

YUGOSLAVIA: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT AND
DISINTEGRATION

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
BILKENT UNIVERSITY

MEVLUT KATIK

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement
for the Degree of Master of Arts

Thesis
DR
1343
• K38
1994

February 1994

YUGOSLAVIA: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT AND
DISINTEGRATION

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
BILKENT UNIVERSITY

MEVLUT KATIK

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement
for the Degree of Master of Arts

February 1994

Mevlut KATIK
for

Thesis

DR

1313

- K38

1994

B022162

Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences


A. S. Kara

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.



Prof.Dr.Ali Karaosmanoglu


I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.



Asst.Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst.Prof.Dr.Ali Fuat Borovali



OZET

Eski Yugoslavya bugun uluslararası politikanın odak noktalarından biri haline gelmiştir. 1991 yılında bu ülkede başlayan ve Avrupa kıtasında İkinci Dünya Savaşından bu yana ilk sıcak çatışma olma özelliği taşıyan savaşla birlikte, yalnız Balkanlaşma kavramı değil, fakat çatışma, dağılma, bölünme ve ayrılma kavramları da yeniden tartışılır hale gelmiştir.

Eski Yugoslavya, yıllarca, içinde çok farklı insan topluluklarının yanyana, ancak bir diğeri cumhuriyet ya da özerk bölgesinde yaşamak durumunda kaldığı bir ülke konumunda olmuştur. Ülkenin böylesine yapay biçimde birleşmiş olması gerçeği günlük yaşamın her cehresinde kolaylıkla hissedilebilmiş ve bugünkü sonuca önemli katkıda bulunmuştur.

Yugoslavya anılan sebeplerle çatışma ve dağılma ile benzer anlamlar çağrıştıran bölünme ve ayrılma kavramları konusunda iyi bir alan araştırması oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı eski Yugoslavya'daki çatışma ve dağılmanın nedenlerini ortaya koymak ve bunun carpıcı özelliklerini belirlemeye çalışmaktır. Çatışma ve dağılma konusundaki teorik yaklaşımların ortaya konması ve eski Yugoslavya'nın bir alan araştırması olarak kullanılarak, bu yaklaşımları ne ölçüde doğrulayıp reddettiğinin belirlenmesi bu çalışmanın amacı arasındadır.

Bu amacla ilk bolumde teorik bir cerceve olusturulmaya calisilmis, daha sonra catisma ve dagilma nedenlerinin ortaya konulma cabasinda, alan arastirmasina konu teskil eden ulkenin genel ozellikleri tanitilmistir. Sozkonusu nedenlerin yillarca geriye gitmesi dolayisiyla tarihsel gelismindeki onemli ve carpici gelismelere yer verilmistir. Ardindan bu gelisme ve ozelliklerin gunumuzdeki tezahuru ve catisma ve dagilmanin yakin sebepleri tartisilmistir.

Sonuc bolumunde ise eski Yugoslavya'nin bir alan arastirmasi olarak teoriyle test edilmesi sonuclari ortaya konulmus ve bundan sonraki muhtemel gelismeler irdelenmeye calisilmistir. Ek bolumunde ise, catisma ve dagilma nedenlerine daha fazla isik tutatacagi inanciyla ve anilan alanin belirgin bicimde anlasilabilmesi icin, bualani olusturan herbir eski cumhuriyet ve ozerk bolgenin ekonomik,sosyal,kulturel ve politik kompozisyonlari sunulmustur.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank all those individuals who assisted and contributed to the writing of the thesis. I express special special gratitude to Dr. Ali Fuat Borovali, who generously provided me with helpful suggestions and guidance. I would also like to thank Haluk Agca, the then First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade, who provided me with valuable research material, and Allison Unruh, my friend and a Harvard student, who edited this thesis.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PART ONE

A THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT AND DISINTEGRATION

PART TWO

1. HISTORY AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

2. REASONS FOR CONFLICT AND DISINTEGRATION

2.1. Serbian Nationalism and its Proponent--Milosevic

2.2. Cultural Ethnicity and Other Historical Reasons--Tito's Role

2.3. Economic Discrepancies between the Republics

2.4. Changing International Climate and Third Party Involvement

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

NOTES

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND DOCUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Following the collapse of communism and the alleged end of the Cold War, the Balkans came into the spotlight of events in Europe. By the spring of 1992 Yugoslavia disintegrated. The war between Serbia and the breakaway republics which began in the immediate aftermath of the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence on 25 June 1991 had already obliterated any possibility of the continued existence of Yugoslavia as a federal entity. At the same time, it presented the international community with a problematique involving complex issues of ethnicity, sovereignty, self-determination, redrawing of borders and diplomatic recognition.

The conflict in Yugoslavia threatened wider regional instability at a time when Europe was busy adjusting itself to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia became essentially divorced from great power rivalry. Subsequent developments confirmed earlier fears that Yugoslavia might become the first significant test in post-Cold War Europe for the creation and maintenance of regional stability.

The war in Yugoslavia has raised two outstanding issues. The first relates to the question of how to prevent emerging conflicts and defuse existing ones in a continent devoid of the East-West confrontation, yet destabilized by the process. The second issue is the establishment of precedents and policies to prevent conflicts that could arise elsewhere. In that regard, the right to secede or the unilateral act of secession is highly important. There is considerable potential for a conflict similar to the Yugoslav case to erupt elsewhere, including Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Yugoslav crisis thus presented the international community with the wider problem of pinpointing and avoiding a situation in which the satisfaction of legitimate national aspirations might encourage destabilization. With the Yugoslav crisis, the concept of Balkanization has again come into fore. It is also the first war on the continent since World War II.

This study aims to trace the reasons for the Yugoslav disintegration and to single out its salient characteristics. It is neither a comprehensive examination of its political history nor is it intended to keep a record of actual events since the war broke out. It is an aim of this study to use the Yugoslav crisis as a case study in conflict and disintegration as well as secessionism. The first chapter will deal with the theoretical framework concerning conflict and disintegration. The second chapter will examine the historical aspects of the conflict and focus on the factors leading into conflict and disintegration such as Serbian nationalism and its proponent Slobodan Milosevic, cultural ethnicity, economic

discrepancies, changing international climate and third party involvement. Finally, there will be a conclusion and conjecture of possible consequences that might flow from present circumstances. The appendix will present the distinctive economic, social, and political characteristics of the former republics and autonomous regions which have facilitated conflict and disintegration.

PART ONE

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT AND DISINTEGRATION

The complexity of living in one unit with peoples of diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds, some peaceful, others in turbulence, gives rise to tendencies of not only coming together, but also moving apart -- integration as well as disintegration. Disintegration, or its similar connotations of separatism and secession, has a negative connotation, bringing to mind fraction, decomposition, the destruction of unity and integrity, and the breaking up of the order. Disintegration has been underestimated by scholars for years, as other problems have been considered more urgent: the East-West confrontation, the North-South gap, other inter-state conflicts and revolutions. However, it is likely that its effects will be felt much more in the years to come, especially after the Soviet and Yugoslav break-ups. In the field of scholarly research, such a neglected issue necessitates a comprehensive study of the matter and reassessment of the various approaches to integration, disintegration and conflict.

Fundamental to the study of integration and politics itself are two questions: 1) Why do subjects or citizens give deference and devotion to the political unit in

which they live and why they do not? 2) How is procedural and substantive consensus achieved and sustained within political systems? (1)

In general, two theories of political integration try to explain these questions. First, political systems gain and maintain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system. What is in question here is a procedural and substantive consensus about the political framework and the solutions. The greater the procedural and substantive consensus the greater the integration of the political systems. Second, as an alternative theory, it is contended that political systems become and remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of force. There are many proponents of this idea. (2)

On the other hand, the term conflict generally refers to a situation in which a certain group of human beings --whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, religious cultural, socio-economic, political or other, is involved in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing incompatible goals. (3) The theories regarding conflict vary widely, considering its causes whether inter-group, interpersonal or intrapersonal. These theories, however, have some common characteristics: Conflict is about change. It is about change in social structure and social institutions, in the distribution of resources, human relations at many levels. Those who promote one form of change enter into conflict with those whose interest is to promote another, and

both are resisted by those opposed to all change. At the same time each contestant seeks to pass the burden of adaptation to change onto the others. (4) So, both a cause and a consequence of change is seen in conflict. Thus, it is also a decision process which selects between alternative futures. The more valuable the objectives, the more intense the conflict. The more numerous the objectives, the greater its scope. The more parties there are in conflict, the larger its domain.

James Rosenau argues that the more rapid the rate of social change becomes, the greater the likelihood of intrasocietal violence.(5) Margot Light contends that changes have important consequences for the kinds of conflict which arise in modern society and the ways in which they need to be handled. First, the changes in popular demands mean that the load on governments has increased. Policy-making becomes increasingly complex when the state has to occupy itself both with its traditional concerns of law, order and diplomacy and with attempts to meet new welfare demands. Secondly, conflicts tend to be inter-connected and complex. The result is that existing institutions are often inadequate to deal with them.(6)

Meanwhile, new phenomena and values, some of which have long existed within the international system have emerged. For example, industrialization began a process of mass participation and communication which led to the politicization of the masses. As communication improved and ideas of nationalism spread, it

became necessary for governments and sovereigns to accept some of the popular needs and values. With time passing, these needs have themselves undergone change. Democracy, participation and technological progress have produced demands for more democracy, more participation and more progress. Moreover, it has created demands for more autonomy and independence. They have also damaged the traditional concept of a world of impenetrable states. It has become clear that interactions between states occur at many levels, that interdependence makes states increasingly vulnerable to the conditions in other states and that domestic politics in one state can cause conflict and affect the international system as much as its foreign policy could.

According to the level of analysis employed, different causes in relation to conflict are given. For example, there are writers who argue that psychological factors affecting decision-makers or institutions are among important reasons for conflict.(7) However, many sociologists and anthropologists attribute a constructive purpose to conflict as long as it helps to establish group boundaries, group consciousness, a sense of self identity, and contributes social integration, community-building and economic development.(8) In this regard, Marx, Simmel, Dahrendorf, Park, Burgess, Summer, Cooley, Ross, and in recent decades, Bernard and Coser attributed a positive aspect to conflict. (9) They tend to consider conflict as a useful means of resolving disputes within society and between societies. To them, it helps to establish group identity, clarifies group boundaries, and contributes to group cohesion.(10)

From the ruins of the Second World War, a new world has emerged. The sweeping majority in this world were multi-ethnic states. These state-nations were attributed a capacity of attaining political, even national integration, and it was thought that nations could be established from above. So, this nation-building entered into the jargon, implying empire building by way of nation-destroying.(11)

Karl Deutsch set forth two important concepts regarding national integration: mobilization and assimilation. Modernization leads to mobilization among the rural population and, as a result, emerging urbanization and greater communication creates assimilation, and the outcome is complementarity of social communication, the very substance of nationhood.(12) Meanwhile, both the nation-building theorists and Marxists argued that non-state nationalism was anachronistic. Clifford Geertz contended that the main problem, especially in the developing world, is primordialism -- a pathological situation which denies the secular essence of modern politics attaching undue importance to ascriptive ties.(13) However, some neo-Marxist scholars have re-commented on their original concept of nationalism, including nationalism outside the strict "bourgeois capitalist framework". To them, there is a dialectic relationship between state and nation in the modern world. They posit that state emerges to coincide with an already existing nation (or the other way round) on the basis of two matrices; the spatial matrix of territory and geography and the matrix of shared historical and cultural traditions.(14) However, it should be mentioned

that Marxism in general was preoccupied with state nationalism, not sub-state (regional) nationalism.(15) Whereas, subnationalism has always existed unabated in many East European countries, and its outcomes are obvious and self-evident today. Ethnic resurgence in these countries, which is stemming from, inter alia, different sorts of ethnicity, is further proof of this argument.

On the other hand, in social anthropology, two important arguments regarding state integration and cohesion were put forward: consociationalism and control or domination.(16) Consociationalism, introduced first by Arend Lijphardt and Eric Nordlinger, contends that states can remain stable without attempts at integration provided a basis of cooperation is reached by the elites of the various cultural segments. However, the attributes of other parts or elements of a said group, not only its elites, are very important as well. (17) For instance, the Serbs of Krajina in Croatia pursued a different policy regarding their quest for independence at the beginning than those of the elites and leaders of Serbia who asked them to delay their declaration of independence from Croatia. The alternative model of state cohesion speaks of internal domination and corporate control of the institutionally and culturally distinct groups by one group.(18) However, control systems by way of domination have also run their course and have their upheavals as is seen in the examples of Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Lebanon, South Africa and most importantly Yugoslavia.(19)

A theory of disintegration should be able to answer such questions as when and why separate groups emerge, exist and resurge, becoming politically important. What are the conditions which ease a process of disintegration? When is autonomy and/or federalism the aim of separatists, and when does the more extreme option, unilateral independence (secession) come out as the goal? What is the role of the international system in an emerging and continuing quest for independence or in less extreme forms of separatism?(20) The question of whether disintegration and separatism is regarded as a breakdown in modernization and state-building or as a major crisis rather than a legitimate alternative option that could resolve long-standing and deep-seated conflicts between groups is also an important issue that should be addressed in that framework.

Approaches concerned with conflict and integration also relevant to a disintegration theory. Indirect theories of disintegration involve approaches of revolution, inter-group conflict and aggression.(21) Relative deprivation, the sudden rise in aspirations that are frustrated, and the discrepancy between expectations and capabilities are considered useful. However, competition between interest groups, mobilization, resource scarcity, the inflexibility of institutions and leadership should not be forgotten as well. On the other hand, internal colonialism, ethnicity and primordialism can be regarded as direct theories.(22) The problem of internal colonialism has generally been raised by Latin Americans, the Blacks of America and the Palestinians living under Israeli

occupation. It is argued that states which are not integrated tend to be divided into two cultural groups; the dominant one and the peripheral. Accordingly, the oppressed and deprived group resist integration and tends toward separatism.(23) However, this theory is soundly criticized in that it can not explain all active secessionist movements.

Proponents of ethnicity or primordialism say that ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness is fundamental to political and militant separatism, regardless of the existence of inequality or dominance. Not social and economic discontent but discontent based on ethnic symbols or distinctions such as language, culture, religion, origin or race can cause separatism.(24)

Today, national groups have started to assert themselves as nation-states, and provinces or federal republics are declaring themselves as countries. The Yugoslav crisis provides a vivid illustration of the dangers and dilemmas involved. The national question of one state is related to the conditions-- by definition inadequate, for free and independent developments of nations and national communities.(25) In the Yugoslav case, it can be traced to the origins of the tragic sequence of the country. Thus, it is needed to touch upon its historical developments as well as the general features of its geography since they have had important impacts on developments in this country.(26) It also provides clues to single out various aspects of the problem such as social, intellectual and

cultural factors. That is why information regarding the educational levels of the peoples living in the former Yugoslav territories is needed.

Further, evocations of history are important in tracing the reasons of a conflict. Whenever one pulls the trigger in order to rectify history's mistake, it is bound to compound the error. One always pulls the trigger out of self-interest and quotes history to avoid responsibility.(27) No man possesses sufficient retrospective ability to justify his deeds. From the very beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one has heard this claim: "It is an outbreak of sheer madness and no one knows what it is all about ... It is a war in which everyone fights everyone else, and you can not make sense out of it . "However, those who know even a little about Yugoslavia before the war, and about the events that led to the war, understand that this is not the case.

The following section will discuss certain salient aspects and possible causes of the Yugoslav conflict and disintegration, starting with a brief overview of Yugoslavia's general characteristics and history so as to understand why it serves as a good case for the theories discussed above.



