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
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HEIDEGGER'S READING OF PARMENIDES:
ON BEING AND THINKING THE SAME



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tańczę w ciemności

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HEIDEGGER'S READING OF PARMENIDES: ON BEING AND THINKING THE SAME

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«SO DOES SELF-CONCEALMENT RULE AT THE
HEART OF DISCLOSURE? A BOLD THOUGHT.
HERACLITUS THOUGHT IT. PARMENIDES UNSWIT-
TINGLY EXPERIENCED THIS THOUGHT INSOFAR
AS, WHILE HEARING THE CALL OF 'ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ,
HE REFLECTED UPON THE MOIRA OF EON, THE
DESTINY OF THE TWOFOLD IN VIEW OF PRES-
ENCING, AS WELL AS OF WHAT IS PRESENT.»¹

In his earlier writings where his interpretation of the Presocratics still resembles traditional scholarship, Heidegger takes the standpoint of the classicist Karl Reinhardt, by whom he was greatly influenced.² He believes that in the philosophical succession Parmenides was earlier than Heraclitus and that the latter attempted to meet the problems posed by the former. Even the order of his Presocratic lectures delivered in the nineteen forties still reflects this early Heideggerian view. The Parmenides lecture course is followed by two lecture courses on Heraclitus. Yet in the later period of his thought, Heidegger no longer thinks that Heraclitus argues against Parmenides and that the two oppose each other. The later Heideggerian position is that both these thinkers say essentially the same.³ In fact, Heidegger believes that Anaximander says also the same as Heraclitus and Parmenides. They would not be primordial thinkers for him, those who think the beginning (*Anfang*), if they were to differ substantially from one another.

The purpose of this article is to provide a unity to Heidegger's later reading of Parmenides. In the winter semester 1942–1943, Heidegger delivered a lecture course which was published posthumously under the title *Parmenides* as vol. 54 of Heidegger's

¹ Martin HEIDEGGER, „Moira,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Stuttgart: Neske, 1954), p. 247; „Moira,” in *Early Greek Thinking*, tr. by David Krell and Frank Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 100. All translations of Heidegger from German editions are my own. However, I sometimes follow closely the English translations of him which are available.

² Heidegger refers to Karl Reinhardt in his lecture course *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (*The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*). He mentions him also in *Being and Time*.

³ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954), p. 74. Hereafter this work is cited as EM.

collected works.⁴ Surprisingly, we find there actually very little on Parmenides himself. Therefore, in addition to considering the lecture course, I look for the Heideggerian interpretations of the Eleatic philosopher in *An Introduction to Metaphysics, What Is Called Thinking?*, “Moirai,” “Principle of Identity,” “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” and “Seminar in Zähringen 1973.” I organize my exposition of Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides around Parmenidean fragments. I follow the traditional order of Diels-Kranz.

1. ἈΛΗΘΕΙΑ THE GODDESS OF THE PARMENIDEAN POEM

Parmenides’ thought is expressed in a single hexameter poem, which is sometimes called the “didactic poem.” Substantial parts of this poem have survived. Fragment 1 is the poem’s prologue. In the prologue Parmenides tells of a goddess who greets him as he arrives at her home on his way which indeed “runs its course far away from the usual dwellings of men.”⁵ To the greetings, the goddess adds an announcement of the revelation which she is going to say. Everything which follows after the prologue in the subsequent fragments of the poem is actually the revelation of the goddess. Who is the goddess?—Heidegger asks. In order to answer this question he points our attention to the concluding part of the prologue, namely, to verses 22–32. In English translation Heidegger’s rendering of these verses into German runs as follows:

And the goddess received me with sympathy; she took my right
hand in her hand; then she spoke the word and addressed me
in this way: ‘O man, companion of immortal charioteers,
arriving at our home with the steeds that convey you.
Blessing be bestowed on you! For it is not an evil fate which has sent
you ahead to travel on this way—and truly this way is apart from men,
outside their (trodden) path—but, rather, rule and order. There is,
however, a need that you experience everything, both the unshaken
heart of the well-enclosing unconcealment,
as well as the appearing in its appearance to mortals, in which there
is no relying on the unconcealed. Also this, however, you will
learn, to experience: how the shining [of clearing]
(necessarily) remains called upon to shine, while it shines
through everything and (hence) in what way brings everything to completion.’⁶

Although, Heidegger claims, the answer to the question ‘Who is the goddess?’ is conveyed by the didactic poem as a whole, we can already anticipate the answer. ‘The goddess is the goddess ‘truth’.’⁷ In fact, Heidegger’s entire lecture course on Parmenides, where he discusses the prologue, concentrates solely on one Greek word which

⁴ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Parmenides* (GA54, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1982); *Parmenides*, tr. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, Indiana University, 1992).

⁵ Martin HEIDEGGER, Seminar in Zähringen 1973, in *Seminare* (GA15, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1986), p. 403.

⁶ GA54, p. 6.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

is commonly translated as truth, namely, on ἀλήθεια. The goddess is not the goddess of truth for this would imply the idea of a goddess to whose patronage truth is merely entrusted. According to Heidegger, the goddess is Ἀλήθεια, the truth itself.

In what sense is Ἀλήθεια, for Heidegger θεά, the goddess in the Parmenidean poem? What is the nature of the Greek gods? What is the essence of Ἀλήθεια? By giving adequate attention to these questions, we shall better understand Heidegger's interpretation of the poem's prologue.

The Greek word for 'goddess' is θεά. It comes very close to the Greek for 'look'—θέα. According to Heidegger, since the Greeks did not use accents and often would display a love for playing on word ambiguities, the two similar words could easily merge together in their meaning and usage.⁸ Relying on a dubious kinship between these two words, as well as between words δαίμονες and δαίοντες, he makes a bold statement about the nature of the Greek gods.

“Θεοί, they who are called ‘gods’ by us, those who look into unconcealment and thereby give a sign, are θεάοντες; according to their essence, they are δαίοντες-δαίμονες; the uncanny ones who present themselves in the ordinary. If thought of essentially, both words θεάοντες and δαίοντες say the same thing.”⁹

Like ὁ θεός and ἡ θεά, in classical Greek words ὁ δαίμων and ἡ δαίμονα mean respectively a god and a goddess; the difference between these words being that the former usually refer to a god or a goddess as a person whereas ὁ δαίμων and ἡ δαίμονα often describe divine powers or lesser divinities. Hence, θεοί, gods, can rightly be identified with δαίοντες.¹⁰ However, Heidegger equates the words θεοί and δαίοντες on different grounds than merely linguistic. He asks about the essence of the Greek divinity as such. According to him, this essence is expressed in both of the Greek words for gods. On the one hand, the gods, for whom he coins the term θεάοντες (the divine ones), are “those who look into unconcealment and thereby give a sign.” On the other hand, they (δαίμονες) are δαίοντες (the self-showing ones), “the uncanny ones who present themselves in the ordinary.”¹¹ Let us further investigate this.

The gods have been described as “those who look into unconcealment.” By the word “looking” (*Blicken*), however, Heidegger does not mean here “seeing” in the sense of looking toward or looking at. It is rather looking as the way in which one appears, comes to presence and shows itself, i. e. emerges as the unconcealed.¹² Consequently, the picture of the Greek gods which Heidegger gives cannot be confused with some popular view of the gods looking into and taking care of the πόλεις.¹³ Also,

⁸ Ibid., p. 160. See also Manfred S. FRINGS, “Parmenides: Heidegger's 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* XIX 1 (January 1988), p. 28.

⁹ GA54, p. 161.

¹⁰ In the New Testament Greek there is a change of meaning of the word ὁ δαίμων which now becomes understood as an evil spirit or demon in contrast to ὁ Θεός, the God.

¹¹ GA54, p. 161.

¹² Ibid., pp. 152-153.

¹³ Manfred Frings, the editor of Heidegger's lectures on Parmenides, surprisingly takes such a naive view for granted and even accuses Heidegger for a “shortness of vision” in the field of the “sociology of culture and cultural anthropology.” However, Heidegger's thought cannot be taken for psychology, sociology or anthropology for it is not a positive science.

the gods are not for him just the projections of man's experiences and ideas about himself. He argues against the view according to which the nature of the Greek gods could be explained on the basis of a mere anthropomorphism. In fact, his picture is a remarkable one for he connects gods with being.

"The Greek gods are neither personalities nor persons that dominate being; they are being itself as looking into beings."¹⁴

The Greek gods are not for Heidegger personalized cosmic forces or man's projections on the course of nature. According to him, the Greeks do not attribute human characteristics to gods. However, if the gods indeed appear to them in human form, it is because "they experience the gods and men in their different essences, and in their reciprocal relation, on the basis of the essence of being in the sense of self-disclosing emerging; i. e. in the sense of looking and pointing."¹⁵ Consequently, the Greek gods, and only they, are for Heidegger a manifestation of being. They are a sphere of possibilities for being for the Greek *Dasein*. They arrive only when being itself comes to its destiny in the Greek word and is experienced in its disclosure. Their essence consists in "their origination out of the essence of the presencing being."¹⁶

The gods have been described as the "uncanny ones." However, for Heidegger, the uncanny (*das Ungeheure*) is in the proper sense being. The Greek gods are for him a manifestation of being. All anthropomorphism which is usually associated with the Greek gods stems, in his view, from man's relatedness to the uncanny in the disclosure of being itself. Being can reveal itself properly to us neither as an animal, nor as a thing.¹⁷ Furthermore, if for Heidegger the Greek gods are a manifestation of being, its particular revelation is the goddess 'Αλήθεια. 'Αλήθεια is θεά, the goddess, precisely as a manifestation of being. What the goddess in its appearing allows to appear directs us to that which is to be thought in primordial thinking. Thus, we can ask further. What does the goddess signify? What is the essence of 'Αλήθεια?

