SOCIAL AND SPATIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY METROPOLISES WITH A FOCUS ON THE DISADVANTAGED

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

Turgut Kerem Tuncel

In Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

September 2002

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science and Public Administration

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tahire Erman
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science and Public Administration

Assist. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çırakman
Examining committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science and Public Administration

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oğuz Işık
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economic and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
Director

ABSTRACT

SOCIAL AND SPATIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
METROPOLISES WITH A FOCUS ON THE DISADVANTAGED

by

TURGUT KEREM TUNCEL

M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tahire Erman

September 2002

The thesis firstly presents a theoretical framework for the space and society relationship. By following this theoretical framework, it examines the recent social and spatial transformations in contemporary Western and Turkish metropolises. Through this effort it brings into light the similarities and differences in these metropolises in spatial and social.

ÖZET

DEZAVAJLI KONUMDAKİLER EKSENİNDEN GÜNÜMÜZ METROPOLLERİNDE MEKANSAL VE SOSYAL DEĞİŞİMLER

Tuncel, Turgut Kerem

Master, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Tahire Erman

Eylül 2002

Bu çalışma ilk olarak mekan-toplum ilişkisine dair bir teorik çerçeve sunar. Bu teorik çerçeveyi takip ederek günümüz Batı ve Türkiye Metropollerindeki son mekansal ve sosyal değişimleri inceler. Böylece bu metropollerdeki mekansal ve sosyal alanlardaki benzerlik ve farklılıkları ortaya çıkarır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mekan ve Toplum İlişkisi, Metropolller, Marjinalleşme, Dışlanma, Sınıfaltı, Etnik ve Dinsel Ayrışmalar.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

It is the responsibility of social and political science students to define and analyze social developments in order to contribute to the formulation of suitable explanations and, if needed, to provide solutions. In this respect, it is needed to follow recent affairs, in order not to be late to fulfill this responsibility. Unfortunately, Turkish scholars are usually the latecomers who follow the Western social science literature, rather than the ones setting a course to the literature. While deciding the research subject of this thesis, I intended to capture one of the pressing research subjects in recent times. Consequently, I decided to study the "metropolis", since we are living in the "age of metropolises" (see Akay, 2001).

It can be argued that the roots of the "age of metropolises" trace back to the Industrial Revolution. Since the Industrial Revolution, cities have been the centers of production, consumption, administration, leisure, confrontation, uprisings and so on. If it is legitimate to label the time period from Industrial Revolution that is late 18th century to the 1970's as the 1st phase of the "age of metropolises", then we can label the time period running since the 1970's as the 2nd phase of the "age of metropolises". What lie at the core of this transition is the transformation of labor process and regime of accumulation in production as a consequence of increasing importance of high technologies in production, and the rising significance of the service sector in the economic domain. In the 2nd phase of the "age of metropolises", we witness extreme forms of "centralization of the life" in metropolises. Consequently, urban issues turn into one of the pressing research subjects for social and political science students.

In this thesis, the main concern is the spatial and social developments in both Western and Turkish metropolises. By such a concern, it is intended to comprehend the similarities and differences between metropolises of different societies. To do this, I have focused on the recent changes in the spatial patterns of metropolises and recent social developments, particularly the changing structure of lower classes. The results of my analysis indicate a similar pattern of spatial development, namely, the fall of interactional sites of people of different social groups and classes, a process which points to the fall of public spaces in metropolises. On the societal side, however, different developments are found in the metropolises, which are the subjects of this thesis. Such a finding points to the importance of factors other than space for social developments. Among these factors, historical-social determinants appears to be the most important influential / determining factors. However, this does not diminish the importance of the perspectives advocating the significance and importance of the space and society relationship.

The recent landscape of the world metropolises is signed by decomposition and disintegration of different quarters of different social groups and classes by clear-cut boundaries between them. This points to the decline of the "ideal" public space in metropolises, and its displacement by the new type of "public spaces" that is the "public spaces" of the like-minded, like-behaving, like-earning and so on. On the societal side, the rise of the 4th World (Akay, 2001) that is the group of people, who are unemployed or underemployed with no social security or guarantee seems to be the common trend. However, the speed and strength of the process of 4th Worldization differ in different societies. In Western metropolises this process has started by the mid 1970's, which deposes itself by the huge literature on the "underclass". In Turkey, on the contrary, the formation of an "underclass" is only

recently on the agenda. It is rather the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages with significant conflictual characteristics that constitutes the most pressing problem. Actually, it is this point that the importance of historical-social determinants become visible: In Western societies, the weakness of the networks among the poor resulted in a direct inclination towards the formation of an 'underclass", whereas, in Turkey, due to deep-seated networks among the poor, the process of formation of an "underclass" slowed down and signed by new strategies in order to prevent the emergence of this process. The rise of ethnic and religious cleavages in Turkish metropolises is the reflection of the new strategies to cope with poverty and to prevent falling into the "underclass" by forming "imagined communities". Application of conflictual strategies in order to prevent the limited privileges in an era marked with increased resource scarcity is one of the most important characteristics of these "imagined communities". It must be remembered that the inherent conflictual characteristics is also directly related to the structure and mode of operation of the ethnic and religious cleavages.

The reader of this thesis must be informed that due to the objectives of the thesis, that is, the exploration of both the recent spatial and social developments in contemporary Western and Turkish metropolises, the thesis turned into a two sided, in other words, bilinear, study. In more concrete terms, I have analyzed two things in a single thesis: firstly I have analyzed spatial developments as the results of societal changes and then secondly I have focused on the consequences of social and spatial developments in Western and Turkish metropolises. While doing these, special effort is paid in order to fulfill one of the objectives of the thesis, namely, the presentation of the theoretical framework of the space and society relationship and its application. However, due to the cobweb like relationship between these two entities and other

3

factors, this effort turned into a big burden. In other words, in addition to the dialectical relationship of space and society, including various factors that affect the relationship, providing a clear as well as non-reductionist (specifically spatial-reductionist) picture in the physical limits of a master's thesis became compulsory.

In order to succeed in this burden, in the first chapter of the thesis, after providing the theoretical framework of the theory of the space and society relationship, economic changes in Western societies after the mid-1970's and the effects of this process on the spatial pattern of Western metropolises are explored. The theory of space and society relationship suggests a dialectical relationship between space and society. In other words, each entity affects and is affected by the other. So it is well grounded to expect to observe the influences of spatial patterns on social developments and affairs. Corollary to this, Western social science literature provides many examples of (urban) space's reaction upon society. Consequently, Chapter I continues with the exploration of the spatial pattern of Western metropolises and its effect on the unprivileged groups of society.

There is abundant literature on marginalization, exclusion, and the "underclass" in Western metropolises. At first instance this implies a positive and direct relationship between marginalization and exclusion and the formation of an "underclass". However, what Western literature implies does not hold true in the Turkish case. When Turkish metropolises are analyzed, similarities with Western metropolises are observed in social and spatial patterns with respect to marginalization and exclusion. Informal neighborhoods and their population in Turkish metropolises appear to be the parallel counterparts of the Western urban periphery in social cognition. The similar territorial labeling and stigmas are attached to the informal neighborhoods and their residents as in the case of Western

metropolises. However, it hardly fits into the reality to argue that the informal neighborhoods of Turkish metropolises are the sites that trigger and / or mediate the emergence of an "underclass". It is due to this fact that the Chapter II of the thesis is reserved for the analyses of the historical course of the formation of informal neighborhoods in Turkish metropolises. To do this, the rural-to-urban migration in Turkey, its social consequences in metropolises regarding migrants are analyzed. This effort provides us the opportunity to comprehend the socio-historical particularities of the Turkish urban poor. Among those, "the culture of networking" appeares to be the most important one that produces differences between the Western and Turkish urban disadvantaged groups. Our analysis showed that, despite the impossibility of full integration of the poor into the urban society in Turkish metropolises, the poor enabled themselves to cope with poverty and, in some cases, achieved an upward mobility through these networks. Also, it is found that despite the importance of socio-historical determination, by no means the entities in time remain constant. In other words, entities evolve with respect to the society's evolution, that is, a phenomenon that brings about a dynamic understanding of society and social entities. In this way, it is shown that the networks of the poor are in a constant process of transformation with respect to the society and their own characteristics, which is to say newly evolving entities carry the characteristics of the older forms out of which they come into existence.

In Chapter III, the general landscape of Istanbul, the largest metropolis of Turkey, is examined with reference to the post-1980 military coup era's social developments. The results indicate again a parallelism with the Western counterparts, namely, the crystallization of advantaged and disadvantaged groups and spatial segregation in a single urban space, and the heavy influence of economy in shaping

these developments. However, divergences are also visible. The role of culture in the definitions of "friends and foes" seems to be much stronger in Turkey when compared to the West. The most important argument in this chapter, which can also be taken as the final remark of the thesis, is the rise of conflictual ethnic and religious cleavages in Turkish metropolises that points to another difference in social domain between the Western and Turkish metropolises regarding the urban periphery both in societal and spatial terms. This points to a change in the politicization pattern of the Turkish urban disadvantaged groups, namely, a change from politicization regarding left and right wing ideologies to politicization regarding ethnicity and religion.

CHAPTER I

THE DIALECTICS OF SPACE AND SOCIETY: THE WESTERN METROPOLIS

1.1 Space-Society Relationship and the City

In the long history of human species, the development of cities can be said to be a recent phenomenon. In the course of history, first cities date back to 3000-4000 BC located in the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia. In addition to these, there are other forms of early cities in Crete, China, Greece and the Indus Valley (Turner, 1997,1). Although, we call these settlements as well as countless others as "city", the differences between these settlements must be recognized. In this sense, it is possible to categorize different kinds of cities in history. Their physical qualities, function, importance, meaning, and so on may be our dimensions while doing so. Considering these, it can be argued that the appearance of the modern large city of the contemporary world dates back to industrial revolution (Turner, 1997, 1). However, in order to catch particularities of the modern cities, we need to analyze them comparatively. In sum, "city" must be studied both in time and space continuum, in other words both historically and geographically. Certainly, this kind of a study would provide us the opportunity to comprehend the dynamics of the city.

If we start with geographical analysis of the modern city, which is more or less shaped with conscious efforts of planning, we find a number of dynamics that give their forms to cities. Donald (1992, 423) states that "debates about urban planning and architecture inevitably entailed aesthetic and psychological considerations as well as social and political ones". Ladd (1997, 234, cited in Dear, 2000, 255) points to the importance of cultural traditions in his examination of German architecture and urban design. In addition to these, of course, economics is another important and integral part of the dynamics of city formation. Turner's

argument about the role of industrial revolution in the onset of large cities is a direct evidence to this fact. Keeping these in mind, it is possible to find other dynamics that are more or less related to the above six ones.

In sum, these six dynamics and their differential interaction affect, or in stronger terms determine, the practices on space, in specific, practices on city space. Certainly, it is the practices on space that shape the physical, mental and social spaces that give cities their peculiarities.

In addition to the analysis of the dynamics of practices on space that makes differences in space and so in geography, historical analysis is required in order to examine the ontology of dynamics of these practices. This historical analysis can be conducted by searching the answer to an appropriate question. This question to be answered can be formulated as follows: Do the practices on space have an independent and separate existence or are they linked to / related to some other "thing(s)"? Likewise, are practices on space a "thing" in itself having independent / separate ends or are they related to some other ends? It can certainly be argued that practices on space have no independent existence or an end in itself. Rather practices on space are related to and an integral part of wider social processes. Practices on space cannot be separated from social affairs and have meaning only in this social frame. This issue becomes clear if one analyzes the practices on space with a historical perspective. The study of the semantic of the concept of "mode of social and spatial regulation" (Soja, 2000, 299) would provide us the means to comprehend the issue.

1.1.1 The Influence of Society on Space

The leading scholars of urbanization formulate theories in order to understand the contemporary city and processes taking place in the city space (see for instance, Pahl, 1975; Castells, 1977; Harvey, 1985). However, if we follow a very simple everyday definition of the city, it would be easier to understand the relationship between the practices on space and the social structure. For the sake of simplicity, urban space can be defined as the geographical site of settlement of people as a totality of quarters of different purposes, like residence, production, and consumption, obviously with a certain observable order and regulation. This order is achieved through certain practices on space, either conducted consciously or non-consciously. In this respect, practices on space are the regulatory practices on space.

Of course, (regulatory) practices are neither unique to urban space nor independent from the social structure. Rather they are the integral part of the wider social structure. The term "regulation", in this study, refers to conscious or non-conscious efforts to achieve more or less institutionalized, definable patterns of relationship between parties. As examples, the pattern of relationship between the slave and the master, the landlord and the serf, the employer and the employee as well as the relationship between the feminine and the masculine "entities" in patriarchal structures can be said to be the results and appearances of this sort of regulations.

In brief, practices on (urban) space are the integral part of social relationships. Social relationships in human societies are constructed with respect to the characteristics of the societies changing / transforming in the course of history. In the contemporary world, we see modern capitalist mode of social regulations, which are different from the previous mode of social regulations. As a result, practices on urban

space turn to be the regulatory practices on urban space that are concordant with the modern capitalist mode of social regulations. Actually, it is this fact that makes the differences between the modern capitalist city and the previous forms of cities, from ancient to feudal city.

If we sum up the argument declared until now, it can be said that aesthetics, psychological motives and modes, social and political matters, culture and traditions, and economics are the dimensions of the practices on space. The interplay of these dimensions determines the way of practices on space. However, the interplay of these dimensions does not come into existence like a free-floating bottle in the ocean. Rather the interplay of these dynamics is in accordance with the historical characteristics of the social life. In other words, they are an integral part of the general conduct of the social life. In this respect the practices on space turn to be the regulatory practices on space that have their roots in the mode of social regulations of a specific time period.

Soja (1989, 120) states that:

> The generative source for a materialist interpretation of spatiality is the recognition that spatiality is socially produced, and like society itself, exist in both substantial forms (concrete spatialities) and as a set of relations between individuals and groups, an 'embodiment', and medium of social life itself. ... In their appropriate interpretive contexts, both the material space of physical nature and the ideational space of human nature have to be seen as being socially produced and reproduced. Each needs to be theorized and understood, therefore, as ontologically and epistemologically part of the spatiality of social life.

And Dear (2000, 119-120) states that:

> Planning is about power. It is concerned with achieving urban outcomes that serve the purpose of powerful agents in society. Since there are many such agents, planning is also about the process of conflict, as agents attempt to maneuver to achieve their ends. The multiplicity of ends that characterize most land-use disputes is simply a reflection of the diverse intentionalities that the

various agents bring to dispute. In this context, intentionality is meant to convey nothing more complex than purpose, goal or motive. In our society, markets, legal systems, and governments are examples of institutional frameworks through which individuals and groups can express intentionality. Sometimes, when larger coalitions form to express collective intentionality, we may speak of a civic will. On occasion, of course, small powerful groups may also find ways by which to express their intentionality as a civic will. ... (F)or most of the twentieth century the urban planning apparatus has become increasingly ensconced as part of the bureaucratic apparatus of state.

In these two quotations, the link between social life and spatiality and practices on space is clearly stated. In fact this cluster of arguments are in concordance with the "city as a text" approach. As Donald (1992, 422) puts it, "the city, then, is above all a representation" in the sense that it constitutes a coherence and integrity of "interaction of historically and geographically specific institutions, social relations of production and reproduction, practices of government, forms and media of communication and so forth". It is an imagined environment in the sense that it was brought into existence by imagination and design, since there was not such a thing before.

Lefebvre (1991, 26) states that "(social) space is a (social) product". In his effort to describe this assertion, he provides information about the interrelation between the practices on space and the characteristics of the historical epoch, and he uses the term "mode of production" to define the historical epoch. "(E)very society – and hence every mode of production with its *sub-variants* (i.e. all those societies which exemplify the general concept) – produces a space, its own space" (emphasis added). Lefebvre (1991, 46) then continues to argue that "since, *ex hypothesi*, each mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode of production to another must entail the production of a new space". Being a dialectical

Marxist, Lefebvre does not speak of only economy but also of politics in his explanation of the production of space (Dear, 2000, 49).

The increasing concern for not to be an economic determinist makes leading scholars to emphasize other realms than the economic realm. By this, they gain capability to go beyond the simplistic explanations of the model of the infrastructure and superstructure duality and come up with more comprehensive explanations. One of the schools in this line is the Parisian Regulation School, which provides important insight for the scholars of urban issues.

> The appeal of regulation theory for urban political theorists, however stems from three main sources. First it presents an account of the changing character of capitalist economies and the role of cities within them. It thus provides a context against which to discuss urban political change. Second, it examines the connections and interrelations between social, political, economic and cultural change ... Third ... (f)or regulation theory, economic change depends upon, and is partly the product of, changes in politics, culture and social life (Painter, 1993, 276).

Regulation theory refers to two concepts to understand and analyze the variations in the character of capitalism with regard to time and space. These concepts are the "regime of accumulation" and "mode of regulation".

> The regime of accumulation refers to a set of macroeconomic relations which allow expanded capital accumulation without the system being immediately and catastrophically undermined by its instabilities...a regime of accumulation may be identified when rough balances between production, consumption and investment, and between the demand and supply of labor and capital allow economic growth to be maintained with reasonable stability over a relatively long period.
> However, this stability cannot arise simply as the result of the operation of the defining core processes of the capitalism ... Rather it is generated in and through social and political institutions of various sorts, cultural norms and even

moral codes. Such norms and codes are not set up for the purpose of sustaining a regime of accumulation, but they can sometimes interact to produce that effect. When this happens, they constitute a mode of regulation also referred to as 'mode of social regulation' or MSR (Painter, 1993, 277-278).

It is the "hegemonic structure" that forms the "concrete historical connection" between the "regime of accumulation" and institutional, normative, social, and political regulations that turn these regulations into MSR. Thus, MSR maintains the equilibrium and stability in order to reproduce the system through institutional forms, networks and norms. It is the "non-hegemonic phases" that social struggles persist as a result of which a new form of accumulation and regulation emerges (Esser and Hirsch, 1995, 74).

In this frame, and by the light of previous arguments, it can be inferred that city and the regulatory practices on (city) space can be regarded as both the means and the result of the MSR: in order to strengthen the "hegemonic structure", special spatial regulations are required and the regulations turn to be the aspects of MSR when the "hegemonic structure" is established.

In sum, practices on space are the products of social affairs. In this sense, society and space on which society "operates" are two distinct but highly dependent entities. Up to now only one side of the relationship between space and the social, that is the effect of the social on space, is discussed. However, as Lefebvre (1970, 25, cited in Soja, 1989,81) puts it, "space and political organization of space express social relationships but also react upon them", upon which the following section dwells.

1.1.2 The Influence of Space on Society

The above quotation from Lefebvre summarizes the dialectical relationship between society and space. Thus, at the other side of the equation, we find the effects of (social) space on society. Soja (1989, 120-121), in his analysis of materialist interpretation of human geography and history, explains the logic of this kind of a perspective as the mutual effect of society and physical and biological processes. At the expense of repeating the arguments above, the space we are dealing with is the social space, not merely natural space. But this does not make any difference in the general logic of the relationship; rather if there is a difference, it is the more visible mutual relationship. In fact, the effect of space on society is not a surprising process since every individual, every society and every civilization occupies a place in space. Social relations take place in space.

> Before producing effects in material realm (tools and objects), before producing itself by drawing nourishment from that realm, and before reproducing itself by generating other bodies, each living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces that space. *This is truly remarkable relationship: the body with the energies at its disposal, the living body, creates or produces its own space; conversely, the laws of space, which is to say laws of discrimination in space, also govern the living body and the deployment of its energies* (Lefebvre, 1991, 170, emphasis added). Activity in space is restricted by that space; space 'decides' what activity may occur, but even this 'decision' has limits placed upon it. Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order – and hence a certain disorder (just as what may be seen defines what is obscene) (Lefebvre, 1991, 143).

From these arguments it can be inferred that regulatory practices on urban space, which are the outcomes of patterns of societal relationships, have effects on societal relationships as well. The effect of practices on (city) space can be either relatively positive or negative for the particular individuals, social groups or classes since social space "permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others" (Lefebvre, 1991, 73). Dear's above statement about the power

relations embedded in urban planning may gain meaning when we consider the social effects of social space. Having argued for the importance of planning as a tool for domination over the different segments of society, however, it must be noted that what planners intend to produce as social outcomes and real experiences of people are hardly in accordance with each other (Donald, 1992, 435-437). That is, we can talk about the difficulty of the powerful to master through what they produce in order to maintain their mastery (Lefebvre, 1991,63). This is because of the contradictions due to the duality of the produced space "as both outcome / embodiment / product and medium / presupposition / producer of social activity" (Soja, 1989, 129).

1.2 The Dynamics of Spatial Structure in the Western Contemporary World: The Influence of Economy

If the practices on (social) space are produced by social relationships, which, in turn, affect society, different social spaces must be produced in different stages of human history. That is to say, the social space in feudal Europe, for instance, must be different from social space in the period of industrial revolution, which must be then different from the 'Post-Fordist' social space of contemporary times. If that is the case, it would be necessary to explore the "ways" of social relationships in a given time period in order to comprehend the social space.

