of both inducements and constraints tend to be associated with the state corporatist systems lying at both extremes of the inducements-constraints continuum (with the pure constraints or most inducement oriented systems).

Finally, the Colliers conclude that it is useful to treat the distinction between state and societal corporatism not as a dichotomy but

as a continuum, with some cases located at least part way along this continuum towards societal corporatism.⁴⁷ During certain periods, adopted corporatist policies toward strong labour movements can be so heavily inducement oriented that they appear to be " intermediate cases " between state and societal corporatism. The Colliers argue that we should not conceive societal corporatism as a " phenomenon that is either present or absent ", but rather as a " series of traits that may be present or absent to varying degrees ".⁴⁸

III. VARIETIES OF SOCIETAL CORPORATISM

While many scholars have given attention to support seeking, inclusionary and inducements oriented varieties of state corporatism, many others discussed the role of state initiative, coercion and societal control in societal corporatist systems. For example, according to Leo Panitch, " although the varieties of corporatist theory are many, the common premise is that class harmony and organic unity are essential to society and could be secured if the various functional groups, and especially the organisations of capital and labour, have the right of representation in national decision making, and a high degree of functional autonomy under the aegis of the state as the supreme collective community, but they would also have the duty of maintaining the functional hierarchy and social discipline consistent with the needs of the nation-state as a whole. "⁴⁹ In short, he states that the main underlying

assumptions of existing theories on corporatism are social harmony, state neutrality vis-a-vis the groups and power equivalence between them.

However, these assumptions lead to ignore the factors of class conflict, status antagonism and center-periphery tension that corporatism is designed to suppress.⁵⁰ Corporatism's relation to capitalism and specific class interests, as well as the role of state coercion in the implementation of corporatism seems as an instrument for rescuing and consolidating capitalism rather than replacing it.⁵¹ In his opinion, the importance of liberal democracy for corporatism in a capitalist society is that " the guarantee of legal and political equality for functional groups makes the " social contract " appear as an exchange between equals, despite vast inequalities between the groups in power and distributional terms."⁵² Therefore, according to him, corporatist intermediation structures are not more than a decorative facade for force and domination.⁵³ Panitch's views lead him to deny that the major distinction between state and societal corporatism is that the former is coercively imposed from above, whereas the latter is voluntarily emerged out of group consensus. Instead, he argues that state initiative and coercion are indispensable in establishing and maintaining all corporatist systems. He states that authoritarian and liberal varieties differ merely in the degree to which the use of coercion is diffuse, sustained and direct, or specific, sporadic and indirect. He insists on that state coercion, at least in the form of repressing rank and file actions and insulting union leadership from its effects is a " sine qua non " of establishing stable corporatist structures and this raises in turn the fundamental question of the contradiction between the corporatism and political freedom.⁵⁴

As it is evident from above, he rejects the assumption of state neutrality. Rather, he employs a theory of state which sees the state as relatively autonomous. He thinks that, as Miliband pointed out with regard to Marx's famous formulation that 'the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' : "the notion of common affairs assume the existence of particular ones and the notion of the whole bourgeoisie implies the existence of separate elements which make up that whole."⁵⁵ In his view, state should enjoy a certain degree of authority to maintain the long-term interests of the whole class and intervene against the short term interests of the factions of capitalist class. For Panitch, this explains the reason of some material, economic and social gains for the working class under corporatist structures. However, these gains are still in the boundaries of capitalist structure.⁵⁶ Therefore, he points out that corporatist exchanges are asymmetric which create imbalances between groups participated in corporatist arrangements.⁵⁷

Panitch concludes that because corporatism within liberal democracies has become a powerful vehicle for reinforcing class dominance, it creates instability.⁵⁸ He argues that under the corporatist structures which have a bias against working class, trade union leaders become unable to promote the interests of their members, thus they eventually come under heavy pressure from their members to withdraw from the incomes policy structures and abstain from cooperative behaviour in broader in economic planning structures.⁵⁹ In other words, he thinks that participation in corporatist arrangements delegitimises the union leadership in the eyes of their base. In his view, this rank-and-file

dissent may culminate in the wage and illegal strike explosion to withdraw from corporatist structures which may in turn bring new state coercive measures.⁶⁰ He suggests that increasing levels of coercion will be necessary to sustain the social corporatist systems. However, to meet the challenge of a working-class united against the operation of laws, state coercion have to go far beyond the immediate field of industrial relations. To have made these laws operable, the extensive use of police powers would have been necessary, and probably would have involved limiting the rights of free speech and assembly. Hence, he states that this inherent instability of corporatism may lead to the "abrogation of liberal democracy itself."⁶¹ He warns that increasingly coercive efforts to preserve and extend corporatism are likely to encourage more overt authoritarian tendencies in the future. In short, he emphasises the similarities between societal and state corporatism and rejects the argument that voluntary participation is a distinguishing trait of societal corporatism.

Gerhard Lehmbruch observes a trend towards direct controls in economic policy to be supplemented or replaced by political bargaining of governments with large interest associations, that is to say, by corporatist consensus-building. However, he adds that it would be premature to speculate that corporatist policy making signifies the displacement of parliamentary and party government by a new pattern of consensus-building.⁶²

Gerhard Lehmbruch thinks that so far, Schmitter has given the most elaborate definition of corporatism which distinguish it from other

types of " interest intermediation ", such as " pluralism " and "syndicalism".⁶³ However, in his opinion, corporatism is more than a peculiar pattern of articulation of interests. Rather, " it is an institutionalised pattern of policy formation in which large interest organisations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in the articulation of interests, but - in its developed forms - in the authoritative allocation of values and in the implementation of such policies. "⁶⁴ For him, the traditional concept of " interest representation " is quite inappropriate for a theoretical understanding of corporatism. He thinks that the mutual penetration of bureaucracies and large interest organisations should be taken into consideration. However, he also warns that consultation and cooperation of government with organised interest groups should not be confused with liberal corporatism, because such consultations are common practises in all constitutional democracies with a highly developed capitalist economies. In his view, the distinguishing characteristic of liberal corporatism is a high degree of collaboration among these groups themselves in the shaping of economic policy.⁶⁵

He distinguishes two levels of bargaining in liberal corporatist systems : First, bargaining among the " autonomous groups " ; second, bargaining between government and the " cartel " of organised groups. However, he states that these two levels may merge into " one-step " bargaining process in which the government engages in " multilateral " talks with a plurality of associations. Thus, the government may serve as an active " mediator " between them.

According to Lehmbruch, liberal variety of corporatism is related to problems of economic policy-making which arise in a rather advanced stage of capitalist development.⁶⁶ Like Panitch, he puts an emphasis on corporatism in the relation of labour and capital. In his view, income policies appear to constitute a core domain of liberal corporatism.⁶⁷ He considers organised labour and business as the most important interest groups included in the corporatist pattern. He thinks that their collaboration in a corporatist scheme constitutes the central feature of liberal corporatism.⁶⁸

Lehmbruch distinguishes more stable and effective varieties of corporatism from more ineffective and unstable ones. He identifies three major varieties of liberal corporatism. He thinks that Austria constitutes the clearest example of the most fully developed type of liberal corporatism which he refers as " Sozialpartnerschaft " (social partnership).⁶⁹ In this system, voluntary and autonomous collaboration of a few powerful peak association concerning economic policy tends to turn into a more formal and permanent one. For example, in the case of Austria, in 1957, the government established a formal institution, Joint Commission on Prices and Wages in which labour, business, agriculture and government are represented. Formal reunions of the Joint Commission are presided over by the Federal Chancellor, however, representatives of the government sit in advisory capacity only in order not to upset numerical parity between organised labour and business. There are also informal summit meetings between the presidents of the major peak organisations preceding the formal reunions in which many issues are negotiated. This most clearly marks the shift towards

autonomous clearing between interest groups and the diminishing role of the government.

In a second category, Lehmbruch includes the less stable systems of "economic crisis management" in which concerted action is more dependent upon active state intervention and tend to break down during periods of economic recovery and prosperity. He gives the West German case as an example of this variety of societal corporatism.⁷⁹ As opposed to Austria, in ex-West Germany number of participants involved in bargaining process was rather high since a large number of associations were invited to join *Konzertierte Aktion* (Concerted Action). Its another difference from the first category is the active leading role played by the government. The Federal Minister of Economy presides over the meetings and has the main responsibility. In addition, there are officials from many ministries. Since the power structure within the interest group system is much diffuse than in Austria, coordination becomes the business of the government in West Germany. However, this leads to lower degree of effectiveness of the *Konzertierte Aktion*. As indicated above, in this state-coordinated type of liberal corporatism effective collaboration only occurs under the pressure of threatening unemployment during the times of economic crisis, and system tends to break down in periods of economic recovery and continuing boom. Hence, in practise, it serves as an instrument of crisis management rather than of continuous economic guidance.