To be sure, if by "truth" we understand truth in the traditional sense as correspondence (a proposition is true if there is a fact to which it corresponds), ἀλήθεια does not mean truth.¹⁸ In a number of places, Heidegger stresses that the word ἀλήθεια interpreted in a totally un-Greek sense and translated thoughtlessly as "truth," but what is expressed in this Greek word has nothing to do with any traditional concept of truth. The word ἀλήθεια is a compound of the privative prefix ἀ- („not") and the verbal stem -λαθ- („to be concealed"). Thus, ἀ-λήθεια means literally "un-concealment" (die Un-verborgenheit). Still, in Heidegger's view, "we win little by being literal for insight into the subject matter of which Parmenides thinks."¹⁹ Hence, it is not enough to translate ἀλήθεια with "un-concealment." We must cross over to its essence as originally experienced by the Greeks.²⁰ Accordingly,

¹⁴ GA54, p. 164.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 163.

¹⁶ Ibid. „die griechischen Götter dem »Wesen« und »wesenden« Sein einstammen..."

¹⁷ Since man's existence is a unique way of being, man cannot imitate the ways of being of other creatures.

¹⁸ GA15, p. 403.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ GA54, p. 22.

in his lecture course on Parmenides Heidegger moves towards the essence of ἀλήθεια by following four directories provided by its literal translation. The outcome of his inquiry can be summarized as follows.

Firstly, Heidegger notices that “un-concealment” directs us to concealment.²¹ What is the Greek experience of ἀλήθεια and what the Greeks think when they allude to “concealment in unconcealment” in ἀλήθεια is not immediately clear. But by this observation we get some insight into the Greek word, the insight which is not there if we translate ἀλήθεια “truth.” Secondly, Heidegger observes that unconcealment stands in some sort of opposition to concealment. Because of this opposition, ἀλήθεια, as it were, stands in conflict. The Greeks think in its essence something like taking away or cancellation of concealment. “Unconcealment is wrested from concealment in a struggle with it.”²² Thirdly, concealment (λήθη) is not yet simply the opposite to ἀλήθεια as unconcealment. Un-concealment is not a mere elimination of concealment.²³ What the prefixes «ἀ-» and «un-» properly mean in the words ἀλήθεια and un-concealment is not just an undetermined universal “not.”

In the usual theory of truth, Heidegger says the opposite to truth is merely “un-truth” in the sense of falsity. Something is either true or false. But “what is counter to ἀλήθεια is neither simply the opposite, nor the bare lack, nor the rejection of it as mere denial. Λήθη ... is that withdrawal by means of which alone the essence of ἀλήθεια can be preserved and thus be and remain unforgotten.”²⁴ It is the withdrawing concealment (λήθη), Heidegger argues, which lies at the heart of ἀλήθεια and reveals itself strikingly to the Greeks in such phenomena as decay or forgetfulness which dispose them to the preservation of what appears in un-concealment. Hence, un-concealment and preservation, ἀλήθεια and μέμνημαι, are linked together. In its essence, ἀλήθεια is not only dis-closure (*Ent-bergung*), but also en-closure (*Ent-bergung*), bringing into sheltering (*Bergung*).²⁵ Lastly, Heidegger makes a sudden leap and says that it is the open (*das Offene*) or the free (*das Freie*) that holds sway in the essence of ἀλήθεια. The open and free is the ground of unconcealment and disclosure.

“For disclosing, i. e. letting appear in the open [region], can only be accomplished by what gives in advance the open [region] and thus is in itself self-opening and thereby, is essentially open, or as we may say, is of itself already «free».”²⁶

What is the essentially open and free? Ordinarily we say that the way which is open is free. The open is that which affords free passage, free from obstructions and hindrances. The openness is an unenclosed and unoccupied extension. However, according to Heidegger, we will never arrive at the open as the essence of ἀλήθεια by considering the open in the sense of the extended and not shut. For him, strictly speaking, “the essence of the open reveals itself only to a thinking that attempts to think being.”²⁷ Whenever we encounter anything, the openness already rules there,

²¹ Ibid., p. 19.

²² Ibid., p. 25.

²³ Ibid, p. 183.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 189.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 198.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 222.

the free region is in play. Everything which is disclosed and appears in unconcealment is as such secured by being's openness and its clearing.

Heidegger ends his lecture course on Parmenides by elucidating the meaning of the goddess Ἀλήθεια. As the manifestation of being, "she is the self-giving and inherent looking of the cleared into the dark."²⁸ She is the "disclosure that shelters all emergence and all appearance and all disappearance."²⁹ In order fully to understand what Heidegger says about Ἀλήθεια and its essence, being as the open, we cannot limit ourselves to the lecture course on Parmenides alone, but we must also consider other works. I shall begin my further inquiry into Heidegger's ἀλήθεια from his discussion of truth in *Being and Time*.

In Section 44 of his fundamental work Heidegger asks about the foundations of the traditional concept of truth as correspondence. According to the correspondence theory, which goes back as far as Plato and Aristotle, a proposition is true if there is a fact to which it corresponds, namely, if it expresses what is the case.³⁰ For example, the proposition: "it is shining here now" is true if it is indeed the case that it is shining here now. To be true this proposition must conform to the state of affairs about which it speaks. The essence of the propositional truth as correspondence is correctness. Heidegger's main point is that the correctness of propositions involves as its necessary antecedent condition the unconcealment of beings. "To say that a proposition *is true* signifies that it uncovers a being as it is in itself."³¹ The proposition lets a being (a fact or a state of affairs, and in this particular case the fact that "it is shining") be seen in its unconcealment. Consequently, to be true means more originally to be unconcealed. The original phenomenon of truth is unconcealment, ἀλήθεια in the manner of ἀποφαίνεσθαι—"taking beings out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness."³² The correctness of propositions arises from and presupposes the unconcealment of beings.

We can notice that Heidegger's investigation of the foundations of the traditional concept of truth in *Being and Time* relates to his programme of the "destruction of the history of ontology." The traditional concept of truth as correspondence is deconstructed down to its original source: the unconcealment of beings. The tradition of philosophy-metaphysics which begins with Plato and Aristotle represents for Heidegger a falling away from the original early Greek experience of ἀλήθεια. This experience is gradually covered over. The true is transformed to the merely correct. Accordingly, the destruction of the history of ontology in this particular case means looking for what went wrong somewhere back in this tradition (the transformation of ἀλήθεια into ὁμοίωσις, i. e. correctness) and recovering that which went out of sight (the original experience of ἀλήθεια).³³ As the necessary ground of the correctness of

²⁸ Ibid., p. 242.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ See *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. by Dagobert D. Runes (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield Adams & Co., 1971), p. 321.

³¹ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Sein und Zeit* (7th ed., Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), p. 218. Hereafter this work will be referred as SZ; *Being and Time*, tr. John Marcquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

³² Ibid., p. 219.

³³ See EM, pp. 144-147.

propositions, Heidegger claims, ἀλήθεια originally means the unconcealment (manifestation) of beings, their radiant self-showing in the manner of ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

Nevertheless, the question of the foundations of the traditional concept of truth can be asked in a more radical manner that takes us beyond *Being and Time*. In that work Heidegger makes the first step: from the correctness of propositions to the unconcealment of beings. His conclusion presented in the important essay of 1929 „*Vom Wesen des Grundes*“ (“*On the Essence of Reasons*”) is that the propositional truth is based on in a more original truth (unconcealment), i. e. in the pre-predicative manifestation (*Offenbarkeit*) of beings that can be called the *ontical truth*.³⁴ Now we can ask further: what is the ground of the unconcealment (manifestation) of beings? Heidegger gives us a precise answer to this question:

“The manifestation of beings is made possible only by the openness of being. This openness [Enthülltheit], as the truth concerning being, will be called the ontological truth.”³⁵

The question of the foundations of truth then brings Heidegger to the question of being. The openness of being is the condition for the unconcealment of beings. “Being as the open, secures in itself every kind of unconcealment of beings.”³⁶ How should we understand this statement?

According to Heidegger, the human being is the only being “to whom being opens itself.”³⁷ This means that man is the unique being who always understands being somehow. However, the way in which man understands being is not just theoretical. Understanding is one of the ontological structures that Heidegger introduces in *Being and Time*. It has to be grasped in the context of his existential analysis of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. “As understanding Dasein projects its being upon possibilities.”³⁸ The understanding of being lies at the root of all man’s comportment. In his lecture course on Parmenides and other works of the later period, Heidegger avoids speaking in terms of understanding, but expresses himself in a more poetic and metaphorical language. He speaks about the “bestowal of being” to which man belongs and about man as the “site of the openness of being.”³⁹ He finds that the conceptual apparatus of *Being and Time* is burdened with both the language of subjectivity and the tradition of metaphysics which he wishes to overcome, and thus is inadequate for his thinking. Yet his basic insight remains the same. For both the Heidegger of fundamental ontology and the later Heidegger man is constituted by his relationship to being. Every man *stands out* into the openness of being; i. e. understands being, and his understanding is a dynamic, ecstatic process. What man is lies in his ek-sistence.⁴⁰ Further, the openness of being (its clearing) is the condition for the unconcealment of beings, i. e. for their accessibility to man. The openness of being is an implicit horizon or a field of

³⁴ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 130.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³⁶ GA54, p. 224.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ SZ, p. 148.

