WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT

A Master's Thesis

by
BEYZA ÜNAL

Department of
International Relations
Bilkent University
Ankara
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OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT

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BEYZA ÜNAL

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

      Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

      Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

      Assist. Prof. Tarık Oğuzlu

      Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

      Assoc. Prof. Tanel Demirel

      Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

      Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel

      Director

ABSTRACT

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT

Ünal, Beyza

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

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This thesis examines the concept of winning hearts and minds from a historical
analysis to a contemporary framework. The literature on the concept fell short of
success to implement the practice of winning hearts and minds. The concept did not
solely attribute to security studies but to religion and political science as well in
history. Therefore, within a historical outlook, winning hearts and minds has a robust
conceptualization. Moreover, this thesis attempts to formulate the components of the
concept of winning hearts and minds. To analyze the components, two sets of case
studies, Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency, and London attack and Madrid
bombings are taken into consideration with regard to the success and failure of state
policies.

Keywords: Winning Hearts and Minds, Coercion, Persuasion, Insurgency, Terrorism

ÖZET

KALPLERİ VE AKILLARI KAZANMA: TARİHSEL İNCELEME VE KAVRAMIN ÇALIŞMA ŞEKLİ

Ünal, Beyza

M.A., Uluslararası İlişkiler Departmanı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

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Bu çalışma, kalpleri ve akılları kazanma kavramını tarihi açıdan ele alarak günümüzde terör ile mücadeledeki uygulamasını araştırmaktadır. Literatür'ün kavramı anlama açısından eksik kaldığı düşünüldüğü için bu çalışma gerekli görülmüştür. Yapılan araştırma sonucunda kavramın sadece ayaklanma ve terör ile mücadelede uygulanmadığı tarihte din ve siyaset biliminde de yer aldığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Söz konusu çalışma, kalpleri ve akılları kazanmak kavramının kullanımındaki eksikleri beş öğe oluşturarak incelemektedir. Bahsi geçen öğelerin geçerliliği ise ikili gruplardan oluşan vaka çalışmalarıyla incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kalpleri ve Akılları Kazanmak, Baskı, İkna, Ayaklanma, Terörizm

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A state intervention based solely on hard measures in a territory of another state with an aim of coping with terrorism/insurgency fall short of success in contemporary era. Since, the center of gravity of wars should be winning hearts and minds of the targeted population[1] presently. Previously, the use of coercion and initiation of fear on the public were regarded as the best strategies to win a war. Yet, in contemporary era the *consent* of populations of the intervening and the intervened country are required for success. In this regard, there is a need to understand the nature of winning hearts and minds.

The western states started realizing the importance of using the utility of the concept of winning hearts and minds as terrorism is increased in contemporary era. Although the implementation of the concept traces back to early history, it has become a major

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[1] Targeted population in this thesis refers to the population that a state attempts to win. In early history the targeted population is a state's own population. In World War I and World War II, the targeted population is the population of the opponent states. In Cold War, the targeted population is again the opponent state's population (In the Soviet Union case, it also encompasses the population of the satellite states. In the struggle against terrorism, the targeted population is the population of the intervened country.

policy in the struggle against terrorism especially for western countries in present days. After September 11 attacks, Tony Blair and George W. Bush started to utilize the concept through their policies and statements. Consequently, there is an increase of interest in understanding of the concept in order to deal with terrorism/insurgency. The concept of winning hearts and minds is selected to investigate in this thesis, since the literature requires a research on the concept. The available literature on the concept of winning hearts and minds has concentrated mainly on the significance of soft power measures. But, there is a gap in literature on how to implement the concept of winning hearts and minds in the struggle against terrorism. For this reason, a theoretical understanding of the concept of winning hearts and minds is necessary.

The main question of this thesis is: "What is the nature of winning hearts and minds?" Under this question, there are four sub-questions that are going to be evaluated:

Sub-Question 1. What is the history of winning hearts and minds? How far can the concept be traced?

Sub-Question 2. What is the place of winning hearts and minds in the struggle against terrorism in contemporary era?

Sub-Question 3. How has the concept of winning hearts and minds been operationalized?[2]

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[2] The operationalization of the concept of winning hearts and minds is assessed by the formulized components. The proposed components of winning hearts and minds are created in terms of their relevance and assistance to the concept. The literature on the concept does not involve such compo-

Sub-Question 4. How can this operationalization of the concept of winning hearts and minds be observed and assessed in specific cases?

The questions above are linked to each other in an organic manner. Therefore, they should be regarded not as four different questions but as a set of query that tries to reveal the nature of the concept of winning hearts and minds. In this regard, this thesis defends that without implementing the proposed components of winning hearts and minds, the policies of states would fall short of success. The components through which the concept has operationalized are (1) public diplomacy, (2) strategic communication, (3) propaganda and psychological operations, (4) intelligence, (5) attitude and behavior change. These components are the outcome of the history account of winning hearts and minds.

The literature shows that *heart* is used for spiritual actions, which are the emotional phase of winning the targeted population to the side of the intervening state. For instance, psychological operations appeal to the heart rather than the mind of the targeted population. On the other hand, *mind* refers to a more materialistic phase in which the targeted population could witness concrete result of the policies of an intervening state. In the mind phase, securing the population from the adversary[3], mak-

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nents. However, to evaluate and operationalize the concept of winning hearts and minds to the state policies, the proposed components are necessary.

[3]In this thesis the adversaries are the insurgents and/or terrorists in a country. Besides, if not mentioned differently, winning hearts and minds of a targeted population regards to win the people inside an intervened country, who do not chose neither to be on the side of the insurgent nor to be with the government. Only in London and Madrid Bombings (see Chapter V) the targeted population is the domestic population that the concerning states employ domestic policies to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim community inside their borders.

ing infrastructures, building schools are the most prominent examples of tangible changes. Such policies help an intervening state to win the population on their side.

Kilcullen (2004, see Appendix C: 4) argues that *hearts* means to persuade "the population that its interests are best served by cooperating with the occupation" and *minds* means to convince the "people that the coalition forces will win the conflict." This thesis argues that the term *hearts* emerges from a historical perspective in which the term is shaped through sensitivity of the population on certain issues rather than state policies. In this respect, *heart* refers to personal, cultural, societal motivations and shared experiences of the targeted population. On the other hand, the term *minds* emerge from rationality and reasoning of the population.

The overall aim of this thesis is to introduce the content of winning hearts and minds, such as where it had firstly occurred, in which context it was used and how it was transformed throughout the history. Besides, this thesis aims to create the components of winning hearts and minds, since the current literature does not specify them.

This thesis is based firstly on a descriptive analysis where the evaluation of winning hearts and minds is pursued in general and secondly on an analytical approach to observe the practice of the term. The thesis depends on three main methodological grounds. It initiates with a historical narrative in which the history is observed as it is. Historical research on winning hearts and minds shows the events where the concept is used in the past. In this regard, the *Campaigns of Alexander the Great* by Arrian, a well known historian, is the origin of the historical research of the thesis.

Later, the political philosophers and strategists, such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Rousseau are analyzed by using content analysis method. The works of these writers are significant to examine the concept of winning hearts and minds. These works generally stress the importance of consent and persuasion[4] in winning the targeted population.

Last but not the least, this thesis uses comparative case study method to examine whether winning hearts and minds has been a useful policy for contemporary terrorism and insurgency. Of this point, the proposed components of winning hearts and minds are used to examine the concept.

This thesis utilizes documentary research, mainly governmental records, memoranda, speeches and declarations as primary sources; whereas, books and articles are used as secondary sources.

Chapter II evaluates the history of winning hearts and minds in regards to the evaluation and formation of the concept in the history. In this regard, the era of Pericles shows the value of *consent* and the significance of *public opinion* under the rule of a statesman. Further, consent and persuasion can be seen in the campaigns of Alexander the Great. After Pericles and Alexander the Great, the usage of winning hearts and minds shifts from population centric to a religious centric discourse. The Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England wrote about winning hearts and minds under the context of converting a person's heart and mind to Jesus Christ. After this

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[4] In Clausewitz and Sun Tzu's understanding of warfare deception and coercive methods to win a war are also important. Considering the structure of old wars, these concept may work as well. However, in the contemporary era coercion and deception seems to be ineffective on the intervened population, especially in the struggle against terrorism.

practice, the concept has not been verbally used for a long period in history in the religious context.

Later, strategists attached great importance to the practice of winning hearts and minds through their writings and advised the rulers to be aware of the concept. In 1519-1520 Machiavelli formulated the "rumor theory" and the implementation of deception in warfare to obtain towns that were disloyal to the ruler. In addition to Machiavelli, Clausewitz in 18th century recommended winning hearts and minds implicitly. The targeted subject of winning hearts and minds in the 18th century was the soldiers rather than the whole population. During that time, the concept was practiced in war conditions. In the 20th century, Mao Tse-tung expressed the significance of population while dealing with insurgencies. With reference to Mao Tse-tung's understanding of winning hearts and minds, the targeted subject became the whole population.

Chapter III examines the contemporary usage of winning hearts and minds, seeking its place in World War II and Cold War period. Although the involved states were relying on hard power in battlefield during World War II, they also started using the components of winning hearts and minds on opponent's (targeted) population. In this sense, the main aim of using the components of winning hearts and minds was to make the opponent's population fed up with war. During the Cold War, the explicit usage of the concept in counter-insurgency struggles had formulated the contemporary conceptualization of the concept in a concrete manner. The Soviet Union and the U.S. applied propaganda and psychological warfare, intelligence, and strategic communication methods on the population of the other party during that period. Histori-

cal research on winning hearts and minds provides to formulate the proposed components in which Chapter IV examines and clarifies them more in detail.

Chapter IV formulates five components of winning hearts and minds. These components are public diplomacy, strategic communication, propaganda and psychological operations, attitude and behavioral change and intelligence. This chapter suggests that the components of winning hearts and minds would not work efficiently to win a war, if they are considered individually. Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis to the literature can be the introduction of the proposed components and their relations to the concept. In the literature, all of the above components are assessed independent from the concept of winning hearts and minds. Yet, the historical research on the concept shows that there are certain policy methods that states should apply in order to win a population. For instance, dropping leaflets in intervened countries' territory (the use of propaganda) and the creation of Radio Free Europe (the use of strategic communication) were applied to win the targeted population during the Cold War. Moreover, when the question "*why do states utilize those components during interventions?*" is asked, the clear answer would be to win the hearts and minds of the intervened (targeted) population.

Chapter V relies on two sets of case studies that are formulated in two branches The proposed components of winning hearts and minds are examined in these sets of case studies. These sets are further divided into two sub-sets. The aim of dividing the case studies into two sub-sets is to demonstrate the policies of governments in insurgencies and terrorism within a comparative frame. On this issue, the first set of cases, which are Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency, are the two comparative case stu-

dies. After stating the historical overview of the two conflicts, this section of the chapter examines those wars in terms of the success and failure of the strategy of winning hearts and minds on the targeted population. In the second set of cases, London and Madrid bombings are analyzed; yet again, in terms of state policies on the success or failure of winning the Muslim population but inside their country, after the attacks[5]. Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency show an interference of a state to a territory of another state; whereas, London and Madrid Bombings present the effect of policies to win the Muslim population inside the country with reference to domestic policies of the states.

Chapter VI is the concluding part that summarizes the nature of the concept of winning hearts and minds. In this regard, the components of winning hearts and minds and their interactions with the concept are seen to be valuable to win a war that is based on insurgency or terrorism. The practice of the proposed components during Malayan Emergency, generally intelligence gathering, propaganda and minimum use of force, shows the necessity of the concept. Whereas, the Vietnam War, where the components are not used in effect, fell short of success. It is concluded that the significance of the proposed components changes from case to case. This chapter concludes with recommendations to further research on the concept of winning hearts and minds.

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[5] London and Madrid Bombings are the comparative case studies that are examined in terms of states domestic policies. This section of the thesis aims to observe whether the components of winning hearts and minds be applicable to the states' own population.

CHAPTER II

ROOTS OF WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IN

EARLY HISTORY

This chapter aims to evaluate the practice of winning hearts and minds on the basis of early historical occasions and philosophical writings. Since the first usage of the concept as a whole was during the Malayan Emergency in 1948 by General Templer, exploration of the concept in history could cause "anachronism." Anachronism by definition is utilizing a concept or a term to a timeframe, even though the concept has not been seen or used on that era yet. It creates an error in chronological order that scholars sometimes avoid. To bear anachronism in mind the aim of searching the roots of winning hearts and minds is not to reinterpret the course of the history, but to investigate whether the concept can be traced back to ancient time.

It would not be incorrect to claim that the practice of the concept can be traced back to the emergence of the state. The existence of human being can be seen as the basis of winning hearts and minds as well, since communication has been an indispensible

part of daily life. Based upon this, human beings by their very nature need to communicate with each other in certain tasks to maintain their existence. During these tasks coercion or persuasion occurred. Therefore, the emergence of communication, namely the dialogue among the human beings, has created the first practice of winning hearts and minds with the aim of tackling the obstacles to survive in nature.

2.1 Pericles and the Will of the Public on the way to Winning Hearts and Minds:

The concept of winning hearts and minds is formed on the political arena in the Classical Greek history. Started by his rule, Pericles (495 – 429 BC) a sophisticated Athenian statesman, had granted the citizens to live under a true democracy. The voting system in which the majority decides on the proceedings had increased Pericles's power. As Fox (2006: 142-44) puts forward about the era of Pericles:

Someone, therefore, who could win the people's trust would be far more effective than an old-fashioned aristocrat, however brave he might be in war and athletics and however well connected in the wider Greek world.

According to Fox (2006: 142-144), Pericles managed to get the support by communication, which is called "public speaking"[6]. Based on Pericles's understanding, in Athenian democracy *the wish of the population* prevailed the will of the statesmen. In the same era, novels had also showed the link of the population with statecraft. As Dodds (2004: 17-18) writes, Homer had shaped the strength of his characters through

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[6] On communication skills, Plato had labeled Pericles as a "demagogue", whereas Thucydides admired his intelligence. At the final stage, Pericles was successful at diverting public opinion. Whether he was a "demagogue" or an admirable public speaker, is not related to the investigation of the thesis.

public opinion. These characters achieved their strengths by political counsel or by battle. Consequently, the will of the public on decision making appeared to the forefront of political arena. This situation constituted the background for the concept of winning hearts and minds and its reliance on the population support.

2.2 Philip II and Alexander the Great in relation to Winning Hearts and Minds:

As Fox (2006: 188) states Alexander the Great, son of Philip II, obtained his skills from his father. Philip II, before fighting Spartans, had established good relations with "neighboring" Athenian cities to pull Sparta easily down. Due to this reason, he sent out "money, arms and mercenaries" to Greek cities under the name of friendship (Fox 2006: 188-89). In contemporary comprehension, the acts of Philip II can be considered as winning the minds by serving goods that the neighboring cities were deprived of.

Likewise, Alexander the Great followed the path of his father with a slight difference. Alexander was more confident and successful than his father in his campaigns. In the translation of Sélincourt (1971) of the book *The Campaigns of Alexander*, Arrian assesses the achievements of Alexander the Great through his campaigns. As a general aim, Alexander the Great had fought for the status of *Leader of Persia*. He followed his ferocious foe Darius, the king of Persia, all through his conquests. He won many battles in Asia, was injured several times. He had defeated Darius and achieved the title of *Leader of all Asia*. During his campaigns, he was respected of

being a stable person in attitude. He could have done anything to get the public to his side. To achieve such an end he was gentle to the conquered population.

Gentle actions of Alexander the Great were supportive to accomplish his conquests not only to gain territory, but also to get the population to his side. He generally did not regulate the taxes of the conquered cities. He kept the taxes at the same level to prevent further revolts. Even in some instances, he had asked indigenous people to come back from mountains and surrender (Sélincourt, 1971: 76). In return he had permitted those people to stay in their villages and continue their life. With this act, Alexander intended to win the conquered population's hearts and minds. In this manner, his aim was not to loot the conquered city but to organize it (Sélincourt, 1971: 76).

Although Aristotle had "advised the young king to behave towards the Greeks as a leader but towards 'barbarians' as a master", Alexander rejected his tutor's advise. He was just, to all communities. In the Hellenistic period, Greeks and Macedonians had the status of being a country of west, whereas Persians and Asians were perceived as barbarians, who were inferior in status and should not be interlinked to any western structure. Alexander had changed this policy by integrating "Macedonian army" into Persian forces (Sélincourt (trans.), 1971: 31).

Moreover, according to a text on Macedonian history (Smitha, 1998), Alexander was gentle to the non-Greek ethnics. After conquering their lands, he did not put them into slavery. In some instances as in Miletus, he offered power to local Greek citizens to connect them to himself, where he had witnessed resistance (Smitha, 1998).

According to Shortsleeve, a Major in United States Air Forces, Alexander the Great won the hearts and minds of the people in conquered cities by "encouraging inter-marriage of the Greeks and the people" (Shortsleeve, 2005: 25). Even Alexander himself married a Persian woman named Roxanne. One of the prominent changes of Alexander the Great, after the marriage, as Diodorus put it in the documentary of Lindsay (2004), was his behavior. According to the claim of Diodorus, Alexander the Great dressed up "in a white robe and a Persian's sash after he captured Persepolis" (Lindsay 2004). Macedonians were offended by Alexander the Great's attitudes (Lindsay 2004). Besides, some generals created unrest inside Macedonia. Even if Alexander aimed to get the Persian people on his side, he could not assess his own population's opinion. This gives clues on the fragileness of winning hearts and minds.