In a third category, Lehmbruch includes highly unstable systems of liberal corporatism in which strong state initiatives and overt threats of force are required to secure bilateral co-operation from the leaders of

numerous decentralised and mutually antagonistic associations. He gives the examples of France and Great Britain representing this variety of liberal corporatism.⁷¹ In such countries, a high degree of rank-and-file autonomy and strong "class conflict" orientation of the labour movement prevents the development of liberal corporatism.

Lehmbruch also specifies the conditions which led to the emergence of different varieties of liberal corporatism that are mentioned above. According to him, the factor that clearly distinguishes the varieties of liberal corporatism is the structural characteristics of the trade union organisation.⁷² He argues that a high degree of centralisation and concentration, as in Austria, seems to be required for stable and effective liberal corporatist arrangements. However, it becomes less stable and effective if the union movement is centralised, but not concentrated, as in the case of West Germany. Lack of both conditions and high degree of rank-and-file autonomy when combined with shop level bargainings as in Great Britain, tend to impair liberal corporatist arrangements.⁷³

In addition to structural properties of union organisation, the position of the labour movement within the party system is another important independent variable determining the greater or lesser willingness of organised labour to cooperate within a liberal corporatist framework.⁷⁴ "Generally speaking, liberal corporatism is more developed in those countries where the working class movement had obtained participation in political power by the channel of party system and where, in consequence, the trade unions had gained privileged access to governmental and administrative centers of decision."⁷⁵ The commitment of union leaders to liberal corporatist arrangements is the greatest where

the social democrats have been the leading party in government as in the case of Scandinavian countries or where the social democrat party is integrated into a elite cartel as in the case of Austria.

Complementing the structural and political ones, there is a key economic factor in influencing the willingness of union leaders to cooperate in liberal corporatist system. It is the extent of state's direct involvement in industrial production and opportunities for organised labour to participate in the management of large public economic sector.⁷⁶

When the views of Panitch and Lehmbruch are compared, they seem to agree that corporatist arrangements are created and sustained by state's willingness to use inducements and constraints which encourage group leaders to accept responsibility for shaping and implementing unpopular economic policies. However, while Lehmbruch views large measure of constitutional autonomy of the groups involved and the voluntary character of institutionalised cooperation of conflicting social groups as the distinguishing trait of liberal corporatism,⁷⁷ Panitch objects this argument by stating that state initiative and coercion are sine qua non conditions of establishing and sustaining all corporatist arrangements including liberal variety of it.⁷⁸ Their explanations of the origins and development of societal corporatism also differ on a number of key issues. According to Panitch, the emergence of corporatist collaboration is dependent on " good times ", when the growth and prosperity may temporarily overshadow the deepening social contradictions. However, for Lehmbruch, corporatist arrangements often originate during " hard times ". He regards them as unconventional responses to crisis and

gradually becoming accepted as routine techniques of conflict resolution. Panitch thinks that the inherent fragility of corporatist bargaining process will result in more frequent breakdowns and likely to encourage authoritarian tendencies in the future.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Lehmbruch sees the possibility that corporatist bargaining may "spill over" and cover previously excluded issues.⁸⁰

As the comparison of Panitch's and Lehmbruch's views has revealed, Panitch's arguments represent the Marxist critique of neo-corporatism. Although he stresses the relative autonomy of the state from the bourgeoisie, there are some fundamental similarities between Panitch's and 'reductionist' Marxists' view which advocate that "corporatism is a straightforwardly a form of class collaboration. The unions are duped into a false sense of social recognition and 'incorporated' into the logic of capitalist economic restraint. Corporatism is thus a state strategy of operating directly on the behalf of the capitalist class."⁸¹ On the other hand, Lehmbruch's understanding of neo-corporatism remains tied to pluralist paradigm. He insists on treating the relationships between interest groups as if they take place between equal partners and assumes that trade unions, employers and the state will counterbalance the each other. However, this pluralist notion does not conform with the general acceptance in the corporatist literature that "corporatism is a means of stabilising capitalist economic relations"⁸² and it emerges as a result of the attempts of interventionist welfare state to resolve the problems it faced with.⁸³ In this sense, the emergence of neo-corporatism can be related to imperatives of the particular stage of capitalist development. In 1960s and 1970s, "as the modern welfare state came serve as the indispensable

guarator of capitalism by expanding its regulative tasks, it found that it needed professional experience and prior aggregation of opinion which only singular, hierarchically ordered, consensually led representative monopolies could provide."⁸⁴ Therefore, as the direct intervention in the economy required the direct cooperation of the trade unions, the concept of corporatism gained popularity in 1960s and 1970s.⁸⁵ Neo-corporatism was the nationalist solution of the domestic economies to the crisis situation in international political economy.⁸⁶ Under the prevailing neo-right mentality in 1980s, however, " it is obvious that capitalism had no ' need ' to resort to corporatism as its main source of survival: the logic of the market and the strong arm of the state would do equally well."⁸⁷

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Chapter Two

FROM PATERNALISM TO INCLUSIONARY STATE CORPORATISM : 1946 - 1960 ERA UNDER EXAMINATION

I. LABOUR AND STATE IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC UNTIL 1950

The emergence of working class as a force on Turkey's political scene is an event of the years since the Second World War. The organized expression of this class, trade unions, also made their appearance in these years. Until the end of the World War II Turkish workers were totally unprotected, with neither a party nor unions to defend their interests.¹ Because of the nature of the authoritarian single-party government, labour had no say whatsoever in the public affairs of the country in the period under review.² The republican rule, established after the end of the Independence War in 1923, recognised no rights to labour to organise or to strike. Although labour still had certain organisations of its own, they were in the form of mere associations. The government, however, closed all of them down after the strikes of the workers at the Eastern Railways and the Istanbul Tramcar Company in 1928.³ And from that year until 1946, workers lacked any organisation either in the forms of associations or unions.

Turkey was ruled by a single party, the Republican People's Party (RPP) until the formation of the Democratic Party (DP) on 7 January 1946. " Among the six principles of the RPP - republicanism, nationalism,

populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism - 'populism' and 'etatism' deserve special mention. Populism was the key concept in denying legitimacy to any interest group formed on a class basis, while etatism meant existence of a national economy under state control. The conflict limiting potential of populism and etatism was used to dominate and control the genesis and development of labour and capital organizations."⁴

Until the late 1940s, three separate pieces of legislation, adopted in 1925, 1936, and 1938 forbade the establishment of " professional associations " and those " based on a social class ". They all point to a constant legal repression on working-class. For example, Restoration of Peace Act (Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu) of 1925 discouraged the establishment of class-based organizations and specifically that of trade unions.⁵ Similarly, the Penal Code was amended in 1935 to punish strikes and the Labour Law of 1936 formally restricted strikes and lockouts by establishing legal penalties.⁶ It also carried a provision on the settlement of industrial disputes by compulsory state arbitration. Although it was silent on the issue of union organization, this was specifically outlawed by the Law of Associations adopted two years later. Associations Act of 1938 prohibited the establishment of class-based organizations. Therefore, it was virtually impossible to form trade unions for both workers and employers.

All of these above mentioned pieces of legislation indicate that the single-party state, cloaked in the Kemalist fiction of a "classless, castless, unified society", showed a paternalistic interest in the problems of labour while it rigorously disallowed any self-organization of workers.⁷ This official position adopted by the Republic familiarized the public with a view that was

largely borrowed from the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim.⁸ Society, according to this view, was an interrelated whole held together by the functional division of labour and reinforced by the collective values which members shared as a nation. Moreover, there were no classes in society but rather strata which arose from the same functional division of labour. Therefore, the function of the state was to aid and protect all the members of society as well as to arbitrate among them when conflicts arose. As a result of this reasoning, the state's attitude towards labour remained paternalistic and active unions were discouraged. During the Kemalist period, all types of associations were clearly subordinated to a one-party apparatus and authoritarian state, which effectively suppressed the expression of interest conflict through either pluralist or corporatist channels.⁹ The single-party regime of Turkey did not utilize pluralism, or neo-corporatism, or "inclusionary", or " exclusionary " variants of state corporatism.¹⁰ Until 1947, the model applied by the state had no relation with corporatism, but it was monism determined by a paternalistic state approach.¹¹

As indicated above , the paternalistic attitude of the state inhibited trade union development for a long time. However, this policy towards union activity began to change with the end of the World War II which accelerated the process of moderating the principle of etatism that had begun in late 1930s. The timing was probably related to several other factors too, such as dissent at home, emergence of small private sector industrialist with the help of the RPP's capitalist-oriented etatism, Turkey's attempt to take its place in post-war " Free World " and the government's concern to win popular support prior to the first general election under the new multi-party regime.