³⁹ GA54, p. 224.

⁴⁰ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Brief über Humanismus*, in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967), p. 325.

view within which the manifestation of beings as a whole occurs, the horizon which, in Heidegger's view, is usually overlooked.

The fundamental Heideggerian conception of the later period is the history of being.⁴¹ This history is for Heidegger the essential history of the West. It begins in ancient Greece with the question of the first thinkers: "What are beings?" and with the primordial disclosure of beings as a whole.⁴² The early Greeks experience beings as what is present in unconcealment. 'Αλήθεια (unconcealment) is for them the basic character of beings, as well as the horizon within which the manifestness of beings occurs.⁴³ Yet, they do not inquire into unconcealment itself. They do not reflect upon ἀλήθεια as the horizon and the openness of being. They do not notice that there is concealment in unconcealment. The λήθη in ἀλήθεια remains unthought by them. According to Heidegger, the lack of inquiry into ἀλήθεια is, however, neither a neglect nor a deficiency, but a consequence of their task. The task of the Greeks was to bring beings as such "to a first recognition and thus to their most simple interpretation."⁴⁴ Should they expressly have questioned ἀλήθεια, he argues, they would have renounced their most proper task. They would then not remain within the question of beings any longer. The inquiry into ἀλήθεια would put into question their question of beings and its answer. Only by the adherence to their task, i. e. by asking the question of beings, Heidegger believes, "did the Greeks secure for themselves the space within which the whole richness of their thinking, and accordingly the character of beings, could unfold."⁴⁵ Consequently, for the Greeks ἀλήθεια as the horizon remains unquestioned. It also remains unquestioned by the tradition of philosophy-metaphysics which follows afterwards. "Αλήθεια is named at the beginning of philosophy, but afterwards it is not explicitly thought as such by philosophy."⁴⁶ In the tradition of Western philosophy, the original Greek experience of ἀλήθεια has been misinterpreted and forced into oblivion.

For Heidegger ἀλήθεια is what is most worthy of being questioned and thought of. Its question is for him inseparably bound up with the question of being. Heidegger's inquiry brings him beyond the Greek experience of ἀλήθεια as the unconcealment of beings to the openness of being, to the 'Αλήθεια in the no longer Greek, but Heideggerian sense.⁴⁷ However, 'Αλήθεια as the openness of being is not something we can merely think or represent. It is not our own production. In Heidegger's view, as the horizon, it is something (or rather no-thing) in which we always come to stand.⁴⁸ We

⁴¹ See my article, "Heidegger, the Presocratics, and the History of Being," in *Existentialia* XI (2001), pp. 491-502.

⁴² See Martin HEIDEGGER, Von Wesen der Wahrheit, in *Wegmarken*, op. cit., pp. 189-90.

⁴³ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte «Probleme der Logik»* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), p. 122; *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected «Problems of Logic»*, tr. by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1994), p. 122.

⁴⁴ *Grundfragen der Philosophie*, op. cit., p. 138.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Martin HEIDEGGER, Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens, in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 76.

⁴⁷ This is a good point of John Caputo which he makes in his essay on "Demythologizing Heidegger: Aletheia and the History of Being," in *Review of Metaphysics* 41 (March 1988).

⁴⁸ *Grundfragen der Philosophie*, op. cit., p. 211.

always understand being somehow. We are thrown into the openness of being in such a way that it opens for us a relationship to beings. As *Dasein*, we are the “Da,” the clearing of being in which beings as such as a whole are manifested.⁴⁹ Further, if our relation to Ἀλήθεια is not our own production and we always come to stand in the openness of being, we can say that being “gives itself” to us. The “*es gibt Sein*” is an important Heideggerian conception.⁵⁰ Heidegger maintains that the verb “is” (in the sense of actuality) is appropriate to beings, but not to being. For him, beings are, but being *is* not. Being “gives itself” as the particular openness of being into which we are thrown. The essential history of humankind which is the history of being happens as being’s self-giving. Nevertheless, being does never gives itself fully. Just as it gives itself, it refuses itself simultaneously.⁵¹ “As it discloses itself in beings, being withdraws.”⁵² There is an essential withdrawal of being. Therefore, the openness of being, Ἀλήθεια is not an empty, bare openness. It is rather a clearing (*Lichtung*). It is the “open region” which is created as the result of the interplay of being’s revelation and its concealment. As it gives and refuses itself, being is more concealed in λήθη (withdrawing concealment) than revealed.⁵³ It holds back to itself. Hence, Ἀλήθεια, the openness thought as clearing, describes being as dis-closure: disclosure in self-concealment. It is a fundamental characteristic of being itself.

The essence of Ἀλήθεια as the openness (clearing) of being is for Heidegger the “open”—being itself in its disclosure and simultaneous withdrawal. Being discloses and conceals itself, sends itself and withholds itself in its history. However, the disclosure of being cannot merely be understood by contrast to its concealment. As Heidegger earlier notices the disclosure is at the same time enclosure. This is why he argues that the word εὐκυκλέος next to Ἀλήθεια in the verse 29 of the Parmenidean prologue cannot be translated as “well-rounded,” but as “properly surrounding” or “well-enclosing.”⁵⁴ Ἀλήθεια is the *well-enclosing dis-closure* because beings as such as a whole do not only appear for a moment within the clearing of being, but they are sheltered within it. Each particular epoch of being—Greece, Rome, the middle ages, the modern world—brings about a new understanding of beings. In Greece beings are understood as what emerges (what is present in its unconcealment); in the middle ages, as *ens creatum*; in the modern world, as object for a thinking subject. In the very end, in our times, at the utmost of being’s withdrawal, they degenerate into mere objects of human contrivance and lived experience.⁵⁵ Because of the clearing of being, beings as a whole are manifested in a particular way. “Without the open, which is how being itself manifests, beings could be neither unconcealed nor concealed.”⁵⁶ Consequently, as it is said at the end of the prologue, being is the open—the “shining of

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 212.

⁵⁰ See *Being and Time*, p. 255 footnote. Brief über Humanismus, op. cit., p. 334.

⁵¹ Brief über Humanismus, op. cit., p. 235.

⁵² Martin HEIDEGGER, Der Spruch des Anaximander, in *Holzwege* (Tübingen: Klosterman, 1950), p. 310.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ GA15, p. 404.

⁵⁵ *Grundfragen der Philosophie*, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

⁵⁶ GA54, p. 237.

clearing” which “shines through everything” and by bringing about the manifestation of beings as a whole, “brings everything into completion.”

Although Heidegger does not produce a detailed interpretation of all the verses of the prologue to the Parmenidean poem, it is nevertheless possible at least in part to interpret his translation.

The fate which sends the primordial thinker Parmenides to the home of the goddess Ἀλήθεια is not indeed an evil one because it is the destiny of being. The way on which the thinker travels indeed runs its course far away from the usual dwellings of men. For men usually keep busy with beings, but Parmenides thinks being. As she stands for the manifestation of being, the goddess is “the self-giving and inherent looking of the cleared into the dark.”⁵⁷ She is the self-giving of being that is at the same time a refusal; the properly surrounding clearing which is the horizon for the manifestness of beings as a whole. As the disclosure that shelters everything unconcealed, the goddess provides the revelation which is to follow. The thinker will experience both “the unshaken heart of the well-enclosing unconcealment,” i. e. the essence of Ἀλήθεια as clearing, as well as “the appearing in its appearance to mortals in which there is no relying on the unconcealed.” The two pathways are thus introduced to him, one to being, one to appearance. He will learn how to distinguish between them. Finally, he will also learn how being in its clearing is called upon to shine, i. e. how it gives itself and withholds itself, and how by bringing being as a whole to manifestation, it brings everything to completion.

To conclude, like the fragment of Anaximander which he discusses elsewhere,⁵⁸ in every word the Parmenidean prologue speaks to Heidegger about being and only about being. However, his return to the primordial thought of Parmenides is not to Parmenides himself. He does not claim that he aims at producing a uniquely correct interpretation of the prologue independent from any framework. The issues which he discusses differ considerably from those discussed by traditional Parmenidean scholars. Rather, Heidegger’s return to the Greek beginning takes place “in the echo of Parmenides” as “that listening which opens itself to the words of Parmenides from [the framework of] our modern age” and emerges from the situation of the essential withdrawal of being.⁵⁹ Seen from this perspective, Ἀλήθεια, the openness of being thought of as clearing, describes being as it gives itself in history and provides the horizon for the manifestation of beings. Ἀλήθεια is θεά, the goddess, as the sheltering-disclosure. Nevertheless, as Heidegger admits, she is a goddess only to the Greeks and not even to all of them, but only to a few of their essential thinkers.⁶⁰ Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, the primordial thinkers, are for him the essential thinkers who think being and behold being itself. I shall now proceed to the next fragments of Parmenides in Heidegger’s reading and see how the essential thinking there unfolds.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 242.

⁵⁸ See my article “Heidegger’s Anaximander: Τὸ Χρεὼν and the History of Being,” in *Existencia* XII (2002), pp. 377-405.

⁵⁹ GA15, p. 394.

⁶⁰ GA54, p. 240.