Yugoslavia before the war

PART TWO

1. HISTORY AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which does not exist any more or persists in a different scale, consisted of six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. It also had two autonomous provinces - Kosovo and Vojvodina which formed part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.(28)

Yugoslavia covered an area of 255,804 square kilometers in the south-east part of Europe, mostly in the Balkans. Its land frontiers were 2,969 kilometers long before disunion. The country bordered on Italy (202 km) in the north-west, Austria (324) and Hungary (623) in the north, Rumania (557) in the north-east, Bulgaria (536) in the east, and Greece (262) and Albania (465) in the south.(29) The Adriatic sea lies to the south-west. Yugoslavia also lies along the Alps and the Dinaric Alps, and portions of the Carpathian and Balkan mountains. The northern section of the country consists of part of the Panonian Plain, while the coastal belt stretching along the Adriatic Sea gives Yugoslavia its Mediterranean characteristics. The country combines features of the Balkan Peninsula, continental Europe, and the Mediterranean basin.

The natural configuration of the country gives easy access to Yugoslavia from the north, across the Panonian Plain, and good access from the southeast along

the Morava-Vardar river valleys. The mountain barriers in the western and southwestern parts of the country make it more difficult (over mountain passes and through tunnels), but the Adriatic coast provides good contact with the outside world along the sea routes. The Danube river, on the other hand, which flows through and along the frontiers of Yugoslavia, links it with the countries of Central Europe. The Sava and Morava rivers flow into the Danube. Sava is the longest river. A total of 1,850 rivers of Yugoslavia flows into the three seas; the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Sea. The major industrial cities and largest cities are located at these river valleys. The former capital Belgrade (population 1,300,000), Zagreb (700,000), Ljubljana (300,000), Skopje (440,000), and Sarajevo (400,000) are the major cities. At the last census (1981), Yugoslavia had a population of 23,864,000. (30) So, it was a middle-size country.

The importance of the Danube river should be mentioned here. Once completed, the proposed Danube-Main-Rhine and Danube-March-Oder canals were to link the North and the Baltic Seas with the Black Sea. On the other hand, if the Morava and the Vardar rivers were to be made navigable, the Aegean Sea could also be connected with this gigantic network of waterways. These proposals might be of importance at a time when the Black Sea Economic Cooperation is being realized.

Apart from its Mediterranean character, Yugoslavia is best known as a Balkan country, since 75 per cent of its territory is located on the Balkan Peninsula. As

the largest of the Balkan countries, Yugoslavia was located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, between the Panonian Plain and the Mediterranean Sea, making it an important juncture where principal highways, railway lines, waterways and air routes intersect. The most important inland highway in the continent passes from Central Europe through Ljubljana and Zagreb across the plain to Belgrade. The mountainous character of the country should be further mentioned. A major mountain range runs parallel to the Dalmatian coast. This range-the Dinaric- to a considerable degree was responsible for the isolation of what became Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro and formed a border between the Italian culture of the coast and the Slavic culture of the interior. The mountains also hindered the development of states by isolating people and encouraging localism. (31) In addition, mountain chains run north-south. This meant not only Yugoslavia, but also the Balkans were open to invasions from north to south. The Ottoman conquest of the region was an exception. The rivers of Yugoslavia also served as borders between republics and to a degree helped maintain their identities. What is at issue here is that the geographical features of the country has been responsible to a certain degree in the maintenance of cultural/ethnic identity throughout the ages and the radically fluctuating fortunes of the region through wars, conquests and upheavals. The multi-national composition of the population was a distinctive feature of Yugoslavia. According to a recent census (held on March 31, 1981) the figures were as follows:

Croats	4,428,000
Macedonians	1,339,729
Montenegrins	579,023
Muslims	2,000,000
Serbs	8,140,452
Slovenes	1,753,754
Those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs	1,219,045

The figures for the nationalities (national minorities) , according to the same census, were:

Albanians	1,730,364
Bulgarians	36,185
Czechs	19,625
Hungarians	426,866
Italians	15,132
Romanies	168,099
Rumanians	54,954
Ruthenians	23,285
Slovaks	80,334
Turks	101,191
Ukrainians	12,813

Official statistics record 25 ethnic groups. However, one point is worth mentioning here. Interesting figures regarding the number of Muslims and the Turks can be found in Ivo Banac's book.⁽³²⁾ Depending on the first census taken in 1921, he puts the figures for the Muslims at the time as 1,337,687, and 168,404 for the Turks. Given the population growth rate among Muslims, even though there has been some migration movements, both figures given for the number of Turks and the Muslims in the 1981 census, 60 years after the first one, are highly debatable.

About 80 per cent of the population is descended from the various Slav tribes that came into the region between the 6th and 8th centuries A.D. The Albanians, generally regarded as descendants of the ancient Illyrians are the largest non-Slavic ethnic group. The Slovenes in the north-west have their own language. They defended their national identity against pressures to Germanize their culture. Like the Slovenes, the Croats use the Latin alphabet. They also have a dominant Roman Catholic religious traditions. Their sense of nationality has been shaped in part by the experience of Austro-Hungarian domination.

The largest ethnic group is the Serbs. They predominate in the Republic of Serbia and in western and southern Bosnia. They converted to Christianity under the Greek Orthodox tradition and write their language in the Cyrillic alphabet. Serbs and Croats are generally recognized as speaking the same language (Serbo-Croat) in spite of differences in orthography, pronunciation and vocabulary that have resulted from the separate historical experiences of

the two peoples. In the South, the province of Kosovo has become entirely Albanophone. They are mainly Muslim. The large size and rapid rate of growth of this group has become the focus of political conflict. They also make up significant minorities in Montenegro and Macedonia. In Montenegro, the Muslim population takes second place after the Montenegrins.

The Montenegrins are culturally very close to the Serbs but own their separate status due to their success in having retained a large measure of independence when the rest of the peninsula was under Ottoman rule. Macedonians follow the Orthodox tradition and use the Cyrillic alphabet, but their language is mostly related to Bulgarian.

In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims make up more than 40 per cent of the population. They are Serbo-Croatian-speaking descendants of the indigenous Slav population who converted to Islam at the time of the Ottoman conquests of the 15th century. Within (former) parts of Habsburg Yugoslavia, language was the most significant focus of national identity, with the prevailing Roman Catholic religion taking second place. In the former Ottoman regions, where the ruling stratum was distinguished by adherence to Islam, religion was the more salient factor. Rates of religious practice were low throughout the country during socialist rule. The percentage is higher among older rural inhabitants and in Slovenia.

Historical and other circumstances led to Yugoslavia's creation as a highly composite community of different nationalities. The members of the six

Yugoslav nations - Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes, ten national minority groups (called nationalities) and two ethnic groups live within its borders. The nationalities are Albanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks and Ukrainians and the two ethnic groups are Romanies and Vlachs, according to the official records. There are also various other nationalities, but populations of these are less than 10,000 or 0,1 percent of total population. They also are dispersed. They do not enjoy special constitutional guarantees as groups or communities, but as individuals they are entitled to the same rights and freedoms as members of majority groups.(33)

In the first decade after the Second World War, there was a substantial drop in the number of Italians and to a certain extent of Turks as a result of emigration. Germans left the country on a large scale at the end of the war, because virtually the entire German community had been in the service of the Nazi occupying forces during the war. For many years, members of some nationalities and nations vacillated in declaring their nationality for a variety of historical, psychological, religious and other reasons. The Muslims called themselves Turks or Albanians, and vice versa until they were granted the status of an ethnic group: Muslims. In the subsequent population census they changed their declaration of nationality.(34) Though there is a group of Muslim gypsies, the Islamic population of Yugoslavia consisted of four groups: Bosnian Muslims, Muslim Albanians, Turks, and Slavic Macedonian Muslims. To determine the number of each group in the areas where they lived together (Sandzak, Metohia, Kosovo, Macedonia) some indirect

methods may be used.:

1) Though there is a small Croat Catholic contingent in Kosovo (in Janjevo near Pristina), it is assumed that all Catholics in the border areas around Albania and in Macedonia are Albanians. Their number is subtracted from that of all Albanian speakers to yield the number of Muslim Albanians.

2) The sum of all Serbian or Croatian and Albanian speakers is subtracted from the sum of all Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox to yield the number of the Turks.

3) The combined total of the Turks and Muslim Albanians is subtracted from the number of all Muslims to yield the Bosnian Muslim contingent in Sandzak, Metohia, and Kosovo, and the Muslim Macedonian contingent in Vardar Macedonia. More than half of Muslim Community live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The numbers of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora in pre-1912 Serbia (about 12,000 according to the first census), and in the former Habsburg territories (about 6,000), the Slavic Muslims of Montenegro, the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, Metohia, and Kosovo should be added to this number to yield the numerical strength of the Yugoslavia's Muslim community. (35) The distribution of Yugoslavia's religious communities also reveals the geopolitical features of the country's national question. The most noticable is the Serb Orthodox island in the middle of old Croat lands, encompassing portions of Dalmatia, Croatia proper (Lika, Kordun, Banija), north-western Bosnia and partly western Slovenia. The compact Muslim communities of eastern Bosnia separate the island from Serbia. It is an important point in the strategy of the Serbs today. And within the island there is a solid Muslim lagoon around Cazin and Bihac, sometimes referred to as

Turkish Croatia. In the southeast, the ethnologically uniform Serb island of Montenegro and eastern Herzegovina is separated from Serbia proper by a Bosnian Muslim channel in the Sandzak, which connects with the predominantly Muslim Albanians of Kosovo and western Macedonia and with the Turks further east, where Turks lived in compact colonies after the Ottoman conquest.

There was a large decrease in the number of Bulgarians in the censuses that followed. The Romanies have shown the most extreme fluctuations, in both directions, because of their inferior social status and displayed awakening of ethnic consciousness. They have often opted for the nationality of the community in which they live. The Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Islamic faith and the Macedonian Orthodox Church have the largest number of adherents. There is also several other smaller religious groups. After understanding the above mentioned characteristics of the former Yugoslavia, it is useful to point out the main developments in its history.

In order to understand its composition, it is necessary to start with the first settlements in the region. Towards the end of the 6th and first half of the 7th centuries Slav tribes settled in the Balkan Peninsula which was already inhabited by Greeks, Romans, Illyrians, Dardanians and other ancient peoples. The late creation of a common South Slav state was also due to historical conditions. In their new environment, the Slavs began to form many small independent states as the necessary organization for resisting

constant attacks by Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Hungarians and other powers which from time to time managed to bring sections of the South Slavs under their control. As early as the 8th century, fairly large and powerful South Slav states began to be formed in the Balkans from Slovenia to Macedonia. Meanwhile, they were for the most part converted to Christianity in the 9th century by missionaries in the west. Though it is a critical period in the history of Christianization of Slavs, little is known about who converted them to Christianity. The question of whether or not it was Byzantine or Frankish missionaries or missionaries from Bulgaria is debatable among historians.(36)

In the 10th and 11th centuries, the Croatian state was in existence. During the reign of Isar Samuel (976-1014), the Macedonian state stretched from the Adriatic, Ionian and Aegean Seas to the Black Sea and from Srem in the north to Thessaly and Epirus in modern Greece today. A large Serbian state was formed under the Nemanjic Dynasty in the 13th and 14th centuries, and during the reign of Emperor Dusan covered two thirds of the Balkan Peninsula. A Bosnian state arose in the 14th century under King Tvrtko who proclaimed himself "King of the Serbs, Bosnia, the Littoral, Dalmatia and the Croats". The Slovenian state emerged in the 7th century stretched to the Isonzo (Soca) river and included parts of Carinthia.(37) The foundation of a single South Slav culture was laid in the 9th century by the brothers Cyril and Methodius, monks from Salonika. The script they developed, known as Cyrillic, and the old Slavonic language formed a common basis for church and secular literature of all the South Slavs living in the area from Macedonia

to Istria. However, the expansion of the Ottomans in the 14th century had important effects on the development of the South Slav states. And its effects are still felt in the life of peoples not only in Yugoslavia, but throughout all the Balkans. Whether the Ottomans cut short the economic, social and political development, as some claim, or they gave it a positive momentum has been a debatable issue among historians, and subject to different interpretations. However, what is undeniable is the Ottoman influence in the Balkans that still survives in an area ranging from food they eat to the languages they speak. That is the case in Yugoslavia as well. The Jelavichs' claim that the corruption and deception in political life, which they say "is a condition that characterized Ottoman rule " was accepted in the region as normal and natural is foundless.(38) Because, such characteristics rather date back to the Byzantines, and the socialists in recent history. That is why "the word Byzantine, in the sense of being wily and not honest, exists to the present day in many European languages."(39) In addition, the so-called socialist culture eliminated many aspects of national culture, making the said characteristics more apparent in political life . Moreover, the Ottomans contributed to the economic development of the region considerably. First of all, with the Ottomans' coming to the region, all economically protectionist measures and customs-like practices were abolished. There was absolutely no Ottoman colonization. (40) The Ottomans also put an end to the persecution of the people of different religious beliefs by the different church organizations and granted people religious autonomy, an important factor in developing their national identities. That was why there was voluntary mass acceptance of Islam. From the very beginning the Ottoman Empire granted

extensive autonomy to all religious communities: Judaism, Eastern Orthodox Christian, Catholics and others. In contradiction to all traditional, but also still dominant misinterpretations, the Ottoman Empire, when compared with the contemporary Balkan states, represented a progressive and universal political/religious power structure that further advanced the state of people under its rule.

By the beginning of the 16th century all the lands of the Yugoslav peoples were within the frontiers of the Habsburg Austria, the Ottoman Empire and Venice. However, many states and empires in the Balkans were short-lived. Slav leaders were not always willing to ally themselves with the Ottomans in the hope of securing aid against their rivals. Many localities changed their allegiance several times until the Ottoman way of ruling settled in. The final extinction of the Serbian state and the defeat of the rebellion of Skenderbeg in Albania removed other obstacles to Ottoman advance. Ottoman advance through Albania was relatively rapid, as many of the local inhabitants enlisted in the Ottoman army against their Slav overlords and they embraced the Islam.

The fundamental characteristic of Bosnia lies in its religious structure. Stefan, the last Duke in Bosnia, renounced the Bosnian church in favor of Roman Catholicism, but Bogomilism, arguably a heresy in Christianity, remained strong particularly among the peasantry. Both Roman Catholic and Orthodox powers had conducted sustained campaigns against the Bogomils, and Ottoman promises of freedom found a response among them. Large

numbers of Bogomils, therefore, accepted Islam. They were followed by a significant proportion of the aristocracy. Thus, Ottoman conquest in this region took roots among the South Slavs that never developed to the same extent elsewhere. Ottoman conquest in the mountainous areas of the west was slow and incomplete. In these regions, chieftains retained independence for a long time. The bandits and uprisings remained a problem for the Ottoman overlords.(41) One of the biggest uprisings took place in 1690 when Serbs rose in support of the Austrian invasion. The retreat of the Austrians left the native people exposed to Ottoman advances. This led to a migration of 30,000 to 40,000 of families from old Serbia, as a result Albanian Muslims spread into the vacated lands. The ethnic map of Yugoslavia bears the marks of these migrations.

In the following centuries, the revolutionary movements in Europe at the end of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the expansion of capitalism exerted an important influence on the struggle of Yugoslav peoples for independence. The independence which had already been won by Montenegro (autonomous since the early 19th century) was given international recognition at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In the Balkan War of 1912, the Ottoman Empire was defeated by the Balkan Alliance made up of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria. However, prior to the First World War , only Serbia and Montenegro existed as independent states for a while, while Croatia and Slovenia formed part of the Habsburg Empire, Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by Austria-Hungary, and Macedonia was partitioned between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria.(42) However, with time, the strengthening and

rapprochement of Balkan peoples ran counter to the interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo by a member of the Young Bosnia Organization in 1914 served Austria-Hungary as a pretext to declare war on Serbia. In fact, real reasons were to be found in Austria-Hungary's expansionist ambitions of conquering the lands to the east and in "Drang nach Osten". That Empire's aspirations in the Balkans had full support of Germany whose army participated in the attack against Serbia and Montenegro.(43)

On the other hand, during the early period of the War, a number of prominent political figures left the Austro-Hungarian Empire and set up a Yugoslav Committee in London with the aim of conducting propaganda on behalf of their compatriots. The general indifference of Allied Powers to the fate of minorities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire slowly compelled the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government-in-exile to come together in common defence. In 1917, representatives of the two groups met in Corfu and signed the Corfu Declaration. They called for a single state governed by a democratic and constitutional monarchy. No mention was made as to whether the State's structure was to be federal or unitary. Even before the military defeat was secure, Serb, Slovene and Croat minorities organized an openly advocated South Slav entity. (44)

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (formed in October 1918) representing the South Slavs from the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy, declared in November

1918 the unification of the previously constituted State of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats living in Yugoslav territories formerly part of Austria-Hungary, with Serbia and Montenegro in a united State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The unification was proclaimed in Belgrade on December 1, 1918, thus creating the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.(45) However, the establishment of the common state was immediately followed by an intensification of class and national antagonisms. The ruling Greater Serbia bourgeoisie benefiting from the old order, refused to recognize the national identity of Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims. In this regard, there exists some similarities between today's conflict and antagonism at that time.