Althusser (1969, 202, cited in Saunders, 1981, 185) defines three levels of social complexity, namely, economic, political and ideological. He continues to argue that in the historical process, in each mode of production, one of the three levels becomes dominant. The dominant level, which is at the final analysis determined by economic relations, has the determining role of social life. In capitalist mode of production, it is the economic level that has the determining role. A similar understanding with Althusser's notion of dominant level exists in

Sztompka's (1991, 130) theoretical framework. The dominational feature of structures at the structural level between different levels of structures results in a form of "domination of some structures among others, results in a precarious balance at the level of structures". From the four levels of social structure, namely, normative, ideal, interactional and opportunity levels, one or more dominant levels has / have the influential power over the other levels. But holding a perspective that rejects a static vision of society, Sztompka notes that the dominance of the levels are and can be changing. The levels of structures are in constant transformation so different levels of social structure can be dominant, or more than one level can constitute a dominant bloc. Also the balance may differ in time and space.

The notion of different levels provides us a useful tool to comprehend the complexity of social life. Also by the notion of different levels, one can gain insight into the different regulatory processes that take place in societal life in general and in city life in particular.

However, it is necessary to identify the dominant level in the time and space continuum in order not to lead to a mess of arguments and assumptions that lacks definitional character. As noted above, while Sztompka holds a more dynamic version, according to Althuser it is economy that holds the dominant feature in capitalist mode of production. In the literature concerning mode of social regulation and practices on (city) space in developed countries, economic level, and specifically the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, has acquired significant emphasis.

1.2.1 Fordism and Social Structure

It was the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci who first used the term "Fordism" in the 1930's. Today the term is used to refer to the 'long boom' that took place in

the world economic history between 1945 and 1974 (Painter, 1993, 278). Following Jessop (1992, in Painter, 1993, 278), we can identify four important characteristics of Fordism, namely, labor process as Taylorism (Esser and Hirsch, 1995,75) involving the moving assembly line, the regime of accumulation as "virtuous circle of growth based on mass production and mass consumption", the mode of regulation which is the Keynesian Welfare State, and mode of socialization, which is marked with the overall impact of the above aspects of Fordism.

It is evident that this is a general picture and there have been differences for all of the four aspects of Fordism in different regions of the world. However this general frame can help us to understand the general operation of the Fordist economy and its impact on social life, since Jessop's four-folded categorization is a well-organized and complementary description of the general aspects of Fordism.

One of the important features of the Fordist economy regarding our subject is its ability to create an expanded middle class. This expansion of the middle class between the rich and the poor softened the social stratification and so provided the means of social mobility especially for the upwardly mobile lower classes. According to Sassen (1994,99), manufacturing as the leading sector of Fordist economy, with wage levels that are at the level to create enough demand to promote consumption, and modeling of the leading sectors by other sectors of the economy, were the most important contributors to the creation of the means of expansion of the middle classes. Social policies promoting "social wage, government planning of economic and social life" and "application of bureaucratic principles" (Painter, 1993, 283-284) also contributed to this process.

Despite the appearance of social consensus in welfare states, it was the hidden struggles that resulted in the expansion of welfare provisions in society. In this

respect, it can be argued that it is the unifying character of the Fordist assembly line mass production of manufacturing that supplied the opportunity of acquiring welfare provisions for the working class. Labor unions and parties lie at the core of this process as being the tools / weapons of the working class for their struggle in order to get welfare provisions. Thus, as an outcome of the "stable legitimization of sociopolitical relationships supported by growth (and) consumption" (Esser & Hirsch, 1989,421, in Kennet, 1994, 1020), "institutionalized class conflict" should be regarded as the determining factor of the Fordist mode of regulation as Keynesian welfarism expanded in society.

As a result, "the dilemmas of urban marginality and social destitution" were solved efficiently by the wage-labor relationship in the Fordist era (Wacquant, 1996, 124) at least for the unionized sections of the workforce. However, in order not to be misleading, it has to be noted that social goods, such as social housing, were not distributed equally in the different sections of society, specifically to all sections of the working class (Mallpass & Murrie, 1987,74, in Kennet, 1994, 1021). For example, housing provisions were given to the politically organized sections of the working class (Harloe, 1981, in Kennet, 1994, 102) as a means of ideological legitimization and corruption, which is the "materialization of ideology" (Hay, 1992, in Kennet, 1994,1021).

Certainly, there are identifiable reflections of "Fordist society" on the regulatory practices on (city) space. The most visible / crystallized practice on the Fordist urban space is the provisions of public housing (Kennet, 1994). Kennet (1994, 1019) defines this by the term "the 'golden age' of social rented housing". According to Painter (1993), suburbanization in the U.S. and the planned land use and infrastructural provisions in the United Kingdom were the Fordist regulatory

practices in urban areas. Castells's 1977 dated work "The Urban Question" is the theoretical reflection of the social processes in Fordist city, with the conceptualization of city as the site of "collective consumption".

1.2.2 Post-Fordism and Social Structure

It is without doubt that from the mid 1970's, the world economic system has been facing a period of transformation. Transition from Fordist to Post-Fordist economy as well as globalization of economy lie at the core of this process. The changes can be briefly summarized as the increasing number and intensity of professional and service activities in economic life at the expense of declining manufacturing and customization, flexible specialization, increased importance of networks of subcontractors, and informalization at the expense of mass production. The destabilization of jobs and flexible economic activities that reflect in increased number of part-time and temporary jobs, and the tendency toward short term employment (Sassen, 1994,100-103) are the consequences of these major changes.

As the result of the transformations in the labor process, Painter (1993, 280) points to the "increased polarization between a multi-skilled (or at least multi-tasked) core workforce and an unskilled 'peripheral' workforce recruited from politically marginalized social groups". A similar argument about the influence of the changing character of the labor process in Post-Fordist economy comes from Castells. He (1998) argues for a distinction between generic and self-programmable labor as a result of no reprogramming capacity of the former, and an embodiment of knowledge that enables the laborer to "reprogram himself / herself towards endlessly changing tasks of the production process" for the latter. As a consequence, generic labor's status / role is reduced to the status / role of a machine. Furthermore, mechanization,

automatization and computerization make production more dependent on capital rather than on the low-status labor (Van Kempen and Marcuse1997, 287). However, this does not give an end to the function of the unskilled labor in the production process. As Sassen (1994, 105) claims, there is structural need for both high skilled and high paid professional labor and contrastingly low skilled and low paid labor, such as secretaries, maintenance workers, and cleaners. This low skilled, low paid labor is an integral and key component of the new economic life, according to Sassen.

However, this development in the production process, namely polarization and hence inner fragmentation of the workforce, results in the loss of the means and capacity of forming strong unions and political parties. As a consequence, large portions of the workforce, namely, the unskilled labor, has lost its bargaining power against the capital (Van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997, 287), which was an important means for the expansion of welfare provisions in the Fordist era.

As a result of the change in the "labor process", increasing portions of the workforce are being excluded, marginalized or devalued in economic life (Painter, 1993, 286) as well as in social life. The loss of labor market security, income security and employment security that were granted in the "Fordist Keynesian social contract" (Wacquant, 1996, 124) became the causes and consequences of marginalization.

It is clear from the above arguments that economic marginalization and / or unemployment are the results of structural changes in economic life. The ones who are excluded or marginalized are the victims of this structural change. It is surprising to realize that these excluded or marginalized groups as a consequence of structural changes fit into what Myrdal labeled as the "underclass" in the 1940's. The decline

of the Keynesian Welfare State and the emergence of the Schumpeterian Workfare State as a consequence of the Post-Fordist economy, which "in contrast to the Keynesian Welfare State of Fordism, ... would: 'promote product, process, organizational, and market innovation and enhance the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side intervention; and to subordinate social policy to the demands of labor market flexibility and structural competitiveness' (Jessop, 1993, 19)" (Painter, 1993, 286) accelerates this process and contributes to the increased polarization in society, which is manifested in terms of socioeconomic inequalities.

The observations on the new fragmentation and grouping of the workforce in the Post-Fordist economy can be categorized into two significant theses, namely the mismatch thesis and the polarization thesis. The mismatch thesis, on the one hand, argues that:

> The increase in the educational and skill demands of the urban economy has outstripped the skills of an increasingly large segments of the urban population. Thus, ... populations that have traditionally relied on low skilled employment will no longer have this access to the urban job market (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991,44,in Van kempen and Ozuekren, 1998,1646).

The polarization thesis, on the other hand, suggests that middle class jobs are disappearing, and high and low class jobs are increasing. In this hypothesis, in contrast to the mismatch thesis, there is place for low skilled labor but the means of upward mobility has been diminishing (Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1998,1646). Actually, the reality seems to be that while large portions of unskilled workforce are excluded from economic life as a result of mechanization, automatization and computerization (resembling the premises of the mismatch thesis), there is a widening gap between the unskilled labor, who are able to protect their position in

economic life against automatization, and the skilled labor, in privileges, opportunities and so on (resembling the premises of polarization thesis). Thus, we can categorize society into two as the privileged (the skilled labor and the upper class) and the non-privileged (containing all sections of unskilled labor either excluded from the workforce or not, as all being uncertains).

To sum up, it can be said that, in the Fordist era, the regime of accumulation and the Taylorist labor process provided the means of integration of the labor in social and political domains. This resulted in standardized, normalized, individualized, bureacratically articulated mass society. "Bureacratically realized egalitarianism" and "statist social reforms" were the means of the Fordist mass society (Hirsch, 1991,69). As a result, "monopolistic mode of regulation" of centralized corporatism and Keynesian Welfare state was on the agenda (Peck, 1994, 152; Hirsch, 1991, 69; Esser and Hirsch, 1995, 76). All these gave way to inclusion of the workforce (Esser and Hirsch, 1995, 76) into mainstream society. While in the Fordist era we see the integration of the society as a whole as a result of regulatory practices, in the Post-fordist era, on the contrary, we face with a somewhat reverse picture, of fragmentation of the workforce and its reflections in society due to flexible accumulation and flexible regulation (Peck, 1994, 152). The effective regulations are shrinking, resulting in the "disintegration of the historic block formed at the level of nation state by the accumulation and the regulation nexus", increasing political and social conflict (Hirsch, 1991, 72). As a result, in the Post-Fordist era, social selection and discrimination are on the agenda rather than social acceptance, as it was in the Fordist era.

1.2.3 The Impacts of Post-Fordism on the Western City Space

Following the previous arguments on the dialectical relationship between the social and social space, it is not surprising to observe the consequences of economic and regulatory changes in the city space. Wacquant (1999, 1641) claims that all leading capitalist countries, which have expanded their Gross National Product (GNP) and increased their common-wealth over the past three decades, face with flourishing "opulence and indigence, luxury and penury, copiousness and deprivation" together.

> Thus the city of Hamburg, by some measurements the richest city in Europe, sports both the highest proportions of millionaires and the highest incidence of public assistance receipt in Germany, while New York City is home to the largest upper class on the planet but also to the single greatest army of homeless and destitute in the Western hemisphere (Mollenkopf and Castell, 1991) (Wacquant, 1999, 1641).

From this argument, it can be concluded that there appears a positive correlation between economic expansion and poverty.

The polarization in world cities is reflected in the social space of residential areas. In fact, spatial segregation and concentration[1] are the appearances of new social space as a result of this process. The relationship between economy, social polarization and spatial segregation would be better understood from the below schema, taken from O'Loughin and Friedrichs (1996, 15).

---

[1] In order to defeat any confusion, it is needed to define what is meant by the term spatial segregation and spatial concentration. "Spatial segregation can be seen as the residential separation of groups within a broader population. A group is said to be completely mixed in a spatial sense when its members are distributed uniformly throughout the population. The greater the deviation from a uniform dispersal the greater the degree of segregation" (Johnston et al., 1986, in Van Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1632). "By definition, spatial segregation implies spatial concentration. If an area (neighborhood) displays an overrepresentation of a certain group (compared to, for example, the share of the group in the city as a whole), we speak of a concentration area for that group" (Van Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1632).

National level   restructuring of the labor market

Urban level   Percent employed in "old" industries

Restructuring of the labor market   changes in income distribution

Public assistance

Unemployment

Social polarization

Social housing market: demand > supply

Neighborhood level

Socio/Spatial polarization (number of depressed neighbor hoods, concentration of households below poverty level)

Figure 1.1) Theoretical model relating economic change, social polarization and residential segregation

Significantly, Marcuse (1989, 697) stresses on misleading features of the "dual city metaphor", a concept that can easily be interpreted as emerging as a result of what Kennet (1994, 1029) calls "exclusionary welfare policies":

"Talk of a 'dual city'" is popular lately. The metaphor is in various forms. Most frequently, it is used as the description of the increasing polarization of society between the rich and the poor, haves and have-nots. The formulation varies –'dual city', 'two cities', 'city of light and city of darkness', 'dualism in the city' or by analog, 'formal and informal sectors', 'sunbelt and snow belt'- but the thrust is the same" (Marcuse, 1989, 697).

While on the one hand, the dual city concept is advantageous as it highlights "a growing inequality and sense of division in society", on the other hand it has disadvantages for several reasons (Marcuse, 1989, 698). The three important disadvantages of the concept are its suggestion of one-dimensional and quantitative

24

division between parts, implication of "the conclusion that redistribution, rather than changes in the causes of the undesired distribution" as the solution, and being ahistorical (Marcuse, 1989, 698). As a conclusion, Marcuse insists on the need to explore the new and qualitatively distinct forms of division in society and cities in the historical process as a consequence of structural changes. So it is needed to analyze the process in a more detailed way rather than simply concluding that there emerges duality in the city.

Marcuse (1993, 356) defines five groups of quarters of a city in the contemporary world as follows: luxury housing, gentrified city, suburban city, tenement city and abandoned city. He continues to argue that luxury-housing quarters contain the section of the society that is at the top of economic, social, and political hierarchy. Gentrified city contains the professional-managerial-technical groups. It is the skilled workers and mid-range professionals and upper civil servants that reside in suburban city. Tenement city contains blue-white collar lower paid workers. Finally, it is the abandoned city that contains the unemployed and excluded ones.

While in his 1993 study, Marcuse talks about the expansion of "certain quarters" in size, namely the gentrified and the abandoned cities, and the shrinking of the others, notably the tenement city, in his 1997 study, he emphasizes the developments in three quarters, namely, the ghetto (abandoned city), the suburbs and the luxury / upper class residence, as key developments in contemporary cities. Despite this shift in Marcuse's observation, the main premise of his argument remains the same, that is, the increasing division and separation of quarters of different socioeconomic classes.

Apart from the widening gap between the quarters, that is, the disappearing of the center or intermediate ones, there is a more serious process going on in the Post-Fordist city space. Barricades rather than boundaries, tangible or intangible, symbolic or actual, promote this process, which is called walling (Marcuse, 1996, 249; 1993, 360). According to Marcuse (1996, 244), the walling of the quarters is due to establishing order in the city. Since the residents of the different quarters are in a hierarchical order due to their power and wealth (Marcuse, 1996, 244), the walling processes have different meanings and consequences for different quarters and their residents, namely, for the abandoned city it is exclusion; for the suburbs, it is intermediation and insurance of the residents' economic, political and social relationships from the outside community and protection from the dangers coming from "below"; and for the luxury / upper class residences, it is protection and enhancing the position of their residents. Marcuse's (1996, 248-249) metaphorication or definition of the walls as prison walls for the abandoned city, barricades for the tenement city, walls of aggression for the gentrified city, stucco walls for the suburban city, and castle walls for the dominating city, that is, the luxury / upper class city, well illustrates the different meanings and consequences of the "walling process". This process results in the transformation of the earlier ghetto into the excluded ghetto, the suburbs into exclusionary enclaves, and the luxury /upper class residences into fortified and totalizing citadels. This is stated as follows: "the increasing separation of each from the other and from other parts of the city through fortification, walling in (for the ghetto) and walling out (for the exclusionary enclaves and citadels), and increasing totalizing internalization of the environment for all aspects of daily life" (Marcuse, 1997, 315).

Despite the arguments about the effects of economy on city space presented above, spatial organization does not merely result from economic developments. Indeed the overarching phenomenon of increased separation of the parts of the city from each other is the reflection of increasing economic, social, political (Marcuse, 1997,311) and ideational separation, which is a consequence of the non-monopolist regulation of Post-Fordism.

1.3 The Impact of the Post-Fordist Space on Society: Loss of Public Space and Its Consequences

Until now, the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, transformations of the labor process and the mode of social regulations as the results of this transition, and their effects on city space are explored through the literature review. Once more it has to be noted that the literature is highly concentrated on economy rather than other domains of the social structure, supporting Althusser's argument on the dominance of economic level in capitalism. However, by referring to the American social sciences literature, non-economic levels of social structures will be emphasized in the following part of the chapter. This will be done by following a political economy approach to conceptualize the non-economic levels. The premise of this effort can be explained briefly as follows: in modern times, non-economic levels gain significance as the result of economic processes. In turn, after exceeding a threshold level, non-economic levels gain an independent existence with considerable influential power on society, which, then, cannot be explained merely by the economic perspective anymore. So, as the result of economy, the ideational, political and social levels come into existence as the aspects of social structure.

Following the "social space's reaction upon society" perspective presented above, in order to explore the new relations in city space, in the following parts the

effect of the new social space on society and its different domains will be explored. "The reaction of space upon society" can be observed in four domains, namely, the economic, social, ideational and political.

The main effects of the new spatial order of Post-Fordist city are the limited participation in civil society by the residents of abandoned neighborhoods (Van Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1633), social isolation (Van kempen, 1997), and in sum the destruction of public space that would bring different groups together (see Davis, 1990, 221-265). This main effect has also sub-effects that need elaboration. One of the mostly debated sub-effects is the formation of symbolic barriers as a result of socio-spatial isolation, which then affects "objective" consequences. Among the symbolic barriers, the stigma attached to poor neighborhoods is of considerable importance.

1.3.1 Territorial Isolation and Stigma as a Symbolic Barrier Acting Against Poor Neighborhoods

The most important dimensions of stigmatization with respect to the focus of the study can be classified into two categories as the instrumentality of stigmatization and its consequences.

> Territorial labels, with their emphasis on socio-spatial segregation and separation, serve social control and especially the exclusionary mode of social control with its practice of social isolation (Cohen, 1985, p.25). From this point of view, territorial labeling is not merely a subjective appreciation of a deviant situation by mainstream society but a social instrument as well. Central to labeling theory is the definition of deviance as "the infraction of some agreed-upon rule." "Social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as *outsiders*" (Becker, 1963, p.9, emphasis added). From this point of view, territorial stigmas thus reflect both the powerless position of the inhabitants involved and a verdict to social exclusion by mainstream society. This "verdict" makes the place where one lives a factor in its own right by affecting the attitudes and behavior of important others,

such as employers or officials who are responsible for the implementation of social rights (Van Kempen, 1997, 437-438).

The media and even social scientists have important, conscious and / or non-conscious contribution to the "exclusionary mode of social control" in terms of their conceptualizations and / or re-conceptualizations of the already existing concepts. The evolution and the popular use of the term "underclass" is a well known example that constitutes a fertile ground to comprehend the question of discrimination and / or exclusion of some members of society by the other members. Although coining of the term "underclass" goes back to the 1962 by Myrdal (Gans, 1993, 327), it is in the last two decades that the term "underclass" became a considerable subject of research in academic and popular writings. This fact can be considered as an awareness of the increasing polarization in contemporary societies, especially in the USA and Western Europe, and of the results of this process, that is, the exclusion of certain individuals and groups.

By the term "underclass" Myrdal intended to point to the increasing number of workers who are "forced to the margins of the labor force in a new and permanent way"(Myrdal, 1962, cited in Gans, 1993, 327). It was the changing nature of American economy that gave rise to "an unprivileged class of unemployed, unemployables and underemployed who are more and more hopelessly set apart from the nation at large and do not share in its life, its ambitions and its achievements" (Myrdal, 1962, 10, cited in Gans, 1993, 327). By the end of the 70's, the term turned to be a behavioral term. The "criminal, deviant, or just non-middle class ways" of behavior became to be the main argument in the definitions of the term "underclass". The culture of poverty thesis of Oscar Lewis and Banfield's work on "lower class" contributed to this transition from structural to behavioral understanding of the term

(Gans, 1993, 327-328). As an influential one, the culture of poverty thesis stresses on the "lack of a will to work" and psychological unpreparedness to take "advantages of the changing conditions" as a result of children's internalization of attitudes and values of the subculture into which they are born, which is characterized by poverty (Morris, 1993, 405). Later on the term coincided with race (Gans, 1993, 327), which was parallel to the emergence of the behaviorist approach to the issue. Then, writings about the emergence of a 'dangerous' Black underclass and similar cautious writings began to be published (Gans, 1993, 328). Katz (1997) asks the question of "why the term underclass rocketed into public discourse in the late 1970's." His answer is as follows:

> My own view is that underclass serves as a metaphor for three interconnected understandings of the current scene in America's inner cities. I call them novelty, complexity and danger. The situation in inner cities is unprecedented; it has several intersecting components; and it threatens the safety and well being of both individuals and society (1997, 355).

As a result of danger and threat, there appeared a need for a new regulation and the term "underclass" as an instrumental / functional conceptualization came into being. If one takes Wacquant's (1993) argument into account, which points to the use of behavioral terms as a means of exoticizing, the effect of academic and popular writings on exclusionary regulations would be clearer.

In this sense, the consequences of stigmatization based on spatial isolation are also important for the patterns of social relationships. One of them is the lack of information of residents about available jobs (Burges et al. 1997, inVan Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1633; Van Kempen , 1997, 435). It is self evident that this situation will further worsen the economic conditions of the residents of poor neighborhoods.