2. AT THE CROSSROADS FRAGMENT 2 AND 6

The goddess introduces to the thinker three ways which are usually called the “paths of inquiry.” In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, the only work of Heidegger in which they are discussed, they are called respectively the path to being, the path to nonbeing and the path of appearance. Heidegger’s interpretation of the “paths of inquiry” given in the *Introduction*, which comes from 1935 and stands somewhere in the middle of the way of his thought, is more traditional than that of fragment 1 given in the 1942–1943 lecture course. It does not yet take place in the historical perspective of being’s withdrawal, so characteristic of the works of the later period. Nevertheless, the interpretation is an interesting one. It proceeds in the context of the discussion of the distinction between being and appearance. It helps us to understand the Greek experience of being. How does Heidegger’s reading differ from the traditional scholarly interpretation? Before I attempt answer to answer the question, I shall introduce fragments 2 and 6 in which the paths of inquiry are described. My English translation of Heidegger’s rendering of these fragments into German reads:

Come then, I will tell you: heed the words that you hear (about) which ways of inquiry are alone to be considered.

The one: that it is (that it, being, is) and that also nonbeing (is) impossible.

This is the path of justified confidence, for it follows unconcealment.

But the other: that it is not and also that nonbeing [is] necessary.

This then, I tell you, is a path which cannot be counselled.

Neither can you make acquaintance with nonbeing, for it cannot be brought forward, nor can you express it in words (fragment 2).⁶¹

Needful is the gathering setting-forth, as well as apprehending: a being (*Seiend*) in its being (*Sein*).

For a being (*Seiend*) namely has being (*Sein*), nonbeing (*Nichtsein*) has no ‘is’; this bid I you to consider. Above all avoid this way of inquiry.

But also the other one which men, knowing nothing, two-headed find right for themselves, and then, do not find right for themselves—[which] is the guideline to their erring understanding.

They are thrown hither and thither, dull-witted, blind, perplexed; the brotherhood of those who do not differentiate, whose judgement is that what-is-present-at-hand and what-is-not-present-at-hand are the same and not the same—for whom in everything the path is backward—turning (fragment 6).⁶²

Heidegger does not comment on his German rendering of these fragments. His rendering looks traditional and seems to depend upon the standard translation by Diels. In the traditional interpretation, the two fragments present the thinker at the crossroads, faced by three possible “paths of inquiry.” The paths of inquiry mentioned in the fragments 2 and 6, which respectively are called by Heidegger the path to being and the path to nonbeing, are traditionally seen as logically exclusive: “it is” or “it is not.” The “it” which is supplied as the grammatical subject to the verb ἔστι and to its negative in order to make the Parmenidean lines intelligible is believed to be the subject

⁶¹ EM, p. 84.

⁶² Ibid., p. 85.

of inquiry in general.⁶³ In any inquiry we need to assume that either the subject is or it is not. From this it follows that the “it is” and “it is not” are roughly equivalent to the “thought (about some subject) is possible” and its negation.⁶⁴ Read in the traditional fashion, Parmenides seems to imply that it is impossible to know or to think of something which does not exist, or (in a predicative reading of Parmenides’ premise) that it is impossible to know or to think of something which is not anything. A proposition concerning something which does not exist or which is not anything does not express a genuine thought for him at all. Therefore, “it is necessary to reject anything that would allow the introduction of something that is not.”⁶⁵ The path to nonbeing and the path of appearance which is described in fragment 6 as the path of ordinary opinions which men find right for themselves and do not find right for themselves, are both to be avoided. Hence, in the traditional Presocratic scholarship, Parmenides is seen as one who sharply opposes being to all change, appearance and becoming. The path to being alone is passable for him: only being is, nonbeing and appearance are not.

Although his rendering of Parmenidean fragments in the *Introduction* looks traditional, we can easily notice that Heidegger contests the traditional interpretation of Parmenides. His argument based on the original unity of being and appearance runs as follows.

At first, Heidegger says, the distinction between being and appearance seems familiar. It is usually understood as the distinction between the real and the unreal, the authentic and the inauthentic, truth and deceit. “The distinction implies an evaluation—the preference is given to being.”⁶⁶ Yet, in spite of the alleged familiarity with the distinction we may claim, he maintains, we do not really understand how it originally comes about. We do not know anything about the original unity of being and appearance. Thus, to understand the distinction in depth we must return to the early Greeks. It has already been noticed that being discloses itself to the Greeks as φύσις. In its original sense the word φύσις means emerging and precisely in this sense it is a basic determination of beings. To be a being means to emerge, to come forth into unconcealment, to appear by coming out, to stand there, to be present. By contrast, not to be means to withdraw from appearing and presence. Consequently, if we understand being, φύσις, as emerging, Heidegger maintains, appearing is not something subsequent to it. Φύειν (to emerge) is at the same time φαίνεσθαι (to show itself, to appear). The being of beings as φύσις manifests thus as both emerging and appearing. Hence, Heidegger concludes, for the Presocratics, appearance as “a definite mode of emerging self-showing” belongs necessarily to being.⁶⁷ They are originally united. How does their distinction occur?

Since the being of beings manifests in appearing, Heidegger argues, a being can offer us an aspect which is related to this or that point of view. It stands thus in the possibility of a mere appearance which covers up what such a being truly is. “Where there is the unconcealment of a being [its appearance], there is also a possibility of

⁶³ G. S. KIRK, J. E. RAVEN, and M. SCHOFIELD, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 245.

⁶⁴ See Edward HUSSEY, *The Pre-Socratics* (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 105.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ EM, p. 75.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 83.

appearance [in the sense of a mere semblance].”⁶⁸ Heidegger plays here on the two meanings of the word “appearance” (*Schein*): appearance in the sense of emerging and coming forth into view (She has made an appearance on TV) and appearance in the sense of self-showing to a perception, an aspect for looking at (She has made an appearance of being happy). If we follow the examples which I have introduced to elucidate the Heideggerian point, the sentence “She has made an appearance on TV” can be rephrased to say “She has appeared on TV” or “She has been on TV.” The word “appearance” in this sentence is thus related to “being.” We can assume that before her first appearance on TV, the actress was unknown and thus “non-existent” to the public. She would keep to herself and remain concealed. She has come to being (unconcealment, presencing), only as she appeared. Being, unconcealment, presencing, emergence, standing-in-light, self-showing, appearing are thus for Heidegger all related. Δόξα, the glory and splendour in which one stands, the display of one’s excellent image, coming forth into unconcealment, is, according to him, the highest mode of man’s being for the Greeks.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the same word δόξα can mean the view people have of someone or something, namely, an opinion. The latter meaning is related to the second meaning of the word “appearance.” The sentence “She has made an appearance of being happy” means that the actress tries to present herself to the public as happy. On the basis of her appearance (self-showing to their perception) they form an opinion about her as of a happy, careless person, but in fact her actual mental state may be just the opposite. We do not know anything about the state of her emotions, but we can notice that she gives us the appearance of being happy and conceals her real self. Thus, appearance as self-showing to a perception is related to concealment, distortion and deception. It offers the possibility of semblance.

Nonetheless, Heidegger does not stop at this point. His next steps are as follows. Being as appearing (emerging, coming forth into unconcealment) cannot be separated from appearance (self-showing to a perception). As soon as something emerges, namely, comes to view and appears, it gives itself to perception and offers an aspect for looking at, an appearance. Yet appearance can make a being look like what it actually is not. It can distort a being. Therefore, the Greeks ‘were compelled to wrest being from appearance and preserve it against appearance’.⁷⁰ The great age of Greek antiquity was a single creative self-assertion amid the struggle between being (unconcealment) and appearance (concealment and distortion). This letting beings hold sway in unconcealment in the midst of appearance was accomplished in the arts, but also in the worshipping of gods, statecraft, architecture, games and philosophy. However, it was not before the time of Sophists and Plato, Heidegger claims, that appearance was declared to be a mere appearance and thus degraded. In his view, the Presocratics still consider appearance as emerging self-showing in the unity with being (φύσις) and unconcealment (ἀλήθεια). The main effort of their thought is to differentiate being from appearance and to “rescue being from its plight to appearance.”⁷¹

Only in the context of the above argument can Heidegger’s interpretation of the Parmenidean ‘paths of inquiry’ be understood. In the traditional scholarly read-

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 79

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 80.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 83.

ing the three paths can be characterized “in a logically perspicuous fashion.”⁷² For Heidegger, the distinction between being, nonbeing and appearance cannot just be made on the basis of logic.

“Because of the relationship between being, unconcealment, appearance and nonbeing, the man who holds to being as it opens around him and whose attitude towards beings stems from this adherence to being, must take three paths. If he is to take over his *Dasein* into the brightness of being, he must bring being to stand, he must endure it in appearance and against appearance, and he must wrest both appearance and being from the abyss of nonbeing.”⁷³

Since being, nonbeing and appearance are interrelated, the distinction between them is not just a matter of logic, but of decision. “Man must distinguish these three paths and he must decide according to them or against them.”⁷⁴ Parmenides’ poem is for Heidegger the oldest record of the opening of the three paths. To bring being to stand means to maintain it in its presencing over against a mere appearance and over against nonbeing as both absence and the withdrawal from presence. This fundamental attitude toward being: standing over against mere appearance and absence, is in Heidegger’s view the main characteristic of early Greek (heroic) way of being human which is expressed in custom, as well as in other cultural and social forms of ancient Greece.