Nevertheless, the Constitution of 1921, which received 223 of a total 413 votes, legally sanctioned national inequality and a centralized system of government. The Balkan Wars, the First World War and typhus placed a great burden on the peoples of the area. The country was devastated. Furthermore, the new state needed a joint army, judiciary and currency. The South Slav State was by no means populated by only South Slavs. A tenth of 12 million inhabitants were not speakers of Slavic language. In the absence of any common traditions or political institutions, it was a difficult task to create a nation. The new state received substantial sums in war reparation from the Central Powers. The problems of physical and organizational reconstruction were immense. These problems were great in Macedonia where two decades of guerrilla strife had been followed by the Balkan Wars as well as World War I.(46)

Even when modern means of communication and transportation were established, they had been constructed with entirely different needs and interests in mind. Serbian rail system existed between Salonika and Serbia, whereas that of northern regions was integrated with the Austrian and Hungarian systems. On the other hand, the October Revolution in Russia had tremendous effects on the Yugoslav peoples. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), founded in 1919 by some wings of social democratic parties in the Yugoslav lands, enjoyed wide popular support.(47) However, after getting 59 seats in the Constituent Assembly in 1920, the then government banned the Party at the end of the same year. In 1928, a Montenegrin deputy shot to death some Croatian deputies, among them was the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, in the Assembly. As a result, the Croatian deputies set up an alternative assembly in Zagreb. The Slovenes tried to do their best to find a solution, without any success. The Serbs, however, were unwilling to contemplate a federal state while the Croats were unprepared to consider anything else. The King also failed to break the deadlock and declared a personal dictatorship in 1929, further deteriorating the existing social antagonism. At the beginning, he tried to develop a new sense of common nationality. The name of the state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The boundaries of the regions were drawn in order to weaken traditional regional loyalties. Political parties appealing to specific or religious constituencies were banned, the press was suppressed. Police practiced torture widely, and critics of royal centralism were arrested. In its foreign policy, Yugoslavia at first relied on France and Great Britain, but later shifted to Italy and

Germany. Meanwhile, many Croatian extremists fled to Italy and Hungary where they set up the terrorist Ustasha organization. Political violence and terrorism became a very important problem for Yugoslavia. All governments were short-lived.

Until 1941, to the outbreak of the World War II, industry was built up, transportation was improved, and the dinar was stabilized by the war reparations from the Central Powers. Owing to the fear of Bolshevism in the wake of the Russian Revolution, a programme of land reform was promulgated. The redistribution of land was used as a means of changing local demography to suit the interests of Belgrade.(48) Under the King (from Karadjordjevic dynasty) and seeking a way out of the chronic political crisis, the country began gravitating increasingly toward fascist Germany and Italy. On the eve of the Second World War, the ruling circles in Serbia reached an agreement with the leaders of the opposition Croatian Peasant Party (Cvetkovic-Macek, 1939) on the creation of the Province of Croatia (Province Banovina) and the participation of the Croatian Peasant Party in the government which continued to pursue a pro- fascist policy.

A turning point in the history of Yugoslavia came in 1937, when Josip Broz Tito took over the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In the years leading up to the attack on Yugoslavia, he re-structured the Yugoslav Communist Party organizationally and politically. Tito was a pivotal figure in the modern history of Yugoslavia. He was born in the village of Kumrovec in Croatia - which was part of Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918, the seventh

of twelve children in a poor peasant family.(49) He worked in Zagreb, Sisak and then in Slovenia. He did his military service in the Austro-Hungarian army. Then he joined a trade union and the Socialist Party. He spent a short time in prison, charged with being a socialist and spreading anti-militarist ideas. Sent to the Russian front, he was wounded and taken prisoner, spending a long time in POW camps in the Urals.(50) After the February Revolution (1917) he escaped from this camp to St.Petersburg where he joined the demonstrations of July. He was imprisoned and then sent to Siberia. While travelling, he escaped to Omsk and joined the International Red Guard and the Bolshevik Party. Upon his return to Yugoslavia, he worked actively in trade unions and workers' movements. He became a party official in 1927 and took over the leadership of the party organization in Zagreb. The year after, he was arrested again and sentenced to five years imprisonment. After serving his sentence, he became a member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee.(51)

During the Second World War he commanded the Partisan forces against the occupying forces. In April 1941, when the government and the King signed a protocol in Vienna on Yugoslavia's accession to the Axis Powers, he fled the country. The government set up Chetnik units, promoting their leader Draza Mihajlovic. It collaborated with the occupiers. The National Liberation Army, consisting of Partisan forces fought against them as well. The Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) was set up as the political representative of the people and the liberation war in 1942. In its second session in November 1943, it decided to set up a temporary

government headed by Tito and to organize Yugoslavia on the federal principle, trying to set up a legal form for the so-called national equality and rights of all the Yugoslav peoples and nationalities, and to unite them in a new state.(52)

In March 1945, at the proposal of the AVNOJ, Tito formed an all-Yugoslav government, which was recognized by the Alliance and the neutral states. At the third session of the Council, it turned itself into a Provisional National Assembly. Elections were held in November the same year. The National Front candidates polled an overwhelming majority of the votes, thereby confirming the socio-political system of a socialist Yugoslavia. At its first session in November 1945, the Assembly approved a declaration proclaiming the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Constitution of the country was promulgated in January 1946. (53)

As is seen, there were many problems at the founding of Yugoslavia. Following these developments, Tito implemented a different form of socialist rule called self-management, and the country entered 1980s with many suppressed problems. After Tito's death these problems, which will be discussed in the following section, have surfaced and have played a vital role for the conflict and disintegration.

2. REASONS FOR CONFLICT AND DISINTEGRATION

History does not fade away in Europe, as everywhere. The Yugoslavs have shown the rest of the continent just how tenacious history can be. The crisis has also revived some old pains that everybody hoped were forgotten. Starting from the end of June 1991, the Yugoslav breakup has come to the fore with a war just after the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. It was, indeed, a very important stage of a long process leading to disintegration, but also the beginning of the end. There have been many factors in this ruggy road of disintegration. To understand this process, it is necessary to examine these factors:

- Serbian nationalism and its proponent, Milosevic
- Cultural ethnicity and other historical reasons including Tito's role
- Economic discrepancies between the republics and
- Changing international climate and third party involvement.

2.1. SERBIAN NATIONALISM AND ITS PROPONENT-- MILOSEVIC

Against Slovenia and Croatia, when they declared independence on 25 June 1991, was the powerful Serbian Republic, the largest in Yugoslavia and the region's last bastion of orthodox communism, and the Yugoslav National Army with its Serbian-dominated officers at top ranks. In the past and present Yugoslavia, Serbian ethnocentrism has always been on the agenda.

With dreams of Medieval Serbia, in the 19th century Serbian cruel leaders of Obrenovic and Karadjordje dynasties started considering plans for expansion leading to a "Great Dream". They used the Ottoman millet system as an effective instrument for the spread of Serb national identity. Thanks to the Ottomans' tolerant, as in the case of Patriarchate of Pec, authorized by the Ottomans as a Serbian patriarchate and provided with an autonomous self-government under their respective religious leaders, the growth of modern Serbian national ideology was prompted and did gain momentum after Serbian uprisings and the establishment of Serbian principality (1830). Thus, religious affiliation among the Serbs helped to shape national identity. Where they exercised jurisdiction, Serbian church organizations prompted Serb nationhood. So, Serbian leaders always furthered its influence, recognizing its assimilationist potential.(54)

With Karadjordje's son Alexander's coming to power after 1842, Ilija Garasanin (1812-74), Serbia's Minister of Interior at the time, became the pivotal figure in the considerations of Great Dream, namely Greater Serbia, and it has been said that he laid the foundations of the Great Serbian policy of unification.(55) Like many of his contemporaries, Garasanin believed that Serbia's national mission was to complete the task of liberation. The frontiers of new Serbia was going to be extended to all areas where Serbs lived. And these frontiers, according to Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic(1787-1864), the Serbian language reformer trying hard to bring a new linguistic definition of Serbdom, were linguistic; hence the responsibility of "liberation and unification" of all Serbs into a single Great Serbian state gradually became the master principle of Serbian policy. The new Serbia was going to be continuation of Stephan Dusan's medieval realm and that

it should resume the old Nemanjic task of building a Serbo-Slavic Empire. Luckily dream of such an empire was halted by the Ottomans in the 14th century.

The feeling of Serb superiority also overwhelmed unitarist Yugoslav ideology. The period of unitarist Yugoslavism had to deal with this issue, and a Serbophilia and belief in Serb superiority influenced the socialist state. Sections of this disparate movement became more and more conservative and chauvinistic, glorifying the army and elite among other Serbian institutions. The policy of centralization was the logical outcome of the political advantage taken in the new state by the Serbian national and unitary Yugoslavist ideologies. Their original wish was to turn Yugoslavia into an extension of the old Serbian state, abolishing all non-Serb national identities.

National tendencies among the League of Communists (LOC) of Serbia cadres are intermingled with authoritarian political views. In 1972, the cadres who stood for self-management and relatively liberal views were dismissed by those who would see the 1974 Constitution as a pretext for "national rebirth". Dragoslav Markovic, a respected leader of the above-mentioned cadres, prepared a report (the Blue Book) opposing the autonomy policy.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The main target was the status of autonomous region given to Kosovo and Vojvodina by the 1974 Constitution. During the 1980s, the tendency from Ivan Stambolic to Milosevic was the line from pragmatic nationalism to chauvinism. Stambolic became an important leader of the Communist Party from 1980 to 1987 and pursued a pragmatic policy. He, however, aimed at making Serbia the number one republic

in the Federation. Toward this, he tried to establish a dialogue with leaders of Kosovo where Serbia's relations were problematic.

The province of Kosovo is of high importance to Serbian nationalism since it was the heart of the medieval Serbian Kingdom. The Ottoman Empire put an end to the Kingdom in Kosovo in 1389. Thus, it is called "Ancient Serbia" by the Serbian nationalists and the "holy land of all Serbs" by the Chetnik Movement. After 1389, the Albanian population has become dominant in this region. For this reason, Serbian nationalists felt that their land had come under occupation. This was further provoked by the present nationalists, especially after the March 1981 demonstrations by the Kosovo leadership demanding self-determination and improved living standards, as well as a fully autonomous Kosovo republic. There were apparent reasons for such demands. Under Serbian policies of oppression, Kosova was deprived of a wide range of rights, including better economic conditions.

On the other hand, claiming they were being pressured to leave the province by ethnic Albanians, the Province's Slavic population became increasingly vocal and directed its complaints at Belgrade. Faced with the challenges, Serbian regional party chief Slobodan Milosevic seized the opportunity with the Kosovo issue in September 1987 to consolidate his control over the Serbian party organization. At this point, it is helpful to discuss how Milosevic could provide an example for social scientists, who argue that psychological factors and human motivations have a considerable role in conflict. There are several theories and arguments which view conflict from a psychological perspective. One of

Kenneth Waltz's three images of international relations is that war is traceable to human nature and behavior.(57) No theory of conflict denies that there is significant relationship between the inner structure of the individual and conflict in the external social order. Herbert Kelman also argues that findings of psychology play their part in conflict.(58) As for Milosevic, the son of an Orthodox priest, he was an ambitious politician. He had been the chairman of Belgrade Bank earlier. After the Kosovo demonstrations, he ousted faction that was following the official party line. By making the party the defender of the Serbs in Kosovo, Milosevic was able to restore the authority and legitimacy of the Serbian party in the eyes of many in the republic. He took a hard line within Serbia, suppressing the opposition and journalists critical of his leadership. At the same time, he continued to exploit nationalist issues, pursuing a populist, chauvinistic version of Serbian nationalism. (59) He underlined that Serbs had been ill-treated by the existing political system, and that Serbs were threatened from all sides. At the 8th Party Congress in September 1987, he eliminated Stambolic and Pavlovic, the reformists of the party. (60) After the Congress, Serbian nationalism was kept alive in the press, the party, public opinion and among the intelligentsia systematically. The Chetnik Movement of the Serbian nation was resurrected against its "historical enemies."(61)

Before Milosevic took over the party leadership, one of the most significant groups to use nationalism, especially against the party, was the Serbian Academy of Art and Science. The Academy condemned "incompetent" leaders for the economic and political crisis at the time. With Milosevic heading the party, they took the same line as him. Some of his cohorts in the Academy and friends

among the government-controlled press spread the pro-war sentiment, calling peace-lovers traitors.

Serbia's opposition was not effective either. The only effective opposition party was the monarchist Serbian Renewal Movement led by Vuk Draskovic, an ex-communist. Now an anti-communist writer, he promotes Eastern Orthodox solidarity. In July 1991, Draskovic's party began recruiting its own militia, the Serbian Guard. However, its most prominent leader Branislav Matic, was shot to death by gunmen. A day before, the Guard's commander, Djordje Bozovic, had to leap from a second-floor hotel window to escape a police siege. (62) Draskovic charged the Serbian government with political assassination, saying that there was no question that insanity is ruling Serbia. The only card, he went on saying, that Serbia's present leaders would have to play was war without end, war with everybody and, last but not least, war against their own people. The government called Draskovic's accusations a calumny. Draskovic points to Vojislav Seselj, a radical nationalist and former political prisoner of the communists, as a dangerous man. Seselj, who hates Draskovic, urged the government to take action against Serbian Guards. His aim was apparently to eliminate any opposition to the Great Dream.

Another important element of Serbian nationalism is the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) with its Serbian-dominated senior officers, a privileged class. Its Chief of Staff is General Blagoje Adzic, a Serb whose family was killed by Croat militiamen during the Second World War. Upon an announcement by Stipe

Mesic, a Croat whose turn as head of the eight-member federal presidency was blocked by Serbia for several weeks, that "the Army will remain in its barracks", Adzic responded that "de-politicized and confined to barracks, the Army would lose its soul and its popular spirit". (63) The 138,000-man Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which was more than 75 percent Serbian, is one of tools of the "the dream of Greater Serbia". It is a very closed society with a strong sense of separate identity. The YPA was born of a nationalist vision. Remnants of Tito's partisan guerillas, the Army grew into a major multi-ethnic force after Yugoslavia left the Soviet bloc in 1948. It collected recruits from all the republics to protect the nation's independent socialism against Stalin, and then Brezhnev. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the YPA found another ancient cause: combatting separatism in line with Serbian interests.

A top Slovene defense adviser Anton Bebler characterized Adzic as a Balkan warrior who received military training in Moscow. These men were all mountain peasants - proud, warlike and committed to the ideal of communism. They embraced the dream of Greater Serbia. (64) Another motive for the Army to attack Slovenia and Croatia was also the contributions of Croatia and Slovenia to the defense budget - meaning officers' salaries which were not keeping pace with inflation. There was also a dissension between the hard-liners and moderates. However, the war has allowed Milosevic and his colleagues from the Party and the Army to tighten their hold on the republic's political life despite a shaky economy. Their ambitions stretch beyond the dreams of Tsar Dusan, the Serb most-heralded medieval ruler, or Karadjordje who led Serbia against the Ottomans.