As a result of the change of policy orientation within the RPP caused by above mentioned factors, the Law of Associations of 1938 was amended in 1946 which lifted the ban on establishing class-based associations. Its another important provision freed association formation from government control. Associations could be established without prior permission simply by presenting a copy of group's constitution to the Ministry of Interior and publishing public notice in a newspaper within fifteen days of organization's formation.¹² It is clear that these liberalising amendments considerably encouraged associational development throughout the post-war era. However, since the 1946 Law of Associations still prevented associations from engaging in activities outside their originally declared goals, especially from " political activities ", and a legal amendment in 1952 made it possible for the government to close them down without judicial proceedings, the RPP etatism continued.¹³

The amendment of 1938 Law of Associations covered the trade unions as well. The birth of the labour movement was made possible simply by striking from the Law of Associations the ban against groups based on class. Therefore, it was soon followed by the formation throughout Turkey of 600 trade unions, numerous other associations and even two socialist parties.¹⁴ The number of organizations that arose in the six months immediately after the adoption of the 1946 Law of Associations clearly suprised the government. The People's Party had expected the development of organized labour at a gradual pace and it was alarmed by the rapid success of opposition leaders in establishing alliances with labour.¹⁵ The workers became so politicised that by the end of the year the martial law regime in

Istanbul closed down all the unions as well as the socialist parties and arrested both labour and party leaders, accusing them of being communist front organizations.¹⁶ In order to reassert its control over union formation and activity, the government adopted a separate Trade Unions Act.

1947 became the year in which unions had their first special law in Turkey. Law 5018 entitled " Law on Employees and Employers' Unions and Union Associations " is generally considered by the Turkish social policy experts as marking the beginning of Turkish trade unionism.¹⁷ This law indeed is celebrated as an important step forward after a long repressive period during which even the spelling out of the word " union " had not been allowed. However, it should be pointed out that 1947 Law on Workers' and Employers' Unions had a ' mixed 'character . While on the one hand " the Act had liberal pluralist orientations, on the other hand it heavily relied on the role of the state in regulating the relationship between itself and organized labour and capital. "¹⁸

1947 Act brought the fragmenting and isolating strategy of "debilitating pluralism" to the labour movement.¹⁹ It gave permission to establish trade unions and employers' associations in certain industries, but the real intent of the law was to " promote a multitude of competing, small local unions, deprived of any substantial economic functions, prohibiting from forming open political alliances, and dependent upon the good will of the government in promoting the welfare of their members. "²⁰ In this period, the goals of the RPP state elite was " to keep a tight control on the form and the substance of Turkish trade unionism so as to make it subservient to the overall policy goals of the state. Therefore, the State introduced a pluralist

strategy of allowing voluntary, multiple, competitive, autonomous interest organizations in order to make it more vulnerable to state monitoring. "²¹ This goal was achieved by the imposition of state controls which could be identified as state corporatism : the state elite was directly involved in the organization of an official union via a ' labour office ' within the RPP; strikes were illegal and participating unions could be closed down by the courts up to one year; unions had the right to negotiate collective agreements for their members, but prohibition against strikes made meaningful bargainings almost impossible in practise so that industrial conflicts were subjected to compulsory arbitration; leadership of the labour movement was isolated from undesired political contamination by stipulation that unions could not " engage in politics, political propaganda or publication " and could not " become the instruments of a political organizations ". The act also encouraged rival unionism by permitting an unlimited number of organizations in the same work branch and allowed multiple membership without providing any mechanism for settling disputes over representation. The principle of voluntary membership was strictly applied to prevent the formation of union shops. Federation or affiliation with any type of multi-union organization required a formal endorsement from two thirds of the membership. Affiliation with international organizations was permitted with approval from the Council of Ministers, but this was not granted for affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions until 1960.

" The provisions of the 1947 Act were not devised against any actual threat of a significant labour movement or ideology, but were part of a strategy to prevent the subsequent emergence of autonomous unions that

are not dependent on the state. "²² In this respect, it is possible to characterise this policy as " preemptive cooptation " type of the Colliers' four different varieties of state corporatism.²³ In this type of the system which is placed on the constraints-oriented side of the continuum, state is able to retain effective control over the nascent labour movements without widespread and sustained coercion, and it tries to avoid a future labour problem by applying strong control over the development potential of labour through corporative provisions. Although this policy was firstly initiated by the RPP, it was more extensively applied under the DP rule.

II. DEMOCRATIC PARTY PERIOD : 1950-60

The Democratic Party's formation internally from the ruling elite of the RPP in 1946 signified a change in policy towards labour organisations. The DP which held power in Turkey from 1950 through 1960 had come to office with a liberal program and promised to recognise the labour's right to strike and free bargaining in its 1949 Program, and repeated this promise once in office, in the program of the First Menderes Government in 1950.²⁴ These promises, however, were never kept by the DP and its governments. On the contrary, " it shaped, dominated and incorporated the labour movement into the political system along the lines similar to the RPP. The DP's approach to the labour sector was ' non-pluralist ' and closer to a pattern of state corporatism. "²⁵

In terms of the political-organizational variables employed by Stepan to distinguish favourable and unfavourable conditions for the implementation of state corporatist policies²⁶, inclusionary authoritarian strategies of corporatism did not face much obstacles in Turkey during the DP period. As it was mentioned in the first chapter, Stepan regards a high degree of autonomous party and interest group organization as the most serious obstacle to both the inclusionary and exclusionary types of corporatism, because the greater potential for opposition increases the costs of widespread coercion.²⁷ When Turkey is examined, one may observe low associational autonomy during that period which could have facilitated the adoption of inclusionary state corporatism. Second, Stepan considers a high degree of ideological polarization as favourable to exclusionary and unfavourable to inclusionary strategies.²⁸ Under the DP rule, there was not an ideological polarization. On the contrary, the two parties had tacitly agreed not to make any concessions to the workers, and they were both committed to the prevailing Cold War ideology.²⁹ Finally, Stepan regards a low degree of social welfare legislation as favourable to inclusionary strategies because it leaves the elite substantial "reform space" for incorporating lower class groups by initiating redistributive measures and conditioning the receipt of benefits on the acceptance of new state-controlled associations.³⁰ Concerning the Turkish case, it was exactly what happened during this period. The DP was generous in distributing material benefits to the working-class, but it was conditional on their restraint from getting involved in politics. As a result, one may conclude that in terms of Stepan's variables, conditions favouring the inclusionary rather than the exclusionary form of state corporatism existed under the DP rule.

In addition to suitable political conditions, economic conditions were also favourable for the emergence of state corporatism under the DP rule. In this respect, Schmitter's argument to associate the emergence of authoritarian state corporatism with the delayed, dependent capitalist development seems valid when Turkish case is taken into consideration. Similarly, O'Donnell's views emphasising economic imperatives in the emergence of varieties of state corporatism seem to carry an explanatory value for the Turkish case. In terms of O'Donnell's distinction between two varieties of state corporatism,³¹ Turkey under the DP rule can be put into the category of "incorporating populist-authoritarian systems", associated with the early phase of import substitution. During the DP period, Turkey was still in the early phase of "easy" import substitution which enabled the DP to implement welfare programs. In fact, by these welfare policies the DP laid the foundations of extended internal market which was part of the import substitution strategy of the period. Therefore, the government often provided more benefits than the union representatives had demanded while consistently rejecting their requests for a greater role in decision making and program administration.

The policy of DP was not an exclusionary form of state corporatism aimed at repressing and excluding worker class demands. Indeed, "legislation for improvement of working and living conditions, health service, housing provisions, tax exemptions, bonuses and minimum wages for the workers were enacted and implemented without the initiative of Turk-Is, the national labour confederation, set up on July 31 1952."³² However, while incorporating the ordinary members of labour through inducements such as welfare legislation, the DP always excluded Turk-Is

from decision-taking process. The confederation was never able to establish itself as the recognized spokesman for the labour movement. The DP sought labour support by ignoring the union leadership and directly distributing the material benefits to the rank and file.³³ Turk-Is leaders were told by several ministers of labour that government had no need for " intermediate channels " in addressing the workers.³⁴ " The Democrat's strategy involved denying any credit to union intermediation for even transitory improvements in workers' material conditions, directly seeking electoral support from the rank and file by making a modest budgetary commitment to housing and welfare programs, and using repression and police harrasment against whatever specific discontent remained."³⁵ Although the DP is generally interpreted as ' populist ', it did not try to use labour organizations as a vehicle for mobizing and incorporating the popular sector. Instead, it excluded them from politics. This can be explained by the fact that the DP was not wholly dependent on working class support. The power base of the party consisted of big farmers, merchants and the nascent industrialists.³⁶ Therefore, the DP did not attempt to mobilize labour organizations in support of its populist policies.

