CITIZENSHIP, MINORITIES AND IMMIGRANTS: A COMPARISON OF TURKEY'S JEWISH MINORITY AND TURKISH-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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THE DEPARTMENT OF
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

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ABSTRACT

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A COMPARISON OF TURKEY'S JEWISH MINORITY
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Toktaş, Şule

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This study investigated the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship and the interaction between them on the layers of international migration and minority issues with use of a comparative case. A research on the perceptions and experiences of Turkey's Jewish minority and Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel regarding citizenship was conducted. The field research which was carried out in both countries - Turkey and Israel – consisted of key informant interviews, participant observation in community institutions and in-depth interviews with a total of 65 respondents from the sample group. The results were analyzed using qualitative data analysis technique.

On the layer of minority, research results illustrated that in a society where the population is overwhelmingly Muslim, being a non-Muslim minority played roles in: a) the appropriation of the monist and universal conceptualization of citizenship in the legal status aspect; b) the endeavor to maintain Jewish identity despite the inevitable consequences of integration and assimilation in the identity aspect; and c) the discrepancy between values and actions in the civic virtue aspect. On the layer of international migration, the research pointed out that despite long years of residence in Israel, first generation of Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel preserved their political culture that they cultivated when they were in Turkey. However, experience of international migration as a process seemed to impact on citizenship and played roles in: a) the appropriation of democratic norms defined by majoritarian terms in the legal status aspect; b) efforts to maintain their Turkish identity in the identity aspect; and c) the preference for complying with the general norms of Jewish-Israeli society and conversely excluding a proactive understanding of virtuous citizenship.

Keywords: Citizenship, Minority, Immigrant, Jew, Turkey, Israel

ÖZET

VATANDAŞLIK, AZINLIKLAR VE GÖÇMENLER:
TÜRKİYE'DEKİ YAHUDİ AZINLIK VE İSRAİL'DEKİ TÜRK-YAHUDİ GÖÇMENLER ÜZERİNE BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA

Toktaş, Şule

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma vatandaşlığın yasal statü, kimlik ve erdem boyutlarını ve aralarındaki etkileşimi uluslararası göç ve azınlık katmanlarında incelemiştir. Türkiye'deki Yahudi azınlığın ve İsrail'deki Türk-Yahudi göçmenlerin vatandaşlığı nasıl algıladığı ve tecrübe ettiği üzerine bir araştırma yapılmıştır. Türkiye ve İsrail'de gerçekleştirilen alan araştırması çerçeve mülakatları, cemaat kurumlarında katılımcı gözlem ve örneklem grubundan 65 kişiyle yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlardan oluşmuştur. Sonuçlar niteliksel veri analizi tekniği kullanılarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Azınlık katmanında, araştırma sonuçları çoğunluğun Müslüman olduğu bir ülkede gayri-Müslim azınlık olmanın a) yasal statü boyutunda tekçi ve evrensel bir vatandaşlık anlayışının sahiplenilmesinde; b) kimlik boyutunda entegrasyon ve asimilasyonun kaçınılmaz sonuçlarına rağmen Yahudi kimliğinin korunmaya çalışılmasında; ve c) sivil erdem boyutunda değerlerle uygulama arasındaki uyumsuzlukta etken olduğuna işaret etmiştir. Uluslararası göç katmanında ise araştırma birinci nesil göçmenlerin uzun yıllardır İsrail'de yaşamalarına rağmen Türkiye'de edinilen politik kültürü koruduklarını göstermiştir. Fakat, uluslararası göç deneyimi bir süreç olarak vatandaşlığı doğrudan etkiliyor görünmektedir. Nitekim yapılan araştırma, göç sürecinin a) yasal statü açısından çoğunluğun tanımı esasında gelişen demokratik normların benimsenmesinde; b) kimlik boyutunda kozmopolit Yahudi-İsrail toplumunda Türk kimliğinin korunmaya çalışılmasında; ve c) sivil erdem boyutunda ise Yahudi-İsrail toplumunun genel kurallarına uyum sağlama ve aktif erdemli vatandaşlığa mesafeli kalmada etkili olduğunu göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık, Azınlık, Göçmen, Yahudi, Türkiye, İsrail

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: FOCUS AND APPROACH

1.1 Laying Down Aspects to Citizenship: Legal Status, Identity and Civic Virtue

Contemporary liberal democracies confront governance problems elicited by the discord between the principles of equality and difference, and between the concepts of majority and minority (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). The pressure on democracies urged scholars of political theory to focus on the resolution of these pressures and in recent years, there has been growing theoretical and empirical interest in the concept of citizenship. Either from the perspective of formal democracy (focusing on formal and institutional aspects of democracy i.e. rule of law, separation of powers, multi-party system and elections that make a democracy viable) or of substantial democracy (concerning the deepening of democracy), citizenship is one of the key components of the state-society relationship. Formal democracy theoreticians tend to be content with universal citizenship rights whereas substantial democracy theoreticians emphasize the constitutive elements of the citizen such as gender, race, culture, class and identity in a multicultural and plural framework.

Democracies, no matter the model that they opt for, confront the challenges imposed by citizenship. There are mainly two models of citizenship

prevalent in political theory- individual rights based citizenship and citizenship based on groups rights. In the former model, rights of citizens regardless of differences in ethnic origin, race, language, gender, sexual orientation, social status, etc. stem from the general doctrine of universal human rights. On the other hand, in the latter model, citizens are conceived with their group membership and hence granted rights accordingly (Üstel, 1999). Despite dissimilar roots to citizenship, advocates for the adoption of universal citizenship in a homogeneous framework or for the implementation of fragmented citizenships in correspondence with the differences and diversities existing in a society, all presume a correlation between citizenship and democracy (Cohen, 1999; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994). In this sense, it is significant that citizenship discussions fall within the domain of quality of democracy at the national and international levels which point to the need of approaching citizenship in some way or another.

The basic precept that citizenship refers to is a constitutionality based relationship between the individual and the state (Delanty, 1997). Citizenship signifies also membership in a political community. Since antiquity, citizenship has been defined as the legal status of equal membership in a political community with regard to the rights and duties (Shachar, 2000: 65), which implies a unique, reciprocal and unmediated relationship between the individual and the political community (Brubaker, 1992). In a similar vein, early studies on citizenship have primarily focused on the *legal status* aspect of citizenship and on the "rights" model of state-citizen relationship. In correspondence to the historical formulation of T.H. Marshall who historicized the development of citizenship with the

introduction of civil rights in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century and social rights in the 20th century (Marshall, 1965), studies on citizenship in the post-World War II era have been an arena where the rights of the citizens vis-à-vis the state were vindicated. The main focus of these studies until 1980s was constitutional rights, social institutions and the welfare state which problematized citizenship as legal status (Kadıoğlu, 1996b).

Rights model of citizenship introduced by T.H. Marshall has not been left without criticism mainly with the argument that the deduction of citizenship only as legal status hindered the *identity* aspect (Erol, 1997: 120). For instance, Hammar (2000) points out that Marshall's formulation concerns the rights of the citizens and ignores the issue of international migration and therefore omits the right to reside, to reunite the family and to work. Turner (1992), on the other hand, questions the linear modeling of citizenship and introduces conceptualization of citizenship in public and private spheres with passive and active dimensions. In a similar vein, Delanty (1997) reveals that rights model relates equality more than participation and points to the significance of substantive dimension of citizenship which regards citizenship not only in terms of rights but also in terms of action and participation in the political community. All these challenges reflected on the development of identity politics after the 1980s when citizenship came to be accepted as an identity that equates to membership to one or more political communities based on race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession and sexuality (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 369; 2000: 30). Accordingly, separation of identity from the traditional definition of citizenship as rights was witnessed (Delanty, 1997). Identity is also considered an

important aspect of citizenship for it serves both multicultural integration and assimilation. As Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 37) put forth:

> Minorities who have secured public recognition and support for their ethnic identity have the confidence to interact with others in an open way; whereas those groups whose identities lack public recognition tend to be more defensive about their culture and more fearful about the consequences of cultural interchange.

Having accumulated the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship, the studies started to shift their analytic category from the state to the society and to citizens. The debates on citizenship accepted that the functioning of society not only depended on justice of its institutions or constitution but also on virtues, identities and practices of its citizens. Simultaneously, it has been increasingly acknowledged that the health and stability of a democracy is correlated to the capacities, responsibilities and willingness to cooperate of the citizens, shortly the *civic virtue* that the citizens possess and perform (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 352). In other words, modern citizenship is perceived as the combination of legal status, social roles and moral attributes that necessitate for "good citizenry" (Erol, 1997: 120).

As a requisite for the quality of democracy, responsible citizenship entails four types of virtues all of which constitute various components of civic virtue (Galston, 1991): general virtues (courage, law-abidingness, loyalty), social virtues (independence, open-mindedness), economic virtues (work ethic, capacity to delay self gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change) and political virtues (capacity to respect others' rights, willingness to demand what

can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse). The sense of identity that citizens have, their maneuvers to deal with competing identities, their willingness to participate in collective decisions and access to political processes, their sense of belonging to the social, political and economic order and their initiative potency all refer to different features of civic virtue (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 352). In this regard, civic virtue appears as the relational bond between the responsibilities that the citizens feel and the actions that the citizens perform accordingly.

In sum, citizenship is argued to have three main aspects (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). *First* is the legal status which enfolds citizenship in terms of civil, political and social rights plus duties like to obey laws, to pay taxes and military service. The *second* aspect is the identity dimension of citizenship which fragments citizenship into multiple categories that arise from membership to different social and political groups. Identity as a member of one or more communities based on race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession, age, sexuality and etc. construes an essential aspect of citizenship. The *third* aspect is the virtue that the citizens feel and execute in terms of their loyalties, responsibilities and roles. It has been suggested that these three aspects of citizenship - *legal status, identity and civic virtue*- are interrelated to one another; as the sensitivity to identities increase, demands for legal rights increase correspondingly (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). It is also claimed that identity affects the way people perform their duty of civic participation and their conception of responsibility (Waldron, 2000: 156). From another point of view, it is also argued that the three components of citizenship conflict with each other

under certain circumstances (Cohen, 1999). For instance, Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 32-33) argue that claims for cultural recognition may conflict with equal citizenship status. As they put forth:

> ...minority claims to cultural recognition threaten equal citizenship status when the costs and benefits of minority protection are unfairly distributed – i.e. when one subgroup within the minority (e.g. women), or when selected non-members (e.g. Anglophones in Quebec), are asked to bear most or all of the costs of cultural reproduction, while others enjoy the benefits.

Still, the dynamics of interaction between the three aspects are rather ambiguous and need further empirical data. In this regard, an empirical investigation of citizenship is necessary to shed light on the correlations and divergences existing in the interaction between three aspects.

1.2 Challenges to Citizenship: International Migration and Minority Issues

Under the impact of globalization, although the nation-state functions as the territorial unit of citizenship (Delanty, 1997; Cohen, 1999), the nation-state, which rests on the myth of one nation and one state, is becoming obsolete (Held, 1995). Furthermore, citizenship which also refers to belonging to a nation or state is also becoming intricate (Hammar, 1986). As the claims for substantive aspects of citizenship like ethnicity, gender, class, culture gained weight in response to the uncertainty and insecurity that globalization brings about (Giddens, 1991), citizenship became more fragmented (Delanty, 1997). As claims that call for diversity to be recognized increase, universal citizenship rights that safeguard individual rights and freedoms fall short of grasping diversity.

International migration and minority issues are contributory facets of this process. Even political theory has started to focus more on minorities and immigrants due to the increasing nationalist and secessionist tendencies after the collapse of the Soviet Block as well as increasing international flow of immigrants and refugees in the 1990s. Due to challenges on nation-state directed by globalization, citizenship extends beyond the concept of nationality which is linked to territoriality (Delanty, 1997). As citizenship becomes susceptible to international migration and minority issues, the relationship established with the nation-state in the form of membership or belonging gets disrupted. It has been argued that a sense of belonging together is required for the citizens to trust each other which may avoid alienation from political institutions and support the stability and the endurance of polities (Mason, 1999: 263). In this regard, states are compelled to develop new policies to deal with the consequences of international migration and the challenge of minority groups (İçduygu, 1996a: 153). Citizenship, which is an operative arena of these new policies, is functional to counter the challenges posed by globalization and the incorporation of individuals and groups, including immigrants and minorities, into the society.

Minority issues and the status of minority groups impose constraint on citizenship. Even, the use of the majority/minority terminology is itself a question relevant for the nation-state (Rodrigue, 1995: 83). Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of minority, there is a growing categorical use of the term to refer to the ones who "are residing on the territory of that state", "are the citizens of that state", "have distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic traits", "are representative but smaller in number than majority" and "have the aim to conserve

their identity" (Karimova and Deverell, 2001: 6). These criteria are also used by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. It must be also noted that refugees and non-citizen immigrants do not fall in the category of minorities according to norms of international law (Çavuşoğlu, 2001: 43). Furthermore, all minority rights go beyond common set of civil and political rights of individual citizenship. Apart from universal rights that call for the same set of rights for every person, minority rights are used to refer to the wide range of public policies, legal rights and constitutional provisions which are adopted to recognize and accommodate distinctive identities and needs of ethnic, cultural and religious groups (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 2-3).

Minority issues appear in international law not as a collective set of principles that were historically accumulated but rather similar to the movement of pendulum determined by the socio-political conjecture of certain historical periods (Hadden, 1998). The initial legislation on minorities is rooted in universal human rights in 19th century which focused mainly on individual rights. It was only with Wilsonian principles in World War I that nations were recognized to determine their future and under conditions that do not permit, minorities were granted certain rights. However, since minority issues served as justification for conquest during World War II, in the Post-war period, there was a return to individual rights discourse and minority rights retreated. Minority rights were limited only to the independence movements in the Third World during 1950s and 1960s. Group rights were recognized first time in 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. They gained weight in 1990s with 1993 United

Nations Declaration on Individuals' Rights Who Belong to National, Ethnic, Religious and Lingual Minorities, and 1994 Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In the current situation, international organization are reluctant to take decisions on ethnic conflicts or to recognize regional autonomy but forced assimilation, forced migration and genocide are prohibited whereas policies or incentives that encourage integration of minorities are considered legitimate (Hadden, 1998).

International migration, as one of the constructive elements of globalization, contributes to cultural diversity and supports the fragmentation of both citizenship and the nation-state. It is even suggested that international migration is a test arena of citizenship that raises questions of membership to, or exclusion from, the nation, the state, the political community and the rights to which they pertain (Castles and Davidson, 2000). In addition, international migration can be perceived to be problematizing citizenship in the medium of membership, belonging or attachment to the nation-state (İçduygu, 2004). As Hammar (2000) sets forth, naturalization of immigrants is a transfer of legal status to a new citizenship but not a change of national origin, nationality, identification and belonging (Hammar, 2000).

There are three important actors in international immigration and citizenship which are the receiving countries, the immigrants and the sending countries (İçduygu, 1996a). After World War II, international immigration changed phase which pushed nation-states to recognize the implications of cultural diversity and to develop new policies to deal with them. There is recognition of significance of citizenship policies in integrating immigrants into

receiving societies. The meaning of citizenship for the immigrants is closely related to "life strategies" like sequential plans and actions in the process of migration. There are several factors at play in determining the nature of life strategies which include whether the receiving society is for permanent or temporary settlement, duration of stay, kinship ties with countries of origin, documented or undocumented status of immigrants and their qualifications and positions in the labor market (İçduygu, 1996a). Most sending states today prefer the blood principle in citizenship. However, there is increasing tendency for dual citizenship to encourage emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their children (Hammar, 1989).

1.3 Setting Citizenship in a Context: Turkey's Jewish Minority and Turkish-Jewish Immigrants in Israel

As discussed above, citizenship is a problematic concept. On the one side, it is accepted that every individual should have the same rights and responsibilities under the principle of equality, but on the other side, due to cultural diversity and membership to different groups within societies, individuals are left with specific needs to be fulfilled under the principle of difference. In this regard, there is a tension between differentiated citizenship that appeals to difference in the context of distinctive identities and needs of ethno-cultural minorities in multi-ethnic societies and democratic citizenship that appeals to equality with universal rights and responsibilities (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 1-2). In addition, the artificial link between the nation and state is breaking down;

definitions of community based on blood and soil are getting ineffectual and there is a crisis of the nation-state (İçduygu et al. 1999: 203). The phenomena of minorities and international migration contribute to this trend bringing by multiple membership and multiple loyalties which lead to confusion between rights and identity, culture and politics, states and nations- in short in citizenship (Kastoryano, 2000).

The Turkish state, having a republican tradition and carrying a certain level of cultural diversity, cannot escape from this tension. On the one hand, having roots in the Ottoman Empire Millet system, there are legally recognized non-Muslim minorities in Turkey like the Armenians, Greeks and the Jews as well as other sociologically recognized ethnic/cultural groups like Alawites, Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, Georgians, etc. some of whom are deemed specific rights pertaining to their groups. On the other hand, due to a strong state tradition (Heper, 1985), citizenship in Turkey refers more to equal rights and responsibilities like paying taxes, performing military service and voting, entitled as positive freedoms in republicanism. Thus, we can speak about the dominancy of the rhetoric of equality concept in Turkey underlined by the unitary, republican state structure and uniform society despite religious, ethnic and cultural diversities and differences in the society.

The status of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey is worthy of special contemplation with regards to citizenship. The Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews are the only groups that have acquired the status of minority who were also acknowledged as "Millets" previously in the Ottoman period. Albeit on religious basis, they are the only groups in Turkey recognized as minorities by the 1923

Lausanne Treaty and have been granted special rights accordingly. These rights incorporate the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration, the rights of legal and political equality, using their mother tongue in the courts, opening their own schools or similar institutions and the holding of religious ceremonies (Karimova and Deverell, 2001: 7). Other non-Muslim religious groups, e.g. Assyrians, who had not been included in the Ottoman Millet system, were denied any distinct minority status.

The non-Muslim minorities in Turkey also point up fruitful exploration sites of citizenship not only on the layer minority but also on the layer of international migration. There is lack of statistical information in Turkish censuses regarding non-Muslim population but it is estimated that out of a total population of 70 million in Turkey, today there are around 50,000-93,000 Armenians, 3,000-3,500 Greeks and 20,000-25,000 Jews (Karimova and Deverell, 2001). It must also be noted that all the non-Muslim minorities, including those who were not granted official recognition, construe a specific segment in total population that illustrate one of the major sources of emigration. In other words, traditionally, Turkey has been an immigrant sending country with respect to its non-Muslim population. Most of the non-Muslim minority has migrated to other countries since the foundation of modern Turkey. Even some of the minority groups like the Greeks have been subject to international exchange agreements especially in the early years of the Republic. In contrast to emigration of non-Muslim minorities from Turkey, there has been immigration of Muslims to the country. In light of such a predominant tendency in Turkey with respect to international migration, the non-Muslim minorities can be considered to be the

crystallization point of citizenship by which the impacts of minority and migration on the three aspects- the legal status, identity and civic virtue- can be traced and investigated.

The status of recognized non-Muslims with respect to citizenship in Turkey reveals certain tensions in social cohesion and paradoxical points inherent in the historical development of citizenship. *First*, one of the layers of the Turkish nation-state was equal citizenship that based itself on secularism, rule of law, constitutionalism and positive rights. This equal citizenship in a way rested on the denial of the Ottoman past and the Millet system *per se*. However, in the Lausanne Treaty, the non-Muslim minorities who were officially recognized were granted separate community rights. This in a way conflicted with the principle of equal citizenship. Therefore, minority both as a category and in substance caused a threat to the foundations of the nation-state.

Second, there is the dilemma of the identity of Turkishness and that of citizenship. It is suggested that in the formation of Turkey, Turkishness was perceived to be an identity which needed to be constructed rather than inherited (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 176); and the basic question of official Turkish nationalism was not who were the Turks but who should be the Turks (Kadıoğlu, 1998). "Turk" as a term was used to refer to peasants in the Ottoman context carrying notions of denigration. The new nation-state stipulated the identity of "Turk" as a superior construction but the definition of the Turk was rather ambiguous and its contents were subject to a broad yet vague set of social, legal, economic and cultural parameters. From time to time, the term "Turk" has been used to define the Turkish citizens who contain the legal aspects of citizenship

and within a broader viewpoint to the citizens of Turkey who have identified willingly with the Turkish language, culture and state. Conversely, Islam was perceived occasionally to be construing an essential element of being Turk as well as membership to Turkish nation. Despite strong determination for secularism, Islam served to unify ethno-linguistic groups and was still dominant in the culture (Yavuz, 2000).

In a similar vein, being Turk was equated with being Muslim which in return excluded non-Muslims from the definition of the Turkish nation (Yumul, 1998). Accordingly, although the non-Muslim minorities were the citizens of the Republic whose group rights were recognized and protected by the Treaty of Lausanne at the international level, they were neither included in the project of the construction of the Turkish identity nor accepted as natural members of the Turkish nation (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 177). In this regard, the situation of the non-Muslims posed a complexity to the Turkish nation-state.

Third, citizenship in Turkey refers more to the belonging to a national community based on loyalty to the state (İçduygu et al. 1999: 197). Even subjects' loyalty to the state is considered one of the legitimacy regarding citizenship that Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Ünsal, 1998a: 15). The notion of loyalty to the state instigated several "others" to come into sight who had been unfaithful to the state and therefore were regarded as "unreliable elements" within the society. Within this discourse, certain groups in the society such as the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jews, some of whom allied with invading powers during the Independence War (1919-1922), were pinpointed as having been disloyal to

the state and in this regard their equal citizenship became susceptible.[1] Their citizenship in terms of loyalty to the state has always been questioned and they were expected to illustrate and prove their loyalty to the Turkish State (Bali, 2000: 53). By the same token, their membership to the national community was under strain.

Although the Armenians, the Greeks and the Jews are categorized as recognized minorities, there are significant historical differences between them that quiver the simplification inherent in the dichotomy of Muslim/non-Muslim. For example, Jews in Turkey traditionally had been a less politicized group. Since the late Ottoman period when they were smaller in number in comparison to Armenians and Greeks, had better relations with the Turkish State (Levi, 1998: 31). The Turkish State had been in a longstanding struggle with the various national/territorial claims of Armenians and the Greeks. With respect to Jews, there had been no similar kind of unrest. Besides, the Jewish community in Turkey serves as an active lobbying group against the ethnic discrimination or genocide claims raised by the Armenians at the international level and advocated the official state position (Bali 2001b: 120).

A further difference between the Jews and the other non-Muslim minorities is that the Jews had not been a homogeneous group historically as had been the Armenians and the Greeks (Karimova and Deverell, 2001). The Jews had had different ethnic origins (Sephardic, Ashkenazic, Romaniyot and Karaite) and consequently there had been different languages i.e. Ladino, Yiddish or Greek

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[1] The Jews who were known as loyal to the state were put on equal footing with the other minority groups and were included in the same rhetoric, too (Levi, 1998: 8).

within the community.[2] In addition, the urban outlook of Jewish minority has older roots than that of other minority groups. Even in the Ottoman period, most of the Jews used to live in their closed neighborhoods in relatively more urban towns in contrast to Greek and Armenian Millets who were dispersed over rural regions as well. Therefore, although the rural population of the Armenians and the Greeks were frequently involved in agriculture and peasantry, the Jews' involvement had been traditionally very limited.[3]

Today, most of the Jews are mainly concentrated in Istanbul and İzmir as part of the overall trend towards urbanization and metropolitanization in Turkey (Liberles, 1984: 139). The biggest community exists in Istanbul with around 17,500 Jews followed by around 2,500 Jews in İzmir. There are also very small communities in Ankara, Adana, Antakya, Bursa, Çanakkale and Şanlıurfa. All of the Jews in Turkey are represented by the Chief Rabbinate in Istanbul. There are two councils under the Chief Rabbinate. The council Bet-Din deals mainly with religious matters related to Judaism. Elections are held for synagogue councils, general communal council, for the boards of directors of the various communal institutions and the Chief Rabbi (Liberles, 1984: 166). The secular council on the other hand is mainly composed of community's respectable figures and generally

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[2] Most of the Jews in Turkey had come from Spain to the Ottoman Empire in 1492 when they were expelled from the Spanish lands. These Jews were known as Sephardic Jews who spoke Ladino (also called Judeo-Spanish) which is a dialect of Castilian Spanish. There were also Ashkenazic Jews who have migrated from central and northern Europe. They spoke Yiddish, a language having Germanic roots. Romaniyots are the Greek speaking Jews who hade been living in Anatolia since the Byzantine Empire. There were also Karaites, the smallest in number, who can be considered as a different sect in Judaism because they recognize only the written scriptures and reject Talmudic oral tradition.

[3] Ottoman Jews illustrated mainly an urban outlook with the exception of Jews in south-east Anatolia (McCarthy, 1998: 105).

deals with the societal affairs. 96% of the Jews in Turkey are Sephardic and the rest is Ashkenazic (Franz, 1994: 330). Almost all of the Jews speak Turkish. Ladino is currently spoken mainly by the older generations (Franz, 1994: 330). The community is one of the most westernized and modernized segments of the Turkish population. Education level is higher than the rest of the population (Liberles, 1984). Knowledge of foreign language is widely spread among the community with English replacing the dominancy of French especially after the 1980s. Most of the Jews are concentrated in private sector and are mainly involved in merchandising, retail, marketing and international trade.