There are also problems in terms of the means of collective consumption supplied to poor neighborhoods (Van Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1634; Van

Kempen, 1997, 438). Even if services like education, health care and pork barrels are supplied, the quality of these services is questionable (see Van Kempen, 1997, 438). Poor neighborhoods and their residents may be viewed as undeserving these social services (Van Kempen, 1997, 438-439). Furthermore, unprivileged residents are incapable to figure out their needs, the means to get the services they need and have lower expectation in terms of the quality of services (Van Kempen and Özuekren, 1998, 1634; Van Kempen, 1997, 438). This is the "institutional desertification" in Wacquant's terms (Wacquant, 1998, in Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1998, 1634).

Thus, the absence of information networks in order to find jobs and institutional desertification and social isolation, which are analyzed above, are the destructive consequences of stigmatization for the stigmatized. It is actually a circular phenomenon: the more the loss of social interaction, and the more stigmatization, the more stigmatization, the more loss of social interaction. "Demonization", "being a symbol of urban pathology" in terms of "moral dissolution", "cultural depravity", and "behavioral deficiencies", as in the American case, are the outcomes of territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 1993, 371). If we sum up all these, it can be argued that stigmatization erodes the means of integration of the stigmatized into the mainstream society and the means of upward mobility in order to escape from their unprivileged socio-economic position.

1.3.2 Fear in the Contemporary City: Political Marginalization of the Poor
In addition to economic, social and ideational changes, contemporary societies also face with changes in the political domain. Actually the above arguments about the transition from "welfarism" to "workfarism" provide the frame of the political changes at the national level. Hirsch (1991, 73-74) argues that there is a change

towards concentration and monopolization of state policies that promotes strategic changes in favor of the market and at the expense of social security systems and welfare provisions. As stated above, the softening of social stratification and expansion of the middle classes were a result of welfare policies in the Fordist era, which in turn contributed to social consensus and peace. Accordingly, in the contemporary world and city, we face with a widening gap between different social groups and classes as a result of political, as well as social, economic and ideational changes. This, in turn, affects social policies. The return of the security state (Hirsch, 1991, 74) is the manifestation of this process. Also the "walling out" of the unprivileged, which is discussed above, is the reflection of the fear of and perceived threat coming from the unprivileged in society, which in turn strengthens the already existing fears.

Actually, the dominating / ruling groups and classes may not be unjust or wrong to fear from "internal threats". Bhala and Lapeyre (1999, 27) argue that economic marginalization and social disintegration cause political marginalization and polarization in society. As a result, radicalization and inclination away from mainstream politics of the unprivileged is an expected outcome in the contemporary city.

1.3.3 Territorial Alienation and the Loss of Hinterland

Apart from but related to the above arguments, today's city embraces a set of new trends. These are "territorial alienation and dissolution of 'place'" and the "loss of hinterland" (Wacquant, 1996), especially in the case of abandoned quarters. The first one is:

> (The) loss of locale that marginalized urban populations identify
> with and feel secure in ...consistent with the change of both ghetto

and banlieue from communal 'places' suffused with shared emotions, joint meanings and practices and institutions of mutuality, to indifferent 'spaces' of mere survival and contest (Wacquant, 1996, 126).

So 'place', which was once a "common resource" in which one felt secure, turned into a 'space' in which one feels insecure and threatened (Smith, 1987, 297, in Wacquant, 1996, 126). It has to be noted that this shift is a consequence of territorial stigmatization to a certain extent (Wacquant, 1996, 126).

Actually this phenomenon goes hand in hand with the "loss of hinterland", that is, the erosion of kin, friend, and group support of the neighborhood (Wacquant, 1996, 127). The decreasing solidarity in the neighborhood is a result of the economic condition of the neighborhood as a whole, since the residents of abandoned quarters lack economic resources and so the means of "collective sustenance" as a result of deproletarization and / or underemployment processes of the Post-Fordist economy. In addition, the ideological dominance of individualism may contribute to the declining solidarity. To sum up, one can infer that the excluded labor has nowhere to turn to, that is, only if s/he wants to.

The consequence of these two processes is the further fragmentation of the unprivileged group or groups in the social domain in addition to their fragmentation / atomization in the economic domain. This also leads to fragmentation in ideational domain due to the loss of the "shared representations and signs through which to conceive a collective destiny and to project possible alternative futures" (Wacquant, 1996, 128).

1.4 Changing Social Structure in Contemporary Western Metropolises

From the above arguments, it can be inferred that Western metropolises since the mid-1970's have been facing radical social and spatial changes. The economic

transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism is the most debated and influential process behind this process, which influenced both the social structure and the spatial organization of western metropolises. The general trend can be generalized as social disintegration with the widening gap between social classes. Today, the existence of extreme poverty and extreme wealth jointly is becoming a usual aspect of Western metropolises. However, this joint existence turns to be a questionable argument if we examine the situation carefully.

It is true that these two extremes exist together in a single social space, namely, the metropolis. However, in contemporary world, the real physical distances and boundaries increasingly losing their importance. Recent developments show that, while distances of thousand kilometers can be accessed in seconds, as in the case of Internet and other telecommunication technologies, it would be impossible to transcend few meters. Actually, it is the latter situation, that is, the impossibility of passing the "inner borders" within a "single" space that is on the agenda in world metropolises. Marcuse's (1996; 1997) statements about the construction of symbolic and actual walls are the declarations of this situation. In this sense, rather than joint existence, disintegration of the social fabric is a more realistic statement about the situation in Western metropolises.

Certainly, disintegration of the social fabric has important consequences. Among these, the loss of public space and socio-spatial dissociation requires further elaboration. As shown above, the loss of public space and socio-spatial dissociation further strengthens the dissociation of social structure, which results in further marginalization and exclusion of lower classes. Actually, it is this process that brings about a huge literature on "underclass" in the Western social science literature. On the contrary, when we examine the Turkish social sciences literature, the formation

of an "underclass" is only recently becoming a topic of interest. It is clear that this is due to different line of social development of Turkish society, which until recently could be able to prevent the formation of an "underclass", rather than the indifference of social scientists of Turkey to the social developments of their society. However, as the increase in the number of studies concerning poverty and urban problems indicates, social structure of Turkey and its metropolises is in a process of change. As a result, it is required to examine the recent developments in Turkish metropolises with a historical perspective in order to gain insight into contemporary developments. In the following chapter, historical course of the rural-to-urban migration in Turkey, migrants' social position in metropolises, and the survival means of large sections of these people, who turned into urban poor after migration process, namely the informal networks of the poor, will be explored. In Chapter III, by the help of the observations made in Chapter II, recent developments in Turkish metropolises will be analyzed.

CHAPTER II

COMMUNITARIAN INFORMAL NETWORKS IN TURKISH METROPOLISES: THE APPARATUS OF THE POOR TO INTEGRATE INTO URBAN SOCIETY

In the previous chapter, theoretical framework of the space and society relationship was discussed. By the help of this theoretical framework and the literature on Western society and metropolis, the effects of economic restructuring on society and city space, and the social consequences of the newly emerging city space were explored. It was shown that social disintegration and spatial fragmentation go hand in hand, that is to say, mutually feeding each other. Although the main cause of the recent social fragmentation and dissociation appears to be the Post-Fordist labor process and social regulations, it is the city space that is directly influenced by and, in turn, accelerates this process.

The walling processes in the Western metropolises served for the "hygiene" of the upper classes that left behind all the 'dirt' in the abandoned neighborhoods. The hygiene and control against the poor that was mainly achieved by stigmatization and territorial labeling resulted in the marginalization of the poor in economic, social, ideational, and political domains. Moreover, territorial alienation and the loss of hinterland among the poor eroded the means of solidarity, that is, a process which resulted in atomization of the individual poor in his / her survival struggle. As a result, marginalization, exclusion and the formation of an "underclass" became one of the "real" aspects of life in Western metropolis.

The below schema illustrates the process of social disintegration, marginalization, exclusion, and formation of an "underclass" in the Western city with reference to spatial dimensions.

Economic

Ideational [2] → practices on space ▶ city space →

economic marginality

ideational irritation   + inner fragmentation of the poor

Social

social discrimination

Political

political marginality

Domains of social structure   consequences of the new city   consequences of the

space at the group level   new city space at

individual level

(Inter-group domain)   (Inner-group domain)

Figure 2-1) The illustration of the process of marginalization, exclusion and the formation of an "underclass" in the Western metropolises with respect to space.

In Turkey, the situation is significantly different from the Western case. As argued in the last section of Chapter 1, the formation of an "underclass" is only recently on the agenda in Turkish metropolises. However, it would be a wrong interpretation to equate the formation of an "underclass" with marginality and / or exclusion and to argue that marginality and exclusion are also recent phenomena in Turkey. On the contrary, since the start of rural-to-urban migration, marginality and

---

[2] The term "ideational domain" in this study refers to the cultural, symbolic and perceptual aspects of the social structure. It is evident that these aspects reqires deeper and separate evaluation. However, in this study due to the focus and the limits of the study, the researcher chose to evaluate this aspects under a common name.

exclusion have been significant features of Turkish metropolises for both migrants and their social spaces, namely the informal neighborhoods. Strikingly, it is due to this fact that Turkish metropolises have been free from an "underclass" until recently.

The case of Western metropolises shows that, as a result of the Fordist Keynesian Welfare State's policies and regulations, the potential poor of the Post-Fordist Schumpeterian Workfare State did not need and intent to develop survival strategies that was independent from the states' welfare provisions. Consequently, when welfarism as a regulation model was left, the sections of the society, which were dependent on welfare provisions, turned into marginalized and excluded groups that became the basses of the Western 'underclass'. On the contrary, the Turkish poor had already been equipped with communitarian survival strategies before the start of migration to cities (see Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000). Migrants, who turned into the urban poor living in the peripheries of the metropolises, adapted these communitarian survival strategies to city life. Consequently, by the help of these strategies, some sections of migrants were able not only to survive in the city, but also to actualize upward mobility. However, it must be remembered that the ability to survive and relative well-being does not mean "full" integration into the wider society. On the contrary, these groups and their residences as social entities could have not overcome the stigmas, discriminatory discourses, and practices towards themselves since the 1950's.

Regarding these, in this chapter, the survival strategies and tools of the urban poor, that is, their communitarian informal networks (CIN) in Turkish metropolises, will be explored. This will enable us to comprehend the social structure of the marginalized, excluded, and disadvantaged urban poor in Turkish metropolises. To

do this, firstly, general features of migration in Third World countries and Turkey will be analyzed.

2.1 Migration in the Third World and Turkey

One of the common features of Third World urbanization is the association of this process with rural-to-urban migration, independent, and usually in the absence, of industrialization. In this respect, third world urbanization is mostly mediated by push forces rather than pull forces[3]. Two main factors behind this type of migration can be stated, namely, the Malthusian pressure as a result of population growth and the economic conditions that are generated by external forces (Parnwell, 1993, 147). Also evacuations due to various projects, such as infrastructural projects for national and strategic interests (Lighford, 1978, in Parnwell, 1993) or conflictual situations, like national or civil wars (Keleş, 1982, 59), may become the triggering factors of migration.

The urbanization of Turkey is not exceptional from the general Third World frame. The formation of "informal neighborhoods" (*gecekondu*)[4] in Turkish metropolises, that is, the residences of migrants, was also triggered by similar factors of migration. It is the 1950's that informal neighborhoods turned to be a significant issue for Turkish society, and continued its importance from then on.

---

[3] Pull forces are the features of the cities that attract migrants. The opportunities oferred by the cities in finding better jobs , accesing to better education, health and other social provisions etc. are some important factors that activate the pull factors. On the contrary, push forces are the changing social, economic and political features of the place of origin, which are disadvantegous for the groups or individuals, who turned into migrants (Keleş, 1990).

[4] In this study, the term "informal neighborhood" is prefered to be used rather than the term "*gecekondu*", since the term "*gecekondu*" does not define the residences of migrants adequately, especialy after the post-1980 transformations.

2.1.1 The First Wave of Migration

The emergence of the "informal neighborhood problem" in the newspapers of the Turkish media dates back to 1947 (Şenyapılı, 1998, 302). Yet, it is the 1950's that mass migration from countryside to metropolises became an important issue in the society. In order to comprehend the migration in Turkey, it is necessary to consider the Marshall Aid Plan, which is commonly accepted as one of the main triggering factors of migration.

The Marshall Aid Plan was a project to modernize the agricultural sector. However, this modernization effort resulted in unemployment in the countryside for those peasants without land, who used to be employed as agricultural workers. In addition to this, for the ones who own agricultural land, the continuous shrinkage of arable fields as a result of sharing between the off springs by inheritance left insufficient amount of land for families to produce sufficient amounts of surplus (Gürel, 2001, 134). The combination of these two factors resulted in a significant number of rural population that had no chance to survive unless migrated to cities. Actually, it is this group that forms the basis of the informal neighborhood population in metropolises, which later on became one of the major concerns of the society.

2.1.2 The 1950-1960 Period

The developments mentioned above led pioneers to migrate to large cities of Turkey, mainly Istanbul and Ankara (Gürel, 2001,135). The major characteristics of this migration process can be said to be the absence of state / formal organizations' interventions in the process, and planning or sponsorship. In such a condition,

migrants shaped their own future with their limited economic, social and cultural capital, without any formal help.

Under these conditions, migrants built their shanties near industrial sites at the peripheries of the city in Istanbul, and close to center in the absence of organized or small industrial sites in Ankara (Şenyapılı, 1998, 302,303). Şenyapılı (1998, 302) states that the industrialists in Istanbul of the time covertly supported the construction of shanties near industrial sites, since this meant lower wages to re-produce the workforce.

The behavioral pattern of these first generation migrants was shy and timid since they were anxious about the security forces because of their awareness of the illegal act they were doing, namely, the construction of illegal shanties. In addition to material causes, this psychological state can be said to be another factor contributed to the construction of the shanties at the peripheries hidden from the public eyes. These altogether created an alienated / stranger migrant typology in the metropolis (Gürel, 2001,135).

Furthermore, the attitude of the established urbanites was exclusionary and discriminatory towards migrants. Urbanites' exclusion of migrants was mainly due to cultural reasons. In the eyes of the urbanites, the migrant was wild and uncivilized (Gürel, 2001, 135). In this sense, the migrant was a threat to the urbanite's "modern" values and life-style (Erman, 2001).

Not only the established urbanites but also the political authority felt threatened. Şengül (2001, 78) states that:

> Particularly, the dual structures appearing in the large cities were turning into conflict, on the one hand between the state and the *gecekondu* population due to disregarding the private ownership and planning rules, and on the other hand, between the latter group and the established middle classes.

So in addition to cultural ones, there were also political aspects of discrimination aroused from perceived or real threats against the norms and laws based on private property rights. Although middle classes were still holding the economic power of urban land as rant, their political and cultural project was impeded (Şengül, 2001, 78).

2.1.3 The 1960-1970 Period

By the 1960's, a new attitude towards migrants started to emerge. In spite of continuation of some negative attitudes and practices towards migrants, such as some demolitions of informal neighborhoods, it can be argued that the general attitude of the state towards the informal neighborhood population became relatively positive. There are identifiable reasons behind this development. Firstly, it can be said that informal neighborhoods started to be seen as an inescapable fact. Secondly, in this time period, migrants, to a considerable extent, were able to overcome their alien mode towards the city and to adapt to this new environment. These people began to be employed in state institutions and informal or marginal sector, usually as unskilled labor in various branches or as street venders and so on. Also, the changing political balance had important effects on this attitude change: the competition of political parties forced them to consider migrants as an important voting potential since this group was becoming an important political target due to its growing size in number (Şengül, 2001, 80-81). In addition to this, Gürel (2001,136) points to the increasing political consciousness of the residents of informal neighborhoods. Although this argument is controversial, it is true that these people were starting to learn how to make use of clientele and party patronage relations for self-interests, which can be regarded as a sign of adaptation to urban way of life. Şengül (200,81) states that

Kemalist project and its representative in the political domain, namely, the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was previously unsuccessful in its effort to be integrated into the society, inclined into a left position by identifying its target population as the urban poor. This also contributed to the tolerant political attitude towards the informal neighborhoods of migrants. Lastly, the increasing hegemony of the Marxist ideology on the public sphere by the end of the 1960's became an important factor for the increasing sympathy towards the poor (Erman, 2001, 986).

In addition to political factors, the economic policies of this period, namely, the import substitution model had significant effects on the relative well-being of the urban poor. Basically, import substitution model aims to achieve economic development by closing and protecting itself against competition in the global market. This strategy necessarily needs a dynamic internal market in order to continue production and economic growth, which makes it dependent on internal consumption and labor. As a result, beginning from the 1960's the urban poor turned to be an important component of consumers as well as cheap labor. The political elite of the Turkish Republic, for this very economic reason, in addition to political ones, tolerated the residents of informal neighborhoods (Erman, 2001, 986; Şengül, 2001, 81).

Although these political and economic developments point to a relatively favorable picture for the urban poor, there was still spatial, economic and cultural duality in the city, which was disadvantageous for the poor groups. These people were still far from being urbanized citizens for socio-spatial reasons (Şengül, 2001, 82). The political polarization in the society (Gürel, 2001,136) and the continuing dominance of modernist ideology (Erman, 2001) were the other reasons that obstructed the integration of informal neighborhoods into urban society. In sum, it

can be claimed that, in the 1960's the metropolis was a relatively favorable but still exclusionary environment for the poor.

2.1.4 The 1970-1980 Period

The 1970's were chaotic years due to political polarization of the society between left wing and right-wing ideologies and organizations. Although the main actors of this polarized politics were university students and intellectuals, the antagonist political atmosphere was also dominating large segments of the society. The urban poor were not free of this situation. Rather informal neighborhoods were at the core of political struggles and street fighting. The urban left approach of RPP and the sympathetic view of Marxists towards informal neighborhoods resulted in an alliance formed between the left and the residents of these quarters. Especially the second-generation, young urban poor were usually the activists of radical left-wing organizations, while the first generation was mostly conventionalist, in the political line of RPP (Şengül, 2001, 85).

Erman (2001, 986) argues that, in this period urban rant from informal neighborhood quarters, that is, "the making of easy money out of *gecekondu* settlements" was tolerated by the governing political parties, who probably saw it as a means of 'bribing' the informal neighborhood population in order to keep them from political activism against the state". The continuing migration and the land scarcity to build shelter, as well as the post-1980 *gecekondu* amnesties were triggering the transformation of informal neighborhood's use value to exchange value. This was a turning point for the evolution of 'informal settlements'.

2.1.5 The 1980- Early 1990 Period

The date of 1980 is a turning point in Turkish history, in which almost all domains of societal life were influenced by structural changes. Among these, the changes in economy are of considerable importance. Briefly, by that time, while economy policies favoring integration into the world capitalist system started to be actualized, Turkey faced an ongoing inner disintegration from then on (Gürel, 2001, 137).

At the urban level, Şengül (2001, 87-88) defines these developments as the end of the process of urbanization of the workforce and the beginning of the powerful penetration of the capital into urban area. Capital dominated the social balance for its own advantage by hegemonizing the previously restricted areas in the absence of any political opposition. The hegemony of the logic of market economy had / has very important results for the city space and its population in general, and for the informal neighborhoods and their population in particular. Among those, increasing emphasis on the exchange value of informal neighborhoods needs further elaboration.

Actually, there were conscious efforts by the Motherland Party, which was holding political power in the 1980's, to emphasize the exchange value. So in this new era of Turkish history, society faced a shift in the meaning and perception of informal neighborhoods from their use value marked by urban leftism in the 1970's to exchange value (Şengül, 2001,90). This process was reinforced by the *gecekondu* amnesties of 1984 and 1985 that allowed the construction of up to four-storey buildings on *gecekondu* estates. It has to be noted that, in addition to the hegemony of the market economy, the political bribing of the government of the time to silence the potential victims of new economic policies is an important factor for these promotions (Erman, 2001, 987; Şenyapılı, 1998).

These developments brought about differentiation in the informal neighborhood population: while some residents of informal neighborhoods experienced an increased deprivation as the result of new liberal economy policies, some of them became economically better off by benefiting from urban rants (Erman, 2001, 987). In addition to this, by the arrival of the South Eastern migrants to Metropolises, this process intensified[5]. The renting of houses to new migrants and more importantly, selling of the land to building contractors in return for apartments in the newly constructed building (Erman, 2001, 993) was the way for economic improvement for advantageous dwellers, who were the ones that came to metropolises relatively long time ago and possessed enough amount of urban land and that had clientelist political networks and held political power in the district by their social networks or personal charisma.

2.2 The Impossibility of Full Integration of Migrants: "Permanent Otherness"

The history of migrants, that is, the urban poor, can be briefly claimed to be the history of struggle to "gain a place" in the urban society (see Erder 1997). However, this goal has never been fully actualized. Migrants and their social spaces have always been a disintegrated, antagonist or at least agonist part of the city and city life. In sum, Turkish metropolises have had always "Others" in them." Permanent Otherness" is an appropriate term to define this situation.

---

[5] The migration from southeast Turkey to metropolises can be labeled as involuntary mass migration. Due to the characteristics of this type of migration and other factors, such as the conflict and clashes in the place of origin of the migrants, this group of post-1980s migrants turned into the most disadvantaged migrant group in the history of internal migration in Turkey. Consequently, it is well grounded to expect and observe the effects of southeastern migration to metropolises in production and strengthening of differention among the residents of the informal neighborhoods.