The DP's independence from the political support of organized labour also explains why the government relied more on the " constraints " to impose new controls over union activity and leadership selection rather than on " inducements " to win the cooperation and political support of labour leaders. When Colliers' framework for distinguishing varieties of state corporatism is employed,³⁷ Turkey could be placed on the more constraints oriented side of the continuum. The DP applied many constraints during its rule. First, Although the DP had promised to recognise labour's

right to strike in 1949 and 1950 programmes, when it came to power it chose to dominate the labour movement through sustaining the pre-existing authoritarian system of interest representation. Until 1961, article 5 of the 1947 Act banning the political activity was used by the government as the " sword of Damocles " over the unions.³⁸ A striking example is the prohibition of a meeting organised by the union of Istanbul Textile and Knitting Industries Workers in 1952 in order to "promote the use of domestic products and to protest unemployment" on the grounds that such a meeting would imply political involvement of labour. Moreover, the government encouraged the apolitical trend among the workers by having the unions organised by American experts. They introduced the notion that unions should have no affiliation with any political party (as they did in Britain); instead (as in the US) they should lobby and bargain for economic concessions with the party in power. Turk-Is which was set up in 1952 with extensive aid and support from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) adopted this philosophy. This kind of unionism soon came to be known as American Unionism.³⁹

Although the DP had prohibited almost every function of unions because it perceived them as political activities, it did not hesitate to politicise the unions along its own line.⁴⁰ However, as the confederation's frustrated leaders increasingly relied on the support of the People's Party, the government began to interpret all union criticisms of its policies as illegal political activity. While Clause 5 of the authoritarian Labour Code of 1947 banned unions from pursuing political activities, " the top cadres of Turk-Is were exclusively recruited from among strong DP partisans. In fact, when in 1955-57 most administrative posts of Turk-Is were still in the hands of the

RPP sympathizers, the government openly threatened to close down Turk-Is. The crisis was overcome by the election of an openly DP partisan, Nuri Baser, as the leader. "41 The change in leadership allowed Turk-Is to retain its subsidy from the government and to preserve its symbolic position as the peak organization of the labour movement. Yet the confederation remained as powerless as ever. The DP used the ambitions of union leaders to become a deputy as well. " This double faced policy of banning political activity and then co-opting union leaders into the DP set the pattern of dependency of labour unions on the state for any organizational and policy benefits and became a disturbing source of weakness in Turkish trade union movement in the years to come. "42

Another constraint mechanism employed by the DP is related to the unions' financial resources.⁴³ In order to make them dependent on itself, it limited membership dues to 120 T.L. per year.⁴⁴ In addition, it used punishment fees which were an important source of revenue for unions as another constraint. These resources were allocated partisanly by the Ministry of Labour and discrimination was made between unions that were regarded as too friendly to the opposition or to the DP.

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Chapter Three

1960-80 ERA

I. LABOUR AND STATE DURING 1960s

1960s represent something of a milestone in Turkish history. The military coup took place in 1960 for the first time in the history of Turkish Republic and the subsequent military rule lasted until the restoration of civilian power in 1961. " The military coup carried particular features distinguishing it from the armed interventions in 1971 and 1980. Since it was a reaction against the authoritarian rule of the Democrat Party, in the line with the outlook of the social groups that formed the bases of opposition against the DP and support for the coup (the intellegensia and the civilian/military bureacracy), the coup had democratic-reformist orientations. The specific project of the coup makers was to set up the institutions of a Western European type of democracy but from above."¹

Two factors that emerged in this period lend the decade a particular complexity and interest. First, the constitution promulgated in 1961 after the military coup extended democratic rights.² It emphasized liberal pluralist freedoms and social and economic rights and duties. It can be argued that in this group of new rights and freedoms, no category has proved to be as important as the one granted to labour.³ The rights to organise, to bargain collectively, and to strike were the basic rights guaranteed to labour

by articles 46 and 47 of the 1961 Constitution.⁴ In addition to these basic rights, the new constitution also contained many provisions on work conditions, paid holidays, wage equity and social security. Based on the new constitution, two further acts respecting trade unions and collective bargainings, strikes and lockouts, namely Law 274 and 275, were enacted in 1963.⁵ Both the 1961 Constitution and these two acts tried to establish a balance by forming interest groups, trade unions and other constitutional institutions against the past authoritarian tendencies of the parliament under the DP rule.⁶ " They were marked by a concern for diffusing political power in society and aimed at adding new groups to the social bases of politics, that is, setting up pluralist power centers in the form of interest associations over a broad range of ideological, economic and social orientations juxtaposed to the state."⁷ This orientation of coup makers towards diffusing political power in society provided greater scope for social and political organisations, opposition and critical thought. The Turkish Workers Party was founded early in the decade and scored some rapid parliamentary successes. Militant youth organizations emerged. Publication of and widespread discussion of socialist ideology multiplied. Strikes, now legalized, became commonplace.

The second factor that coincided with these developments mentioned above was the rapid economic development. Their combination, that is rapid transformation of socioeconomic structures, imposed severe strains on the existing structures of Turkish society.⁸ The economic policy of this era placed increasing emphasis on planned development. The principal goals of economic policy were more rapid and concentrated industrialisation and manufacture of goods that could be competitive in foreign markets to

achieve ultimate integration into the European Economic Community by the 1990s. However, these ambitious aims necessitated greater coordination of the public and private sectors. Therefore, public policy toward associations became a key element in the attempt to reconcile rapid economic development with democracy and to avoid a return to overt authoritarian rule.⁹ " Policy toward associations sought to encourage cooperative interest group leaders in the major economic sectors to share responsibility for implementing developmental programs and to voluntarily moderate demands and make sacrifices for political participation and economic redistribution. As series of weak governments in pursuit of increasingly ambitious economic goals were confronted with growing demands from a politically more organized and conscious citizenry and with resulting crises of participation and distribution, they attempted to achieve their aims by means of general corporatisation of associational interest representation."¹⁰

Related to above mentioned political and economic objectives of policy makers, the model emerged in the organization of labour in this era was still on the state corporatist side of the continuum. However, as different from the 1950-60 era, there was " more emphasis on corporatist inducements than on constraints."¹¹ Throughout 1960s and 1970s, the neo-corporatist mechanisms of trade-offs in terms of both constraints and inducements were used in order to secure the collaboration of major interest group leaders for realising ambitious economic and political aims as mentioned above. Although this cooperation between the state and main interest groups resembled something near neo-corporatism,¹² it would be still more appropriate to characterise it as an example of state corporatism due to the fact that even the experiment with societal corporatism in Turkey was state

initiated and state directed.¹³ " It is clear that the initiative for the corporatisation of labour unions has come primarily from the state's attempt to co-opt reliable clients who are willing to share responsibility for policy implementation and not from a confident and aggressive set of union leaders seeking to translate preexisting organizational strength into a greater role in policy formation."¹⁴ Although legal acts adopted after 1960 had positive effects on labour unions, they were still weak, insecure and manipulable associations. Therefore, they generally welcomed state-initiatives in return for official recognition and privileges to improve their political and economic positions immediately and in the long-run.¹⁵ In this respect, Schmitter's differentiation between state and liberal variants of corporatism does not seem utilisable for characterising Turkish case.¹⁶ He describes authoritarian state corporatism as being coersively imposed " from above " in contexts of delayed dependent development, while liberal corporatism evolves " from below " in contexts of advanced welfare state capitalism. However, when compared to Western European experiences, the Turkish brand of liberal corporatism is unusual, because it does not emerge spontaneously from below, but is imposed from above in the absence of advance capitalist development.¹⁷ " It has resulted primarily from the efforts of government to create series of cartels in the major economic sectors and to draw them into a centralised state bargaining process that would facilitate planned economic development."¹⁸

As indicated above, the model of interest representation system in the labour sector was more close to state corporatist variant in 1960s even though it carried some elements of societal corporatism. However, the 1960s was also different from the previous decade, because there was more reliance

on corporatist inducements than on constraints.¹⁹ 1971-80 period, however, witnessed increasing constraints on the labour sector as a response to growing radicalisation, militancy and fragmentation of the labour movement.²⁰

When the Colliers' identification of four different varieties of state corporatism along a continuum of " constraints-oriented " and " inducements-oriented " arrangements is employed,²¹ Turkey under the Democratic Party rule seems more on the " preemptive co-optation " type of the constraints oriented side of the continuum. According to the Colliers' categorisation, in this type of the system, elites have exercised early and continuous influence over the development of nascent labour movements. By gradually increasing both constraints and inducements, they have encouraged the cooperation of weak union leaders. This allowed the state to have effective control over growing labour movements without widespread and sustained coercion. On the other hand, the period after the military coup of 1960 seems more on the inducements-oriented side of the continuum. In this type of categorisation, labour emerges as an essential support group, but because of the still weak and disorganised structure of unionism, governments are able to use inducements to create labour movements from above and keep them under control.