Jews in Turkey tried to get integrated into the Turkish society (Yumul, 2001: 112). Yet, at the same time they were able to keep their cultural, ethnic and religious identities without restrictions from the Turkish State. The tolerance towards the Jewish community is argued to be one of the reasons of the underdevelopment of Zionism among the Jews living in Turkey (Benbassa and Rodrigue, 1995), the first Zionist association being founded only in 1934 (Bali, 2000). They have not experienced overt racism, anti-Semitism or Holocaust as did their counterparts in Europe especially during World War II. However, anti-Semitic discourse is frequently utilized by political wings and movements of either extreme rightist or leftist.

The Jewish community of Turkey corresponds not only to a minority group but also to an immigrant group as most of its members have immigrated, primarily to Israel after its establishment in 1948. The number of the Jews in Turkey diminished from an estimated 1927 census figure of 81,400 to 20,000-

25,000 Jews in 2003 (Dündar, 2000: 154; Karimova and Deverell, 2001).[4] The Jewish emigration to Israel is one of the major mass movements out of Turkey, the largest being the labor migration to Germany and other Western European countries (Geray, 1970). The reasons for emigration changed from time to time. For some of the immigrants, ideological (Zionist) reasons like contributing to the establishment of a Jewish state played role in their decision to emigrate while some others mainly had economic concerns such as establishing a higher standard of living in Israel. It is estimated that around 100,000-150,000 Turkish Jews live in Israel today (Yetkin, 1996: 56).[5]

Due to restrictions in the legal framework in Turkey, these emigrants could not hold dual citizenship prior to 1981 after when Turkey allowed multiple citizenship with a new regulation on citizenship that affected the status of all Turkish immigrants in foreign countries. In 1995, Turkey allowed ex-Turkish citizens who converted to another citizenship (i.e. Israeli citizenship) to keep their rights in Turkey, such as inheritance, settlement and travel. Similar to the practices in other immigrant sending countries, Turkey prefers blood principle of citizenship and tends to stress the legal aspect that permit emigrants to qualify for

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[4] In this study, the members of the Jewish minority in Turkey are generally referred as "Jews in Turkey" or "Turkey's Jews". Such a terminology is preferred in order to avoid repetition of "Turkish Jews in Turkey" and confusion with the Turkish Jews in Israel. Other than that there is not any ideological preposition in not labeling them as Turkish Jews even though some of the Jews themselves may prefer not to be called Turkish Jews but merely Jews while some others may prefer to be called Turkish only. Whatever the preferences may be, in this study, the category "Jews in Turkey" simply addresses Turkey's Jews.

[5] For the first generation of Jewish immigrants who moved from Turkey and currently living in Israel, generally the term "Turkish Jews in Israel" is used simply because of the fact that they were born in Turkey. Such a label does not entail any ethnic or subjective meaning. What's more, it does not mean that these immigrants only had Turkish citizenship nor they affiliated themselves solely with Turkish culture.

naturalization without giving up their original citizenship (İçduygu, 2004). Dual citizenship generally implies membership in more than one state and as a concept it presupposes loyalty to the state rather than the nation (Hammar, 1989). The changes in Turkish citizenship witnessed after 1980s brought by new citizenship debate centered on the forces of migration, ethnicity and religion. In other words, emigration and dual citizenship are the two layers that changed the conventional understanding of the nation-state which is under the challenge of globalization (İçduygu et al. 1999: 187).

The Jewish emigration to Israel has had implications for Israel as well. As one of the new states established in late 1940s, Israel also construes an imperative illustration of the development of citizenship. Generally, citizenship in Israel is arranged by the Nationality Law which set forth the conditions to earn Israeli citizenship. The Law of Return is the major legislation regarding the citizenship of the Jews. Upon the claim of Palestine to be the historical homeland of the Jews before their expulsion in the Roman Empire, it refers to the "return rights" of the Jews dispersed all over the world to their homeland in Israel. As the Law of Return certifies, most of the citizens of Israel have earned their citizenship status due to immigration to Israel from other countries like Turkey. In the case of emigration from countries that did not allow dual citizenship, Israel granted the Jewish migrants permanent residence so that the migrants would not lose its rights such as property rights in the sending country.

Immigration to Israel is considered unique because it is the immigration of the Jews; it is not restricted; and Israel's commitment to immigration is based on ideological considerations rather than economic ones (Ichilov, 2002: 5). The state

subsidizes Jewish immigrants by providing housing, employment, healthcare entitlements, taxation concessions and language training. Still, the integration of immigrants to the Israeli society is a question of citizenship and Israel witnesses the discussions on membership. Israel has been experiencing the tension between secular norms of nation-building and religiously grounded definition of membership (Bauböck, 2001). The debate over "Who is a Jew?" in Israel is a reflection of this tension. There are controversies whether Jewishness is race, nation or religion. The debate created opposing positions between secular and religious definitions as well as objective and subjective criteria of membership (Joppke and Roshenhek, 2001).

1.4 Statement of Problem and Aim of the Study

This study is an attempt to understand how Turkey's Jewish minority and Turkish Jewish immigrants in Israel perceive citizenship. There are two components to the study: one is the investigation of the three aspects of citizenship – legal status, identity and civic virtue – and their interaction with each other; and the other is investigation of citizenship on the layers of international migration and minority issues. These two components are unified in one research skeleton and the task of the exploration of citizenship spotlights the nature and the variance of the impact of being immigrant and being minority on the intercourse between legal status, identity and civic virtue elements in citizenship.

Such an investigation dwells on citizen-centric approach that reflects on personal accounts of Jews in Turkey and in Israel and focuses on their perceptions

and experiences on citizenship. Although earlier studies citizenship pinpoint legal structures and policies of the states by utilizing a state-centric approach, recently, putting citizens into the center of the analytic framework and setting citizens as the main category of analysis have started to be spread (İçduygu, 2004). The issues of how citizens identify with their rights, roles and responsibilities; how they perform their citizenship as legal status, identity and virtue; how they are situated in the politics of membership, and belonging; under which motivations they participate in the political community as well as the public sphere; and how they negotiate with what they perceive and experience as unequal and injustice all refer to a framework where citizens are central both in the examination and in the policy making of citizenship. In light of these points, this study aims to understand citizenship from the perspectives of citizens themselves and to give an account of their experiences.

The Jewish minority living in Turkey and the Turkish Jews who migrated from Turkey to Israel and currently living in Israel construe the empirical case for the comparative investigation. Jews of Turkey do not only refer to a distinct minority group granted official recognition in a country where majority of its population is Muslim but also to an immigrant group most of whom have migrated to Israel and became Israeli citizens. Research on this specific group of minorities and immigrants assures insights for both Turkey and Israel, as states founded in the first half of the 20th century in the Middle East. By use of this case study, the role of citizenship in state formations comes into view, too.

The comparative case of Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel serves elaboration of the discourses and practices of citizenship in both countries. The

field research in Turkey aims to discover how members of the Jewish minority perceive and perform Turkish citizenship with its aspects of legal status, identity and civic virtue. In a similar vein, the field research in Israel aims to shed light on the impact of the process of migration on citizenship from the perspectives of the citizens/migrants themselves. Since Turkish Jews in Israel have the options of having Israeli, Turkish or multiple citizenships, the field research spotlights varieties of citizenship status among the immigrants.

This study is the first one in the field of studies on citizenship in Turkey in several respects. It construes one of the first examples of empirical research. Most studies prevalent in social sciences generally highlight on the theory of the development of citizenship in Turkey. But this current study provides empirical evidence. For instance major studies on Turkish citizenship e.g. by İçduygu (1996a; 1996b), Kirişçi (2000) and Soyarık (2000) focus on state policies with respect to citizenship matters. The books *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*[6] and *Challenges to Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*[7] compile various articles by different scholars but tend to focus on macro issues of citizenship rather than concerning the interplay of citizenship on the individual level.

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[6] The reference information for the book is: Ünsal, Artun (ed.) 1998b. *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru* (From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years). İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, İş Bankası Yayınları.

[7] The reference of the book is: Keyman, E. Fuat, and Ahmet İçduygu (eds.) 2004. *Challenges to Citizenship in a Globalizing World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. London: Routledge.

Another contribution of this study is that it combines Jewish minority and immigrants in one research framework, an incorporation which has not been employed before. Furthermore, it takes into account the contemporary circumstances and the present day Jewish minority/immigrant communities. There have been several studies on the Jewish minority in Turkey primarily in the discipline of history. The historians explored the Jews by and large in the Ottoman Empire.[8] These studies focused primarily on the structure of the Millet system as part of the Ottoman state administration and the status of the Jewish Millet vis-à-vis other non-Muslim Millets. The most common argument made in the studies on Ottoman Jewry is that the Jews had not experienced the oppression in the Ottoman Empire as they had witnessed in Europe and their difference had been tolerated which caused the Empire to attract Jewish migratory flows.

Regarding the status of the Jews in Republican Turkey, the existing studies mainly concentrated in the Early Republican Period between the years 1923-1945, a time when the seeds of nation-building and modern state formation were rooted.[9] They explored various dynamics of the transformation of the former non-Muslim Millets of the Ottoman Empire into officially recognized minorities and reflected on the pressures of the nation-state formation on the Jews as well as

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[8] To exemplify, some of the essential literature on Ottoman Jewry as well as other non-Muslims include those of Alkan (2000), Baer (2000), Benbassa and Rodrigue (2001), Besalel (1999), Davison (1954), Emecen (1997), Eroğlu (2000), Galanti (1995), Groepler (1999), Güleryüz (1993), Gülsoy (2000), Karpat (1985; 1988), Levy (1994), Lewis (1996), Molho (1999), Nahum (2000), Van Bekkum (2001) and Sharon (1993).

[9] Some of the studies that focus on the Early Republican Period are those of Rıdvan Akar, Rıfat Bali, Moşe Grosman, Haluk Karabatak, Avner Levi, Laurent Mallet and Çetin Yetkin. For references of these works, see Select Bibliography.

other non-Muslims. They brought into light previously omitted historical accounts that influenced the non-Muslims in Turkey to a great extent. Despite the fruitful variety of inquiry on the Ottoman Period and the Early Republican Period, the years after 1945 are not often covered and empirical investigations on contemporary Jewish community in Turkey are very rare. Yet, recently there has been growing concern on the current situation evidenced by rising number of work, either published or unpublished, on the Jews in Turkey.[10] These studies, most of which emanate from the field within the vein of sociological or ethnographic inquiry, give voice to the personal accounts of the Jews in Turkey. However, none of them entail the view of political science and put the status of the Jews as a question of citizenship in Turkey. Therefore, this current study contributes to preceding literature by dealing with the task of bringing the voices of the Jews into the interplay of state-society relations and hence citizenship.

Despite the richness of the literature on the Jews in Turkey including the Ottoman Empire, the literature on the migration of Jews from Turkey to Israel or on the Turkish-Jewish community in Israel is scarce. The major studies focusing specifically on migration from Turkey to Israel are those of Bali (2003) and Weiker (1988). Bali's study centers on migration to Israel in the years 1946-49 generally using secondary documents such as memoirs, newspapers, books and archival documents, though the migration flows prior to and after his focus period are given some coverage. In addition, the study generally focuses on Jewish migrants with their former minority group status within Turkey in the 1930s and

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[10] Some of these inquiries on the contemporary era are those of Kaya (1999), Koçoğlu (2001; 2003), Liberles (1984), Yuna (1999) and Tuval (1999).

'40s and therefore concentrates more on issues related to the conditions, policies, discourses and actors of migration. In other words, it builds up a direct correlation between the Turkification policies of the Early Republican Era towards the Jews and mass migration to Israel and therefore illustrates a thematic viewpoint from the sending side of emigration.

On the other hand, Weiker's study is an empirical one spotlighting individual narratives of emigrants from Turkey who reside in 1980s Israel. The study generally explores the identity dimension of Jewish émigrés from Turkey to Israel, showing them as full-fledged Israelis. The main point of the study refers to the "invisibility" of Israelis who have come from Turkey – that is, that Turkish Jews have been well integrated into conditions inside Israel and so have not emerged as an outcast group within Israeli society. These two important studies on migration from Turkey to Israel, from both the perspective of the sending country and the recipient, highlight the triangle of international migration, Israel and Turkey which so far has received scant attention. The current study contributes to the existing ones by attaching a comparative view on the above mentioned triangle and by exploring the transformations in citizenship of the present-day Turkish Jewish community in Israel.

1.5 Methodology of the Study

In order to investigate how citizenship is perceived and experienced on the individual level, research was conducted by constructing a comparative case study of Turkey's Jewish minority and Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel. The

research drew on information mainly from primary sources obtained in the field studies both in Turkey and in Israel that made individual level of analysis possible. The field studies were launched in March 2002 and ended in September 2003 making up 19 months of empirical work.

The research combined various qualitative research techniques all of which combined into a semi-anthropological approach. The minority and immigrant communities both in Turkey and in Israel were contacted. Unstructured interviews were conducted with various key informants in both countries. These informants were generally people who fell outside the sample group but who had substantial information on Jewish minority/immigrant communities in both countries. Among them, there were community leaders, association representatives, school teachers, journalists, editors of publications addressing Jewish minority in Turkey and Turkish-Jewish immigrant community in Israel, ambassadors, state officials, specialists on Turkish Jewry and etc. all of whom provided substantial information for the study. Each key informant was addressed different questions varying according to specificity of the information to be provided by the informants. Participant observation complemented the information gathered in these interviews which mainly took place during the visits to foundations, associations and other institutional settings related to immigrant and minority communities in Israel and in Turkey. Field notes were taken during key informant respondents and participant observation.

Apart from the interviews with key informants, a survey with a semi-structured interviewing technique, which includes structured questionnaire plus in-depth questioning, was conducted with the members of the Jewish minority in

Turkey and Turkish Jewish community in Israel. Since it was important to understand the operative dynamics and mechanisms of citizenship, non-probability sampling that enabled purposive quota sampling was used. Of course, what were used as samples of Jews in both countries is far from being fully representative of the communities, but it attempted to catch diversities of the people so that it provided something close to a representative type. In total 65 interviews were made with the sample group in Turkey and in Israel.[11] The respondents were ordinary members of the minority and immigrant groups with or without membership bond, belonging sentiment or identity. All of the interviews were made face-to-face and the involvement of third parties to the interviews was eliminated. Again, all of them were recorded with a digital recorder and transcribed personally by the researcher. Transcription was one-to-one- that is everything that was recorded was put into written form word-by-word. Then, the interviews were analyzed by using methods of qualitative research analysis. Therefore, rather than the quantification of the ideas mentioned in the interviews, focus was centered on the diversity as well as the articulation of the opinions.

All the interviews, key informant interviews as well as interviews with sample group, were conducted in Turkish. The interviewees were fluent in Turkish and therefore knowledge of Ladino or Hebrew was not a requirement of the methodology. Even the key informants like ambassadors of Israel in Turkey were former immigrants from Turkey who knew and spoke Turkish very well. Having set these brief points regarding research, below there is a detailed review

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[11] Further information on details of sample selection is given in the following parts of this chapter.

of methodology. Since the layers of international migration and minority issues in the comparative case of Jews in Turkey and in Israel point out to the need of conducting research as separate research schemes in two countries, the research conducted is discussed separately according to countries in focus.

1.5.1 The Field Study in Turkey

Presently, almost all of the Jews in Turkey live in urban areas. Istanbul is the major site in Turkey where the Jewish population is concentrated. Massive majority of the community associations, foundations, publications, synagogues, and museums are also in Istanbul. Owing to this fact, Istanbul composed the main setting of the field research in Turkey. However, a few of the interviews- both with the members of the Jewish minority and with the key informants- took place in Ankara. Some of the key informant interviews took place in Ankara, the capital of Turkey where the central state offices and so the key informants working at these offices were located. In addition, some of the sample group interviews were conducted in Ankara because these interviewees were temporarily located in Ankara, though they were living in Istanbul. The field study took place between March 2002 and September 2003.

The interviews with the key informants and participant observation in various communal institutions did not compose the major source of research data to be analyzed. Rather they served to provide background information about the general characteristics of Jewish minority in Turkey and to illuminate and clarify the data obtained in the sample group questionnaire interviews. In this regard,

they shed light on the discussions that arose during the in-depth interviews with the ordinary members of the Jewish minority. Accordingly, several community places and key informants were contacted with. In addition to participant observation of the facilities that occurred in those places, interviews were conducted with key informants which covered a wide range of issues. Notes were taken during the interviews.

In order to obtain information about the general structure of the community newspaper, *Şalom* weekly, two visits were paid to the central office of the publishing company *Gözlem Gazetecilik Basın ve Yayın A.Ş.* in Nişantaşı, Istanbul. Some of the people working at the office either professionally or as volunteers were interviewed.[12] Şalom weekly was also subscribed so that the news related to the community were attained periodically.[13]

A visit to *the Quincentennial Foundation Jewish Museum of Turkey* in Karaköy, Istanbul was made.[14] The representatives of the Foundation were interviewed during that visit.[15] *Schneidertempel Sanat Merkezi* (Schneidertempel

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[12] The interviews were conducted on April 19, 2002 and on May 16, 2003.

[13] Şalom weekly was founded by Avram Leon in 1948. It was published in Judeo-Spanish until 1984 but changed to Turkish when a new editorial team took over the newspaper. Currently, only one page of the newspaper is allocated to Ladino. The newspaper is sold only in a few bookstores and is generally distributed by subscription. There are around 4,000-4,500 subscribers. Şalom circulates not only in Turkey but also in Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Denmark, Nicaragua, Italy and the U.S.A.

[14] The Museum was visited on April 21, 2002.

[15] The Quincentennial Foundation was founded in 1992 as part of the celebratory activities of the 500th year of the reception of the Jewish refugees in the Ottoman Empire who were expelled from Spain and Portugal in 1492. It organizes various conferences about the Jews in Turkey and the Jewish culture. The Foundation also led the foundation of Jewish Museum of Turkey in 2001. In the museum, history of the Jews in Turkey is presented with various illustrative objects.

Art Center) in Galata which serves as one of the major locations where Jewish art and culture facilities take place was also explored.[16] The Princes' Islands in Marmara Sea are notorious with their non-Muslim population. *Burgazada* and *Büyükada* are popular sites for summers among the Istanbulite Jews. There are synagogues, vacation houses, sports club on the islands. Both of the islands were visited and representatives of *Yıldırımspor Gençlik ve Kültür Derneği* (Yıldırımspor Youth and Culture Association) in Büyükada told of the sports activities, cultural events and generally the summer life on the islands.[17]

Visits were also made to *the Chief Rabbinate of Turkey*. Some of the officials working were interviewed.[18] These informants delivered crucial information about the legal status of the Chief Rabbinate and the general characteristics of the Jewish community. They also helped to establish contacts with other communal institutions. The civic leader of the Jewish community was also visited who delivered knowledge about the community structure and the division of labor between the secular and religious councils.[19] *Neva Şalom Synagogue*, the largest in Istanbul was explored as well.[20] Some of the communal

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[16] European Day of Jewish Culture was held on September 7, 2003. The concert of Klezmer Melodies was given in the Center as part of festival activities.

[17] Burgazada was visited on May 17, 2003 and Büyükada on July 26, 2003.

[18] The Chief Rabbinate of Turkey was visited on November 21, 2002 and on July 22, 2003.

[19] The community leader was met on November 21, 2002.

[20] There are 20 synagogues in Istanbul and three of them are on the Princes' Islands. Each synagogue is registered as a foundation of the community and administered by an executive committee.

institutions in Istanbul were also visited. These included nursing homes of *İhtiyarlara Yardım Derneği* (Aid Association for the Elderly) in Hasköy, *Barınyurt Matan Baseter* (Barınyurt Assisted Care Home) in Kuledibi and *Or-Ahayim Hastanesi* (Or-Ahayim Hospital) in Balat.[21] All of these key informants from the Jewish community made a concise summary on the communal institutions.[22]

Some of the prominent scholars who work on Jews in Turkey were also interviewed. With Rıfat Bali, I made two interviews. He provided essential knowledge about relations within the community and the integration of Jews into general society.[23] I interviewed Moşe Grosman as well. He is affiliated to studies on Ashkenazic Jewry in Turkey and publishes *Tiryaki*, [24] a journal for and about Jews in Turkey.[25]

Apart from these interviews in Istanbul with key informants who were generally from the community, I also contacted with *the Bureau for Minorities at*

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[21] They were visited on November 29, 2002, on January 7, 2003 and on May 16, 2003 respectively.

[22] Some of the communal institutions were not visited personally but the key informants substantiated information about them. Most prominent ones in Istanbul are *Fakirlere Yardım Derneği* (Society for the Support of the Poor), *Dostluk Yurdu Derneği* (Friendship Association), *Göztepe Kültür Derneği* (Göztepe Culture Association), Neve Şalom Kültür Merkezi (Neva Şalom Culture Center) and *Mişne Tora* (Machazike Torah). In İzmir, there is *İzmir Kültür Derneği* (İzmir Culture Association). News about the activities in these institutions frequently appears in Şalom. For further information about communal institutions, see Liberles (1984).

[23] He was interviewed twice; one on April 22, 2002 and the other on March 18, 2003.

[24] Tiryaki has started to be published in 1994 but has not appeared periodically.

[25] He was interviewed on November 22, 2002.

the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior in Ankara. The Bureau is founded according to the provisions in the Lausanne Treaty for the purpose of watching over law and order during the elections of foundations of the non-Muslims. The police officers at the Bureau told of the articles of the Lausanne Treaty and its implementations in the domestic law. [26] The interviews with them also covered the recent amendments upon European Union requirements.

In addition to key informant interviews and participant observation, survey interviews were conducted with individual members of the community in order to investigate perception on citizenship of the Jewish minority in Turkey. In total, 31 interviews were conducted in Turkey.[27] Initial contact with the interviewees was made by phone calls and appointments were taken. The interviews were in-depth in focus and semi-structured in technique. *Three sets of questions* were addressed.[28] The *first* set of questions was asked at the start of the interviews. These questions aimed to understand the individual characteristics of the respondents such as age, gender, place of birth, place of settlement, class characteristics, education level, marital status, family structure, languages used, citizenship status and ethno-religious (Sephardim or Ashkenazim) origin. The

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[26] The interviews were conducted on September 10, 2003.

[27] Each interviewee is given a code, i.e. FRIT19, that starts with FRIT referring to the abbreviation for "Field Research in Turkey" and ends with a number referring to that specific interviewee.

[28] The first and second sets of questions were structured and composed the questionnaire part of the interviews. The third set of questions which were in-depth in focus complimented the questionnaire. See Appendix A in the Appendices for the structured set of the questions asked in the interviews.

second set of questions addressed more the investigation of citizenship with its aspects of legal status, identity and civic virtue. In addition, they aimed to understand how the respondents perceive and experience their membership and belonging to the Turkish nation-state when at the same time they were members of a non-Muslim minority group in a Muslim majority society. In addition to questionnaire, some ad-hoc questions were addressed to the respondents which make up the *third* group of questions. They helped to clarify the ideas, values and experiences that each respondent disclose during the interviews. These questions were related to the specific and personal histories and positions of the respondents. The questionnaire covered 57 questions but with the addition of ad-hoc questions went up to around 80 questions depending on the flow of the interviewing. The duration of the interviews varied, minimum taking 40 minutes and maximum taking 230 minutes, with a total average of 90 minutes.

The respondents were contacted by a combination of various means. In the snowball technique, the respondents referred to their family members, relatives, workmates or friends as the next possible interviewee candidates. But, in order to avoid the risk of interviewing people in the same network, attempts were made not to interview people who were close to each other as relatives or friends. In addition, the people who stay at the nursing homes, *Barınyurt* and *İhtiyarlara Yardım Derneği*, were also contacted. Volunteers working at communal institutions were also contacted. Furthermore, personal relations of the researcher with her Jewish friends helped finding new respondents. Some of the members *Debarkader* which is an electronic group on the internet for the Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel also gave consent for the interviews. The intellectuals

of the Jewish community or the academicians at various universities in Turkey who work on the Jews in Turkey or who have Jewish students also provided the names of respondents for the interviews. The Jews who appeared in Şalom weekly as writers or in relation to community events were also interviewed.

In the selection of the possible respondents, *three criteria* played crucial roles. *First*, only the ones who fall within the sample group categories were chosen. That is, the interviewees were to consider themselves as belonging to the Jewish community in Turkey or perceive themselves as Jewish minority in Turkey. Self perceptions on Jewishness and/or formal membership to the Jewish community in Turkey were considered important in the selection of the respondents. This, however, was not in terms of the level of their religious practices as there could have been atheists in the sample group.[29] Rather, the sample group covered the Jews in Turkey who had Turkish citizenship by birth and who lived in Turkey for many years and who had families of Jewish origin. The sample group representative of the Jewish community in Turkey was categorized in three age groups: between 20-40 years of age, between 40-60 years of age and above 60 years of age. Therefore, the ones who were below the age group 20 were not chosen. Additionally, only the ones who were in good mental and physical condition were selected as some of the elderly could have been exposed to illnesses due to their old ages. Since equal numbers of women and

[29] Sabbataites were excluded from the sampling as neither they nor Jews in Turkey consider Sabbataites Jewish. Sabbataites are merely the followers of Sabbatai Zvi who formed messianic sect converged from Judaism in 16th century.

men were aimed to be interviewed according to the research methodology, balance in terms of gender was tried to be sustained in the selection process.