As early as 1948, there appeared complaints about the informal neighborhoods that were said to be terrifying and disgusting. In 1949 a reaction by a well-known journalist towards those neighborhoods was as follows:

> Governor (F.K. Gokay) has taken the *gecekondu* population under his protection. I have no objection. But, we should not be surprised if the *gecekondu*s that have their own law, order, and cabinet today, have control over the security forces, and even over the army tomorrow (Toker, 1949, cited in Şenyapılı, 1998, 308).

Of course, this is an exaggerated version of the complaints. However, it shows us the existence of discomfort and anxiety towards informal neighborhoods, at least in some portions of the society.

In addition to this sort of complains, there were also modest reactions. In the 1950's and 1960's, by the influence of the modernist ideology of the urban middle classes, the residents of informal neighborhoods were blamed for their unwillingness to abandon their rural values and life styles. Informal neighborhoods and their residents were the "non-modern Other", which were obstacles to modernization. In other words, they were the "non-urban, rural Other*"* (Erman, 2001, 990).

Şenyapılı (1982, cited in Erman, 2001, 991-993) claims that in the 1970's and early 1980's, the residents of informal neighborhoods were still viewed as culturally inferior by the established urbanites. Despite the continuity of cultural exclusion, in this period some scholars started to emphasize structural barriers against gecekondu people's integration into the wider society. The unavailability of jobs and inadequate public policies were the mostly emphasized structural obstacles (Erman, 2001, 992). However, these scholarly defenses of informal neighborhoods could not change the perceptions of the urbanites (Erman, 2001).

Another important dimension of the exclusion of the residents of informal neighborhoods can be analyzed by considering the radical-politics of the 1970's. As it was argued above, in those years, informal neighborhoods turned to be quarters from where radical groups were gaining activists. In this sense it is well grounded that these districts would have been blamed and excluded for posing political threats, especially against the upper classes. So another dimension of Otherness can be named as "political Otherness", at least in the minds of some portions of the society.

By the date 1980, in addition to the disintegration process that took place in Turkish society as a whole, fragmentation and disintegration also showed itself in informal neighborhoods. Before the 1980's, the residents of informal neighborhoods were used to be perceived as forming a homogenous group. Certainly, this may well be a result of the dominant ideology / paradigm of the related time period. However, there was solid ground, up to a certain extent, that confirms this totalistic view. In short, the "other" of pre-1980, by the onset of the 1980's was fragmented into several "others". The emergence of "multiple others" can be followed by analyzing two domains, namely, the economic domain and the ideational domain.

As a result of the process discussed above, while some *gecekondu* dwellers turned to be better off economically, the remaining group became poorer. On the one hand, there appeared a group of post-residents of informal neighborhoods who were the "undeserving rich other", and on the other hand, the remaining group turned to be the "urban poor other" (Erman, 2001). In addition to these, the dominance of the modernist ideology of the Turkish upper classes and elite maintained the *"culturally inferior Otherness"* for both groups.

2.3 Understanding Informal Neighborhoods in Turkey: The Inescapable Territorial Labels

In the physical sense, informal neighborhoods in Turkey can be defined as a type of residential settlement, which are formed illegally with poor infrastructure at the real (and symbolic) peripheries of the city. However, as mentioned in the first chapter, a space is never neutral but social. The characteristics of the space is a result of the general conduct of the society. Thus, physical qualities are only partial descriptions of any space, and in our case, informal neighborhoods. So, the exploration of social conditions in which the informal space is formed, is needed. The result of the analysis shows that the informal neighborhood has always been an "other space" with its own meaning and identity, which is an integral part of the identity of its population. As argued above, "otherness" is the most significant aspect of this identity. In this sense, despite the important sociological differences between the American ghetto, European *banlieue* and Turkish *gecekondu,* there is important parallelism between these settlements in symbolic means. The "confession" of a young informal neighborhood resident clearly shows the negative symbolic meaning of informal neighborhoods.

> I live in a *gecekondu* settlement. So our house is a *gecekondu* ... I hate that through my life I felt shame because of this. This turned into my only secret to hide in university, in my job, and in my relationships. I always wanted to hear that someone else also resides in a *gecekondu* house. But this never happened. The words resembling building like up-floor, down-floor always hurt me. I always said if only. I think if only I could be able to start a sentence with "the son of our next door". I am at this age but I still think the same things. I feel the strongest shame whenever I need to write or tell my address. How bad, isn't it? I feel shame (itiraf.com, cited in Erdoğan, 2001).

Actually the reason behind large number of studies on informal neighborhoods in Turkish social science literature can only become meaningful if

one considers this covert reality. Otherwise, only explanation of this large literature can be the attractiveness of physical entities for Turkish scholars or just their habit to study these neighborhoods.

Regarding these it can be claimed that similar results of socio-spatial disintegration in Western metropolises must exist in Turkish metropolises. However, at the expense of repeating myself, it must be said that results are considerably different: in Turkey territorial stigma and labeling resulted in further strengthening of marginalization and exclusion but did not contribute to the formation of an "underclass". It can be said that the communitarian informal networks (CIN) of the "others", other than formal ones, formed in the "other" spaces were the apparatus that prevented the urban poor from becoming an "underclass".

2.4 Informal Networks in the Turkish Case

The existence of informal networks is not unique to Turkish metropolises. Indeed, there is a worldwide phenomenon of informal networks. However, their causes (Roberts, 1994, 7), and relative strength and importance differ due to specificities of different regions. Roberts (1994) categorizes the causes specific to regions as follows: in developing countries "economic survival during rapid urbanization", in the USA "economic adjustment of immigrant groups", in Britain "decline in formal employment opportunities and in welfare state", and in Italy "new and dynamic models of economic growth". In spite of the differences in the causes, there are shared characteristics explained by different scholars. Firstly, the weakness of bureaucratic structures, which make and carry out the social policies of the state, especially in the area of job opportunities and distribution of wealth, is a major determinant of the formation of informal networks. Secondly, informal networks

cannot be defined as "clearly bounded set of activities", that is to say, there is a fusion of legal and illegal activities that makes it impossible to make essential judgements regarding their legal status. In fact, at least in some cases, formal and informal activities interact. The role of informal economy in capital accumulation for the formal economy is a widely known and relevant phenomenon to Turkish setting that constitutes an example to this relationship. Thirdly, the members of the networks are not passive. On the contrary they are active actors. In other words, as Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) put it, they are the actors having "transforming capacity". Fourthly, these networks are not traditional in their practice, although their roots may be traced to rural way of life (see for instance, Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001a). Finally, related to the fourth characteristics, personal relations, such as kinship, friendship and co-ethnicity, are the grounds that networks rise.

One more aspect to be considered in order to comprehend the issue is the difference between the short-term and the long-term goals of the networks. While the short-term goals can be defined as defensive purposes that reflect the values and means of the local community, the long-term goals can be defined as social mobility strategies (Roberts, 1994, 11). By using this framework, the long-term survival of informal networks becomes comprehensible. The functionality of the networks, in addition to "secular trends" that provide ground for their survival, are the determinants of their existence.

The "permanent Otherness" of the informal neighborhood residents points to the inability of their full integration into the wider urban society. If one considers the Durkhemian notion of organic solidarity in modern society, this would point to an obstacle against the survival of the informal neighborhood population, since organic

solidarity points to the necessity of mutual dependency for the members of the society.

For a brief explanation, it should be argued that the lack of organic solidarity with the wider urban society is replaced by the communitarian informal networks (CIN) of the informal neighborhood residents, which lies at the heart of the "Turkish model of welfare" (TMW).

Self-responsibility to satisfy social needs and to formulate strategies for this purpose is the main aspect of TMW. Erder (1998) explains the basis of the TMW as the transfer of the social solidarity issues solely to the domain of traditional family / relative relations. This resulted in a new pattern of relationship that provides welfare independent from the regulation of the state. In fact, this model was preferable for the state since TMW relieved the burden of the state by providing solutions to the problems of migrants. By this way, the state freed itself from providing social promotions to its citizens.

In order to be successful in this process, primordial ties of "family / kin networks of economic and social solidarity" are used in the absence of state intervention (Kalaycıoğlu & Tılıç, 2000, 526). Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000, 526) argue that "the state had no policies for providing housing. The state institutions functioned as if there were no housing problem ... Due to lack of resources, the Turkish welfare state was able to provide only limited social benefits, and the demand was too great to be easily met". Actually, it was not only the housing problem that was to be solved. In addition to shelter, "regular income" and "better share in health and educational opportunities" were also among the main problems. These problems of the migrant population were solved by the migrants themselves

by developing their own strategies based on primordial relations that, then, turned into CIN.

In fact, these strategies and networks are the extensions of the rural life (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000). In this sense they were not brand new organizations, rather they were applications of rural networks to the new setting, that is, the metropolis. Sjoberg's (cited in Aslanoğlu, 1998, 36-38) evolutionary exposition of the transformation of social structures from pre-industrial to industrial may be fruitful to comprehend the process of reshaping of the primordial networks or their continuing existence in the urban setting. His linear developmental process is as follows (cited in Aslanoğlu, 1998, 38):

i) Resistance and strive of some of the traditional forms to survive
ii) Transformation of traditional forms after scrutinization
iii) Disappearance of traditional forms
iv) Replacement of the disappeared forms and institutions by new ones

Sjoberg also proposes that there are some forms of adaptation mechanisms. By the help of these mechanisms, the migrant adapts to the new urban way of life. In this process, the family and the kin have roles in the "education" of the migrant, by means of which he / she learns how to behave and formulate strategies to cope with urban difficulties. By this mechanism, the ties with the countryside continue.

If we regard social forms as parts of the adaptation mechanisms, we can infer that evolution of social forms from traditional to modern must be parallel with their functionality. When better social forms to adapt to urban life come into agenda, the previous ones leave their place to these new ones.

When we apply this model to the Turkish case, the continuity of non-modern ties in the form of CIN becomes understandable. Firstly, as was said above, the lack

of sufficient state provisions to support new migrants in order to fulfill their social needs has forced migrants to transfer rural-based strategies to the urban setting. The character of the migration process constitutes the second reason. Since the migration in the Turkish case was due to push factors, in other words, it was a migration not accompanied by industrialization, there was no ground for migrants to create or join modern social organizations, such as labor unions or associations. These two factors lie behind the lack of evolution of social forms into modern ones in the Turkish case, which Sjoberg suggests.

In fact, there is another factor that contributes to the continuity of primordial ties. This is about the type of migration. Erder (1995) claims that it is possible to categorize the types of migration into three, namely, 1) individual-rational migration, 2) mass migration, and 3) chain migration. Individual-rational type migration is, in general, irrelevant to our study, since it usually takes place among the middle and upper class individuals in order to upgrade their living conditions that are already above a certain level. In this sense, individual-rational migration is a result of a rational calculation process. The emigration of professionals for better salaries and occupational opportunities, and the "student emigration" to Western universities for better educational opportunities are the two common examples of this kind of migration.

The particularity of mass migration is that, at the end of migration there remains very little or no ties with the region of origin of migrants. This is a result of a migration process that is not in echelon. That is to say, migration process covers almost whole population of the region and occurs in a very short time period. There may be social, economic or political reasons behind this type of migration. It shows similarities with forced migration but not always involves force.

In chain migration, decision to migrate is not made by the individual. Rather, it is a collective decision. The migrant, usually a young man, migrates to the city as a pioneer, and then the other members of the family follow him. The previously migrated pioneer-migrant provides information and support for the ones, who follow him to the city. Also the pioneer is by no means rootless since he has relatives, who support him materially and psychologically, in the region of origin. Rural ties also function as safety belts for the ones who could not succeed in metropolises, since these ties give the opportunity to turn back. Actually, this network can be extended to the whole village or province. In the Turkish case, especially in the pre-1980 era, the dominant type of migration can be said to be the chain migration.

The result of chain migration in the urban setting is the culturally concentrated areas for migrants coming from the same region. Rural ties also contribute to the maintenance of cultural homogeneity and continuity. The strong fellow villagership (*hemsehrilik*) consciousness rises from these causes. Considering the characteristics of chain migration, we can comprehend the cultural and economic reasons that lie behind the lack of evolution of traditional structures to modern ones, in addition to insufficient industrialization to absorb migrants and the indifferent state response to migrants.

To sum up the argument of this section, we can talk about three reasons for the lack of formation of modern social structures: 1) urbanization not accompanied by industrialization and the non-existence of the prerequisites for modern social networks to develop, such as labor unions; 2) the indifference of state institutions to provide social provisions to migrants, leaving its responsibilities to non-state actors, such as family and kin networks; and 3) by the help of chain migration, the relatively easy and quick adaptation of primordial networks to urban matters, facilitated by

cultural and economic solidarity. The fusion of these factors gave way to the formation of strong "non-modern", relatively closed and sometimes hostile networks and communities, which I label as communitarian informal networks (CIN).

For the CIN in the Turkish setting, despite the wide consensus on the causes and general characteristics of the networks, there are two camps of arguments that differ with regard to their descriptions of the underlying mechanisms of the networks. These camps can be classified as the advocates of the family and the advocates of the *hemsehri* ties to be the basic unit of the networks.

2.4.1 The Perspective Suggesting the Family to be the Basic Unit of the Communitarian Informal Networks (CIN)

Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000; 2001), in addition to advocating the family to be the basic unit of the CIN, formulated a model called "the family pool model". Since, according to this model, family lies at the core of the CIN, Turkish family structure is of considerable importance. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç define Turkish family structure as follows:

> Traditionally, families in Turkey are highly structured, with a dense pattern of kin relations. The extended family is a major unit for the socialization of the individual as well as for determining the individual's educational and occupational attainment. Although aiding the development of the individual, this structure to some extent restricts opportunities for the young to express their feelings and opinions, especially within rural-based families. Although they may disagree with the opinions and decisions of the older generation, they cannot easily display this. Dense kinship relations and family loyalty mean that open conflict between the generations is not tolerated, even in the urban nuclear family (Kalycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000, 524-525).

It is clear from this quotation that family is one of most important determinants of one's life in Turkish society. Furthermore, family in Turkey may turn to be a constraint against one's own achievements. Although that is the case, young generations do not / cannot free themselves from their families. While, on the

one hand, cultural explanations can be put forward in order to explain this fact, on the other hand, there is an important material cause for this dependency to the family, that is, family's functionality to provide support for the ones who obey its rules. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2000, 532) argue that family is a "crucial resource, a form of capital, which provides them (the individual members) with a socio-economic frame within which they can develop viable life-plans". Family resources are important for achieving one's goals, which, in some cases, become instigators, and in some other cases become inspirations. This fact lies at the core of family pooling.

In order for the resources to be redistributed among the family members, there is the need for collective resources that are provided by the members of the family to be accumulated by a "central organ". Usually the head of the extended family, that is, the father or the eldest son, plays the role of the central organ. Once the central organ collects the resources, they are, in turn, redistributed to the members of the family that are in need. Certainly, this distribution is not done randomly. The member of the family to whom resources are to be allocated is chosen by some criteria: the individual's commitment to the family and his/her capability to enhance the allocated resource. Thus, it can be argued that the family pool operates like a corporate composed of various sub-companies. The head of the family functions like the board of directors who decides or plans the investment policies and the individual members of the family, like the sub-companies that depend on the head of directors, fulfills their responsibilities to the head of the family, in return of support and resources provided to them by the "center". As Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) argue, the branches of the family pool can spread from the region of origin to foreign countries. At this point, it has to be noted that spatial proximity does not matter, and that is a consequence of the "highly structured families of Turkey":

center may be in the Turkish metropolis or even in a foreign country (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000).

To sum up the characteristics of the family pool system, two main points can be put forward: 1) "the welfare-providing role of the family of origin is significant, especially with migration"; unity and solidarity are actually defense mechanisms against the worsening life conditions, and all members share and benefit from this mechanism in different ways; and 2) there is little or no individual space or freedom of choice for the members of the family benefiting from the network (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000, 539-541).

As a result of these observations, functionally speaking, it can be argued that the family pool serves both for the people and the state institutions by contributing, in Buğra's terms (2001, 23), to the social welfare regime of Turkey. On the other hand, this kind of a social welfare regime further strengthens the already existing fragmentations in the society based on primordial ties. As Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç put it;

> (M)utual aid greatly strengthens relations based on obligation and reciprocity, binding members of the family to each other as a close-knit group and excluding others: non-kin members of different ethnic groups, and often their neighbors. Rather than creating inter-generational cleavages in society, this generates a strong family identity that is influenced and defined in large part by authority of the older members (2000, 541).

Up to here the main operation principle of family pooling is discussed. Although, according to Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, family pooling lies at the core of social welfare regime of Turkey, there are also other networks and resources that

contribute to the social welfare of the urban poor. The below schema illustrates the

overall picture.

Figure 2-2) A model proposed for coping with poverty after the 1980's in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001).

2.4.2 The Perspective Suggesting *Hemsehrilik* to be the Basic Unit of the Communitarian Informal Networks (CIN)

The scholars that formulate their analysis on the *hemsehri* relationship especially focus on the importance of cultural unity for its instrumentality in the formation of *hemsehrilik* (see for instance Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 47).

In the formation of *hemsehri* networks, in addition to economic-functional factors, there are normative and social-psychological factors. Normative factors, which are also functional at the final analysis, are illustrated by Güneş-Ayata (1990-1991, 91,101) by the example of the assistantship circle that expands from close relatives to *hemsehris* for the construction of shelter. The help provided by relatives and *hemsehri*s in the construction of shelter is a symbolic sign of the willingness to help, solidarity and sympathy. The social-psychological factor is the will and need or preference to corporate with the groups that are most similar to the newcomer in the foreign environment of the metropolis.

In the literature on *hemsehri* ties, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu's study (2001a) provides a satisfactory explanation of the principles of the operation of CIN based on *hemsehri* ties as a mechanism. It has to be noted that it would be a wrong interpretation to equate the mechanism, which Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) name as "poverty in turns", with *hemsehri* networks. In fact, "poverty in turns" is the name of a general mechanism or way of operation, which usually rises on the basis of *hemsehrilik*. *Hemsehri* networks serve for the "poverty in turns" mechanism by providing a unifying element, that is, the culture that is the basis for the mechanism to be lasting.

The mechanism of "poverty in turns", according to Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a), is the "partnership" of migrants. This mechanism provides the early comers

and the privileged groups the chance to get better off by benefiting from the new comers. Actually, it is in this sense an unequal power relationship: the groups in the mechanism do not benefit equally by the mechanism. In fact, this inequality is a must in order for the mechanism to operate. This is not to say that this is a zero sum game for new comers; they also benefit from the mechanism as this mechanism prevents them from the "chaotic" order of the city and provides them means and hope to achieve up-ward mobility by offering them opportunities in the job and housing markets. This mechanism relies on four fundamental characteristics. These are as follows:

> "a) it is always based on the relations formed in the land and job markets; b) it is usually supported by the relations with the business sector, especially those built upon *hemsehrilik;* c) the unequal distribution of the gains made in this sector to those who take part in the system; and d) the political interests that are based upon these unequal gains"(Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 40).

Actually, it is the changes in the job and housing markets that the formation and continuation of the 'poverty in turns' depends. With the help of the clientelist-patronage relationship, the owners of the *gecekondu* land and the house(s) take advantage of these in order to provide economic and political profit by selling or renting the land or the house(s) to the new comers. This is certainly related to the transition of the *gecekondu*'s use-value to exchange-value, which reflects itself by the increasing percentage of tenants and the decreasing size of the land on which the houses are constructed (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a).

2.5 Perspectives and Concluding Remarks on Communitarian Informal Networks in Turkish Metropolises

Although family pooling and 'poverty in turns' are separate mechanisms, which are argued to be the operating principles of the CIN, there is a wide consensus among the scholars on the main characteristics, ontology and functions of the CIN.

As it was argued above, for the formation of the CIN, there are three main factors that can be identified, namely, the state institutions' disability to formulate and apply social and economic policies in order to regulate the migration process or, simply, their indifference to emerging problems aroused from migration, the absence of sufficient level of industrialization in the metropolises to absorb the increasing labor force that would engender modern organizations, such as labor unions and class loyalty, and, lastly, chain migration that made the continuation of family, kin or *hemsehri* ties possible. As a consequence of these, rural based primordial social ties became the primary means of migrants for their economic and social survival, and their psychological well being in the city. The functions of the networks can be put as follows: 1) preservation / acquisition of identity in a "chaotic" environment (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991); 2) related to identity, the transfer of norms, values and mores to young generations (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2000); 3) provision of access to material goods, like shelter and jobs. (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991; Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç 2000; 2001); 4) social control (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991); and 5) provision of perceptual accessibility in order to make sense of the chaotic urban environment (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991).

It has to be note that these networks are also for the benefit of the state. By the help of the networks among migrants and the poor, state excused itself from its obligations to provide welfare to its citizens. Also, the social control inherent in these

networks, most of the time prevented the poor from participating both in individual criminality and anti-systemic political action.

These observations provide us the means to comprehend the reasons behind the relative stability and order in Turkish metropolises. At first instance, it would be claimed that, in the absence of any sufficient formal regulations, Turkish metropolises would have faced with social disorder and unrest as a result of poverty, discrimination and exclusion. Also, it would be easily predicted that formation of an "underclass" in such a situation was a strong probability. But in reality this was not the case. The networks, in both short and long terms, fulfilled their functions of defense and meritocracy. In this respect, Turkish metropolises neither faced with significant "deviant" and criminal activities nor contained an "underclass", as in the case of post- 1980's Western metropolises. In brief, the situation in Turkish metropolises can be defined as the impossibility of full integration in both societal and spatial domains, but also as the absence of full exclusion and marginalization, that is, a situation that can be labeled as a relative balance between the state, the upper and middle classes and the poor.