The Colliers argue that certain inclusionary arrangements have differed so much from other varieties of state corporatism that they may be considered emerging forms of societal corporatism. According to them, during certain periods, adopted policies towards labour movements can be so heavily inducements-oriented and so clearly tied to the search for working

class support that they appear to be intermediate cases between state and societal corporatism.²² These arguments seem to be valid for Turkish case especially when governments' great reliance on inducements rather than constraints over labour unions in 1960-71 era is taken into consideration. During this period, governments' policies towards labour unions were heavily inducements-oriented in order to secure their collaboration for realising ambitious political and economic aims. As a result of this emphasis on inducements, the model emerged in the organisation of labour in 1960-71 era could also be characterised as an " intermediate or hybrid case " between state and societal corporatism.²³

" There were three basic categories of inducements offered to the Turkish working class between 1960 and 1971. The first was the progressive welfare legislation, chiefly initiated by the right-of-center successor of the Democratic Party, the Justice Party (JP) which remained in power with absolute majorities from 1965 to 1971."²⁴ Many issues were addressed by the legislation. For instance, 1961 Constitution had a new emphasis on social security and minimum wages for employees; 1961 Law on State Retirement Fund (no.228) combined the previous legislation on retirement, insurance and health services; 1964 Minimum Wage Regulations brought arrangements concerning minimum wage; 1964 Social Insurance Act (no.506) covered retirement fund and insurance of employees in the case of employment injury, occupational disease, illness, and disability; 1969 Labour Law (no.931) outlawed Labour Code of 1936 and regulated employment, individual contracts, compensation, working conditions, hours, health and safety, severance pay, and layoffs; 1969 Decree on Employment and Working Conditions of Pregnant Women and Mothers with Dependent

Children (no.6/11 645) regulated the work conditions and paid time off for pregnant women and mothers.²⁵ " Together with the rising tendency in real wages between 1963 and 1971, these legislations granted the working class greater privileges and rights compared with other less developed countries."²⁶ In fact, these welfare state redistributions in the 1960s were possible thanks to the rapid economic development resulting from positive international conjuncture.²⁷ Statistical figures show that economic growth, and particularly industrial growth, was very rapid in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1970, the GDP index rose from 63.6 to 110.5, while the index of industrial GDP rose even more sharply from 45.0 to 113.5. In the same period, manufacturing workplaces more than doubled. By 1970, 173,000 workers, 20 percent of the industrial workforce, worked in factories employing more than 1,000 workers.²⁸

The second category of inducements offered to the Turkish working class was Turk-Is's access to the decision making process within the state.²⁹ The Constitution's framers had thought that accelerated industrialisation required a more centralised system of industrial relations that would necessitate the support of reliable labour leaders. Therefore, tripartite commissions including representatives from government, employers' associations and labour unions were formed which drafted two key pieces of legislation - a new Trade Unions Act and a Law on Strikes, Lockout and Collective Agreements. According to these pieces of legislation, " Turk-Is representatives together with the main employers' bodies sat officially in special commissions of the State Planning Organisation, Minimum Wages Commissions, Executive Councils of Public Economic Enterprises and other public bodies in a way reminiscent of an institutionalised cooperation with

the state in making and implementing public policies which is an important dimension of neo-corporatism in the West."³⁰

" The third category of inducements was related to provisions aiming at strengthening the organisational framework of Turk-Is. These inducements were formalised in the second Labour Code of the Turkish Republic enacted in 1963, the Act on Trade Unions (Act no.274) and the Act on Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lockouts (Act no.275). The main provisions under this heading are official recognition, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership and state help in ensuring a regular source of income for unions."³¹ According to these two Acts, which were generally referred as " twin laws "³², in order to promote industrywide unionisation and centralisation, geographic federations were eliminated and conditions for affiliation were eased. In addition, union shops were still prohibited but greater financial security was provided for dues collection. As an important corporatist inducement, the common practise of free-riding was discouraged by requiring non-union members to pay "solidarity contributions" amounting to two thirds of regular dues in order to enjoy the benefits of collective agreements negotiated by the union. " By this back-door strategy, in this decade Turk-Is was equipped with elements of organisational superiority without the impetus coming from below."³³

All of these provisions for strengthening union organisation closely paralleled Turk-Is's aim of establishing itself as the sole representative of a more centralised labour movement. The confederation leadership hoped that it might achieve the acceptance by the government and the unions of its claim to act as the only authoritative spokesman for Turkish labour.³⁴

However, in spite of centralisation and monopolisation desires of Turk-Is, the organising principle of the Labour Code was pluralist.³⁵ Several key aspects of the new Trade Unions Act were frustrating Turk-Is's goal of "fewer unions and more members" because they preserved rival unionism and maintained government's ability to fragment labour organisation.³⁶ Acts no.275 and 275 encouraged multiplicity of unionism, caused "union inflation" and accelerated the establishment of small and ineffective unions vulnerable to political influence and employer control.³⁷ These acts permitted an unlimited number of unions in each work branch and allowed multiple voluntary membership. Moreover, the Ministry of Labour remained as the only body authorised to decide on work branches that structure union organisations. While Turk-Is demanded German model of centralised unionisation with as few as fifteen national federations, the government insisted on keeping a highly differentiated list of about thirty-five industrial categories. These encouragements of multiple organisations in highly fragmented work branches made the emergence of large amount of authorisation disputes possible. However, no mechanism was established for their resolution other than applying to courts.³⁸

These weaknesses in the union structure further motivated Turk-Is to intensify its efforts towards centralisation. With the help of the state, it reduced work branches to 24 in 1964, with a national union in each.³⁹ However, within this problematic legal framework, Turk-Is's efforts to establish a single national union in each industrial sector quickly alienated unionists who refused to accept confederation's discipline, and led many jurisdictional disputes with militant independent and left-wing organisations. This was the case in early 1966, in the strike at the Pasabahce glass factory.

The local union, Kristal-Is, attempted to break through the existing industry wide agreement. Turk-Is agreed with the employers' rejection of this, and tried to play a role of safety valve for the working class movement. It declared the strike illegal before any court ruling to this effect. Moreover, despite the protests of the workers on strike, Turk-Is signed a protocol with the employers' confederation to end the strike. Nevertheless, a number of Turk-Is affiliated unions refused to comply with the protocol and supported the strikers. In eighty-three days of the strike, they collected 460,000 Turkish Liras as an impressive show of solidarity for the striking workers.⁴⁰ Turk-Is responded by suspending six unions from the confederation. A few months later, in February 1967, some of the suspended unions - Maden-Is, Basın-Is, Lastik-Is, Bank-Is, Yapı-Is - came together to form DISK, the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions.

Even though DISK was second to the Turk-Is in terms of membership, it has played a far more active and effective role in the union and political affairs of the country given the number of its members.⁴¹ Towards the end of 1970s, it was able to attract new members due to its growing popularity among workers. In 1980, while the right-wing Turk-Is had thirty affiliated industrywide unions with 1,970,000 members, the left-oriented DISK had twenty-eight affiliated unions with claimed 1,635,000 members.⁴² It indicated that Turk-Is's centralisation efforts were not successful. The reasons of DISK's effectiveness can be summarised as follows:⁴³ First, DISK had a greater appeal to the urbanised working classes with increasing radical tendencies. In contrast with the Turk-Is, which has always stressed professional issues of unionism, DISK argued that professional and political issues make up a whole. It openly advocated

political struggle as indispensable for advancing the interests of the working class and declared Turk-Is's "above-party, bread and butter unionism" as a mask for collaboration with bourgeois politicians in an attempt to suppress class struggle.⁴⁴ Second, while Turk-Is has recognised the existing sociopolitical order as its starting point, DISK was engaged in a fight against it. DISK based its activities on the class struggle whereas Turk-Is tried to promote national consciousness and harmony. Third, while Turk-Is is comprised mainly of unions in the state industrial establishments, DISK as Turk-Is's chief rival was active in private and foreign owned workplaces and among civil service workers in municipalities.⁴⁵ DISK's choice of private sector as its target has helped to create an image as the real representative of labour in class struggle.⁴⁶ Lastly, DISK was successful in identifying its rival with negative aspects of the existing system. This strategy discredited Turk-Is in the eyes of workers.

The founding of DISK sharpened the conflict between workers and their employers, and accelerated the process of politicisation.⁴⁷ As DISK became more active and effective, the employers encouraged so-called yellow unions that are affiliated to Turk-Is in order to keep the unions in their factories under control. However, such kinds of actions discredited Turk-Is even more in the eyes of the workers. Turk-Is had great difficulty in limiting the radicalisation and militancy of its own rank and file. Even when it organised demonstrations in support of economic demands, Turk-Is together with the government took prohibitory measures to prevent any spontaneous acts in favour of DISK.