Second, only the ones who gave consent to be interviewed were selected. The interviewees were ensured that their names would not be publicized and the data obtained in the interviews would be used only for scientific purposes. The aims, the scope and the procedures of the research as well as points on confidentiality were expressed in the protocol which was read vocally to the respondents by the researcher before the interview started.[30] The *third* criterion for selecting the respondents who belong to the Jewish community in Turkey was upholding diversity as much as possible. The diversity among the respondents was built upon the basis of differences in age, gender, marital status, citizenship status, place of birth, place of settlement, occupation, education, socio-economic background and ethno-religious origin (Sephardim or Ashkenazim) of the respondents. For instance, when it was realized that generally educated Jews were interviewed, the consequent interviews were made with the Jews who had lesser education levels or no education at all. Similarly, when at a point in the research, the interviews with the Jews from the young generation was completed, the interviewee selection process for following interviews switched to the respondents from older generations.

Most of the interviews took place in Istanbul in various places such as houses of the respondents, work offices, university classrooms, libraries, nursing homes, art exhibition halls, dressing rooms a theater, meeting rooms of the Chief

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[30] See Appendix B for the full text of the protocol read to the respondents at the beginning of the interviews.

Rabbinate, hospital belonging to the Jewish community in Turkey, coffee bars or restaurants. Only one of the interviews took place in Ankara.

There were some shortcomings of the research. Since the researcher was located in Ankara and the research mainly took place in Istanbul, visits to research site remained limited to the appointments taken before hand. It would have been more convenient if the researcher had the opportunity to stay in Istanbul for longer periods. Additionally, some of the respondents seemed to have been in a defensive position with the questions related to their minority and/or religious identity. From time to time, the research needed to kindly attract the motivation of the respondent when answering the questions. These efforts included in-depth explanation of the aim of the research, the questions asked in the interviews and the relevance and significance of the information provided by the respondents' answers.

1.5.2 The Field Study in Israel

It is estimated that there are around 100,000- 150,000 Turkish Jews including first generation of immigrants and their offspring living in Israel. Although they are dispersed throughout the country, Bat-Yam, Ramat-Aviv, Rishon Lezziyon, Ramat Gan, Herzeliya, central Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Yahud are the main places of concentration. In the field research in Israel, there was no main research setting and according to the appointments, several towns were visited. Similar to the field research in Turkey, the study in Israel was composed of key informant interviews and participant observation, and survey interviews. I visited

Israel in June and July of 2003. However, all the phases of the research including the preparation and aftermath were carried out between March 2002 and September 2003.

The associations, organizations or foundations established by the Turkish Jews in Israel are less in number and in variety than those founded by the Jewish community in Turkey. Yet, there are some which aim at preserving Turkish culture among the Jews from Turkey in Israel and establishing a network between them. The leading organization in Israel founded by Turkish Jews is *Itahdut Yotsei Turkia* (Association of People Coming from Turkey). The central office of the organization is located in Bat-Yam but there are branches in central Tel-Aviv, Yahud, Natanya and Haifa. Individual interviews were conducted with various members of the organization. Among them, there were chair, vice chair, secretary, editor of *Türkiyeliler Birliği Bülteni* (Bulletin of the Association)[31], accountant, head of the youth branch and head of the branch in Yahud.[32] The key informants told of the general characteristics of Turkish Jews in Israel and of the distinctions between first generation of immigrants and their Israel-born children. They helped the research to outline a picture of the community and its difference with other Jewish Israelis who came from other countries. These members of Itahdut also gave information about *Nur Masonic Lodge* and *B'nai B'rith Yosef Niyego Lodge* most of whose members are Turkish Jews.

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[31] The Bulletin is a journal of Itahdut Yotsei Turkia published six times a year.

[32] 12 members of the organization were interviewed as key informants during June 2003. The interviews mainly took place in the central office of the Itahdut. However, some of the interviews were conducted at the houses of the interviewees located in various districts.

Moadon Tarbut Yotsei Turkia (Bat-Yam Culture Club) is another organization founded by Turkish Jews. The municipality of Bat-Yam allocated an apartment for Turkish Jews to perform art facilities. Several visits were paid to the club and the chorus as well as theater play rehearsals were watched. Former members of the *Herzeliya Culture Club* which was founded in 1985 but closed in 1990 were also interviewed in the interviewees' houses in the Herzeliya region.[33] One of the former members of the association *Morit* (Foundation for a Center of Turkish Judaism in Israel) founded in 1986 but ended activities by mid-1990s was also met.[34] *Amutat Yotsei Hatnua Hatziyonit Be Turkiya* (Association of Activists for the Zionist Movement in Turkey) which is the organization founded by Turkish Zionists was also interviewed. A representative of *Bat-Yam Lions' Club* was also met who told of the joint activities with some of the Lions Clubs in Turkey.[35] *Merkaz Yom L'Kashish* (Retirees' Center) in Yahud was also visited.[36] This is a social center for old men and women and generally Sephardim Jews attend. It is administered by Yahud Municipality. During an afternoon, the activities held at the center were observed. A similar center for the elderly *Moadon Zahav* (Old Age Club) was also seen in Bat-Yam. It is administered by Bat-Yam Municipality. Sephardim Jews who came mainly from Bulgaria, former

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[33] The interviews were conducted on June 17 and 18, 2003.

[34] The interview with the representative of Morit was done on June 18, 2003.

[35] The interview was held on June 16, 2003.

[36] The visit took place on June 23, 2003.

Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey generally go to this center to play cards or drink tea. An afternoon was spent on the street *Rehov Levinsky*. Most of the stores and shops on the street are owned by Turkish Jews. I made ad-hoc interviews were with some of the store keepers.

The archives at the central office of Itahdut Yotsei Turkia in Bat-Yam were also investigated. Various issues of the newspapers, the journals and the bulletins addressing Turkish Jews in Israel like *La Vera Luz*, *Haber*, *Dostluk*, *Gelişim*, *Sesimiz*, *Bülten* and *Türkiyeliler Birliği Bülteni* were collected from the archive. These were not used directly in the dissertation but helped me to understand the immigrant community more. The statistics regarding immigration numbers from Turkey to Israel were collected at Israel's *Central Bureau of Statistics*. Regarding official proceedings of citizenship, immigration from Turkey to Israel and relations with the Jews in Turkey as well as the Turkish Jews in Israel, the Turkish embassies in Tel-Aviv and in Jerusalem were visited.[37] These interviews complemented the previous ones which were conducted with the personnel from Israel's Consulate and Embassy in Istanbul and in Ankara.[38]

In addition to the key informant interviews and participant observation in various associations and centers which provided general information on the characteristics of Turkish Jews in Israel, simultaneously, survey interviews were conducted to investigate citizenship on the layer of international migration. 34

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[37] The personnel from Turkey's Embassy in Tel-Aviv were interviewed on June 18, 2003 and from Turkey's Embassy in Jerusalem on June 30, 2003.

[38] Interviews at Israel's Embassy in Ankara were conducted on May 9, 2002 and one year later on May 22, 2003. Interview at Israel's Embassy in Istanbul was conducted on May 16, 2003.

respondents who migrated from Turkey to Israel in various years after 1948 until 1980 and currently living in Israel were interviewed.[39] The interviews were semi-structured and contributory questions were addressed to the respondents in addition to questionnaire.[40] The questions asked to the Jewish immigrants from Turkey in Israel were similar to the ones addressed to the Jewish minority group in Turkey. In other words, in order to be able to make a comparison between the two groups, parallel questions were addressed that investigated the relation between legal status, identity and civic virtue. However, these interviews with the Jews from Turkey in Israel tended more to cover the migration history and the changing perceptions on citizenship in result of migration to Israel.

There were *three sets of questions* in survey interviews in Israel as had been the case with the survey interviews in Turkey. These questions were similar in context with those in Turkey as discussed previously. The *first* set addressed to the general characteristics of the immigrants such as age, gender, class, ethnicity, education level, marital status, family structure, changes in the languages used after migration, change in citizenship status, ethno-religious (Sephardim or Ashkenazim) origin, date of migration, age at the time of migration and changes in work and settlement after migration. The *second* set of questions addressed more the investigation of citizenship both before and after migration. Since the respondents were former members of the Jewish minority in Turkey before

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[39] Each interviewee is given a code, e.g. FRIS21, that starts with FRIS referring to the abbreviation for "Field Research in Israel" and ends with a number referring to that specific interviewee.

[40] See Appendix C for the questionnaire used in the field research in Israel.

emigration, some of the questions focused on the relationship between Turkish citizenship and minority status. Some other questions focused on the history of migration and the changes in the citizenship status and the perception of citizenship in due course. All the questions in the second set followed a chorological order. The *third* group of questions was addressed to the respondents spontaneously. They helped the researcher to clarify the ideas, values, perceptions and experiences that each respondent mentioned during the interviews in relation to his or her personal life history. The questionnaire included 70 questions, yet with ad-hoc questions interviews covered around 100 questions depending on the flow of interviewing. The duration of the interviews varied, minimum taking 40 minutes and maximum taking 120 minutes, with a total average of 70 minutes.

The 34 respondents were contacted by a combination of various means. As had been the case with the interviews in Turkey, snowball technique was also used in Israel. Each respondent referred to their family members, relatives, neighbors or friends as the next possible interviewee candidates. However, interviewing people only within these circles was tried to be avoided by supplementary means. Having finished the field research in Turkey, the interviewees in Turkey provided contact names of their friends and relatives in Israel which helped the researcher with the field research in Israel. In addition to these respondents, several other people in Turkey who were not Jewish themselves but had some affiliation with Israel – by reasons of work, education, tourism, etc. - provided contact information for interviewing in Israel. The people working at immigrant organizations founded by the Jews emigrated from Turkey

were also contacted for interviewing. The major immigrant association of the Jews from Turkey in Israel is Itahdut Yotsei Turkia and its active members provided the membership list of the Association. Some of the names which were covered in the list accepted to give interviews. The members of the Bat-Yam Culture Club were also contacted during theater play rehearsal. Some of the members of the e-group Debarkader accepted to give interviews. The researcher had friends and colleagues in Israel who provided contact names in Israel. Last but not least, several people who had migrated from Turkey or had Turkish origins were met spontaneously, e.g. cashier at supermarket; taxi driver, bakery, etc. They provided some names for interviewing.

In the selection of the possible respondents, there were *three criteria* that the researcher considered important. *First*, only the ones who migrated from Turkey to Israel in the mass migration between 1948 and 1951 and who migrated after 1951 until 1980 were selected. The Jews who migrated before 1948 and after 1980 were eliminated in the sample group. The sample groups covered only the immigrants whose country of origin was Turkey. It was also important that the immigrants were the first generation of immigrants; hence the second or third generation of immigrants who are the offspring of adult immigrants were ignored in the sample group.[41] Furthermore, the first generation of immigrants was to be in their adult or juvenile ages at the time of migration. In other words, if the immigrants were not mature enough for the decision to emigrate from Turkey to

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[41] It is also acknowledged in previous studies that the immigrating adults and the immigrant-offspring communities in Israel experience sharp generation gaps since the offspring cannot duplicate the socialization, life course, language and cultural features and socio-geographic constraints that the adult immigrating group experienced (Matras, 1985: 3).

Israel, they were excluded from the sample group. Consequently, the sample group referred to an age group above middle ages. Only the immigrants who were in good mental and physical condition were preferred as some of the elderly could have been exposed to illnesses due to their old ages. Since equal numbers of women and men were aimed to be interviewed according to the research methodology, balance in terms of gender was tried to be sustained in the selection process.

Second, only the ones who gave consent to be interviewed were selected. The interviewees were ensured that their names would not be publicized and the data obtained in the interviews would be used only for scientific purposes. The aims, the scope and the procedures of the research as well as points on confidentiality were expressed in the protocol which was read vocally to the respondents by the researcher at the start of the interviews.[42] The *third* criterion for selecting the respondents who belong to the Jewish community in Turkey was upholding diversity as much as possible. The diversity among the respondents was built upon the basis of differences in age, gender, marital status, citizenship status, place of birth, place of settlement in Turkey before emigration, date of arrival in Israel, place of settlement in Israel, occupation, education, socio-economic background and ethno-religious origin (Sephardim or Ashkenazim). For instance, when it was realized that generally the Jews who migrated in the early 1970s were interviewed, the consequent interviews were made with the Jews who migrated in the late 1970s. Similarly, when, at a point in the field research, it was realized that

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[42] See Appendix B for the full text of the protocol guideline.

only middle-class Jews from Turkey in Israel were interviewed, the interviewee selection process for consequent interviews switched to the lower-class or upper class immigrants.

The interviews took place mainly in the houses of the respondents though work offices, meeting rooms of the Itahdut, rehearsal room of the Bat-Yam Culture Club and the play room of Merkaz Yom L'Kashish (Retirees' Center) in Yahud were also used. They were mainly in districts like Herzeliya, Ramat-Aviv, Bat-Yam, Rishon Lezziyon, central Tel-Aviv and Yahud. None of the interviews were made in coffee bars for security reasons. It must be noted that conducting a research in another country brought by certain technical problems, foremost those of timing. Israel was visited once. If more visits were paid, interaction with the immigrants would have been more intense and profound.

1.6 Organization of the Study

As has been described in the present chapter, this study aims to analyze citizenship on the layers of international migration and minority issues in the comparative case of the Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel. This analysis is organized in six additional chapters. A brief synopsis of each follows.

Chapter II presents a historical overview of the Jews in Turkey intersected within the general phenomenon of citizenship and minority issues as a whole. The chapter discusses citizenship of Jewish minority in Turkey in four periods: the Ottoman Period, the Early Republican Period (1923-1945), the Multi-Party

Democracy Period (1945-1980) and the Post-1980 Period covering more recent developments.

Chapter III deals with citizenship on the layer of international migration and generally discusses Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel. After a brief historical overview of Israel as a nation of immigrants founded in Palestine, background information is presented on Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. The core of this chapter, which is Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel, is examined in-depth in two periods: the mass migration of 1948-51 and subsequent migrations up through today.

Chapter IV is an analytical chapter based on data collected in the field study and focuses on the results of the survey interviews conducted with the Jews in Turkey. After a theoretical overview of Turkish citizenship and the status of non-Muslim minorities *per se* are put forth, a detailed profile of background characteristics of the sampled Jews in Turkey and their perceptions of the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of Turkish citizenship are presented.

Chapter V is also an analytical chapter but which gives a detailed interpretative account of Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel. It focuses on research results obtained in the field work in Israel. After a theoretical overview on citizenship and international migration in Turkey and in Israel is given, a detailed profile of background characteristics of the sampled Turkish Jews in Israel and their perceptions of the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of Turkish/Israeli citizenship are discussed.

Chapter VI highlights on the points made in Chapters IV and V and links the layers of international migration and minority issues to each other in a discussion that utilizes the elements of legal status, identity and legal status aspects of citizenship. The cases of minority and immigrant groups are analyzed with a comparative perspective and the similarities plus the differences between the two groups in terms of experiences and perceptions on citizenship are set forth. Furthermore, the discussion puts the immigrant and minority groups under the same rubric of citizenship and links the empirical framework to the theoretical one.

Chapter VII concludes the discussion with a review of the results of the study. The strengths as well as the weaknesses of the study are evaluated with possible prospects for future studies.

CHAPTER II

CITIZENSHIP AND MINORITIES: A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH MINORITY IN TURKEY

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to revisit the history of Jews in Turkey starting from Ottoman times with a special focus on citizenship as a concept and a construction. Therefore, rather than utilizing a general framework of the Jewish presence during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, here we will employ a structure designed to portray the specific history of a specific group. In this regard, the history of the Jews as a minority group and as citizens is illustrated by way of a chronological methodology encompassing a broad range of events, laws, ideas and movements spanning Ottoman times up to present-day Turkey. In line with the conventional classification utilized by many studies of Turkish politics, the historical projection developed on the citizenship and minority status of Jews in Turkey is categorized into four periods: the Ottoman Period, the Early Republican Period (1923-1945), the Multi-Party Democracy Period (1945-1980) and the Post-1980 Period covering more recent developments.[1]

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[1] For a similar breakdown of Turkish politics into eras, see Ahmad (1995), Barkey (2000) and Özbudun (1988).

The history of Jews during the Ottoman Empire era focuses mainly on the Millet system. Since "minority" as a term was alien to the imperial structure of the Ottoman state and since society was generally organized into ethno-religious communities called Millets, in this part of the chapter, Ottoman Jews are analyzed analytically as one of the major non-Muslim Millets. Additionally, in view of the fact that citizenship is a modern concept whose development overlaps with the development of the modern state, the discussion of Jews as citizens of the Ottoman state mainly refers to the 19th century, especially after the Tanzimat Reforms in 1839, when the Ottoman state adopted several administrative modernization measures. On the other hand, the history of the Jews during the Turkish Republic suggests a more articulate projection of a minority group and of modern citizenship.

The Early Republican Period (1923-1945) is generally marked with the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the taking root of Republican norms and values such as secularism, nationalism and unitary state structure. This period is also known as the Single-Party Period since the Republican People's Party (RPP) was the sole party dominating the political agenda until the transition to multi-party democracy in 1945. The specific relevance of this period with respect to the Jewish minority is that its policies for building a Turkish nation-state and creating a Turkish citizenry were characterized largely by the homogenization of society under the term "Turk." Therefore, this period is generally marked with the tension that arose during the inclusion of non-Muslim groups, and hence the Jews, under the definition of supra-Turk and a supra-Turkish citizenry.

The Multi-Party Period (1945-1980), however, indicates a more tolerant period in comparison to the Single-Party Period with respect to religious identities and its understanding of citizenship. It is a period during which the citizenship project entailed a broader range of civic rights under the 1961 Constitution. However, during its later stages, especially in the 1970s, these rights were curtailed by additional legislation in response to rising violence between leftist and rightist groups. The pressure of "Turkification" on the Jewish minority was reduced in the Multi-Party Period, but the social unrest of the 1970s impinged upon emigration to Israel, which did not take a mass form as it did post-1948, after the establishment of Israel.

The Post-1980 Period was significant for the Jews in terms of the impact of globalization and neo-liberal policies. The 1982 Constitution, one greatly influenced by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, brought restrictions to basic rights and liberties. However, several trends – the development of civil society, the rise of identity politics, liberalization of the economy and the accession process to the European Union – all provided challenges concerning the minority issues and the concept of citizenship.

2.2 The Jewish Millet in the Ottoman Empire

The Jewish presence in Ottoman lands has a long history dating back to the era of the Byzantine Empire, when Jews lived in communities in regions as diverse as the Middle East, Anatolia, Thrace and the Balkans (Galanti, 1995: 16). However, the roots of the Jewish population living in the Ottoman Empire and

later in the Turkish Republic lie mainly in mass migrations from the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) starting in the late 15th century. Sephardic Jews experiencing violent religious oppression under the Catholic Inquisition were expelled from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1497. The Ottoman state accepted the Jewish refugees in lands of the Empire, and so around 100,000-150,000 Jews immigrated to Ottoman territory (Emecen, 1997: 19).

The religious tolerance enjoyed by the Jews under the Ottoman Millet system and the Ottoman Empire's immigration policies enabling the reception and naturalization of many immigrants and refugees spurred several waves of Jewish migration from European countries (Kirişçi, 2000: 3). The reason behind this reception of the Jews was the economic, technical and cultural services and interests that they could contribute to the empire (Lewis, 1996: 159). The migration of Sephardic Jews to the Ottoman Empire continued in the centuries following, and many Ashkenazic Jews from various central and Eastern European countries, including Russia, came to join their brethren in the Ottoman Empire. Until its collapse in the early 20th century, the empire maintained its status as a destination country for Jewish migrants and refugees who had lived under religious discrimination and oppression in their home countries.[2] The oppressions that Jewry faced in most European countries gave rise to the belief that Jews would be loyal to the Ottoman state. This seems to be the reason why the Jewish

[2] However, there were times that the Ottoman government put restrictions on Jewish migration into the empire's lands. For instance, the Ottoman state tried to limit Jewish migration to Palestine after the first World Zionist Conference of 1897, and prohibited it completely in 1906 (Tekeli, 1990: 58).

Millet came to be called "the Millet that came by itself" (*kendi gelen Millet*) or ""the loyal Millet" (Millet-i sadıka) (Alkan, 2000: 182).

The Jewish immigrants settled in various towns and provinces – most prominently in Safad, Salonika, İzmir and Istanbul – and established Jewish neighborhoods in these settlements. Salonika became such a center for Jewish culture that eventually its population was majority Jew, a rare characteristic for settlements not only then but also throughout world history (Baer, 2000: 205). Furthermore, Istanbul's Jews made up one of the world's largest Jewish communities (Sharon, 1993: 41). The immigrants brought with them a language which had the basic features of early 16th century Spanish dialects called Ladino or Judeo-Spanish (Şaul, 2001: 130).

The Ottoman Jews contained several sub-groups. There were the Ladino-speaking Sephardic Jews who ultimately originated in the Iberian Peninsula but, due to varying patterns of migration, came proximally from several western and southern European countries; the Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazic Jews who immigrated from central and eastern Europe; the Greek-speaking Romaniots who originated in the Byzantine Empire; the Arabic-speaking Jews (Müsta'rib or Mizrahim Jews) living in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iraq; the Kurdish-speaking Jews present throughout the Middle East; and the Karaites who reject the oral tradition and believe only in scriptural Judaism.

These Jews enjoyed religious and social liberties in the Ottoman Empire, free from the oppression and discrimination that their brethren faced in most European countries. Although there were some incidents such as small-scale attacks on Jewish neighborhoods, these incidents did not escalate into pogroms or

other acts of fatal violence. Furthermore, Ottoman rule served as a constant guard against Christian "blood libel" attacks on the Jews (Groepler, 1999).

The religious tolerance shown the Jews and the peaceful co-existence of various religions in the Ottoman Empire were the result of two key elements of the Ottoman administrative structure (Karpat, 1988: 36-39). The *first* was the faith which served the legitimacy of the state. Under the Islamic decree of dhimmi (*zımmi*), Christians and Jews were acknowledged as "people of the book" (*ehl-i kitap*) and hence were granted protection, security, religious autonomy and cultural independence.[3] Non-Muslims were given dhimmi status in return for a special poll tax called "jizya" (*cizye*).[4] Only non-Muslim men of arms-bearing age paid the jizya and by so doing, they obtained exemption from military service. The jizya functioned as a kind of social contract ensuring the maintenance of security for non-Muslims in exchange for a fee. In addition to the jizya, every year the Jewish community also paid a special tax called the "rabbi's tax" (*cizye-i ray*). In exchange for this tax, Jewish communities scattered among several neighborhoods – unlike the well-known ghettos of Europe – gained the right to have their religious leader known as the rabbi (*Rav ha-Kolel*) (Levy, 1994).

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[3] Religious freedom based on the principle of faith was only granted to monotheistic religions, more specifically to believers in the Zebur (the Psalms of David), Torah, Bible and Koran. Furthermore, apostasy was punishable by death; hence it was not easy for Christians or Jews to make converts among Muslims, though conversion to Islam itself was not discouraged (Davison, 1954: 845).

[4] Dhimmi status could be obtained in three ways: by accepting Ottoman rule without war or before an Ottoman conquest; by submitting to Ottoman rule after defeat in battle; or by immigrating to the Ottoman Empire.

The *second* element had to do with community, which in addition to the principle of faith formed the core of the Millet system. In the Millet system, which formed the basis of the Ottoman administrative structure, individuals were not recognized, and subjects were defined according to their religions and only within the religious groups to which they belonged. The Millet system illustrated the significance of "difference," rather than homogeneity, as a norm in Ottoman administration (Rodrigue, 1995: 82-83). It helped to preserve and emphasize the religious distinctions among the subjects, yet at the same time as an administrative tool gave non-Muslims a certain level of cultural and religious autonomy and local self-rule (Karpat, 1985: 95). The Millet system was also reflected in the empire's class structure. Ottoman class structure was determined by religious and ethnic differences, and for several centuries, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was made up of non-Muslim traders, bankers and commissioners (Keyder, 1989). Jews, for instance, made up a Millet which was not very much involved in agricultural production or peasant labor.

There were several Millets in the Ottoman Empire and the three major non-Muslim Millets were the Greeks (Orthodox Christians all, including Arab, Albanian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian Orthodox Christians), the Armenians (non-orthodox Christians such as eastern Armenians, Georgians, Assyrians, Protestants and Catholics) and the Jews. Millets had separate administrative rules for marriage, divorce, inheritance and tax collection. The non-Muslim Millets were allowed to administer their communal affairs under the authority of their own ecclesiastical leaders who also represented the community in the Ottoman Palace and had important administrative, judicial and financial responsibilities.

This in a way bureaucratized religious structures within the Ottoman state and served to integrate ethno-religious communities, a need which surfaced only after the Ottoman state became an empire with its territorial gains in the Balkans (Karpat, 1988: 39-40).