2.2. CULTURAL ETHNICITY AND HISTORICAL REASONS

As stated earlier, a main factor which has given rise to conflict in the former Yugoslavia is cultural. Group identity, cohesion and the feeling of deprivation are just a few playing role in this. What is in question in Yugoslavia, especially between the Serbs and Croats and Slovenes is cultural ethnicity rather than race. Cultural ethnicity also covers ideological and religious differences. Animosity between the Serbs and their western neighbours goes back for centuries. An ancient cultural line runs through Yugoslavia, dividing the east from the west. The most elementary characteristic of the Balkan lands is that they are an area in which three religious traditions, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, have met. It is a cultural frontier zone. Different languages were spoken even when Theodosius divided his Empire into two parts: the Western Roman Empire, which included what are now Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia; and the Byzantine Empire, which included what are now Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. And then for centuries, Slovenia and Croatia have generally been under Western influence; Serbia and other southern republics lived under the Ottoman Empire. For hundreds of years, the Ottoman Empire ruled the Serbs, while the Austrian Habsburgs ruled the Slovenes and Croats. The western part uses Latin alphabet and generally worships in the Roman Catholic tradition. The Slovenes and Croats have been Catholics, as were the Habsburgs. The Serbs and the southern republics are Eastern Orthodox with Muslim communities. While Serbs and Croats speak the same language, the Croats write in the Roman alphabet, and the Serbs use Cyrillic. The east-west frontier in the main followed the course of Drina River, the border between

Serbia and Bosnia. Adherence to the three principal religion was of importance for the cultural and political content of nationality. These allegiances were deep-rooted, and should not be underestimated. Deep differences have remained to this day.

For the Slovenes and Croats, the Serbs are still infidels - a mixed bag of communists and barbarians - slothful, ignorant of Western ways and prone to authoritarianism unacceptable to democrats. On the other hand, Serbs view their northern neighbours with equal disdain. To them, the Slovenes and Croats are stodgy people, obsessed with aping the ways of the West. They also remember the legacy of World War II, when Croatia was a Nazi puppet state led by the Ustasha which is known to have killed hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs as well as Jews. The flags and emblems seen in Croatia today may go back 1,000 years, but for Serbs they recall only the brutality of the Ustasha regime. "The Croats hate the Serbs and all we can expect from them is misfortune." says a Croatian woman from Pakrac, on Croatia's southern border with Serbia.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Slovenia claims that it is the most westernized republic in Yugoslavia. They like to think themselves apart from the rest of Yugoslavia. Many Yugoslavs seem to be possessed by such a cultural ethnic patriotism that they can not see its effects on others. This has become an important factor leading to disunion.

In the process of Yugoslav dissolution , Tito's role should be mentioned as well. For many people today's process of conflict and disintegration started after his demise. However, he had a role in the whole thing. The Western support of Yugoslavia stemmed from the belief that only Tito can save Yugoslavia from a

Soviet threat, and that the one-party rule under Tito would be capable of keeping the country together. The "brotherhood and unity" platform, adopted at the AVNOJ conference in 1943 was the basis which was supposed to bring all together. Tito began to draw some artificial boundaries and create the so-called republics. Montenegro is one instance of this. It contains only less than three percent of the total population, and it is highly debatable whether most of the population is anything else other than Serbs by another name. That is why it constitutes a part of the new Yugoslav Federation. As for Kosovo, according to Enver Hodza, during his visit to Belgrade, Tito told him that he believed Kosovo belonged to Albania, but in view of the strong Serb opposition at the time it would be inappropriate to transfer it to Albania. (66) However, it can also be argued that since Enver Hodza is not necessarily a reliable source, Tito may have created Kosovo within the Serbia in order to constrain it like Vojvodina. In the final analysis however, we can draw the conclusion that Tito has played an important role in drawing the internal borders of Yugoslavia.

By the end of the war, six republics were established within Yugoslavia and given cultural autonomy; the right to use their own languages and alphabet, but only to express the one and the same party line. The concept of federation, in its Bolshevik meaning, was something other than what the Westerners thought it to be. Regarding constitutional rights (especially the right to secede), Milovan Djilas says that on one occasion Tito told his associates: "Our situation is different from that of Russians, we can not give this right. Say something changes in Macedonia and they demand secession. What then?" (67) In the words of Yugoslavia's leading constitutional lawyer, Milan Djordjevic, commenting on the

1974 constitution: "As regards to right to secession, there is no change from earlier constitutions. Such a right legally does not exist...The constitution confirms the historical process which led to the creation of the Yugoslav community. (68) In reality, as Ivo Lapenna (of the London School of Economics) pointed out, the peoples of Yugoslavia were never consulted at any time, about whether or not they wish to be incorporated into a single state. (69)

However, the polycentric etatism given to the "six plus two", and their efforts to make it impossible to exchange it for the centrally directed etatism has gone far and made it difficult to retain a central control on issues affecting daily life. On October 2, 1983, Belgrade TV showed that it took only 55 seconds for a car to cross the bridge which separates Zvornik from Mali Zvornik, the two towns in different republics, Bosnia and Serbia, because of bureaucratic procedures a letter might take several days, as the post had to go via Tuzla and Belgrade. Such examples could be multiplied.

2.3. ECONOMIC DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS

The national economy of Yugoslavia underwent remarkable transformation since 1945 within a distinctive socialist ideological framework, and under special difficulties resulting from the country's contrasting regional levels of economic development and losses during World War II. Economic recovery was rapid in the postwar period, assisted by loans from both the East and West. It was particularly high between 1953 and 1965, but slowed dramatically in the 1980s.

Industrial growth has been a key to economic development. However, overall productivity remained low and unemployment high.

The system, which is known as self-management has been the creation of Yugoslavia's leading ideologist, Edvard Kardelj. The means of production and other major resources were not regarded as state property but "social property". Individuals participated in the management of the work organizations which they were employed. Each organization was governed by a Worker's Council. If the organization was very small these functions were exercised by the whole workforce. In 1967, foreign capital investments were allowed for the first time. The changes were intended to give a greater role to market forces. Small private business which employed up to five people were permitted. Attempts to introduce market mechanism had been only partly successful. In the absence of real stimulus to efficiency, Worker's Councils often raised wage levels above the true earning capacity of their firms. They have been aided by local political officials who wanted to secure their own positions. The bureaucratic burden necessarily carried by self-managing organizations provided considerable disincentive to the creation of smaller enterprises.

Extreme decentralization in the economy also exacerbated the effects of the international oil crisis of 1970s. The dismantling of the Yugoslav economy deprived the country of any regular supply of energy. As Politika reported on November 16, 1983, "local authorities have regarded it far easier to reach a deal with a foreign power than with an energy producer just a few hundred kilometers away".(70) Inter-republican rivalries obstructed two major hydro-electric

projects. The first, to be partially financed by the World Bank, was going to be located at the mouth of Rivers Pliva and Tara near Foca, and was held up by disagreements on the share out of benefits between Montenegro and Bosnia; the second on the Drina river where Mimar Sinan had built a great bridge, by a similar dispute between Bosnia and Serbia.(71)

Economic differences between the first breakaway republics, Slovenia and Croatia, and the other republics in the south was another source of conflict. They felt that their richness were poured into the underdeveloped republics. Slovenia and Croatia began industrializing earlier. They claim that Yugoslav communism under the Serbs held back their development and poured their money to subsidize poor regions in the south. Slovenia is indeed prosperous. With 8 percent of Yugoslavia's population, it generated one quarter of the country's national production. It was the richest republic of the country with an enviable foreign-trade balance, and hard-working people. But, they felt that they were impoverished by a galloping inflation and federal taxes whose revenues were destined for the less-developed areas of the country. Many Slovenes concluded that central planning and self-management system were the source of their problems, and they considered themselves powerless to change them. (71) Thus, beside the antagonisms between peoples, serious economic disparities between the various Yugoslav republics are also at the root of the conflict. Unemployment affected the less-developed regions much more than the others: 16% in Macedonia, much more in Kosovo. Political relations within the country were influenced by the disintegration of the economy, low internal exchanges, expensive and unproductive production process - all factors contributing to

nationalism among other things. During the second half of 1980s, economic policies of the republics increasingly blocked the integrating economic trends. According to Bogomil Fertila (professor at the Ljubljana University), there was almost no flow of capital between the republics. Each republic and province had its own central bank, in addition to the federal one. All commercial banking was done at the republic level. Inter-republican market exchange was decreasing. And, each republic pursued its own distinct policies on technological development, taxes, and price regulation. These and other economic policies were not coordinated with other republics or with the Federation.(72) The primacy of politics over economics remained. Instead of the center running the entire economy, there were eight centers running eight economies. The leadership of each tended to carry out autarkic policies meant to reinforce its political position within the republic. In addition, managers were appointed by local and federal party organizations on the basis of political loyalty rather than expertise.

Such policies contributed to Yugoslavia's economic stagnation. The result was stalemate. The party cracked down on growing internal dissent. The response outside the party, especially in Croatia and Serbia, was to arrest and harass the opposition. However, the party was paralyzed by disunity. Especially in Serbia, criticism was directed at party's alleged disregard of Serbian national interest. It was also this use of nationalism as a political issue that effectively reinforced the stalemate over economic policy reform.

Moreover, economic priorities and needs of each republic were completely different, and clashed with each other. What was in question was uncontested opposition of economic interests: One republic (Serbia) was completely opposed to any devaluation of dinar because of its huge foreign debts, while the other (Slovenia) needed this measure because of its high export potential. Additionally one region (Kosovo) objected to any increase in the price of electricity because it had to buy it from the other, while the other (Montenegro) asked for increases in its price because it had to sell electricity it. Disintegration started with economy.

The Yugoslav economy today is in desperate shape, as war damages mount, hyperinflation and unemployment accelerate, and hard currency reserves dry up. The country was already plagued by severe economic problems before the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. Since then, civil strife has further damaged the economy. Total war-related costs for Yugoslavia as a whole are not yet available. Croatia estimates that it alone has suffered more than \$15 billion in damages. Much of the transportation infra-structure has been severely damaged and key industries are no longer in operation. Tourism along the Dalmatia coast is almost non-existent, costing Croatia millions of dollars annually in hard currency revenues. Serbia's decision to introduce a new currency caused many difficulties for the republics that had big amounts of dinar in their reserves at the time. Even Serbia itself had to print five billion dinar notes because of hyperinflation.⁽⁷³⁾ Additionally, total industrial production for 1991 was estimated to have declined 20 per cent, following a 10,5 per cent dip in 1990. In 1992 and 1993, all kinds of production had totally collapsed. Unemployment increased, and nearly all of the employees are earning only

minimum wages with which nothing can be bought. Hyperinflation is steadily increasing. The Serbian government is printing additional banknotes to cover Yugoslav Armed Forces' costs. The army's costs have accounted for about five times the federal spending of 1991.

2.4.CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT

Today, national groups started to assert themselves as nation-states. Balkanization is on the agenda, not only in the Balkans. The Yugoslavs used to say; "we have six republics, five ethnic groups, four languages, three religions, two alphabets - one Tito." Now, there is no Tito, and the center can not hold anymore. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ensured to reinforce the long-established boundaries of countries no matter how artificial they were. Any attempt to redraw the map might have led to superpower intervention, and confrontation. The countries had their patrons, without doing any attempt unless they allowed. Now, it is much easier for people to express their complaints and grievances, pursue their aspirations and raise their flags.

International system is increasingly becoming a multipolar one. The events in the Balkans are helping to re-define the new international system, replacing the bipolar order of the Cold War years. There is no superpower confrontation any more that could be affected by the Yugoslav conflict. In the past, the superpowers would never allow such a situation. These changes have given rise to secessionist movements. It has become difficult to keep boundaries intact.

There is a wide variety of motives for outside intervention in ethnic conflicts. (74) Hegemonic ambitions, concerns about regional stability; ethnic sympathy for oppressed groups; a sense of international responsibility, perhaps allied to some notion of world order or regional order; and humanitarian concerns. The most common single reason for third-party support is instrumental in nature, it is international political gain. As in many conflicts, there is third-party involvement in the Yugoslav case.

First of all, the European Union (EU) took an initiative with a wide range of differences between member countries. Its explanation goes beyond geographical proximity and relates to the transformation of the continent in a way that would make it much more an important actor in a multipolar world. At the beginning of the conflict, the Union sent three delegations to Belgrade and initiated efforts within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to address the crisis.

The Hague Conference series were started, headed by Lord Carrington. But the results were inconclusive. At the beginning, they advocated territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and a new loose confederation. This is highly important in demonstrating EU's incapacity to deal with the issue and how outside factors affected the process leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. After the Ministerial Political Cooperation Meeting of the Council of the European Communities held in Brussels on 4-5 March 1991, the Community confirmed "the importance it attached to Yugoslavia's territorial unity and integrity", calling it

"imperative" for the unity of the "Yugoslav nation". It also called for arrangements at the federal level for future structures of Yugoslavia. (75)

At the joint communique released after a similar meeting of the EC foreign ministers held Chateau de Senningen, France, on March 26, 1991, the Community declared: "In the view of the Twelve, a united and a democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself in the new Europe." In the Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia, released after extraordinary European Political Cooperation (EPC) Ministerial Meeting in the Hague on July 5, 1991, it reiterated its position concerning the future of Yugoslavia, "which should be based on the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states (Charter of Paris)". (76)

In the Hague on August 6, 1991, the Community expressed the Twelve's strong interest in a peaceful solution to Yugoslavia's problems, "not only for the sake of Yugoslavia itself and its constituent peoples, but for Europe as a whole", and declared "any change of internal and international borders by force is not acceptable." (77) And, most importantly, the Community pledged in its extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 27 August 1991: "The European Community and its member states remind those responsible for the violence of their determination never to recognise changes of frontiers which have not been brought about by peaceful means and by agreement." It also added that "it can no longer be denied that elements of the Yugoslav People's

Army are lending their active support to the Serbian side, " calling the then Federal Presidency to put an immediate end to "this illegal use of forces under its command".(78) The same declaration also pledged:"The Community and its member States will never accept a policy of *fait accompli*. They are determined not to recognise changes of borders by force...Territorial conquests will never produce the kind of legitimate protection sought by all in Yugoslavia". The same Community,however, recognized declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992.

The Union itself was too divided to take decisive action. Not only have the Europeans been unable to stop a war on their doorstep, but some of their contradictory responses have aggravated it. Some French officials were talking of a "Teutonic Bloc", reminiscent of the old German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. France was worrying that micro states in the Balkans might be pulled irrevocably into Germany's orbit, shifting the balance of influence in the Community towards Berlin. Even the republics the EC recognized were not the pair recommended by a committee of legal advisers, led by Robert Badinter, president of France's constitutional court. The Badinter Group said that Slovenia and Macedonia met the Community's conditions for diplomatic recognition; Croatia did not, despite the fact that the Community pledged that it would never recognise any change of borders. However, what it did not recognize for months was the declaration of independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina.

German insistence was one of the reasons. Germany enthusiastically led the diplomatic charge in support of secessionist republics. Bonn, in an effort to

increase its influence in the continent, was the first to recognize the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. Greece continues to support Serbia despite agreed upon EU policies and United Nations sanctions. Britain, in an effort to prevent Germany and France from having new strategic gains in the Balkans, did not seem to have acted to stop the war in order to prolong Serbian rivalry with German allies Croatia and Slovenia. As a result of such a variety of opinions, policies, contradictions and lack of capability within the EU, diplomatic failure was inevitable. The Union could not pass the first major test for its common and multilateral foreign policy. Then, the United Nations has taken its own initiative to deploy UN peace-keeping forces. The continuation of conflict war and ethnic purification for months seemed to be proof of ineptitude of this organization. The UN, however, is not able to take much action without full consent of its permanent members, the USA and Russia in particular. That was why some world leaders called the UN to quit Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its mishandling of the situation, rather than its inability, have further exacerbated the conflict.

CONCLUSION

Yugoslavia serves as a good case of which questions a theory of disintegration should address. It also offers a good example in understanding when and why separate groups emerge, exist and resurge, becoming politically significant. Many of the elements necessary for a disintegration process can easily be found in the Yugoslav case. These elements are also what indirect and direct theories of disintegration see as necessary for a disintegration process--communal boundaries, a territorial base, a centralized bureaucracy, nationalism, and socio-psychological factors such as relative deprivation, the sudden rise in aspirations that are frustrated and discrepancy between expectations and attainments. All have existed in the Yugoslav case. Thus, it may offer an empirical base for testing the theories of integration, conflict and disintegration.