As the economic crisis reduced rates of profit and the popularity of DISK associated with political unionism grew, the ruling class represented by both of the major parties (The JP and the RPP) felt threatened and decided to act.⁴⁸ In 1970, the JP government with the support of the RPP desired to move away from the pluralism of the 1963 legislation and opt for more unitary labour organisation under Turk-Is control. As a result, two discriminatory amendments were made to the Labour Code which aimed at granting Turk-Is an effective representational monopoly at the national level and eliminating its rivals. The crucial amendment specified that a trade union could organise nationally only if it represented at least one-third of the workers in that particular branch of industry. The purpose of this legislation was to destroy DISK and prevent the growth of its influence and to re-establish Turk-Is as the only labour organisation that is open to governments' and employers' demands. In fact, the government openly declared its intention in public. The Ministry of Labour announced that " unions which have become tools of ideological movements [i.e., DISK-affiliated unions] will automatically be abolished as soon as the law is passed."⁴⁹

DISK lobbied against this unjust legislation and tried to prevent the passage of the bill. However, when its efforts failed, it planned a mass demonstration against it. But before its plans were complete, it was faced with a fait accompli; factory workers, particularly DISK members in and around Istanbul left their tools and went out of the factories into the streets. This spontaneous response of the working class caught both the ruling class and also DISK leadership by surprise.⁵⁰ The demonstration began on 15 June 1970 with about 70,000 workers from over 100 factories. They blocked the Istanbul-Ankara highway. The authorities mobilised the security forces

including the army and declared martial law in the Marmara industrial region on 16 June. However, workers were armed with clubs and they fought battles with police and soldiers on June 15 and 16. Three workers were killed along with a policeman and a shopkeeper, hundreds were wounded and many others were taken into custody. These first spontaneous, large-scale political actions of working class in Turkey signalled the coming of age of increasing polarisation, politicisation and radicalisation in the labour sector.⁵¹

In return for the organisational privileges such as legislation granting Turk-Is monopoly of representation and centralisation and providing welfare concessions provided to working class, " the state imposed legal and de facto constraints on the unions to secure their commitment for maintaining social peace."⁵² The first constraint was " state intervention in collective bargaining over wages and working conditions by authorising state approved strikes but outlawing strikes against national security and those undertaken for political reasons. Second, the substance of collective agreements was controlled by the state, which fixed wages by its fiscal provisions. And, third, the legislature intervened in the area of labour employer relations by stipulating when a labour dispute would be mediated by administrative and/or judicial decisions."⁵³

In addition to these constraints, probably the most important part of the corporatist deal was the " above party politics " policy adopted by Turk-Is in exchange for organisational and welfare concessions. According to a resolution adopted by the Fifth Convention in 1964, Turk-Is decided " to remain absolutely independent vis-a-vis political parties and associated bodies thereof, and pursue an above party policy."⁵⁴ In theory, this meant

that, it did not have an alliance with any political party and it did not guide its members' votes in general elections. It advocated only the bread-and-butter type of job unionism. In the minds of Turk-Is executives, above party politics policy was in the same line with the prohibition imposed by the trade unions law on the establishment of organic links with political bodies.

Although the 1963 Trade Unions Act was highly liberal concerning the establishment of labour organisations, it was rather restrictive about their involvement in politics. Article 16 of the trade unions law stated under the heading of " Prohibited Political Activities " that " Professional bodies formed under this law are prohibited from granting or receiving any pecuniary assistance in any form to or from any political party or associated bodies thereof and also from making up a part of any political party's structure; establishing a professional organisation under the name of any political party is also prohibited."⁵⁵ Hence, the law not only prohibited establishment of any organic links between political parties and unions, but also banned them from receiving any financial support from political parties or contributing to them.⁵⁶

Despite some of its prohibitory provisions, 1963 Trade Unions Act was more liberal than the previous one concerning the political activities of labour unions.⁵⁷ There was a marked difference between the 1947 Trade Unions Act and that of 1963. In the former, " unions were banned from any political activity, and the definition of the political was made by the ruling parties. This had the consequence of political parties being unresponsive to the demands of the unions."⁵⁸ On the other hand, the latter did not prohibit all kinds of political activities. In fact, the above-quoted article of 1963 law did

not say anything preventing labour unions from working as pressure groups or supporting any political party in elections. Therefore, unions could freely engage in political affairs.⁵⁹ However, governments' attitudes remained as prohibitory as it was before.⁶⁰ A clear example of this situation could be observed in 1965 general elections in which Turk-Is had launched a political campaign. The confederation had prepared a " blacklist " to prevent the re-election of ten members of parliament from various parties who had claimed to have taken anti-labour attitudes and worked against the interests of workers.⁶¹ The campaign resulted with success and eight of the MP's could not return to parliament. However, based upon this activity, Turk-Is headquarters were searched and propaganda leaflets found there were confiscated. As this event indicated, the governments still continued their old pattern of behaviour and regarded even some pure pressure-group actions as falling within the category of prohibited political activities.⁶²

As mentioned above, the official policy of Turk-Is was to " not get involved in politics ". However, many union leaders and some top officials of Turk-Is entered parliament on the party lists of the major political parties. In fact, even though the Confederation opposed political unionism, all the affiliates and the confederation itself had close unofficial contacts with different political parties.⁶³ The executive board of Turk-Is cooperated with almost all center-right parties, particularly with the JP. Some of the major affiliates of the organisation, which had an important influence in the executive board elections, joined forces with the neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party. The only group that has openly advocated the necessity of cooperation with a political party to ensure a labour union's success was the social democratic faction within Turk-Is. This faction emerged in the early

1970s and believed in the necessity of political activity to implement social reforms and improve the living and working conditions of the workers. Their policy was in the line with the RPP. It is obvious that " changes in attitude and leadership that took place in the RPP after 1965 affected the leadership of many unions associated with Turk-Is."⁶⁴ The RPP's adoption of " left-of-center " policy and " democratic left " label had attracted the labour as a whole. The leader of the new movement in the RPP, Bulent Ecevit, invited Turk-Is to cooperate with the RPP. He stated that the above party policy of the confederation was undermining the strength of labour.⁶⁵ Ecevit's cooperation calls directed at the Turk-Is had some important effects . By the mid-1970s, the number of social-democratic unions within Turk-Is was 24, representing 40 percent of the total membership of Turk-Is.⁶⁶ In the 1973 general elections and the 1977 partial elections, the social-democratic faction of Turk-Is supported the RPP, indicating that they did not consider above party politics policy as a valid principle. However, in general, the social-democratic faction was unable to change Turk-Is's overall line of not getting involved in politics.⁶⁷

Unlike Turk-Is, DISK regarded " above party politics " policy as a mask for collaboration with bourgeois politicians. It blamed Turk-Is being a loyal follower of American type of trade unionism. DISK argued that economic and political issues make up a whole. Therefore, it openly advocated political struggle as indispensable for promoting the interests of working-class. From the very beginning, DISK had aimed at securing labour a role in the administration of the country. It wished to promote labour to the status of a " decision-maker " factor in the government. This general policy line was also stated in the " Basic Principle " section of the DISK statute.

Paragraph (e) of Article 3 read as follows : " It is not possible to gain the rights of the labour through economic struggle only. To achieve this, the labour, by using its democratic rights provided by the constitution, should engage in political battle. This battle, by rendering the labour fully conscious of its existence, will put an end to the exploitation of men by men."⁶⁸ Advocating this view, DISK employed all kinds of instruments of political struggle including demonstration, boycott, factory occupation, slowing down the work, sit-ins etc. In 1967-71 period, these actions of DISK led to violence and battles with the police in which many people were killed or wounded. In addition to these actions, following its foundation, DISK openly supported the Turkish Labour Party (TLP) in the first general elections which took place in 1969 and at these elections many DISK executives ran for parliament on the TLP lists.⁶⁹ However, the election results showed that this policy was not effective since only one among the candidates of DISK was elected.

II. 1971-80 PERIOD

Turk-Is's above party stand was part of the corporatist deal as mentioned above. Turk-Is had a heterogeneous character and there were many factions within it supporting different parties. It was Turk-Is's strategy to replace its own executives belonging to the opposition by the ones supporting the ruling party. In return, Turk-Is leaders hoped to have some benefits such as monopoly of representation, official recognition etc. However, in the atmosphere of increasing radicalisation and polarisation of 1970s, as Turk-Is

acquired greater government, business and military support for representational monopoly to eliminate its rivals, it lost its control over increasingly militant rank-and-file.⁷⁰ Thus, although the corporatist above-party politics strategy aimed at "avoiding divisive impact of politics on the union movement and promoting the organisational strength of Turk-Is, it produced effects which were the opposite of the ones that were intended."⁷¹

In the end, the corporatist deal produced more fragmentation and instability. In addition to DISK and social-democratic faction within Turk-Is, five more small unions were set up in 1970s.⁷² First of them was the Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions (MISK) which was supporting extreme right-wing, the Nationalist Action Party. The second one was the Confederation of Turkish Just Workers' Unions (HAK-IS) which supported the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party. Three remaining smaller unions with no significant role in Turkish labour movement were the Confederation of Social Democrat Workers' Unions (SOSYAL DEMOKRAT-IS), the Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Pro-Justice Women's Labour Unions (TURK ULKE-IS), and the Confederation of Turkish Communist Workers' Unions (TOPLUM-IS). All of these rival confederations competing against Turk-Is were rejecting the above-party politics strategy of Turk-Is. The inevitable result of this fragmentation which was brought by the corporatist trade-off was "ineffectiveness and reduction in the bargaining power of the labour movement as a whole which in the end served the interests of business. This weakness in turn eroded the bases for the corporatist concessions and compromises made with Turk-Is in return for keeping its rank-and-file under control."⁷³ In this respect, establishment of

DISK and other confederations can be accepted as a success for the dominant classes.⁷⁴

As a result of the weakening of Turkish working class, many anti-labour provisions were enacted in early 1970s by the military backed governments. In fact, towards the end of 1960s, the JP governments became alarmed by the growing tendency of labour unions to collaborate with opposition and get involved in politics. However, Demirel governments generally not applied severe repression, because they did not want to provide the military with an excuse to overthrow them. Rather, they stressed increasing ideological polarisation, violence and threat of anarchy in order to justify their demands for drafting a new associations law. They thought that it would enable them to establish government controls over all associations including labour unions.⁷⁵ Although the JP was unable to provide two-thirds legislative majority necessary for the constitutional revision, it was done by the inter-party government set up by the military junta after March 1971. In 1972 new Law of Associations was drafted for the regulation of voluntary groups which brought many limitations concerning the political activities of unions. The Section 1 of the Law stated that " to support or to oppose a specific political party, or to establish cooperation among political parties, or to support or prevent the victory of a political party or any of its candidates or of independent candidates in elections for parliament, local or precinct offices, or to establish cooperation among these candidates " was prohibited.⁷⁶ It broadened the government authority for the continuous control and inspection of associations' internal organisations and operations.