However the integration of the Millets was achieved only within the limitations imposed by the doctrine of difference. *First*, although the Millets were recognized officially as separate units, among the various millets, the Muslim Millet was the dominant one, and the dhimmi status granted to non-Muslims marked an inequality of status between themselves and Muslims (Davison, 1954: 845). The doctrine of difference functioned as "the difference from Muslims." For instance, non-Muslims were forbidden to carry arms, ride horses, reside next to mosques, or build houses above six meters, and their testimony was inadmissible in Muslim courts of law. Moreover, non-Muslims were made to dress in different colors than Muslims. *Second*, the three major non-Muslim Millets – the Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews – were engaged in constant power struggles with one another (Baer, 2000: 203). For instance, since Jews tended to know several languages and had ties with European powers due to their path of immigration, in the 16th century they were recruited to high administrative positions in diplomacy, the economy, and the financial, medical and trade sectors, in an era known as the golden age of the Jews. However, as the empire started to decline, after the 16th century the Jewish elite gradually lost their contacts with Western powers and hence their enviable position. Consequently, Armenians and Greeks started to obtain positions vacated by the Jews (Şeni and Le Tarnec, 2000: 16, 18). The division of labor was ethnic; ethic competition was high, and reactions against the

growth of any given group developed along the lines of group membership. Since, however, the doctrine of difference was supported through the general acceptance of social hierarchy as inevitable (Mardin, 1980), the practices of the Millet system did not provoke deep or festering societal tensions.

The doctrine of difference as a cornerstone of the Millet system maintained its dominance in the administrative structure until the 19th century. However, due to territorial losses in a series of wars as well as the new post-French Revolution political atmosphere marked by the emergence of nation-states, along with the rise of the public/private distinction and territorial statehood, there appeared the need to make certain changes to the Millet system. The core ideas of the French Revolution such as liberty, equality and nationality stood in opposition to the fundamentals of the multi-Millet Ottoman Empire, yet they had an immense and prolonged influence on the administrative structure throughout the 19th century. The foremost change to the Millet system was the introduction of the concept of citizenship, a Western phenomenon the empire adopted out of the need to protect the state's integrity in response to rising separatist movements. At the same time, the doctrine of difference was replaced by the doctrine of equality, which abandoned the differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslim subjects and began a new but equal form of subjecthood.

Essentially equality was used to refer to the equality of classes in the French Revolution, but in the Ottoman context, it referred to the equality of nationalities leading to the spread of nationalist ideology and the transformation of the non-Muslim Millets into minorities (Kedourie, 1998: 27; Lewis, 1965: 33). The empire lacked the modern tools to deal with nationalist uprisings by non-

Muslims and so became susceptible to pressures from European powers. The Ottoman ruling elite believed that a new egalitarian citizenship was necessary to prevent secessionist nationalist turmoil from wearing the empire down. Furthermore, they were of the idea that putting non-Muslims on the same footing as Muslims in an equal framework would frustrate Western interference in the Ottoman state's internal affairs, since European powers frequently used a strategy of manipulating non-Muslims to their advantage in international relations. In this regard, the utilization of equal citizenship within the broader framework of westernization appeared as a means of governance. Accordingly, the doctrine of equality became official policy in the 19th century, and it was instrumentalized through various reforms including declarations, decrees and laws to regulate relations between the different Millets and to establish a new framework of subjecthood (Nisan, 1991: 21).

The wave of reforms aimed at reorganizing the Millet system was launched in 1839 with the Tanzimat Declaration (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*), the first legislative attempt in Ottoman history granting non-Muslims the same rights as Muslims. These reforms, in a broad sense, brought a new framework of administrative, legal and educational policies. All the subjects of the sultan, both Muslim and not, were made equal before the law and accorded the rights to life, property and safety regardless of their Millet membership. The Tanzimat Reforms also established a level, equal playing field in recruitment to state offices and introduced fair public court trials for non-Muslims. The death penalty for apostasy from Islam was also abolished. The Tanzimat Reforms signified the entry of the

individual onto the public agenda as a subject construing society irrespective of ethno-religious background.

With Tanzimat, non-Muslims began to be covered by not only the same set of rights but also by the same obligations, the foremost being universal conscription. Although the Tanzimat Declaration contained no special clause on the conscription of non-Muslims, military service came to be seen by the government as an obligation of all citizens due to be paid to the state. Thus, with a new 1855 law, the jizya tax was abolished and military service became obligatory for non-Muslims. Furthermore, the professional ranks of the military were opened up to non-Muslims. However, due to treasury deficits and the reluctance of non-Muslims to serve in the military, exemption from military service reemerged under a new tax called the "military charge" (*bedel-i askeriye*). The conscription of non-Muslims remained negligible until the early 20th century.[5]

The reforms paving the path for the construction of a modern form of subjecthood continued with the Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermanı*) of 1856. This edict denounced discrimination on the grounds of religious beliefs or practice and emphasized the equality of all Ottoman subjects in terms of educational opportunity and eligibility for government posts. Accordingly, the administration of justice, taxation and the military service were all reorganized. Non-Muslims began to receive appointments and were later elected to provincial advisory councils and to the Grand Council of State. With the Reform Edict, the non-

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[5] It was only in 1909 with a special law enacted by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that the conscription of non-Muslims, including Jews, was made obligatory, a measure which enjoyed almost full compliance.

Muslim Millets prepared regulations for their internal administration and the Jews prepared their "Regulation for the Chief Rabbinate." Along the lines of the doctrine of equality among subjects regardless of religious affiliation, the Millet system became a purely religious structure and started to lose its administrative function. Correspondingly, as new educational, legal and judicial institutions were developed to administer and govern subjects on the basis of the equality of the Millets, the patriarchs and the rabbinates started to lose institutional control over their followers.

1869 saw the enactment of the Ottoman Nationality Law (*Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi*), which delineated Ottoman nationality on a territorial basis. The law introduced a territorial concept of citizenship under which all subjects living within the territory of the Ottoman Empire as Ottoman nationals were subject to Ottoman authority regardless of religious or sectarian affiliation. Children whose parents were not of Ottoman nationality were entitled to Ottoman nationality on the condition that they were born in empire territory and that they maintained their nationality until adulthood. The burden of proving claims of having nationality from another country rested upon the claimant. The law's primary aim was to discourage minorities from claiming foreign nationality. In view of the fact that some Greeks acquired Greek citizenship and some Armenians Russian citizenship in order to get access to benefits springing from the Capitulations as well as the protection of Christian states, the Ottoman government thought that a territorial basis for nationality would reduce the level of Western interference in its internal affairs. Some Jews also changed their

citizenship, for example to French, Italian, Greek or British, but not at the mass level seen with other minority groups (Yetkin, 1996: 110).

The 1876 Constitution declared all peoples of the empire as Ottoman and underlined that their primary allegiance was to the state, with other affiliations such as religion or ethnicity relegated to secondary status. Continuing the reforms taken previously by Tanzimat, the 1876 Constitution regarded subjects living within the territories of the Ottoman Empire as individuals making up society and not simply as parts of different religious-ethnic communities. Regarding political rights, the Constitution granted property-owning males the right to stand for the Legislative Assembly, the first time the empire had seen such an institution. Consequently, many property-owning Jewish and other non-Muslim men won seats in the assembly. Non-Muslims held over one-third of the total number.[6] Even the issue of Jewish settlers in Palestine was discussed in the assembly, though the settlement movement met serious criticism from its Arab members. The Constitution and the assembly were suspended in 1878 by Sultan Abdulhamid II, but reappeared in 1908 to usher in the second constitutional period, which lasted until the empire's collapse.

Despite the legal, social and administrative reforms taken throughout the 19th century to save the empire from fragmentation, the political milieu was marked by nationalism both as an ideology and a mass movement. In addition to the reforms, the Ottoman government brought into play first patriotism for Ottomanism to recover the loyalty of non-Muslims to the state, then for Pan-

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[6] In the 1877-78 Legislative Assembly, there were 115 representatives composed of 67 Muslims and 48 non-Muslims, five of whom were Jewish (Güleryüz, 1993: 201).

Islamism and, as a last try, Pan-Turkism in order to sustain the empire's integrity and head off secession. However, all these measures proved unable to forestall the revolt of non-Muslim minorities supported by European powers such as Britain, France and Russia. In due course the Greek Orthodox community supported the foundation of Greece, and the Bulgarian Orthodox community, after a rivalry with the Orthodox Church in Istanbul, went for the foundation of Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Armenian Millet, with the help of the Russians during wars on the eastern frontier, revolted many times for secession, but the integrity of the Anatolian lands was maintained. By the second half of the 19th century, the only non-Muslim subject group which had not rebelled against the empire and was perceived to be loyal was the Jewish Millet (Poulton, 1997: 54). Nationalism did not spread among the Jews, and even the political Zionism that emerged in Europe in the 1890s had limited influence on Ottoman Jewry in comparison to the inspiration that nationalism gave rise to in the Christian Millets (Bali, 2001a: 71, 80).[7]

The reasons for the failure of nationalism and Zionism to take root among Ottoman Jews were several. *First*, the Jews lacked a nation-state to which to show allegiance. Jews were scattered all over the world, lacking any mutual bond in terms of nationality, language or culture. Although there were Jews concentrated in Palestine due to faith-inspired immigration, the idea of an Israeli nation-state was still nascent.

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[7] According to the online Jewish Virtual Library, Zionism stands for "the national movement for the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel, advocated, from its inception, tangible as well as spiritual aims." For forther information on Zionism, see http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Zionism/zionism.html.

Second, Ottoman Jews did not face discrimination against the free practice of their religion or preservation of their culture. In contrast to the violent oppression faced by Jews living in other countries, which in turn fed there the emergence and spread of political Zionism, the Ottoman Jews were able to maintain their identity in a more liberal atmosphere. Fearing that they would lose their religious freedom and live in fear, the Jews took sides with the Ottoman government against secessionist movements. In line with their loyalty to the Ottoman state, patriotic Ottomanism was very strong among the Jews (Nahum, 2000: 79). Even when Theodore Herzl, the leader of the World Zionist Organization, asked Sultan Abdulhamid II to open up Palestine for Jewish settlement in return for financial support to the Ottoman Treasury, the elites of the Jewish Millet did not work with him, though they were not opposed to the idea of a safe haven for the world's Jews. The Ottoman Jewish elite tolerated Zionism only to the extent that it would not threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and hence the peaceful survival of the empire's Jews. If the Jews had joined the secessionist wave like other non-Muslim groups, they would, they feared, lose their reputation for loyalty. As a community with a history of being expelled from a host of countries for century after century, the Jewish elite in the 1870s thought that a homeland in Palestine proposing an unrealistic ideal would draw a severe backlash from the Ottoman government and could even threaten their expulsion from the empire. Therefore they had no wish to damage the Jews' reputation as the only non-Muslim group loyal to the Ottoman state, that is, the only one not seeking secession or territorial demands from the Ottoman government. When Abdulhamid II rejected Herlz's offer and restricted the selling of lands to Jews in

Palestine, the Jewish elite made donations to the Ottoman Navy as a gesture of their loyalty to the state (Nahum, 2000: 77, 143).[8]

Third, the influence of the *Alliance Israelite Universelle*, an organization founded in Paris in 1860 with the aim of modernizing contemporary Jewry and assisting the integration of Jews into the societies they lived in, was stronger among the Ottoman Jews than was Zionism.[9] The alliance considered the idea of establishing a nation made up of Jews speaking different tongues and coming from different cultural and social backgrounds to be unrealistic. In a similar vein, it rejected the ideology of Zionism and Zionist activities, both of which they thought hindered the assimilation and acculturation of Jews into the nations they lived in. Regarding the Jews of the Ottoman Empire, the Alliance Israelite Universelle advocated their integration into Turkish culture and promoted the idea of Jewish military conscription (Nahum, 2000: 82, 152).

The main tool that the alliance used to support the economic, social and cultural development of the Oriental Jews was education. In the Ottoman Empire, the group established several Alliance Israelite schools at the secondary education level for the Jewry.[10] The Alliance Israelite schools not only taught technical

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[8] Notwithstanding the general lack of support for Zionism among the empire's Jewry, some Jews, more specifically ones from the younger generations, flirted with the idea of Zion, but this failed to lead to any strong Zionist activism (Haker, 2002: 318; Rodrigue, 1997: 208).

[9] The Ashkenazim gave priority to education in German and established Goldschmidt Schools, in contrast to the Sephardim who opted for the French alliance schools (Frayman et al. 2000: 15). However, the Sephardic Jews were the dominant group within the Jewish community, both in numbers and influence.

[10] In 1912, there were 1,155 Alliance Israelite Universelle schools in the empire (Molho, 1999: 85).

skills to students to boost Jewish employment but also aimed to promote Jewish culture and ethics. The alliance considered Ladino an archaic language which ill-served the needs of contemporary Jewry and saw Hebrew as a tool of Zionism, an ideology rejected by the group. Therefore, French, a language which signified modernization and westernization for the alliance, was preferred in education in Alliance Israelite schools (Rodrigue, 1997).[11] In line with its integrationist policies, the group did not challenge the spread of Turkish, as at the turn of the 20th century some Jews ideologically close to the alliance founded an institution called the Ottoman Organization for Language Training (*Lisan-ı Tamimi-i Osmani Cemiyeti*) specifically in order to make Turkish the national language of Ottoman Jewry (Şaul, 2001: 153). The alliance, with its efforts against traditional Judaism and religious dogmatism, contributed to the secularization of the Ottoman Jews (Rodrigue, 1997: 179).

Although the alliance prepared the Ottoman Jews for modernization and integration into mass Turkish culture, it was unable to avoid the emergence of two paradoxical outcomes that Jews had to encounter even in the Republic of Turkey. First, by forging bonds between Western and Eastern Jews, the alliance and hence its schools aided the formation of a universal Jewish identity and therefore cultivated the seeds of Zionism among Turkey's Jews. Religion had always comprised the essential element of the Ottoman Jews' communal identity, though Judaism was more an identity than a religion, but the alliance lifted Jewish identity to a universal level (Nahum, 2000: 43, 140). And second, the

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[11] Due to the influence from the alliance, French became a everyday language used prominently among upper-class Jews (Alkan, 2000: 170).

modernization that the organization brought about followed an uneven course. The Alliance Israelite schools in the Ottoman Empire created a wide gap between the socio-economically middle- and upper-class French-speaking westernized elites on the one hand and the lower- class Ladino-speaking, underdeveloped, semi-educated, conservative Jewish masses on the other.[12] By the end of the Ottoman Empire, the lower-class Jews were characterized by a position which was largely poor, uneducated, low profile, and fragmented into groups and synagogues based on place of origin. Social mobility (i.e. by marriage) and contact between these groups was minimal (Weiker, 1988: 9, 107). The dichotomy that appeared among the Jewish community at the end of the 19th century also carried into modern Turkey in the 20th century (Rodrigue, 1997: 180).

As the Jews were facing these changes, the Ottoman state, which had tried to take precautionary measures such as modernizing the state military and administrative structure, was proving unsuccessful in maintaining its own integrity. In the Balkan Wars and later in World War I, the Ottoman Empire lost major territories on both its western and eastern frontiers. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that ruled the state during these wars was unable to head off separatist movements. In response to universal conscription being made obligatory in 1909, non-Muslims, especially younger ones who did not want to be drafted, began to migrate to foreign countries. Although the migration of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie after World War I served the CUP's aim of establishing a

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[12] It should be noted that the Jewish Millet in general illustrated a more urban outlook than other minority groups. This was also significant in the professions held by Jews. Though there were Jewish artisans and tradesmen, we cannot speak of a Jewish peasant class in the Ottoman Empire.

national bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989), it also reinforced the view that non-Muslims were untrustworthy during times of national crisis. With the 1918 signing of the Treaty of Sevres, laying out the master plan for the dismemberment of Anatolian lands after the Ottomans' defeat in World War I, this prejudice that non-Muslims were untrustworthy was reinforced.

2.3 The Early Republican Period (1923-1945): Jews *vis-à-vis* Nation-Building Process

During the War of Independence, some non-Muslims – more often among the Greek and Armenian communities – collaborated with Allied forces in the invasion of Istanbul and İzmir, and failed to support Muslim groups fighting against the invasion of Anatolia. The Jews, on the other hand, took no active part in the war, notwithstanding the damaging consequences that they faced during those years.[13] The Jews supported the War of Independence and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had always been a respected national figure in the eyes of the Jewish community in general (Galanti, 1995: 212). They saw Atatürk as an enlightened leader who would raise Turkey to the level of civilized culture and a just figure who would defuse threats against the Jews.[14]

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[13] During the War of Independence, the Greek troops left western Anatolia in ruins, which in turn disrupted the scattered Jewish communities in the region and led them to migrate to İzmir. The war devastated the Jews, destroying families in some cases, and spurring some survivors to emigrate abroad (Levi, 1998: 15).

[14] Although the Jews retained their respect for Atatürk and his policies, they blamed other national leaders such as Atatürk's successor İsmet İnönü for the Turkification policies of the Early Republican Period.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was founded in 1920 and two years later, Turkish passports for the first time included the insignia of the Turkish government. The republic was proclaimed in 1923. After Turkey's foundation, the recent separatist history of Greeks and Armenians before and during the War of Independence came to dominate the general perception towards all non-Muslim groups.[15] In a sense, the public refused to forget the collaboration of non-Muslims with Allied forces in invading and carving up Anatolia during the War of Independence, and this betrayal was burned into the public's collective memory.[16] In general, society regarded non-Muslims as foreign elements in its midst and so repeatedly questioned their loyalty and reliability (Bali, 1998a: 171).

Hence, all non-Muslims who continued to live in Turkey were expected to demonstrate and prove their loyalty to the Turkish state. In this expectation, there was no distinction made between the various groups of non-Muslims. All non-Muslims, no matter whether they supported the independence movement or joined the resistance in line with their group affiliation, were put into the same basket as separatist groups. Likewise, though the Jews were traditionally known as loyal to the state, during the Early Republican Period they were lumped in with other non-

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[15] When new Turkish identity cards were issued, some Jews faced difficulties obtaining theirs in state offices. Similar problems arose in trying to obtain return visas for trips abroad. The 1924 Law on Free Travel allowed individuals who traveled abroad with Turkish passports during times of the war or armistice to return to Turkey. Procedures for Jews who were considered covered under this law were carried out swiftly and easily, but not so for Armenians and Greeks (Levi, 1998: 38, 54). In 1927, the Law on Revoking Turkish Citizenship from Former Ottoman Subjects was passed. Under the law, former Ottoman subjects who had failed to return to Turkey before that year could lose their citizenship only with a Council of Ministers decision.

[16] What's more, the spirit of the War of Independence – meaning sensitivity towards keeping a watchful eye on Anatolia's indivisibility – continued in the following decades even up to today and constituted the most vigorous aspect of Turkey's national security policies (Ahmad, 1995; Hale, 1996; Akçam, 1995).

Muslim groups. This bias towards Jews was also the consequence of the general enmity against both foreigners and minorities who were seen as part of foreign classes (Sharon, 1993: 102). The elites of the Jewish minority, moreover, failed to combat the common view that minorities were foreign elements within the Turkish population (Bali, 1998a: 175-176).

One of the major consequences of the War of Independence was a sharp fall in the population of non-Muslims living within the borders of the just-founded Turkish state. It should be pointed out that the decrease in the general non-Muslim population, which is mainly attributed to mass emigrations out of Turkey, reflected an uneven rate amongst the various non-Muslim groups. The drops in the Armenian and Greek populations were greater than that in the Jewish population. The Armenian population had already fallen during World War I due to the forced migration of 1915. However, during the War of Independence, the emigration of Armenians continued, mainly to Armenia, Russia, Iran and France. In the case of the Greeks, although Greece's 1829 independence had a huge impact on the population of this minority, it also dropped sharply after the defeat of Greek forces in western Anatolia in the War of Independence. The emigration of Greeks was carried through at the state level with the 1923 Convention and Protocol Concerning the Exchange of Greek-Turkish Populations signed by Ankara and Athens. As for the Jews, unlike the Armenian and Greek populations, they had never seen a mass emigration. During World War I and the War of Independence, some Jews did move to European countries such as France, Italy and Spain or to Latin American countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina or to Palestine, but this emigration was never at the mass level seen with the

Armenians and Greeks. For instance, in 1914 there were an estimated 1.55 million Greeks, 1.2 million Armenians and 128,000 Jews living in the Ottoman Empire. By 1927, however, these figures had fallen to 110,000 Greeks, 77,000 Armenians and 82,000 Jews (Courbage and Fargues, 1998: 128).[17] The change in minorities' populations was also reflected in the ethnic composition of Turkey's economy. After the mass emigrations of Armenians and Greeks living in Turkey, domestic sectors dominated by these minorities such as trade and finance began to be overtaken by Jewish tradesmen.

The foremost change after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Turkey with regards to non-Muslim groups took place in the legal framework. The Republican People's Party (RPP), which until 1946 dominated Turkey as its sole political party, not only set the fundamentals of modern Turkey during the Early Republican Period but also established the initial legislation on non-Muslim minorities. The Millet system was abandoned; the Turkish nation emerged as an extension of the Muslim Millet in the Ottoman Empire; and non-Muslims – meaning only the Greeks, Armenians and Jews – were granted minority status under a new minority regime whose fundamental principles were set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Since that time, there have been few revisions or additional pacts challenging the minority regime laid out by Lausanne, and even today, the treaty is considered the legal cornerstone

[17] Other sources also confirm the general downward population spiral of Armenian, Greek and Jewish nationals as well as the relatively lower falls in the Jewish population in comparison to the other non-Muslim groups, yet the estimates vary. For the non-Muslim population and/or emigration estimates, see Dündar (2000), Benbasse and Rodrigue (2001), Geray (1970), Karpat (1985) and Soner (2001).

structuring the general framework of issues related to non-Muslim minorities (Soner, 2004).

The Treaty of Lausanne was signed by Turkey and Allied forces such as France, Britain, Italy, and Greece and was put under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The treaty covered a broad range of general issues, but Articles 37-45 specifically regulated the status and rights of non-Muslims living in Turkey. Accordingly, only three non-Muslim groups – the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, who made up the Ottoman Empire's major non-Muslim Millets – were recognized as minorities, and therefore were granted the same freedoms as other Turkish nationals of life, religious belief and migration, plus the rights of legal and political equality and to use their mother tongue in courts, found schools or similar institutions, and hold religious ceremonies.[18] The articles granted these three non-Muslim groups the right to use their own language, the right of political and civic equality, the right to establish religious, educational and social welfare institutions, and the freedom of religion, travel and migration.[19] Under Article 42,

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[18] Article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne states: "All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order." Article 39 of the treaty states: "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law...Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts" (Hurewitz, 1956: 122).

[19] Article 40 of the treaty states: "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein" (Hurewitz, 1956: 122-123).

the family laws and customs of minorities were protected. Furthermore, for every minority group, a committee was formed with an equal number of representatives from the group and the Turkish government.[20] Lausanne also stipulated that the minority rights covered under Articles 37-44 were to be reciprocated by Greece and would be granted to the ethnic Turks living in western Thrace.

Although the Treaty of Lausanne granted non-Muslim minority groups the right to education in their own schools as well as in their own languages and gave the Turkish government the responsibility to give financial assistance to minority schools, such a reciprocated rights-responsibilities structure proved ineffective when particularized in educational policies.[21] *First*, under Lausanne, the communal language of the Jews was accepted as Hebrew. In practice, however, Ladino was frequently used as a spoken language, and French was generally the

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[20] Article 42 of the treaty states: "The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature" (Hurewitz, 1956: 123).

[21] Article 41 of the Treaty of Lausanne declared: "As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned" (Hurewitz, 1956: 123).

language used in Alliance Israelite and other community schools. Hebrew was only used for religious purposes such as prayer in synagogues led by rabbis. When the Ministry of Education demanded in 1924 that the community make either Hebrew or Turkish its official educational tongue in Jewish schools, the Jews had little choice but to choose Turkish. French became only an elective language. *Second*, under the 1924 Law on the Unification of Education, all schools – including Jewish ones – were ruled to fall under the purview and administration of the Ministry of Education. Consequently, the Alliance Israelite schools previously administered by France's Alliance Israelite Universelle were made into Jewish schools, thus ending the formal bond between the alliance headquarters and the local alliance schools in Turkey. The Turkish government had already restricted the founding of new Alliance Israelite schools in 1922, and the new Law on the Unification of Education put further impediments on them. *Third*, under a regulation issued by the Ministry of Education in 1923, only teachers holding Turkish citizenship were allowed to work in community schools. Since the teachers at alliance schools were generally foreign nationals, largely French, they had to quit their jobs and leave Turkey. New Turkish teachers were appointed to the Jewish schools, but their salaries were not always paid by the Turkish government but rather by the Jewish community. *Fourth*, the principle of secularism set out in 1928 restricted religious boards from intervening in minority schools.[22] By the same token, religious education started to be given at religious institutions, which for the Jews meant at synagogues.

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[22] In 1928, the article specifying Islam as the religion of the Turkish state was revoked.

During the 1924 negotiations in Lausanne, the Turkish Grand National Assembly debated the first Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and it was enacted the very same year. With respect to citizenship, Article 88 of the Constitution stated (Gözübüyük, 1995: 76): "The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship." Article 12 banned the nomination of people to the Grand National Assembly who during the War of National Independence had claimed to be citizens of foreign countries. This article was mainly concerned with non-Muslims, since some of them had previously asserted their allegiance to foreign states such as Greece and Italy so as to end any obligations towards the Turkish authorities.