According to a research paper written by Shortsleeve (2005), Alexander used all the "instruments of power" to win the hearts and minds of the Asian people. Yet Shortsleeve (2005) goes further and cites John F.C. Fuller who claims that during the conquest of Persia, Alexander had distinguished the defeat of the Persian army from the Persian population (cited in Shortsleeve, 2005: 11). As Shortsleeve said "the defeat of the army was his [Alexander's] strategic aim, the winning over the people his political aim" (Shortsleeve, 2005: 10).

In general, Alexander's actions show that winning hearts and minds is a population focused concept. In this focus, the population that is considered can be the interferer's own population or the intervened population. From the actions of Alexander the Great, the significance of the two can be observed.

2.3 Religion in relation to winning hearts and minds:

Winning hearts and minds is practiced not only in the practices of the states but also in religion. The concept is used in religion in 1599 as a mean to get the believers to the love of God. This reasoning is explicit in The Book of Common Prayer (Philippians, 4:7) as: "The peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Jesus Christ."

There are several interpretations of the above verse. From all different kinds, the *Geneva Bible Notes* interprets those verses as (see Center for Reformed Theology and Apologetics website):

> That great quietness of mind, which God alone gives in Christ. He divides the mind into the heart, that is, into that part which is the seat of the *will and affections*, and into the higher part, by which we understand the *reason about matters*[7].

With this interpretation, winning hearts and minds locates in sacred book, to guide the true believers to the right way of God. According to this definition, heart resembles the emotional motivation, whereas mind resembles the deeper cause of the issues which interlinks heart and mind to get the affective result. The concept's practice in religion explains that hearts and minds has not been merely a strategic term but a concept that transforms. In this transformation, hearts and minds is utilized as a tool. The aim was to convince the intended population to be a true believer.

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[7] Emphasis added.

Lee (2009) analyzes the concept hearts and minds on religion through a theoretical framework. From Lee (2009)'s understanding Pascal, a 17th century French philosopher, had questioned the "truths of religious nature" by taking 'reason and heart' as the two prominent variables. According to Lee, Pascal assumed that heart is "other than a rational mindset" (Lee, 2009: 338). With Pascal's hypothesis, Lee (2009) concluded that to be a true believer reason should not be the driving force; but it is the heart that directs human beings on religion. In this process, heart does not only feel but also knows the true reality. Lee (2009: 342) situates Pascal's view of heart in a "metaphorical" way. He stresses that heart does not combine only the emotional phases of the human being, but it is also the "center of operation", affects the "thoughts and will (Lee 2009: 342). Approaching from Lee's point, even reason is affected by the assessment of heart.

Winning hearts and minds on religious discourse is a tool to persuade the targeted population for the cause of the interveners. Examining theology is significant, since 16th century conjuncture was influenced by religious discourse. It can be concluded that winning hearts and minds was applied by the necessities of conjuncture of the related era.

2.4 Political Discourse on Winning Hearts and Minds in 18th Century:

In the state level, consent of the population and to persuade them through coercion prevail the roots of winning hearts and minds to get a population. The former is the most desirable way for the intervener.

According to the arguments offered by Gourevitch (1997) on Rousseau[8], there are three different kinds of will in ruling apparatus. The first one is the *individual's own will*, stemming from other people's conditions. The second one is the *common will*, comes from society to the prince or the governor. The third one is the *sovereign will* that comes from society to state. According to Gourevitch on Rousseau's writings, an individual never renounces upon his particular will as a human being but gives his consent to the sovereign to rule; and to the state to check the ruler's administration (Gourevitch 1997: 87). The prince, for instance, has legitimate reasons either to punish or convince the public through persuasive measures. However, it is the sovereign power, the higher branch of the pyramid that regulates prince's actions and prevents prince's personal desires on people. The sovereign power consists of the consent of society. However, a prince may use the population for his own interest. Besides, rulers cannot put pressure to "win men's hearts" on every individual (Gourevitch, 1762: 11-12). The former stance can well be seen, when Rousseau (cited in Gourevitch 1997: 95) observed that:

> A political sermonizer may well tell them [Princes] that since the people's force is their force, their greater interest is to have the people flourishing, numerous, formidable; they know perfectly well that this is not true. Their personal interest is first of all that the People be weak, wretched, and never able to resist them.

Moreover, in accordance with Gourevitch's conceptualization of Rousseau on theory, general will is always right; and common good rules the particular will. For instance, if the will of an individual clashes with the general will, the general will would pre-

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[8]In the following arguments references on Rousseau is taken from the book *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, which is translated and edited by Gourevitch (1997).

vail and the 'individual will' would diminish; therefore, the latter should not be taken seriously. In contemporary era, the particular will cannot be separated from common good; and such a separation creates radicalization on the individual level.

Moreover, as Gourevitch (1997) states, Rousseau believed that giving consent to the sovereign on purpose, would produce a relatively secure environment. Although the presumed social contract of J. J. Rousseau is an imaginary one, it gives clues on the creation of peaceful conditions inside the borders of a state. Along with the need of consent, citizens would defend their country only when they adopt the territory as their "fatherland." The image of a fatherland emphasizes the implementation of hearts and minds.

Besides, in *Discourse on Political Economy,*[9] Rousseau explicitly states that even the rulers cannot put pressure to "win men's hearts" on every individual (Gourevitch, 1997: 11-12). Nonetheless, the book does not cover what would happen, if the given consent is taken away.

The understanding of Rousseau provides the necessity of population. The significance of getting the consent from the ruled population is associated to the concept of winning hearts and minds. It can be derived from the political discourse that rulers should consider the will of their population. In this respect, the concept of winning hearts and minds is directed to the domestic population rather than a foreign one.

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[9] The *Discourse on Political Economy* is translated in Gourevitch (1997: 3-39)

2.5 Strategic Studies and Winning Hearts and Minds

2.5.1 Sun Tzu on Winning the Soldiers Hearts and Minds

The components of winning hearts and minds (see Chapter VI) have their roots in strategic studies by Sun-Tzu. According to Giles translation on Sun Tzu, "warfare is based on deception" (Giles 1910: 2-5) and a virtuous leader should win a war without having a battle and both "direct and indirect methods of attack" are valuable to win a battle. The harmony of the two would lead to extensive maneuver (Giles 1910: 11).

Considering the era of Sun Tzu by being cognizant of conventional warfare structures, it is surprising to observe the motivation of winning the *heart* of soldiers in war times. According to Giles on Sun Tzu, generals should behave in mercy to the soldiers as if they are the soldiers' "children" (Giles, 1910 22-25). Such an act would result in loyalty to the generals. Although Sun Tzu did not extend his work by creating links on each point, he had shown the basics of warfare. Since the logic in *Art of War* captures the military phase of war, applying negative methods, such as deception and misinformation, on the population in contemporary would not be valuable. Nonetheless, Sun Tzu provides the necessity to win the hearts and minds of the soldiers. On the investigation of winning hearts and minds in history, the reference point of *whose hearts and minds* always changes. In this regard, the reference point becomes the soldiers.

2.5.2 Carl von Clausewitz on Winning the Soldiers Hearts and Minds

On the characteristic of modern warfare, the "heart" of a nation is regarded as a notion that can change the very course of the "war potentials, politics and fighting strength"; therefore, "Clausewitz warned the governments to be cognizant of the power of heart in a nation" (Howard and Paret 1993: 258). According to Clausewitz, deducted from the translation of Howard and Paret, heart has two forms. First is the heart of an army; the other one is the heart of a nation. The heart of a nation is its will to fight. The heart of the army is the center of gravity, which is called to be the strongest value of an army, where artillery units, command and control systems are located.

Clausewitz was more in favor of the conditions of troops and artillery numbers, meaning the operational phase of the war rather than the population. From this stance, the vital tenets in old wars were to acquire the territory of the enemy in which the skill of the soldiers and artillery were the most prominent factors. Considering the era of Clausewitz, the quantity of the troops also played a vital role to win the wars. Besides, war combines the entire nation regardless of civilians (Howard and Paret, 1993). Yet, the concept of winning hearts and minds found its value through the virtues of commanders on soldiers to augment the will to fight during the war (Howard and Paret, 1993: 220). Therefore, the "military spirit in every soldier's *heart* that goes beyond bravery must be the duty of a commander" (Howard and Paret, 1993: 220).

Morality was the other element of wars. The moral factors unite people into "mass of force" and this has a psychological base: the will. Hence, it is harder to win "people in arms" than armies (Howard and Paret, 1993: 216-221).

From the military perspective, cunning and intelligence were the basic tools during the operational phase of conventional wars. These methods are considered in the thesis as the components to win hearts and minds of the population. Therefore, one of the basic components of winning hearts and minds, intelligence gathering, had traced back to conventional era. Besides, communication was a strategy in conventional wars too. Unlike the contemporary era, where words should abide by the actions of states, Handel (1989) discusses, Clausewitz's communication strategy and the way it led to deception as "… but words, being cheap, are the most common means of creating false impressions."

Stemming the idea from Howard and Paret's (1993) book, although Clausewitz suggested the vitality of masses during war conditions, he regarded the army rather than civilians. This was the logic of conventional wars in which the center of gravity was to hit the enemy forces from the core in order to fracture the courage and power of the adversary to retaliate. Nevertheless at about hundred years after Clausewitz's writings, Colmar von der Goltz[10], both a Prussian soldier and a writer, tried to shift the center of gravity from soldier specific logic to a people based one, especially by saying "it is the conflict of interests that leads to war, but the *passions* of peoples determine how far the war must be pushed outside all consideration of interest"

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[10] Colmar von der Goltz was a soldier who joined in Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 on the Prussian side. Later in 1883 he had the duty to modernize the Ottoman army, which had enabled him to get the rank of Field Marshal.

(Goltz, 1994, 809). Yet, Goltz (1994) also had the common reasoning similar to Clausewitz: annihilation of the opponent as the major goal.

2.6 Democracy and Winning Hearts and Minds in 19th Century:

In 19th century, the term hearts and minds transformed more into the framework of democracy. On this point Alexis de Tocqueville used hearts and minds both separately and together quite often in his two major works: *Democracy in America, the Old Regime and the Revolution[11]*.

The writings of Tocqueville on democracy, equality and liberalism considering the U.S. are one of the milestones of social theory**.** Horwitz referred to Tocqueville on the term "tyranny of the majority" with a slight change in the meaning: "the tyranny of the unanimity" (Horwitz, 1966: 304-305). According to Horwitz, Tocqueville observed tyranny in dichotomous terms: the tyranny of the government on the public, the tyranny of majority over the government. As indicated by Reeve's translation of Tocqueville (Reeve, 2003), Tocqueville states that to escape from the former, individuals ought to bind by associations among each other. Associations would eventually create a civil society frame. So that, individuals be exempted from government's coercive actions. In this respect, Tocqueville rest his views on the voluntary accumulation of individuals under an association, where "feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged and the human mind is developed by no other means

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[11] The translated versions by Henry Reeve and John Bonner of the books are reviewed.

than by the reciprocal influence of men upon each other" (Reeve, 2003: 583). Furthermore, the flow of opinions cannot be controlled easily in a democratic state. In parallel, the ideas of individuals will flourish "into the minds or hearts of all around [others]" effortlessly (Reeve, 2003: 584). Thus, associations among the people should be like checks and balances. Besides, hearts and minds can be the road to achieve the ultimate end, which is to create a unity among the public.

To exempt from "tyranny of unanimity[12]", states should act from the heart (emotions and feelings), rather than solely by rationality (mind) in politics; so to refrain from "the impoverishment of citizens' souls" and to prevent "despotism" (Hoffman, 2003: 272). Therefore, the objective of the government should be to keep individual identity alive and the way to achieve this is by emphasizing emotionality more.

On the argument of "tyranny of the unanimity", John Stuart Mill opposed to Tocqueville's view that tyranny comes "not over the body, but over the mind" (Mill, 1864: 118). When Mill (1864) stated the relationship of body and mind, he did not evaluate the reasoning behind it. An interpretation on mind from the conceptualization of Tocqueville is easier to grasp than the heart. What he probably meant by the *tyranny over the mind* is the gathering of ideas to oppose a government.

Other than the use of heart and minds in his books, on a letter to a friend regarding his reliance more on the individual than to the institutions, Tocqueville said (cited in Herr, 1962: 35-36):

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[12] Tyranny of unanimity is to coerce the government.

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> … and I am thoroughly convinced that political societies are not what their laws make them but what they are prepared in advance to be by the feelings, the beliefs, the ideas, the habits of heart and mind of the men who compose them.

Therefore, a democratic state should be cognizant of its compositions that are the habits of individuals' thinking and evaluating processes. Besides, "citizens should rely on their souls" [feelings to unite them in terms of being a society] to abstain from driving into despotism (Herr, 1962: 35).

Moreover, *The Old Regime and the Revolution* refers to the economists[13] and their conceptualization of state and the society before the French Revolution. According to the economists (Bonner, 1856: 197), a state should shape the characteristics of the society as following:

> The state, said the economists, must not only govern, it must shape the nation. It must form a mind of citizens conformably to a preconceived model. It is its duty to fill their minds with such opinions and their hearts with such feelings as it may judge necessary. It must transform as well as reform its subjects; perhaps even create new subjects, if it thinks fits.

The state centric approach is obviously stated in the former view. Moreover, the above statement indicates the proposed component of winning hearts and minds, which is attitude and behavioral change as the statement regards to shape hearts and the minds of a society.

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[13] Economists are school of writers before the French Revolution, who conceptualizes state and the individual from economical perspective. They are also known as the physiocrats.

CHAPTER III

CONTEMPORARY USE OF WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

Historical search on hearts and minds shows that the implementation of the concept has changed according to the necessities of states. The usage has evolved more towards terrorism in the contemporary world. This chapter covers the 20th century and onwards, tracing the history of hearts and minds both as a concept and as a practice. The conceptual framework settled down in revolutionary warfare and terrorism literature in general. Particularly the U.S. politicians and presidents use the concept through their speeches on the issues such as the rule of democracy and fight against terrorism.

3.1 Insurgency and Terrorism with respect to Winning Hearts and Minds:

In the 20th century, Mao Tse-tung[14] directly put forward the importance of winning hearts and minds, with regards to Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in Second Sino-Japanese War. In this regard, *On Guerilla Warfare* Tse-tung (Maoist Documentation Project, 2000) addressed guerrilla warfare as an "independent form of warfare" which implied the fact that invaders should not underestimate the guerilla's political motivation merely on military means. The population is the key factor to organize the masses of people under guerilla activity (Maoist Documentation Project, 1937:1-19). In accordance, the *cliché* in literature regarding the significance of winning hearts and minds stems from Mao's well-known sentence (Maoist Documentation Project, 2000: 31), as follows:

> Many people think it is impossible for guerillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How many it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.

This *cliché* finds its form in scholarly writings (Kroenig and et al. 2009: 23) as: "Since insurgents must move through the people like fish move through the water, a hearts and minds campaign is designed to drain the sea of popular support in which the counterinsurgent fish swim."

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[14] The translated version of *On Guerilla Warfare* can be found online in:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ (accessed on June 10, 2010)

Besides, the *cliché* was re-shaped with reference to terrorism by Margaret Thatcher, as follows: "Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend" (as cited in Hibbert, 2006: 32). Thatcher shifted the center from population to publicity that the terrorist organizations depend on. In general, seek for publicity has two major aims. The first one is to vindicate the validity of a terrorist cause. The second is to inflict fear on the intended public through attacks. Therefore, both of the aims address the intended public as their subject.

Insurgents in 20th century fought in an asymmetric way to provide political legitimacy. Their cause relied mainly on beliefs and ideologies. Therefore, the counter-insurgency methods, which were depended purely on military force, fell short of success due to two reasons: (1) the insurgents knew the terrain better than the counter-insurgent military forces. (2) The intervened population chose to be on the side of the insurgent group due to the emergence of civilian deaths.

From the perspective of the intervened population, the insurgent group's cause is legitimate especially when the government cannot satisfy the needs of its citizens (Galula, 2006). Indeed, civilians can be considered as the backyard of insurgent groups where they can recruit new people to their cause. Surprisingly, the same backyard can be used to inflict fear and chaos among the public. States realize that military superiority *per se* is not sufficient to win an asymmetrical warfare. Hence, this awareness directs government's domestic and foreign policies further towards winning hearts and minds of the targeted population.

3.2 World War II in regard to Winning Hearts and Minds:

During World War I and World War II, decision-makers relied more on the military dimension of war. Yet, different ways of propaganda and psychological warfare occurred in both of the world wars. In this regard, Speier (1948) questioned the practice of propaganda and psychological warfare merely in world wars. He had differentiated propaganda into two forms as "tactical" and "strategic" propaganda. The former is "directed at enemy soldiers", whereas the latter is directed at the public. Speier (1948) concluded the article by emphasizing the necessity of peace time propaganda activities, which should be achieved by strategic propaganda.

The logic of the leaders throughout the world wars differed from each other. For instance, Förster (2003: 322) argues that Hitler explained the defeat of Germany in World War I as a result of the lack in "will power" of the masses and "morale" of the soldiers. According to Förster, on Hitler's argumentation about wars, the "will power" is the main course of "future warfare" in which "mass consent" is the prerequisite to win a war (Förster, 2003: 322). Furthermore, Föster (2003:325-327) discusses that "war aims" operates as a "mobilization of hearts and minds for a unified national attitude." Moreover, World War II was lost from the German side because "German hearts and minds" was not taken into consideration (Förster, 2003: 325-327).