Up to here, a general picture of the Turkish metropolises and networks of the poor was given. It is now necessary to identify the changes in the networks in time. It was claimed that the networks of the poor were primarily based on rural ties of family and kin. However, by no means the rural ties are the same as the networks in the metropolises. In fact, the networks of migrants are in a process of constant change in response to the changing social context. In this sense, it can be claimed that rural ties are transformed into the CIN with different operating principles than the rural networks in the post-1980 period. Family pooling and the 'poverty in turns' are the two different explanations of the mechanism of the CIN. In brief, although

there is an important influential power of the rural ties in operation regarding the CIN, these two are, indeed, different entities. In this sense, it would be a wrong interpretation to claim that the CIN are traditional organizations. By the light of these arguments, it is possible to come up with an important inference: The networks of the poor are by no means constant or static. Rather they are in a constant process of change in response to the social context. So, it is well grounded to expect a new mode of operation of the networks with the changing context.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-1980'S ISTANBUL

AND THE RISE OF URBAN ETHNICITY AND UNREST

In Chapter I, contemporary social and spatial developments in Western metropolises were examined. The results of the analysis show that Western metropolises are facing with a phenomenon, which can be labeled as social fragmentation and disintegration. The main factor behind this proved to be economic transition, namely, the transition from Fordist to Post-Fordist economy that has started by the mid's of the 1970's. As a consequence of Post-Fordist labor process and social regulations, class hierarchy in these societies strengthened and socio-economic polarization between the rich and the poor went to extremes. These social developments also reflected themselves on spatial patterns of Western metropolises. The quarters of the rich and the poor crystallized, and this turned into a new aspect of the inequalities in those societies. The crystallization of the quarters of the classes, in turn, strengthened social fragmentation and disintegration by causing further economic, social, ideational, and political marginalization. As a result, while on the one hand Western metropolises witnessed the emergence of a class of extreme rich, on the other hand faced with the rise of an "underclass". In brief, Western metropolises, contemporarily, experience a phase of polarization in both social and spatial domains.

Although societies in different regions of the world experience different developments, the general picture of the Third World metropolises show some

parallelism to their Western counterparts. Social and spatial fragmentation and disintegration in Third World metropolises are the major problems that must be investigated in order to escape from their destructive consequences. In this chapter, Istanbul, the largest metropolis and the only 'global city' in Turkey, will be examined to comprehend the recent developments in spatial and social domains in this city and their consequences. To do this, our analysis will regard the post-1980 military coup era as the turning point of Turkish society, since almost whole social sciences literature on Turkey does so. The main emphasis will be on the transformation of the networks of the poor in today's Turkey. But before doing this, changing social structure of Turkey, especially the metropolis of Istanbul will be analyzed. Following the premises of the perspective on society and space relationship that has proposed in Chapter I of the thesis, and by the light of observations on the recent social structure of Istanbul, the spatial transformations in this city will also be explored. This will enable us to make comparisons between the Western "World Metropolises" and Istanbul in the conclusion chapter of the thesis. After stating our insights on the newly emerging public space in Istanbul, by the light of the relative deprivation and comparative reference group theories, the rise of conflict among the poor in Istanbul will be analyzed. Lastly, the main emphasize of this chapter, namely the transition of the communitarian informal networks of the poor into conflictual ethnic and religious cleavages will be studied in order to comprehend the recent developments in Metropolises of Turkey.

3.1 The Recently Emerging Landscape of the Metropolis of Istanbul: From a Patchwork-like City Space to Isolated Quarters

Social and spatial segregation has been one of the characteristics of cities, which is a result of social differentiation and dissociation (Calderia, 1999, 87). However, specific characteristics and the degree of social and spatial segregation matters, since particular forms of segregation have particular consequences.

Recent developments in Istanbul indicate the increasing fragmentation of its citizens into segments based on different expectations and life styles, and the increasing problems of unemployment, housing, inequality and social justice (e.g. Erkip, 2000). Not surprisingly, this newly emerging social structure reflects itself in a new trend of urbanization in the city of Istanbul. The most visible and also extreme vision of the fragmented and isolated city is seen in the division of formal and informal settlements, occupied by diverse economic, cultural and social groups (Köksal, 1993, cited in Erkip, 2000, 374). It can be argued that already existing walls are being strengthening and new ones are being erected between the rich and the poor and their residences. The most extreme, however not exceptional, appearance of the walling in / walling out process can be followed by examining the formation of 'gated communities' / 'fortified enclaves' that are becoming usual elements of Istanbul's landscape. This in turn, strengthens social exclusion and creates the perception of Otherness, which may foster social disorder. Recently, social tension(s) due to this development are increasing in Istanbul (see, Güvenç and Işık, 2002; Erkip, 2000; Aksoy and Robins, 1994) . State's and local governments' indifference

to new socio-spatial developments further increases the possibility of the emergence of destructive urban problems.

Calderia's (1999) observations on the city of Sao Paulo constitute a good example to comprehend the historical course of segregation in Istanbul due to the similarities between these two metropolises. Calderia (1999) states that by the late 1940's the city of Sao Paulo faced with a process of transition from a heterogeneous landscape of dense and congested housing of different social groups to a segregated landscape, fragmented in accordance with the differentiation of social classes. This new fragmented landscape further intensified by the 1980's and took a new form, which can be labeled as isolation. This qualitatively new landscape is marked with spatial closeness, but as a result of walling in / walling out practices and security precautions, limited or no interaction between different social groups settled in different neighborhoods exists. It would be fair to argue that these three phases of urban landscape and organization of the city of Sao Paulo, namely, heterogeneity, segregation, and isolation is similar to the "phases" of the city of Istanbul.

Aksoy and Robins (1994, 58) with reference to Leontidou (1993), state that Istanbul historically resembles the general characteristics of Mediterranean cities. Leontidou (1993) argues that Mediterranean cities are characterized by anti-planning attitudes and patchwork-like city space. This argument points to the historical heterogeneity of Mediterranean cities and so Istanbul with respect to social classes and their residences. In spite of this historical characteristic, by the first half of the 19th century, Istanbul faced with conscious efforts in order to achieve "regularity" and "order" (Çelik, 1986, cited in Aksoy and Robins 1994, 58). It is actually this

effort to "rationalize the urban system" that segmented Istanbul, similar to the city of Sao Paulo's second phase of development. Aksoy and Robins (1994, 58) argue that globalization is the bases of the next and necessary stage of rationalization and modernization of the city, which brings the process of "rationalization" to its logical extremes, namely isolation, as in the case of the third phase of city of Sao Paulo.

Parallel to these arguments, Güvenç and Işık (2002) state that "Istanbul was already a *divided city* in 1990". But from this date up to now, this picture is significantly changing as indicated above. The roots of this change can be traced back to the early 1980's. One of the most important developments of this period is the worsened income distribution within the city.

> The available data suggest that the *gini coefficient,* a measure of the degree of inequality in income distribution, rose from 0.38 in 1978 tp 0.48 in 1987 and finally to 0.59 in 1994. Similarly, when households are divided into ten income groups, the share in total urban income of the wealthiest 10 per cent increased from 28.9 per cent in 1978 to 39.2 in 1987 and to 52.0 per cent in 1994, with the richest 1 per cent only receiving 29 per cent of all income in 1994. Not only do gaps between different income groups seem to be widened, but also the entire income structure of the city has undergone a radical change. This is best evidence in drastic fall in the share of wages and salaries in the total urban income: from 57.9 per cent in 1978 and to 32.9 per cent and to 23.6 per cent in 1994 (Güvenç and Işık, 2002,213-214).

Examining the newly emerging elite in Turkish society by the 1980's would help to comprehend this data and the observations made on Istanbul.

3.1.1 The New Post-1980's Elite in Istanbul and the Fortified Enclaves

In the Özalist era following the 1980 military coup, the most radical changes took place in the economic domain. Application of the principles of liberal economy, such

as cancelling of constraints against importation and foreign bills, dramatically changed the social structure of the society. Some portions of the Turkish bourgeoisie gained large amounts of wealth by adapting their corporate structures to the new requirements of the competititive liberal market. The most important change was the replacement of managers, who were previously the members of the family that own the corporate, by highly educated Turkish or foreign professionals. This new professional group started to earn large amounts of money. Actually, it is this group of professionals that make up the Turkish yuppies (young urban professional individuals)[6]. Consequently, yuppies and the portions of Turkish bourgeoisie which were mentioned above, became the *cream de la cream* of the society (Bali, 2002).

The emergence of unbalanced wealth[7] was supported by the state. The rationale behind this support was to increase consumption by creating a culture of consumption in order to integrate Turkish economy into the global market. This may also be considered as an effort to continue with the historical project of the Turkish right, namely, "creating a millionaire in every quarter" and /or constructing "the little America"[8]. Certainly, the changed political balance between the right and the left in favor of the right in the post-military-coup period made it easier to apply such economy policies in the absence of a leftist opposition.

---

[6] The term yuppie defines the group of young professionals usually employed in the financial or industrial sectors with very high salaries, who appeared in the 1980's in the Reagan era in USA. An important characteristic of this group is the desire for the highest quality services and products (Bali, 2002, 40-41).

[7] It was / is unbalanced because extreme wealth and poverty were / are arising at the same time.

The appearance of the distinctive cultural characteristics of the new elite in the public sphere did not take long. Consumption and popular western culture became established in Turkish society in a relatively short time period. Actually the new elite, especially the yuppies, had already been familiarized with western culture, since most of them had completed their university education in foreign countries, especially in the USA (Bali, 2002). Consequently, the new elite, in addition to some politicians and high-level bureaucrats, constituted a new group of consumers having high standards of "taste" and consumption, and also wealth that can afford it. The choice of dressing, cultural and leisure activities, foods and drinks became one of the major aspects of the identity of this group (see Bali, 2002). In this sense, 'culture', once again became the distinguishing factor for being a member of the elite or the common people (*avam*), although the underlying factor was the economic status, that is, the income.

Due to increasing emphasis on culture, fragmentation among the rich emerged. The new elite distanced themselves not only from the poor, but also from the "undeserved rich" of post-informal neighborhood residents and Anatolian bourgeoisie. A conflict between the 'Anatolians' and "original" citizens of Istanbul emerged. The Anatolian bourgeoisie perceived to be culturally inferior like the post-informal neighborhood residents, by the "original" citizens of Istanbul. The discourse of *maganda* and *kiro* turned into a common stigma attached to 'culturally inferior Others', both the rich and the poor. The new elite, on the contrary to the common rich, was cultured, westernized, and intellectual with distinctive tastes. The popular press also supported and promoted this new image of the new elite (Bali, 2002).

---

[8] These historical slogans were brought forward by the officials of the Democrat Party (DP) that came to power in 1950. DP can be regarded as the prototype and the premiss of the later center-right parties

It did not take much time for the free market economy in the metropolises to supply shopping malls, place of amusements, restaurants and clubs, centers of cultural activities and so on to the new elite. The opening of Galleria in 1988 at Ataköy and Akmerkez in 1993 at Ulus, various nightclubs and restaurants like Şamdan, Safran and Ece Bar, which applied a concept of "friend-client" in order to create an atmosphere of friendship and care are several examples of this development. Certainly, in order to create such an atmosphere the doors of these new places were / are closed to common people by erecting various kinds of "walls", such as security guards and words of warnings at the entrances of these places. In addition to these, business quarters moved from the Karaköy-Eminönü-Sirkeci line to the Salıpazarı-Kabataş-Fındıklı line, and then to the Mecidiyekoy-Gayrettepe-Esentepe line and finally to the Zicirlikuyu-Levent-Maslak line. In this way, the employees in Zincirlikuyu-Levent-Maslak line, who were mostly the new elite, were able to ride their cars on the TEM highway, without moving into the city crowds and interacting with the common people (Bali, 2002, 124-134).

It is clear that the new pattern of income distribution and the lifestyle of the new elite points to an increasing fragmentation and isolation of social classes and groups in both societal and spatial domains. As a before hand statement it can be claimed that the most evident and clear form of fragmentation and isolation can be followed by examining the new residences of the new elite (see Bartu, 2001; Danış, 2001).

The increase in income levels of the new elite significantly influenced the pattern of urbanization in Istanbul. In addition to the construction of new business

in Turkish political history.

centers, shopping malls, amusement centers and the like, the new residential sites of the new elite are of considerable importance in the creation of this new pattern.

The rich, who were previously located at the coastal side of Istanbul, started to move to the newly-built sites surrounded by high security technologies and private security agencies, having prices between 250 000 to 1 million USD, constructed by big contraction companies "outside the built-up portion of the metropolitan area" (Güvenç and Işık, 2002, 214). These new residences offer their residents a secure environment, and most importantly a new way of life. The secure environment and cultural "quality" of these sites are provided by strict selectivity by extreme ways, such as the requirement to fill out questionnaires for new comers, in order to decide whether they qualify for these residences. The self-sustainability, which is a prerequisite for 'security', is provided by separate and private schools, sport centers, health center, transportation facilities and so on. It has to be noted that while selectivity, security and isolation act against the lower classes, elements of global elite culture are welcomed (Aksoy and Robins, 1994; Güvenç and Işık, 2002). As Güvenç and Işık (2002, 215) point out: "the result on the part of the nascent elite, is an impermeable caste-like culture in which elements of the national culture are used as an asset in the globalization game".

Certainly, the formation of fortified enclaves was dependent on some prerequisites. In addition to a certain level of socio-economic development, one of the most important prerequisites was the re-regulation of the related code of laws. This re-regulation was actualized by the 1984 housing law (Bali, 2002, 112). By this date "the urbanization of capital" (Şengül, 2001) started, which became one of the

most important dynamics of the formation of fortified enclaves. Şengül (2001) states that by the early 1980's Turkish metropolises became increasingly hegemonized by (big) capital. Big contraction companies, which were previously disinterested in this market, started to involve in big housing projects. Indeed, for these companies consideration and conformity to the legal regulations was not a considerable matter having priority. Erkip (2000, 372) states that:

> Previously, the housing demand of middle and upper income groups was met by independent contractors who were small in scale and weak in capital. Thanks to the state supporting large corporations that have been trying to cope with decreasing profits in manufacturing, housing investments turned out to be the most profitable area of investment. Higher profit rates are sustained by public land invaded by corporations, almost in same manner that squatters did once. The only difference is in style of consent of the state, which ignores the invasion in both cases, yet provides infrastructure and other urban services more willingly this time. After the land is sold to the firms at lower prices, municipal authorities undertake the development of land. The newly emerging conflicts of interest between squatters and large construction firms forced the state to choose the side of the later (Buğra, 1998).

Although the dynamics of the formation of fortified enclaves in different regions of the world (may) differ, examining the Western literature on issue is fruitful to comprehend these dynamics, since they are more or less universal among the global elite.

Bauman's (2001, 57) statement of the escape of elite from community seems to lie at the heart of social- psychological factors of the formation of fortified enclaves.

> More than anything else, the 'bubble' in which the new cosmopolitan business and culture-industry global elite spends most of their lives is –let me repeat- a *community free zone*. It is a site where a togetherness understood as a sameness (or, more

precisely, an insignificance of idiosyncrasies) of casually encountered and 'irrelevant on demand' individuals – and an individuality understood as a trouble-free facility with which partnerships are entered and left – are daily practiced to exclusion of all other socially shared practices. The 'secession of the successful' is, first and foremost, escape from community

A more political economy explanation is also available in the same study.

Feature of community which prompts all those who can afford it to opt out of it: an integral part of the idea of community is the 'fraternal obligation' 'to share benefits among their members, regardless of how talented or important they are'. This feature alone makes 'communalism' 'a philosophy of the weak' ... 'The powerful and successful' cannot easily dispose of the meritocratic worldview without seriously affecting the social foundation of the privilege which they cherish and have no intention of surrendering. And as long as that worldview is upheld and made into canon of public virtue, the communal principle cannot be accepted ... For the 'powerful and successful' the desire for 'dignity, worth and honor' paradoxically calls for the denial of community (Bauman, 2001, 58-59)

Although these arguments point out to the reasons behind the escape of the elite from the community, in fact this group also needs community, but of different kind than the "ideal" one. This community is the one composed of the "powerful and successful". This is so because like other people, the elite also find life precarious, dissatisfying and even frightening in the absence of community. Despite the conflict and clash between freedom and community, the absence of one or the other makes life unsatisfactory. Furthermore, there is a perceived, and also a real, need for belonging to a community in the recent "risk society" for safety, identity, and material privileges. As a result, the elite form homogenous communities (Bauman, 2001).

It is a 'community' of the like-minded and the like-behaving; a community of sameness –which, when projected on a wide screen

of widely replicated / copied conduct, seems to endow the chosen individual identity with the solid foundations the choosers would not otherwise trust it to possess (Bauman, 2001, 64)

In addition to this frame, in the literature, it is also possible to observe one other dynamic behind the new elite's tendency to form homogenous communities, namely, security obsession, both in cultural and symbolic, and political aspects.

Aspiration to the 'traditional neighborhood', new "style" of life, and integration into the global elite culture are the visible discourses legitimizing fortified enclaves. The "sense of belonging" is a crucial aspect of these enclaves. The elite, who consciously or non-consciously dissociate / disintegrate themselves from the society of "others", feel a need of belonging to a community, as Bauman suggests. Actually, this community is supplied by the fortified enclaves perfectly. Since these enclaves are intended to be highly homogenous, a community that is free from "threats and others" becomes available[9]. The emphasis on the common public space at the heart of the sites is a highly used advertisement discourse (see Bartu, 2001; Danış, 2001). By this public space, the elite, who are alienated from the society by choice, would overcome their alienation by interacting with other alienated elites. As a result, the aspiration to traditional neighborhood is satisfied in these fortified enclaves. In addition to this, cultural, artistic and sportive activities provided by the sites fulfill the "requirements" in order to integrate with the global elite culture. These two become the aspects of the new style of life. Although these are the cultural and symbolic aspects of the dynamics of the formation of the fortified enclaves, it

would be a partial explanation unless we analyze the political aspects, since they are as important as the cultural and symbolic ones.

Beck (1999) identifies recent social life and structure by the term "risk society".

> A life of risk –in which 'the very idea of controllability, certainty and security ... collapses', and because at no other social location has that certainty and security- and particularly the reassuring feeling of 'knowing for sure what is going to happen' – collapsed so spectacularly as in the underdefined, underinstitutionalized, underregulated and all too often anomic territory of exterritoriality inhabited by the new cosmopolitans (Beck, 1999,2, cited in Bauman, 2001, 60).

Actually, risk society, which is uncertain, uncontrollable and insecure, leads the elite to be obsessed with their security. More than anything else, it is the "dangerous classes" of metropolis, composed of the ones who are at the lower strata of the income distribution that constitute the bases of the metropolis dangers. This is most obvious in the discourses and rhetoric that legitimize social isolation, fragmentation and irritation, in sum the new mode of public space (Calderia, 1999). Calderia (1999) argues that the elite in Sao Paulo expressed their views on chaos and disorder in the city with the concepts, like contagious disease, nastiness and sexual degeneration, and soon relate these with crime. In fact, statistical data provide legitimacy to this rhetoric since crime rates as well as the rates of violence in criminal activities started to increase by the 1980's. This further strengthened by the increased violence of the security forces toward those who are perceived / believed to be criminal. So it is a security crisis that metropolises of the world are facing. Zukin (1995, 38-39, cited in Bauman, 2001, 114-115) defines this situation by the terms "watershed institutionalization of urban fear' and "the politics of everyday fear".

---

[9] Although significant effort is spent in order to achieve homogenity, sometimes cracks arise on the "filtering walls" of fortified enclaves, through which unwanted persons, who are "culturally inferior" seeps in. Danış's (2001) study provides emprical evidence to this fact.

This makes the new elite withdraw from public spaces and turn inward to create their own "public" life.

> It looks increasingly likely that the missing comforts of a safe existence need to be sought through other means. Safety, like other aspects of human life in relentlessly individualized and privatized world, must be a 'do-it-yourself' job. 'Defense of the place ', seen as the necessary condition of all safety, must be a neighborhood matter, a 'communal affair' ... The members of the globe-trotting elite… need a secure place of their own. Perhaps the other places, other people's places, do not matter- but that special place, their own place does ... The community they seek stands for a burglar-free and stranger-proof 'safe environment'. 'Community stands for isolation, separation, protective walls and guarded gates ... What looms therefore on the horizon of the long march towards 'safe community', community as safety is a bizarre mutant of a 'voluntary ghetto' (Bauman, 2001, 112-116).