Although the RPP applied to the Constitutional Court to amend the new associations law and the court revised some of its provisions, it did not seriously challenge governments' broad powers of intervention. Therefore, " throughout the 1970s , coalition governments led by the Justice Party were able to revive and expand the old Democratic Party practice of selective repression by strictly enforcing the law against the troublesome student and labour organisations while tolerating or encouraging its violation by supporters of its right-wing coalition partners."⁷⁷ In fact, this combination of control and privilege was the most obvious characteristic of corporatism as pointed out in Schmitter's definition : " grant of a deliberate representational monopoly in exchange for observing some controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports."⁷⁸

The aim of the military in making the coup and bringing about these prohibitory legal provisions was to maintain social peace and to accelerate the pace of economic development. The basic problem of Turkish politics after 1971 was " the search for non-authoritarian and non-coercive means of moderating demands for participation and distribution in order to reconcile democracy with rapid economic development."⁷⁹ Thus, cooperation and compromise of large interest groups, especially the peak associations of the labour movement and the business community were seen as vital. There were some institutional proposals about the bargaining process. Some journals opened a debate on the merits of corporatism. These proposals about the bargaining process advocated experimenting with a form of societal corporatism as a possible institutional mechanism for reconciling democracy with rapid economic development. ⁸⁰ In this respect, the experiment of societal corporatism in 1978 is important even though it failed at the end.

When Ecevit returned from his tour of Scandinavia in 1976, he had announced a new opposition strategy in preparation for the 1977 elections. He declared that the RPP would organise its supporters along the lines of Scandinavian social-democratic movements by building a new relationship with professional organisations.⁸¹ Two years later in 1978, as the leading party of the coalition he tried to put this idea into practise. In order to be able to cope with Turkey's deepening financial crisis and rising inflation, he was forced to launch an experiment with societal corporatism by signing a " Social Contract " with Turk-Is in which he asked for union cooperation in holding labour costs down.⁸² By this agreement, voluntary wage restraint was traded for semiofficial recognition of Turk-Is as the exclusive bargaining agent of public sector workers. Naturally, DISK organised mass demonstrations to protest the deal. Nevertheless, six months later it became clear that " it was unworkable document because of its highly unrealistic promise of guaranteeing the public-sector workers their 1976 level of earnings."⁸³

Another interesting development which took place in 1970s was the moderation of DISK while the militancy of Turk-Is was increasing. In 1970s, Halil Tunc gradually emerged as the leader of Turk-Is who was in favour of adopting more aggressive political role. As ideological conflict multiplied Turk-Is's internal divisions, Tunc began to fear that the confederation was moving towards a major split. Therefore, the combination of increasing popularity of DISK and insistent appeals from Ecevit finally persuaded him to cooperate openly with leftists. He tried to revive the militancy within Turk-Is in order to stop the loss of membership towards socialist unions.

On the other hand, at the same time with Tunc's adoption of more militant and politically more activist line, DISK was trying to resist a new wave of radicalism. After the 12 March memorandum and the closure of TLP, DISK decided to support the RPP, which it found to be the second closest political party to its ideology. However, DISK still advocated the principles of political trade unionism and has not given up its belief that " political battle should primarily be fought by labour's own political organisation."⁸⁴ Despite ideological differences, cooperation with the RPP affected it in many ways, DISK leaders began to place greater emphasis on centralising authority in order to discipline new affiliates and focused on well-planned forms of political action and winning legislative reforms in increasingly important economic struggle.⁸⁵

In fact, DISK's bureaucrats were determined to preserve their position as respectable, law-abiding negotiators and not to disturb the state beyond a certain point.⁸⁶ However, some events showed that the spontaneous rank-and-file militancy of the working class went beyond what the DISK leadership was prepared to lead. The Taris strike on the eve of military coup, in January 1980, clearly proved this. Several socialist organisations were active in this agricultural processing complex near Izmir. The strike began when the new JP government planned to fire some workers and employ its own supporters. The spontaneous strike turned into an occupation and received wide support from other working class districts. The government sent the army equipped with armoured vehicles and helicopters to break the occupation. Street fights spread to other districts of Izmir. However, DISK leadership refused to broaden the struggle beyond Izmir and prevented the

emergence of more serious events. DISK's moderation, as it was observed in Taris strike case, resulted in its growing popularity among workers and strengthened its position as the leading representative of political unionism despite Turk-Is's new militancy.

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Chapter Four

CONCLUSION

One aim of analysing state-labour relationship in Turkey with the help of the application of the corporatist model is to show that labour unions were not the only responsible actors for radicalisation and instability of the pre-1980 era. During the last decade, unions were blamed for almost every economic and political problem of 1970s. It is important to note that authoritarian solutions to the labour question after the 1980 coup were introduced in the name of correcting the extremes of past decades. " Internal public opinion and international financial institutions claiming that it was the growth of union power which had led to the distortion of the market conditions prepared the climate for the radical reorganisation of the sector after 1980 with more extensive state controls over it."¹

This paper tries to invalidate these claims by identifying the dominant model that emerged in the relationship between the state and labour unions in 1946-1980 era as mainly a variant of state corporatism. It indicates that the labour unions were not the only source of every economic and political ill, but rather they were subject to continuous state attempts to install corporatist structures. Therefore, before putting all the blame on labour unions, responsibility should be sought in state policies that shaped them. It should be recognised that state's initiatives " to incorporate labour into the

political system through corporatist structures contributed to the failure of Turkish democracy in terms of its 'ungovernability' as became apparent in late 1970s."² In this sense, it becomes clear that even though unions are not perfect, they are certainly not the source of all evil, they are products of the society in which they are situated.

However, there is nothing unique about the Turkish case. In general, corporatist experiments end up with crisis regardless of which type of corporatism is employed, whether inclusionary or exclusionary, inducements-oriented or constraints-oriented, societal or state variant.³ It is one of the most striking and strange characteristics of corporatism that it divides and radicalises the sector it wants to unite and depoliticise.⁴ In fact, instability is inherent in the very nature of the corporatism itself.⁵ Since corporatism is biased against labour class and works asymmetrically as Panitch pointed out,⁶ it results in breakdowns. In this view, social contracts are actually uneven exchanges between groups having unequal levels of power and resources. As groups emerge and rise up against the asymmetrical applications of corporatism, fragmentation intensifies and the system becomes more unstable and fragile. Actually, it is what happened in Turkey. Although Turk-Is was eager for gaining official recognition, monopoly of representation and some welfare benefits in return for accepting imposition of asymmetrical constraints, splinter groups emerged from within it in the late 1960s and 1970s which opposed Turk-Is's "bread-and-butter" job unionism and apolitical stand. However, this fragmentation brought "more conflict, disorder and instability for the Turkish democracy. Thus, the 1970s were characterised by increasing politicisation, polarisation and

radicalisation in the labour sector "⁷ which provided justification for the 1980 military coup.

Throughout its history, Turk-Is welcomed introduction of corporatist measures as an opportunity to build itself as the sole authorised body to represent workers' interests. On the other hand, governments were enthusiastic about the formation of a powerful labour confederation which would facilitate the establishment of centralised control over labour unions. They thought that such a confederation would be a suitable tool in manipulating, co-opting and reducing the working class struggle to a mere economism.⁸ In short, the bargain between Turk-Is and state involved exclusive right of representation and the guaranteed access to policy making that Turk-Is leaders could not achieve independently, in return for moderation in exercising labour's right to strike and engage in collective bargaining.⁹ Semiofficial status and clientalism were exchanged for cooperation in reducing working-class demands and promoting social peace. However, it was these artificial attempts to create representational monopoly which were responsible for dissent within Turk-Is and for increasing fragmentation and radicalisation.