Beginning with the world wars, a new era on the shape of the warfare was initiated, in which battles occurred not only within the frontiers but also within the hearts and minds of the people. Joseph Goebbels (1934), The Minister of Propaganda of Hitler,

was cognizant of the "power of the people". He stated that the "power" of a modern state comes not only from "weapons" but also from "winning and holding the heart of a nation." In support of Goebbels' statement (1934), Ludendorff, a German officer, stressed the value of words as follows: "Words are battles to-day. The right word is a battle won. The wrong one is a battle lost" (Ludendorff, 1920: 557).

Besides, propaganda in Germany was carried out by leaflets, posters and magazines. The methods of propaganda on the enemy stressed the inevitable "German victory" and the "encouragement of pacifism in enemy" (Lutz, 1933:500-501). On the other hand, the war propaganda to the German public was on "self defense" and "high culture of Germans" (Lutz, 1933: 500-501).

As a propaganda method, during World War II, a magazine named Signal had been "translated into 25 languages" (Bytwerk 2007). Besides, leaflets, written towards the American soldiers in English, were effective as well. The below leaflet[15] (Bytwerk 2001) shows the implications of the leaflet propaganda which aimed to lessen the morale and the will to fight of the American soldiers:

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[15] Since the below leaflet has a copywriter material, the author's permission is obtained via e-mail on June 3, 2010.

Figure 1. German Leaflet during World War II

During World War II, propaganda was a new concept to rely on and Hitler could not effectively implement it. According to Speier (1948: 6), Hitler's speech in October 1941 is a concrete example for his failure on propaganda methods, when Hitler declared his victory in the East. Although, this was not the case in reality.

World War II produced a new perspective in international politics. States ceased their conceptualization on conventional warfare. Different strategies began to dominate the minds of the decision makers. Within this line of thought, psychological warfare, propaganda, cultural exchanges and strategic communication became the most influential mechanisms for influencing the public opinion in other countries (Osgood,

2002: 85). Moreover, new wars started to be a "battle waged for the hearts and minds of the peoples" (Bjelajac, 1962: 74; Osgood, 2002: 86).

3.3 Cold War and Winning Hearts and Minds:

Throughout the Cold War, states experienced significant liberation movements, revolutionary and guerilla warfare. The strength of Communist ideology relied on mass support. Therefore, the revolutionary warfare strategies "fought for the minds of people" in the aim of "closeness and appeal to people" (Bjelajac, 1962: 79). On the other hand, Truman with the "Campaign of Truth", aimed to show the people under Soviet influence the "reality". The campaign proved to be successful with the support of radio broadcastings. However, Coste (1950), who worked under Romanian diplomatic service in Washington for thirteen years, wrote that the *truth*" itself would not be adequate to win the Eastern European people on the side of the U.S. Since those people were subjugated by the Soviet Union, they were in need of assistance and military support for revolution. The logic behind the argument of Coste found its expression as follows: "propaganda itself cannot lead to the liberation of Eastern European peoples" (1950-1951: 645). However, the resistance movements in Eastern Europe proved the opposite reality that propaganda would be sufficient to win a war.

Another campaign throughout the Cold War era was the establishment of CIA and its overt and covert operations. Although radio channels were of vital importance to obtain the mind of the audience by the "Campaign of Truth", CIA's actions were

directed towards both the hearts and minds of the people. For instance, CIA's covert action during the Italian elections of 1948 was a successful case. As Barnes elaborated; to prevent the Communist Party's success in Italy, CIA directed "10 million $ [U.S. dollars] taken from economic stabilization fund to pay for local election campaigns, anti-communist propaganda and to bribes" (Barnes, 1981: 412).

Letters to Italy was another initiative to win the hearts and minds of Italian citizens. As Martinez and Suchman (1950) stated, Americans in Italian origin, who had family, relatives or close contacts in Italy wrote letters to express the freedom in the U.S. and the lovely atmosphere of liberty by their own experiences. The effect of the campaign relied more on the psychological dimension. The campaign sought to eliminate the possibility of the rule of Communist Party. Hence to send letters from someone that the receiver knows and trusts was the best way to achieve the objective (Martinez and Suchman, 1950: 112). The campaign succeeded to reach the audience with a positive impact. Contrary to CIA's estimation for a possible victory of Communist Party (Barnes 1981: 412), the elections produced positive results with regards to the U.S. interest.

During the Eisenhower administration, the success of propaganda reached its peak. The campaign of "Crusade for Freedom" was employed in international arena over the minds of Soviet dominated peoples with the assistance of newly established "Jackson Committee"[16] (see Parry-Giles, 1994). In Crusade for Freedom, freedom and liberty were regarded as the greatest benefits of the westernized countries in re-

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[16] In this issue, Parry-Giles phrased Jackson's speech at Princeton about psychological warfare on May 10, 1952, where Jackson said: "We created one or more salients into the hearts and minds of our friends behind the Iron Curtain…" (Parry-Giles, 1996: 295).

sponse to the Soviet hypocrisy. With the metaphor of a Freedom Bell, Crusade for Freedom was formed by the bell, which travelled the U.S. cities and then was located to West Berlin (Medhurst, 1997: 656-657). During its journey to different American cities, the Freedom Bell instilled hope and morale to the American public. Furthermore, its location as West Berlin symbolized the American belief on freedom and liberty in Germany and Eastern Europe. Therefore, in its essence, the Cold War was different from previous wars that had preceded it. The former was consisted of human element on top of military capability of states.

During Cold War, the U.S. aimed to win the hearts and minds of Europe and Middle Eastern countries through materialistic methods. Truman Doctrine as well as Marshall Plan was the prominent methods to contain the spread of communism. In this regard the "Domino Theory" was the leading approach, which was used both in Middle East and Far East. To bear in mind, on contrary to the U.S. strategy, Soviet Union was trying to flourish communism in the countries where it had sphere of influences. To win Cold War, winning hearts and minds of the foreign public was the prominent method. In this regard, the proposed component of winning hearts and minds, which is propaganda and psychological warfare played huge role during the Cold War period.

3.4 The Discourse of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty:

Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) is a radio broadcasting channel, which was established in response to the necessities of Cold War structure. In order to grasp

the Cold War environment in depth, RFE/RL is crucial with reference to the impacts of propaganda and psychological operations to win the hearts and minds of communism oriented countries.

The Cold War was a "battle of words, sounds and pictures" (Shaw, 2006: 1353), driven by the aim of "controlling" and mobilizing the public opinion at home and abroad" (Deery, 2001: 607). In parallel to Show's and Deery's description, the Truman administration relied on a new broadcasting institution with the aim of providing "objective" information to the publics of Communist countries. Therefore, the major goal of the U.S. was not only to contain Soviet ideology via media but also instill the idea of liberty and freedom initially to five countries: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria (Rearden, 2001: 707). On the other hand, the communist ideology was the main motivation behind the Soviet propaganda (Laswell 1951: 72), in which "disinformation policies of the controlled media" were the main methods (Beichman 1984).

As Bolsever states, the Soviet Union mainly implemented *inside propaganda* through the Communist Party about the "political, economical and cultural superiority of Soviet Socialism over Western Capitalim" (Bolsever, 1948: 177). On this issue, the mandatory teachings of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in higher education can be considered as one of the concrete evidences (Bolsever, 1948: 176). Yet, the Soviet Union also considered *outside propaganda* methods. Inkeles' research findings[17] (1953) demonstrated that Soviet propaganda against Voice of America's broadcastings was

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[17] Inkeles had conducted his research by evaluating more than seven thousand documentaries, which were broadcastings, newspapers and journals from the Soviet side.

generally on the flawed policies of the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. propaganda towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be regarded as an *outside propaganda* method in which the main struggle occurred to win the outside public rather than the American public.

RFE/RL, the unique radio stations, which is still broadcasting to a broad region of the world, had different purposes than of Voice of America (1942). The Voice of America was established to counter Japanese and Nazi propaganda (Jowett 2009: 131). After all, the Voice of America is an "agent of U.S. government representing American culture and American foreign policy" (Urban, 1990: 42), whereas RFE/RL is a non-profit private corporation, funded by the United States. Into the bargain, during the Cold War era, the purpose of Voice of America was to introduce and highlight the American culture to overseas, whereas RFE/RL aimed to reveal the corruptions related to the counties specified above.

The necessity of a separate radio station emerged in 1947-1948 (Cummings, 2008: 169) during Truman Administration, as an initiative of "Campaign of Truth". The idea was put into practice in 1950 by the creation of RFE and in 1953 by the creation of RL. The founding fathers of the radio stations were George Kennan, Allen Dulles and Frank Eisner whom aimed to create "unrest in Stalin's backyard" (Shattan, 2000: 75)[18]. In 1976, the two corporations were merged together under the name of RFE/RL, Inc. in order to increase the effects of the propaganda.

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[18] Review: "Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Arch Puddington, University Press of Kentucky, Reviewed by: Joseph Shattan "Freedom's Radio Stations", The American Spectator, June 2000, pp.75-76

The effect of RFE/RL was based on its peculiar methods to transmit the "*true*" information by the émigrés, who suffered from communist ruling and fled to another country to survive. In the Appendix of Annual Report on RFE/RL Inc., the RFE/RL Professional Code of 1987 presents the aim behind the creation of RFE/RL as follows (The Board For International Broadcasting 1990):

> Open communication of information and ideas among the peoples of the world not only constitutes a fundamental human right, but also contributes to international peace and stability. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are significant instruments in realizing the right to information and ideas across frontiers and in binding the human family together. The essence of RFE/RL's mission is the practice of independent, professional, and responsible broadcast journalism in order to provide uncensored news, information, and ideas to audiences whose governments systematically deny fundamental freedoms of communication and contact.

Beside the use of strategic communication method through radio broadcastings, "leaflet droppings by balloons" were conducted during the Cold War initially from "West Germany to Czechoslovakia in 1951" (Cummings, 2010: 1). The U.S. used balloons to drop "leaflets, books and posters" (Cummings, 2008: 169) and the balloon operation developed into a crisis in Soviet decision-making. The issue was brought on the United Nations based on the claim of an intrusion to the Soviet territorial air space (Puddington, 2000: 71). Therefore, the impact of the balloon campaign should not be underestimated. As Puddington states, the balloon campaign created revolt, demonstrations and boycotting in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary (Puddington, 2000: 61), which automatically shows the power of the campaign.

Beginning with the dropping of the propaganda materials, the history of RFE/RL has started. Although the main aim was to "*tell the truth*" to communist satellite states, in

some occasions RFE has exceeded its major goal and shifted to an anti-communist discourse. Due to the incompliance of the statements and the practices, especially J. William Fulbright opposed the very logic behind RFE. As an achievement, Fulbright was successful to cease the anti-communist provocative discourse in the broadcastings (Shattan, 2000: 75). One of the prominent examples of vagueness in broadcasting occurred during Hungarian revolt in which RFE/RL was "accused of encouraging" the revolt via its broadcasting speeches (Martin, 1987: 850; Mickelson, 1978: 574). Along these lines, for five months, "balloons dropped oppositional ballots and stickers" in Hungary (Granville, 2005: 818). Besides, RFE/RL was not broadcasting solely on political corruptions and valid information but also on entertainment programs and jazz music. Due to this reason, the effect of winning hearts and minds occurred not only with propaganda methods but also with public diplomacy. The aim of the entertainment programs was to show the lifestyle in America.

The propaganda was effective, since the Soviet Union started jamming the frequency of RFE/RL, which was more "costly than transmitting" and "more difficult" to achieve (Brookhiser 1978: 332). As Krol (2001) stated, from the Soviet perspective, jamming was significant to stop the opposition in Soviet satellite states as well as to cease the information flow through the air.

RFE/RL was a successful overt operation of the U.S. to win the hearts and minds of the communism driven publics. It was considered to be victorious in many countries, especially in Hungary. As Hixson affirmed, the Cold War was after all a struggle for the "hearts and minds", a "psychological struggle for the support of world public opinion" (Hixson, 1997: 225; 233).

In addition, Robin has highlighted the Troy Project during the Cold War era, by the Department of State, with the collaboration of military and academic intellectuals, who attempted to change the discourse of "atomic analogy" more into a "battle for hearts and minds" by reducing the "antagonistic messages that might turn the audience off" (Robin, 2001: 45). In the final analysis the Cold War era was more related to public diplomacy, strategic communication, propaganda and psychological operations rather than military confrontation. The impact of the methods to win the hearts and minds can be considered as one of the main reasons for Soviet Union's demise.

CHAPTER IV

MAJOR COMPONENTS OF WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

4.1 Conceptualization of Winning Hearts and Minds

The foundation for the operationalization of the components of winning hearts and minds rests on the history of the concept, which is examined in previous chapters. Winning hearts and minds, for the remaining chapters of this thesis, will be regarded in relations to to domestic as well as foreign policies, with particular emphasis on terrorism and insurgency.

The concept of winning hearts and minds relies primarily on the employment of soft power understanding. This understanding presumes that persuasion is at the core of the struggle. In this regard, Nye (2008: 96) evaluates the "soft power of a country" through three dimensions: "its culture, its political values and its foreign policy." Adopting Nye's (2008) conceptualization on soft power, this part of the thesis focuses on the foreign policy aspect. In foreign policy, states employ the concept winning hearts and minds towards targeted population abroad through the proposed compo-

nents. However, states do not regard those components together. Therefore, the decision-making fell short of success in the operationalization phase of winning hearts and minds. To distinguish the approach of this thesis from that of Nye (2008), domestic policy tools of states towards their own population will also be evaluated within the cases studies.[19]

4.2 Operationalization of Winning Hearts and Minds with regard to the Proposed Components

The concept winning hearts and minds can be understood in relation to its correspondence with proposed components. These components would not work in harmony, if they are examined individually in foreign policy. That is to say, the framework of hearts and minds allows for certain terms to work in harmony. In thesis, the proposed terms comprising hearts and minds are: public diplomacy, strategic communication, psychological operations, propaganda and attitude and behavioral change and intelligence. Figure 1 illustrates the components of the concept of winning hearts and minds:

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[19] Nye's (2008) conceptualization of soft power assumes that states strengthen their soft power through public diplomacy. Nye's (2008) concept of public diplomacy is restricted within the framework of foreign policy and omits policies directed at domestic population.

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                        ┌─────────────────────────┐
                        │ Components of Winning    │
                        │    Hearts  and Minds     │
                        └─────────────────────────┘
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| Public Diplomacy | Strategic Communication | Propaganda and Pschological Operations | Intelligence | Attitude and Behavioral Change |

Figure 2. Components of Winning Hearts and Minds

The former concepts are created by examining the necessities of foreign policy and are considered to be significant depending on the structure of the problems. In this regard, the components are used by decision makers and military personnel. In spite of that, the proposed components should not be separated from each other. Quite to the contrary, they are significantly related and considered as the parts of the sum, which is winning hearts and minds. Depending on the cases, states should determine the level of employing each component to their domestic and foreign policies. Since each case is unique, employing the components all together to every case would not be helpful. For instance, in the current case of Iraq strategic communication, propaganda and attitude and behavior change would work more than in any other conflictual places.

The intervening states should constitute the requirements to win the hearts and minds by observing the population's desire and will to cooperate. Polls would be a good method to assess the targeted population's opinion. Moreover, to figure out which component would work better, states should rely on area studies. Even more than

area study knowing the culture and the societal needs would enable the states to create efficient policies.

4.2.1 Public Diplomacy

In traditional understanding diplomacy refers to the profession of managing international relations, typically by country's representatives abroad, that is diplomats. In that context, the term diplomacy becomes highly associated with the skills of governmental representatives concerning state to state relationships (see Broderick 1924). However, public diplomacy is beyond traditionally understood diplomacy. It is not a solemn tool of states but also "non-state actors" in their approach to foreign public (Center on Diplomacy Research Group, 2010). Cull (2008a: 32) identifies public diplomacy components within five categories: "listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and broadcasting agencies."[20] Cull (2008a) judges the effectiveness of foreign policy through the assessment of whether a state has employed the components accurately. On the other hand, taking the argument of Leonard (2002, as cited by Nye, 2008: 102) there are three dimensions of public diplomacy, which embrace "daily communication, strategic communication and cultural diplomacy." This thesis deviates from Leonard's (2002) dimensions on public diplomacy, since strategic communications does not regarded as a branch of public diplomacy. That is, the strategic communication and public diplomacy are components of equal value to each other, rather than constituting one dimension. In addition to the above

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[20] For an extensive analysis of public diplomacy see Cull (2008b).

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view, strategic communication is a new term. The scholars of strategic communication consider the concept as separate from public diplomacy as well. In this respect, Cull (2008a) applies one part of public diplomacy through the employment of "cultural exchange" policies. As an example, the exchange of students[21] through Fulbright scholarship as well as scholars and artist exchanges are all regarded as cultural exchange. Cultural exchange needs long-term commitment. Therefore, it would not be a short term response policy for states during an intervention to another state's territory. For that reason, in definition, public diplomacy encompasses a broader public domain.

In consideration of the above, a historical example would bring the reader to understand better of public diplomacy. Barghoorn's article (1958: 44-45) provides for such an account as he analyzed Soviet Union's cultural diplomacy during Cold War. According to Barghoorn (1958), Soviet Union's public diplomacy relied essentially on cultural exchanges and on the promotion of the image of Soviet Union under the title of "center of progress, enlightenment, and humanitarianism." This observation introduces a notion that one of the major aims of public diplomacy is to create a credible image[22] on the foreign public, through which hearts and minds could be achieved most effortlessly. On this issue, a concrete example would be the establishment of

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[21] Janowitz (1961) has compared the cultural diplomacy of the U.S. to the Soviet Union concerning the years 1958-1959 with regard to exchange students. "43.000 foreign students came to the U.S. and 12.000 Americans studied outside" whereas "the Soviet Union hosted 17.000 foreign students."