The Treaty of Lausanne not only failed to provide full rights to minority groups but also gave rise to enmity against minorities in the eyes of the public. Despite national legislation such as the adoption of the Constitution in 1924 and the Civic Code in 1926, minority issues were regulated by special clauses in Lausanne, which was conceived as a handicap to the social homogenization and nation-building aims of the new state (Bali, 2000: 62). The dominant ideology at the time was national interest supplemented by unity and collective purpose (Ayata, 1992). Alliances based on class, religion, or ethnic group were viewed as attempts at disunity, and a national interest that served unity and collective purpose was considered more important than the reconciliation of various interest groups (Heper, 1990a; Toprak, 1988). Since Jews had better relations with the Muslim Turks than other minority groups, they were expected to willingly opt out of the articles on minorities in Lausanne. The Greeks and Armenians, it was thought, would follow the Jews' lead and forsake their minority status as well.

Consequently, on September 15, 1925 the committee of the Jewish minority declared that it had opted out of Lausanne's Article 42 (Galanti, 1995: 73). To obtain this chain of assent, the Turkish government allowed the press to put pressure on the Jews by stressing the differences of the Jewish community from other minority groups in terms of loyalty and solidarity (Levi, 1998: 31).

The mainstream press at the time specifically used two incidents related to Turkish Jewry as propaganda against the Jewish community. The first was a letter allegedly sent by the Jewish community in Turkey to Spanish authorities celebrating the discovery of the American continent. The press condemned the letter and questioned the Jews' loyalty to the Turkish state. The Jewish elite also denounced the letter and paid visits to state officials to repudiate and refute the claims of disloyalty.[23] This letter incident was one of the major factors behind Jews' opting out of Lausanne as a show of loyalty to the republic (Bali, 2000: 77).

The *second* incident that sped the campaign against the Jewish minority was the 1927 case of Elza Niyego, an Istanbulite Jewish girl murdered by a Muslim man whose advances she rejected (Levi, 1996a: 75). Niyego's funeral was accompanied by crowd of Jews protesting the circumstances of her death. The coverage of popular newspapers at the time portrayed the funeral as a protest demonstration by the Jewish community against Turkish authorities. The public prosecutor filed charges against some of the Jews who attended the funeral. Furthermore, under a special provincial regulation, Jews were barred from moving

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[23] In addition to these visits, former Ottoman Jewish citizens living in Italy, Switzerland and Palestine sent letters to the Turkish authorities stressing that although they resided abroad, they remained loyal to Turkey (Levi, 1998: 72).

out of Istanbul. The travel restriction ended several months later after Jewish community leaders visited the minister of the interior (Bali, 2000: 127).[24]

In response to the press pressure of 1923-27, Jewish leaders felt the need to demonstrate their loyalty to the Turkish state by making donations to *Türk Hava Kurumu* (Institute for Turkish Aviation) and *Kızılay* (Turkish Red Crescent) (Levi, 1998: 41, 63). They also frequently emphasized that the recently adopted Turkish Civil Code would suffice to serve the Jewry's needs and that this broad legislation covered all citizens, regardless of religious background, and so nullified Lausanne's specific articles on minorities. Jewish leaders also declared that the Jews were equal to other Turkish citizens in terms of rights and responsibilities and also had religious freedom, and hence had no need for any distinctive status that privileged them as a minority. After the Jews withdrew in 1925 from these articles of Lausanne, the Greek and the Armenian minorities followed their lead and opted out of Article 42 in 1926. The minorities' withdrawal from Lausanne had no legal standing in terms of international norms since the treaties' signatory parties were the states, not the minorities. The representative committees for each minority group were also abolished. The campaign against special community rights ended in 1926 with the decision of each minority group to opt out of Lausanne (Levi, 1998: 73).

The opting out hastened the retreat of the authority of the Chief Rabbinate over the Jewish community and its representative power in relations with the Turkish government. The Chief Rabbinate was already pacified due to the 1925

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[24] Travel restrictions on non-Muslims continued periodically until 1932 with shorter periods, the maximum being some two months (Nahum, 2000: 222).

Law on Order passed during the Kurdish rebellions in the east. In the same year, the rabbinate's revenues fell with the prohibitions on its authority to collect tax from the Jewish community for licensing kosher food (Bali, 2000: 55).[25] It was only a year later that the Chief Rabbinate was allowed to collect taxes from the community. With the passage of the Law on Secularism in 1928, the role of the Chief Rabbinate as a mediator between the Jewish community and the state was further weakened. As secularism became one of the cornerstones of Republican Turkey, any connotation of religious communal identification in the public sphere, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was strictly forbidden. According to Law on Attire No. 2596, attire worn for religious purposes, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was prohibited from being worn on the streets outside the scope of religious practice. The intention of the law with respect to the Jews was that the attire of the chief rabbi could only be used by the rabbi himself, while ordinary Jews were prohibited from wearing any attire signifying religious orientation. The decline in the authority of the Chief Rabbinate was also evident in appointments to fill the post, or rather the lack thereof. For over two decades up until 1953, the Jewish community had neither an elected chief rabbi nor an appointed one. Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum[26] resigned from the office in 1921 due to internal conflicts within the Jewish community, with only Moşe Becerano remaining to serve as deputy chief rabbi. After Becerano's death in 1931, the Turkish government appointed no one to fill the post, leaving it vacant until 1953 when David Asseo was assigned

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[25] Kosher is the term used for Jewish dietary laws.

[26] Haim Nahum was in the Turkish delegation to the negotiations over Lausanne in 1923.

chief rabbi. The Republican leadership aimed to weaken the central minority organizations such as the Chief Rabbinate for two reasons: *first* these central organizations resembled the Ottoman Millet system, and one of the basic paradigms of new Turkey was a rejection of the Ottoman legacy; and *second,* due to the past record of some minorities in working for the dismemberment of Anatolian lands, the existing central organizations were suspected of serving similar ends.

Turkey's legal framework set forth the full equality of all its citizens regardless of differences of religion, sect, ethnicity, gender or class. Despite an inclusive understanding of citizenship in the law, during the Early Republican Period "Turk" was generally equated with "Muslim," and the Kemalist bureaucratic elite tried to establish state authority over ethnic and religious groups (Toprak, 1986). On the practical level, certain issues arose concerning discriminative tendencies against minorities and hence, from time to time, the Jews. For instance, in the 1920s non-Muslims were discharged from their positions in state offices and state-owned companies (Levi, 1998: 37).

In 1928, Turkish citizenship was specified with a special law acting as supplement to Article 88 of the Constitution. The law, no. 1312, set forth the blood (descent) principle as the basic paradigm of Turkish citizenship and excluded territorial specifications.[27] Due to the low population levels of the 1920s, the law aimed at an inclusive definition of Turkish citizenship (Aybay, 1998: 40). Under the law, children of a Turkish citizen, whether a mother or father, were

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[27] Article 1 of Law No. 1312 states: "Children born from a Turkish father or mother whether in Turkey or in a foreign country are considered Turkish citizens" (Nomer, 1989: 45).

entitled to Turkish citizenship by birth regardless of where they were born. The law also stipulated that individuals living abroad who failed to register themselves at a Turkish embassy would have their Turkish citizenship revoked through a Council of Ministers decision.

This equality under the law was aimed at not only the construction of modern citizenship but also as part of the process of nation-building through a homogenization under the new category "Turk"; hence the "Turkification" of non-Muslim groups and their assimilation into Turkish language and culture (Bali, 1998a: 171). Since the major criterion for being a "Turk" was speaking Turkish, during the Early Republican Period the unity of language was thought to carry key importance in Turkification and nation-building.

During Ottoman times the Millets spoke their own languages, and in their closed neighborhoods, a diversity of languages used among the communities that might be considered an extension of the private sphere caused no problems for public affairs. Hence, Jewish men who had access to the Muslim world in their work usually knew how to speak Ottoman to facilitate their public affairs, but women and the children only knew their community language.

However, the Early Republican Period witnessed abrupt changes in demography, the foremost being mass migration into and out of the country accompanied by modification in settlements and the disintegration of closed neighborhoods, all of which caused transformation in the public and private spheres. The need for a common language emerged as one of the fundamentals of nation-building, yet there were many groups, such as minorities, whose mother tongue was not Turkish. These minority groups spoke their own language, a

marking point in their difference which became more obvious in the public sphere. Similarly, the Jewish minority continued to speak Ladino, but their community was no longer considered confined to the private sphere at a time when the definitions of public and private spheres were changing with the establishment of a new territorial and national state. Ladino became more conspicuous in the public sphere as a form of difference within that sphere, and hence more susceptible to the policies of homogenization and Turkification in line with the official nationalism targeting Turkish as the common tongue. In the 1920s this move for a common language provoked press criticisms, both explicit and acute, against Jews for speaking Ladino (Levi, 1998: 66). Moreover, a campaign called "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" (*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!*) organized specifically to make Turkish the language of minority groups was in force until the mid 1930s.

The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign was launched in 1928 by a group of students at Istanbul University's Faculty of Law. However, it very quickly spread to other segments of society through press endorsements and generated a mass reaction against minorities for their language differences. As part of the campaign, posters were hung on walls, bulletins were distributed on the streets and public declarations were made advocating that Turkish be spoken by Turkish citizens. There were even individual responses such as warnings to Jews to cease speaking Ladino in favor of Turkish in schools at all levels, on streets and on public conveyances such as buses, ships and trains.

The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign received the support of not only the Turkish- speaking masses but also intellectuals and leaders of the Jewish

community such as Moiz Kohen (Tekinalp) and Avram Galanti (Landau, 1996). Speaking in Turkish was considered a sign of loyalty to the ideals of the republic, while speaking Ladino was thought to be an obstacle to the Jewry's unification with society and integration with Turkish culture. Language differences were evaluated through the lens of the citizenship question and so in order to become full citizens, Jewish leaders exhorted their communities on the necessity to learn and use Turkish (Bali, 1999b: 44). In order to facilitate the spread of Turkish amongst themselves, many associations were founded by the Jews towards this end, i.e. *Türkçe Konuşturma Birliği* (Union for the Turkish Language), *Türk Dilini Yaygınlaştırma Komisyonu* (Jewish Commission for the Dissemination of the Turkish Language), *Kültür Birliği* (Union for Culture), *Türk Kültür Birliği* (Turkish Culture Association), and *Balat Türk Kültür ve Yardım Derneği* (Association for Balat Turkish Culture and Aid).

Despite the encouragement of Jewish leaders, the campaign also caused a counter-reaction among Jews when some of them resisted learning and speaking the tongue of their adopted land. The tension between advocates of the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign and Jews who preferred speaking their own language led to a rise in legal charges filed against Jews under Article 159 of the Penal Code – the "Insulting Turkishness" clause – which allowed charges to be brought on the basis of any verbal or physical act judged to insult or denigrate Turkishness. Still, the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign can be considered successful in the sense that, albeit with some ups and downs, it lasted until 1934, and through creating a consciousness of the Turkish language and Turkish citizenship, more Jews, especially younger ones, started to learn and speak

Turkish. The 1934 Law on Surnames also helped spread the use of Turkish. Under the law, the use of titles such as Madame and Mösyö, previously a very common practice among non-Muslims, was prohibited.[28] The law also had an impact on Jews as they adopted surnames which were easily pronounced in Turkish.

The 1931 program of the RPP included the definition of nation as a social and political whole formed by citizens united by a common language, culture and goal; there was no mention of ethnicity. This RPP definition can be characterized as civic nationalism. However, in practice the government's stance deviated from civic nationalism, because non-Muslims were discriminated against and Turkishness was linked closely to Islam.[29] In the construction of "Turk," one of the instruments of the Turkish state was the Law on Settlement, which is still in use for granting people Turkish citizenship (Soyarık, 2000).

Law on Settlement No. 2510 was passed in 1934 to set forth the basic principles of immigration and settlement policy at a time when in Europe, preparations for war could already be seen. The law distinguished between people of Turkish culture and others who were not, and grouped settlements into three regions as follows (Kirişçi, 2000: 5-6): 1) Regions where people of Turkish culture are free to settle; 2) regions where people who are to be integrated into the

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[28] With the same Law on Surnames, titles indicating a religious, tribal or societal class-rank difference such as sheikh or pasha were also banned.

[29] Such a linkage between Turkishness and Islam was apparent in immigration policies as well. For instance, Turkish-speaking Christian Greeks in Konya were sent to Greece during the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923-24; in the mid-'30s the government rejected immigration applications from the ethnic Turkish Romanian Christian Gagauz; but Muslims who migrated from the Balkans to Turkey during the same period were naturalized very swiftly. Moreover, although Turkey had declared that it would prioritize factors of Turkish language and ethnic affiliation but remained silent on the issue of religion, in practice immigrants from the Sunni or Hanefi sects of Islam were received more easily (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997).

Turkish culture can settle; and 3) regions in which civilian settlement is prohibited for military, security, political, economic, or health reasons or to maintain public order. Similarly, immigrants to be settled were grouped intro three groups: 1) Those who speak Turkish and are of Turkish identity and ethnicity; 2) those who speak no Turkish but are considered to be of Turkish culture (e.g. Albanian and Romanian immigrants); 3) those who are neither of Turkish origin nor Turkish culture (i.e. non-Muslims, Kurds, Arabs).[30]

With respect to the settlement of minority groups, the Armenians, Greeks and Jews fell under the second group of regions and were regarded as group of people who were to be integrated into Turkish culture. The most significant section of the law for non-Muslim minorities was its provision of legal grounds for the government – contrary to relevant portions of the Treaty of Lausanne – to dislocate and disintegrate the community neighborhoods, as in the 1930s the Jews were still living in closed circles in urban settlements. In this respect, the Law on Settlement can be considered a fundamental piece of legislation which altered the life of Jews in Turkey, as shown by the 1934 Thrace incidents which occurred in the immediate aftermath of Parliament's passage of the law.[31]

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[30] The law prescribed that immigrants who were of Turkish culture and descent (immigrant group 1) were either to settle in a region of their choosing or if they were to receive state subsidies , they were to settle in places determined by the state. However, immigrants of non-Turkish descent (immigrant group 3) were to settle only in places specified by the state and were not to move without government permission, notwithstanding the absence of any subsidy.

[31] Law on Settlement No. 2510 was issued on June 14, 1934, and the Thrace Incidents occurred on July 3.

Although the law's main objective was to provide the government with the means to maintain security at a time when there were Kurdish rebellions in eastern and southeastern Anatolia and the threat of Nazis at the European borders, the demarcation between people who belonged to Turkish culture and descent and those who did not, caused anxiety among the Jewish minority (Bali, 2000: 244). The Turkish government, on the other hand, was anxious that the war in Europe might spread to Turkey. Within the possibility of a Nazi attack, the province of Thrace on the border with Europe was thought to be the primary area in jeopardy and therefore the first needing protection. For that reason, the Republican elite thought to relocate "untrustworthy" elements such as non-Muslims from Thrace to eastern regions due to their past record of betrayal (Karabatak, 1996: 6). Although the Law on Settlement supplied the government a legal tool for dislocating the Jews living in Thrace and settle them in regions far from the European border, in fact it was never used with respect to non-Muslims.

The rise of racism in Europe not only impacted Turkey's domestic politics with the enactment of the Settlement Law and the accompanying defense measures, but also caused anti-Semitism to seep into domestic extreme-right movements. There was a rise in far-right publications carrying anti-Semitic writings. Anti-Semitist allegations included charges of the threat international Jewry posed to the world order, the Jews' dominance of Turkish trade, the exploitation of Turks by Jewish capital, and the betrayal of the Jews during the conquest of Istanbul (Levi, 1998: 34). These themes were also prevalent in the cartoon magazines of the 1930s and '40s, which stereotyped Jews as rich, money-grubbing merchants living in Istanbul and speaking heavily accented Turkish,

utterly lacking in affinity or loyalty to the nation, with money as their master (Mallet, 1996). These anti-Semitic publications, most notably the ones of Cevat Rıfat Atilhan and Nihal Atsız, were the chief cause of the anti-Semitic attacks on Jews living in Thrace (Bali, 1999a: 50).

The incidents first began in Çanakkale, a province in southern Thrace, with Jews receiving unsigned letters telling them to leave the area. The letters wrote that then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and the Turkish government also wanted the Jews to leave Çanakkale. Rather than replying to the far-right, anti-Semitic accusations by way of counter publication, the Jewish elite preferred to write to Prime Ministry officials, but no response was forthcoming. This inaction has been blamed on the chronic indolence of the bureaucracy, and also that at the time the matter of verbal attacks on minorities was considered nothing unusual (Levi, 1998: 128).

On July 3, 1934, the anti-Semitic campaign that began with unsigned letters and extreme-right publications escalated into physical violence against the Jews. Jews living in the various provinces of Thrace such as Çanakkale, Edirne, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ were attacked and beaten, their houses and shops destroyed, and their goods stolen. Afterwards, most Jews were forced to sell off their remaining goods very cheaply. Jews who fled to Istanbul were settled in Balat by the Jewish community there. It is estimated that out of a total 15,000-20,000 Jews living in the Thrace region, fully half immigrated to Istanbul during and after the incidents (Karabatak, 1996: 7). Although some of them remained in Istanbul, never to return to their hometowns, others emigrated from the metropolis to Palestine (Levi, 1996b: 10).

The Prime Ministry swiftly intervened in the incidents, and the local authorities suppressed the anti-Jewish violence and restored order and peace. The rightist press organs that provoked the incidents were shut down and charges filed against them. The governors and mayors of the provinces where the incidents occurred were removed from office. The government made a public declaration that there was no anti-Semitism in Turkey and that the anti-Semitism behind these events originated from abroad, specifically from Europe, and not from within Turkey's borders.

Some newspapers claimed that the Jews were still non-Turkified and that their insistence on speaking Ladino instead of Turkish had led to the incidents. By the same token, during and after the events, the pressure for Jews to speak Turkish intensified. In response to accusations of a refusal to speak Turkish, following the Thrace Incidents Jewish community leaders declared their loyalty to the state and furthermore donated money to civic foundations to underline it (Toprak, 1996: 23).

The 1934 Thrace Incidents caused not only a mass Jewish migration to Istanbul and to Palestine from the region but also a rise of Zionism among Turkey's Jews. The first domestic Zionist association, the aim of which was Jewish migration to Israel, was founded by a group of Jews in Istanbul in 1934, just after the incidents. (Bali, 1999b: 43). Especially after the rise of European anti-Semitism in the 1930s and '40s, Zionism spread among Turkey's Jews. Although Zionism was constitutionally restricted and the state barred dual loyalty among minorities, aiming instead at their full integration into the Turkish nation, the authorities did not persecute Zionist activities (Bali, 2001a: 60). However, the

1938 Law on Associations (No. 3512) brought restrictions on associations with connections outside Turkey. Under this law, associations operating as local branches of international groups were banned. Consequently, Jewish associations such as *B'nai B'rith* were closed down. Additionally, any community associations, foundations or sports clubs bearing foreign names were given new Turkish ones.[32]

During World War II, the policies of the Turkish government on minority issues were largely dominated by the paradigm of national security and defense.[33] The state's prime concern was to not get involved in the war, but with the proviso that if war proved unavoidable, Turkey should be economically and militaristically strong enough to defend itself. The economy was prioritized not only for the welfare of society – which fell sharply due to the war atmosphere – but also for supporting military readiness. Within this context, minorities were considered untrustworthy elements of society. In addition, since under the national security and defense paradigm they were to be pacified, the militaristic and economic measures had unforeseen consequences for the non-Muslim minorities.

As part of these militaristic measures, in 1939 it was decided that minorities serving in the military or due for conscription would not be given arms training but would instead be enlisted in support services. This decision was in effect until the end of the war, in 1945 (Nahum, 2000: 222). In their recruitment, desegregation was the active principle – that is, although non-Muslims were

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[32] The Law on Associations was amended in 2001.

[33] For a discussion on the national security and defense paradigm, see İba (1998).

present in the support services, they worked alongside Muslim soldiers. It was only in 1941 that a principle of segregation was applied when non-Muslim men age 26 to 45 were recruited to the military as reserve forces. This special recruitment is known as the Incident of Reserves (*Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatlar*), and is significant for the history of non-Muslims in Turkey not only for forming a reserve force composed solely of non-Muslims, but also because this reserve force was set up solely to serve a particular support branch which had been disarmed and deployed for civic purposes such as building national parks and roads and collecting garbage. Non-Muslim men recruited to this special reserve force were distressed at being gathered under a special branch segregated from Muslim soldiers at a time when concentration camps were in widespread use by racist regimes in Europe. However, the main concern of the Turkish government and the military was not to constitute a racist tool with this reserve force but rather to maintain national security by isolating society's "untrustworthy" elements in camps at a time when the war had already spread close to Turkey's borders and was drawing nearer (Bali, 1998b). The non-Muslim soldiers served the military as reserve forces for nearly a year and were released from duty in 1942. As for the professional military cadres, during World War II the military academies set forth "being of the Turkish race" as an eligibility requirement for admission (Bali, 2000: 410).

As part of the economic measures taken during World War II, the Law on Capital Tax (Law No. 4305) was issued in 1942. The Capital Tax was a special one-time tax designed to provide additional resources for the Treasury and to discourage war economy market speculation and profiteering (Ökte, 1987: 24).

During those years a number of basic goods such as oil, flour, sugar and gasoline were scarce, with their supply in the control of group of merchants who frequently used speculation to inflate market prices. In the eyes of the public, merchants and traders were corrupt businessmen, and successful non-Muslims merchants – more specifically the Jews – suffered from this negative stereotype. In response to the dominance of non-Muslims in the trade sector, state authorities tried to weaken their position with the Capital Tax. The tax also aided the rise of a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie under state protection. The Turkish state curbed non-Muslims minorities and redistributed their capital to other sectors of society so as to create a national bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1989).

There were four groups taxed under the law: Muslims, non-Muslims, converts and foreigners.[34] Using categories set forth according to these groups, Tax Assessment Boards made up of governmental, commercial and local authorities from each city, town or district were formed to calculate the tax bill owed by individuals in that region. Per the tax boards' rulings, non-Muslims and converts were made to pay much higher taxes than other groups.[35] In order to pay the tax, most non-Muslims were forced to sell off their property. It is estimated that 98% of the real estate owned by non-Muslims was either bought by individuals, mostly Muslim, or made the property of the state (Akar, 2000: 147). Those unable pay their taxes were sent to the Aşkale Work Camp in Erzurum, an

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[34] Jewish immigrants holding German, Austrian, Romanian or Bulgarian citizenship were classified for tax purposes in the foreigners' group.

[35] The tax rate calculated on the basis of annual revenue earned was 5% for Muslims, 156% for Greeks, 179% for Jews and 232% for Armenians (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 376).

eastern province, to construct roads and shovel snow under severe weather conditions. Since the tax rate for non-Muslims was higher than that of other groups and the local council decisions were biased against them, all of the people sent to the Aşkale Work Camp were non-Muslims.[36] The Jewish Agency in Palestine did not condemn the Capital Tax as an anti-Semitic measure, noting instead that not only Jews but also other non-Muslim minority groups were being charged extra taxes (Bali, 2000: 424). The Capital Tax was abandoned in 1944 with a new law, no. 4530, ending the levies and forgiving former tax debts.

The Capital Tax is generally considered to have been a racist policy, and alongside the long tradition of tolerance shown towards Jews is regarded as an exception (Yetkin, 1996: 252).[37] Still, it caused a number of Jews to emigrate from Turkey, and their capital was transferred to the Muslim bourgeoisie. Furthermore, most Jews voted for the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1946 general elections in protest of the Capital Tax imposed by the ruling RPP (Akar, 2000; Bali, 1997).

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[36] Sources differ on the number of non-Muslims sent to the Aşkale Work Camp. Akar (2000) estimates the number to be around 6,000-7,000. Yetkin (1996), on the other hand, estimates it at 2,057.

[37] There was even a belief among the Jews that if Atatürk (who had passed away four years earlier) were still alive, he would not have allowed passage of the Capital Tax (Bali, 2000: 489).

2.4 The Multi-Party Democracy Period (1945-1980): More Democracy for a Shrinking Jewish Minority

During the Early Republican Period, Turkish modernization was formulated and moderated by the RPP and the Kemalist elites. It was also the period of the establishment of the national-territorial state (Karpat, 1991). Although Turkish politics was facing two more parties, the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party, they proved short-lived, as they were closed very quickly in the wake of domestic rebellions. Turkish politics' transition to multi-party democracy occurred only in 1945 when new parties were allowed to be founded and to compete in national elections. The most influential parties in the early stages of multi-party democracy was the Democrat Party (DP). The 1950s witnessed the clash of the DP and the RPP – that is, proponents of populist democracy versus proponents of rationalist democracy, or national will against national interest (Heper, 1990a). Due to wartime shortages and profiteering, social unrest resulted in the DP's victory in the national elections of 1950, '54 and '57, and it ruled the country until 1960, the year of the first military intervention in the history of modern Turkey.

As for the non-Muslims and Jews specifically, the Early Republican Period was generally a period of pressure for nation-building and Turkification. The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, national legislation designed to form a homogeneous citizenship, efforts to establish a national bourgeoisie and finally the Capital Tax were all instruments of the Turkification project, and all can be considered special tools of the general "top-down" tradition during the Early

Republican Period. It has been argued that, in the same period, people had choices but their choices were limited (Karpat, 1991). Such choices were even more limited for non-Muslims. Therefore, after the transition to multi-party democracy, the DP's program promising equality and freedom attracted most of the non-Muslim minority vote (Bali, 1998a: 173). In addition, the number of non-Muslim deputies in Parliament rose under DP rule. However, although the political climate during DP rule favored Jews more than in previous years, nearly half of the existing Jewish population emigrated to Israel in the early 1950s.[38] Therefore, the Multi-Party Democracy Period can be considered an era of relaxation of the Turkification policies, though there were then fewer Jews present to make use of this relative freedom.