3.1.2 New Mode of Public Space in Istanbul and Its Social Consequences

The new elite's culture, in addition to integration with the world economy as the result of increasing service sector at the expense of manufacture, strengthens the link between the local and the global (Erkip, 2000). However the local consequences of this process are highly questionable. Scholars like Nilüfer Göle, Ayşe Öncü and Çağlar Keyder argue that new developments in Istanbul point to a formation of a multi-cultural city. In other words, according to these scholars, a new cosmopolitanism is on the agenda with short term and manageable negative consequences (Aksoy and Robins, 1994). On the other side, scholars like Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins state that hostile identities and groups are emerging, new forms of cleavages and segmentations are forming and the suppressed Istanbul is becoming visible (Aksoy and Robins, 1994). It is clear that this picture is far from indicating a harmonious society with only mild and manageable problems. If we evaluate the

newly emerging situation with respect to social developments, Aksoy and Robins'

arguments appear to be a more realistic interpretation of the new public space. For

example Erdoğan (2001, 8) states that neo-liberal policies that are dominant in

Turkish politics since the 1980's have produced new forms of social exclusion and

marginalization. In the Özalist era, increasing income polarization, declining social

welfare and security expenditures on the one hand, and on the other hand, the

"institutionalization" of "ostentation society", the acceptance of social and class

hierarchies without question, increasing economic, cultural and symbolic violence

towards the poor, and the decline of egalitarian principles and cultural elements of

social justice, re-structured and re-produced the peripheral and minoriterian status of

the poor in distinct ways. The rhetoric of the "Other Turkey" can be viewed as an

expression of what Erdoğan states. In fact, any analysis of the rhetoric of

advertisement brochures of "fortified enclaves" and their residents (e.g. Aksoy and

Robins, 1994; Bartu, 2001; Danış, 2001) show clear evidence of the exclusion of the

"Other" and the will and conscious effort of isolation and walling, in order to create a

new style of life and a selected community and neighborhood (e.g. Bartu, 2001;

Danış, 2001). Danış's (2001,160) interview with a resident of a fortified enclave,

namely, Bahçeşehir, strikingly illustrates this reality.

> I think that Bahçeşehir, at least its current situation, must be
> protected. Because Istanbul's many disadvantages do not exist
> here. It is for sure that these must be protected as much as possible.
> (…) To do this residents must do something from below.
> I am sure that, being a class A consumer, I think it must be
> protected from the consumers of class B2. This must be said clearly
> … While they were coming here people acted to prevent their
> interests, their individual and class interests. Me too. Why do
> people live in such a place where its walls are protected by
> security? Because of this reason. To protect their individual, social,

and also economic interests as long as it is possible. (…) I live in a place of 20 000 population surrounded by walls in order to protect myself in social means. No one should exaggerate this. It is for sure that people reside here to protect and isolate their income levels and class positions. (…) People came here by running away. This statement is true also for the mafia leaders, also for me, also for the people who started to work in a good company and gained wealth in the age of 25, also for the famous textile industrialist, also for the *Çeçen* mafia leaders, also for İbrahim Sadri. All of them are here because they ran away.

Calderia (1999), in her study of Sao Paulo, states that this city as well as many others in the world, face a decline of modern ideals, such as public use of the public space[10]. Calderia (1999, 87) further argues that contemporary cities face a new mode of public space that is characterized by homogenous enclaves, and distance between the social groups who are perceived to be different and with whom less communication is desirable. In this respect, new landscapes and social geography of cities constitute the roots of this new regulation of public space.

By the light of above arguments, the general features of the newly emerging public space can be analyzed. First and most visible outcome of the new regulations in the city is the fragmentation of the social fabric and the isolation of social classes from each other, both mentally and physically. In more concrete terms, what is on the agenda is self-isolation and production of a closed but globally integrated culture for the rich, and involuntary isolation and the formation of inward-looking communities for the poor (Güvenç and Işık, 2002, 217). In this sense Aksoy and Robin's (1994) criticisms against the advocates of "new cosmopolitanism" and "cultural mosaic"

---

[10] It is interesting to note that while Calderia views the loss of public space as contrary to modernism, Aksoy and Robins (1994) argues this process is a direct result of modernity and rationality.

seem to hold true. This is so because any kind of mosaic needs mortar in order to unite the pieces, and as Işık (1994-1995) states, the logic and common ground that unites the elements of a city and social structure is becoming absent.

An important aspect of this development can also be put as the disappearance of trust between the groups that make up the metropolis society. According to Sztompka (1999), trust in a society promotes cooperation, binds individuals and community, encourages sociability and participation, enriches the networks of interpersonal ties, enlarges the field of interactions, allows for intimacy of interpersonal contact, and increases moral density, social capital and civic engagement as well as tolerance, acceptance of strangers and endurance to inter-group conflicts. It is obvious that for a peaceful, harmonious and emancipatory society these aspects are almost 'must's. On the contrary, distrust results in the decline of social capital, communication between people and interpersonal networks, the rise of xenophobia, increase in alienation and uprootness of individuals and the emergence of criminal activities and social fragmentation. From the above arguments, it can be inferred that a "culture of distrust" is rising with its all negative consequences influencing urban life and urban public space. The roots of "collective counter-culture of self-defense" that is so visible in today's world cities and also in Istanbul seems to be a result of this "culture of distrust". In this sense, today's public spaces of metropolises are shaped by the severe forms of bio-politics aimed to achieve and institutionalize "public hygiene". This picture certainly proves Akay's (2001) claim about the emergence of a police and control society to be true. Aksoy and Robins (1994, 64) rightly state that:

Such an ideal of a new civic is very far from being realized in Istanbul, and, moreover, that the forces of change may also be working in ways that actually obstruct or inhibit the development of such a vital urban culture. As in other global cities, what may be emerging in reality are new forms of segmentation and cleavage among different groups in urban population. At best, this may result in the refusal of encounters, as particular groups elect to live in relative isolation; at worst, however, it provides the basis for new forms of urban conflict and confrontation.

Calderia (1999) states that the previous form of public space was characterized by openness, egalitarian and communitarian ideals and universality. On the contrary, today's public space is characterized by separateness and disagreeable differences. While her view on previous public space is highly questionable, her view on the contemporary one is appropriate.

3.1.2.1 New Mode of Public Space and Urban Conflict

The above quotation from Aksoy and Robins indicates the possibility of new forms of urban conflict and confrontations.

In this section, possible forms of urban conflicts and confrontations will be explored. There are various studies on the effect of the (new) mode of public space on urban conflict. In these studies, the relationship between crime and fragmentation / disintegration of social groups is discussed. Shihadeh and Ousey (1996, 649), for example, state that "degree of suburbanization in a metropolitan area is positively related to the rates of serious crime in the incorporated center-city". The important point in this study is the distinction between the black and white criminality, which actually points to a class division (see for instance Wilson, 1987). These authors argue that center city rates of serious crime in the Black community, not among the

whites, are rising with suburbanization due to mediating factors. In another research conducted by Shihadeh and Flynn (1996) the relationship between Black isolation and Black violence was explored. This study is important for its premises. The first one is the argument that residential segregation is a qualitatively distinct type of inequality. In concrete terms, the inequalities aroused from geographical separation and segregation must be identified from other types of inequalities, such as income, education and occupational prestige. The second premise is the argument concerning different types of segregation, namely, unevenness, centralization, concentration, clustering and isolation, which are not "five measures of the same phenomenon, but five distinct ways in which two or more groups live separately from one another" (Massey and Denton, 1988, cited in Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996, 1328). The term isolation refers to the low degree of potential contact between the social groups across geographic subareas of a spatial unit. In this sense the term isolation is a definitive term for contemporary public space. Another important point in this article is the distinction made by the authors between urban violence and Black urban violence. This is important since conceptualization of violence in terms of social groups provides the researchers the opportunity to comprehend the specific dynamics of the violent behaviors of different social groups. The concluding argument of the study can be put as the evidence of a positive correlation between social isolation and Black urban violence.

The factors behind this are the violation of the norm of achievement, that is to say, segregation, and specifically isolation, produces an ascriptive form of inequality that weakens the norms inhibiting violence; the situation that obscures and acts

against social and economic mobility that is strengthened by cultural and political factors; and lastly, the geographical concentration of negative aspects, such as poverty, joblessness, and social malaise in a single ecological space.

In sum, these studies show that the new mode of public space that is characterized by isolation produces unrest because of economic, social, cultural and political factors. Among the related factors, erosion of meritocratic principles and the increase of ascriptive form of inequality appear to be the most important ones. However, despite the important information available in the literature, the category of the "unrest" is usually missing and remains unexplored.

In the attempt to categorize unrest, it is possible to argue that, in general, with respect to social groupings, there are four categories of conflict and confrontation, namely, inter-group individual conflict, inter-group collective conflict, intra-group individual conflict, and intra-group collective conflict. It is also possible to give common examples to these categories: For the inter-group individual conflict, burglaries and snatch theft that constitute an important portion of the urban crime in Istanbul, at least in the media; for the inter-group collective conflict, the 1996 Mayday events in Istanbul; for the intra-group individual conflicts Black ghetto crime in USA's cities, such as rape and assassination; and finally, for the intra-group collective conflicts recent events in Esenler district in Istanbul.

What is usually discussed is the inter-group collective and inter-group individual conflicts and confrontations. The rhetoric used in these discussions is usually marked by the terms crime, criminality and violence. In the media and popular public discourses, these confrontations are usually explained with reference

to individualistic elements, such as degeneration, deviance and pathology. The "underclass" debates, usually used by conservative scholars like Charles Murray, constitute a stereotypical example to this kind of rhetoric.

In Turkey, the picture is more or less the same. It is usually the members of popular media who use this kind of a "methodology" to "analyze" urban criminality and unrest. Despite their heavy influence on the society, fortunately Turkish scholars are aware of the need to pass beyond this simplistic "explanation", based on individual pathology. Thus, there are increasing, yet not sufficient numbers of studies conducted that are more or less able to pass beyond such simplistic views. Unfortunately, these scholarly studies are heavily concentrated on the inter-group collective conflicts and confrontations. In my point of view, in fact, what is crucial is intra-group collective conflicts at best, and clashes at worst.

As stated in Chapter II, in Turkish metropolises, it is the communitarian informal networks (CIN) of the poor, which not only prevent these groups from extreme forms of poverty, but also give them the chance for upward mobility. However, recently, the CIN are increasingly eroding, and also evolving into a new form of network, that is the ethnic and religious cleavages. This development results in two important consequences, namely, the danger of the formation of an "underclass" and the rise of ethnicity among the poor in Turkish metropolises. It is this reality, in addition to the new mode of public space that constitutes the ground of intra-group conflict, confrontation and unrest among the poor. The logic of this statement is briefly as follows: isolation in metropolis prevents the poor to compare themselves with the rich, since actual and symbolic walls remove the possibility of

interaction between these social groups, producing two truly separated "societies". On the other hand, the poor, who were previously fragmented along networks based on primordial ties, are acceleratedly pushed to the "real ghettos" of involuntary closures. This results in limited interaction of the poor with other social groups, and, thus, only comparison that becomes available is between the poor groups of informal networks. Moreover, limited resources for the groups among the poor produce conflict among them. The "privileged" group of poor becomes the object of comparison that turns them to be the hostile in the eyes of the "unprivileged" poor. Actually, this process also works for the "privileged" poor: they start to perceive the other poor as their enemies trying to possess their resources. This leads to a vicious circle of hostilities. Furthermore, conflict generally result in the rise of identity / ethnic politics, as a result of the evolution of the CIN into ethnic cleavages, which may also bring traditional hostilities to the surface.

In order to understand the lack of comparison between the rich and the poor, and the heightened comparison among the poor, a phenomenon which is strengthened by the newly emerging spatial pattern of the cities, namely the isolation of different quarters of different social classes and groups that diminishes the social spaces in which members of different classes and groups interact in equal status, the concepts of relative deprivation and comparative reference group must be analyzed.

At first glance, it is surprising and contrary to the common view to note that it is the members of the social groups who are nearer to the top of the social hierarchy, who are resentful and critical of the social systems rather than the bottom groups (Runciman, 1966). Thus, there is a discrepancy between one's social position and his

/ her rejecting or accepting it. This is so because of the fact that "people's attitudes, aspirations and grievances largely depend on the frame of reference within which they are conceived" (Ruciman, 1966).

> Although at first sight a paradox, it has become a commonplace that steady poverty is the best guarantee of conservatism: if people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it. But if, on the other hand, they have been led to see as a possible goal the relative prosperity of some more fortunate community with which they can directly compare themselves, then they will remain discontented with their lot until they have succeeded in catching up (Runciman, 1966, 9).

It is possible, at least to sense that, in the process of comparison and "decision" of the reference groups, there is a "law" regulating the process of comparisons, which results in relative deprivation that can lead to action. In other words, reference group comparison that causes dissatisfaction is not an "arbitrary" process. So in loose terms, it is possible to argue that there are "legitimate" and "illegitimate" comparisons and feelings of injustice (Runciman, 1966). That is to say, relative deprivation occurs only as a result of comparison between the groups that have some similarities in status. The uprisings and revolutions in history, in general, occurred at times of rising prosperity. At least, part of the rationale behind this "strange observation" can be understood if one comprehends the issue by considering the relative deprivation and reference group approach: at times of prosperity, social groups' tendency to compare themselves with upper strata strengthens as social groups find rising similarity of opportunities with the upper strata, which in turn leads to unrest whenever they realize that there is a gap between the opportunities of

the two groups and so feel blocked and relatively deprived. On the other hand, decades of decline may also cause relative deprivation as a result of disappointment of stable expectations.

> What is common to both situations is that people are made aware of not having what they have been brought to think it feasible or proper or necessary that they should have. The upsetting of expectations provokes the sense of relative deprivation, which may in turn provide impetus for drastic change (Runciman, 1996, 22).

Festinger's (1968) study provides useful information in order to comprehend the issue.

> The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one's own increases ... In other words, there is self-imposed restriction in the range of opinion or ability with which a person compares himself (sic!) (Festinger, 1968, 217).

Thus, there is a selectivity in the choice of comparative reference groups based on the degree of discrepancy / proximity of one's status. When the optimum degree of discrepancy / proximity exists, people tend to intend to move close to the "level of aspiration" of "others like himself" / herself. It is this tendency that leads people to engage in action to reduce the discrepancy. So it can be argued that there is a tendency for unity between the persons who are similar to each other. The cessation of comparison between divergent persons and groups in terms of abilities will not lead to hostility or derogation, since the comparison loses its legitimacy. It is, indeed, between comparable groups that possibility of conflict and confrontation occurs, since they find the competition against each other more attainable. Finally, people

tend to narrow down their range of competitive groups whenever they perceive the divergence as resulting from the divergence of attributes (Festinger, 1968).

What can be inferred from these arguments related to urban conflict is that as isolation, which makes comparison impossible between social groups, increases in addition to widening economic and mental gap between the isolated groups, the poor groups stop comparing themselves with the better-off groups. What they actually do is to compare themselves with the "others like themselves", that is, the subgroups of the poor. The fragmented structure of the poor is important in the sense that it provides subgroups to make comparisons between each other. If it is legitimate to speculate, it can be said that whenever the poor fall to the bottom and "unite" in this respect, it is then the poor would start comparing their situation with their previous situation, which would lead to anti-systemic unrest. Until this kind of a situation occurs, the poor would continue to make comparison with each other, which produces confrontation within this group.

3.2 From Communitarian Informal Networks to Ethnic and Religious Cleavages
Since the 1990's identity politics has been gaining importance. The protests as a response to widening gap between the classes, increasing inequalities, and social, political and cultural domination started to be expressed in terms of identity rather than economic struggles. Since this period Kurdish, Islamic and Alevi identities have been the major components of identity politics (Ayata, 1997).

The rise of ethnic and religious cleavages can be analyzed through exploring both the developments in macro scale, namely, the wider context of Turkey, and the developments in Turkish metropolises, which is done in the following sections.

3.2.1 The Rise of Ethnic and Religious Cleavages in Turkey: The Perspectives Based on Macro Analysis

Keyder, in his 1997 dated study, analyzes the "tradition" of modernization in Turkish society since the late Ottoman and early Republican period. He argues that, what characterizes Turkish modernization is the phenomenon of "modernization from above", which enabled modernizers not to apply or promote all dimensions of modernization, but the ones that are parallel to their own interests. This, in addition to the permanent gap between the ruling / modernizing elite and the masses, caused the alienation of masses from the project of modernity and a perception of modernity as the instrument of the authoritarian state emerged. Consequently, the national identity that was intended to be constructed by the ruling / modernizing elite was never fully accepted by the masses. Corollary to this, in the 1990's, with the increased legitimacy crisis of the Turkish state, ethnic and sectarian identities started to rise.

Keyman (1995) asks how nationalism and the process of national identity formation have resulted in the rise of Islamic identity in recent decades in Turkey. According to him, the decline of the hegemonic discourse of national identity resulted in the emergence and strengthening of different political identities based on gender, Islam, and ethnicity. Moreover, as nationalist discourse lost its unifying

function, the state started to apply Islamic discourse as an alternative to Kemalist national identity as a unifying force to safeguard the state.

Also the newly emerging global economy and its cultural impulses have promoted the rise of identity politics and Islamic political parties (Öniş, 1997). Öniş (1997) argues that structural aspects of the economic and cultural spheres provided groups and communities the means to express their identities and organize themselves around issues concerning individual or group identity.

In sum, the process of modernization and attitudes of modernizers, alienation of the masses from the modernization project, the crisis of legitimacy and hegemony of the state and the discourse of Turkish national identity, the post-1980 policies that applied Islamic discourse as an unifying force, and globalizing economy are the major factors behind the rise of identity politics in Turkey in the 1990's.

3.2.2 The Rise of Ethnic and Religious Cleavages in the Urban Context

Kazgan (2001) states that the Kustepe quarter of Istanbul, which can be categorized in the "surpassedbelt" of the city of Istanbul, has never achieved either the inter-integration with the city or the intra-integration between the *hemsehri* groups. This picture of the absence of integration in both domains can be generalized to other "surpassed" quarters of the metropolises. The underlying factor behind the absence of intra-integration is the fragmented structure of poor residences along the informal networks based on non-modern ties, mainly of families and groups of origin. This fragmented structure strengthens whenever competition over resources increases (Güneş-Ayata, 1990-1991). In fact, the competition over interest increases and takes

aggressive forms as the state abandons the already limited welfare promotions. As a response, the networks turn to be exclusionary communities seeking self-interest and the means to enhance their "transformation capacity". Thus, the anonymity of the city leaves its place to fragmented "totalities" characterized by communitarian relationships (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 334). These communities, previously based on family and *hemsehrilik*, increasingly take a form of ethnic / religious cleavages, in addition to their adoption "mafiatic" attributes (Şengül, 2001). In this respect, Erkip's (2000, 374) statement pointing to the changing face of Istanbul towards an arena of different ethnic, religious and communal backgrounds is of considerable importance. While on the one hand, there is a convergence of religious / ethnic communities and mafiatic attitudes (Güvenç and Işık, 2002, 215-216), on the other hand, metropolises face with the politization of ethnic / sectarian communities and identities (see Ayata, 1997). Ayata (1997) defines various factors behind the rise of urban ethnicity, such as minority consciousness and "us" versus "them", the feeling of threat against one's culture and identity, the failure in integration and adaptation to urban society, socio-economic inequalities between the identity groups, and the solidarity networks usually based on religion, and mediated and controlled by religious groups, namely, *tarikats*. Although, Ayata's arguments provide important insight about the rise of ethnicity and identity politics in the urban context, in the following sections these arguments will be developed by analyzing first the perspectives on ethnicity and then the evolution of networks among the poor.

i) Perspectives on Ethnicity: Primordial versus Structural and Situational Views

In general, perspectives on ethnicity can be classified into two broad categories. One of these categories can be named as the primordial view.

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto,* as the result not merely of personal attraction, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz, 1963, 109, cited in Rex, 1989, 27).

This view considers ethnicity as an unchanging identity, which is indifferent to external pressures and developments. In this sense, ethnicity has its own dynamics independent from other elements or domains of the societal life. In brief, primordial view perceives ethnicity as more or less a static identity.

The second perspective on ethnicity can be divided into two sub-categories, namely, structural view and situational view. These two views are, in fact, complementary rather than oppositional. While structural view deals with relations between classes, races and ethnic groups that can be labeled as macro issues, situational view is concerned with micro issues, in more concrete terms it examines here-and-now aspects of societal life. In brief, structural view examines the position of ethnicity in the given social structure. On the other hand, situational view

examines the function of ethnicity as a resource to attain ends, which can be latent or ignored (Rex, 1989, 26-28).

Recent developments prove that the formation of different identities is a matter and aspect of societal life. In other words, identities are not given, static and more importantly ahistorical. Rather, different identities emerge and fade away as the social structure changes. The rise of working class identity by the onset of the 19th century, and its fall by the mid 1970's can be regarded as an evidence of the dynamic nature of identity depended on the social structure. So rather than primordial perspective on ethnicity, situational and structural perspectives are more appropriate to use in ethnicity studies.

Certainly, the rise of urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises must be regarded in this framework. As a before hand conclusion, it can be argued that the rise of urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises has utilitarian reasons, in addition to structural ones. The decline of the CIN and their already existing features that can very easily be transformed into ethnicity are of considerable importance in this process.

ii) The "Rational Choice" of the Poor to Re-Regulate and Re-Define Their Pattern of Relationship by Ethnicity

Having argued for the utilitarian reasons of the rise of ethnicity, in this section, "rational choice" of the poor to re-regulate and re-define their pattern of relationship by ethnicity will be explored.

Narayanan (1989, 184) states that, in societies in which there exist different ethnic groups, the pattern of relationship between these groups are very much

influenced by external environment in instrumental aspects, mainly for security. She

further argues that, in ethnically pluralistic settings, structural aspects play a more

important role for ethnicity and issues related to ethnicity more than cultural factors:

"more than cultural factors it is social relationships that are important in establishing

group identity and a sense of community" (Narayanan, 1989, 147). The most

important domains of social structure appear to be the economic and political

domains that contribute to the rise of ethnicity (Rex, 1989).

> Clearly any realist account of what brings racial and ethnic groups
> together must refer to the structure of the polity and the
> economy…Even insofar as race and ethnicity are, of themselves,
> potentially important sources of in-group unity and intra-group
> division, their potential does require a structural content if it is to
> become activated. *Racial and ethnic differences might very well be
> latent for long periods. When, however, groups or quasi-groups
> thus differentiated come into economic or political relations with
> each other, such latent relations become salient in a new way* (Rex,
> 1989, 35-36, emphasis added).