First of all, a number of background conditions have facilitated and fostered such a process in the former Yugoslavia. The conflict in this country was initiated by Serbian policies of internal colonialism and nationalism, escalating when it sent forces against Slovenia and Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the beginning, the extreme option of unilateral independence came out as the goal of the breakaway states of Slovenia and Croatia, when the center, Serbia, resorted to internal colonialist policies.

The scope of analysis in this thesis tends to confirm some of the theories regarding integration, conflict and disintegration, and discredits others. One of the

results of this case study is that there should be factors which could constitute a base for and justify a disintegration theory:

- a) a high level of suffering at the hand of the center (central state or power)-- domination, exploitation, assimilation, and direct violence,
- b) the existence of a community or separate society,
- c) a conceivable image of a more peaceful and advantageous situation which would emerge from separatism.

Further, the Yugoslav case verifies one of the two integration theories about the reasons of cohesiveness of political systems, and invalidates the other. In the former Yugoslavia, there has been neither procedural nor substantive consensus about the political framework of the system. The previous system could never establish and maintain cohesiveness because of the lack of widely shared values among its members, therefore hindering integration, as the first theory of integration suggests. On the other hand, the case discredits the second theory of integration argued by such writers as Hobbes and Dahrendorf, which argues that political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence or threat of force. Here, Serbian policies of using force did not work; these policies could not keep the old state system in line with Serbian interests, and further provoked secessionist tendencies.

Furthermore, efforts for consociationalism, one of the two approaches concerning state integration and cohesion, did not work well for the old state system. Contrary to what Lijphardt and Nordlinger argue--states can remain stable without attempts at integration provided a basis of cooperation is reached

by the elites of various cultural segments, there had not even been a compromise about the framework of the state system sustained by the elites of different groups, the former republics in our case.

The other concepts regarding national integration, namely Karl Deutsch's concepts of mobilization and assimilation, do not fit our case, since mobilization did not occur at the needed level in such an overwhelmingly rural society and there was no single major nation to which the others were going to be assimilated. The Yugoslav case also seems to have disproved certain Marxian approaches to the issue of integration and disintegration, since almost no shared historical and cultural traditions emerged as a result of the diverse groups having to live together, and did not lead to the creation of a single state.

The alternative model of state cohesion, by way of internal domination and corporate control of institutionally and culturally distinct groups by one group (Serbia in our case) was undermined by such a policy itself. Such control efforts by Serbia were met with strong resistance by the other groups in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, our case demonstrates that such control systems have their own upheavals. They should be acceptable to other groups so as to have a better chance of cohesiveness. Such control systems may even lead to the other distinct groups to unite against the dominant one, as in the case of unity efforts by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in a possible federation or confederation.

Harsh strategies which seek to usurp the rights of other groups by such means as imposing policies, territorial claims, and attempting to become more authoritative in state affairs (as Serbia tried to do) are ineffective in the long run and in many instances can turn mere autonomists into full-fledged secessionists. Thus, it is not an overstatement to argue that when such groups resort to secession, it is also due to the centre's lack of imagination, moderation, or simple ability to adjust to change, and unnecessarily harsh strategies.

As to direct theories of disintegration, namely internal colonialism and ethnicity or primordialism, as being the two polar models of disintegration, the Yugoslav case tends to confirm both in certain degrees. In our case, Serbia, considering itself the dominant factor in ex-Yugoslavia in terms of population and the positions they used to hold, tried to impose its internal colonialist and nationalistic policies on the other former republics. Consequently, the oppressed and deprived groups resisted integration and tended towards separatism.

The hypothesis of ethnicity (in a cultural sense) or primordialism (which suggests that ethnic consciousness, regardless of inequality or dominance, and not social and economic discontent, but discontent based on only ethnic symbols can cause separatism) should also receive active consideration. Economic discontent has been a highly important motivation for Slovenia to secede. The roots of separatism also lie in elite disputes over the direction of change and grievances linked to the scarcity of resources. Yet the second part of the same hypothesis, which states that ethnic identity, in our case cultural, is one of the fundamental reasons for political and militant separatism was confirmed by the

Yugoslav case. This factor has played a key role in the process of Yugoslav disintegration.

As for the theories of conflict, inter-group, interpersonal and intrapersonal reasons are counted among the causes of conflict. In the Yugoslav case, it is much more inter-group conflict, since most groups in this country pursued incompatible goals. The case also confirms James Rosenau's argument which suggests that the more rapid the rate of change becomes, the greater the likelihood of intrasocietal violence is. What was in question in ex-Yugoslavia after Tito's death has been a rapid breakaway from the patterns of the old system, thereby rapidly increasing the rate of change, and consequently conflict. So, it is not an overstatement to argue that conflict results from the need for change and the reaction to change. Separatism and conflict develops when previously acquired privileges are threatened or alternatively when underprivileged groups realize that the moment has come to redress inequality. This has been important in the Yugoslav disintegration. Even the rotative presidency system caused serious problems between the former republics after Tito's death. In other words, a deficiency in the state system leads to each state (the former republics in our case) to pursue its own interests, and act as judge in its own case when it becomes involved in disputes with others. Therefore, it makes the recurrence of conflict inevitable and gives rise to the expectation of war as a normal feature of state system.

Furthermore, the domain of conflict in the country has been large since there are many parties involved--three active parties (Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-

Herzegovina), four involved ones (three plus Slovenia), and other parties watching and closely being affected by the conflict (Macedonia, Kosovo, the neighbouring countries and other international actors). The case confirms the known hypothesis that the more parties in a conflict, the larger its domain.

The arguments seeking the causes of conflict in the condition known to the classical political theorists as international anarchy (the absence of those instruments of law and organization and the will to use them even for peace-making and peace-keeping) have also received sound confirmation in the Yugoslav case.

The end of the Cold War can be said to have produced the paradoxical result of having revitalized the ideas of nationalism and tendencies toward secessionism particularly in the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, affected the leaders as well as the masses. Nationalism rose as an instrument for political struggle, expansionism and the retention of power. Lack of ideas for dealing with these issues and the rise of ethnic hatreds also contributed to secessionist tendencies. Yugoslavia has highlighted those negative trends.

Therefore, whatever the precise reasons for violent disintegration and secession, by their very nature they are thrust onto the international scene and become an issue of serious international concern. Primarily they are a source of worry to states bordering secessionist territories and bordering the central power that is the object of secession. Meanwhile, extended involvement of third states, whose

main instrumental motive is strategic gains, can escalate rather than contain the conflict, as was the case at the beginning of Yugoslav crisis.

The basic rules of international conduct, including rules that borders must not be changed by force and territory won by aggression can not be held, may be endangered if third parties are involved in secessionist conflicts for their own strategic interests. Whereas Yugoslavia poses a threat to peace and stability in Europe and the world. It also represents a case of how appeals to ethnic national sentiment and chauvinistic nationalism, to the interest of specific nations, Serbs and Croats in the Yugoslav example, can affect stability in a way that could lead into disintegration and conflict with negative regional or even global consequences.

In the light of those negative trends, a new understanding of relations between the international community and any given state, especially in the present European context, could lead to the creation of effective modalities in solving crises like the Yugoslav one. In the absence of such modalities, the larger defeat could be at a global level. It would be a defeat for integration, and the cosmopolitan principle on which the modern world professes to run its affairs.

APPENDIX *

CROATIA

Croatia which covers an area of 56,538 square kilometers or 21 per cent of Yugoslavia's total area, can be divided on the basis of geographic and climatic conditions into three regions: Mediterranean, mountain and Panonian. The Mediterranean sector has one of the longest shorelines in the world. If added to the mainland coastline of 1,778 km, that of the 1,185 islands and islets, then this land of a thousand islands has a total shoreline of 5,790 km. The mountain region, which joins Mediterranean and Panonian sectors, is the smallest and most sparsely populated. The Panonian region is the largest and most densely populated part of Croatia.

Demography and History

According to the 1981 census, Croatia had 4,601,469 inhabitants, of whom 3,454,661 (75%) were Croats, 531,502 (11,5%) were Serbs, 379,057 (8,2%) were so-called Yugoslavs, while the remainder belonged to the other Yugoslav nations and nationalities. The capital of Croatia is Zagreb, which had a population of 855,568 in 1981. It is the second largest city in Yugoslavia, but in

* Sources previously referred to were used in the appendix. It underlines the distinctive economic, social and political characteristics of the former republics and autonomous regions which have facilitated conflict and disintegration.

terms of industrial potential it holds first place. Other big towns are Split, Rijeka, Osijek, Cakovec, Zadar, Slavonski Brod, Varazdin, Sisak, Sibenik, Karlovac, Dubrovnik and Pula.

After settling in their present homeland in the 6th and 7th centuries, the Croats founded their own state (princes Trpimir, Branimir, kings Tomislav and Petar Kresimir IV) which remained independent until 1102 when it entered a union with Hungary. In 1527, the Croatian feudal nobility recognized Habsburg rule. A struggle was waged from that time onwards, until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, against the hegemony of Vienna and Budapest (the Zrinski-Frankopan conspiracy in the 17th century, the Rakovica revolt in 1871, and the revolutionary youth movement at the beginning of this century). The down-trodden peasantry waged a long and bloody struggle against feudal oppression. The biggest peasant revolt, which was led by the Croatian serf Matija Gubec, broke out in 1573. It spread throughout the Hrvatsko Zagorje region and into Kranjska and Stajerska in Slovenia. In the second half of the 19th century, the newly formed bourgeoisie launched a national revival generally known as the Illyrian movement, which sought wider support for its struggle through the idea of a union with other South Slavs. The inspiration guidelines of the period were the legal concept of an autonomous Croatian state by Ante Starcevic and the Yugoslav idea by Josip Juraj Strossmayer, both were prominent figures in political and cultural life of the country.

The worker's movement, which had fairly strong support in northern Croatia, gained impetus after 1895 when the Social Democratic Party won a majority at the Zagreb municipal elections in 1920. It was in the city of Zagreb that Tito began his revolutionary activity. It was again in Zagreb, that the Eighth Zagreb Party Conference and the struggle against factionalism began. In 1940, at the Fifth National Conference of the Yugoslav Communist Party, it was decided that the Party was organizationally prepared to undertake the historic task in the face of "fascist" aggression. After the collapse of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941 and the establishment of the Ustasha quisling regime, many of the Croatian people joined the other Yugoslav nations and nationalities in their struggle for national liberation, under the leadership of the Communist Party. By the end of 1941, there were already 16 Partisan detachments with about 7,000 fighters. In autumn of the same year, the Main Headquarter of Croatia and the first people's liberation committee were formed. After the first session of the AVNOJ, the corresponding body for Croatia was set up as the highest political representative of the national liberation movement in Croatia. In the course of the national liberation war and the socialist revolution, it regained statehood and the regions that had been previously taken by Italy (Istria, Rijeka, Zadar and some of the islands).

Economy and Education

In the period from 1945 until mid-1980s, Croatia's economy expanded at an extremely fast pace, the growth rate of its gross national product being the highest in Yugoslavia. Between 1952 and 1983, gross national product of economy rose at an annual rate of 6% while per capita growth was 5.4%. Industry showed the highest average growth rate (7,3%). In 1983, Croatia was responsible for 25,2% of the country's national income, that is more than a quarter of Yugoslav industrial production. Its industry employed 35,9% of the total number employed. Some several modern industries have been developed: metal manufactures, electric-powered machines, shipbuilding, chemicals, petroleum refining. Croatia built 73,3% of Yugoslavia's shipping and produced and refined 64% of its petroleum and natural gas. It specialised in petroleum, shipping and chemicals. Croatia's oil fields yielded three million tons of petroleum a year, which was enough to satisfy one-quarter of Yugoslavia's needs. Natural gas deposits were discovered under the Adriatic Sea. Petroleum used to be refined at Rijeka, Sisak and Zagreb. Yugoslavia's biggest shipyards were located in Rijeka, Split and Pula with 80% of the ships being constructed there exported. It also had 30% of Yugoslavia's chemical industry. Pliva, Jugoplastika and Jugovinil are the most important firms in this field. Boris Kidric, in Sibenik and Djuro Djakovic of Slavonski Brod were the biggest ones in metal-working industry.

of the country's exports. Tourism also contributed an important share to the country's earnings. About 50% of the domestic tourist trade and 75% of its foreign tourist trade was transacted in Croatia.

Croatia has nearly 3,000 primary schools. The teaching was not only in Croatian or Serbian, but also in the languages of the other Yugoslav nations and nationalities. In nearly 60 schools over 2,500 children received instruction in Italian (21 schools), Hungarian (15 schools), Czech (13 schools), Slovak (2 schools), Ruthenian and Ukranian.

In 1948, 900 students received university degrees. Forty years later, the annual figure for students completing a course of study at the university or some other institution of higher education was 12,384. It has four big universities (Zagreb, Rijeka, Split and Osijek) with 55 faculties and 28 colleges. About 500 post-graduates are used to obtain master's and 200 doctor's degrees every year in Croatia. Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts (the oldest institution of this kind in the country), the Yugoslav Lexicographical Institute, the National and University Libraries, the Archives of the Republic of Croatia, the Rudjer Boskovic Nuclear Institute are all located in Zagreb. There are some cultural institutions in Croatia; 123 Museums, 718 libraries, about 15 professional theatres and 61 cultural centres. Additionally, there were more than 708 newspapers with a total circulation of 340,023,000 copies annually and 382 magazines with 11,883,000

copies. There were 51 radio stations and four television centres (Zagreb, Rijeka , Split and Osijek).

SLOVENIA

Slovenia occupies the north-western part of Yugoslavia bordering on Italy, Austria and Hungary. Slovenia covers an area of 20,251 square kilometers, 8% of Yugoslavia's total. The western and northern parts of Slovenia lie in a region dominated by the eastern Alps. The southern most part of Slovenia extends to the Adriatic Sea. Its coastline is 46,6 km and includes the port of Koper and the summer resorts of Piran, Portoroz, Izola and Ankaran. Rolling hills, covered mostly with vineyards, extend towards the east, along the Krka valley.

Demography and History

According to the 1981 census, Slovenia had 1,891,864 inhabitants, of whom 1,712,445 (90,5%) were Slovenes, 55,625 (2,9%) were Croats, 42,182 (2,2%) Serbs, 26,263 (1,4%) so-called Yugoslavs, 13,425 (0,7%) Muslims, 9,496 (0,5%) Hungarians, 2,187 (0,1%) Italians. Of the total population, 48,9% live in towns. Its capital is Ljubljana with 310,211 inhabitants. Other important towns are Maribor, Celje, Kranj, Koper, Novo Mesto, Nova Gorica and Jesenice. In 1984, there were 829,000 persons employed in Slovenia.

It was only after the struggle for national liberation and the revolution during the Second World War that the Slovenian people, one of the smallest of the Slav nations, finally became true masters of their native land. In the 6th century the Slovenes settled in their present home, and in territories twice as extensive to the north and west which over the centuries were wrested from them by foreign conquerors. In 623, the Slovene tribes joined the state ruled by Samo. After his death in the middle of the 7th century, Karantanija - the state of Slovenes - survived until 745 when it fell under Bavarian rule. In the 13th century, the Habsburg gained control of the territory inhabited by the Slovenes who remained under Austrian rule for over six centuries until 1918.

The years 1478, 1515 and 1573 were marked by the biggest uprisings of the Slovene peasantry against their feudal overlords. These peasant revolts were suppressed. The peasant rebellions and the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century fostered a political and cultural awakening among the Slovenes. Primož Trubar, Jurij Dalmatin and other Protestant writers printed the first books in the Slovenian language. In the middle of the 19th century, under the influence of the revolution which had broken out in Vienna in March of 1848, Slovenian students in Vienna drew up a programme for a unified Slovenia. The programme called for the unification of all Slovenes who were then living in scattered feudal provinces, the establishment of a Slovenian parliament and administration, and a whole series of national and social rights. At the same time, the Slovenian

peasantry demanded and obtained the abolition of land taxes. Under the conditions of the time and with an economic depression which had driven hundreds of thousands of Slovenes abroad to seek a living in the late 19th century, the working class was roused. In 1896, the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party was founded in Ljubljana. At the end of the First World War, the Slovenes united in the new state - the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but this did not bring them complete national equality and autonomy. Moreover, due to the European political arrangements, nearly half a million Slovenes remained outside the borders of the common state in Italy and Austria.