The aftermath of the war climate not only paved the path for the multi-party system and the introduction of the DP into Turkish politics, it also ushered in a more liberal environment for Jews and other non-Muslim minorities. As of 1945 non-Muslims could be admitted to military academies, and they began to be recruited to the professional cadres of the Turkish military (Bali, 2000: 489). The Jewish press also saw a leap in both its variety and number. Many newspapers and journals such as *Şabat*, *Şalom*, *Atikva*, *Or Yehuda*, *Or Israel* and *La Boz De Turkiya* began to be published in Turkish, French or Ladino. The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign ended. However, the steps taken during the Early Republican Period towards nation-building yielded the projected results. For instance, the

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[38] The Jews' emigration to Israel continued in the following decades extending even up to this day. Since emigration to Israel from Turkey will be covered in Chapter III, relevant immigration and population figures will not be covered here.

adoption of Turkish names and the use of Turkish as a language spread among the Jewry, and the early 1960s saw Turkish become the mother tongue of Turkey's Jews (Şaul, 2001: 158).[39] Language use became to be differentiated more by generation. In the new situation, by 1970s, for the vast majority of middle-aged Jews, the norm became to use Ladino at home, Turkish in the street (Şaul, 2001: 159). Older generations spoke Ladino more in contrast to younger generations who started to speak mainly Turkish.

In contrast to the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere during the Early Republican Period, the DP legitimized Islam and rural values. The DP coming to power signified the victory of a periphery made up of grassroots and the counter-official culture (Mardin, 1990). This development not only shook the balance of the traditional Ottoman-Turkish polity, which had hitherto followed a policy of strengthening the center against the periphery for the sake of a strong state, but also provoked unintended consequences with respect to non-Muslims.

The Early Republican Period saw efforts to suppress Islamic identity through the lens of the state's project of secularization and modernization, but being Muslim remained one of the essential criteria of Turkishness. The resurgence of Islam during DP rule did not alter the basic condition of Turkishness, and Islam was still considered one of the characteristics of Turkish identity. However, in the 1950s, as Islam came to be more frequently used as a social and cultural touchstone for politics, and religious liberties began to be practiced more in the public sphere, non-Muslims felt a lessening in the pressure

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[39] In the 1960 census, the Turkish literacy rate among the Jewry was 85% (Dündar, 2000: 63).

to secularize. By the same token, they were able to make the most of their communal rights, which were defined in close relation to religious rights. This trend was confirmed for Jews in 1953, with first appointment to the Chief Rabbinate since the foundation of the republic. In this regard, it can be argued that non-Muslims were part of the periphery. Similar to the countryside, which was suspected as being separatist due to several rebellions (i.e. Kurdish and Islamic ones) against the Turkish state in the 1920s and '30s, non-Muslims were also consigned to the periphery with similar suspicions cast on them due their past history in the National War of Independence. The centralist policies of the RPP therefore not only set limitations on Islam transgressing the public sphere but also restricted other religious groups within society. When the DP articulated Islam in politics and facilitated the periphery, such as rural masses, becoming a medium of power against state elites, then non-Muslims, as elements of the periphery, also found a more liberal environment for their communal identities.[40]

However, with respect to the definition of nation and the building of the Turkish nation, analogous changes failed to materialize. During the Early Republican Period, nation-building and secularization were complimentary parts of Turkish modernization, and the construction of modern citizenship required Islamic identity to be curtailed. This indicated a complicated position for non-Muslim minorities. Although they were not Muslim and therefore had no Islamic

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[40] In his autobiography, Eli Şaul (1999), Jewish emigrant from Balat, a Istanbul district where there was a Jewish majority until the mass migration to Israel, tells that when the Free Republican Party (FRP) was established in 1930 under Atatürk's order, Balat's Jews resoundingly supported this new party, in contrast to the RPP. The party was closed down the same year for attracting Islamist and separatist elements. It was Turkey's first attempt at multi-party democracy, and it was very short-lived.

identity to be curbed, they still fell outside the definition of the Turkish nation (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 177). The exclusion of non-Muslims from this definition continued during the DP period. It seems that though Islam was an issue to be dealt with in Turkish politics either in the form of prohibition or permission in the public sphere as well as a criteria for Turkishness both during the RPP and DP periods until the 1960s, the status of non-Muslims was more susceptible to the center-periphery cleavage than was Islam. Therefore, setting the center-periphery relation instead of Islam as an independent variable of the construction of citizenship provides an explanatory key to the changing milieu of non-Muslim citizenship in the 1950s.

The DP utilized populist policies, and in the emergence of the conflict over Cyprus with Greece in 1954, it frequently utilized nationalist discourse. The party adopted a hard-line foreign policy against Greece. This Cyprus conflict also had implications for domestic politics. The Greek minority living in Turkey was accused of taking sides with both Greece and the Greek Cypriots in anti-Turkish Cypriot violence on the island. In 1955, in the wake of the burning in Salonika of the house where Atatürk was born, the DP's propaganda against Greeks both in Greece and in Turkey itself grew even harsher. In consequence, on September 6-7, 1955, anti-Greek violence over the Cyprus dispute erupted in Istanbul and İzmir, and then spilled over to Jewish-owned businesses.

Other non-Muslims groups such as Armenians were also threatened. Some people swayed by both nationalist rhetoric and their sensitivity over Cyprus went on to assault non-Muslims, putting the torch to their shops, attacking minority schools, insulting NATO-commissioned Greek officers on the streets of İzmir,

and burning down the residence of the Orthodox patriarch. There were some 100 injuries. Although there was speculation that the DP itself had engineered the arson attack on Atatürk's house in Salonika, the government paid compensation to the victims of the violence in Turkey. The September 6-7 Events constituted one of the major causes behind non-Muslim emigration from Turkey to foreign countries in the 1960s. Hence, as the Greeks emigrated to Greece, the Jews emigrated to Israel.[41]

Sensitivity on the Cyprus issue and the attack on Atatürk's house were not the only reasons behind the September 6-7 Events; the hostility towards non-Muslims that developed in the 1950s among the Islamic and nationalist right was also a factor (Bora, 1995: 39). The seed of this reaction against non-Muslims dates back to Ottoman times. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire was clearly in decline, in negotiations over international pacts such as the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Treaty of Sevres in 1918, the issue of the status of non-Muslim communities was always a key issue. In view of this, the widespread belief that imperial Western powers used the minority issue as a tool during international negotiations to weaken Turkey gained currency among the rightists. In the September 6-7 Events, the view that "untrustworthy, alien elements within Turkish society are being aided

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[41] The integration of Turkey into the international migration regime in the 1950s made emigration to foreign countries easier. The 1950s and '60s were not only years when non-Muslims left Turkey, but also years of urbanization and industrialization which saw the beginning of migration from rural areas to urban ones and from eastern regions to western ones. Likewise, many Jews living in southeastern provinces such as Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır and Hakkari migrated to Israel in the early 1950s, and many living in the eastern province of Van migrated to Istanbul in the '60s (Aydın, 1985: 511). According the 1965 census, 80% of Turkey's total Jewish population lived in the metropolis of Istanbul (Dündar, 2000: 61).

by foreign powers" resurfaced.[42] However, in subsequent years the damage done to civilians was compensated by the government.

With respect to the Jews, the hostility towards "alien elements within the nation" was reflected as anti-Semitism and throughout the 1950s and '60s, the view that non-Muslims were outsiders exploiting Turkey through reaping huge profits in domestic trade and then moving this money to foreign investments maintained its dominance among rightists (Demir and Akar, 1994).[43] Even more, some extreme rightists established associations to combat Zionism such as İzmir's "Association for Combating Zionism in Turkey" established in 1968 (Bali, 1996). Throughout the 1950s while the latitude of citizenship was widened by political liberties at the social level, questions and doubts about the citizenship of minorities persisted.

The 1960 coup d'état brought DP rule to an end. The party was closed down and some of its leaders were tried and executed. Blame for the failure of democracy during DP rule and the subsequent military intervention is generally laid on the center-periphery cleavage: the DP became authoritarian due to a lack of necessary checks and balances in the system, and the military and bureaucratic elites grew weak and reacted to the failure of civilian mechanisms with a coup (Heper, 1984; Heper, 1991a). The Constituent Assembly composed of

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[42] Even in the debates in the 1980s and '90s over Turkey's application to join the European Union, the issue of minorities frequently resurfaced in a strikingly similar context – that is, the alleged interference of Western European Union powers in Turkey's internal affairs and their using minorities to weaken its position in international relations.

[43] Traditionally, the nationalist and Islamic extreme right in Turkey had been anti-Semitic and targeted not only Jews but also converts.

representatives from various civic organizations and military commanders gathered to draw up a new constitution. Also included in the Constituent Assembly group were a single representative from each recognized minority group – one Armenian, one Greek and one Jew.

The 1961 Constitution promoted a democratic environment by creating an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of the elected assemblies as well as by strengthening the Council of State, sustaining the independence of the judiciary, granting autonomy to universities, and enhancing civil liberties and social rights. Since the foundation of the republic, all citizens had been equal before the law; citizenship rights were granted from above without public deliberation; and citizens were bound to the state on the individual level regardless of their cultural, religious or ethnic affiliation. With the 1961 Constitution, the scope of citizenship was expanded and the basic elements of civil society – such as the right to organize and the freedoms of the press, public speech and political participation – were safeguarded. The new Constitution allowed a freedom of association which resulted in an increasing number of organizations, including religious ones (Toprak, 1988). Although the new Constitution extended the grounds of political participation through enhancing it, still from the 1960s onward no non-Muslim deputy took a seat in Parliament for over 30 years.[44]

A new form of citizenship, one more participatory and active, took shape though still maintaining the constitutional emphasis on duties to the state such as

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[44] It was only in the 1995 elections that a Jew from the True Path Party (DYP) won a seat in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

voting, paying taxes and doing military service (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 177). The 1961 Constitution limited the interference of the state in the affairs of individuals and aspired for a more liberal understanding of citizenship in comparison to the "devoted" citizen of the Early Republican Period (Soyarık, 2000: 156).

The 1961 Constitution laid out the specifics of Turkish citizenship in Article 54 (Gözübüyük, 1995: 131):

> Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship status of a child born from a foreign father and a Turkish mother will be arranged by law. Citizenship is acquired and lost under the circumstances defined by law. No Turk can be expelled from citizenship, unless s/he engages in activities contrary to the loyalty to the country. The decisions and implementations of expulsion can be subject to appeal.

In 1964, a new Citizenship Law, no. 403, was put into effect.[45] This law was an amendment to Law No. 1312 according to the general framework on citizenship laid out by the 1961 Constitution. This new law, like its predecessor, also emphasized the blood principle. The law, which is still in use today, set forth three basic principles (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1964) Everyone should have a citizenship; 2) Everyone should have single citizenship; 3) Everyone should be free to choose their own citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship they do not want.[46]

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[45] This Law was published in the Official Gazette No. 11638 dated February 22, 1964.

[46] Law No. 403 was amended in 1981 by Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 to allow dual citizenship.

The law regarded citizenship as unique, disclaiming dual citizenship. The underlying assumption of this premise seems to be the idea that citizenship means loyalty to the state, so loyalty to more than one state is not viable. Revocation of Turkish citizenship, for instance, was designed as a response to activities putting one's loyalty to the state into question. Loyalty to the state was perceived as a requirement of national security (Soyarık, 2000: 162). As discussed above, loyalty to the Turkish state was one of the parameters of non-Muslim citizenship. Therefore, although the 1961 Constitution and 1964 Citizenship Law set forth a more specified citizenship that enhanced the sphere of the individual vis-à-vis the state, the emphasis laid on loyalty in these legal documents maintained the burden on Jews of demonstrating their loyalty to the state.

The rights and liberties defined by the 1961 Constitution led not only to a participatory citizenship but also promoted a more active civil society. In addition, however, in the late 1960s and early '70s rightist and leftist groups came to confront each other more and more, leading to an alarming rise in political violence. The Justice Party, established as an heir to the shuttered DP, was the ruling party during the '60s. In a reflection of the old cleavage between the centralist bureaucratic elite and the forces of the periphery which commanded an electoral majority, both civilian bureaucrats and the military distrusted the Justice Party and in response to its failure to rein in political terrorism, in 1971 the military intervened for the second time in modern Turkish history. As a result, constitutional amendments were enacted to strengthen the executive and limit the activities of citizens so as to safeguard national security and unity.

With respect to relations between non-Muslims and the state, the conjecture of the '70s was mainly dominated by the Cyprus issue. With the rise of violence on the island in 1964, Ankara withdrew from the 1930 Turkish-Greek Agreement. The agreement, whose strong advocates at the time included Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, aimed at economic cooperation between the two countries. It also regulated the status of Greek citizens living in Turkey with generous residence permits as a gesture of friendship between the Greek and Turkish nations. After the agreement was terminated in 1964, the Turkish government revoked the residence permits of Greek citizens living in Turkey and had them deported.[47] The rising nationalism due to the Cyprus conflict put pressure on the Greek minority, leading most of them to emigrate to Greece (Demir and Akar, 1994). In 1974 the Cyprus issue flared into an international crisis with the entrance of the Turkish military on the island to protect the Cypriot Turks. For its intervention, Turkey was faced with international pressure in the form of an arms embargo, diplomatic crises and accusations of human rights violations. Turkey's Jewish elites, who had been exerting constant efforts to prove their community's loyalty to the Turkish state, launched lobbying campaigns to defend Turkey in the international arena (Başak, 1995: 153).

Against the background of the prevalent hostile atmosphere against non-Muslims during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the issue of religious foundations arose as a sphere of control over minorities. Under Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, non-Muslims were already granted the right to establish their own religious

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[47] It is estimated that around 30,000-40,000 ethnic Greek Turkish citizens emigrated to Greece after Turkey terminated the Turkish-Greek Treaty in 1964 (Aydın, 1985: 510).

foundations. But in 1936, with Law on Religious Foundations No. 2762, the Turkish government undertook to treat those foundations on the same basis as Muslim ones. Furthermore, since the Civic Law outlawed the establishment of any religious foundation designed to support the members of any race or community, the Law on Religious Foundations, which desegregated the status of minority foundations with other foundations, disclaimed the establishment of new foundations by minority groups.[48] The Law on Religious Foundations also urged foundations to prepare a declaration of properties they owned at the time. However, in 1974, the Council of State decreed that no corporate body constituted by non-Turkish citizens would be allowed to obtain immovable property (Soner, 2004). Consequently, governmental authorities began to liquidate real estate belonging to the religious foundations of minorities. The official confiscation was based on the declaration of properties made in 1936. All the properties declared on the 1936 listing were considered the true property of a given foundation. On the other hand, properties acquired from that date up to 1974 either through donation or purchase were considered illegal. These properties were returned to the heirs of those who had first donated them and if no suitable heir could be found, they were confiscated. Post-1936 property purchases were confiscated outright (Oran, 2001: 229).[49] The liquidation of these non-Muslim assets hindered

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[48] Today, the legal prohibition against religious communities founding any non-profit collective entity is still in effect. Non-Muslim minorities still cannot establish new religious foundations or other nonprofit associations for their communities. It should be noted that this is not specific to non-Muslims; the same restrictions apply to Muslims and adherents of other faiths.

[49] The provision prohibiting the acquisition of property by minority religious foundations remained in force until 2002, when it was removed under the pressure of the EU accession process.

the services that they provided to their communities, i.e. religious, educational and charity services, because most of them depended on the revenues earned from rents of the properties.

The 1970s was also a period when the traditional center-periphery split started to give way to a functional cleavage (Özbudun, 1988). Class relations started to dominate the polity. The voters adopted more autonomous and instrumentalized criteria in most developed western regions and metropolitan areas (Kazancıgil, 1994). In a way, as a result of rapid urbanization, construction of shantytowns and changes in the socio-economic outlook of the country in general, the scope and content of groups forming the periphery was altered, a development which left its mark on the political parties as well. The Justice Party veered more to the right, and the RPP more to the left. At the same time, political terrorism was also becoming more violent, causing an ideological polarization of society.

2.5 The Post-1980 Period: Jews *vis-à-vis* Globalization Process

Due to the political violence between leftist and rightist groups as well as the fragmentation and polarization of society during the 1970s, the Turkish military intervened in politics in 1980 for a third time to forestall the erosion of state authority. Stringent measures were taken, such as strict control of the media, universities and the bureaucracy. All the existing political parties were closed

down and their leaders banned from politics.[50] In 1982, the military regime replaced the 1961 Constitution with a new one. The 1982 Constitution aimed at a major restructuring of Turkish democracy to prevent any recurrence of the recent domestic crises (Heper, 1990b). Under the new Constitution, the executive was strengthened, the powers of high courts reduced, the universities centralized, and the National Security Council given more authority. The procedural rules of politics were tightened – e.g., political parties were banned from organizing in foreign countries – and there were restrictions put on their women and youth branches. The Constitution brought strict limits to individual rights as well. It limited the rights of labor and other interest groups and barred trade unions, associations and cooperatives from engaging in political activities.

The military at that time viewed Islam as the antidote to the extremism of the late 1970s, and so wielded it as a tool for promoting social and political stability as well as societal unity (Bora and Can, 1991). In line with this conception, the military advocated a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a rightist position which presumed that Turkishness and Islamism were complimentary aspects of Turkish culture and furthermore emphasized religious values in the fabric of Turkish nationalism (Bora, 1998). This synthesis leaned in favor of cultural Islam rather than political Islam. Hence, Islam started to take its place as a resource in public policies (Heper, 1991b). The foremost policy change took place in the arena of education. Mandatory religion courses with a content based on Islamic ethics and the Sunni sect were introduced into the curriculum of primary schools

[50] With a referendum in 1986, the formerly banned politicians were able to return to politics.

(Öniş, 1997). It was only in 1987 that Christians and the Jews were excused from these lessons, and in 1990 they were completely freed from any obligation to participate in classes on religion or ethics (Franz, 1994: 333; Anar, 1997: 91).

The 1980s were marked not only by the limitation of rights and freedoms brought by the new Constitution but also by the demilitarization and civilianization of the regime (Evin, 1994). In the competitive elections held in 1983, the Motherland Party (MP) – a group bringing together conservative, nationalist, social democratic and liberal wings under its roof – won a large majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, leading it to rule for the rest of the decade. The party brought significant changes to the economy and politics, ones similar in nature to the other contemporary neo-rightist waves in other Western countries.[51] The MP replaced the import substitution economic policy with a free market model based on export-oriented growth. The liberal strategies of the MP aimed at Turkey's economic integration with global capitalism. The MP combined engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism, and all its policies emphasized traditional values, economic development and the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals (Toprak, 1993). In addition, in line with the dominant Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the time, rises were seen in religious sentiments, publications and education alike (Salt, 1995).

Besides these internal developments, the Post-1980 Period was also characterized by globalization. The domain of intertwining politics and economics

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[51] As the neo-rightist wave was called Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States, after its most prominent local proponents, it was called Özalism in Turkey after Turgut Özal, the leader of the Motherland Party.

overtook the conventional nation-state and brought international networks and realms to the fore. The people's expectations about what the state ought to deliver grew, even as the state's ability to provide these much-needed services was rapidly falling (Öniş, 1997). Homogenization went hand-in-hand with fragmentation across and within societies, leading to a rise in nationalist movements and ethnic conflicts as well as transnational movements such as feminism, environmentalism and Islamist fundamentalism. These movements, known under the blanket term identity politics, were also felt in Turkey. Besides the rise of Kurdish nationalism which took on violent expression as terrorism and reactionary Turkish nationalism, Turkey witnessed the rising Islamist movement. Hence the Welfare Party, with its Islamist worldview, gained prominence in various national and local elections during this period.

With respect to citizenship, the 1980s saw increasing consciousness of this concept. Although the MP's liberalism conception lacked a concrete definition of citizenship encompassing individualization as in the West and was instead taken merely as an easy way to get rich (Göle, 1996), its policies such as privatization, transferring funds to municipalities, and development of the market economy served to indirectly strengthen civil society (Heper, 1990a). With its close relationship with the development of civil society, the increasing consciousness of citizenship pointed to contradictory trends in precisely this sphere. Citizenship, as an instrument within the domain of democracy and civil society and not of the state, entered the public agenda in the Post-1980 Period. The rise of civil society was accompanied by a shift from state-centered modernization imposed from

above to a more civil society-centered modernization coming from below (Göle, 2000).

In the interface between citizenship and globalization, two issues concerning citizenship marked the Post-1980 Period. The *first* was dual citizenship and the legislation having to do with it. Against the changing contexts of globalization driven primarily by international migration, the existing laws on citizenship were inadequate. Before 1981, Turkey did not allow dual citizenship and its citizenship laws primarily emphasized the blood principle. However, due to extensive labor emigration to European countries, the Turkish state felt the need to alter the citizenship laws in accordance with trends in international migration, especially with regard to second- and third-generation émigrés. Therefore, in 1981's Dual Citizenship Law – Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 – the basic principle was loyalty to the state rather than the nation. Theoretically, dual citizenship refers mainly to membership to more than one state, and the concept presupposes loyalty to the state rather than the nation. Therefore, this law on dual citizenship illustrated the tendency to prioritize loyalty to the Turkish state rather than the Turkish nation. In consequence, besides the blood principle, which is also generally preferred by other migrant-exporting countries, Turkey stressed the legal aspect of citizenship so as to permit émigrés to qualify for naturalization without giving up their original citizenship (İçduygu et al. 1999: 198). The Dual Citizenship Law not only impacted Turkish émigrés in European countries but also Jewish migrants from Turkey to Israel and returnees from Israel back to Turkey.

Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended in 1995 with a supplemental law, No. 4112, to further encourage dual citizenship. Under this law, people naturalized in foreign countries prior to 1981 when dual citizenship was not allowed were granted the same set of rights as Turkish citizens, among which were property, inheritance, settlement and travel . The challenges posed by the rise of civil society and the complexity of international migration demonstrated that the conventional understanding of the nation-state was under challenge by globalization. As the artificial link between the nation and state started to break down, definitions of community based on blood and soil began to lose their power. Specifically in Turkey, the attempt to deal with these challenges was found in new legislation on dual citizenship, laws which can justifiably be interpreted as the liberalization of citizenship policies (İçduygu et al. 1999: 203).

The *second* issue in the interface between citizenship and globalization was the discussion on constitutional citizenship that occurred specifically in the 1990s. In response to the rise of identity politics, multiculturalism, and demands from different segments of society (i.e. Islamists, Kurds, etc.), constitutional citizenship was proposed as a solution which would ensure internal peace in academic and political party circles (Soyarık, 2000: 202). In constitutional citizenship, the constitution represents a kind of social contract safeguarding the recognition of different ethnic and religious groups whose loyalty to the state would supersede the principle of loyalty to the nation (İçduygu, 1996b; Keyder, 1997). Although constitutional citizenship was suggested primarily as a possible solution to the Kurdish problem or the Islamic question, it also had implications for non-Muslim minorities.

The Post-1980 Period saw not only a sharp rise in publications put out by non-Muslim minorities discussing their communal identities such as community newspapers and journals, but also a proliferation of other publications, research, and websites addressing a wide-ranging audience of both academics and laypeople.[52] Although since Turkey's foundation non-Muslims had had self-published newspapers and journals addressing their closed communities, the post-1980 publication wave differed with its emphasis on communal identity and assertions of the preservation and promotion of ethno-religious cultures.

The surge of publications by and about non-Muslim minorities signified a rise of public interest in both differences and identities. It also confirmed the relevance of issues of difference and equality to the growing debates throughout the 1990s on loyalty to the nation/state and Turkish citizenship alike. In this regard, the simultaneous occurrence of debates on constitutional citizenship and on the status of non-Muslims cannot be mere coincidence. As differences within society became more visible and therefore more publicly discussed, debates on how to deal with this host of ethnic, linguistic and religious differences inclined and tended to center around citizenship, with a focus on what the fundamentals of Turkish citizenship should be.[53]

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[52] All the cultural minority groups, including those not officially recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne, expressed themselves through a number of newspapers and journals. The most widely known publications today are Agos (by Armenians), Ogni (Lazes); and Şalom (Jews).

[53] The most important discussion in the '90s about non-Muslims centered on the Capital Tax. The debate was spurred by "Salkım Hanımın Taneleri" (The Jewelry of Miss Salkım), a historical film based on a novel by Yılmaz Karakoyunlu which many saw in both movie theaters and on television. The film concerned the impact of the Capital Tax on one Armenian family, some of whose members were forced to sell off their property just in order to pay the tax, and others who ended up being sent to the Aşkale Work Camp.

In these discussions, minorities' loyalty to states other than Turkey was also questioned and certain criteria were set unofficially to resolve conflicting identities and loyalties. The Cyprus issue was considered the breaking point for the Greek minority, just as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served the same purpose for the Jews and the Armenian genocide issue for the Armenians.