[22] In a policy prescript article Finn (2003) gave five methods to create a better image: encouraging foreign educational reforms, extending existing foreign exchange programs, improving the access of foreign publics to American institutions and values, encouraging better cross-cultural understanding at home; and revitalizing volunteerism abroad". The prescription on the article is directed to the American interest; however it can be generalized under public diplomacy efforts.

U.S. presence with three hundred thousand Americans in Europe after World War II. The U.S. has aimed to assure the European public that not only European but also American citizens would be endangered by Soviet Union's proximity. This example indicates that words should comply with the deeds. This represents the fact that one of the aims of public diplomacy is to present the foreign audience that the credibility of the state's policies depend on the compliance of words with actions.

The U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been diverted to a new phase after September 11. The statements of George W. Bush, the former President of the U.S., embraced much of ambiguousness in meaning. In his speech on September 16, 2001 George W. Bush stated that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while" (Bush, September 16, 2001). The word *crusade* was misleading in his speech, since the targeted audience cannot be clearly identified. This resulted in condemnation of West by the public of the Muslim world, both radical and moderate Muslims. The speech's metaphor was interpreted as hostile, based on its historical precedent. After such an incident, the need to rely on public diplomacy was more than a necessity.[23] This leads to a conclusion that public diplomacy would operate well by choosing right and direct words to the foreign public with accurate reference to the receiver.

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[23] At the end of September 2001, Bush created the term Operation Enduring Freedom, which is generally referred to the activities of the U.S. The operation in Iraq has the same name as "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Even in the U.S. military base in Baghdad, they are using tickets (in correspondence to money), which has Iraqi children on one side and on the former side of the tickets. Such labeling lacks the understanding of what it could have meant to a foreigner? (This is a personal observation, after staying in an American compound in Iraq for ten days.) In this regard, public diplomacy means choosing right words and symbols.

4.2.2 Strategic Communication

Before discussing strategic communication, a clarification on the definition of audience, which is the core of literature on strategic communication, is needed. The definition of audience is a "group of people who have gathered together to hear or watch somebody/something" (Cowie, 1989: 66). Therefore, the audience can only hear and listen as if they are obliged to. The audience is supposed to be open to any communication by definition in such a way that audience is merely there to listen. After reviewing the literature both in terms of message influence model and accepting a more complex model of Corman[24] et al. (2007), there appears to be a minor misconception in the use of the word *audience* that needs clarification by employing another word as the existing literature lacks in the complementary word to describe *the public who can manage to change the course of an event*.

Let's assume an audience in a theater to understand the gap in strategic communication literature in searching for a suitable term. In a certain play the audience would get a direct message from the players. Yet they cannot change the course of the play. Therefore, a play reflects a unilateral action. The term play is the equivalent form of policies of an intervening state during an intervention. In this instance, the audience represents the intended public that can be manipulated either in positive or negative manner. Yet, communication is a two-way channel, since public can also affect the performance of the players.

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[24] Steven Corman is a Professor at Arizona State University, who has his specialization on Strategic Communication.

In the context of communication, the public actually involves in the case through their beliefs and judgments. Thus, a proposed term, *participatory audience*, is developed on the search of this thesis. Based upon the advice of Corman[25] (2010), the word *participant* is chosen rather than audience *per se*. Because of the stated reason, the term *audience* conceptualizes and defines *participatory public*, who have the ability and capability to change the course of an action.

Taking into consideration above definition of the audience, strategic communication remains blurry in terms of meaning. The United States, officially, has not defined the meaning of strategic communication, yet. However, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, proposes a definition to improve the efficiency of Department of Defense (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006: 3) as follows:

> Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage *key audiences* [emphasize is added] to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.

The proposed definition of strategic communication highlights the main difference between strategic communication and public diplomacy by stating the *key audiences* as the reference. Brigadier General Mari K. Eder (2007: 63) clarifies the intention of strategic communication by stressing the magnitude of "specific audience", since it serves for "specific purpose". Contrary, in public diplomacy the recipient would be vaguer, since the message is not delivered to specific masses but to a broad public.

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[25] Personal discussion with Corman at the conference Global Terrorism and International Cooperation III held by Center of Excellence Defense against Terrorism in March 15-16, 2010.

Yet, the definition poses instruments to have an effective strategic communication system. These instruments are public affairs, public diplomacy, military diplomacy and information operations, and psychological operations (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006: 2). The Department of Defense has named the above terms as "primary supporting capabilities" of strategic communication (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006: 5).

Since strategic communication is a fairly new concept, scholars define its scope and instruments in distinct ways. Colonel William M. Darley (2008: 2) presents an extensive scope of the concept. He emphasizes the word *strategic*, and explores the word in regard to winning hearts and minds and communication. Darley (2008) shapes the scope of strategic communication as an "event-driven process". According to him, during the course of events, the style of the communication and the instruments become totally apparent. Since public diplomacy and public affairs are defined in advance (Darley, 2008: 4), observation and assessment of certain situations profoundly during the event is a hard task to accomplish.

Strategic communication does not imply only words but also deeds, so that words would comply with actions. Cable's (1993) observation on "the old *cliché*, 'actions speak louder than words'" is not always true. Cable assumes that through psychological operations governments can achieve the "perceived legitimacy" (Cable, 1993: 258). However, actions do count in strategic studies. It is the Department of Defense and military cadre that decide on the scope and choice of response.

According to Murphy (2008: 3), military operations are at the core of strategic communication in terms of sending apparent messages. In this manner, Murphy (2008: 3) states that strategic communication can be seen as a tool for deception to convince the population by sending messages such as media coverage and rumors. On contrary, deception can lead the public to the adversary, which can result by the loss of public support. On this point, Admiral James Stavridis (2007) offers a set of communication guidelines. According to Stavridis (2007: 5), the main concern should be given to tell the truth to the audience. In the author's conceptualization of communication systems, lie eventually appears somewhere in some time. Thus when it emerges it will decrease the credit of decision makers.

To grasp the roots of strategic communication, Shannon-Weaver model (1949) on the basics of "information theory" (U.S. Congress, September 1995: 77) should be identified. The so called traditional message influence model is developed by Shannon and Weaver (1949), where Shannon had evaluated the mathematical logic of information, whereas Weaver examined the "general theory of communication" (Burks, 1951: 3). Through Shannon's (1949:1) assessment communication is complex since it is not related only to send the message but also observing the outcome of the message. The Shannon's diagram (1949: 2) on communication system has the similar logic with strategic communication.

Shannon-Waever's communication diagram shows the transmission of a message from the "source" and the channels it passes through to reach the receiver. This model generally assumes telephony, telegraphy, radio and television as the instruments to

send the message. Beside the proposed logic, noise is shown as an intervening source that influences and alters the outcome.

As Corman et al. (2007) discuss, although the traditional model of Shannon-Weaver describes the basic logic of telephony, strategic communication's form has changed through communication theory. Corman et al. (2007) observed the value of information, after moving from different channels. Corman et al. (2007: 3-9) examine message sending in communication systems in terms of the sender and the receiver. According to them, when the old "message influence model" is transformed to social sciences, it may not take into consideration the complexity of message sending. Moreover, it may avoid the beliefs and attitudes of the audience. The Naval Officer and Public Spokesman in Iraq, Steve Tatham[26] (2009) shares similar concerns as Corman et al. do. Tatham (2009) names the drawbacks of message influencing model by stating that it is a "simplistic way of communication" in which outside interference and audiences' conditions are not taken into consideration. Tatham (2009) points out the necessity of *pragmatic complexity model* of Corman et al. (2007), stating that the audience has its own values and beliefs that are subjected to sender's "behavior" and receiver's "expectations" (Tatham, 2009: 19-20). Therefore, in a complex environment, strategic communicators should assume at least two important factors that can penetrate into the message: (1) too much noise surrounding the message. (2) The audience might have its own beliefs, prejudices and a posture to the actions.

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[26] To have further information on Tatham visit his website:

http://web.mac.com/statham/iWeb/Site%202/Home.html

Too much noise refers to circumstances in which there are too many messages surrounding the population that cause hesitation to choose or believe one or the other. When there is too much noise, the message that communicators send can change in a negative way or in a way that is not intended. In this paradigm there are two drawbacks. The first is the hardness to control the outer information, since there will be too much information circumnavigating the targeted population. The second is the assumption that terrorists/insurgents may attempt to persuade the public to support their cause to fight. For this reason, the insurgents/terrorists may convert the message or create a new message that contradicts the ideas of the government and/or the intervening state. The latter case generally occurs in insurgency led conditions. Too much information has also an effect on the decision-making process. It can lead the decision-makers to a psychological trap, which is known in literature as cognitive dissonance.[27]

In the workshop of Centre of Excellence Defense against Terrorism, Steven Corman (2009) suggested a new parameter, concerning the usefulness of too much noise surrounding the environment. He defends that message controlling is insufficient, since the noise will be constant. For that reason, decision makers should benefit from other messages within the environment. According to Corman (2009), no message can be considered as the "best message," yet an optimal one would serve well than seek for

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[27] In the part Attitude and Behavioral Change, cognitive dissonance will be examined in a deep manner. However, since all five concepts are highly interlinked to each other, one cannot dismiss the relation between strategic communication and attitude-behavior change. Once the aim of strategic communication is to create an attitude/behavioral change, it can be said that strategic communication is a mean to establish a new form of ideas on the targeted population. Therefore, attitude and behavior change becomes the end in itself. On the other hand, in the broad form attitude-behavior change is also becomes a tool to win hearts and minds of the population.

a perfect message. Since "messages will be interacting no matter what we do" the decision-makers should find an exit point to turn the situation to their own benefit. Transferring the aggregated messages into a beneficial stage, Corman (2009) proposes to rely on random variation and experimentation. This proposal accounts for "contingency planning."

Apart from the noise surrounding the environment, the audience also should not be seen as a recipient of all the information upon which a judgment is made. Such instance can be defended in Shannon-Waever model (as cited in Corman et. al. 2007: 4) in which right before the destination of a message, there is the receiver that gets both the received signal and the noise surrounding the environment. In Shannon-Weaver's model (1949), the problem can be solved by eradicating the noise, relying on technical methods. However, when it is applied to social sciences, it fails since the object is human beings whom have internal beliefs and experiences. Therefore, an essentially mechanical model lacks the understanding of the audience's own beliefs and attitudes. In *Military Review*, Robert Deutsch (2007: 124), who is a cognitive anthropologist and communications consultant, states that "foreign audiences have emotions more complex than the electrical circuitry in modern munitions."

Scholars from psychology affirm that in actual life it is hard to eradicate an existent belief of a population, since human beings do not like instable environments. Accepting or rejecting an idea can be considered as a change for a short time. Yet, it would lead to a general change of belief system afterwards. Apart from that, human beings cannot cope with a chaotic environment. As a result, they are eager to solve the prob-

lem with a rapid move. On the methods to cope with terrorism, the former is likely to be observed as a hard task to manage.

Apart from audience's own beliefs, at the first level the sender needs an audience that the message will be received. Zalman (2009: 88), a Ph.D. candidate, put this as "every story requires both a teller and a listener in order to be complete." If one has a story to tell but does not have an audience then the story would not be worth. Yet, one should produce an exciting story that will achieve the enthusiasm of the participatory audience.

The asymmetric nature represents a challenge to the context of terrorism/insurgency. The audience is out there. However, manipulation of the audience becomes an issue of sensitivity, since the participatory audience has their own world. Interference of counter-terrorism units to that realm of reality would recoil every action that is achieved formerly. Strategic communication is a method to minimize the negativism on the actions of the third power or the existing government in a given country. However, strategic communication is a double sided sharp knife that can cut off the interferer's attempts, as it is discussed above. To strengthen the implementation of strategic communication, the interferer should notice the very basics of communication. In this regard, linguistic is at the core of this process. In a case in which the countering unit is not familiar with the language of the targeted population, the units risk a danger of falling into the trap of sending wrong messages. To diminish this risk, the counter terrorism units work with interpreters. Even much harder is that these experts should also know the culture and the cultural norms to assess the message. Besides, strategic communication alone may not be adequate to win hearts and

minds of the targeted audience. Accordingly the harmony of all the components would be more efficient. Yet, strategists, strategic consultants and academicians should bear in mind that manipulating the population to their end would not create a stabile and peaceful environment, where all population benefits.

4.2.3 Intelligence

The role of intelligence is to capture and assess information. According to Elworthy (2005: 1), intelligence is necessary to know the whereabouts of certain individuals, to curtail the supplies of weapons, to stop the flow of money transfer and to understand the terrorist mind. Intelligence is a part of winning hearts and minds as it assesses whether the local population is on the side of the government or pro to the insurgent cause. As Kahn (2006: 134) underlines, "information cannot win wars by itself". It can help to prevent a terrorist attack in advance or it can lead the decision makers to understand the targeted populations will. Besides, intelligence can be helpful to track terrorists via enormous changes of bank accounts. Moreover, internet is another realm that information flows to intended people to conduct an attack. To prevent an attack beforehand, the information on internet should be assessed by the experts of intelligence as well (see Jacobson, 2010: 353). Thus, intelligence takes the role of checking and controlling systems. Insurgents can achieve support and assistance to their cause by winning the hearts and minds of the population. Tackling this support by leaving the insurgents alone can be achievable by intelligence gathering. In insurgency based struggles, if the intervening state can win the hearts and minds of the

population, they can easily acquire intelligence about the specific places where in-surgents stays. Besides, intelligence can lack the supporters help to the insurgents.

Intelligence gathering is not an easy task. The validity of the information should al-ways be questioned. It is the duty of specialists to assess which information is rele-vant. As Ronczkowski (2004: 74) stresses, specialists should be well trained and know what they seek and "how to portray the details". The aim of the specialists is to create a database on the relevant information and to assess it carefully (Ronczkowski, 2004: 74).

In countering terrorism, intelligence can work in different ways. A reported false identification card or a stolen passport can be the base of gathering intelligence on a terrorist organization. Population is a useful intelligence system as well. When intel-ligence is gathered from citizens, it is named as human intelligence (Humint) and it is a part of community intelligence. Innes (2006: 231) states community intelligence as follow: "Community intelligence is one way in which police can obtain some under-standing of any tensions that might be exacerbated following a terrorist incident." According to Innes (2006: 230), "community intelligence applied to counterterror-ism" and assists the police to fill the "gaps" of their "methods." It is a method to achieve the "community view" (Innes, 2006: 234). Neighbor policing is a method of intelligence gathering, which is conducted by police officers (to have further view on neighbor policing see Innes 2006). This intelligence gathering system is associated with community policing as well. Besides, Murray (2005: 348) pointed out to a fun-damental difference between traditional policing and community policing. As he stated, traditional policing is reactionary and it separates public from the police; whe-

reas community policing entails the integration of police forces within the public to achieve intelligence.

4.2.4 Attitude and Behavioral Change

To achieve support from the population, governmental forces should know how to change attitude and/or the behavior of the population. In this respect, one of the other components of winning hearts and minds is to alter the human thinking and acting. In this regard, Wolf (1965:14) underestimates the significance of winning hearts and minds, finds the concept as unrealistic, "broad, and an ambitious term" due to the "social transformation solutions" that it tackles. He is in favor of behavioral change rather than attitude change. In support to the argument of Wolf, Lilja (2009: 308-310) also advocates behavioral change, which shapes "passive neutral cooperation to silence, to the offering of food, shelter, information and finances."

To go further, Rokeach (2001: 530) defines attitude change as the "change in the organization or structure of beliefs or a change in the content of one or more of the beliefs entering into the attitude organization." According to Rokeack the attitude of a person determines the behavior. Besides, behavior operates with the combination of two kinds of attitudes: attitude-toward-object and attitude-toward-situation. The latter presents an attitude change in a certain situation; whereas the former illustrates an attitude change in reference to an object, which can be witnessed only if a situation occurs (Rokeach, 2001: 532).

Nevertheless, people hold strong personal beliefs and are inclined to preserve them to seek for a "positive outcome" of the behavior (Hartman, 2008: 6). Therefore, behavioral change is also a challenging task to manage. To change the behavior of the population, Wolf (1965) states the significant role of improving life standards, social and economic conditions of the population. When and if the former conditions change then the behavior of the population to the interferer would also change is the main logic of Wolf's (1965) argument.

On contrary, behavior change can also occur in the opposite direction, beneficial to the insurgent by enforcing the driving motive of fear. In this set of questioning, behavior alters as a consequence of fear and "anxiety about an attack" (Goodwin et al. 2005: 393). Yet, consistency theorists (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2005: 172) pose a distinct understanding on the behavior, stating that consistency is the main aim of the population in which the population desires for consistency in cognitive level. Therefore, seek for consistency would limit the aim to shape the attitude and behavior of the population.

Although behavior change is easier and less time consuming than attitude change, in the long-run, attitude change is more reliable. If attitude change occurs in regard to the alteration of ideology and beliefs during a conflicting timeframe, it will last longer. In such an instance, the population will reject the new messages due to the desire for consistency that come into prominence. Yet, attitude change is a long process. It is highly unlikely to change the attitudes in countering terrorism/insurgency within a short period.