What turns latent ethnicity into salient ethnicity is the rational choice of the

social and political actors that seek opportunities to upgrade their lives in the given

social structure. When aspects of social structure provide opportunity for those actors

to upgrade their lives by using their ethnic identities, the actors bring them forward.

In this sense, rational choice theory provides a useful insight for researchers to

comprehend the rise of ethnicity in Turkish metropolises, although this perspective

has important limitations in itself (see Malesevic 2002; Rex, 1989, 29).

Following a perspective holding the premise of the importance of economic

and political structure and the pragmatic / utilitarian choice of actors to upgrade their

lives, one can define the rising importance of ethnic and religious networks, political

parties, organizations and networks, and NGO's for the survival of the poor as a result of the evolution of the networks of the poor that points to a new pattern of relationship among the poor, and the rise of ethnicity as the new determinant of the patterns of relationships among the poor. This would help to demystificate urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises.

In the following sections of the thesis, the evolution of the networks of the poor and the rise of urban ethnicity as a consequence of this change will be explored.

3.2.2.1 The Evolution of the Networks of the Poor and the Rise of Urban Ethnicity

In chapter 2, the networks of the poor were explored by drawing upon the literature. In the final section of the chapter, it was argued the networks of the poor are changing in response to changing social context, which makes networks dynamic entities rather than static ones. In this line, the CIN of the poor are argued to be qualitatively distinct from the rural ties, although they originated from them. Also, it was implied that recent developments indicate that the CIN are transforming into a new pattern of relationship that is qualitatively different than the CIN. In this section, the trend of the decline of the CIN as a mode of regulatory relationship among the poor and the rise of urban ethnicity as the new mode of regulation and interaction among the poor will be explored. But before doing this, some observations on the CIN and the mechanisms behind them, namely the family pooling and the 'poverty in turns', will be discussed.

i) Comparative Analysis of the Family Pool Model and the Poverty in Turns Mechanism

In the previous chapter, both the family pool model and the 'poverty in turns' mechanism were analyzed. By the help of this analysis, it is possible to comprehend some distinctive and important features of the proposed models, which constitute both the strong and the weak sides of the models.

Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç's (2001) model of family pooling is constructed on a comprehensive perspective of survival means of the poor. They have identified fifteen different resources that contribute to family pooling. In addition to these, they have identified secondary or indirect resources, which brace the mechanism. On the other hand, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) focus on urban rent as the only resource, on which the survival and well being of the poor depend. While the comprehensive analysis of Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç is the strong point of the model of family pooling, the in-depth study of Işık and Pınarcıoğlu on the use of urban rent makes the mechanism of 'poverty in turns' a good descriptive model. However, the very same aspects of these studies constitute the weaknesses of their models. Simply the absence of any information about the relative importance of the fifteen resources for the survival of the mechanism in the family pool model, and the absence of any information about the resources other than urban rent in the 'poverty in turns' model can be argued to be the weaknesses in the models proposed. Certainly, if we combine these two models rather than taking them as granted, we are able to gain a deeper and more comprehensive insight into the CIN. By doing this, we can also comprehend the link between the family and *hemsehri* ties.

In fact, urban rent as a resource that contributes to family pooling, has been proposed by Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001), by the clause "provision of house, land, property", without any description of the way of acquiring this provision. However, if we regard the study of Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) as a long and comprehensive description of the 'provision of house, land, property", the whole picture becomes apparent. We can define the whole picture of the CIN as follows: Among the fifteen resources proposed by Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, the most crucial one appears to be urban rent, which is, most of the time, acquired through the use of *hemsehri* relations and ties. In this way the networks and the relationships among the poor, which are primarily family based, expand through the kins and *hemsehri*s. In sum, in my interpretation, the operation of the CIN is parallel to the model proposed by Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, but with greater and significant importance of urban rent as the primary source of the mechanism and *hemrehrlik* as an important and complimentary pattern of relationship among the poor.

ii) Decline of the CIN as a Historical Pattern of Relationship Among the Poor

Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) propose several cases in which the family pool model does not help to the well being of the poor. The below schema illustrates these cases.

Figure 3-1) The conditions in which the coping strategies do not work in the large / extended family scale (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001).

Although this schema provides important information about "the conditions in which coping strategies do not work in the large / extended family scale", it is also visible that these conditions are either individual or exceptional cases except for the first and sixth ones. In order to identify the general and structural conditions or statements, it is required to examine the model.

As it was shown above, there are fifteen sources that feed the system. Any defect, affecting the resource flow to the center, means a stroke to the system. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) argue that today while the significance of the material support of relatives living in a foreign country, child labor, woman's domestic labor and income of woman by domestic and / or public labor is preserved and even increased, whereas social security and health support, regular income from formal sector, income from informal sector, country side support and the probability of acquiring home, land and real estate are in decline. Any comparison of the relative economic significance of the increasing and decreasing resources shows that it is the resources, which are in decline that provide the most significant support to the family pool. This infers that the shift in the availability of the resources is far from promoting upward mobility or even maintaining the present economic status. Indeed, there is a clear indication of downward mobility as a result of the imbalance between what is lost and what is gained.

Like the resources in the first circle of the model, the resources in the outer circles must also be analyzed. Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç (2001) state that *hemsehri* ties and the neighborhood, friendship, imagined kinship and employer support are in decline as well. Moreover, public services, such as free education and health, social security, pork barrels, employment opportunities in the public sector, and juristical regulations are far from benefiting the poor. So what is left in the outer circles is the ethnic / religious networks, political parties, organizations and networks, and the NGO's that would promote the means of well being of the poor.

In the previous chapter, *hemsehri* networks are defined as hierarchical organizations built upon profit enhancement. The primary sources of profit enhancement are said to be the land and job markets. So it is necessary to examine the changes in these domains in order to comprehend the future of *hemsehri* networks. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a) point that the continuity of the mechanism of 'poverty in turns' depends upon continuous growth in land and job markets. The continuous growth of the land and job markets, in turn, stands on two prerequisites, namely, a dynamic economic structure, which highly depends on urban rant, and continuity of flow of "consumers", who are to be the new migrants (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 336).

The availability of urban rant is in sharp decline for two reasons. First, after about five decades of migration to metropolises, there remained almost no land to be occupied in the peripheries of metropolises in general and of Istanbul in particular (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 340). The second factor is the capital's / formal market's inclination to move towards the peripheries of the cities as their sites of investment (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a, 63), which is discussed above.

There is one more point to be considered, which lies in the social psychological motives / inclinations of individuals. The hierarchical structure of the networks has already discussed above. Although this is a hierarchy based on profit among the members of the networks, it must be considered that all the members of the network benefit from these networks, despite the inequalities inherent in the networks.

The profitability of the networks for the members at the lower ranks of the hierarchy depends on the patronage of the higher rank members in housing and job markets (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001a). However, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001a, 340) point to the possibility of cession of the higher rank members from the networks. According to the authors, this would terminate the whole logic of the mechanism, since patronage of higher rank members is a crucial element for the operation of the mechanism. Also, due to the reasons explained above, the formation of a new "elite" that would fulfill the requirements of patronage seems to be difficult. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001b, 42-43) conclude as follows:

> The pyramidal networks originated in the "poverty in turns" process do not possess a continuous character because of their class structure. Particularly, the ones who are at the top of the pyramid have a permanent tendency to leave the networks and to get in touch with different interest groups. In such a situation, there is always a probability to break up the invisible ties with the ones who are at the bottom of the pyramid. Especially, when the illegal process becomes legalized, a complete disappearance of communitarian rules may occur. In such a condition, entering into other networks and finding new lands to occupy and benefiting from these lands by opening them to the new comers becomes the only hope of the ones at the bottom of the pyramid. In this way, the continuation of the preconditions of the continuous growth is necessary for the continuation of the process of 'poverty in turns'. This is possible only by forming new networks and by the existence of land at the peripheries of the city, which is to be occupied. However, this process is moving toward an end due to the slowing down of migration to the cities and to the running out of the land that is to be easily occupied. This indicates an end for the 'poverty in turns' as an regulatory mechanism, and the formation of an underclass without any regulatory rule, or in other words, the new poverty.

iii) The Outer Circles of the Mechanism of the CIN and the Rise of Urban Ethnicity

It has already been stated that while the primary sources, which feed the mechanism of the CIN, to operate and become the primary aspect of the pattern of relationship among the poor, are acceleratedly diminishing, the sources, which were previously secondary, namely, ethnic and religious networks, political parties, organizations and networks, and NGOs, are becoming the primary resource supplies for the poor, which are indeed in a hierarchy according to their relative importance, respectively (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001). So what is on the agenda in the metropolises is the increased importance of ethnic and religious networks for the survival of the poor. In addition to ethnic and religious networks, the importance of political parties, organizations and networks is also visible in the informal neighborhood quarters[11]. The NGO support is still a secondary resource for the urban poor, since civil organizations in Turkey are not institutionalized and have not gained significance in public life in its full terms (Kalaycıoğlu and Tılıç, 2001).

Ethnic and religious networks and NGO's do not require deeper analysis in the boundaries of this study, since the former has a self-evident factor for the rise of urban ethnicity, and the latter is weak and unimportant[12]. However, political parties,

---

[11] This development is, indeed, observed by many scholars working on informal neighborhoods and urbanization in Tukey. Also this fact was observed in the recent field study conducted by Assoc. Prof.Tahire Erman in Ege quarter of Mamak, Ankara.

organizations and networks and their effects on the rise of urban ethnicity must be analyzed, since these have important contributions to the rise of urban ethnicity.

The contribution of political parties, organizations and networks to the rise of urban ethnicity can be examined by following the clientelist politics that is deeply rooted in Turkish society. Although the evolutionist perspective on clientelism states that clientelist politics is a step towards modern politics, the existence of clientelist relationships in different degrees almost in every region of the world shows the fault of this perspective. Rather, what seems to be a more realist perspective is the articulationist perspective that suggests the coexistence of different modes of political activity. In this perspective, modern politics and clientelist relationships are not only compatible but also can replace each other: whenever institutional or modern regulations or aspects of politics fail, clientelist relationships fill the gap. However, in Turkey, clientelism plays a much more significant role than filling the gaps.

From the 17th and 18th century Ottoman times to the post-1980 military coup era, clientelism has always been an important aspect of politics in Turkish society in different modes, in accordance with structural developments[13]. The major change in the mode of clientelism in Turkish politics occurred by the multi-party period. In this period the previously dominant form of traditional clientelism transformed itself into

---

[12] Erder (1998, 113) observes increasing efforts of certain groups in order to prevent the rise, especially, of religious communities by forming "civil" organizations. This shows how seriouss the developments are, as well as the awareness and discomfort of certain groups from this. However, as stated above these efforts are far from being significant in the public life. Also, my observation in Kadıköy, Istanbul, indicates that some organizations so called civil society organizations or NGO's are far from being independent from political parties or organizations. In this sense, influences of the so called civil society organizations and NGO's on the urban ethnicity can be followed in the frame of clientelist politics of political parties and organizations.

[13] There are various studies on clientelism in Ottoman state and Turkish Republic. Some of these works are as follows: Kudat (1975); Sayarı(1975; 1977); Özbudun (1980; 1981); Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984); Güneş-Ayata (1990; 1994); Şahin (1999).

client-broker and party-patronage mode of clientelism. The main difference between traditional clientelism and the client-broker and party-patronage modes is the source of the resources, which the patrons use in order to gain profit from their clients. While in traditional clientelism patrons primarily use their own resources, in client-broker and party-patronage modes, brokers or political parties provide support to their clients by using the resources of the state rather than their own individual resources (see Güneş-Ayata, 1990). Despite there are significant differences between traditional and contemporary clientelism which mainly arise from the kind of the resource that is used to build clientelist relationship, there is a main aspect that is inherent in any kind of clientelist relationship, namely, the unequal and exploitative nature of the relationship as well as its counter-effect on the formation of class consciousness and class politics (see Şahin 1999).

One of the objectives of the 1980 military coup is said to to dissolute clientelistic networks of the political parties at any level in order to clean the "dirtiness of politics". To do this, in the new constitution related items and the law of political parties were changed (Schuler 1998, in Şahin, 1999, 97). However, contrary to the objectives of the military coup, by the 1980's clientelist relationships spread out to the society more than the pre-coup era (Schuler 1998, 117, in Şahin 1999, 99). Şahin (1999, 99) observes the reason and results of the failure of the coup to prevent clientetist relations as follows:

> Together with applications, realized by military government, aiming at depolitization of important spheres of society; the image of being party of "technocrats and pragmatical solutions", nucleus of which was created by MP, resulted in de-ideologisation of party programs and created an impression in public opinion that any grassroots party in center could be substituted by others. Political strategies based on class oriented organization of masses and anti-communism as an ideological symbol, lost their popularities, especially with the collapse of socialist block. Parallel to these changes, ethnic divisions started to forego.

After the military coup and Motherland Party (MP) government Turkey's economy entered into a new phase. The new economic policies were towards the integration of the country's economy with the global system. In order to achieve this goal, new regulations in economy took place. In order to achieve the restructuring of the economy, social, political and administrative regulations also took place. The increased rights and responsibilities of the municipalities was one of the new administrative regulations. This, in turn, had considerable effect on the political life in localities. The establishment of new clientelist relations based on urban rents again appeared. In the local elections of 1990 the victory of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) was a result of its ability to continue and strengthen clientelist relations in addition to SDPP's inclination towards ethnic politics (Şahin, 1999).

Actually these developments were not a qualitatively new phenomenon. As discussed above, before the 1980's clientelism in various forms, either in traditional or in party-patronage mode, was a character of Turkish politics. However, by the 1980's destructive consequences of clientelism came into existence in many domains of society, namely, corruption (Şahin, 1999) and the rise of ethnic cleavages. Of course it would be exaggeration to claim that the only reason of corruption and the rise of ethnic cleavages is clientelism. But it can be argued that clientelism strengthened and accelerated the process of spreading of corruption to many domains of the society as well as the rise of ethnicity, as mentioned in the quotation.

3.2.3 The Rise of Conflict Between the Ethnic and Religious Groups Among the Poor in Turkish Metropolises

In the above sections, the new mode of public space, and comparative reference group and relative deprivation approaches were explored in order to provide information about the rise of unrest in metropolises among the poor. In addition to this, the factors behind the rise of ethnicity as the new determinant of the pattern of relationship among the poor in Turkish metropolises were analyzed. In brief, in previous sections two important arguments were stated, that is, the rise of unrest among the poor and the rise of urban ethnicity in Turkish metropolises. From these arguments, it can be inferred that the unrest in metropolises will be / is between ethnic / religious groups among the poor.

It is generally accepted that informal networks are stabilizing forces for Third World countries, which have experienced rapid urbanization. There are several observations behind this view that are related to the characteristics of the networks. First of all, it is argued that since informal networks cut across social classes, they work as counter forces against the formation of class consciousness and loyalties among the poor. Secondly, these networks protect the poor against anomie, normlessness and alienation. They turn to be agents of socialization that provide a sense of community and collective identity, which help the poor to integrate into the urban political order. And thirdly, these networks, by having the function of providing aid and assistance, provide the poor material support in the form of shelter, food and the like, in the absence of any other sources or support. Furthermore, informal networks are the only instrument of the poor in many cases by which the poor members of the networks convey their demands to the local or central

governments or to other political actors who have the power to provide services and / or support to the poor (Denoeux, 1993, 17). This conduct of demands becomes possible by the existence of a "patron" at the top of the hierarchy of the network, who functions as a broker between the locality and the decision making actors. Since the broker type of patrons have an important role for the networks, their characteristics and motives become important aspects of the stabilizing role of the networks. First, since the broker type patrons are part of the political system and "part of the government apparatus", and since they have hegemonic role in the network, they play a role in "softening" the demands of the urban poor (Bienen, 1984, 669, cited in Denoeux, 1993,17). Secondly, Nelson (1979, 394 & 166, cited in Denoeux, 1993, 18) suggests that there is a "conservative bias" emerging from the fact that "neither traditional leaders nor patrons are likely to use the political power inherent in their followings to bring about substantial change, since such change would almost surely undermine their own position". Finally, Cornelius (1975; 1977, cited in Denoeux, 1993, 18) also provides evidence to the integrative and controlling role of the broker type patrons in his study conducted on the Mexican urban poor.

Also the motives of the poor in the networks are of considerable importance. Basically, the primary motive of the poor is to integrate into the urban system. Obtaining immediate benefits are the primary concern of this group. So they are willing to participate rather than to work against the existing system. As a consequence, cooperation with the brokers and patrons turns to be a more rational choice for the poor rather than following revolutionary ideas and leaders (Huntington, 1968, 280, cited in Denoeux, 1993, 18).

In sum, informal networks' characteristics, such as their position cross-cutting social classes, their socializing role and function as a provider of material support, the broker type patrons at the top of the networks, and the motives of their members to integrate into urban society are claimed to be the bases of these networks' stabilizing role.

Erder (1997), a scholar of urban informal networks in Turkey, also states that the primary goal of the urban poor is to integrate into urban society, to gain legitimization and establishment in urban life and to find access to urban public services. The informal networks of the poor are their primary apparatus to reach these goals. Despite some counter effects of these networks on the integration process, it is evident that these networks provide important means for this purpose. However, as a result of "historical sedimentation", informal networks ossified and changed as a response to changing social context. As a consequence, today, they have turned to be destabilizing forces, acting as a means of confrontation and unrest in the poor quarters of the city, which I would call "surpassedbelt" of the metropolises. In other words, they have become the means of intra-conflict among the poor. At the heart of this development, there lie the increased resource scarcity for the well being of the poor and the changing character of the networks, that is, changing from the communitarian informal networks (CIN) to ethnic / religious cleavages

Landis and Boucher (1987) state that whenever there is competition between ethnic groups for economic, power or security goals, ethnic unrest rises. The motives

of the actors and the intensity of the conflicts are the determinants of the degree of the unrest. They further suggest that:

> The frequency with which interethnic conflict involves a difference in allocation of resources between groups in conflict makes it tempting to suggest that interethnic *contact* becomes interethnic *conflict* when such an imbalance occurs. While this is too simplistic a suggestion, it does point to the importance of this theme… From the conflicts discussed in this volume it appears that the issue of allocation of resources is a more important source of conflict when parties to the conflict occupy the same territory (Landis and Boucher, 1987, 21-22).

Although the competition over material resources between ethnic groups is argued to be the primary factor behind ethnic conflict, non-material contributors can also be identified. Following Essed's (1991) study on racism, it can be argued that conflict over norms, values, non-material resources, and definition of the social world are the non-material contributors to ethnic conflict[14]. In addition to these, public discourse and everyday experiences (Essed, 1991), perceived or real threats to identity (see Ayata, 1997; Grant and Brown, 1995), socialization patterns of new generations, prejudices and stereotypes rooted in history can be identified as non-material factors.

In Turkey, as mentioned above, resource scarcity among the poor is on the agenda with its destructive effects on the lives of the poor. In fact, transition of the CIN into ethnic / religious groupings as the primary tool of the poor to survive in the metropolises is a result of this development. As the poor lose the means to continue the CIN, they divert into ethnic / religious networks and political parties

---

[14] It must be noted that race and ethnicity are different categories. However, there is a convergence between the reasons behind the racial and ethnic conflict. For a comparision between the concepts of race and ethnicity see Oommen (1994).

organizations in order to replace the lost resources[15]. In this kind of networks patronage and clientelist relationships become a much more important aspect of the mechanism, compared to the CIN. Thus, the structure of politics in Turkey, that is, political parties, organizations, constitution and laws, the characteristics, intentions and motives of the cadres of the political parties and so on, is also an important factor for ethnic conflicts. Party patronage and indifference of political leaders to use any means to gain political power and the absence and / or prohibitions of class politics are the major, previously external but contemporarily internal, contributor to the rise of ethnic conflict in Turkish metropolises.

---

[15] The relationship between the ethnic / religious networks and the political parties and organizations is of considerable importance. Well known examples like the relations between the *tarikat*s and right-wing political parties and organizations, emergence of Peace Party by the influence of the Alevi organizations in Europe that brings Alevi identity forward explicitly, the case of People's Democracy Party, the identification of the Republican People's Party with Alevi identity, especially in the poor neighborhoods, the Welfare Party and its successors using a Sunni Islamic discourse and networks

CONCLUSION

In the conclusion chapter of the thesis, first, a brief summary of the thesis will be presented. Then, by the help of this brief summary, the findings of the thesis will be discussed. Finally, suggestions will be put forward in order to provide a preliminary outline for future urban studies.

In Chapter I of this thesis, by surveying the perspectives on the space and society relationship, a general theoretical framework for the space and society relationship is presented. By the help of this theoretical framework, spatial and social developments in Western metropolises are examined. It is shown that transition from Fordist to Post-Fordist economy has been the most important contributor to the changes in social structure and newly emerging spatial organization in Western metropolises. It is also shown that the loss of public space, as a result of these developments, has important effects on social structure. By the decomposition of quarters of different social groups and classes, ideational, economic, social, and political fragmentation strengthens. In this chapter it is proved that spatial organization of the contemporary Western metropolises has important effects on marginalization, exclusion, and the formation of an "underclass" in these metropolises.