To sum up, for the Presocratics appearance belongs to being, and becoming as coming-into-presence is an appearance of being. Therefore, Parmenides cannot be seen as one who simply opposes being to appearance, to becoming and all change, as it is traditionally maintained.⁷⁵ Further, the Parmenidean distinction between being, nonbeing and appearance is not just made to say, as it is commonly believed, that we cannot think of things which do not exist and must reject ordinary opinions. Heidegger’s interpretation of the three paths can then be summarized as follows. First, the path to being (traditionally called the way of truth) is at the same time the way to unconcealment (*ἀλήθεια*). Although in the *Introduction* and other earlier works, he does still use the notion of “truth” in reference to the Presocratics and even says that “truth was in the beginning the basic character of beings themselves” (a statement which such traditional Presocratic scholars as Kahn would certainly not deny), Heidegger does not understand “truth” in the traditional sense as correspondence, but as unconcealment.⁷⁶ As uncon-

⁷² See Jonathan BARNES, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Vol. 1, Tales to Zeno; London: Routledge, 1979), p. 159.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 93.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Hussey, p. 105; Charles H. KAHN, “Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy,” in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1976).

⁷⁶ *Grundfragen der Philosophie*, op. cit., pp. 146-147. See KAHN, “Why Existence...,” pp. 328-330. Kahn’s claim that “in the formation of the Greek concept of Being, the key notion is that of truth...” sounds almost like Heidegger. However, differences between these two thinkers become apparent when we closely examine both “being” and “truth.” Kahn understands truth in the traditional sense as correspondence. For him, the pre-philosophical conception of truth in early Greek thought “involves some kind of correlation or ‘fit’ between what is said or thought, on one side, and what is or what is the case or the way things are on the other side” (p. 329). Then, he defines “being” as reality or *what is*. Thus, his being is rather to be understood as *das Seiendes* than as *das Sein*. Nevertheless, in spite of these terminological differences which come from different schools of thought, the basic insight which underlies Kahn’s claim remains, I believe, at this particular point very close to Heidegger’s.

concealment, truth belongs to the essence of being.⁷⁷ Being in Presocratic thought (φύσις) is in his view understood primarily in reference to ἀλήθεια. If any inquiry is to happen, the path to being as the path to unconcealment is indispensable—we can follow it with justified confidence. Second, that the path to nonbeing which comes next cannot be counselled, and yet it must be considered, means for Heidegger that it is wrong to “turn one’s back on nothingness (*Nichts*) with the assurance that nothingness is obviously not.”⁷⁸ Heidegger does not simply identify nonbeing formally with the content of falsehood or false belief that has to be rejected. Only if we remember about nothingness, he suggests, can we maintain ourselves in our being. “Unconcealment [being] is wrested from concealment [nonbeing] in a struggle with it,” he adds in one of his later lectures on Parmenides.⁷⁹ Third, the path of appearance (ordinary opinion), on which people travel frequently and on which they lose themselves entirely, must also be considered; however, not just in order to be dismissed, but because precisely on this path “being may disclose itself in appearance and against appearance.”⁸⁰ Our way to being, Heidegger implies, begins from everyday experience—from the analysis of average everydayness to which the Division One of *Being and Time* is devoted. There is thus no good reason to reject appearance as such. Appearance belongs to being.

3. BEING AND THINKING FRAGMENTS 3 AND 6

The next distinction which Heidegger introduces in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* is the distinction between being and thinking. He considers this distinction as fundamental for Western philosophy. In order to elucidate it, he introduces fragment 3 and other fragments of Parmenides, particularly fragment 6, which help him to interpret this fragment. Also, on this occasion he discusses several fragments of Heraclitus. The relation between being and thinking is further reflected upon in *What is Called Thinking?*, a lecture course delivered at the University of Freiburg during the winter and summer semesters of 1951 and 1952, and in “Moirai”, an essay based on an undelivered portion of this lecture course. In addition, he discusses fragment 3 in his essay on “The Principle of Identity” which comes from 1957. Also, he reflects briefly upon the issue of being and thinking in the “Seminar in Zähringen 1973.”

3.1. Fragment 3

Fragment 3 is sometimes translated to say: “For the same thing is there to be thought and to be” and interpreted in connection with fragment 2 to mean that “Parmenides explicitly deploys considerations about what can be thought” and consequently rejects the possibility of thinking about things which do not exist.⁸¹ Although both the above

⁷⁷ EM, p. 78.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 85.

⁷⁹ GA54, p. 25.

⁸⁰ EM, p. 86.

⁸¹ Kirk, *opp. cit.*, p. 246, footnote 2.

translation and the subsequent interpretation come from Kirk, we can easily discover that they fit into the tradition which begins with Zeller and Burnet, and includes such contemporary interpreters as Hussey and Barnes.⁸² However, for Heidegger the Parmenidean task is not just to say that we cannot think of things which do not exist. Therefore, even if he does not explicitly discuss it, he would not accept such a translation its subsequent interpretation as true to Parmenides. Nevertheless, there is another rendering of fragment 3 possible. The standard translation of Diels-Kranz says: "For thinking and being are the same." Heidegger takes note of this translation in both the *Introduction* and "Moira." He does not find it acceptable either. He calls it totally 'un-Greek'.⁸³ In his view, it is based on the subjectivistic identification of thinking with the activity of the subject and of being with the object of thinking. In his view, it makes Parmenides a forerunner of German idealism.⁸⁴ Heidegger insists that we do not read Parmenides in the light of later philosophies. Is there then a correct reading of fragment 3 for him? What is the meaning of this fragment to Heidegger?

Heidegger quotes the text of fragment 3 as follows:

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.⁸⁵

and analyses the Greek words which occur in it. Thought in the Greek way, he says, εἶναι (to be) means presencing, to be present in unconcealment.⁸⁶ Then νοεῖν, which is commonly translated as "to think," may not, in his view, be interpreted as thinking in today's ordinary sense of the word. It is neither judging, nor arguing, nor justifying. Rather, νοεῖν is "grounding oneself in vision," pure beholding, apprehending (*Vernehmen*).⁸⁷ Lastly, Heidegger asks what Parmenides means by τὸ αὐτὸ, which is usually translated as "the same." In fact, he analyses the meaning of τὸ αὐτὸ in as many as three works in which fragment 3 is discussed. His general conclusion is that in reference to εἶναι and νοεῖν, the τὸ αὐτὸ means that they belong together. Hence, the translations which he finally chooses in order to come closer to the original truth of the Parmenidean saying in the *Introduction* and in "Seminar in Zähringen" respectively run as follows.

Being and apprehension belong [reciprocally] together.⁸⁸

"Thinking and being (i. e. apprehending and presencing) belong indeed to one another."⁸⁹

Although these translations are separated by almost 40 years, they look alike. What do they say? To begin with An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes:

Whenever this happens, whenever being holds sway, there prevails and happens with it that which belongs to it: apprehension (*Vernehmung*) as the receptive bringing to stand of what stands in itself and shows itself.⁹⁰

⁸² See John BURNET, *Early Greek Philosophy* (New York: Meridian, 1957), p. 173; Hussey, op. cit., p. 83; Barnes, op. cit., p. 157.

⁸³ EM, p. 104.

⁸⁴ George Joseph SEIDEL, *Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics: An Introduction to his Thought* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. 61.

⁸⁵ EM, p. 105.

⁸⁶ GA15, p. 397.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 407; EM, p. 105; *Grundfragen der Philosophie*, op. cit., p. 139.

⁸⁸ EM, p. 140. See also EM, p. 111.

⁸⁹ GA15, p. 401.

⁹⁰ EM, p. 106.

The earlier interpretation which comes from the *Introduction* does not yet take in the perspective of being's withdrawal. Heidegger does not discuss here yet the framework in which apprehension and being are placed, the "open and free area within which they approach each other."⁹¹ At the core of his earlier interpretation there lies the conception of being as *φύσις*: emerging, standing in light, coming into unconcealment, appearing; in short, presencing. Heidegger's argument here seems to be something like this. If *φύσις* indeed prevails, if being is understood as presencing or emerging self-manifestation, then apprehension as the receptive taking to stand, pure beholding of beings, is needed. Both being and apprehension reciprocally need each other. Without being there could not be apprehension. Without apprehension beings would not be manifested in their being. Further, apprehension is not just a man's faculty. It is not perception through which and for which beings come to stand against as objects. It is rather 'the happening (*Geschehen*) by which man as a being first enters into history'.⁹² It is the happening that holds sway over man. In other words, apprehension is what originally constitutes man as *Dasein* in its being. Consequently, in Heidegger's view, in fragment 3 Parmenides for the first time defines the essence of being-human (*Dasein*).⁹³ The essence of the human being is not determined by some characteristics, such as reason or language, which supposedly distinguishes man from lower animals. According to Heidegger, at the beginning of Western thought, *Dasein* is defined from the relationship to what-is as such as a whole.⁹⁴ Man is that being whose distinctiveness consists in apprehending beings as a whole in their being.

For Heidegger of the *Introduction*, fragment 3 for the first time defines the essence of being human. The original definition takes place in the context of the primordial unity of being and thinking (presencing and apprehension). Yet, the determination of man as one who apprehends and preserves beings as a whole in their being is in his view soon to be abandoned. The falling away from the original meaning of the Parmenidean fragment begins with the Greeks themselves, namely, with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.⁹⁵ The later scholastic definition of man as a rational animal which derives from Aristotle is still valid today. In the course of Western thinking the original meaning of fragment 3 is lost. In modern philosophy, Heidegger argues, being equals being represented. "Being is identical with thinking insofar as the objectivity of objects is composed and constituted in the representing consciousness."⁹⁶ Being is referred to thinking and subjected to the domination of reason. Yet, in the Presocratic thought just the opposite holds true. Parmenides grants priority to being. Being is not something merely apprehended. Thinking as apprehension is assigned to being understood as presencing.