The struggle of the Slovenes for their nation, state and social rights was won during the National Liberation War (1941- 1945). Just after the collapse of the Kingdom and the fascist dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the southern part of Slovenia was occupied by the Italians, the region accross the Mura river by the Hungarians, while the northern part was annexed by Germany. The Slovenes set up a Liberation Front within the framework of the joint resistance of the Yugoslav peoples under the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Suffering great losses in the four years of fighting, Slovenia finally became a socialist republic within Federal Yugoslavia. Most of the territory was returned which had been given to Italy under the Treaty of Rapallo following the First World War.

Economy and Education

Slovenia is economically the most advanced region of Yugoslavia, even though, compared with the other republics, it has little farmland and its natural resources were more or less depleted even before socialist rule. Slovenia's economic growth has been based on its industrial tradition, comparatively well-organised production and the advantages accruing from its geographical location as a transit point. In 1983, Slovenia accounted for 14,7% of Yugoslavia's national income. As a result of radical demographic changes that followed the war, the rural population declined from 44,1% in 1948 to 9,4% in 1981. Rapid industrialization was undertaken. In 1984, there were 364,634 persons employed in industry and mining.

Slovenia's major enterprises are: Iskra of Kranj, Emona in Ljubljana and Metalka, Tam and the others in the different sectors. Its primary industrial sectors are the production of electric-powered machines, metal-working, finished textile goods, wood products, chemical industry and motor vehicles. Slovenia's industry and mining account for about 46% of its national income. The remaining 54% comes from building construction, transport and communications, agriculture, trade, catering and tourism. It also makes efforts to develop production based on a higher level of technological know-how and scientific research. The stated goal is to re-direct manufacturing structurally towards products that require a high level

of processing using domestic raw materials and energy sources. Its exports accounted for 20,5% of overall Yugoslav exports in 1984.

In 1989-90, the 11 faculties of the universities in Ljubljana and Maribor, three colleges, three art academies and 10 other institutions of higher education had an overall student population of 27,664. In 1989, 5,907 students graduated. In 1983, there were 620,919 radio sets (one set to every household) and 458,733 TV- licence holders (one set to every 1,3 household). There were 21 radio stations and three television centres.

Slovenia had three dailies which were printed in a total of 68,044 copies in 1983. The total annual circulation of Slovenia's 739 newspapers, reviews, magazines, and technical journals amounted to 146,898,000 copies. Slovenia had eight professional and 222 amateur theatre companies. There are 47 museums, 68 permanent collections and 81 art galleries; the number of libraries, both general and technical, was 556. A large network of scientific research institutes exists at the universities and attached to economic and other organizations. The Slovenian Academy of Science and Art, founded in 1938, embarked upon a highly intensified programme of activity since 1945.

SERBIA

Serbia covers an area of 88,361 square kilometers, 34,5% per cent of former Yugoslavia. The autonomous Province of Vojvodina (21,506 sq.km) and the formerly autonomous Province of Kosovo (10,887 sq.km) also formed part of Serbia. Serbian territory covers the central part of the Balkan Peninsula.

Demography and History

According to the census taken on March 31,1981, Serbia had 9,313,676 inhabitants - 5,694,464 living on the territory of Serbia, excluding the autonomous provinces. The total population of Serbia included 6,185,155 Serbs (66,8%), 1,303,034 Albanians (14%), 390,468 Hungarians (4,2%), 149,368 Croats (1,6), 215,166 Muslims (2,3%), 147,466 Montenegrins (1,6) 441,941 Yugoslavs (4,8%). There are also large groups belonging to other nationalities: Slovaks, Rumanans, Ruthenians, Bulgarians, Turks, and others. The capital city, Belgrade, has a total population of 1,470,073. Other large cities include Novi Sad, Pristina, Nis, Subotica, Titovo Uzice. According to the 1981 census, 25,4% of the population live in rural areas.

The Serbs settled in the Balkan Peninsula in the 6th and 7th centuries. In the 12th century during the rule of Stefan Nemanja, Serbia managed to free itself from Byzantine domination. In the first half of the 14th century, Serbia was one of

the most powerful states in the Balkans. However, the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, in which the Ottomans defeated the Serbs, marked the beginning of centuries of Ottoman rule. In face of the advancing Ottomans, the Serbian population gradually moved north and west.

During the First Serbian uprising, which broke out in 1804 under Karadjordje, and the second uprising of 1815 led by Milos Obrenovic, some territory was recaptured. In 1830, Serbia was granted autonomy. It gained complete independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and became a kingdom under Milan Obrenovic in 1882. In the 19th century, there had been some cultural initiatives in an effort to create and solidify a Serbian identity. It was during this period that Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, a leading Serbian poet and writer, wrote and published a history of the first Serbian uprising. He also produced an alphabet, and introduced linguistic reforms.

The Socialist movement, led by Svetozar Markovic, an advocate of self-government, began to take hold in Serbia in the very late 19th century. The Social Democratic Party under the leadership of such figures as Dimitrije Tucakovic, Radovan Dragovic and Dusan Popovic, was founded in 1903.

During the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, Serbian territory was re-captured from the Ottomans. In the First World War, Serbian Army had to withdraw from the country (in 1915). After various battles, it became part of the Kingdom of the

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later known as Yugoslavia). During the rule of the Kingdom, the country went through one crisis after another. It also saw large-scale fighting between the National Liberation Army, mainly composed of Partizan forces, and the German occupiers. By September 1944, considerable amount of Serbian territory was liberated. The postwar creation of the state of Serbia coincided with the constitution of new Yugoslavia and all its republics, as mentioned previously.

Economy and Education

In Serbia priority had been given to production of raw materials, food and energy and development of transportation. The point to draw attention is that Yugoslavia's main communication arteries, which connect Europe with the Near East, pass through Serbia. In addition to older industries such as food-processing, textiles and metal manufacturing, industry had developed several new sectors: automobiles, tractors, farm machinery, electrical household appliances, machine tools. Nevertheless, economy of the country is undergoing a heavy crisis and hyperinflation at the moment because of war and economic sanctions imposed by the international community with some exceptions. Kosovo is also a very underdeveloped part of Serbia.

There were 53,670 students enrolled at 64 colleges, and 135,852 students at 80 faculties in six university centres. Serbia had 11 dailies and 102 weeklies. Now

just a few is printed. There are three TV stations. In 1983, there were 1,834,000 radio-licence holders (one set to every 1,4 household) and 1,586,000 TV holders (one set to every 1,6 household). Serbia also has scientific and cultural institutions, most important of which is the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, one of the most important feet of Serbian nationalism.

KOSOVO

Kosovo covers 10,908 square kilometers. The capital of Kosovo, Pristina (210,000 inhabitants according to the 1981 census) is the administrative, cultural, industrial and university centre. Other towns are Prizren, Pec, Titova Mitrovica, Djakovica, Urosevac and Gnjilane.

Demography and History

According to the 1981, census Kosovo have 1,584,440 inhabitants, of which 514,755 (32,5%) were living in urban areas. The population is multi-national: 1,226,736 Albanians (77,4%), 209,497 Serbs (13,2%), 27,028 Montenegrins (1,7%), 58,562 Turks (3,7%), 12,513 Yugoslavs (0,2%), with 47,428 (3,0%) belonging to other nationalities. However, Albanians are also predominantly Muslims.

Kosovo has been inhabited since prehistoric times. Ancient sources mention the Illyrian tribe of the Dardanae as inhabitants of the region. It later fell under Roman domination and subsequently was incorporated into the Byzantine Empire. In the late 6th and 7th centuries the Slavs settled these parts, as they did other regions of the Balkan Peninsula. Towards the end of the 12th century Kosovo became the central part of the medieval Serbian state. In 1389, during the war with Serbia, the Ottomans conquered Kosovo, which remained part of the Ottoman Empire until 1912. In the 17th and 18th centuries, particularly after two northward migrations of Serbs, the region began to be more intensively settled by Albanians. During the Balkan War of 1912 Serbia regained Kosovo, thus reintegrating it within its own frontiers. During the Second World War Kosovo was occupied by German, Bulgarian and Italian troops. In response to the appeal of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the people of Kosovo took up arms against the invaders and fought the occupying forces.

Given its multi-national structure and the specific features of the historical and cultural development and also bearing in mind the wishes expressed by the nations and nationalities of this region, the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija was established in 1945 as part of Serbia, and from 1968 until recently an autonomous province within the framework of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Then, its autonomous status was suspended by the Milosevic administration. The Great Dream of Serbian leadership throughout the ages

concerning Kosovo never fades away, and it still poses a dangerous potential for future Balkan nightmares.

Economy and Education

As a result of unfavourable social and economic conditions caused by deliberate Serbian policies such as limited investments and bureaucratic appointments in line with Serbian interests, Kosovo today is the least developed part of Yugoslavia. The per capita national income is highly below Yugoslavia's total per capita national average. However, the general socio-economic growth achieved in the post-war period led to an increase to a certain extent in the national income. In 1984, its national income accounted for less than 10% of Yugoslavia's overall national income, and its exports for 2,0% of total Yugoslav exports.

According to the 1981 census, 23,8% of the population was economically active. In 1984, a total of 205,600 persons (12,8%) were employed in the public sector of the economy. About 154,000 were employed in economy.

The known deposits of lead and zinc ores account for 52,2% of Yugoslav's total reserves; it has 50% of the country's nickel, 35% of its manganese, 53% of the lignite, and 100% of the bismuth. Despite this richness in mines, the fact that its national income is highly below the general average is striking and an indication of mismanagement. Farmland in Kosovo covers 585,909 hectares, 68% of which

is arable land and 32% pastures. The timber industry is also an important sector of the economy. Farming provides employment for 14,7% of the population. About 40% of the total production comes from industry, which employs about 50% of those engaged in production.

Kosovo used to provide an interesting example in the field of education. Instruction in the schools was bilingual, and in places, tri-lingual for a short while. Albanian, Serbian and Turkish pupils attended the same schools, but all followed instructions in their mother tongue. There were also Turkish language departments at the Teacher Training College in Pristina and at the Department of Oriental Languages in Pristina. Pristina University has 10 faculties. The Faculty of Philosophy was the first to be opened in 1960. A total of 39,836 students were enrolled at the 10 faculties and 7 other institutions of higher education (colleges) in 1983-84.

The Society for Science and Art, founded in 1974, became the Academy of Science and Art of Kosovo in May 1978. There are many scientific, cultural and social institutions such as : the Albanological and Historical Institute, the Provincial Museum, Archives, Provincial National Theatre. Kosovo has 8 museums, 10 archives, the University Library, 5 scientific research institutes dedicated to the conservation of cultural monuments, especially those of Serbian culture.

VOJVODINA

Vojvodina covers an area of 21,506 square kilometers. The Danube and Tisa rivers divide Vojvodina into three regions: Srem, Banat and Backa. Novi Sad, with 257,685 inhabitants, is the administrative, economic and cultural centre of the Province. Other important towns are Subotica, Zrenjanin, Pancevo, Sombor and Sremska Mitrovica.

Demography and History

In Vojvodina the members of its multi-national population live together. According to the 1981 census Vojvodina had 2,034,772 inhabitants, of whom 1,107,375 were Serbs (54,4%), 385,356 Hungarians (18,9%), 109,203 Croats (5,4%), 69,549 Slovaks (3,4%), 47,289 Rumanians (2,3%), 43,304 Montenegrins (2,1%), 19,305 Ruthenes (0,9%), 167,215 Yugoslavs (8,2%), while the remainder was composed of members of other Yugoslav nations and nationalities - Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims, Slovenes, Romanies and others.

The fertile plains of Vojvodina have always attracted different peoples. The region was conquered in turn by the Celts, Romans, Huns, Gepids, Lombards and Avars. The Slavs settled here in the 6th and 7th centuries. Towards the end

of the 9th and beginning of the 10th centuries Hungarians entered Vojvodina from the east and remained here together with the Slavs.

In their advance towards central Europe the Ottomans overrun Vojvodina and held it for nearly two centuries. Under the terms of the Treaty of Karlovca (1699), Backa and north-west Srem came under Ottoman domination until 1718. The number of Serbs rose considerably in the late 17th and 18th centuries when they moved here from Serbia. Impoverished, landless peasants from underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia were re-settled here during the inter-war period and after the Second World War, forming thus the national structure of Vojvodina's population as it is today.

After the First World War, in November 1918, the National Assembly of Vojvodina Serbs proclaimed the incorporation of Vojvodina into Serbia whereby it became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In April 1941 German troops occupied Srem and Banat, while Hungary annexed Backa. Srem was incorporated into the quisling "Independent State of Croatia". In June 1941 the Provincial Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party for Vojvodina held a meeting, at which it was decided to start an uprising and set up a headquarter for national liberation detachments. After the war, in 1945, the peoples and nationalities of Vojvodina became an autonomous unit within Serbia.

Economy and Education

Fertile plains, an extremely favourable climate, and many waterways offer proper conditions for the development of crop and livestock farming. Around 1,800,000 hectares are farmland, of which 1,640,000 hectares are arable (21,5% of all Yugoslav farmland). Almost half the arable land is state-owned. The rest is owned by individual farmers who pool their resources and cooperate in other ways with the big state-owned farms. So, it is not privately owned in the real meaning of the term.

The construction of the Danube-Tisa-Danube canal system has created good opportunities for boosting crop yields through irrigation. The system also provides industry and towns with a water supply as well as a place for fishing and other recreational activities. Primary agricultural products used to process in a food industry consisting of 11 sugar refineries, 6 cooking oil refineries, several meat-packing plants, flour mills, plants for making pasta, and tinning fruits and vegetables. Vojvodina had also other branches of industry - the exploitation and refining of petroleum and natural gas, machine- tool manufacturing, the production of building materials, chemicals, and to a lesser extent textiles, leather goods, wood products and others.

During 1980s, Vojvodina contributed 11,8% of the total Yugoslav national income. The number of persons employed in both productive and administrative

activities and in the social services was 592,000 (218,640 in industry), while about 392,000 earned their living from farming. Vojvodina's share in Yugoslav exports in 1980s amounted to 8,8%.

In order to show its ethnic structure, it may be worthy to say that in 1983-84 there were 523 primary schools, of which 327 had instructions in Serbo-Croat language, 150 in Hungarian, 22 in Slovak, 29 in Rumanian and 4 in Ruthenian. Novi Sad University is consisted of 16 faculties, an art academy and 13 other institutions of higher education. Within the framework of Novi Sad University there are 63 learned institutions combining education with scientific research. Collaborating with industry, they try to ensure that technological and scientific achievements are put into practice. Scientific research projects of fundamental importance for the general advancement of the Province are initiated by the Vojvodina Academy of Science and Art.

MACEDONIA

Macedonia covers an area of 25,713 square kilometers (10,5% of total Yugoslav territory). Skopje, the capital and the largest city, and also the political, economic centre of Macedonia, has a population of 504,932 according to the census taken in 1981. Other important cities are Bitola, Prilep, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Ohrid, Stip, Gostivar and Kicevo. Its rivers drain either into the Aegean-the Vardar,

Pcinja,Treska,etc., or into the Adriatic-the Crni Drim,Radika,Jablanicka and others.

Demography and History

According to the 1981 census, Macedonia had 1,909,136 inhabitants, (940,993 women) and of this number 1,279,323 (67%) were Macedonians, 337,208 (19,8%) were Albanians, 86,591 (4,5%) were Turks, 44,468 (2,3%) were Serbs, 43,223 (2,3%) were Romanies, 39,513 (2,1%) were Muslims, 14,225 (0,7%) were Yugoslavs.