According to the psychiatrist Abdulkadir Çevik (2009: 6), attitude and behavior change relies on the perception of the intervened society. As said by Çevik, "perception management" is the clue to get the population. Moreover, according to him, to change the perceptions, the intervener should fulfill the "expectations of the public." 19th century poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (1852) also supports the view on perception with regard to the mind, on his work *A Defense of Poetry*. The poet stated that: "all things exist as they are perceived; at least in relation to the percipient. 'The mind is its own place, and of itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven'" (Shelley, 1852: 44). Adding Çevik's view (2009) to the 19th century poetic philosophy, it may be concluded that the change of attitude or behavior is more related to the mind-set of the society rather than pure emotional feelings.

To summarize, as it is discussed, some scholars are in favor of behavioral change, whereas others support attitude change. The behavioral change is a short term policy; whereas attitude change is a long term process and needs patience. In this regard, from the stance of the population, cutting the assistance to insurgents/terrorists may be regarded as a behavioral change. On the other hand, cutting the view to support terrorist organizations' ideological views can be considered as an attitude change.

4.2.5 Propaganda and Psychological Warfare

According to Payne (2009: 111), propaganda is the "attempt to persuade the public through the communication narrative" that the propagandist's particular idea is just. In addition, propaganda differs from normal communication since the former relies on "memory" and perception (Payne, 2009:111). In daily communication, the reality

is presented through facts; whereas in propaganda the interferer can change or convert the facts to the desired shape.

Literature shows that there are three different kinds of propaganda, named black, grey and white propaganda. Becker (1949: 221-235) defined black propaganda in terms of "rumors", "gossip", "slogans" and "leaflets" on which the control is difficult to handle, since black propaganda spreads without the will of the creator in any direction and in any other form. To give an example of black propaganda, with reference to Mein Kampf (as cited in Eayrs, 1951/1952: 37), Hitler stated the description of a "big lie" essential to understand the impact of black propaganda as follows:

> The great masses…with the primitive simplicity of their minds… will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one, since they themselves perhaps also lie in small things, but would certainly be ashamed to lie in big things. Thus such an untruth will not at all enter their heads, and therefore they will be unable to believe in the possibility of the enormous impudence of the most infamous distortion of others… therefore, just for this reason some part of the most impudent lie will remain and stick."

Hitler regarded lie as a mean in politics and war. In this respect, as Eayrs stated, Hitler is more inclined to black propaganda, which the Soviet Union also utilized in Eastern Europe. The great realists of the history such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu would also be considered to be black propagandist, if they have lived in contemporary era, since their conceptualization of propaganda is based on deception.

According to Gordon Simpsons (1999: 98), who is a military police officer in Canadian Defense Forces, psychological operations and propaganda are significant to persuade the civilians on the usefulness of government structures and services. Referring to the above statement, in his work, Davison (1971) shows the "trends" in prop-

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aganda by looking at its history. By the start of World War I, allied powers used propaganda by dropping "leaflets and posters" to affect the moral of the opponent to fight. Yet, major propaganda in World War I was conducted within the framework of "domestic morale" with the exception of "leaflet and pamphlets" droppings into the fighting fronts (Eayrs, 1951-1952: 36). In World War II, as Davison (1971) framed, the U.S. used propaganda by "infiltrating agents to the enemy lines" to achieve information and to spread news via "rumors." Throughout and after the world wars, decision-makers had comprehended the significance of the population. After all, as the Davison claimed even in the life of Alexander the Great, propaganda can be visible. Major evidence to his argument is based on the "public relations advisors" and historians of Alexander the Great. According to Davison (1971), Alexander the Great had asked to have historians nearby through his conquests in the aim of creating a credible history of his campaigns and of notifying the Macedonian public about his accomplishments, so to get the public support.

The programs of propaganda can be successful via the practice of strategic communication. Yet, both in propaganda and in strategic communication, storytelling is significant. After 2001, the term *narrative* steps into the literature as a method to win hearts and minds. The logic behind the narrative is to tell a story to the foreign audience and expect their response to the stories. Due to this former reason, the story as well as the interpretation of the story in terms of propagandist discourse is vital. Propaganda can be utilized to change the behavior of the population. Yet, propaganda is not an end in itself; rather it serves for winning hearts and minds through which the decision makers can employ.

As Payne (2009: 110) evaluates, programs of propaganda are generally "deception, manipulation and outright lying." This negative connotation erodes when persuasion, the use of media and leaflet dropping are linked as a program of propaganda as well. Leaflets are helpful to conduct a successful operation under the method of psychological operations and propaganda. In this framework, during Gulf War leaflets were used to convince the Iraqi soldiers to abandon the will to fight (Hickey, 2001: 1).

Words can also be a form of propaganda. For instance former President George Bush's famous declaration of "axis of evil"[28] (Bush, January 29, 2002) can be considered as a propagandist discourse to get the world on the side of the U.S. However, it had a negative effect. Likewise, Bush's speech on "you are either with us or against us"[29] (CNN November 6, 2001), is another propagandist discourse to force the international arena to choose side.

4.3 The Examination of the Proposed Components with respect to Response Policy of States

The components of winning hearts and minds are shaped through the response phase of states in relation to their foreign policy actions towards the population. In the book

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[28] The declaration on the axis of evil by the former president George W. Bush is: "States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic."

[29] The declaration on the stated sentence is: "Over time it's going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity," he said. "You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror."

The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, Ganor (2005) points out the necessity of a definition of terrorism. The author questions the effectiveness of state responses in an era where scholars, decision-makers and specialists cannot agree on the definition. The response of states generally differs from each other. Yet, it is generally admitted that "intimidation and/or "coercing a government" (U.S. Department of State 2004; FBI) is the major motive under terrorism. Due to the gap upon an international definition of terrorism, countering mechanisms are inadequate to address the remedy of terrorism/insurgency. Although states try to cooperate under the umbrella *to fight against terrorism*, figuring out a conduct of unified action is arduous. In this sense, the concept of winning hearts and minds as a genuine act would be valuable to counter a terrorist action even if there is no consensus on the definition internationally.

The components above are associated with minimum use of force during a conflict. The case studies presented in Chapter V are highly related to the response of states and components that they implement during a conflict. Therefore, without evaluating the foreign policy methods, the chapter would not be accomplished in full manner.

The dilemma on the response level is a factor dealing with terrorism. In the realist agenda states are regarded as rational actors on decision making. However, a crisis could force the decision-makers to respond without questioning the adequacy of the action. The result could be a disaster, since the planning phase of response is shortened. Following this statement, states that counter terrorism should grasp the aspects of response. Besides, they should organize their policy structures on variety of dimensions, before responding. To bear in mind, response does not only qualify the countering strategy to a terrorist organization or the hub state; but also qualifies the

approval of the public as well as the international actors. This process renders the response phase a fragile process.

During the response, states can adopt hard line policies as well as soft line policies to transform the environment on behalf of the state cause. McCormick (2003) evaluates the theoretical approaches in terrorism with regards to terrorist organizations, under rational, organizational and psychological model. He stresses the expecting result of a terrorist organization after an attack is conducted. According to McCormick a terrorist organization "hope" to achieve the "targeted audience(s) respond in a way that advances group interests" (McCormick, 2003: 483). This shows that terrorist organizations inflict states to have rapid response in return to terrorists attacks to strengthen the latter's cause on the intended population. In this regard, states can fall into two kinds of trap. First of all, if states use disproportionate counter terrorism measures that can affect not only the terrorist groups but also the citizens, they may not succeed in attaining the intended public support. Secondly, if states rely solely on soft-line methods to counter terrorism, they can practice pressure from their own public, since citizens will demand total security. Therefore, the response has duplicities and none of the two branches meet the criteria to conduct an effective campaign. An effective campaign should consider two primary questions: *How to respond? What would be the anticipated result from that respond*?

4.3.1 How to Respond: Minimum Use of Force

When examining British response to insurgencies from 1919 to 1960, Mockaitis (1990: 63) states that minimum use of force should be the logic of countering insurgency. However, as the author also poses, minimum use of force fall short of success, if states do not employ a robust intelligence system. According to this logic, a proper intelligence should locate the places of insurgents, their sanctuaries, their communication systems etc. In general, minimum use of force should be the first principle to counter insurgency. Yet, in countering international terrorism locating terrorists is a hard job to do.

Terrorist organizations aim to achieve a response from states to hit back, hard. Most states fail into this trap with the aim to represent the invulnerability and power of the state structure. In this regard, Iraqi grievances pioneered by the United States or hard campaigns of Spanish government towards ETA were similar in terms of response. These examples show that rapid response with major flows would instill problems for the state to persuade the intended public to support their argument. Therefore, response should be planned carefully. Hard measures on the targeted population would cause more damage than intended.

4.3.2 How to Respond: Military-Police Relations during Response

Essentially the lack of civil-military harmony creates immense problems in the operational phase of response. The job description of police forces from soldiers, differ majorly, which curtails the efficiency of timely response. Taking into account the

former stance, major aim of a soldier is to find and if necessary shoot the opponent forces; whereas polices' duty is to control violence inside the society. Cooperation and collaboration between the two forces is critical to win the hearts and minds of the population. The network within the police forces can provide required information about the insurgents. As long as police unit has the information, it can share with the military (Mockaitis, 1990: 69). In practice the creation of "joint commanders" can be beneficial between the military and police to have efficiency throughout the operations.

When and if police units are perceived as a hostile institution from the perspective of a population, winning hearts and minds approach should prevail on the purpose of fixing the reputation of the police. In the case of Malayan Emergency, police units had reestablished this reputation by broadening their job description to help people in need (see Chapter V). Therefore, although radicals of a group are responsible for an action, with the selected response tactic the state can either succeed or fail. The latter generally concludes by collateral damages.

4.3.3 How to Respond: Hard Means (Contemporary Counter Argument)

On contrary to the positive responses on winning hearts and minds in *Operations Other Than Wars,* Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade (1996) present a counter argument with a term named "shock and awe" by employing rapid dominance. Their work provides insights in countering the contemporary logic on winning hearts and minds in respect of the response phase. The authors defend the view that adversary should be countered by rapid, timely actions, and by dominating the public percep-

tion and values and transforming them into the U.S. intend. The work cannot be generalized to each and every country, since for shock and awe the intervened state should have the power and capability to change the course of a war by military means.

Ullman and Wade (1996: 25) discuss that "massive bombardment" to cities, public, or command and control system of the opponent, the U.S. can achieve its main aim, which is to create exhaustion on the intended public and break its will to fight. To achieve such an end "deception, misinformation, guile" are the methods. However, main driving motives should be to create "pain and shock" on the society and on the decision-makers cadre (Ullman and Wade, 1996: 25). This aim would generate a societal breakdown; in addition through the destruction of military facilities the opponent would renounce upon resisting (Ullman and Wade, 1996: 30-32).

Ullman and Wade (1996) support the above argument with historical cases. One of the cases is the dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the purpose of ceasing resistance by changing people's perception and attitude. The authors defend the view that devastation by nuclear bombs to alter society's attitude and perception is more effortless than by conventional weapons. The logic within the assumption of the authors relies on the use of hard means. The main idea that the authors refer to is to attack strategically important site, command and control systems, direct military compound, or the population to "control the subset of enemy's perception" (Ullman and Wade, 1996: 83).

However, the logic behind the argument lacks in certain contemporary cases since hard means would not bring success in itself. Gaza War from December 2008 to January 2009 cannot be considered as a successful initiative on the part of Israel. It lacked the hopes for rapprochement, ended with immense number of death toll, and the condemnation of the world. Can Israel be regarded as a regional hegemonic power comparing to the U.S.? The logical response to this question relies on Israel's power of conventional and probable nuclear capabilities in the region. Besides, after its establishment, Israel kindly dominated the Arab world by indicating its military capability. After Gaza War, due to the creation of new perceptions on the new generation, it is significantly impossible to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinians. This new generation may remember the tragic events, might have lost their parents and may grow up with tragic stories. Thus, particular to this case, "how would Israel change the perception of those who are once strike by massive bombardment?" is the crucial question to direct on Ullman and Wade's argument.

CHAPTER V

CASE STUDIES

This chapter examines four case studies under two frameworks. It evaluates the assumption that winning hearts and minds and its components are necessary in fighting against terrorism and insurgency. The first set of case study composes of Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency (1940s-1960s). These cases are examined with comparative case study method in terms of examining the components of winning hearts and minds. The second set of case studies is composed of Madrid and London Bombings (2004-2005) in which Al-Qaeda is the perpetrator. This group of cases aims to show the difference of domestic policies in terms of response.

The cases show two different form of practice during the employment of the proposed components of the concept. The Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency demonstrate outside party involvement to another state's territory in which the intervened government cannot be able to rule itself. London and Madrid Bombings reveal coun-

ter terrorism responses of governments inside their own territory in which governments conduct domestic policies to win its citizens, who are Muslim in origin.

5.1 Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War

5.1.1 Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency that took place from 1948-1960 can be seen as a successful counter-insurgency campaign. It was carried by British authorities against Communist Chinese insurgents, who were in favor of Mao's communist ideology. At the beginning of the struggle, British forces were unorganized and came to the brick of defeat. However, Britain had a valuable campaign. According to Cable (1993), Britain's success had relied on the "single ethno-linguistic minority" that they faced in Malaya. Since the struggle was based on minority dissatisfaction, it was handled easily (Cable, 1993: 238). The decisive actions of British authorities, which were led by the leadership of General Briggs and by General Sir Gerald Templer, change the very course of the insurgency.[30]

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[30] According to the impact of General Templer on the course of insurgency, there are two contradicting historiography. The revisionist/Communist view argues that Templer's era was the continuity of improvement and it was not a break-through of the conflict by emphasizing the role of Briggs Plan, before Templer's arrival. The traditional/Anglo Saxon view puts the emphasis on Templer's successes and the drastic change after his arrival. This part of the thesis defends the revisionist view by showing the flows of the traditionalist standing. To have an overall conceptualization of the contradiction **see** Karl Hack and Kumar Ramakrishna.

5.1.1.1 Historical Overview of Malayan Emergency

Malaya was not a "united" nation state, but it was a "Federation that had nine semi-autonomous states" (Mockaitis, 1990: 112). In June 1948, Malayan Government declared "State of Emergency", since violence had spread after the "killing of European planters and the attacks to police, and government" (Gregorian, 1994: 343). Chinese insurgents had their expertise in the jungle and it was hard to defeat them with pure military power. They were considered to be minority. Yet, 38% of the population was Chinese (Sunderland, 1964: v). An initial attempt to drive insurgents back was jungle patrolling in which insurgents were ahead contrary to the government. The superiority over the terrain lies in the insurgent's knowledge of the area that they were fighting.

This advantage of communist insurrection created a favorable condition at the beginning of the insurgency. However, with the set up of jungle warfare training schools, this process changed to the opposite direction, where the Malayan government started to benefit from tactical and operational actions. First school, known as the Ferret Force, was established by Walter Walker. The training schools were consisted of 167 hours of practical training on spending the day in jungle, jungle routing, and tracking. Apart from practical training lectures, seminars also took place (Sunderland, 1964: 45) to assist and educate the military personal, commanders and fighters[31].

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[31] Contradictory approach to Sunderland's argument (1964) on the uselessness of training schools was Jones (1996). Jones (1996: 284) posed that many of the soldiers had already fought in Burma, which provided them the necessary knowledge on irregular warfare and basic level of training. Yet, training schools had rendered the Malayan military a basic tenet: every case has its own characteristics; therefore, countering mechanism ought to be different in Malaya.

5.1.1.2 Leadership in Malayan Emergency: Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs and General Sir Gerald Templer

The course of insurgency changed favorable to the side of Malayan Government and British forces in February 1952, when General Sir Gerald Templer, known as the "Tiger of Malaya", was assigned to finalize the stalemate in favor of the colonial government. Leadership was vital to end the struggle. In this regard, the two Generals' policies by using the proposed components of winning hearts and minds had provided success.

General Templer was assigned both as High Commissioner and Director of Operations to Malaya (Mockaitis, 1990: 216). Templer's major intention was to direct Chinese population to the side of government. In parallel to this idea, he grasped Mao's metaphor of *fish and the water*[32] and used it against the insurgents. He is considered as the founding father of the concept of winning hearts and minds[33] in countering insurgency as he employed the following argument (cited in Kilcullen 2004: 36):

> The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble; the other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us…The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.

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[32] For the direct quotation of Mao on *fish and the water*, see in the thesis Chapter III: 26

[33] Mao Tse-Tung can be considered as the person who indirectly contributed to the concept of winning hearts and minds. He revealed the significance of the population to the insurgencies. On the other hand, General Templer had recognized the same vitality. He transformed this understanding from insurgency to population to state to population.

Templer achieved his goal to win the hearts and minds of the population in several steps. The prominent one was to carry out the Briggs Plan,[34] which was to "resettle hundreds of villages" (Smith, 2001: 61). With this objective he created village councils inside the New Villages[35]. The "resettlement program" restored the villages to "fenced and defensible" areas (Sunderland, 1964: vi-vii). Guards, who were Chinese in origin, but working for the government, were responsible to protect and defense the new villages. The selection of guards from moderate Chinese people was a wise strategy that facilitated to break the resistance of radical people. The logic behind the creation of those villages was to prevent the local support in terms of providing supply of food and shelter, and the flow of intelligence. That is the reason why Sunderland (1964) named the villages as *fenced areas*.

Fencing the villages was a productive policy on the grounds that, since intelligence units could fully inspect the villages. Apart from that, General Briggs's food denial program gave the police the opportunity to acquire intelligence from the villagers. As Mockaitis (1990: 116-117) argues, in the aftermath of the initiation of the stated programs, some villagers were being observed for over weeks and were taken under custody. Food denial program was effective in terms of "putting pressure on the insurgents" due to the scarcity of the food (Hack, 1999: 100-103).