What is said there in the Parmenidean poem, Heidegger believes, deserves more thought. "The dialogue with Parmenides never comes to an end."⁹⁷ Fragment 3 is further discussed in such works of the later period as "Moirai," "The Principle of Iden-

⁹¹ GA51, p. 402.

⁹² EM, p. 108.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 112.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 130.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 111 and 137.

⁹⁶ "Moirai," in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 227.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 248.

tity” and “Seminar in Zähringen.” In these works he moves even farther away from a traditional scholarly interpretation. He puts thinking and being in the context of the framework (*Ge-Stell*). This framework, he says, concerns us everywhere, immediately. It is more essential than atomic energy, the whole of world machinery or the power of organisation, communication and automation.⁹⁸ What is the framework? Actually, the conception of the framework is discussed at a greater length only in “The Principle of Identity.” In “Seminar in Zähringen” it is mentioned only once. In “Moirā” it is not explicitly mentioned at all. Nevertheless, even if not directly called “framework,” this conception hovers over later Heideggerian thought. The framework, or more precisely the being as framework, means the same as Ἀλήθεια, the openness of being to which man, who finds himself in a certain historically conditioned environment, always belongs. It is the implicit horizon within which the manifestness of beings as a whole occurs. It is the open and free area which, always out of sight, is that within which every epoch of being takes place. In later Heidegger the interpretation of fragment 3 is thus put in the context of the history of being. Thinking and being (apprehending and presencing) belong indeed to one another because of the event—the disclosure of being which happens in history. I shall return to this interpretation in the next section where fragments 3 and 8 will be discussed together.

3.2. Fragment 6

In *What Is Called Thinking?* (1951/1952) Heidegger elaborates on the relationship between being and thinking while discussing Parmenides’ fragment 6. In fact, he concentrates only on the first line of the fragment which he quotes as follows:

χρῆ: τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’· ἔδν: ἔμμεναι.

The standard translation of this line in Diels-Kranz runs:

*Nötig ist zu sagen und zu denken, daß das Seiende ist.*⁹⁹

One should both say and think that being is.

As with fragment 3, Heidegger examines the Greek words which occur in the fragment. However, whatever these individual words may mean, he claims, the syntax of the modern translation organizes them into a certain structure of meaning. The subject-object form of the sentence makes us imagine an agent who is to act in a certain way (to say and to think that being is). The syntactic translation must therefore be set aside. This does not yet make the fragment any clearer, he claims, but it nevertheless brings us closer to the original Greek text.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, Heidegger makes the words stand next to each other in a parataxis, i. e. without the connective words inserted by modern

⁹⁸ Martin HEIDEGGER, Der Satz der Identität, in *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 28; The Principle of Identity, in *Identity and Difference* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 35.

⁹⁹ Heidegger removes the word ‘nur’ (only) from Diels’ translation. In Diels-Kranz the sentence runs: „Nötig ist zu sagen und zu denken, daß *nur* das Seiende ist“.

¹⁰⁰ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Was Heisst Denken?* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1954), p. 111; *What is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 182.

translators.¹⁰¹ This gives him an additional justification for the word-by-word analysis which he employs. In order to give a sharper articulation to the word structure, he marks the spaces between the elements of the parataxis with three colons.

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἔδν ἔμμεναι.

Following the standard translation, the fragment then runs:

*Nötig: das Sagen so Denken auch: Seiendes: sein.*¹⁰²

Needful: the saying also thinking too: being: to be.

Heidegger begins his analysis with the word *χρή* which he derives from *χράω*, which he in turn traces from *ἡ χεῖρ*, the hand. Because of this etymology, the word *χράω* means: “I handle and so I keep in hand,” “I use,” “I need” (I have use for).¹⁰³ However, “using” (*Brauchen*), as he has already noticed in ‘The Anaximander Fragment’, should not be understood by reference to mere utility. “Using” does not mean mere utilizing, using up or exploiting. In the proper sense, using refers to bringing things to their essential being (*Wesen*) and maintaining them there.¹⁰⁴ “To use” originally means “to let things be as they are.” Hence, the word *χρή* is rendered with “it is useful” (*es brauchet*). By using the word impersonally, Heidegger claims, we can free ourselves from the dependence upon someone who needs or uses or upon objects which are useful and satisfy our needs.¹⁰⁵ “It is useful,” just as “it is raining” or “it is windy,” gives an impression of a detached, impersonal description. Further, “it is useful” means something more essential than “it is needful.”¹⁰⁶ Parmenides’ fragment, Heidegger argues, is not concerned with any need in the usual sense as a basic life necessity. “Using commends a command, a calling.”¹⁰⁷

Next Heidegger analyses two words *λέγειν* and *νοεῖν*. Both these words have been widely discussed in his works.

To begin with the former, *λέγειν* does not originally mean “to speak.” Heidegger usually translates it as “to gather.” In *What is Called Thinking?*, however, he initially says that the verb means the same as the Latin *legere* or the German *legen*: to lay.¹⁰⁸ If *legen* has come to mean “to speak,” he claims, it is because the Greeks understood speaking as laying out (*Darlegen*), laying before (*Vorlegen*) and laying to (*Überlegen*). The relationship between these words can be noticed even in everyday speech.

“When someone lays before us a request, we do not mean that he produces papers on the desk before us, but that he *speaks* of the request. When someone *tells* of an event, he lays it out for us. When we *exert* ourselves, we lay to.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰¹ Robert GOFF, “Saying and Being with Heidegger and Parmenides,” in *Man and World* V 1 (February 1972), p. 63. Although the aims of his essay remain obscure and his conclusions are not fully clear, Goff provides a sound analysis of the Heidegger’s initial interpretation of fragment 6 in *What is Called Thinking?*

¹⁰² *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁰⁴ *Der Spruch des Anaximander*, op. cit., p. 337; *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 114.

¹⁰⁵ Goff, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁰⁶ *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 116.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Hence, to lay before, to lay out, to lay to—all this laying refers to the Greek λέγειν. Speaking is to the Greeks in essence a laying. Further, what is essential to λέγειν as ‘to lay’ and ‘to speak’ is that it lets something rest before us or that it makes something appear.¹¹⁰ When we speak about something, Heidegger argues, we make it lie there before us. The full significance of λέγειν as letting-lie-before is thus disclosed by reference to what lies before us primarily, namely before all the laying and speaking that are man’s work. Laying, thought as letting-lie, relates to what in the widest sense lies before us, to what is present as such. “When man finds himself among what so lies before him,” Heidegger says, “should he not respond to it in all purity by letting it lie before him just as it lies?”¹¹¹ What he wishes to convey is that the fundamental trait of Presocratic thinking expressed in the word λέγειν is letting that which lies before us to appear simply as it is in its presencing.

Noēiv has already been described as apprehending (*Vernehmen*). This word, Heidegger believes, does not originally mean “thinking.” However, we should not understand apprehending as a mere receiving or taking-in something, as a kind of passive acceptance. As apprehending, νοεῖν includes an active trait of taking-heed-of something (*in-die-Acht-nehmen von etwas*).¹¹² Apprehending occurs by taking-into-attention.

As a result of his analysis, Heidegger translates λέγειν with letting-lie-before-us (*Vorliegenlassen*) and νοεῖν with taking-heed-of (*in-die-Acht-nehmen*). Such a translation, he says, is not only more faithful to the Greek original, but also clearer. It explains why in the fragment the word λέγειν precedes νοεῖν.

“Λέγειν is prior to νοεῖν, and not only because it [letting things lie before us] has to be accomplished first in order that νοεῖν may find anything it can take into attention. Rather, λέγειν surpasses νοεῖν, in that it once again gathers and preserves as what is gathered whatever νοεῖν takes need of; for λέγειν, being a laying is also *legere* that is gathering (*lesen*).”¹¹³

Both meanings of λέγειν: *legen* (to lay) and *lesen* (to gather) are introduced here. Actually, the German word *legen* is ambiguous. It means “to lay” as “to bring to lie” and at the same time as “to place one thing beside another, to lay them together.” With reference to the second meaning, Heidegger claims, *legen* is *lesen*.¹¹⁴ *Lesen*, in turn, is the gathering which brings under shelter. Sheltering, safeguarding, preserving are the constitutive elements of gathering.¹¹⁵ Consequently, λέγειν and νοεῖν are interconnected and put into a definite order in the Parmenidean fragment; not only because the moment of taking into attention of something requires first the moment of letting something before us, but also because letting something lie before us as it lies presupposes taking something into attention—focussing on what lies before us; i. e. gathering, bringing-in under shelter. The phrase τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε is thus carefully structured. The words λέγειν and νοεῖν are not tied to each other by a mere ‘and’ (καί). The phrase does not merely say “the saying also thinking too,” but rather “the

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 123.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 171.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 125.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Martin HEIDEGGER, “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50),” in *Vorträge and Aufsätze* (Stuttgart: Neske, 1954), p. 201.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

letting-lie-before-us and the taking-into-attention enter upon and into one another, in a reciprocal manner.”¹¹⁶

In a simplified version the Heideggerian translation of τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε runs “the letting-lie-before-us so also (as this) the taking- heed-of (such as the other).”¹¹⁷ As Heidegger argues, this translation does not only bring out the words λέγειν and νοεῖν more faithfully to their original meaning, but also “makes the entire saying audible in what it says.”¹¹⁸ What is called thinking is firstly announced through the conjunction of λέγειν and νοεῖν. The conjunction, Heidegger’s argument proceeds, does not however rest upon itself. It points toward εὖν: ἔμμεναι and only thereby is fully defined. Therefore, “the essence of thinking cannot be adequately defined either by λέγειν, taken alone, or by νοεῖν, taken alone, or again by both taken by conjunction.”¹¹⁹ Yet, in the course of Western history, Heidegger states, thinking becomes understood in terms of either λέγειν in the sense of proposition or νοεῖν taken as reason. The original nature of λέγειν and νοεῖν disappears in ratio.¹²⁰ The access to the essence of thinking in Parmenides, which is fundamentally different from a mere rational activity of a thinking subject, is blocked by the subsequent tradition of philosophy-metaphysics. Philosophy in his view strays away from the question “What is called thinking?” or more precisely from “What is it that calls us to think?” “Concept and system alike are foreign to the Greek thinking.”¹²¹ The interpretation of the Presocratics in terms of modern conceptual thinking completely misses the point.