The combination of control and privilege that characterised the relationship between labour unions and state in 1946-1980 era is a clear example of Schmitter's definition of corporatism: the exchange of legal monopoly of representation and guaranteed access to decision-making process in return for some limitations on behaviour and interest articulation. However, Schmitter's differentiation between state and liberal variants of corporatism¹⁰ does not seem utilisable for the Turkish case. He explains the

transition from one variant of corporatism to the other with reference to underlying economic change. He describes authoritarian state corporatism as being coercively imposed "from above" in contexts of delayed dependent development, while liberal corporatism evolves "from below" in contexts of advanced welfare state capitalism. However, Turkish experiment with societal corporatism does not conform to his criteria, because liberal corporatism did not emerge spontaneously from below, but it was imposed from above in the absence of advanced capitalist development. In 1960s and 1970s Turkish capitalism was still trying to cope with the problems of delayed, dependent development. Attempts to implement societal corporatism in Turkey resulted primarily from the efforts of governments to create series of cartels in the major economic sectors and to draw them into centralised bargaining process that would facilitate planned economic development.¹¹

Turkish case appears conforming to Lehmbruch's definition of fully "corporatised" polity.¹² First, labour unions were coopted into decision-making process. They were included in advisory committees. As it can be recalled from previous chapter, Turk-Is represented the labour in Minimum Wage Commission, the Supreme Arbitration Board, and in ad-hoc committees for the establishment of new constitutions and labour legislation.¹³

Second, labour unions were hierarchically structured and membership tended to be compulsory. Although under the effect of pluralist orientation of 1960s, Labour Code of 1963 permitted multiple unions based on voluntary membership in the same work branch, a corporative legal

amendment was introduced in 1970 which aimed at granting Turk-Is a representational monopoly at the national level.¹⁴ According to this crucial amendment, a trade union could organise nationally only if it represented at least one-third of the workers in that particular branch of industry.

Third, industrial relations were characterised by "concertation" of labour unions and employers' organisations with government in 1960-1980 era. It implied that unions refrained from strongly employing the strike weapon or highly conflictual tactics. Fundamentally, the heavy government and business influence on Turk-Is played a restraining role on workers' struggles. One particularly clear example occurred in Kozlu where coal miners had to battle with security forces (with two miners shot) and then Halil Tunc, Secretary General of Turk-Is denounced the strike as illegal and strikers as communist provocateurs.¹⁵ Another example is the strike at the Pasabahce glass factory in 1966 which led to the establishment of DISK in 1967.

Finally, although for a long time Turkish case lacked Lehmbruch's last criteria, that is strong linkages between political parties and labour unions, apolitical trend came to an end with emergence of social-democratic faction within Turk-Is which advocated for supporting the RPP, and other confederations each of which siding with different parties - DISK first supporting TLP then the RPP, HAK-IS supporting pro-Islamic NSP, and MISK supporting the neo-fascist NAP.

When O'Donnell's views emphasising economic imperatives in the emergence of different varieties of state corporatism are applied to Turkish case, Turkey under the DP rule can be put into the category of "incorporating populist-authoritarian" systems associated with the early

phase of import substitution policy.¹⁶ During the DP period, Turkey was still in the early phase of "easy" import substitution which enabled the DP to implement welfare programs. According to O'Donnell, Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies of populist governments necessitates the expansion of the domestic market and real increases in the purchasing power of workers. Hence, under incorporating regimes workers receive important benefits and support for unionisation. When Turkish case is examined under the light of views expressed by O'Donnell, it can be claimed that by implementing welfare policies, the DP was in fact trying to lay down the foundations of extended internal market which was a part of the import substitution strategy of the period.

However, populism of the DP was also corporatist: it permitted the political activation and social incorporation of labour while carefully controlling their demands by the imposition of vertical relationship subordinating the unions to the state. While the government often provided more benefits than the union representatives had demanded, it consistently rejected their requests for a greater role in decision making and program administration. The policy of the DP was not an exclusionary form of state corporatism aimed at repressing and excluding worker class demands. However, while incorporating the ordinary members of labour through inducements such as welfare legislation, the DP always excluded Turk-Is from decision taking process. As a mechanism of control, the DP encouraged an apolitical trend among workers by having the unions organised by American experts. On the other hand, however, "the top cadres of Turk-Is were exclusively recruited from among strong DP partisans. The DP employed a double faced policy of banning political activity and then co-

opting union leaders into their own party."¹⁷ Throughout the 1970s, coalition governments led by the JP revived this old DP practise of selective incorporation. " They strictly enforced the law against troublesome labour groups while tolerating or encouraging its violation by supporters of its right-wing coalition partners."¹⁸

In terms of the political-organisational variables employed by Stepan to distinguish favourable and unfavourable conditions for the implementation of state corporatist policies,¹⁹ inclusionary authoritarian policies did not face much obstacles in Turkey during the DP period. In this era, there was a low degree of associational autonomy which could have facilitated the adoption of inclusionary state corporatism. Second, under the DP rule, there was not an ideological polarisation. On the contrary, both of the two parties were committed to the prevailing Cold War ideology.²⁰ This situation made the implementation of incorporating policies easier. Finally, there was a low degree of prior social welfare legislation as favourable to inclusionary strategies, because it left the DP substantial " reform space " for incorporating labour by initiating redistributive measures and conditioning the receipt of benefits on the acceptance of state control over unions. The DP was generous in distributing material benefits to the working class, but it made them conditional on their restraint from getting involved in politics.

By using the Colliers' identification of four different varieties of state corporatism along a continuum of " constraints-oriented " and " inducements-oriented " arrangements,²¹ it is possible to characterise the policy of the DP towards labour unions as " preemptive co-optation " type. In this kind of the system which is situated on the constraints-oriented side of

the continuum, state is able to retain effective control over the nascent labour movements without widespread and sustained coercion by gradually increasing both constraints and inducements. Through encouragement of the cooperation of weak union leaders, governments try to avoid a future labour problem. On the other hand, the period after the military coup of 1960 seems more on the inducements-oriented side of state corporatism. However, especially when great reliance on inducements over labour unions during 1960-1971 era is taken into consideration, it is also possible to characterise the model of the period as an " emerging form of societal corporatism " or an " intermediate case between state and societal corporatism ". During this period, governments' policies towards labour unions were heavily inducements-oriented in order to provide their collaboration for realising ambitious political and economic aims. " After the 1971 coup-by-memorandum, however, the motifs of state corporatism gained the prominence."²²

Considering the developments that took place in Turkey during 1970s, Panitch's views seem right regarding the inherent instability of corporatist structures due to their asymmetrical functioning.²³ Since the corporatist structures had a bias against working class, Turk-Is leaders became unable to promote the interests of their members, thus they were delegitimised in the eyes of their rank-and-file. This dissent brought fragmentation and instability which in turn led to new state coercive measures as Panitch estimated. 1980 military coup proved the rightness of Panitch's warning that increasing instability and resulting coercive efforts to preserve corporatism will bring more authoritarian tendencies and breakdowns in the future.

When Lehmbruch's identification of three major varieties of liberal corporatism is taken into consideration, Turkish experiment with societal corporatism in 1970s resemble unstable systems of " economic crisis management " in which concerted action is dependent on active state intervention and tend to break down during periods of economic recovery and prosperity.²⁴ In this state-coordinated type of liberal corporatism, effective collaboration only occurs under the pressure of threatening unemployment and it serves as an instrument of crisis management rather than of continuous economic guidance. In conformity with this view, Ecevit government as the leading party of the coalition was forced to experiment with societal corporatism in 1978 as result of Turkey's deepening financial crisis and rising inflation.²⁵ As Lehmbruch has foreseen, union leaders' willingness to participate in liberal corporatist arrangement was relatively high because social democrats were the leading party in government. However, contrary to Lehmbruch's expectations, this unconventional response to crisis was not gradually accepted as a routine technique of conflict resolution, and corporatist bargaining did not " spill over " to cover previously excluded issues.

Prior to 1980 military coup, conditions seemed favouring more the emergence of " exclusionary bureaucratic-authoritarian " type of corporatism.²⁶ There were trade imbalances, chronic shortages of foreign exchange and high levels of foreign indebtedness, all leading to increasing external economic dependence. In addition, although Turkey was successful in the " easy " phase of ISI by achieving the production of basic consumer goods for the domestic market and light industries such as glass and textile, further development necessitated the " deepening " of industrialisation

through the domestic manufacture of intermediate and capital goods. However, this could not be realised without the collaboration of international capital which in turn required a high degree of " future certainty " of social peace and political stability. As a result, a defensive reaction occurred and a " bureaucratic-authoritarian " state which is based on exclusion of previously activated popular sector emerged. Although this new type of state was obviously exclusionary, it was not corporatist. The policy of the government was not to corporatise unions, but rather " de-politicise, de-mobilise, de-radicalise and de-unionise " ²⁷ labour class. According to Sakallıoglu, " the post-1980 arrangements were not neo-corporatist and also they could hardly be called pluralist. " ²⁸

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