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[34] The original plan of resettlement was Harold Briggs's, who was the former Director of Operations before Templer. During Briggs, the resettlement project had formed; however, fencing villagers was not active. Villagers could leave the fence to work which would enable them to get into contact with the insurgents. General Templer's effective policies regarding villages by securing the villages with home guards produce a new momentum to the Briggs Plan.

[35] During General Briggs's era those areas are called as "resettlement areas"; however, after General Templer's success they were known as New Villages (Ramakrishna, 2001: 88).

However, food denial program did not end the stalemate on the course of the insurgency. Insurgents continued their harsh raids even after the Briggs Plan. As Mockaitis (1990) states, General Briggs had no power on the civil military cooperation. Although, General Briggs was the Director of Operations, he could not use his power neither on the military nor on the police. To be effective, General Briggs needed the High Commissioner's power, Sir Henry Gurney, to "energize the system by instilling in his subordinates a sense of emergency" (Mockaitis, 1990: 119). After the retirement of Briggs and the assassination of Gurney, Templer acquired both positions. He became the men, who unified the civil position with the military, which marked the breaking point of the insurgency.

The impact of a leader during an insurgency or in a struggle against terrorism should not be underestimated. General Templer's effort to generate a new society was an accomplishment of a leader, who knew the terrain well.

5.1.1.3 Intelligence during the Emergency

Concerning intelligence gathering, General Templer asked assistance from a British expert, John Morton. As Mahnken (2007) states, Morton suggested the increase on the resources of intelligence activities. Moreover, encouragement of villagers to reveal information was beneficial to trace the activities and plans of the insurgents (Mahnken, 2007: 73).

Hack (1999: 217) underlines the necessity of new villages for intelligence purposes by stressing that Malayan government had lacked the Communist counter-

intelligence. That is why insurgents killed approximately 100 villagers in a month. They killed villagers who betrayed them. In this regard, the strategy of the insurgents was to create fear among others who could possibly betray. However, these incidents occurred before the settlement project. New villages program was successful. It empowered to "collect rates and taxes, control their own budget and education" (Mahnken, 2007: 66), which provided a certain level of freedom from the center.

All of these attempts were achieved by intelligence gathering from the villages. Soft power initiative of the government was highly effective, since insurgents could not live without popular support. Contrary to this point, Hack (1999: 212) opposes the impact of winning hearts and minds campaign during Emergency, referring to the coercive methods of military with the program named "population control". In reality, population control was General Brigg's plan through the formation of new settlements. Counter to General Brigg, Templer had converted the campaign into the struggle of winning hearts and minds.[36] Hack's (1999) point on massive use of power and controlling the population by fencing them with small villages seems to be lacking from proper logic, since Chinese moderates in villages wanted to be secure.

Beside to the intelligence, the improvement of living conditions, evaluating the quality of life by checking the sanitation and agricultural lands in the villages, as well as Templer's effort to grant citizenship rights to large numbers of ethnic Chinese minority initiated the component of attitude and behavior change on Chinese population.

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[36] Although either population control or winning hearts and minds serve for the same cause, they are different in term of conceptualization. The former has the negative connotation, whereas winning hearts and minds has positive connotation. Literally words and concepts can have the power to transform the conflict, depending on their usage. What Templer has achieved by transforming the concept rests on his differentiation of the concept from a negative connotation.

5.1.1.4 Strategic Communication, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare during the Emergency

Propaganda and Psychological warfare methods were the key stones to succeed in war. Leaflets dropping and the use of speakers by British forces to curtail the morale of the insurgents were the main methods of propaganda and psychological operations.

Kumar Ramakrishna (2001: 87), head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, analyses Templer's period with glorification. According to Ramakrishna, fear was the driving force that led the moderates either to be silent or chose to be with the insurgents. He addresses the implementation of propaganda in governmental services that gave courage not to fear from Communist insurgency.

General Templer's success also derives from the very usage of strategic communication skills. He announced the government's success via *Radio Malaya* and appreciated the villagers whom overthrew the insurgents (Ramakrishna, 2001: 88-89). Postill (2003), who submitted a paper in a conference on the usage of media sources during Malayan Emergency, identifies the impact of communication by stressing that not only campaigns does matter but also "words should accompany to the deeds." Postill (2003) examines an ethnically different tribal group in today's Malaysia and forms a new term "sustainable propaganda" with regard to this specific group. From the study of Postill (2003), on the current Malaysian structure, *sustainable propaganda* was initiated during the transformation of the institutions. Yet, propaganda can be sustainable to the time until the state achieves its goals. During the Malayan

Emergency the use of media deliberately was to gather Malayan moderates. After the end of the Emergency (1960) it was no longer significant.

5.1.1.5 Civil-Military Relations during the Emergency

In addition to the creation of new settlements, joint committees[37], which had operated locally, were established. With this establishment, military achieved the flexibility to conduct operations. Yet again, Templer created harmony between operational, tactical and structural level in Malaya.

As Templer announced, "Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated" (cited in Smith, 2001: 65). The interconnectedness of the local government to the process and linking it with the military structure had rendered the British struggle purposeful, since the local government was requisite for assistance.

5.1.1.6 Use of force during the Emergency

Another principle of Britain in Malaya was to use minimum force in the aim of reinforcing the legitimacy of the local government on behalf of the population. This notion was interlinked to the hearts and minds campaign. It highlighted the significance of political dimension in counter-insurgency rather than solely of jungle patrolling.

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[37] Joint committees took orders from the center but operated locally.

According to this principle it can be concluded that Malayan Government and soldiers had not use improportionate force.

The rest of the principles as assigning experts, who knew the language, culture and the terrain provided the success of Britain to win the war in Malaya. British officers used propaganda and psychological warfare to convince the population that the government had the capability and power to end the insurgency and through intelligence gathering this verbal capability was put into action.

5.1.2 Vietnam War

5.1.2.1 Historical Overview of Vietnam War

After WORLD WAR II, the U.S. President Roosevelt requested Britain and France to withdraw their powers from colonized countries and gave independence to the colonial states. In that case, Britain chose to withdraw from Malaya with a transformation immediately, yet resulted by a struggle. However France, dominating Indochina over half a century, did not wish to turn over the territory, since the era was the expansion of communism. Vietnamese insurgents, who were fed up with several occupations- French domination before WORLD WAR II, Japanese occupation during the war, and once more French colonial regime after the war- had initiated insurgency tactics on France, which led hard times to French government in 1945.

Vietnamese insurgency is considered to be more communism oriented than nationa-listic. With respect to this point Nixon (1985) and Hamilton (1998) had two contra-dictory views. Nixon considers the North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh more of a communist rather than a nationalist. Nixon (1985: 35) gave the facts of Ho Chi Ming's cooperation with France in 1946 to tackle and kill "hundreds of leaders and thousand of rank-and file members of nationalist groups"; so that there would be no nationalist discourse to challenge the communist struggle. Hamilton (1998: 66), on the other hand, stressed the struggle of Minh during the Japanese invasion as a fact in which Ming had assisted the allied powers with intelligence. Yet, Nixon's statement is more convincing based on Ming's own declaration on a newspaper in which Ming stated nationalism as a "dangerous phenomenon" that tackles communism (cited in Nixon, 1985: 33).

During the struggle, Ngo Dinh Diem was the Prime Minister had sympathy to France under the Emperor Bao Dai. Diem's anti communist actions with forceful regulations in Vietnam villages had catalyzed the nationalistic struggle in the southern region too. Apart from the northern resistance, groups inside the southern region had launched armed resistance against Diem's excessive regulations. Diem's wrong as-sessment on the assumption that "controlling the population" would create loyalty inevitably (Department of Defense, 1971a: 131) had produced a negative result: di-verting the population from the government to the insurgency. The complicated es-sence of the insurgency with communist struggle in the north and nationalist struggle in the southern part of Vietnam, as well as insufficient encounter of France to cease the insurgency, led the U.S. penetration into the region.

Although during the presidency of Roosevelt, the U.S. government supported de-colonization whole over the world in general and Vietnam in particular, the fell of Dien Bien Phu[38], in 1954, had forced the US government to enter into a war that was not desired at all. However, during 1950s the idea of "domino theory"[39] had its peak point to the U.S. policy in which the US believed "the loss of Vietnam would be the loss of whole Southeast Asia which would be the victory of communism" (Depart-ment of Defense, 1971b: 54). This was the scariest scenario of Cold War and the U.S. foreign policy was confined to the reality of entering the war. Nixon (1985) assessed the U.S. involvement to the Vietnam War not as being punctual, and Nixon advocated that the interference should have happened before the loss of Dien Bien Phu. Yet the US fell into the trap of insurgency, a battle that they were not used to.

Actions of France against the insurgents were inactive during the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. For instance as The Pentagon Papers stated the "statistics on the ethnic composition of the defending garrison of Dien Bien Phu", Viet officers were few compared to the French officers. Although the Vietnamese fighting units were 40% of all troops, the Vietnamese officers were simply the 3% of the whole group (De-partment of Defense, 1971b: 68). Therefore France's incapability to create indigen-ous forces under the command of Vietnamese leaders was the major error. Further-more France had never wholly achieved reliability from the Vietnamese population

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[38] Dien Bien Phu is a town at northwest Vietnam.

[39] Domino Theory first appeared on the U.S. agenda during Korean War in which China appeared on the scene to be the possible interferer. International arena had the fear from the likelihood of Chinese interference to Indochina, since it would destroy the reason of the war, which was to keep communism under control. The same pattern of understanding had also been seen in the Vietnam War, questioning the likelihood of Chinese interference and changing the course of the war.

since it hesitated on giving full independence to Vietnam. Starting from 1948 to 1950 it recognized the Bao Dai government step by step; first accepted the independence of Vietnam but kept the charge inside the army and governmental functioning and then verified its independence in 1949 by stating that Vietnam is an Associated State of the French Union (Department of Defense, 1971b: 58). In February 7, 1949 the U.S. government recognized Vietnam as an "independent state within the French Union" (U.S. Congress, July 1967: 43-44). In 1950s the U.S. government's interference to the conflict after a request from the French side, began with enlarging the monetary assistance to the southern region. The U.S. assistance to Vietnam multiplied hundred times from $10 million in 1950 to $1,063 million in 1954 (Department of Defense, 1971b: 76).

The Pentagon Papers stated the major difference between France and the U.S with regard to foreign policy as France fighting against colonial opposition, whereas the U.S. fighting against the spread of communism. The foreign policy methods of France can be interpreted as a transition strategy; however the lack of popular support to Bao Dai government, since it was observed as a puppet of France and U.S., had lacked the possibility to win the battle for hearts and minds. In 1951 John F. Kennedy put forward the significance of winning the population in Vietnam issuing the below statement (cited in Department of Defense 1971b: 72) in the U.S. Senate in June 1953:

> …regardless of our unified effort, it is a truism that the war can never be successful unless large numbers of the people of Vietnam are won over from their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and fully support its successful conclusion.".

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The history was not on the side of neither France nor the U.S. in the Vietnam War. The U.S. encountered to strong resistance, since the majority of the population was on the side of the insurgents. Although the U.S officials agreed on the effectiveness of methods that Britain had used in Malaya and requested Robert Thompson, the British advisor in Malayan Emergency, the U.S. strategists could not exercise the exact methods in Vietnam. Besides, Thompson could not assist the military efficiently as he had done in Malaya.

Moreover, the United States Marine Corps refused to learn British techniques offered by British Advisory Mission (Nagl, 2005: 115). Based on the conventional war experience, especially on the Korean War the U.S. tried to shape its strategy, since the U.S was inured to the characteristics of counter-insurgency. On the article *War, Culture and the Interpretation of History* Johnson named the Vietnam strategy as fallacious since Americans used American style and values throughout the war (Johnson, 1998: 84-85) which were more of a conventional thinking. In addition, probably the major strategic fault of the U.S. was to adopt massive military means to suppress the insurgents. Psychological operations that the U.S. used, aircrafts to deter the population, created insecurity among the public; which resulted by the loss of population support (Rouse: 8).

The administration during John F. Kennedy in 1961 concentrated on guerilla warfare and counter-insurgency. Nonetheless Kennedy faced resistance from the U.S. army. The army opposed to the request of Kennedy to create Special Forces concerning counter-insurgency stating the political conditions of Cold War. Huge expenses on

"massive retaliation" doctrine during Eisenhower government had lacked the budget of the army with regard to counter insurgency. More to the point, the education of Marine Corps on counter-insurgency seemed too costly (Nagl, 2005: 126). Hamilton (1998: 124) described the U.S. policy-makers posture in Vietnam as "arrogant", concluding that army did not have any effort to suppress the insurgents other than conventional means. Yet, President Kennedy authorized the military forces to fight combat struggle for the first time in 1963 (Nixon, 1985: 73). Moreover, in general, in the year 1963, Diem was killed by the pro coup general, followed up by President Kennedy's assassination, only three weeks after Diem's death.

To assess Vietnam War in detail the components of winning hearts and minds would be helpful.

5.1.2.2 Intelligence during the Vietnam War

In 1957 General Williams stated that CIA could not perform its duties on intelligence gathering; therefore he asked for a local intelligence unit composed of South Vietnamese soldiers. In 1960 the request was accepted, and the local army was trained by the U.S. intelligence units to acquire information on Viet-Cong (Hamilton, 1998: 123).

Moreover, before leaving the office, Eisenhower initiated the documentation of Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam. The plan stated the basic necessity of intelligence and emphasized the lack of "military intelligence capability" since the "civilian communication systems in the provinces were inadequate." (Country Team Stuff

Committee, 1961) It was the administration under J.F. Kennedy who made the plan as a "hallmark initiative of South Vietnam strategy" in 1961 (Hamilton, 1998: 134). In 1961 Sir General Robert Thompson, who had also worked during the Malayan Emergency, came as an assistant to Vietnam to teach the necessary requirements to fight insurgency to the Diem's government. In this particular subject, the Strategic Hamlet Program (code name Operation Sunrise), "to pull the population from the side of the insurgents and to prevent insurgent's penetration into the hamlets" was Thompson's main strategy (Hamilton, 1998: 142). Since the effectiveness of a similar plan was tested in Malaya, Thompson considered that it could be successful in Vietnam as well. The program was more than hamlets; its aim was to create "pacification" (Department of Defense, 1971a: 128-131) which would stop the population's reliance on the insurgents.

Before Operation Sunrise, during the French rule of Vietnam, France had tried to create secure zones. In 1959 the government had created "Rural Community Developing Centers" by relocating the peasants. However, none of the initiatives had been successful due to the unexpected discomfort and psychological outcomes over the peasants. At the first half of 1961, the Strategic Hamlet Program had also a converse effect and insurgents killed 2000 people, from officials, civilians and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. The main reason of mass killings was the lack of intelligence gathering during the administration of Diem, since Diem did not have successful communication skills both with military officials and province chiefs (Department of Defense 1971a: 139-142).

In late 1960s by the U.S. Marine Corps' Combined Action Program (CAP), which was akin to the New Villages program of Britain during Malayan Emergency, the U.S. tried to create a secure area that both corps and villagers live together, which would be supportive to achieve intelligence. With this initiative, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups worked in accordance with CAP, to secure the border and achieve valuable intelligence (Cassidy, 2004: 75-76).

5.1.2.3 Propaganda during the Vietnam War

Propaganda methods were used both by Viet-Cong and the alliance during the Vietnam War. The former used efficient propaganda methods to win the population, relying mainly on negative connotation of winning hearts and minds in theory, which was persuasion through coercive means. They systematically attacked not only the military bases and governmental places/personal, but also to civilians. They deliberately attacked civilians to show that the government was not capable of protecting them. Based on the numbers, communist murdered 36,725 South Vietnamese in the years 1957-1973. Based on the former facts, Nixon formed the "hearts and minds" approach used by insurgents on the strategy of creating hatred (Nixon, 1985: 51-53). Aside from attacking to civilians, insurgents put to death "village and hamlet officials" by their aggressive strategy (Country Team Stuff Committee, 1961).

The use of propaganda had two conflictual sides from the American perspective. Although American military forces dropped leaflets for surrender in Vietnam, the American media in the U.S. put pressure on the U.S. government with the expression that the U.S. should not fight a war in Vietnam. Besides, the U.S. media condemned

Diem's policy in Vietnam due to its incomprehensiveness. Diem's coercive methods on persuading the people and the media had backfired and created hatred among the population. For this reason, as Nixon (1985: 64-65) stated, reporters in the U.S. media had represented Diem as an "extreme Catholic", who repressed both the nationalists and Buddhists, with a claim that 70% of the population is Buddhist in Vietnam. Whereas, Nixon stressed that the Buddhist residents were 30% of the population. This propagandist posture of the U.S. reporters against the Diem government was also in effect on the creation of a mind-set with the view of "the U.S. takes the wrong side of the war in wrong time" (Nixon, 1985: 64-65).

Another method of propaganda during the war was Saigon Songs by the singer Maj. Gen. Ed Lansdale of the US Army, who labeled the campaign in the name of hearts and minds with the "hope to persuade the villagers" to fight against or at least refuse the Vie-Cong resistance (Bell 2008). The songs were broadcasted via radio and named as "heart songs" that addressed directly to the heart of the targeted population (Bell 2008).