The conjunction of λέγειν and νοεῖν refer to the final words of the fragment εὖν: ἔμμεναι that are usually translated respectively as a being (*Seiendes*) and to be (*sein*). But why do λέγειν and νοεῖν refer to them?—Heidegger asks. “To whom or to what is this reference useful?”¹²² He alludes to his translation of χρή with “it is useful.” “Does ‘being’ or ‘to be’ have any use for the letting-lie-before-us and taking-heed-of?”¹²³ In order to answer these questions we must first clarify what the Greek words εὖν and ἔμμεναι truly signify.

We have already come across the word εὖν in “The Anaximander Fragment.” Although in this essay Heidegger strongly maintains that the destiny of the West depends on whether or not we can “cross over to the truth which comes to language in this archaic word, its meaning is still not fully clear. What we learn from him is that just as its later form ὄν, εὖν is a participle like “running or “blooming,” i. e. the word-form which participates in both the verbal and the nominal senses of a word.¹²⁴ In *What Is Called Thinking?* and in “Moirā” the topic is further explored. The participle εὖν we learn, is not just one among others. It is the participle of participles. There is a fundamentally twofold character to this participle. It refers to the twofold (*Zwiefalt*) which is unique and distinctive. It is the twofold of being and beings.

¹¹⁶ *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 126.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., „das Vorliegenlassen so (nämlich wie dieses) das In-die-Acht-nehmen auch (nämlich wie jenes).“

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 126-7.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 129.

¹²² Ibid, p. 132.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ *Der Spruch des Anaximander*, op. cit., p. 316.

“When we say «being» (*Sein*), it means «the being of a being». When we say a being (*Seiendes*), it means «a being with respect to its being.» We are always speaking within the twofold.”¹²⁵

Heidegger’s point is that we cannot think of either a being in itself (*das Seiende an sich*) or being for itself (*das Sein für sich*).¹²⁶ When we say “being,” we really mean the being of beings; when we say “beings,” we mean beings with reference to their being. We constantly speak from out of this twofold. The substantive character of the participle *ἔόν* is inseparably connected to its verbal character. There are neither beings without being nor being which would not refer to a being. When we say “a being” its being is always implicitly behind, even if not directly reflected upon. For this reason, Heidegger says that the participle *ἔόν*, thought of as the twofold, “speaks throughout the language.”¹²⁷ It can be expressed in such phrases as the being of beings (*das Sein des Seienden*) and beings in being (*Seiendes im Sein*).

The *λέγειν* and *νοεῖν* refer to the final words of the fragment *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι*, but these words, Heidegger argues, are interrelated. Because of the verbal character of the participle *ἔόν*, we can actually substitute *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι*.¹²⁸ Thus, *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι* in fact expresses the twofold in which both nominal and verbal meanings of *ἔόν* are stressed: beings in being and the being of beings. Still, “beings” and “being” are words which have become too vague for the contemporary ear to hear. In order to hear what the Parmenidean saying says and cross over to what is there said in *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι*, Heidegger translates the twofold as what is present in presencing, the presencing of what is present. What has thus been gained? “What is present” (*das Anwesende*) and “to be present” (*anwesen*), he claims, say to us something more definite than “beings” and “to be.” That something is present means that it has been brought into unconcealment and that it stands over against us. “Presencing” (*Anwesen*) describes the basic Greek experience of the being of beings. Hence, if we replace *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι* by the twofold, the translation of fragment 6 will run:

“Useful is: the letting-lie-before-us so (the) taking-into-attention too: what is present in presencing / the presencing of what is present.”

In fact, Heidegger does not supply us with the above translation, which can nevertheless be inferred from the text of his lecture course. *What Is Called Thinking?* ends abruptly and at its end it leaves us with more questions than there are at its beginning. The leading question of these lectures “What is it that calls us to think?” is answered, but in a questioning way. The Heideggerian interpretation of fragment 6, which relates to his inquiry into the call which directs us to thinking, seems to be finally this.

What is called thinking is announced through the conjunction of *λέγειν* and *νοεῖν*, letting-lie-before-us and taking-heed-of. The conjunction directs us to the *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι*. “Only if the letting-lie-before-us and the taking-heed-of conform and join themselves to the *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι*, and remain dependent and focused on it, will their conjunction be sufficient to the essence of thinking...”¹²⁹ The *ἔόν: ἔμμεναι*, the two-

¹²⁵ *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 174.

¹²⁶ „Moirai,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 232.

¹²⁷ *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 141.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

fold of what is present and presencing, is therefore that which calls us to think. It is the “it” in *χρή*, “it is useful.” It is the call which is concealed in *es braucht*. But why it is so? A preliminary answer to this question comes from the “Moirā” essay.

“[N]either «a being in itself» nor «being for itself» necessitate thought But because of their duality, because of *ἕν* thinking occurs [west].”¹³⁰

Neither the pure stage of thinghood (what is present as such) nor the pure stage of existence can necessitate thinking—letting beings lie before us and taking heed of them—but only their duality, the twofold. It is the twofold of what is present in presencing, of beings in their being. The twofold gathers thinking to itself.¹³¹ But why is it so? Why and in what way is thinking directed and called into its essence by the presencing of what is present, by the being of beings? This remains obscure. No further explanation is offered. According to Heidegger, that it is so follows directly from Parmenidean fragments 3 and 8.¹³² Hence, I shall now turn to these fragments.

4. MOIRA FRAGMENTS 3 AND 8

The essay “Moirā” of 1954 is based on the undelivered part of the lecture course on *What Is Called Thinking?* In this essay the Parmenidean fragments 3 and 8 (lines 34-41) are discussed. At the outset Heidegger says that his interpretation of these fragments will be limited to a series of points—individual commentaries on some issues. Some of these issues refer to the topic of thinking presented in the lecture course. Nevertheless, there is a new topic—Moirā—which refers directly to the essay’s title and expands considerably on the material covered in the lectures. How does the interpretation of fragment 3 offered in “Moirā” differ from the earlier interpretation given in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*? In what way, along with the interpretation of fragment 8, does it help us to understand the relationship between being and thinking?

In fragment 3, instead of *λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε*, Parmenides says *νοεῖν* and instead of *ἕν* *ἔμμεναι*, he says *εἶναι*. However, in Heidegger’s view, the *εἶναι* of fragment 3 should in fact be understood as *ἕν* *ἔμμεναι*, whereas *νοεῖν* should be taken in conjunction with *λέγειν*.¹³³ If *εἶναι* and *νοεῖν*, as the earlier introduced readings of the fragment 3 suggest, indeed belong together, this means that in light of the above interpretation of fragment 6, *λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε* is thinking only to the extent to which it remains directed on *ἕν* *ἔμμεναι*, the twofold: what is present in presencing or the presencing of what is present. According to Heidegger, precisely the same point is made in fragment 8 (lines 35ff.) where Parmenides says: *οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἑόντος ... εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν*—“For you cannot find thinking apart from the twofold.”¹³⁴ Yet, at the same time Heidegger admits that Parmenides does not yet reflect upon the unfolding of the

¹³⁰ „Moirā,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 235.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 238.

¹³² *Was heißt Denken?*, op. cit., p. 148.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 146.

¹³⁴ „Moirā,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 237. Traditionally fragment 8 (lines 35 ff.) is translated as follows: ‘For you will not find thinking without what is...’ (Kirk, op. cit., p. 252).

twofold or the twofold as such.¹³⁵ How should this be understood? What is the unfolding of the twofold (*die Entfaltung der Zwiefalt*)?

A few pages later Heidegger gives us an answer. He says:

“The Greeks experienced the basic character [of the unfolding of the twofold] as disclosure (*Entbergen*). Thus, what reigns in the twofold is disclosure. The Greeks call it *Ἀλήθεια*.”¹³⁶

First, according to Heidegger, the word which describes *ἔὼν ἔμμεναι* is *Ἀλήθεια*. As we have already learned, *Ἀλήθεια* as the openness of being thought of as clearing is the horizon for the manifestation of beings which remains unquestioned by the Greeks. It is the framework to which a historical man always belongs. Parmenides does not yet reflect upon the unfolding of the twofold: he does not yet think explicitly of *Ἀλήθεια* as the horizon and openness of being; and yet, being is thought by him and *Ἀλήθεια*, the goddess, is mentioned right at the beginning of his didactic poem. Second, Heidegger goes further than what is there directly said in Parmenides to the experience of the twofold in its unfolding or of being in its disclosure. His interpretation is completed with the history of being. This becomes explicit in his reading of the part of fragment 8 (lines 37ff.) in which Moira is mentioned.