In Chapter II, in order to follow the footprints of marginalization and exclusion in Turkish metropolises, migrants, some sections of whom turned to be the urban disadvantaged group, and their residences as social spaces, are focused. The course of rural-to-urban migration, the position of migrants in the social structure of the metropolises, and their survival means, namely, their informal networks are examined with a historical perspective. It is shown that there was a relative balance

---

proves the convergence of the political organizations and the ethnic / religious networks.

between integration and disintegration of migrants into the urban society in metropolises. In other words, there was neither full exclusion nor full inclusion for the migrants. This situation of relative balance was achieved by the help of informal networks among these people who have roots in rural life. Although informal networks of the poor evolved from rural ties, urban networks that are the communitarian informal networks can by no means be classified as rural. From the arguments proposed in this chapter, it can be inferred that networks of the poor in Turkish metropolises are dynamic rather than static that adapt themselves to the developments in societal life.

In Chapter III, social and spatial developments in Turkish metropolises, particularly in Istanbul are examined. Similar to the Western case of transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, the economy policies of the post-1980 military coup era appeared to be the most important determining factor for the changes in the Turkish society and metropolises. In the societal domain, parallel to the changes in economy, a new social group, named Turkish yuppies, emerged. This went hand in hand with the opening gap between the rich and the poor. Another development in this domain was the re-emergence or increasing importance of culture in the definitions of "friends and foes". Not only the rich and the poor, but also the "elite" rich and the common rich dissociated from each other with reference to culture. These societal developments reflected themselves on the spatial pattern of Istanbul. The sites of consumption, leisure, business, and residence of social groups and classes became separated from each other. This resulted in the loss of the "ideal" public space and the production of "false public spaces", as in the case of Western metropolises. However, social developments in Turkish metropolises in the domain of lower classes are different from the their Western counterparts. In Turkish metropolises

rather than the formation of an "underclass", it is the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages that is the pressing problem.

From the arguments inherent to this thesis, various findings can be brought forward for discussion. These are as follows:

i) Space is a social entity that is influenced by and is influencing social affairs. Space is by no means neutral. Rather, it is an entity that has a major role in shaping the social structure, which is shaped by the social structure. This kind of a relationship is a dialectical relationship having the full complexity of any dialectical relationship.

ii) Due to the dialectical nature of the space and society relationship, space reacts upon society. This is a process that contributes to shaping the social structure. However, attention must be paid not to forget other factors affecting the social and spatial developments and changes. In other words, one must be aware of the danger of falling into the trap of reductionism.

It is this awareness of the trap of reductionism, particularly spatial reductionism that led the researcher to focus on socio-historical determinants of social developments. The analysis of the "underclass" formation in Western metropolises, and the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages among the poor as a result of the evolution of the networks of the poor in Turkish metropolises, point to the importance of socio-historical determinants for social developments.

iii) The literature on the networks of the poor implies functional aspects of these networks. The same functionalist perspective is preserved in this thesis. The functionalism of the networks, indeed, is not surprising or misleading. By following the premises of Maslow's 'Hierarchy of Needs', the roots of functionalism and the pragmatic / utilitarian aspects of the networks and the functionalist approaches in the

analyses become clear. However, there may be non-functionalist aspects of these networks that are waiting to be explored by the social and political science students.

v) In the third chapter of the thesis, the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages in Turkish metropolises is examined. The main factor behind this development is argued to be the evolution of the communitarian informal networks of the poor into ethnic and religious cleavages. In addition to this, the importance of the wider social context and the political structure of the society appeared to be influential in this process.

vi) It is almost self-evident that in Western societies the rise of micro-nationalism and micro-ethnicity are pressing problems. So at first instance, one can be suspicious about the reliability of this thesis, since it is argued that in Western metropolises "underclass" is the pressing problem whereas in Turkey it is the rise of ethnic and religious cleavages. However, this thesis concentrates on the disadvantaged classes and groups of both societies. So it mainly examines the social developments by considering these sections of the societies. If one regards the social bases of micro-nationalism and micro-ethnicity in Western societies, which are the middle classes, the possible suspicions about the reliability of this thesis loses their legitimacy.

vii) It appeared to be the economic domain that is the most important determinant of the social as well as spatial developments in recent decades. In Western societies, it is the economic transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, and in Turkey post-1980 neo-liberal export-oriented economy policies that has the major influence on society and (social) space.

vii) Although economy has the determining influence on whole society, its effects differ with respect to differences in societal groupings and classes. While new economic regulations in both Western and Turkish societies favor the upper classes

and professionals, then work contrary to the benefits of middle and lower classes. So it can be argued that what appears to be the influence of economics on the whole society is the effect of economy on the societal patterns of interaction among the individuals and social groups and classes. Through this insight, a new understanding or conceptualization of "society" based on interaction patterns between the parts in a given "fragmented totality" can be reached and strengthened.

viii) The trend of the loss of public space is universal among the world metropolises. This points to the increasing decomposition, disintegration and fragmentation of the societies that are usually considered to be unitary. Thus, rather than the emergence of new cosmopolitanism, the emergence of new fragmentations and isolation is a more realist conclusion for the recent developments in the world.

Certainly, this thesis and its findings must be strengthened and re-examined by future studies. Thus, the last part of this thesis is reserved for the suggestions for the future urban studies.

i) As a result of fragmentation and isolation of social groups and classes in almost all domains of the societal life, a process which has manifested itself in the spatial pattern of the contemporary cities, (small scale) community formations are on the agenda. Thus, social and political science students must focus on community formations in order to comprehend the recent developments and changes in the world.

ii) While doing this, special emphasis must be given to the use of space. Formation of communities can be read as the social actors' re-definition of their friends and foes, which turns them into political actors. This political action is, indeed, visible at different levels and settings. While the "clash of civilizations" thesis and other

related perspectives could be regarded as the examples of the new mode of political action at the global level, the formation of gated communities in cities is the example of this phenomenon at the local level. What seems to be the main rationale in this process is the re-regulation of the patterns of relationships. For re-definition and re-regulation, geography and space is of considerable importance. For control, discipline and hygiene, and terror against the foes, the use of space is one of the primary aspects. In this sense, studies conducted on the issue of the "geo-political space" that is the fusion of bio-politics and space, would be one of the major and necessary contributions to the social and political sciences literature in the new millennium.

iii) In this thesis it is implied that the formation of an "underclass" in Turkish metropolises is a high probability in the near future. In the literature, there are some studies pointing to this development. The decline of the networks among the poor and the exclusion of previous members or not including new members who are "useless" for the networks lie at the core of this process. Erder (1995, 112) observes the situation as follows:

> It is understood that, due to the hard conditions of the urban environment, these relationships may get away from being self-sacrificing solidarity networks and transform into selective and hard power relations, especially for the ones living on the edge of poverty. The existence of these relations may mean the establishment of poverty for the ones who came to the city with hope but could not enter into the networks and who are excluded from these networks.

Thus, the formation of an 'underclass' in Turkey is a pressing research subject for social and political science students.

SELECT BIBLIOGHRAPHY

Akay, Ali. 2001. "Megapoller Döneminde Toplumsal Sorunlar: "Devlet Şiddet Sefalet"" (Social Problems in the Age of Megapolises: "State, Violence, Poverty"), in Firdevs Gümüsoğlu, eds., 21. Yüzyil Karşısında Kent ve İnsan. Ankara: Bağlam.

Aksoy, Asu, and Kevin Robins. 1994. "Istanbul between Civilization and Discontent", New Perspectives on Turkey, 10, pp. 57-74.

Aslanoğlu, Rana A. 1998. Kent, Kimlik ve Küreselleşme (City, Identity, and Globalization). Bursa: Asa.

Ayata, Ayşe. 1997. "The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey", New Perspectives on Turkey, 17, pp 59-73.

Bali, Rıfat N.. 2002. Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar (From Mode of Life to Life Style: New Elites, New Places, New Lifes). İstanbul: İletisim.

Bali, Rifat N.. 1999. "Çılgın Kalabalıktan Uzak ..." (Far from Crazy Crowds), Birikim, 123, pp. 35-46.

Bartu, Ayfer. 2001; "Kentsel Ayrı(şı)m: İstanbulda'ki Yeni Yerlesimler ve Kemer Country Örneği (Urban Apartheid / Decomposition: New Residences in Istanbul and the Kemer Country Example), in Firdevs Gümüsoğlu, eds., 21. Yüzyıl karşısında Kent ve İnsan. Ankara: Bağlam.

Bauman, Zygmund. 2001. Community. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. Translated by M. Ritter, London; Newbury Park; California: Sage Publications.

Bhala, A.S. and Frederic Lapeyre. 1999. Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World. London: MacMillan Press; NewYork: St.Martin's Press.

Buğra, Ayşe. 2001. "Kriz Karşısında Türkiye'nin Geleneksel Refah Rejimi" (Turkey's Traditional Welfare Regime confronting the Crisis), Toplum ve Bilim, 89, pp 22-30.

Calderia T.P.R.. 1999. "Duvarlar İnsa Etmek" (Constructing Walls), translated by Asena Günal, Birikim, 123. pp. 87-96.

Castells, Manuel. 1998. The End of Millennium. Malden: Blackwell.

Castells, Manuel. 1977. Urban Question. London: Arnold.

Danış, Didem. 2001. "İstanbul'da Uydu Yerleşmelerin Yaygınlaşması: Bahçeşehir Örneği"(Widespreading of the Satellite Settlements in Istanbul: The Bahcesehir Example), in Firdevs Gümüşoğlu, eds., 21. Yüzyıl Karşısında Kent ve İnsan. Ankara: Bağlam.

Davis, Mike. 1990. City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. London and New York: Verso.

Dear, Michael J.. 2000. The Postmodern Urban Condition. Oxford: Blackwell.

Denoeux, Guilain. 1993. Urban Unrest in the Middle East: a Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran and Lebanon. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Donald, James. 1992. "Metropolis: The City as Text", in Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson, eds., Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity. Frome and London: Polity Press.

Eisentadt, Shmuel Noah and Luis Roniger. 1984. Patrons, Clients and Friends. Cambridge: Cambrıdge University Press.

Erder, Sema. 1998. "Kentlerdeki Enformal Örgütlenmeler, "Yeni" Eğilimler ve Kent Yoksulları ya da Eski Hamamdaki Yeni Taslar" (Informal organizations in Cities, "New" Tendencies and the Urban Poor), in 75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı.

Erder, Sema. 1997. Kentsel Gerilim (The Urban Tension). Ankara: Um:Ag Vakfı Yayınları.

Erder, Sema. 1995. "Yeni Kentliler ve Kentin Yeni Yoksulları" (New Urbanites and New Urban Poor), Toplum ve Bilim, 66, pp 106-119.

Erdoğan, Necmi. 2001. "Garibanların Dünyasi: Turkiye'de Yoksulların Temsilleri Üzerine İlk Notlar" (The World of the Poor: Early Notes on the Representations of the Poor in Turkey, Toplum ve Bilim, 89, pp.8-21.

Erkip, Feyzan. 2000. "Global Transformations Versus Local Dynamics in İstanbul; Planing in a Fragmented Metropolis", Cities, 17(5), pp. 371-377.

Erman, Tahire E.. 2001. "The Politics of Squatter (*Gecekondu*) Studies in Turkey: The Changing Representation of Rural Migrants in the Academic Discourse", Urban Studies, 38(7), pp 983-1002

Essed, Philomena. 1991. Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory. Newbury Park: Sage.

Esser, Josef and Joachim Hirsch. 1995. "The Crisis of Fordism and the Dimensions of a 'Post-Fordist' Regional and Urban Structure", in Ash Amin, eds., Post-Fordism. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Festinger, Luis. 1968. "A Theory of Social Comparison", in H.H. Hyman and E. Singer, eds., Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research. New York: The Free Press.

Friedrichs, Jurgen and John O'Loughlin. 1996. "Chapter 1: Polarization in Post-Industrial Societies: Social and Economic Roots and Consequences", in Jurgen Friedrichs and John O'Loughlin, eds., Social Polarization in Post-Industrial Metropolis. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Gans, Herbert. 1993. "From 'Underclass' to 'Undercaste': Some Observations about the Future of the Postindustrial Economy and its Major Victims", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 17(3), 327-335.

Grant, Peter R. and Rupert Brown 1995; "From Ethnocentrism to Collective Protest: Responses to Relative Deprivation and Threats to Social Identity", Social Psychology Quarterly, 58(3), pp 195-212.

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe. 1994. Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey, in Luis Roniger and Ayse Güneş-Ayata, eds., Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society. London: Lyenne Rienner Publishers.

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe. 1990-1991. "Gecekondularda Kimlik Sorunu, Dayanışma Örüntüleri ve Hemşehrilik" (Identity Problem, Solidarity Networks, and *Hemsehrilik* in *Gecekondus),* Toplum ve Bilim, 51-52, pp. 89-101.

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe. 1990. Kasabada Politika ve Politikacı (Politics and the Politician in the Small Town), Toplum ve Bilim, 50, pp. 97-110.

Gürel, Sümer. 2001. "Türkiye'de Göç ve Bütünleşme Sorunsalı" (The Problematique of Migrantion and Integration in Turkey), in Firdevs Gümüşoğlu, eds., 21. Yüzyıl Karşısında Kent ve İnsan. Ankara: Bağlam.

Güvenç, Murat and Oğuz Işık. 2002. "A Metropolis at the Crossroads: the Changing Social Geography of Istanbul Under the Impact of Globalization", in Peter Marcuse and Ronald Van Kempen, eds., Of States and Cities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, David. 1985. Urbanization of Capital. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hirsch, Joachim. 1991. "From Fordism to Post-Fordist State", in Bob Jessop et all., eds., The Politics of Flexibility; Restructuring State and Industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia. Edward Elgar.

Işık, Oğuz. 1994-1995. "Globalleşme Süreci ve Kentin / Kentliliğin Değişen Anlamları" (The Process of Globalization and the Changing Meaning of the City and Being Urbanite, Birikim, 68-69, pp. 98-105.

Işık, Oğuz and Melih Pınarcıoğlu. 2001a. Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk; Sultanbeyli Örneği (Poverty in Turns: The Sultanbeyli Example). İstanbul: İletişim.

Işık, Oğuz and Melih Pınarcıoğlu. 2001b. "Kent Yoksullarının Ağ İlskileri: Sultanbeyli Örnegi" (The Networks of the Urban Poor: The Sultanbeyli Example),Toplum ve Bilim, 89, pp 31-61.

Kalaycıoğlu, Sibel and Helga R. Tılıc. 2001. The Unpublished Paper Presented in the 7th Turkish Social Sciences Congress, Ankara.

Kalaycıoğlu, Sibel and Helga R. Tılıc. 2000. "Intergenerational Solidarity Networks of Instrumental and Cultural Transfers Within Migrant Families in Turkey", Ageing and Society, 20, pp 523-542.

Katz, Michael B. 1997. "Comment on Loic J.D. Wacquant, 'Three Pernicious Premises in the Study of the American Ghetto", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 21(2), pp. 354-356.

Kazgan, Gülten. 2001. "İstanbul'da Bir Gecekondu Mahallesi: Kuştepe" (A *Gecekondu* Quarter in Istanbul: Kustepe), in Firdevs Gümüşoğlu, eds., 21 Yüzyıl Karşısında Kent ve İnsan. Ankara: Bağlam.

Keleş, Ruşen. 1990. Kentleşme Politikası (Urbanization Policy). Ankara: İmge:

Keleş, Ruşen and A. Unsal 1982. Kent ve Siyasal Şiddet (City and Political Violence). Ankara: A.Ü.S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yuksek Okulu.

Kennett, Patricia 1994. "Modes of Regulation of the Urban Poor", Urban Studies, 31(7), pp. 1017-1031.

Keyder, Cağlar 1997. "Whither the Project of Modernity ?: Turkey in the 1990's", in Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle; London: University of Washington Press.

Keyman, E. Fuat 1995. "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: the Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey", New Perspectives on Turkey, 13, pp. 93-120.

Kudat, Ayşe. 1975. Patron-Client Relations: The State of the Art and Research in Eastern Turkey, in E.D.Akarlı and G.Ben-Dor, eds., Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.

Landis, Dan and Jerry Boucher. 1987. "Themes and Models of Conflict", in Jerry Boucher et.al., eds., Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives. California: Sage.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Translated by D. Nicholson-Smith, Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell.

Leontidou, L. 1993; "Postmodernism and the City: Mediterranean Versions", Urban Studies, 30(6), pp 949-965.

Malesevic, Sinisa. 2002. "Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A critique", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(2), pp 193-212.

Marcuse, Peter. 1997. "The Ghetto of Exclusion and the Fortified Enclave, New Patterns in the United States", American Behavioral scientist, 41(3), pp. 311-326.

Marcuse, Peter. 1996. "Not Chaos, but Walls: Postmodernism and the Partitioned City", in Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson, eds., Postmodern Cities & Spaces, Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell.
Marcuse, Peter. 1993. "What is so new About divided Cities?", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 17(3), pp. 355-365.

Marcuse, Peter. 1989. "'Dual City': a Muddy Metaphor for a Quartered City", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, pp. 13(4), 697-708.

Marcuse, Peter. and Roland Van Kempen. 1997. "A New Spatial Order in Cities?" American Behavioral Scientist, 41(3), pp. 285-298.

Morris, Linda D. 1993. "Is There a British Underclass?", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 17(3), pp. 404-412.

Narayanan, Leila. 1989. Ethnicity in Urban Context: The Gujaratis in Madras City. Jaipur: Rawat Publications.

Öniş, Ziya 1997. "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: the Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective", Third World Quarterly, 18(4), pp. 743-766.

Özbudun, Ergun. 1981. Turkey: The Politics of Clientelism, in S.N.Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand ,eds., Political Clientelism Patronage and Development. Beverly Hills; London: Sage Publications.

Özbudun, Ergun, and Landau, J.M. and Tachau, F. (eds.) 1980; Electoral Politics in Middle East: Issues, Voters, and Elites. London: Hoover Institution Press.

Oommen T.K. 1994; "Race, Ethnicity and Class: An Analysis of Interrelations", International Social Science Journal, No 139, pp 83-93.

Pahl, R. 1975; Whose City?. London: Penquin.

Painter, Joe 1993; "Regulation Theory, Post-Fordism and Urban Politics", in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman, eds., Theories of Urban Politics. London: Sage.

Parnwell, Mike. 1993. Population Movements and the Third World. London: Routledge.

Peck, J. 1994; "Regulating Labour: The Social Regulation and Reproduction of Local-Labor Markets", in Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, eds., Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe. Oxford University Press.

Rex, John. 1989. Race and Ethnicity, reprinted from 1986 version, Millan Keynes: Open University Press.

Roberts, Byran. 1994. "Informal Economy and Family Strategies", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 18(1), pp 6-23.

Runciman, Walter Garrison. 1966. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Reprinted in 1993, Hampshire: Gregg Revivals.

Sassen, Saskia. 1994. Cities in the World Economy. Thousand Oaks; London; NewDelhi: Pine Forge Press.
Saunders, Peter. 1981. Social Theory and the Urban Question. London: Unwin Hyman.

Sayarı, Sabri. 1977. Political Patronage in Turkey, in E.Gellner and John Waterburry, eds,. Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies. London: Duckworth.

Sayarı, Sabri. 1975. Political Participation in Turkey, in E.D.Akarlı and G.Ben-Dor, eds., Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.

Soja, Edward W.. 2000. Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions. Oxford: Blackwell.

Soja, Edward W.. 1989. Postmodern Geographies: The reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso.

Shihadeh Edward S. and Graham C. Ousey. 1996: "Metropolitan Expansion and Black Social Dislocation: the Link Between Suburbanization and Center-city Crime", Social Forces, 75(2), pp.649-666.

Shihadeh Edward S. and Nicole Flynn. 1996; "Segragation and Crime; the Effect of Black Social Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence", Social Forces, 74(4), pp. 1325-1353.

Sztomka, Piotr. 1999. Trust: a Sociological Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sztompka, Piotr. 1991. Society in Action. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Şahin, Z. 1999; Clientelist Relations in Urban Sphere: A Turkish Case, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, METU, Department of Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments.

Şengül H. Tarık. 2001. Kentsel Celişki ve Siyaset: Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçleri Üzerine Yazılar (Urban Conflict and Politics: Writings on Capitalist Urbanization Processes), İstanbul: Dünya Yerel Yönetim ve Demokrasi Akademisi.

Şenyapılı, Tansı. 1998. "Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılı Gecekondunun 50. Yılı" (75th Year of Republic 50th Year of *Gecekondu*), in 75. Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlik. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı.

Turner, Bryan S. 1997. "The Making of Sociology: The Early Sociology of the City", in Bryan S. Turner, eds., Social Theories of the City. London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press.

Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass, and the Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wacquant, Loic J.D.. 1999. "Urban Marginality in the Coming Millennium", Urban Studies, 36(10), pp. 1639-1647.

Wacquant, Loic J.D.. 1996. "The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on its Nature and Implications", Acta Sociologica, 39(2), pp. 121-139.

Wacquant, Loic J.D.. 1993. "Urban Outcasts: Stigma and Division in the Black American Ghetto and the French Urban Periphery", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 17(3), pp. 366-383.

Van Kempen, Eva T.. 1997. "Poverty Pockets and Life Chances, on the Role of Place in Shaping Social Inequality", American Behavioral Scientist, 41(3), pp. 430-449.

Van Kempen, Ronald. and A. S. Özüekren. 1998; "Ethnic Segregation in Cities: New Forms and Explanations in a Dynamic World", Urban Studies, 35(10), pp. 1631-1656.