For the Jews, the influence of identity politics could be traced back to the surge in studies and publications on Turkish Jewry from the '90s into the next decade. In line with the general tendency to celebrate differences, the Jewish community emphasized its religious identity but without going so far as to exclude a preeminent Turkish culture and identity in the formation of this identity. These publications and studies focused mainly on the tolerance granted to the Jewish community both by the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic and the loyalty that the Jews felt in return (Emecen, 1997: 10). Although in various publications Islamists frequently deployed anti-Semitic propaganda against the Jews (i.e., allegations of an Jewish-Freemason conspiracy manipulating states across the globe, Jews exploiting the resources of countries where they live, or Israel being the "devil" of the Middle East), still it is generally argued by both the Jewish elite and state officials that anti-Semitism in Turkey is nearly nonexistent (Bali, 2001a: 16). Even the 1984 bombing of the Neva Shalom Synagogue, which left a death toll of 23, was blamed on foreign elements and anger over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the bomber was an Arab (Franz, 1994: 329). Two more synagogues were bombed in November 2003. These recent bombings were more related to the bombing of the Twin Towers in U.S.A known as 9/11 Incident.

The Jews' insistence on demonstrating their loyalty and at the same time pursuing a cultural politics based on religion was underlined in 1989 with the establishment of the Quincentennial Foundation (Bali, 2001b). With their strong ties to American Jews, Turkish Jewry has lobbied on the international stage since the 1970s to refute the Armenian genocide allegations and to support the Turkish position on Cyprus. With the Quincentennial Foundation, this Jewish community role continued under an institutional framework. The foundation's original aim was to celebrate the welcome that Jewish refugees found in the Ottoman Empire, but it also served to bolster Turkey's image in the face of damaging accusations of human rights violations and the like (Bali, 2001a: 309; Kılıç, 1995: 9).

As mentioned above, the post-1980 rise of civil society and the development of a consciousness of citizenship both as legal status and identity served together to illustrate a paradox in light of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and limitations of the 1982 Constitution. In the case of Jews, these contradictory trends pointed to a further paradox. On the one hand, Jews became more visible in the public arena by virtue of the public interest in differences within society as well as the Jews' pursuit of identity politics. This trend was accompanied by discussions of citizenship. Yet on the other hand, political and cultural Islam became more hegemonic in the public sphere and discussions of Turkish citizenship centered occasionally on its connection with Islamic identity. This trend was accompanied in the 1990s by a rise in anti-Semitic rhetoric making its mark in Turkish politics, especially on the part of Islamists and the Welfare Party. These conflicting trends can be understood by examining globalization and its inspiration upon the global and local. The global endorses a universal concept of

citizenship with its attendant basic rights and freedoms and calls attention to the legal aspect of citizenship. The local, however, substantiates an understanding of citizenship based upon differences and therefore reinforces the identity aspect of citizenship. The local lacks uniform characteristics and so in the process of celebrating and authenticating differences, multiple identities of the local come into view. Therefore, in the post-1980 *zeitgeist*, though Islamic identity and Jewish identity have sometimes come into conflict, they actually go hand-in-hand.

The European Union also construed yet another important aspect of the process of globalization and its reflections in Turkey. The 1993 Copenhagen summit of the EU Council affirmed that before its accession a candidate country must have achieved a stable democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. In the council's conclusions from that summit, one sine qua non condition set out for the accession of candidate states was the protection of minorities. Under the so-called Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries had to satisfy standards related to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Detailed articulation of standards for minority protection was left to the progressive implementation of the accession partnership documents reached between the EU and its various candidate countries. In addition, progress reports were released annually on the efforts made by candidate countries to meet the accession requirements. In Turkey's Accession Partnership Document, priority was given to enhancing the linguistic and cultural rights of minorities. Turkey, as a candidate country, was tasked with satisfying minimal standards of protection within the national system. Starting in 1998, the EU Commission's annual reports also monitored Turkey's

progress in protecting minorities and included comprehensive assessments of the prevailing state of minority treatment. These reports insisted that the Assyrian, Alawite and Kurdish groups be officially recognized, along with the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, and necessary legislation be enacted in order to promote and protect the distinct identities of these Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. Towards this end, the reports urged Turkey to adopt constitutional amendments to integrate with EU standards on minority protection.

Turkey's EU Accession Partnership Document compelled it to review the prevailing minority regime whose basics were originally set out in the Treaty of Lausanne. Historically, the minority issue has been a sensitive issue for Turkey both domestically and internationally. In the latter, the minority issue was considered a springboard for foreign powers to interfere in Turkey's domestic affairs and hence threaten its sovereignty. In the former, the issue was seen through the lens of national security in response to secessionist pressures. But in the 1990s, with the accession requirements, Turkey faced the question of how to preserve its national and territorial integrity while also recognizing the ethno-linguistic and religious diversity present within society (Soner, 2004). The rise of identity politics, demands for cultural rights, and debates on constitutional citizenship all contributed to EU accession process pressures on Turkey vis-à-vis changing the minority regime (Soner, 2004). In the '90s, although Turkey continued to resist enlarging the existing framework of minority rights, the standards required by the EU came to be recognized within the context of individual rights and freedoms. In 2002, major constitutional amendments were introduced. Accordingly, it became legal to do broadcasts in both minority

languages and dialects used traditionally by many Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Although the official language of education in the schools remained Turkish, special courses for different languages and dialects were henceforth allowed. The Law on Religious Foundations was also amended. Foundations run by non-Muslim minorities were allowed to acquire and dispose of property. However, after the amendment was adopted, complications arose. Religious foundations run by non-Muslim minorities were allowed to register property that they actually used as long as they could provide proof of ownership. However, the procedures for registration were complicated and subject to frequent bureaucratic intervention. Furthermore, the amendment did not cover the authority of the General Directorate of Foundations to dismiss the board of trustees. The amendment also failed to address the question of the already confiscated properties of non-Muslim foundations. The problems related to bureaucratic procedures were resolved with additional decrees in 2003.

With the last constitutional amendments made in accordance with European Union requirements in 2003, the establishment of new synagogues was also allowed. From the changes of the previous year, building synagogues or places of worship for non-Muslim believers was no longer legally prohibited, yet the Law on Public Works still covered only mosques, leaving out entirely other places of worship. That year the wording of the law was changed, replacing "mosques" in the phrase "in the public work plan, a place for mosques is reserved" with the ecumenical "places of worship." These amendments taken to satisfy EU requirements, however, did not alter the policy of specifying the faith

of individuals on their national identity cards. Today, Turkish identity cards still identify the religious affiliations of Turkish citizens.

In the Post-1980 Period, in addition to these steps taken, a first time event regarding Jewish minority occurred. After the death of David Asseo, the Chief Rabbi who was appointed in 1953, the Jewish community in Turkey held elections in October 2002 for the first time in the history of modern Turkey. It was a two-rounded election in which Jews over the age of 18 would vote for delegates composing the committee who would then elect the Chief Rabbi. Permission for elections was taken from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, according to Lausanne Treaty, and General Directorate of Security the Bureau of Minorities saw that the elections were executed in peace and order. The motto during the elections, as repeated frequently in Şalom weekly, was "Voting is a duty, candidacy is a right!" In result of the elections, İzak Haleva was chosen as the Chief Rabbi.

CHAPTER III

CITIZENSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: A HISTORY OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION FROM TURKEY TO ISRAEL

3.1 Introduction

Turkey, traditionally, is recognized as a sending country in terms of international migration flows, and in the form of both labor migration and asylum seekers, it has sent out thousands of immigrants, mainly to European countries.[1] For these reasons, existing studies on Turkey and international migration have traditionally focused on Turkish immigrants in Europe or on Turkey's sending country characteristic (İçduygu, 1991; 2000).

The migration of Jews from Turkey to Israel is the second-largest mass emigration movement out of Turkey, the first one being its labor migration of workers to European countries (Geray, 1970).[2] Despite this prominent characteristic, the mass migration of Jews to Israel has failed to attract significant

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[1] One must add that Turkey's dominant character as an immigrant sending country has in recent decades seen a shift. There is growing widespread acknowledgement that since the 1990s, Turkey has become a country of immigration and irregular transit migration as well as a country of asylum (İçduygu, 2000; Kirişçi, 2002).

[2] It should be added the largest mass emigration of minorities from Turkey was that of the Greeks during the Turkish-Greek population exchanges of the early 1920s. However, the emigration of the Jews was not part of a government-mandated population exchange. On the contrary, the Jews emigrated to Israel of their own free will.

attention either from the perspective of policy-making or of social science, as shown by the paucity of studies on the subject. Even in terms of official documentation on the scope of migration from Turkey to Israel, the more concrete and reliable data come from Israeli sources, which can be interpreted as a natural consequence of Israel being founded by waves of immigration from all over the world.[3] On the Turkish side, as a sending country, there is a scarcity of official documentation of Jewish emigration.

The current study, drawing upon the existing literature on Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel, deals mainly with the triangle of international migration, Israel and Turkey with an in-depth perspective on citizenship. It centers on the quandaries posed to citizenship in both Turkey and in Israel through the case of migration from Turkey to Israel. Such a framework is built through employing a historical account of this migration to Israel and hence respective transformations in citizenship in both countries.[4] A historical analysis of the nexus between international migration and citizenship in the case of Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel necessitates drawing a distinction between the 1948-51 mass migration that occurred immediately after Israel's establishment and subsequent migrations, which were smaller in both scope and number but continue even today. Therefore migration from Turkey to Israel is examined in-

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[3] The data on international migration is posted regularly on the official website of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics at http://www.cbs.gov.il.

[4] The discussion on citizenship in Israel omits the citizenship of the minorities in Israel or the population problems of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and focuses only on the subject of the dissertation which is Jewish immigration to Israel.

depth in two periods: (1) the mass migration of 1948-51 and (2) subsequent migrations up through today.

The task of historicizing migration from Turkey to Israel with a focus on citizenship is undertaken within this chapter in four parts. In the *first* part, a brief historical overview of Israel as a nation of immigrants founded in Palestine is presented. Due to the religious and ideological importance attributed to Israel by the Jews, historically, Israel, as a destination country, has attracted numerous migration flows from all over the world. Therefore, the history of Israel is presented in light of the historical roots of immigration. In order to pinpoint the specificity of Jewish migration to Israel from Turkey, a rough outline of the migration waves directed to Israel and the transitions within and between these waves are presented. Furthermore, Israeli laws regulating immigration and citizenship are covered in this part.

In the *second* part of the chapter, background information is presented on Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. This part discusses Jewish emigration before 1948 in two periods. During the period of the Ottoman Empire, as there was Jewish emigration to a number of countries, the specificity of the migration to Palestine as an Ottoman province and as part of internal migration is discussed briefly. The period after Turkey's establishment in 1923 until the foundation of Israel in 1948 is marked by a nation-building process in Turkey at the national level and by the rise of Nazism and anti-Semitism in Europe at the international level. Therefore, Jewish migration to Palestine from Turkey in the period of 1923-48 is presented in light of the changing global and national context. The impact of World War II on

international migration flows in general and on Turkey in particular is also clarified in this section by treating the migration of Jewish refugees to Turkey and transit migration to Palestine through Turkey.

In the *third* part of the chapter, Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel after 1948 up until today is discussed. As stated above, the mass migration of 1948-51 is different in both size and character from subsequent migrations to Israel, and the third part of the chapter depicts Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel in two separate periods. The wave of 1948-51 is explored with a general description of the actors, factors and conditions involved. Furthermore, the consequences of this mass migration on the Jewish community in Turkey left behind are discussed. The ensuing migrations from Turkey to Israel since 1951 through today demonstrate differences not only from the mass migration of 1948-51 but also amongst themselves. Therefore, the post-1951 period is discussed by considering these inner differences which illustrate themselves as specific migrations in the late 1960s and late '70s. After 1980, since migration from Turkey to Israel fell even as return migration from Israel to Turkey showed a relative increase compared to previous return rates, return migration is also discussed in this part. The third part of the chapter ends with a general evaluation of the current situation of the Turkish Jews in Israel in terms of group and organizational ties, demographic character and socio-economic status.

In the *fourth* part of the chapter, the question of how Turkey and Israel dealt with the immigration of Jews from Turkey to Israel takes the focus. Herein are summarized the legislative changes and administrative measures taken by Turkey and Israel on such issues as citizenship, nationality, military conscription,

inheritance, immigration and visa regimes that affected the status of Israeli migrants from Turkey. Furthermore, Israel's reception policies towards the migration of Turkish Jews are treated. Last but not least, Israeli-Turkish relations and their influence on Jewish émigrés from Turkey, especially after the mid 1980s, are also treated very briefly.

3.2 Immigration to Israel: Historical Roots and Transitions

As stated in Israel's 1948 Declaration of Independence by its first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Israel is the state of the Jews. Under the Law of Return, all the Jews of the world were granted the right to immigrate to and settle in Israel. The significance of "returning to the homeland" and the state of the Jews is rooted in their religious and political history dating back even from ancient times.

The Jews have a history spanning more than 2,000 years.[5] The stories told in Genesis, the first book of the holy Jewish Pentateuch, say that the first families to be called Hebrew (children of the ancestor *Eber* or people coming from *eber*, beyond the river) lived near Babylonia in the ancient Near East. King Abraham moved the Hebrew tribe to *Canaan*, the Promised Land, and then his grandson Jacob moved it to Egypt. The Hebrews suffered under slavery in Egypt, but sustained their hope of returning to the Promised Land. The Prophet Moses led the

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[5] This summary of the ancient history of the Jews is compiled from Patai (1970).

Hebrews out of servitude in Egypt, and this exodus symbolized the birth of the Jewish nation. After wandering in the desert for 40 years, Moses received the Jewish Law at Mt. Sinai. The Jews lived in Canaan for nearly six centuries, first under the helm of local leaders called the judges, then under the rule of kings. The Temple was built by King Solomon in Jerusalem. Canaan was divided into two kingdoms, the Kingdom of Judah in the south and the Kingdom of Israel in the north. In 721 B.C., Israel was conquered by the Assyrians. In 586 B.C. Judea was captured by the Babylonians, the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem was destroyed, and the Jews were exiled. Only a minor part of the Jewish people remained in the Land of Israel or Palestine, meaning land of the Philistines (a non-Semitic tribe) as it was called by the Romans. However, the Jews maintained their belief that the Land of Israel (*Eretz Israel*) belonged to them, and so some of them returned after the conquest of Palestine by the Persians with the permission of King Cyrus and rebuilt Jerusalem and its religious center, the Temple. However, the Romans captured Jerusalem in 70 B.C. and Emperor Titus destroyed the Temple and dispersed the Jews, an incident referred to in Hebrew as *galut* (the exile). Only a very small number of Jews remained in or returned to Jerusalem after this dispersion. Over the centuries, the rule of Palestine passed from the Romans, to the Byzantines, to the Arabs, to the Ottomans and finally, in the early 20th century, to the British.

But after the Jews were expelled from Palestine in 70 B.C., they went on to form various Diaspora communities in places as wide-ranging as Central and Western Europe, North Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and even the Middle East itself. From the 11th century A.D., the

Jews of France and Germany were designated Ashkenazim in Hebrew writings as distinguished from the Sephardim, the Jews who lived on the Iberian Peninsula. Though the Jews lived in diverse societies and sometimes became assimilated in their adopted cultures, Zion, the name given to the religious heart of Jerusalem, maintained its religious significance among world Jewry and was often symbolized as the desire to return to *Eretz Israel*. In the late 19th century, the doctrine of Zionism carried this religious significance attributed to Israel to a political level.

The emergence of modern Zionism is closely related to the wave of nationalism in the 19th century, as it provoked Jewish nationalism among the Jews in eastern and central Europe as well as anti-Semitic violence against these same Jews. For instance, the Russian pogroms of 1881 not only spurred the Jews to emigrate abroad but also led to Russia's first Zionist association, *Hovevei Zion* (Lovers of Zion) by name. Some of the young idealists in Hovevei Zion launched the *Bilium Movement* and in 1882 manifested the first Zionist declaration of a Jewish homeland in Palestine followed by a wave of emigration from Russia.

There were only four cities in Palestine that had organized Jewish communities – Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safed and Hebron – until 1882, when Jewish settlement in Palestine began to be invigorated by waves of immigration. Between 1882 and 1947, there were five waves of immigration that together made up the *Yishuv* (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66).[6] In the *first aliya* of 1882-1903, around 25,000

[6] Yishuv is the name given to the Jewish community in Palestine prior to independence.

Jews moved to Palestine from Romania and Russia (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66).[7] That wave was sparked by a series of pogroms in Russia in 1881 and grew out of Hovevei Zion, Russia's Zionist movement.

Hovevei Zion failed to find as many followers among Russian Jewry as did the movement started by Theodor Herzl. Influenced by the Dreyfus Affair,[8] Austrian journalist Herzl published *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) in 1896 proposing a nation of the Jews living in a homeland in Palestine. In 1897, the First Zionist Congress was convened in Basel, Switzerland with representatives from each Zionist community. The Zionist organization was formed under Herzl's leadership, but the congress did not insist on a "Jewish state" but rather "a home in Palestine secured by public law' with a "Zionist Program." The Second Zionist Congress was held in 1898 during which the Jewish Colonial Trust was established to fund a Jewish homeland. Towards this end, Herzl had visited Istanbul two years earlier, in 1896, and offered to Sultan Abdulhamid II that the trust would cover Ottoman debts, which were putting a huge drain on the economy, in return for lands for the Jews in Palestine. Abdulhamid II rejected this offer, but fearing that the Ottoman Empire would share the fate of Egypt, which was occupied by Britain de facto after having failed to honor its national debts, he

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[7] Aliya is a very common Hebrew term that means ascendancy. It refers to the immigration of Jews into Israel.

[8] Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish soldier in the French Army who in 1894 was dismissed on accusations of espionage on behalf of Germany. His Jewishness served to legitimize the accusations against him in the eyes of the French public and provoked rising anti-Semitism . Although in the end he was cleared of all charges, the Dreyfus Affair dashed the hopes of many Jews worldwide that assimilation was a solution to the "Jewish question." The idea for a homeland of the Jewish nation gained weight.

agreed to meet Herzl again in 1901 (Öke, 1982: 330). However, since the two men were unable to agree on plans for debt consolidation and colonization, Abdulhamid II rejected the idea of charter for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He thought that this charter would turn into a rejection of Ottoman municipal law as well as pressure for international recognition under the law of nations. Furthermore, the sultan feared that the immigration and settlement of Jews in Palestine would lead to the emergence of a Jewish question in the Ottoman Empire, something considered dangerous at a time when there were already other nationality problems such as the Armenians. Zionism was viewed suspiciously as another vehicle for further European influence in the Ottoman Empire (Öke, 1982: 331-33). In order to restrict immigration and settlement of foreign Jews to Palestine, various measures were taken at different times, such as prohibiting all foreign Jews from visiting Palestine (with the exception of pilgrims), requesting a cash deposit for visas to Palestine so as to guarantee departure, controlling residence permits with red tickets, the deportation of Jews without documents, and forbidding land sales to Jews (Öke, 1982: 335-36).

However, none of these measures was able to prevent the waves of immigration directed to Palestine and the establishment of Jewish colonies there. In the *second aliya* of 1904-14, 40,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). These immigrants were mainly members of Russian Zionist labor groups who had grown disappointed with the social reform movement there. They launched new forms of settlements known as the moshav

and kibbutz.[9] Urban development also began as the foundations were laid for the all-Jewish town (and future capital) of Tel-Aviv. During this period, the World Zionist Organization started to work in Palestine (1908).

The great powers, making use of the capitulation concessions granted to them by the Ottoman Empire, became promoters of Jewish colonization in Palestine. During World War I, British policy became gradually committed to the idea of establishing a Jewish home in Palestine. After discussions in the British Cabinet and consultation with Zionist leaders, the decision was made known in 1917 in the form of a letter by Arthur James Lord Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lord Edmund Rothschild, the head of the Zionist Federation. The Balfour Declaration was met with great enthusiasm in the Jewish world. After the war, Palestine became a mandate of Britain and was also recognized by the League of Nations in 1922, and larger waves of legal and illegal immigration followed. In the *third aliya* of 1919-23, some 35,000 Jews mainly from European countries moved to Palestine under its British mandate (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). This wave of immigration began after the Balfour Declaration, which was recognized as a major step towards the realization of the Zionist ideal by the Jewish world. This group of immigrants consisted largely of young people who had been trained through *Halutz* (pioneer) organizations prior to their departure

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[9] The moshav (plural moshavim) and kibbutz (plural kibbutzim) are collective forms of rural settlement in which land is owned by the Jewish National Fund. On a moshav, the land is divided among its inhabitants equally, on which production and consumption are done privately. On a kibbutz, however, production and consumption are collective and the guiding principles are "contributing according to one's own ability" and "consuming according to one's needs."

for Palestine. They were ready to do any work required of them, so they moved to moshavim and kibbutzim.

On the other hand, the Arabs in Palestine were at odds with the intentions of the British mandate rule. Although Britain tried to delimit Jewish immigration from time to time in response to rising Arab nationalism and concomitant protests, it could not head off the Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine that has persisted up to this day. In the 1920s, violent conflicts arose between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews in Palestine. Both sides of the dispute formed a number of groups, associations and organizations, the most prominent Jewish ones being the *Jewish Agency* and the *Haganah* armed group. In the meantime, the *fourth aliya* took place in 1924-31. In this wave, 85,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine from Eastern Europe (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). This aliya was spurred by improved economic conditions in Palestine enabling the absorption of further immigrants. In addition, the Polish Jewry's worsening economic situation stemming from Warsaw's policy of excluding Jews from the major economic sectors helped motivate the migrants. Most of the migrants in this aliya were middle-class. They mainly settled in towns and went into commerce or industry or else became artisans.

Britain tried to resolve the Palestinian-Jewish conflict by the *Passfield White Book* in 1930, the Peel Commission Report in 1937 and the MacDonald White Book in 1939, all of which proved futile. Such conflicts continued during World War II as refugee migration from Europe accelerated. In the *fifth aliya* of 1932-47, 270,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine, mainly due to the rise and spread of Nazism in Germany and Eastern Europe (Eisenstadt, 1992: 165-66). The immigrants brought with them large amounts of capital which served large-scale

development of the as yet unincorporated country's economy, agriculture and commerce and boosted population growth in urban areas. As a result of these waves of immigration to Palestine, the Jewish population and hence the number of Jewish settlements, both rural and urban, rose. By 1945, there were 27 Jewish towns, 98 moshavim and 115 kibbutzim, with a total population of 588,400 Jews (Lipshitz: 1998: 39).

Towards the end of World War II, the United States of America began to get involved in the conflict, and several suggestions were prepared by Anglo-American commissions on the status of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. None of the suggestions provided resolution, however, and so Britain decided to bring the conflict over Palestine to the United Nations. In 1947, the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine was formed. A UN resolution of November 29, 1947 decided on partition of the territory and the establishment within it of two states – one Jewish and one Arab.[10] Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948 as the state of the Jews and opened its gates to unrestricted Jewish immigration. The first Arab-Israel War broke out immediately thereafter, eventually ending with victory for the Jews. After its cease-fire agreements with the neighboring Arab countries and recognition from many states, Israel was accepted into the United Nations in 1949, thus becoming a full-fledged member of the international community.[11]

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[10] The decision was voted on and passed by the UN General Assembly. Earlier, Turkey voted "no" on the decision to partition the land.

[11] Turkey recognized Israel officially in 1949.

As seen in the discussions by Rouhana, there are three pillars of state ideology in Israel which together form the basic structure of the state (Rouhana, 1997: 28-43). The *first* pillar is that Israel is a Jewish state. Israel's raison d'être is that it is a Jewish state, which in turn represents the essence of the state's identity, guides its relations with Jewish communities in other countries, and steers its policies toward its non-Jewish minorities. Israel views itself as the guardian of all the Jewish people, including the Jewish Diaspora. Although Israel is in practice a state of both Jews and non-Jewish citizens (i.e. Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, non-Arab Christians, Druze, Circassian, Bahais and Bedouins within its borders), the dominant culture is determined by its Jewish majority, as the laws governing cultural, educational and memorial institutions give statutory recognition to cultural and educational institutions and define their aims in strictly Jewish terms. The *second* pillar of the state ideology is that Israel is a democracy. Democracy is a fundamental component of Israel's political system and national self-concept. Israel's democracy emphasizes the procedural component by focusing on aspects of representational politics such as a multi-party system and free and fair elections. The *third* pillar is that Israel is a state with profound security concerns. Security is a central and predominant concern for the Israeli state and its Jewish public, and as an ethos has acquired supremacy owing to the threats, fears and anxieties on all levels shared by the Jewish public. The reason for its preoccupation with security is that Israel has been involved in many wars since its establishment, more than any country since World War II. The current Palestinian

Intifada against the Israelis plays an important role in the dominance of security concerns as well (Rouhana, 1997: 28-43).[12]

Israel's laws governing immigration and citizenship rest primarily on the pillars of the state ideology outlined above. The immigration to Israel of Jews from all over the world was not only accepted but actively promoted by Israel. Therefore, its immigration laws reflected the priority given to Jews in reception and naturalization policies. The acquisition of Israeli nationality was covered by its Nationality Law passed in 1952.[13] Under the law, Israeli citizenship can be acquired by birth, residence, naturalization, or the Law of Return. Through birth, people born in Israel to at least one parent who is an Israeli citizen are granted Israeli nationality. Through residence, certain provisions are included in the law specifying the terms and length of residence required to gain Israeli citizenship. For instance, according to a special provision in the Nationality Law for former citizens of British Mandatory Palestine, those who remained in Israel from the 1948 founding of the state until the 1952 passage of the Nationality Law became Israeli citizens by residence. For the acquisition of nationality by naturalization, certain conditions are set forth, including a knowledge of Hebrew (former Palestinian citizens are exempt from this provision), the renouncement of prior

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[12] To date Israel has fought in six wars: its War of Independence (1947-49), the Suez War (1956), the Six-Day War (1967), the War of Attrition (1970-71), the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the Lebanon War (1982-83).