The poems about the U.S. soldiers during the war combat in Vietnam also showed the tragic conditions and the hesitation that the U.S. soldiers were in. In this regard the book *Winning Hearts and Minds: War Poems by Vietnam Veterans* demonstrates the tragic psychology of the veterans both in the war that they were fighting and to the U.S. government. Two poems (Binno and Valentine, 1973: 1023), illustrate the U.S. soldiers' condition quite sound and clear:

We were on patrol last night;
And as we moved along,
We came upon one of the enemy.

Strange, in the bright moon
He did not seem an enemy at all
He had arms and legs, a head…
… and a rifle
I shot him. (by W. D. Ehrhart)
…………..
Ask what kind of war is it
where you can be pinned down
all day in a muddy rice paddy
while your buddies are being shot
and a close-support Phantom jet
that has been napalming the enemy
wraps itself around a tree and explodes
and you cheer inside? (by Larry Rottmann)

5.1.2.4 Use of force during the Vietnam War

The use of massive force during the Vietnam War was extensive. Although the U.S. government was aware of the fact that it was not a conventional war as world wars, it chose the method based on hard power. On August 7, 1964, Congress issued a statement "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" (Joint Resolution of Congress, 1964). To achieve this aim, the U.S. trust in its air power, mainly to helicopters, jets and "sophisticated weapons" which rendered the "Vietnam War a testing ground for the U.S. military" (Nastasi, 2001). Thereof, it would be accurate to remark the unused of minimum use of force during the Vietnam War.

5.1.3 Assessment of Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War

According to Nagl (2005), organizational culture of Britain is accustomed to limited war understanding on the process of learning; whereas the in U.S. organizational culture, war is subjected to national interest which is a threat to national existence. For this reason, the U.S. had a simplistic view: when war starts politics ends. Nagl (2005) describes Britain as a learning institution that drives conclusions from each war/insurgency, whereas the U.S. as a non-learning institution that strove in non-conventional wars with conventional methods. The U.S. major flow in the Vietnam War stands on the basic premise, which is *every case, is unique and the management of every case needs unique methods*. Due to this reasoning, the U.S. endeavors to adopt British methods of Malaya into the Vietnam War, did not facilitate the U.S. initiatives.

In the first chapter of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,* Nagl (2005) stress institutions, mainly armies, as a learning institution. According to the organizational theory that Nagl portrays states build their new knowledge on, the past experiences that they are exposed to. Therefore, written documents such as doctrines are helpful to witness the past experience and to build on the reality of what they are facing that time (Nagl, 2005: 3-7). The U.S. Field Manual (Department of the Army Headquarters), based on the methods of counter-insurgency is a good example on this point. Yet British Government did not have doctrines during and after the Malayan Emergency, which may be the belief on doctrines would curb new initiatives in countering a non-conventional warfare. This thesis supports the view that past experience can be help-

ful; only if the decision-makers assess the reality on the existing situation; however, assessing a situation, while it is happening is a difficult task to accomplish.

Britain had suffered at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency. It even came to the brick of losing the struggle. However, the employment of the components of winning hearts and minds were accurate and enabled British government to win the war. On contrary to the hard measures over the Vietnamese people- the use of B-52 bombers had caused civilian casualties and wrong operations with chemical sprays to ruin the rice supplies in Vietnam had resulted by "birth defects in Vietnamese children" and even on the U.S. officials (cited in Nagl, 2005: 200) [40]- led the U.S to tackle the Vietnam War nothing more than conventional strategies.

One of the other differences between the U.S and British army was about the ranking system inside the army forces. British forces were always more flexible and open to innovations in which the ranks of the military officials did not endanger the status among them to communicate to a low rank soldier; whereas the U.S army command and control system was quite hierarchal. With the assumption that a fascinating idea, which could divert the course of the war, could not come from a low rank soldier/officer, the low ranking officers could not deliver their ideas to the top, due to the hierarchy. Thomas Mockaitis (1990: 175) attributes the flexibility of the British system stemming from the effect of "social structure" on the military.

Moreover, Britain used small operation units in jungle patrolling in which the General of the unit could appoint his decisions during the combat. Opposite to the British

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[40] Cited in John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife*, 2005, Andrew J. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1986: 201).

method, the U.S. was in favor of massive military operations from the center, planned in advance, to hunt down the insurgents. Regrettably, the U.S. could not put the civilian side into play. Hereof, Sir Robert Thompson (Department of Defense 1971a, 146) emphasized the failure of the U.S. on refusing to admit that the problem was connected to political branch in rural areas, rather than to the loss of territory in unpopulated territories. Thompson was also aware of the fact that failure on a battle would mean the loss of territory but the problem was more than an area *per se,* the population's requests ought to be considered as the key point to win the war.

This part of the thesis seeks to argue the implementations of countering insurgency methods by taking Malayan Emergency and Vietnam as case studies. The U.S. actions in Vietnam on contrary to British methods in Malaya had occurred from the difference of the mindset of the two states. Britain, as being an imperial power, is more familiar with fighting both in its continent and in parts. Whereas the U.S. fought conventional wars throughout its history such as American Civil War, Two World Wars, the Korean War and could not transfer its conventional experience to unconventional warfare. Nevertheless methods in Iraq resemble the methods in Malaya, which can be seen as an evidence for the transformation of the U.S mindset in recent years (see Chapter VI).

5.2 Madrid Attacks and London Bombings

There are two weak points for a terrorist organization to survive. A terrorist organization needs *recruitment* to its network as well as *reaction to its attacks* (response).

States can prevent recruitment only when it achieves the support of the moderates. Similarly, the reaction of the states should be based on winning the hearts and minds of the moderate population. Response and recruitment are two sides of a coin that are bind to each other. For a successful counter terrorism action, these two sides should be taken into consideration. Basically, there should be an action (an attack of a terrorist organization) that states can react (state policy). The action-reaction circle works to the benefit of the terrorist organizations, but states can challenge the process by focusing on response (state policy).

Since states cannot agree upon a comprehensive definition on terrorism, it is a habitual action to respond terrorist attacks either by hard measures. Nonetheless, the conventional methods are proven to be erroneous, since terrorist organizations act in a complex and different manner than states do. Besides, terrorist organizations are decentralized units unlike states. Al-Qaeda and its sub-branches had concluded two major attacks on the European peninsula: Madrid attacks (2004) and London bombings (2005). Based on Al-Qaeda's goals, these attacks can be seen as an opposition to Western existence in the Middle Eastern region.

Although there are similarities of Britain and Spain, they had responded similar kind of an attack in a different manner. The similarities of Britain and Spain are: both states are from the same region, they have faced domestic terrorism inside their border previously. After September 11, Al-Qaeda organized an attack in train stations in both countries. However, Britain relied more on community policing; whereas Spain relied on traditional policing after the attack to win the Muslim population inside their territory. Below table shows the similarities clearly:

Table 1: Comparison of Madrid Attacks and London Bombings

	Spain	England
Region	Europe	Europe
Connection with countering terrorism	ETA- Domestic Terrorism	IRA-Domestic Terrorism
The year of terrorist attack	After 9/11 (March 11, 2004)	After 9/11 (July 7, 2005)
Attacked place*	4 train stations	3 train stations and 1 bus
Attack Type	Suicide bombing	Suicide bombing
The terrorist organization	Al-Qaeda	Al-Qaeda
State response	More traditional policing	Community policing measures

As it can be seen from the table, regardless of the similarities between the two states in terms of region and connection with countering terrorism, Spain and England faced an attack from Al-Qaeda after September 11. Yet, state responses (in terms of domestic policy regulations) to their Muslim citizens varied.

5.2.1 Madrid Attacks

On 11 March 2004, Spain faced four explosions in Madrid subway which caused 191 casualties and injured more than 1000 people. Partido Popular (PP), the party in power led by Jose Maria Aznar (2004) accused ETA for the responsibility of the actions. This was a rapid response of the government without the consultancy of the intelligence unit. In reality, the attack was conducted by homegrown terrorists mainly Moroccan in origin, who were part of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (see Global Security). The group had connections both with Algerian Jihadist Networks and a Syrian originated Abu Dandah Network, which were linked to Al-Qaeda (Jordan and Horsburgh 2005). The mastermind of the attack was Allekema Lamari, who is an Algerian in origin.

The statistics show that from 1995 to 2004, 83 Algerian origin suspects were arrested with the diminishing number of 40 Moroccans and 21 Syrians (Jordan and Horsburgh, 2005: 173) in Spain. This data demonstrates that the attack could be prevented in advance. However, Spanish intelligence could not predict such an attack.

March 11 attacks on Madrid subway were important for two reasons. First, the attacks took place three days before the elections in Spain. Secondly, in the aftermath of the attacks foreign policy of Spain directly changed.

5.2.1.1 Why Spain as a Target?

Although Spanish public tried to hamper the involvement in Iraqi War by February 15 demonstrations, Aznar did not change the Spanish foreign policy. Three days after March 11 attacks, Spanish society selected a new government. The Socialists won the elections by 42%, whereas the Popular Party got 38% of the votes (BBC News). Georgina Blakeley (2006: 242) conducted a survey on 2004 elections. Blakeley (2006) stated that although Popular Party hold the opposition parties responsible for the demonstrations, it was the failure of the Popular Party for not handling the bombings prudently. The Spanish citizens' response through the elections was inevitable, since even before the Madrid bombings citizens performed huge demonstrations. Moreover, it was the government of Aznar that ignored public support in the struggle against terrorism. Luis Moreno (2005), a Research Fellow in Spanish National Research Council, explains Aznar's denial of Islamic Fundamentalism after Madrid attacks with reference to two political stances that Aznar faced. First, the acceptation of Islamic fundamentalism would damage Aznar's policies in parallel to Britain and the USA in Iraq. Second, holding ETA responsible for the attacks legitimized Aznar's policies on Basque nationalities (Moreno, 2005: 66).

5.2.1.2 The Spanish Response to the Attacks

Initially, Aznar's policies against ETA were regarded positively by the public. Aznar's government legitimized its actions on ETA and declared full support to "war on terrorism" by stating that there was "no fundamental difference between ETA and Al-Qaeda" (Woodworth, 2004: 177). In his statement to *Wall Street Journal in 24 March 2004*, Aznar put his words as follows: "ETA or Al Qaeda the difference is important, to be sure, but the response to what has happened should be the same: firmness, political unity and international cooperation."

In psychological terms, Aznar coped with "cognitive dissonance," when he could not decide on the perpetrator of the attack: Al Qaeda or ETA? Cognitive dissonance is "a feeling of uncomfortable tension which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind at the same time." Scholars offer three solutions to eliminate the pressure in decision making: (1) to change one's own previous behavior, (2) to justify one's own behavior by changing the conflicting cognition, and (3) to justify one's own behavior by adding new cognitions (see Changing Minds). Aznar did not change his position even though Arnoldo Otegi, spokeman of Batasuna, supported ETA's innocence concerning the attacks (Inter Press Service). He probably had the second condition in which he tried to change the conflicting cognition by blaming ETA and the opposition parties.

Right after being elected, the Socialist Party leader Zapatero declared "the war and the occupation in Iraq as a disaster" (BBC News)**.** In accordance to this statement, the European newspapers were divided into two groups about the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq. The conservative newspapers, such as ABC, defended that

the withdrawal of troops was a grand mistake (Global Security 2004). On the other hand, the leftist newspapers, such as El Pais, observed the war in Iraq under the framework of illegality and wrongness. (Global Security, 2004).

The component of intelligence of winning hearts and minds was not taken into consideration by Spanish intelligence units. The weeks before March 11, Spanish intelligence disregarded the message about the "plan to steal 150 kilos of explosives, which were said to be used in Madrid attacks" (Woodworth 2004, 179). Moreover, the Spanish intelligence unit did not consider the message about Spain's vulnerability on internet either. In this regard, an Islamic Research Center E-Prism translated a booklet which was written by a group Information Commission for the Help of the Iraqi People: The Department of Foreign Propaganda Baghdad. "Global Islamic Media" shared the message in the under the title of *A Message to the Spanish People* (Paz, 2004a). The booklet started with Aznar's support of the U.S. government on the war on terror and condemned the two thousand Spanish troops that were deployed in Iraq. The booklet of *Foreign Propaganda in Iraq* (Paz, 2004a) went further and blamed Aznar's government for putting the Spanish people into danger. This strategy of the terrorist organization can be evaluated as a strategic communication method to instill fear on the public. Their message ended with the following statement: "The battalions of the Iraqi resistance and its supporters outside of Iraq are able to increase the dosage and will eclipse your memorandum of the rotten spies" (Paz, 2004a: 8). Yet, the Spanish intelligence unit did not examine this message properly.

In accordance to his declarations, Zapatero withdrew Spanish forces- 1.300 troops- from Iraq. This policy change can be regarded as a latest terrorism strategy of the newly elected government. Yet, this policy change can also be regarded as a success of Al-Qaeda (see Avilés, 2004). While it was argued by Rose and Murphy that Madrid bombings is a political success for Al-Qaeda, Abrahms opposed this view with the argument that the attack is not a political success for Al-Qaeda, since Spain increased the number of troops in Afghanistan (Rose et al. 2007). However, the latter view is contestable due to the fact that Spanish troops are not combat forces; but they are merely the leading Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). However, it can be concluded that the Spanish foreign policy went through a gradual shift. Since the intelligence did not work well before the attacks, National Antiterrorism Coordination Centre was created to work closely about international terrorism with "integrated intelligence analysis" on May 28, 2004 (Reinares, 2008: 8).

However, there are still concerns about Spanish law on terrorism. For instance, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in UK conducted a survey on selected countries and one of them was Spain. The survey stated that Spain does not have a separate anti-terrorism law, but it regarded terrorism as "aggravated form of crime" (FWA 2005: 25). On the working paper about Internal Security reforms in Spain, Reinares (2008: 7) underlined the same point as it is doubtful to melt ETA and other terrorist organizations into the same pot which is the Criminal Code of Spain. Therefore, to what extend the terrorists can be considered as criminals or more than that remains a question that the Spanish state should focus on.

In terms of domestic policy the Spanish government should focus on its citizens, since a vast majority of Muslim citizens live in Spain. The government should convince the moderate Muslims that it is not only the Spaniards, who are vulnerable to attacks but also Muslim citizens that live in Spain as well.

Countering terrorism should not be addressed only by foreign policies. Domestic policies are important in order to create a common ground for the citizens, where cultures, religions, beliefs and nationalities would live together. It is the responsibility of the government to eradicate the radical groups within the population (Thieux, 2004: 70). Only by then, the recruitment policy of Al-Qaeda could be countered.

In conclusion, the research on the Spanish government's policy shows that Spain relied more on foreign policy instruments. The literature on this case study indicates that after the election of Zapatero significant changes has occurred in the foreign policy dimension. The "Alliance of Civilizations", pioneered by Zapatero and Erdoğan is one of the prominent foreign policy actions to understand the Muslim mind in other states, generally in Middle East. Yet, Zapatero did not make major changes to win the Muslim citizens inside Spain. Besides, Contrary to the claim of Paz (2004b), Spanish withdrawal from Iraq did not create a "domino effect[41]". Therefore, sub-groups in the name of Al-Qaeda conducted another operation to Britain in 2005.

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[41] According to Paz (2004b), Spanish withdrawal would create a domino effect inside the war coalition in Iraq in which "neither British nor Italian forces [could] resist pressure."

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5.2.2 London Bombings

Britain faced four explosions in London, which resulted in 52 casualties, 770 injured on July 7, 2005. Three of the explosions occurred close to the train stations and one of them exploded in a public transportation bus. The suicide bombers ranging from the age 18-30 were home-grown terrorists[42]. As the BBC News (2005) pointed out three of the four suicide bombers were living in Leeds West Yorkshire (BBC News Special Reports, 2005). The attackers were linked to a senior Al-Qaeda leader in Pakistan.

Although the intelligence units were aware of such an upcoming attack, they could not prevent it (The Economist, 2005). In general, the argument surrounding the vulnerability of the cities was the main pretext of the London Resilience Metropolitan Police Service for such an excuse (London Assembly, 2006). However, the attack on July 21 was prevented in advance by proper intelligence.

The videos of Mohammad Sidique Khan and Ayman Al-Zawahiri made the perpetrator of the attack clear. (BBC News, 2005). The homegrown terrorism in Britain was linked to Al-Qaeda[43]. In April 2007, Americans captured Abd al-Hadi, who was the mastermind behind the London bombings[44]. According to Hadi, it is favorable for the

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[42] The name of the terrorists are Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lindsay, Shehzad Tanweer.

[43] Many small groups acts in the name of Al-Qaeda, since they share the same sensibility and rationality with the latter organization.

[44] Al-Hadi trained Khan and Tanweer in Pakistani camps for suicide bombing.

organization to turn homegrown individuals into terrorists since they "know the country, know the language and own passports of that country[45]" (O'Neill et al.).

Britain was thought to be fully equipped to international terrorist attacks, after September 11 attacks and Madrid Bombings in Spain. Besides, Special Branches under the Security Service created the New Guidelines that provided the priority of countering terrorism in 2004 (Gregory, 2005: 3). In addition, 300 cameras were employed in Britain to observe illegal and criminal activities (Rasmussen, 2005: 3). However, none of the mechanisms prevented the attack. The Review Committee admitted that "the key to effective response is based on communication, which is to be considered with the public and the individuals who are harmed during the attack" (London Assembly Reports, 2006: 12). According to the Review Committee, the best response should not be based on the incidents but on individuals and it was the primary mistake on July 7 bombings (London Assembly Reports, 2006). In addition, Bland et al. (2006) emphasize both military and civilian measures to tackle an attack. In the light of the stated reports, Britain has focused on its citizens rather than going for a foreign policy change.