Most of the Balkans was settled by Slavs of one of two types,excluding the smaller groups of Slavic Slovenes and Turkic Avars in the western Balkans. The first of these two groups was the Bulgaro-Macedonians whose Slavic component derived from the Antes. However they were conquered in the late seventh century by the Turkic Bulgars. The Slavs eventually assimilated them. The second of the Slavic groups was Serbo-Croatian Slavs. The term Macedonian was used in reference to a geographical region in the Middle Ages and into the 19th century. Nevertheless, the absence of a national consciousness in the past is no grounds to reject the Macedonians as a nationality.

In the second half of the 10th century Samuilo (Samuel in some books) established the first Macedonian state,which lasted until 1018. Its capital was

Prespa, then Ohrid, where Samuilo was crowned emperor. After the collapse of Samuilo's state, Basil II ruled the area, bringing some Byzantine influences. However Macedonians continued the struggle against him. But after his death a Turkish tribe called Pechenegs under the leadership of Kegenis and Tyrach, who were in power struggle against each other due to Byzantine tricky politics, became a serious factor in what is called Macedonia, and Pechenegs settled in Macedonia, Bulgaria, Thrace from 1030s till 1070s. The region also experienced raids of some other Turkish tribes called Ghuz Turks and Kumans.

In the late 14th century Ottomans came and ruled the entire Macedonia for five centuries. Macedonia came into prominence in the 18th century as a result of nationalistic movements by the Bulgars, Greeks and Srbs for the control of Macedonia. Although initially proclaimed as an effort to secure independence for the Macedonians, the Macedonian question soon turned into individual ambitions for political annexation and control of Macedonia itself by the neighbouring states. 19th century also saw an upsurge of nationalist movements. It was also provoked by the said states. In the second half of the 19th century movements for the so-called independence increased. On October 1893 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was founded with an aim to organize the population for political autonomy. They initiated some uprisings, most important of which was Ilinden uprising in 1903. Then a republic was founded in Krusevo lasting only ten days.

However, after the Balkan wars Macedonia was not nearer to gaining its historic and political rights even recognized during the Ottoman rule. It was partitioned between three states after the Second Balkan War of 1913: The so-called Pirin region went to Bulgaria, Greece obtained the Aegean Macedonia, and Serbia acquired the large territory around the upper flow of the Vardar together with Strumica district after the First World War. Since their objectives were both based upon ethnic distinction and geographic distribution of ethnic groups, intensified effort was focused on ethnic groups. Associated with this was the sharpened interest of the rest of Europe in the disposition of Ottoman territories. Every involved country was trying to show their "true" ethnic structure. Ethnic criteria was being resorted to as the main criteria in relationship to political identification and affiliation. What was the key factor in political identification during Ottoman times was religion. Strategic value, historical rights, and ethnic relationship were the key points of contrasting claims.

The Bulgarians lay historical claims to Macedonia on ground of early empires, especially that of Tsar Simeon, and of the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, which created "Greater Bulgaria". The Bulgarians also insisted that the Macedonians were in truth Bulgarians ethnically in reference to language and customs. For example, Macedonians, like Bulgarians, use the personal pronoun "As" for "I" rather than Serbian "Ja".

The Serbs expressed historical claims, too based on the 14th century empire of Tsar Stepan Dusan. They also used language and customs as proof of Serbian affinity. However these claims have been invalidated by Tito's recognition of the Macedonians of Yugoslavia as a separate ethnic group and by the subsequent creation on August 1944 of the "People's Republic of Macedonia".

The Greek case based upon historical claims dating back to Alexander of Macedon and Byzantine rule in the Balkans. They also claim the lack of a national consciousness of Slavophone peoples who were "Greek at heart". Their arguments apparently are too weak to have any claim over Macedonia. These are classical arguments used by the each in their battle. The end of the First World War saw Macedonia divided among three Balkan states plus Albania getting a tiny stripe along its border. About half of it went to Greece. Bulgaria obtained only a small area. But creation of Macedonian republic in Yugoslavia gave them a recognition as a separate group with the right of using Macedonian as an official language, of teaching the language in the Macedonian schools, and of publishing newspapers and books in this language. However it still remains to pose a serious problem not only in Yugoslavia, but also for the entire peninsula.

Economy and Education

The leading positions in the breakdown of total production are held by industry and mining, which contributed 38,9% of total production. The percentages for the

other branches of the economy are as follows: agriculture 15,2%, construction 10,2%, commerce, catering and tourism 23,2%, transport and communications 5,7%. Macedonia's contribution to national income and total exports were more than 5 %. There are several power plants in the country. Macedonia produces about 24,000 tons of fermented tobacco annually. There are tobacco processing and cigarette factories in Prilep, Skopje and Kumanovo. Macedonia has over 660,000 hectares of arable land. It is a major producer of spring vegetables and fruit.

The agricultural sector is widely spread over large areas in Macedonia. There are agro-industrial complexes and scientific research centers in that field. It also includes several wine cellars, dairies, poultry, cattle farms, plants for processing fruit and vegetables, cooking oil and rice, refrigerating and meat-packing plants. Over 49% of Macedonia's exports are finished products.

Standards have been set for the Macedonian literary language and for its future evolution in a free manner at the time. The Macedonian alphabet was published on May 5, 1945, the first Macedonian orthography on June 7, 1945. The Institute for the Macedonian Language was founded in 1953, and a three-volume Macedonian dictionary appeared between 1961 and 1965. The network of primary and secondary schools was greatly expanded, while in April 1949 a university was founded in Skopje, followed by a second university in Bitola in

1979. The Macedonian Academy of Science and Art was founded in February 1967.

Modern Macedonian literature occupied an important place in the literature world of Yugoslavia. Every year a large number of works by Macedonian writers appeared. In 1983, 624 books were published (61 written in Albanian and 14 in Turkish), while the best of the world classics and modern literature were translated into Macedonian.(99) In addition to the Kliment Ohridski National Library in Skopje there are 135 public libraries, 121 scientific and technical libraries, and 863 school libraries, their stocks totalling about nine million books.

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro covers an area of 13,812 square kilometers, or 5,4% of Yugoslavia's total area. Montenegro is situated on one of Yugoslavia's highest mountain plateau, between the sea and the continental hinterland. This region is especially interesting because of the diversity and contrasts of terrain and climate that nature has bestowed upon this small area.

Demography and History

According to the 1981 census, Montenegro had 584,310 inhabitants. Of this number 400,488 (68,5%) were Montenegrins, 78,000 (13,4%) were Muslims,

37,735 (6,5%) were Albanians, 31,243 (5,3%) were Yugoslavs, 19,407 (3,3%) were Serbs, 6,904 (1,2%) were Croats, and the rest belonging to other nations and nationalities. The capital of Montenegro is Podgorica (formerly Titograd) with a population of 132,290 inhabitants. Razed to the ground during the Second World War, Titograd has developed into a thriving industrial, cultural and political centre. Other cities are Cetinje (the old political and cultural centre of Montenegro), Niksic, Pjevlja, Bijelo Polje, Ivangrad, Kotor, Bar Herceg-Novi and Ulcinj.

In the middle of the 7th century the territory that now makes up Montenegro was settled by the Slavs, who established their own state, Duklja, named after the Roman city of Doclea. From the 11th century onwards the region was called Zeta, ruled in the 14th and 15th centuries by the Balsic and Crnojevic families. The name Montenegro was mentioned for the first time towards the end of the 13th century and originally referred to the region around mountain Lovcen; by the end of the 15th century it applied to all of Upper Zeta. Flanked by the two great powers of the time, Ottoman Empire and Venetian Republic, Zeta was unable to maintain its autonomy. In 1499 Montenegro came under Ottoman rule. Venice took part of the Montenegrin coast with Kotor as the center. It was under the administration of the bishop-princes of the Petrovic family (Danilo, Petar I, Petar II, Prince Danilo and King Nikola I) that the Montenegrin clans joined forces, that a government was set up, and the foundations of Montenegrin autonomy and statehood were laid. International recognition of Montenegro's

independence was given at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In the Balkan wars of 1912-13 Montenegro extended its frontiers. During the Second World War, on July 13, 1941, answering the appeal of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the people of Montenegro joined the struggle against the occupiers. The Montenegrin National Assembly was constituted on April 15, 1945. It gained its statehood within the framework of the Yugoslavia.

Economy and Education

Montenegro's socio-economic development during the period between the two world wars was extremely slow, and its material foundations totally underdeveloped. The per capita national income was about 31% of the Yugoslav average and was derived almost entirely from primitive smallholder farming. About 80% of the population was engaged in farming, while only 0,4% was employed in a few minor semi-artisan manufacturing establishments. During the Second World War practically all the existing manufacturing capacities were destroyed. In a period of almost forty years (1945-1984) some progress have been achieved in the all-round economic and social development of Montenegro. Largely based on natural resources to be found in this republic (bauxite, lead, zinc, coal, hydro-electric power and forests) some investments have been made in the basic and manufacturing industries. The most important are the Gornja Zeta and Piva hydro-electric power plants, the Pljevlja thermal power plant, the

Niksic iron and steel works, the aluminium mills, a construction machine factory and textile mills in Podgorica.

With the construction of infrastructure of communications and transportation including the Belgrade-Bar railway, the port of Bar, over 500 km of paved roads and a merchant fleet that accounts for a little over one-fifth of the former Yugoslav merchant navy (around 522,000 gross registered tons once upon a time) some efforts to integrate it into former central Yugoslav economy were made. Farmland covers an area of 517,000 hectares, of which 56,000 are arable. The national income was not more than 2% of Yugoslavia's total national income. It is one of the most backward regions of Yugoslavia.

Cultural treasures from the earliest civilizations and the various peoples who settled in these lands - Montenegrins, Muslims, Albanians and others - are preserved in 24 museums and collections. Montenegro has several independent scientific research institutions and a number of research departments attached to larger economic organizations. The Montenegrin Academy of Science and Art, the Lexicographical Institute and other important cultural and scientific institutions are located in Podgorica. The Central Montenegrin Library, the State Archives and a national museum complex are in Cetinje.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia-Herzegovina, covering an area of 51,564 square kilometers (20,7% of Yugoslavia's total area) occupies the central part of the country. Not far from Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the village of Rakovica, lies the geographical centre of the former Yugoslavia. The high Dinaric range divides Bosnia-Herzegovina into two watersheds-the Black Sea and the Adriatic, which are made up of over 1,000 rivers and streams, the largest being the Neretva, Bosna, Vrbas, Pliva, Drina and Una rivers.

Demography and History

According to the 1981 census, Bosnia-Herzegovina had 4,124,256 inhabitants. This figure included 1,630,033 Muslims (40%), 1,320,738 Serbs (32%), 758,140 Croats (18,4%), 326,316 Yugoslavs (7,9%), and 89,029 members of other Yugoslav nations and nationalities (2,2%). The largest city and the political, economic and cultural centre of the Republic is Sarajevo with a population of 448,519 according to the 1981 census. However, its population has dropped to about 350,000 from 580,000 after the war, according to the latest statistics. Next largest is Banja Luka, followed by Mostar, Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac, Doboj, Jajce, Travnik and Trebinje.

By the middle of the 7th century Bosnia and Herzegovina was settled by Slav tribes. At the end of the 12th century an independent Bosnian state was established under Ban Kulin. In the late 14th century it was a powerful state among the South Slavs. In 1463 Bosnia, and in 1482 Herzegovina were conquered by the Ottomans, and the Ottoman rule lasted for centuries. The 19th century was marked by a series of uprisings. It was first occupied and in 1908 was annexed by Austria-Hungary. After the annexation Young Bosnia Revolutionary Movement (Mlada Bosna), which planned the attack against Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, was set up. The attack constituted a pretext to give a start to the First World War. Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was partitioned into several administrative provinces. The collapse of the Kingdom in April 1941 brought sufferings to its people. And Italian and German occupiers incorporated Bosnia-Herzegovina in the quisling "Independent state of Croatia". During that period Ustashas and Chetniks carried out large-scale massacres. As in other parts of Yugoslavia, armed struggle against the occupiers started in 1941 lasting four years. The armed struggle began with the liberation of Drvar in July 1941, and the establishment of liberated areas in Bosanska Krajina, Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia. In November 1943 in Mrkonjic Grad, representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina elected their Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was later transformed into the supreme organ of government at its second session held in Sanski Most in 1944. At its third session in Sarajevo it was turned into the

National Assembly, and on that occasion the first national government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Here, the distinct characteristics of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be further mentioned, since it is the core of current war in what was Yugoslavia. Bosnians is a case study about a fascinating people who throughout many centuries suffered immensely for their national and much more religious convictions. They are the most westernly located European Muslims. They are also a highly advanced Islamic community with their rich cultural heritage. The plight of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not something new at all. For centuries, Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzak have been exposed to sufferings and attempts to destroy them and to colonize and acquire their wealth and strategic country. With the emergence of new independence movements in the Balkans in the 19th century, the genocide and massacre of them intensified because of their Islamic convictions. Not only ever since Karadjordje's rebellion in 1804, but also during the socialist rule it was a common practice to persecute and massacre them. With each imperial defeat and subsequent territorial loss, the first act of the so-called liberators was to wipe out the Muslim population. These clean-up efforts commenced in 1804 with Karadjordje and never stopped. The dynasty of Karadjordje has always been remembered for the bloodiness of its regime. It made its name known by attacks, persecution and massacre of Muslims for years since their crowning. In the 20th century, after the 1918 unification the destruction of Muslims continued unabated. It was expected that

they would not survive to 21st century, but due to a high birth rate this was aborted.

A brief background information on how these people converted to Islam will shed light on their historical development. Differences and confrontations between Rome and the kingdoms-especially Croat Kingdom in the Adriatic created a long-lasting enmity between the said two. In 1073 Gregory VII tried to create Pax Romana. The number of people who were becoming uneasy with the grand papal design for the so-called universal peace and security rapidly increased. As time passed, the deeply rooted hostility between these two conflicting powers intensified. The dissenters gradually withdrew from the Adriatic and the plains between the Sava and Drava rivers, finding shelters in the central mountainous region of the Kingdom-later called Bosna after the name of a river. In this naturally protected environment they were able to continue their own way of life independently of Rome. Resisting the ecclesiastic reforms of Gregory VII, they displayed solid determination to protect their own values. They were persecuted, suppressed and massacred. The lasting conflict came to an end when the Islamic faith was voluntarily accepted in a most impressive mass conversion, that provoked much controversial writings in the centuries to come, in 1463 with Ottomans' coming. Bosnian Church, Crvska Bosanska, had a role in that. Because the church's role in the life of its believers was not only religious, but also of political function. Church voluntarily joined Islam.

The church of Bosna-Hum (medieval name for Hercegovina) was in a deep confrontation with the Roman See. Whether they were Bogomils or theological dualists, and even a heresy is a debatable issue that remains to be clarified. Most of the writers in the field argued that they were of Bogomil heresy, arguments to the contrary are too strong to ignore. These arguments contend that it was accusations of Papal vassal and their advocates that led to call them Bogomils or believers of a heresy. The carvings of cross on some tombstones-something commonly believed that Bogomils never used, and some other findings have been used as proof showing they were pure Christians-Krstani as they called themselves. Acceptance of people from Bosnia by the then Republic of Dubrovnik which was a catholic one into the Republic territory, while they were not accepting Orthodox ones is another example in the same direction. Historians note that they wouldn't have been accepted if they were seen as believers of a heresy. Some historians explain accusations of heresy with the West's finding this reality that true Christians do not convert to Islam unacceptable in terms of Christianity. On the other hand, rejection of the the usage of Latin language and the alphabet were also other major issues in the conflict between the two church organizations. Their dressing, practices, refusal of the Old Testament and acceptance of the Gospel were other differences.

Thus, from the time of the first resistance to the papal patrimonialism throughout almost five centuries, it was a continual struggle for survival facing numerous foreign crusades of plundering and mass killing. It is also worth mentioning that

the land they lived was rich with silver, iron, copper. Moreover it was also strategically connecting two very significant strategic and trade routes, the Adriatic and the Danube.