...ἐπεὶ τὸ γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν οὔλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμμεναι·
...since Moira bound it to be whole and changeless.¹³⁷

Heidegger's interpretation of the passage runs as follows:

“Parmenides speaks of *ἔὼν*, of the presencing (of what is present), and of the twofold, and in no sense of «beings.» He names the *Μοῖρα*, the allotment, which allots by bestowing and so unfolds the twofold. The allotment dispenses (provides and endows) through the twofold. It is the dispensation of presencing which is gathered in itself and unfolded as the presencing of what is present. *Μοῖρα* is the destiny of «being» in the sense of *ἔὼν*. *Μοῖρα* has delivered the destiny of being, *τό γε*, into the twofold and thus has bound it to totality and immobility, from which and in which, the presencing of what is present comes to pass.”¹³⁸

The history of being, as the history of being's transformations throughout the history of the West, is in fact for Heidegger the history of the twofold in which both the twofold as such and its unfolding are concealed.¹³⁹ It is the history of *beyng* (*das Seyn*).¹⁴⁰ Heidegger coins the word *Seyn*, which I render as “beyng,” and uses it in various works of the later period in order to describe the twofold: the being of beings or the presencing of what is present. Then, like *Χρεών* in Anaximander, *Μοῖρα* is for him the fundamental word in Parmenides that describes being as it gives itself throughout the history. *Μοῖρα* is “the allotment, which allots by bestowing and so unfolds the twofold.”¹⁴¹ In its history, being gives itself as *ἰδέα, ἐνέργεια, actualitas*, objectivity,

¹³⁵ „Moira,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 237.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 239.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 243.

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 243-4.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁴⁰ Von Wesen der Wahrheit, in *Wegmarken*, op. cit., p. 201.

¹⁴¹ „Moira,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 243.

absolute concept and will to power.¹⁴² *Moĩpa* “unfolds the twofold” means that in each case (in each of its transformations) being gives itself actually as the being of beings. Further, since each revelation of being which occurs within history concerns the totality of beings and brings about an epoch of being (e. g. Greek antiquity, Rome, Christianity, modern times) in which its interpretation is fixed (e. g. objectivity, will to power), it binds the twofold to “totality and immobility.” Hence, it is clear that Heidegger plays on the Parmenidean words to describe in a metaphoric way the fundamental conception of his later thought—the history of being.

It is commonly believed that in fragment 8 Parmenides is making an attempt to show that “what is exists completely and changelessly.”¹⁴³ A common interpretation of Parmenides is that he invents some sort of principle which secures elimination from being of all change and diversity.¹⁴⁴ In this respect, by contrast to Heraclitus as the thinker of change and interplay of opposites, Parmenides is associated with immobility and permanence. The opposition between Heraclitus and Parmenides goes back to antiquity and we find it well established in Plato.¹⁴⁵ However, already in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger no longer opposes Parmenides and Heraclitus. He argues that they both say essentially the same.¹⁴⁶ The issue is further explored in Heidegger’s later works where the history of being, as the history of the twofold, unfolds. According to his view expressed in “Moirā,” as primordial thinkers both Heraclitus and Parmenides think within the “riddle of being.”¹⁴⁷ They both experience the truth of being in the sense of being’s disclosure and withdrawing concealment.

In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger does not yet develop the conception of the history of being. Thinking and being (apprehending and presencing), the *voeĩv* and *eiĩvai* of fragment 3, are not yet placed in the context of being’s withdrawal. In Heidegger’s later interpretation of fragment 8, which comes from “Moirā,” this new dimension is added. Accordingly, thinking becomes dependent upon the preceding clearing of being, i. e. upon the “dispensation of presencing”—the presencing in its disclosure. Yet, to be sure, thinking as *voeĩv* is not for Heidegger a mere rational activity of the thinking subject by which thinking is usually understood. It is neither judging nor arguing nor justifying. As it is profoundly described in the Heraclitus lectures, thinking as *voeĩv* means gathering of the unconcealed “in bringing it forth in accordance with emerging—(all this however) in hearkening to the original fore-collection.”¹⁴⁸ Thinking is apprehending beings as a whole in their being. In light of Heidegger’s interpretation of fragment 8, thinking as *voeĩv* (apprehending) is placed in the historical context of the destiny of being.

¹⁴² See “Heidegger, the Presocratics, and the History of Being,” pp. 497-501.

¹⁴³ Kirk, op. cit., p. 253.

¹⁴⁴ Hussey, op. cit., p. 105.

¹⁴⁵ See Jean BEAUFRET, Heraclitus and Parmenides, in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. by Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), p. 70.

¹⁴⁶ EM, p. 74.

¹⁴⁷ „Moirā,” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, op. cit., p. 248.

¹⁴⁸ “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50),” in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* op. cit., pp. 273-4.

CONCLUSION

There are only a few publications devoted to Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides. To begin with the pioneer and most complete given by George Seidel in his work on *Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics*, it is primarily based on *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. As a result, Seidel does not place his interpretation within the context of the history of being, and thus misses the major point. The *Introduction* is also the only basis of George Vick's "Heidegger's Linguistic Interpretation of Parmenides' «Being»."¹⁴⁹ In more recent interpretations, later works are usually considered. In "Parmenides: Circle of Disclosure, Circle of Possibility," Kenneth Maly discusses parts of the texts of Parmenides and "Seminar in Zahringen 1973."¹⁵⁰ However, since he does not translate correctly Heidegger's basic terms, his interpretation is fairly arbitrary and seem more obscure than Heidegger himself. We can also find the same problem of mistranslation and subsequent misinterpretation in Robert Goff's otherwise well and clearly written essay "Saying and Being with Heidegger and Parmenides."¹⁵¹

The key notion which emerges in Parmenides' didactic poem is for Heidegger ἀλήθεια. However, it would be wrong, he argues, to understand it as a mere propositional truth. "'Αλήθεια is thought of as disclosure (*Entbergung*), which properly surrounds εἶν (which means the present: presencing itself)."¹⁵² It is a name for being. It describes being as the open: being in its disclosure in self-concealment, which provides the horizon for the manifestation of beings; the openness in which we always come to stand. However, the Presocratics themselves do not inquire into ἀλήθεια as the horizon and the openness of being. They do not notice that there is concealment in unconcealment. The λήθη in ἀλήθεια remains unthought by them. Heidegger's inquiry into beings him then beyond the early Greek experience of ἀλήθεια to 'Αλήθεια in the no longer Greek but Heideggerian sense. His interpretation of the didactic poem is not a return to Parmenides himself, but takes place "in the echo of Parmenides."¹⁵³ It is a repetition. It happens as the listening which opens itself out to the Parmenidean words from within our modern age marked by the forgetfulness of being. It is consistent with Heidegger's concept of the history of being.

Like his interpretation of Anaximander, Heidegger's reading of Parmenides which comes from his later works is thus embedded in his original philosophy of history—the history of being. These days, Heidegger believes, we have turned away from being so far that we can experience an instance of the clearing of being only by a return to the beginning which provides for the origin of Western thought and civilization. The task of thinking is then to exercise the repetition of the past which "has been" in its possibilities. We need, he believes, to undertake a return to being as experienced and thought by the early Greeks. We need to replace the first Greek beginning by a second beginning from which the Western civilization can take its new course.

¹⁴⁹ George VICK, "Heidegger's Linguistic Rehabilitation of Parmenides' «Being»," in *American Philosophical Quarterly* VIII 2 (April, 1971).

¹⁵⁰ Kenneth MALY, "Parmenides: Circle of Disclosure, Circle of Possibility," in *Heidegger Studies* I (1985).

¹⁵¹ Robert GOFF, "Saying and Being with Heidegger and Parmenides," *Man and World* V 1 (February, 1972).

¹⁵² GA15, p. 398.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

AIMS AND SCOPE

«EXISTENTIA» is a journal of philosophy and related subjects. This international journal has been published in Hungary since 1991. We publish first of all *texts of purely philosophical content*, and focus on classical European thought, especially on the timeliness and actualization of the imperishable doctrines of ancient Greek and Latin authors. This ancient humanism permeating the whole of human *paideia* and culture, the essential digest of which is philosophy, is what our periodical wishes to display. However, the purely philosophical character of our periodical does not mean that we do not welcome writings dealing with the philosophical concepts and theories in literature, arts or science, since it is philosophy that is destined—owing to its ancient *Greek* character—to study the questions *what* is literature, *what* is science, and *what* are the arts. The central purpose of EXISTENTIA is to foster a living dialogue within the international community on philosophical issues of mutual interest. It seeks to elicit, within this international dialogue, discussions of *fundamental* philosophical problems and original *approaches* to their solution. Although not an advocate of any one trend or school in philosophy, it endeavours to keep abreast of developments within phenomenology, hermeneutical philosophy, and contemporary continental philosophy. It is also interested in investigations that probe possible points of intersection between continental and Anglo-American traditions. Although the articles are usually published in English and German, from time to time manuscripts written in French, Italian, and Hungarian are accepted. EXISTENTIA contains reviews of recent, original works in philosophy. It provides considerable space for such reviews, allowing critics to develop their comments and assessments at some length.

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