5.2.2.1 Why Britain as a Target?

Since the withdrawal of Spain from the coalition did not create a domino effect as Jihadist groups were seeking, the selection of Britain as a target was an inevitable

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[45] An interpretation from the view of al-Hadi would be that states should aim to prevent homegrown terrorism. Therefore, the British government employed domestic policies through the components of winning hearts and minds.

consequence. Besides, Britain is a strategic ally of the U.S. government, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan[46].

The video of London suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan put the very logic behind the British bombings as follows: "Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight" (BBC News, 2005). In light of this logic, the British response on its Muslim citizens is important.

5.2.2.2 The British Response to the Attacks

Britain was in a stalemate between its courts and European Laws In 2004. Nine foreigners detained without any trial and sentenced to prison for almost three years. This verdict was against the Human Rights Act in European Union. The duplicity occurred due to hard line counter-terrorism measures of Britain, which were titled under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. Charles Clarks, the Home Secretary, personally defended the action as "the detainees are threat to homeland security" (cited in Oliver and Left, 2004). The detainees could go out from prison only if they accepted to return to their home country. However, most of them were asylum seekers and did not have choice rather than staying (cited in Oliver and Left, 2004).

Gardiner (2006: 2) blames the European Laws as an undermining factor for Britain's anti-terrorism efforts, since Britain cannot enjoy free act within its borders. However,

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[46] Britain had more or less 7.200 troops in Iraq and more than 5000 in Afghanistan by 2006.

the former application was changed by Counter-Terrorism Act of 2005, which gave permission not to detentions but "control orders." Control orders were designed to implement house investigations, house arrests and even restricting the movements of individuals (Office of Public Sector Information, 2005: 5). Tony Blair recognized control orders as a regular mechanism, which does not "involve detention". As Blair (2007) said, control orders "impose some limits on the individual's freedom." Blair (2007) stressed that security should have the priority since without security there will be no liberty at all. Although the Blair government asked for 90 days of detention time, the House of Commons considered the request and increased it up to 28 days (Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, 2006). Control orders can be regarded as an intelligence gathering activity of Britain.

From late 2005, Britain focused on a new strategy, which was community policing. According to this new policy, Intelligence and Security Committee admitted the consequences of radicalization and the cost of alienation inside the public and requested for a better understanding of radicalized people (Home Office, 2006). Consequently, the Home Office published a report, named *Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities* in 2008. In this report, key issues were addressed, such as gathering the Muslim scholars on a common base through the aim of British society to "understand Islam" and creating forums for young people to discuss and debate issues about Islam. This action can be regarded in two components of winning hearts and minds, which are public diplomacy, and attitude and behavioral change.

Apart from creating social understanding, the report put forward preventive measures as well. Such measures are the prohibition of violent sources in internet, to increase

support of Muslim citizens to challenge radicals, and the prevention of radicalization in prison. All of the efforts after 2005 are to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim society in London. As it can be interpreted from the policies, the component of strategic communication, public diplomacy, intelligence gathering are used by the British government.

Community policing aims to create better communication channels among the Muslim community, the police and British citizens to avoid extremism (Klausen, 2009: 408). Reaching the Muslim community and emphasizing the common grounds can prevent the radicals to find safe havens inside the population. Although Saggar (2009) did not state specifically about community policing, he examined counter terrorism efforts by stressing the role of fence sitters. According to Saggar (2009), if states can divert tacit supporters in support of the state's cause, the base of the organization will be damaged. This is the significance of the recruitment phase for a terrorist organization to survive.

The community policing is the most effective response to terrorism in the long term, since the money spend on hard line security measures can be transferred to other lacking parts, such as creating job opportunities, education, making infrastructure or creating economical equality to the Muslim community in Britain. By establishing harmony inside the community, it is possible to achieve stability.

As Karmani (2006: 104) puts forward, it is not the Muslim community or the Muslim language that creates a radical mindset but it is the one that has the power such as the media, who creates such mindsets. The survey of Pew Global Attitudes Project in

2005 asked the respondents to give an answer to the following question: "Views on which religion is the most violent?" British respondents of 63% chose Islam as the most violent religion (Bleich, 2009: 368). It is true that Islamic fundamentalism highly increased. With the initiation of community policing and new measures that encompass strategic communication, public diplomacy and intelligence, homegrown terrorism could diminish in Britain.

Mosques and prisons are the most effective places to gather for the homegrown terrorists. Therefore, British government also questioned the effectiveness of mosques. Some scholars like Bergen and Pandey, oppose the idea that *medrese* inherently cause unpleasant effects on the individual. According to their sample, only 11 % of the terrorists attended *medrese* to take education. Only one man, Hasib Hussain in London bombings attended *medrese* (Bergen and Pandey, 2006: 118-122). Nonetheless, not all of the current *medrese* should be seen as a teaching institution. Some of them are places to organize plans. *Medrese* are problematic, since one can get theological motives but also training (Ranstorp, 2005) to be a terrorist as well. Three of the four London bombers stayed in Pakistan between November 2004 and February 2005, where they had contacted to Abd al-Hadi. Therefore, there is a need for proper intelligence from the mosques and prisons.

Moreover, the British response relied on strategic communication as well. The *scholars' Roadshow- The Radical Middle Way* campaign tried to familiarize British society with Islamic theology. In this respect, Muslim scholars gave lectures via internet. This policy was organized in collaboration of Foreign Office with Home Office (Modood 2007).

London bombings taught Britain that the fight should rely on necessary means. During the learning process, Britain shifted from firm methods to soft ones. Traditional policing would be favorable to deter home-grown terrorists as far as Britain stayed within the rule of law. However, community policing should not be disregarded, because it is the key stone to undertake terrorism in the long-term. Besides, the policies that Britain used on its society to tackle homegrown terrorism, are based on components of winning hearts and minds.

On the other hand, no country is immune to terrorist actions. Ignoring the facts would only lead to a new disaster. Therefore, the collaboration of intelligence units, police forces and the community would be the paramount long-term response in the struggle against terrorism.

5.2.2.3 Assessment of British and Spanish Responses

Many demonstrations in Spain proved the requirement of domestic policy regulations as well as a foreign policy change to display unjust policies in Iraqi war. On the other hand, British society did not create a major concern of London bombings in the same manner as Spanish society did. According to Freedland (2006), a year after the attack nothing significant changed in British people's style of living. Freedland (2006) stressed the "habits of leisure and transport, the attitudes to politics, the way British people live with each other" as examples to his proposed assumption.

The literature on the implications of policies in Spain indicates that Spanish government relied on traditional policing, since it conducted many operations right after the

Madrid bombings. The Spanish government arrested individuals, who were affiliated to a terrorist organization or who were likely to be terrorists without questioning. Besides, there is a gap in Spanish law structure that considers terrorism as equivalent to crime. The main question lies whether crime laws would be beneficial to address terrorism, since the former is a domestic problem in nature, and the latter is an international concern.

On the contrary, Britain as a country which have been suffering from IRA terrorism, responded the same phenomenon in a different manner. At first, with the amendments of Terrorism Act 2000, Britain failed to respect the rule of law due to the tight nature of emergency. Later in 2005, the Home Office initiated to impel rules, which were more based on community policing and social policy. Tony Blair, who was the strategic ally of the U.S, did not renounce its strategies upon Al-Qaeda's intentions and kept the forces both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concerning the alleged success of Al-Qaeda in London, this thesis suggests that Al-Qaeda did not achieve political gains; however it gained publicity and imposed fear among the Spanish citizens.

Last but not the least, both military and police units in collaboration with social policy and community policing are required in order to fight against terrorism in a comprehensive manner. States are not immune from terrorism inherently. Terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be reduced only to bombings or violent acts. This understanding reduces the countering mechanism into a reaction phase. The need is to adopt new societal precautions in advance.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the struggle against terrorism/insurgency, there is a need of understanding the concept of winning hearts and minds. The aim of the thesis is to stress the importance of proposed components in order to understand the concept of winning hearts and minds.

This thesis attempts to fill the gap in literature on the concept of winning hearts and minds by examining and formulating the components of winning hearts and minds. In other words, the literature lacks in two points: (1) there is a lack of literature based mainly on the history of the concept of winning hearts and minds, (2) there is no specific method of winning the hearts and minds of the targeted population.

While searching the concept of winning hearts and minds, history provides the grounds to the question "*whose hearts and minds are to be won*?" The main conclusion from the historical investigation is the evolution and transformation of the targeted subject of the concept through time. In early history, the concept of winning

hearts and minds had covered the whole population, where taking the consent of the public was significant. However, the concept of winning hearts and minds covered only the believers with the rise of Christianity in 16th century. When the concept is examined in all war times, it is observed that winning hearts and minds of the soldiers became the prominent issue. That is to say, soldiers happened to be the targeted subject.

Coming more to the contemporary era, the targeted subject became the population once more during the World War I and World War II. However, populations considered in these wars were both the population of the fighting state and the population of the states that should be countered. In the former, the consent of the population of the fighting states is needed as well. In the latter, the major aim of a fighting state is to win the hearts and minds of a population of a targeted state.

In the Cold War, the reference subject of winning hearts and minds changed entirely to the opponent states' population. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. aimed to win the hearts and minds of the population of satellite states; whereas, Soviet Union attempted to counter this aim by intercepting the communication channels of the U.S. Since there was no actual fighting in the Cold War, winning hearts and minds was directly practiced. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of winning hearts and minds is observed in conflicts between state and non-state actors. The aim of the strategies through the implication of the concept is to isolate the insurgents and lack them from basic needs, which are food, shelter, and intelligence.

Moreover, the concept is practiced in the struggle against terrorism in contemporary era. A state intervening to a territory of another state to prevent the latter's assistance to a terrorist organization leads to the reliance of the concept once more. Contemporarily, the intervened population becomes the targeted subject, whose hearts and minds should be achieved.

The historical investigation on the concept indicates the second gap in literature, which is to say, the components of winning hearts and minds. When the question "*how to win the hearts and minds?*" is asked, the literature does not state explicitly the components of the concept. In this regard, the components of winning hearts and minds are proposed by examining the contemporary interventions and the policies of states during intervention times. In literature, those components are regarded merely as a policy for winning a war. However, this thesis defends the view that they are, in actual, the components of winning hearts and minds. The proposed components are (1) public diplomacy, (2) strategic communication, (3) intelligence, (4) attitude and behavioral change, (5) propaganda and psychological warfare. The findings on the components of the concept are as follows:

(1) The components are highly interlinked to each other in the practices of the concept through state policies. For instance, propaganda and psychological operations can lead to attitude and/or behavioral change, which can further lead to intelligence gathering. As a consequence, it can result with winning hearts and minds of the targeted population. Radio Free Europe would be a concrete example to examine the interaction of the components among each other. Radio Free Europe was a successful strategic communication method

(through broadcasting), which encompasses propaganda tools (speeches) in order to change the attitude of the targeted population (the Hungarian revolt)[47].

(2) All of the components of winning hearts and minds are equally important. However, the impact of individual components changes from case to case. Due to this reason, states should decide on the efficiency of the components in different situations. For instance, in World War II intelligence gathering was the primary strategy for the powers; whereas propaganda and psychological operations led the West to win the Cold War.

In Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. systematically tries to link these components in the struggle against terrorism currently. In Afghanistan General McChrystal requested more troops to protect the civilians in 2009. In accordance, the main aim becomes taking and holding areas controlled by Taliban. However, it is an ambitious purpose and needs time to be accomplished. There are still lacks in terms of implementing the proposed components of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan. For instance in the Strategic Communication Plan of 2007 the key audiences are extensive in number[48], although strategic communication aims specific audiences. In this regard, extensive number of key audiences diverts the U.S. and ISAF's aim. Besides, the U.S. has lack of expertise on Strategic Communication and Information Operations.

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[47] See Radio Free Europe, p. 32-36 in this thesis.

[48] The key audiences are Afghan population, Afghan government, Government of Pakistan, Military of Pakistan, Pakistani population, Population of ISAF troops, IGO and NGO communities, U.S. domestic audience, Taliban rank and file, Enemy leadership, Central Asian Populations (Department of Defense 2007: 2).

Therefore, the implementation of these terms does not effectively working. To win the hearts and minds of the Afghani population, the U.S. and NATO forces should give the control to the Afghani forces. The Afghani population should feel that they are not ruling by a third power but it is going to be their governmental success to fight against Taliban.

The components of winning hearts and minds can be found in Iraq clearly as well. The U.S. organizes polls about the opinions of the Iraqi population on the U.S. presence. This can be regarded as a method of strategic communication. Besides, small tickets in replacement of coins are being used in Iraq. On one of the side of these tickets there are American soldiers helping Iraqi population. The use of such materials is to create attitude/behavioral change. Moreover, living conditions especially in the northern side of Iraq has improved dramatically. Therefore, the Kurdish population has frank sympathy to the U.S. officials. However, the Sunni and Shi'a communities are still in severe fight. This fight can be prevented by implementing the components of winning hearts and minds, generally strategic communication, propaganda and psychological operations. However, there is a lack of expertise on Strategic Communication and Information Operations in Iraq as well. Therefore, for an effective campaign in Iraq the U.S. needs more experts who know the area, culture, society and the language[49].

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[49] Although "knowing the culture, language and the area" is a well known phrase, the U.S. cannot implement it totally. During my stay in northern Iraq, I have witnessed that not many of the U.S. officials know Kurdish/Arabic. To have communication with the population interpreters were needed. Besides, even in northern Iraq, the U.S. fenced its forces and officials into secure areas, which actually does not help the cause. To win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population the U.S. officials should learn to leave the field and join to the public.

To examine the impact of the components of winning hearts and minds, two sets of case studies[50] are assessed in this thesis. The first set of case studies, which are Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War, demonstrates the impact of the concept in the struggle against insurgencies. In this set, intervening states' policies on the population of the intervened state are examined. The important conclusions of this set of case studies with regard to the use of components are as follows:

(1) In Malayan Emergency, the attempt of the British government to win the hearts and minds of the Malayan population was effective. The components of winning hearts and minds are implemented throughout the Emergency. The most prominent examples are the improvement of the *intelligence services* by encouraging the villagers to reveal information about the insurgents, dropping leaflets (propaganda), and the strategy of minimum use of force.

(2) In the Vietnam War, the U.S. did not implement the components of winning hearts and minds effectively. On the contrary, the U.S. policy relied on air power, which hampered the idea of minimum use of force during response. Besides, the U.S. attempted to use the same components as Britain used in Malayan Emergency to win the hearts and minds of Vietnamese. However, it did not lead to success.

To conclude, when the components of winning hearts and minds are implemented, the success of a state to cope with insurgency would be high. Moreover, same components would not work in different cases. In the struggle against terror-

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[50] In this study the war in Iraq and Afghanistan are not examined as case studies, since the specified wars still continue. Therefore, it would not be totally effective to discuss those wars.

ism/insurgency, every case is unique and every case needs different policy prescriptions.

The second set of case studies, which are Madrid Attacks and London Bombings, reveals the impact of the concept in the struggle against terrorism. These cases are examined in the thesis in order to find out the implementation of the components through domestic policy actions on the Muslim population of Britain and Spain. In this set, there is neither intervening nor intervened state. But the domestic policies of Spanish and British government after the attacks, in order to win the hearts and minds of their Muslim citizens, are evaluated. The important conclusions of this set of case studies with regard to the use of components are as follows:

(1) After London Bombings, the British government created new intelligence units to prevent further attacks. These units were successful to prevent an attempt of explosions on March 21, 2005. To win the hearts and minds of Muslim citizens, British government chose the component of public diplomacy. The Blair government used public diplomacy by gathering Muslim scholars and publicizing the Islamic values in order to make the British society to understand Islam. Furthermore, strategic communication is used via internet to familiarize the British society with Islam with the aim of preventing hostilities inside the country. The general policy that the British government conducted after London Bombings was community policing.

(2) After Madrid Bombings, the Spanish government did not attempt to change its domestic policy towards its Muslim citizens as Britain did. By the election

of Zapatero, many changes occurred in Spain, but at the foreign policy level. In this regard, The Alliance of Civilizations is the most prominent initiative of the government. However, the government did not consider winning hearts and minds of its own Muslim citizens. In accordance to this, many Muslim citizens were arrested as a suspect of terrorist after the attacks. Therefore, the components of winning hearts and minds cannot be observed in the Spanish case.

To conclude, the implementation of the concept in domestic policy is achieved by applying community policing in the British case. However, Spanish government does not comprehend the same method. Therefore, the Spanish government needs to rely more on domestic policy rather than foreign policy *per se*. In the struggle against terrorism, the major method should be winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim population. This will prevent terrorism to flourish. As a result, the recruitment strategy of terrorist organizations can also be prevented.

This thesis gives the following recommendations on the concept of winning hearts and minds for further research:

(1) There is a need to examine the concept through a variety of terrorism and insurgency based case studies. In this regard, the proposed components may assist the researchers.

(2) The cases with regard to intervened country's population are needed. In this regard, Iraq and Afghanistan Wars can be two proper case studies to analyze.

(3) Strategic Communication, one of the proposed components, is a new term that attempts to take the place of the concept of winning hearts and minds. It prioritizes communication theory to win asymmetrical conflicts. Scholars should be cognizant of the emergence of this term.

Besides,

(4) The decision-makers should consider the basic necessities in the practices of the concept of winning hearts and minds by taking the culture, language and societal norms of the intervened population into consideration.

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