In the end, bitterness caused by the continuous confrontation between triumphant Rome and Bosnian church and church's centuries of struggle for political and religious freedom resulted in their voluntary mass acceptance of Islam by which they found all necessary conditions they sought for years. It commenced in 1463 when about 36,000 families in Bosnia in one act in an open field converted to Islam. Mehmet the Conqueror also granted them what they requested: key legal rights. Similar voluntary mass conversions took place in Hum (later Herzegovina) in 1482 and in the subsequent years in other regions like Lika and Krbara. The Sultan confirmed and legalized all old hereditary rights of this new Muslim nobility. He also made Bosna-Hum a separate province, *corpus separatum* within the Empire. Ottomans never resorted to force to convert them to Islam. Not only they retained power in their country, but also gained new power positions throughout the Empire, having the rights to inherit all power positions, land, prestige, respective political, military and administrative titles. They held political and economic power due to Ottoman tolerance. In later dates, peasantry, too, converted to Islam. And most importantly not only those who were of that belief, but also some Catholics too converted to the Islamic faith. The Western world was shocked by this "betrayal". Only the Ottomans rushed to their aid. However, the attractiveness of Islam was not only because of their help, but also

universal egalitarianism that lies in this faith as well. But their acceptance of Islam was going to cost them much, and the persecution that would last for long and painful years was going to start because of their identity of being most westernly located, advanced European Muslims .

Economy and Education

Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered important losses during the wars in human life and property. For instance, one fourth of the population lost their lives during the Second World War; out of 180 industrial firms, the majority fairly small, 130 were completely wiped out. All 36 mines were dismantled. During the war, and especially during the occupiers' retreat, the entire system of communication was demolished.

From 1945 till 1980s, some achievements were made in the total material and social development of the republic. Industrial production increased about 22 times, electric power about 80 times, ferrous metallurgy 14 times, the metal-working industry 28 times, the chemical industry 16 times. The total production rose more than 6 times, and per capita national income also increased. In 1980s, Bosnia-Herzegovina share in the Yugoslav national income was more than 14%. This dynamic socio-economic development was based on the rich natural resources to be found in the Republic. Bosnia-Herzegovina has 85% of ex-Yugoslavia's known reserves of iron ore, over 40% of its brown coal and

lignite, 40% of its boxite, about 60% of its asbestos, 100% of its rock salt. It **also** possesses enormous hydro-electric power potential - around 16,000 million **kwh** (25% of the Yugoslav total). It has about 300 million cubic metres of standing timber (about 35% of the woodland and 35% of the standing timber in Yugoslavia). So it was comparatively a rich republic in the former Yugoslavia. Industrial products accounted for 98% of its total exports, over 60% of which are finished products. Export commodities with advanced technology included electronic apparatus and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, equipment for atomic, hydro-electric and thermal power stations, furniture, textile and leather goods. Bosnia-Herzegovina contributed 15% of Yugoslavia's overall exports in 1980s. Noteworthy results have also been achieved in the development of the manufacturing industries, agriculture, building construction and the tourist trade. However all above mentioned characteristics of the economy have been devastated by the Serb and Croat aggressors.

In 1980, Bosnia-Herzegovina had 211 public and 155 specialised and scientific libraries, and over 2,600 school libraries. In 1983, there were 177 cinemas, 26 theatres and one film production and distribution enterprise. A meeting-place of many cultures and the scene of numerous conflicts and historical events, Bosnia-Herzegovina has produced many artists who have found an inexhaustible source of inspiration in this land. Before the war Bosnia-Herzegovina had four university centres (about 50 faculties and 12 colleges of higher education). Beside general economic and social progress, considerable

headway was made in the field of science. There were more than 70 scientific institutions in the Republic, of which the Academy of Science and Art of Bosnia-Herzegovina is of special importance. The country also produced many artists. In the middle of such a cultural city these artists used to find a source of inspiration for their works. Many people also used to belong to the numerous amateur theatre companies. In addition, there were opera and ballet companies, symphony orchestras, and a large number of other musical ensembles.

NOTES

1. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Harper and Row Press, 1981), pp.417-18.
2. Hobbes, Dahrendorf, Niebuhr and Morgenthau can be mentioned among the proponents of this idea.
3. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.317.
4. Michael Banks, "The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution," ed. Anthony de Reuck, *Conflict in World Society*, (Brighton:Harvester Press,1988), p.97.
- 5.Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.317 and James N.Rosenau, *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1964), p.72.
6. Banks, p.122; Margot Light, *The Role of Scholarship in Conflict Resolution* (Brighton:Harvester Press,1987). This point was also raised by Margot Light during an interview at London School of Economics in November 1992.
7. Banks, p.115; A.N.Oppenheim, "Psychological Processes in World Society," ed. Anthony de Reuck, p.156.
8. About these arguments see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.187.
9. *Ibid.*, p.302.
10. Particularly "conflict-as-function" theorists like George Simmel supported this argument.
11. Alexis Heraclides, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*, (London:Frank Cass, 1991), p.3; Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, 24, (April 1972), pp.320-21.

12. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, (New York:Academic Press, 1966), Quoted in Heraclides, p.3; Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp.425,461.
13. Clifford Geertz, *The Integrative Revolution:Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States*, Quoted in Heraclides, p.212.
14. Nicos Poulantzas and Samir Amin were cited in Heraclides, p.4.
15. Heraclides, p.4.
16. Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," *World Politics*, 20, (October 1969), pp. 167-77; Heraclides,pp.5,212 ; Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control," *World Politics*, 31, (April 1979), pp.325-45.
17. Arend Lijphardt, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, 21, (January 1971), pp. 211-25.
18. M.G.Smith, *Corporations and Society*, (London:Penguin Books, 1974); M.G.Smith and Leo Kuper, *Pluralism in Africa*,(Berkeley:1969), pp.27-38, both quoted in Heraclides, p.212.
19. A.F.Borovali, "A Lebanon in Cyprus," *International Perspectives*, (May-June 1989), p.15.
20. Answers to such questions are quite important in tracing the reasons of conflict.
21. Jack A.Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics*, 32, (April 1980), pp.425-53.
22. Heraclides, p.8.
23. Michael Hatcher, *Internal Colonialism*, (London:Sage,1975), pp.9-43; A.J. Groom and A.Heraclides, *Integration and Disintegration*, Quoted in Margot Light, p.118 ; A.J.Groom, *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* , (London:Penguin,1985), pp.53-58.
24. Connor, Glazer, Geertz, Horowitz and theoreticians of nationalism like A.D.Smith defend this idea.

25. Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.12.

26. John V.A. Fine, Jr., *The Early Medieval Balkans*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p.1.

27. This is a very common practice used by Serbian leaders.

28. For the sake of simplicity, I am going to keep calling it Yugoslavia since it focuses on developments and reasons leading to conflict and disintegration. For figures see Rajko Bobot, *Facts About Yugoslavia*, (Beograd: Beogradski Izdavacko, 1985), p.7.

29. *Ibid.*, p.8.

30. *Ibid.*, p.9.

31. Fine, p.2.

32. Banac, pp.50,55.

33. Bozidar Milosavljevic and others, eds., *Handbook on Yugoslavia*, (Beograd: NIRO Exportpress, 1987), p.22.

34. The decision to recognize Muslims as a separate nation was taken in 1969 by the Central Committee of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1974 Constitution sanctioned this decision.

35. Banac, p.50.

36. For this debatable issue see Fine, p.9 ; Banac, p.27.

37. Alan Palmer, *The Penguin Dictionary of Modern History*, (London: Penguin Books, 1983), p.57.

38. Charles and Barbara Jelavich eds., *The Balkans in Transition: Essays On the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the 18th Century*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p.5.

39. Fine, p.20.

40. Banac, pp.40-42.

41. Bobot, p.14.

42. After the Second Balkan War of 1913, waged by the Balkan Allies against Bulgaria over the share in the Macedonian spoil, taken from the Ottomans in 1912, Macedonia was divided among three states. Defeated Bulgaria received the smallest portion, the so-called Pirin Macedonia; Greece obtained the Aegean littoral of Macedonia, centered round Salonika, and Serbia acquired the large territory around the upper flow of the Vardar to which Strumica district accrued after Bulgaria's defeat in the First World War.

43. Milan Bajec and Petar Stojanovic, *History in the Making*, (Beograd:Jugoslovenska Revija,1978), pp.116-122.

44. Milosavljevic, p.38.

45. *Ibid.*, p.40.

46. Sabrina P.Ramel, " War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, 20, N.4., (Fall 1992), p.64.

47. George W.Hoffman and Fred W.Neal, *Yugoslavia and New Communism*, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p.57.

48. Bobot, p.13.

49. Milosavljevic, p.47. The fact that Tito was born in Croatia has always been a source of unease among the Serbs. They claimed that Tito always worked against Serbian interests.

50. Hoffman and Neal, p.62.

51. *Ibid.*, p.63.

52. Bajec and Stojanevic, p.51.

53. *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*, (Washington DC: American University Press, 1982), pp.48,74.
54. Banac, pp.66-68.
55. *Ibid.*, pp.82-84.
56. Tan Oral, *Yugoslavya:Milliyetciligin Provokasyonu*, (Istanbul:Birikim Yayinlari, 1991), p.109.
57. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.258.
58. *Ibid.*, p.276.
59. In forming the roots of his chauvinistic nationalism, the Milosevic Administration even asked Turkish Embassy in Belgrade in 1988 if it will have any objection to the anniversary celebrations of Kosovo War.
60. Mevlut Katik, "Serbian Nationalism and Its Leader," *Turkish Daily News*, July 7,1992.
61. Proponents of Chetnik Movement began selling emblems and banners with Chetnik signs in Belgrade streets starting from 1987.
62. *Newsweek*, December 12, 1991.
63. *Newsweek*, January 9, 1992.
64. *Time*, December 26,1991.
65. Nora Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, (London:Victor Golloncz, 1985), p.87.
66. Brace Jovanovich, *Memories of a Revolutionary*, (New York:Praeger Publishers, 1973), p.122.
67. Beloff, p.94.
68. *Ibid.*, p.113.
69. *Ibid.*, p.119.

70. Diplomats based in Belgrade at the time told me that the World Bank credits given to the federal government for rebuilding the E-5 international highway were used for their own purposes.

71. This point was raised by Tomaz Strumbelj, member of the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia and member of the Liberal Democratic Party, during our meeting in Lisbon, Portugal in November 1991 and by Zoran Morvaj, the chairman of Croat export company Enconet International, in Ankara in December 1991.

72. Bogomil Fertila, "Yugoslavia:Confederation or Disintegration?" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XL,(July-August 1991), p.105.

73. *The Guardian*, January 12, 1993.

74. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No.1, (Spring 1993), p.134.

75. Council of the European Communities General Secreteriat, *Press Release*, 4862/91, (Presse 25-G), March 4-5, 1991.

76. European Political Cooperation, "Declaration on Yugoslavia," *Press Release*, P 61/91, July 5, 1991.

77. This point was also stated by the then spokesman of the European Commission for Yugoslav Affairs, Vale de Almzeida, a Portugeese, during our meeting in Brussels in November 29,1991. Also see European Political Cooperation, "Declaration on Yugoslavia," *Press Release*, P 73/91, August 6,1991.

78. European Political Cooperation, "Declaration on Yugoslavia," *Press Release*, P 82/91, August 27,1991.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

1. Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, London:Victor Gollonncz Ltd.,1985.
2. Braun ,Aurel, *Small-State security in the Balkans*, London: The MacMillan Press, 1983.
3. Coakley, John (ed.),*The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements*, London:Sage Publications,1992.
4. Cviic, Christopher, *Remaking the Balkans*, Chatham House Papers, London:Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1991.
5. Dedijer, Vladimir, *Tito Speaks*, Rijeka:Hvala,1981.
6. Dizdarevic,Zladko, *Sarajevo:A War Journal*, New York:Fromm International,1993.
7. Djilas, Alexis, *The Contested Country*, Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1991.
8. Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London:Penguin Books,1992.
9. Greenfeld, Liah, *Nationalism:Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge and London:Harvard University Press,1992.
10. Jankovic, Branimir M., *The Balkans in International Relations*, London:The MacMillan Press, 1988.
11. Jelavich, Charles and Barbara, *History of the Balkans*, 2 Volumes, London:Cambridge University Press, 1983.
12. Jelavich, Charles and Barbara (ed.), *The Balkans in Transition:Essays on the Developments of Balkan Life and Politics since the 18th Century*, Archan Books,1974.

13. Jelavich, Barbara, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1991.
14. Karaosmanoglu, Ali L., *İç Katismaların Cozumu ve Uluslararası Orgutler*, Istanbul:Bogazici Yayinlari,1981.
15. Kardelj, Edvard, *Democracy and Socialism*, London:The Summerfield Press,1978.
16. Lydall, Harold, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, Oxford:Clarendon Print,1989.
17. MacFarlane, Bruce J., *Yugoslavia:Politics, Economics and Society*, London, 1988.
18. Milivojevic, Milan and Peter Maurer, *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas:Armed Forces, National Defense, and Foreign Policy*, London:Oxford,1988.
19. Olzak , Susan and Joane Nagel, *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, Orlando:Academic Press,1986.
20. Petrovic, Belan, *A History of Modern Serbia*, New York:Brace, 1976.
21. Raanan Uri, *The Nation-State Fallacy*, New York:Pergamon Press, 1980.
22. Simmie, James and Joze Dekleva, *Yugoslavia in Turmoil After Self-Management*,London:1991.
23. Sirc, Ljubo, *The Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management*, London:MacMillan,1979.
- 24,Smith, Anthony D., *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Cambridge and Oxford:Blackwell,1991.
25. Thompson, Mark, *A Paper House :The Ending of Yugoslavia*, New York:Pantheon Books,1992.

ARTICLES

1. Andrejevic, Milan, "What Future for Serbia", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*(*RFE/RL*) *Report*, Vol.1, No.50, (December 1992).
2. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, N.4, (Fall 1992).
3. Doder, Duska, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds", *Foreign Policy*, Vol.91, (Summer 1993).
4. Gagnon, V.P.Jr., "Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability", *Foreign Affairs*, N.4, (Summer 1992).
5. Gow, James, "Deconstruction Yugoslavia", *Survival*, Vol.33, N.4, (July-August 1991).
6. Jerris, Robert, "The Future of World Politics", *International Security*, Vol.16, N.3, (Winter 91/92).
7. Joffe, Josef, "The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, N.1, (Fall 1992).
8. Mamula, Branko, "Yugoslavia at a Time of Change", *Rosi Journal*, V.136, No.1, (Spring 1991).
9. Mendelson, Sarah e., "Internal Battles and External Wars", *World Politics*, Vol.45, N.3, (April 1993).
10. Moore, Patrick, "Kosovo Could Spark Another Balkan War", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, N.50, (December 1992).
11. Posen, Barry R., "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism", *Survival*, Vol.35, N.1, (Spring 1993).
12. Roger, Carole, "Slovenia's Independence", *Problems of Communism*, V.40, N.4, (July-August 1991).

13. Smith, Anthony D., "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism", *Survival*, Vol.35,N.1,(Spring 1993).
14. Walker, Jenonne, "International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts", *Survival*, Vol.35.N.1,(Spring 1993).
15. Welsh,David, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict", *Survival*, Vol.35,N.1, (Spring 1993).

SELECTED DOCUMENTS

1. BBC Monitoring, *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)*, Eastern Europe Series, 1991-94.
2. BBC World News, *Newscopies on Yugoslavia*, 1992-94.
3. Center For Strategic Studies, *CSS Papers*, Belgrade, 1991.
4. Congressional Human Rights Foundation, *News from Foundation for Press*, Washington, 1991-93.
5. European Political Cooperation Secretariat, *Declarations on Yugoslavia*, Press Releases, 1991-93.
6. Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, *Helsinki Watch Reports*, New York, 1993.
7. *Newsweek*, 1991-94.
8. Office of Foreign Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Press Bulletins*, 1991-94.
9. *The Economist*, 1991-94.
10. *Time*, 1991-94.