[13] This Nationality Law – a quite long text – is available in full at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.il. It was amended in 1968, 1971 and 1980 with additional articles.

nationality and taking an oath of loyalty to the state of Israel. Israel often allows its citizens to get dual citizenship in other countries.

Citizenship for non-Jewish foreigners is regulated by the Law of Entry to Israel, and this law does not permit dual citizenship. The conditions of birth, residence and naturalization relate to persons born in Israel or resident therein, as well as to those wishing to settle in the country, regardless of race, religion, creed, sex or political belief. However, the Law of Return relate only to the Jews. Jewish persons, citizens of any country in the world, become Israeli citizens according to the Law of Return, which does permit dual citizenship.

The Law of Return, which is a condition of acquisition of Israeli citizenship, is the basic work of legislation regulating Jewish immigration to Israel. Law of Return 5710-1950 was enacted on July 5, 1950.[14] Under the law, all Jews, wherever they may be, are granted the right to come to Israel as *olim* (immigrants) and become Israeli citizens.[15] Israeli citizenship becomes effective upon an *oleh*'s arrival in the country or upon receipt of an oleh's certificate, whichever is later, but within the first three months the immigrant may declare that s/he does not wish to become a citizen. The status of oleh may be denied to

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[14] Law of Return 5710-1950 was passed by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) on July 5, 1950 and published the same day in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 51, p. 159.

[15] Oleh (plural olim) is a Hebrew word meaning a Jew immigrating into Israel.

persons deemed to have engaged in activity directed against the Jewish people or to constitute a danger to the public health or security of the state.[16]

In 1954 Law of Return 5710-1950 was modified with Amendment 5714-1954, under which the Ministry of Immigration was replaced by the Ministry of the Interior as the institution in charge of implementing the law.[17] The amendment further specified that the oleh visa would be granted to every Jew wanting to settle in Israel unless the Minister of the Interior determined that the applicant was a person with a criminal past likely to endanger public welfare. This amendment aimed at discouraging criminals from trying to escape domestic law in their home countries by immigrating to Israel.

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[16] The full text of Law of Return 5710-1950 is presented on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.il) as follows:
Article 1: Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.
Article 2: (a) Aliyah [immigration to Israel] shall be by oleh's visa.
(b) An oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, unless the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant
(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or
(2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.
Article 3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival has expressed his desire to settle in Israel may, while in Israel, receive an oleh's certificate.
(b) The restrictions specified in section 2(b) shall apply also to the grant of an oleh's certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as endangering public health on account of an illness contracted after his arrival in Israel.
Article 4: Every Jew who has immigrated into this country before the coming into force of this Law, and every Jew who was born in this country, whether before or after the coming into force of this Law, shall be deemed to be a person who has come to this country as an oleh under this Law.
Article 5: The Ministry of Immigration is charged with the implementation of this Law and make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation and also as to the grant of oleh's visas and oleh's certificates to minors up to the age of 18 years.

[17] The Law of Return (Amendment 5714-1954) was passed by the Knesset on August 23, 1954 and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 163 dated September 1, 1954, p. 88.

In 1970 Law of Return 5710-1950 was modified once again, with Amendment No. 2, 5730-1970.[18] This amendment specified who was considered as a Jew and therefore entitled to the rights of an oleh.[19] Under the law, "Jew" means a person born of a Jewish mother or someone who has converted to Judaism and does not belong to any religion.[20] The law prescribes that the rights of an oleh are also vested in the children and grandchildren of Jews, the spouses of Jews, and the spouses of children and grandchildren of Jews, excepting formerly Jewish individuals who have voluntarily changed their religion. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure the unity of families where intermarriage had occurred. The legal definition of "Jew" specified in the 1970 amendment was also referred to in an amendment to the 1965 Population Registry Law 5725-1965 included in the same legislative package as its Law of Return counterpart.[21]

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[18] The Law of Return (Amendment 5730-1970) was passed by the Knesset on March 10, 1970 and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 586 dated March 19, 1970, p. 36.

[19] The full text of the amendments made in 1970 is available on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.il). The major sections added to Article 4 of the Law of Return 1950 are as follows:
Article 4A. (a) The rights of a Jew under this Law and the rights of an oleh under the Nationality Law 5712-1952, as well as the rights of an oleh under any other enactment, are also vested in a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion.
Article 4B. For the purposes of this Law, "Jew" means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.

[20] We should note that Judaism accepts matrilineal affiliation in religion. In order to be considered a Jew, the person should have a Jewish mother, and religion passes from the mother alone.

[21] On the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.il), the section added to Article 3 of the Population Registration Law is as follows:

The establishment of Israel as a Jewish state and the priority given to Jews in Israel's immigration regulations led to mass Jewish immigration from countries all over the world. This immigration did not rise gradually over time but rather was characterized by waves of both rates of immigration and their varied sources. To date there have been four waves of immigration since independence (Goldscheider, 1996: 49-52). The *first* immigration wave occurred between 1948 and 1951 known as the great wave. In these years marked by war and the transition to national independence, a high volume and rate of Jewish immigration from diverse countries of origin arrived in the new state of Israel. The number of immigrants who in 1948 arrived in Israel in this wave was 101,828 (after the establishment of the state on May 14), 239,954 in 1949, 170,563 in 1950, and 175,279 in 1951, for a grand total of 687,624 (State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). In the course of the four years just after independence, the bulk of Jewish immigration came from Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and North Africa, and was composed mainly of Oriental and Sephardic Jews who changed the ethnic composition of the Yishuv, which up to then had been predominated by the Ashkenazim (Patai, 1970: 70, 74).[22] From Yemen and North Africa, large

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Article 3A. (a) A person shall not be registered as a Jew by ethnic affiliation or religion if a notification under this Law or another entry in the Registry or a public document indicates that he is not a Jew, so long as the said notification, entry or document has not been converted to the satisfaction of the Chief Registration Officer or so long as declaratory judgment of a competent court or tribunal has not otherwise determined.
(b) For the purposes of this Law and of any registration or document thereunder, "Jew" has the same meaning as in section 4B of the Law of Return, 5710-1950.

[22] Oriental Jews are those who have lived in Middle Eastern or North African countries (i.e. Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Morocco and Yemen), Sephardic Jews are those ultimately originating from Spain (i.e. proximally from Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Italy), and Ashkenazic Jews come from Central and Eastern European countries (Austria, Germany, Romania, Hungary, Russia and Poland).

numbers arrived not only due to their religio-nationalistic enthusiasm, but also as part of forced migration due to the political pressures that Arab countries put on their Jewish citizens. The mass immigration of 1948-51 established some of the basic elements of modern Israeli society, expanding major social, political, economic and cultural institutions and forging the development and extension of the welfare entitlement system (Goldscheider, 1996: 50).

The *second* wave of immigration to Israel had its start in the mid-1950s. In 1955-57, a total of 166,492 immigrants arrived in Israel (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). They came mainly from North African countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Immigration continued slowly after 1957, but picked up again in the early 1960s. In 1958-60, a total of 75,970 immigrants arrived in Israel, and 1961-64 saw an additional 228,793 (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The occupational skills and educational backgrounds of these immigrants differed significantly from the earlier European-origin streams. Accordingly, this period saw Israel impose immigration regulations to curb the negative impact of large-scale immigration (Goldscheider, 1996: 50). From the 1950s on, different immigrant groups – predominantly those from Europe – began to form immigrant associations (Eisenstadt, 1985: 319).

The *third* major immigration wave began after the 1967 Six-Day war, mostly from Eastern Europe and Western countries, mainly the United States. The 1969-71 period saw a total of 116,791 immigrants arrive in Israel, followed by 267,580 in 1972-79, and 153,833 in 1980-89 (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors led not only to this immigration wave but also to a growth in financial and political support to

Israel from Jewish communities worldwide. The immigrants arrived amidst a period of economic growth and geographic expansion which was also characterized by a new national and military self-confidence. Higher standards of immigrant integration within Israeli society also emerged during this period. Housing, jobs and provisions for university-level education for the children of immigrants were given special focus in the absorption policies. These subsidies offered to the new immigrants were higher than the subsidies (i.e. elementary health care and minimum living accommodations) offered to previous immigrant waves. Therefore, some immigrants of the previous waves and their Israeli-born children remained disadvantaged (Goldscheider, 1996: 51). Restrictions on the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and the option of alternative destinations, especially the United States, delayed the flow of Russian immigrants to Israel until 1990.

The *fourth* major immigration wave began in 1989 and has continued up to this day. This wave is composed mainly of Jews emigrating from countries of the former Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and restrictions on immigration to the United States directed Jews from former Soviet republics to Israel. From 1990 to 2001, the number of immigrants coming to Israel reached a total of 882,600 (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). This wave is different from the previous ones in that a significant proportion of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union were non-Jews, primarily Christians. Since the 1970 amendment to the Law of Return allowed the immigration of Jews' relatives to Israel, 218,000 of the immigrants were non-Jewish over the same 1990-2001

period in comparison to 664,600 Jewish immigrants (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003).

Although Zionism is certainly a factor in immigration to Israel, ideological shifts cannot account for the changes over time in rates and sources of immigration. Similar to other examples of international migration after the 1960s, economic factors have started to play a significant role in voluntary immigration to Israel. Furthermore, changes in the political conditions of Jews in countries outside Israel and the options available for migration to alternate destinations have shaped the fluctuating rates of migration to Israel and the changes in the country of origin (Goldscheider, 1996: 53).

Just as immigration to Israel (*aliya*) occurred, there has also been emigration out of the country (*yerida*).[23] There were 340,000 emigrants from Israel to other countries from 1948 to 1979, reflecting an average annual emigration rate of 4.6 residents per 1,000. Although emigration from Israel is a less-studied subject than immigration into the country, it has been suggested that emigration is much more voluntary and individual in character than immigration to Israel. It is conjectured that young adults, single males and immigrants from Western countries have higher rates of emigration out of Israel. Return migration to places of origin is more likely among immigrants to Israel from Western Europe and the United States. Emigration rates are also higher among those who moved voluntarily to Israel. Family, social and economic networks between

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[23] In Hebrew, aliya, the term used for immigration to Israel, literally means "going up,"' while Yerida, the name given to emigration out of Israel, means "going down." As these meanings show, yerida denotes an undesirable or pejorative condition.

Israelis living in Israel and in other countries are some other factors lying behind emigration (Goldscheider, 1996: 58). Economic expectations rather than economic conditions per se also have a strong effect on emigration.

Immigration to Israel has over time led to an enormous increase in the country's Jewish population. The total number of immigrants from the founding of the state until 2001 is 2.89 million. The Jewish population during the Declaration of Independence was 717,000. By 2002 the total population of Israel, both Jewish and non-Jewish, had reached over 6 million. The Jewish population of Israel is over 5 million. Jews in Israel constitute fully 40 percent of all world Jewry, whose population is currently estimated at around 13 million. As of 2002, the number of Israeli-born Jews had surpassed the number of immigrants.[24] Hence, Israeli-born Jews with their population of 3.27 million make up nearly 65% of the total Jewish population of Israel.[25]

After this brief history of Israel as a country of immigration, the next section considers how Jews from the Ottoman Empire and Turkey became integrated into other streams of immigration from all over the world to Palestine/Israel.

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[24] Israeli-born Jews or those reared in Israel are generally referred to as the Sabra, after the cactus fruit sabra which is prickly on the outside and sweet on the inside. The Sabra symbolizes emancipated Jews who enjoy self-confidence free from the insecurities of the Diaspora communities and are considered to be ready for the ultimate stand and the most heroic self-sacrifice. These new generations were the first Jewish children brought up in only a single culture (Patai, 1970: 179-80).

[25] These figures are derived from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2002 No. 53, posted in 2003 on the website http://www.cbs.gov.il.

3.3 Jewish Emigration from Turkey to Palestine

Jewish emigration from Turkey is not a purely modern phenomenon, since it dates back to imperial times, as some Ottoman Jews migrated to Palestine when the region was still under Ottoman rule. Nor was Palestine the only destination for Ottoman Jews, as some chose to emigrate to other regions. For instance, when Jews who had been expelled from Spain and Portugal were received into Ottoman lands in the early 16th century, not all of them chose to stay, with some electing to emigrate further to Europe, Egypt, and even as far as Latin America. Continuing the long and rich Jewish heritage of immigration, some Ottoman Jews emigrated to the Congo, Rhodesia, South Africa, the US, France, Italy, Spain, Morocco, Belgium, Cuba, Mexico or Argentina (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 380). The reasons for this emigration were economic or social in nature, as Jews struggling with severe economic conditions chose to start a new life either individually or with their families in foreign countries (Weiker, 1988: 19). Since Spanish was linguistically close to Ladino, some of the Sephardic Jews in the Ottoman Empire chose Latin American countries where Spanish predominated. Wartime situations, i.e. the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, also led the Jews to emigrate to foreign countries. After universal conscription was made compulsory for non-Muslims in 1909, some young Jewish men seeking to avoid conscription and war emigrated from the Ottoman Empire to Latin American countries as well as Egypt and France (Gülsoy, 2000; Nahum, 2000: 81, 239).

Jewish migration from various towns of the Ottoman Empire to Palestine differs from the emigration paths of Jews in the Ottoman Empire to other

countries. *First,* Palestine remained under the control of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I; therefore, migration to Palestine from other regions under Ottoman rule can be considered an example of internal migration, in contrast to examples of international immigration such as immigration to Latin American or European countries. *Second,* the migration of the Ottoman Jews to Palestine was not merely due to economic conditions but also to religious or Zionist goals (Weiker, 1988: 19). Some aging Jews who wanted to die in the holy lands of Palestine moved there for religious reasons.[26] Others influenced by Zionism migrated in order to contribute to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.[27] *Third,* this internal migration to Palestine was occasionally put under strict controls by the Ottoman state. Jewish immigration to Palestine, both from Ottoman territory and other parts of the world, was generally considered an issue of international politics and relations, and was therefore subject to limitations set by the Ottoman government, with the exception of the 1882 visit of pilgrims to Palestine. However, these immigration restrictions, either of Ottoman subjects or foreign Jews, proved ineffective, and so the immigration continued until the collapse of the empire at the end of World War I. There are no exact figures available on the migration of Ottoman Jews to Palestine, but it is estimated that

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[26] According to Jewish theology, during the apocalypse the messiah would gather all the people together in Palestine. Those living far away would come there under miserable conditions, so settlement in Palestine was thought to be a means of liberation from that threat.

[27] The spread of Zionism among Ottoman Jews took place especially after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, later than its spread among Ashkenazic Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. This was due to the religious tolerance granted Jews under the Ottoman Millet system (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 299).

larger numbers made their way there after the foundation of Turkey (Weiker, 1988: 19).

The invasion of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence in 1919 generated a push on emigration of non-Muslims to foreign countries which continued after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Similarly, many Jews emigrated abroad in groups due to economic, social and political factors, i.e. to France, Italy, Greece, the US, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, or Palestine (Bali, 2000: 48; Franz, 1994: 329; Nahum, 2000: 206).[28]

The basic difference between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic with respect to Jewish immigration/emigration seems to lie in which countries received and which sent the migrants. The Ottoman Empire had mainly been a receiving country for Jews all around the world. Although there has always been emigration of Jews as discussed above, the large numbers of Jewish immigrants received can be considered incomparable to the small scope of Jewish emigration. The empire's liberal reception policies towards Jews as well as its religious tolerance towards non-Muslims made the country a choice destination for Jewish immigrants from Europe and Russia where Jews frequently suffered under severe ethno-religious oppression. In contrast, however, Turkey was

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[28] The migration flows to these countries fluctuated over time as a reflection of the intensity of the factors spurring them (Bali, 2000, 2003; Levi, 1998; Nahum, 2000; Weiker, 1988). As will be discussed in later sections, the following factors lay behind Jewish emigration from Turkey: a failure to adapt to the ideas of the new nation-state; the 1924 purging of non-Muslims from state offices; Turkish statist economic policies which blocked adequate welfare opportunities; the aftermath of the 1960 and 1971 military interventions; and various incidents against non-Muslim minorities such as the 1934 Thracian Incidents and the September 6-7 Events of 1955.

predominantly a sending country with respect to its Jewish population.[29] Over time the number of the Jews in Turkey dwindled, leaving only some 20,000-25,000 Jews in 2003 from an estimated 1927 census figure of 81,400 (Dündar, 2000: 154; Karimova and Deverell, 2001). Emigration was the major reason for this decline. To this day, Turkey can still be considered a sending country of Jews, as its Jewish community continues to shrink due to emigration.

Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine from 1923 to 1948 – that is, from the foundation of the Turkish Republic until the foundation of Israel – can be analyzed at both the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, Turkey's nation-building process urged that the status of non-Muslims (and hence Jews) who were long used to live under the Millet system be changed to a minority regime the essentials of which were set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. In attempts to generate this "from above," the Turkish nation entailed certain social, economic and cultural reforms (Kadıoğlu, 1998). In this process, education was unified under a national administrative unit, Turkish was promoted as the national tongue, population exchanges were done between non-Muslims in Anatolia and Muslims in the Balkans, and the emergence of a national bourgeoisie and entrepreneur class was supported. All these reforms aimed at homogenization, which put pressure on minority groups to adapt themselves to the new reforms

[29] During World War II, Turkey did receive a small number of Jews fleeing the Nazis. Turkey's role was more that of a limited transit country site for Jews en route from Europe to Palestine.

and policies. Hence, emigration from Turkey to Palestine in 1923-48 had domestic dynamics that were shaped by Turkey's own nation-building process.[30]

At the international level, the rise of anti-Semitism and the Nazi Party in Germany in the 1920s led to gravely tragic consequences for European Jews and worldwide Jewry alike. The Nazis' 1933 rise to power in Germany brought with it a systematic anti-Semitism armed with militaristic and fascist weapons. Before and during World War II, Jews living in countries invaded by the Nazis were forced to flee to escape, at best, harsh oppression or, at worst, the methodical slaughter seen in the concentration camps and elsewhere. Around 6 million Jews were systematically killed in the genocide known as the Holocaust (or the Shoah in Hebrew). This wave of Nazism also spread to other countries which were never actually occupied by Germany. Either as part of the policy of appeasement or under the spread of extreme nationalism that took racist forms, rising anti-Semitism was seen in many countries. All these worldwide developments reinforced the idea that a Jewish state established in Palestine was needed so Jews could have a place to live in a safe, liberal environment, free from anti-Semitism. Consequently, Jewish immigration to Palestine accelerated. On the Turkish side, Turkey served as a legal/illegal transit site for Jewish immigration to Palestine. However, the rise of Nazism in Europe influenced some nationalists in Turkey and so led to a rise in anti-Semitism in the 1930s and '40s. Accordingly, Jews in Turkey joined the global wave of Jewish emigration to Palestine. Therefore, the

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[30] This subject was previously covered in greater detail in the chapter on the history of Turkey's Jewish minority.

international context shaped by World War II and the rise of Nazism also affected Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine in the 1923-1948 period.

From 1923 up to the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, an estimated 7,308 Jews emigrated from Turkey to Palestine (Weiker, 1988: 19). Through the 1920s, the immigration of Jews remained small scale. In newspapers of the period, frequent pointed reference was made to the way some Greeks and Armenians sided with invasion forces and against Turkish forces during the War of Independence. Although for their part Turkey's Jews had not sided with the invaders, they were lumped in with other non-Muslims and therefore faced similar accusations. These accusations called on some of the Jews to emigrate to Palestine (Bali, 2000: 26, 47). In addition, some Jewish office-holders working at state-owned companies emigrated to Palestine after their positions were terminated (Nahum, 2000: 239).

A noteworthy rise was seen in Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine after the 1934 Thrace Incidents, which were discussed previously Chapter II. Anti-Semitic attacks on Jews in Europe and anti-Semitic publications in Turkey – especially in the Thrace region – were causing frustration among Turkish Jewry. After the Thrace Incidents beginning on July 3, 1934 in Kırklareli, Edirne and Çanakkale, some Jews who had faced attacks by civilian groups went on to emigrate to Palestine either directly or via Istanbul. It is estimated that 521 Jews left Turkey for Palestine in 1934, and another 1,445 emigrated the following year (Bali, 1999b: 43). Jewish emigration to Palestine after the Thrace Incidents was generally organized by *The Jewish Colonization Agency* and *The Palestine Aliya*

Anoar Organization, both of which had offices or representatives in Istanbul (Bali, 1999b: 43).

Developments on the international stage cast a long shadow over the years following 1934. The rise of Nazism provoked a wave of Jewish refugee emigration from Europe. The outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939 made international migration much more difficult for the Jews.[31] Refugee emigration from Europe before and during World War II affected Turkey in two respects. *First,* part of the resulting refugee wave was directed towards Turkey – naturally, as it shared borders with Europe and also pursued a foreign policy of neutrality. In 1933-45, some 800 German-speaking Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazis were received in Turkey (Yetkin, 1996: 250). Yet Turkey did not alter its immigration policy radically during World War II.[32] Turkey followed an immigration policy that prioritized the reception of Muslims from the Balkans and the Caucasus regions (Kirişçi, 2000: 3). Therefore, the reception of Jewish refugees fleeing en masse from Nazi persecution remained limited.[33] In addition to the general framework of immigration policy, Law on Professions and Services for Turkish Citizens No. 2007, passed in 1932, also restricted the immigration of Jews from

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[31] Although Germany annexed Austria in '38, most historians date the war to Sept. '39, when Britain and France declared war on Germany after it invaded Poland.

[32] It was only after Turkey signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Geneva Convention) in 1951 that it adopted a modern asylum policy. Accordingly, Turkey became obliged to accept refugees fleeing persecution in Europe (Kirişçi, 2002).

[33] It should be noted that the Turkish ambassadors to France's Vichy puppet government saved around 3,000 Jewish French citizens who were former Turkish citizens. They also provided forged Turkish citizenship documents to Jews who were in imminent danger of being sent to concentration camps (Shaw, 1992: 8).

Europe (Bali, 2000: 331; Levi, 1998: 99). The law imposed restrictions on non-Turkish citizens holding certain occupations and professions. Therefore, Jews subject to these restrictions were not granted refugee status in Turkey and their immigration was prohibited. Among the Jewish refugees received were intellectuals, scholars and artists who were recruited to lead Istanbul University's educational reform program (Bali, 2000: 331-32; Levi, 1998: 97-99). These professors established universities in Turkey in 1933-45 and furthered the nation's scientific advancement (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 370; Franz, 1994: 329).

The *second* aspect of the impact of the European refugee wave on Turkey was transit migration. Jewish refugees fleeing the Holocaust with Palestine as their destination used Turkey as a transit country en route. However, fearing that many would instead settle within its own borders, Turkey did not grant full refugee status to these immigrants (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 371; Kirişçi, 2000: 10).[34] Two domestic laws set Turkey's policy towards transit migration. The Law on Passports enacted in 1938 stated that individuals who wished to use Turkey as transit site to immigrate to other countries would not be allowed to enter its border without a visa from their destination country as well as sufficient money and means for the journey. Law on the Settlement and Travel of Foreigners No. 3529, also passed in 1938, stated that the deportation of non-Turkish citizens out of Turkey was possible with Council of Ministers decisions

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[34] Turkey's status as a safe transit site for Jewish migrants to Palestine dated back to the 1920s when Istanbul was used by Russian Jews on their way to the Holy Lands (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 291). Even after 1948, Turkey continued to serve as an unofficial temporary asylum and safe transit country for Jews en route to Israel (Frayman et al. 2000: 12). For instance, in 1979 Turkey allowed Jews fleeing Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran to enter and stay temporarily without a visa (Kirişçi, 2000: p: 10-11).

and that the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the deportation of immigrants with foreign citizenships (Bali, 2000: 333). Under the law, transit visas would be issued only to those with official entry visas and travel tickets to Palestine. The Turkish government cooperated with Britain in its efforts to stem illegal human traffic to Palestine and developed a policy that combined a willingness to make some concessions with a desire to remain in control of the refugee flow (Ofer, 1990: 162-63). On the one hand, Turkey provided assistance to European Jews by allowing Istanbul to be used by the Jewish Agency and other Jewish groups set up to assist and rescue East European Jews (Shaw, 1992: 6, 17).[35] Furthermore, it did not interfere with the local Jewish community's efforts to lend aid and support to Jewish refugees. On the other hand, the restrictions on refugees without the required documents sometimes led to disasters such as the 1942 Struma case (Gökay, 1993).[36] However, overall Turkish policy towards transit and/or illegal migration was in favor of Jewish refugees on their way to Palestine (Ofer, 1990: 164), as shown by how 37,000 European Jews used Turkey as a transit site to immigrate to Palestine from 1934 to 1944 (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 292).

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[35] Such Jewish organizations as Aliya, Betar, Sohnut, Ne'emanei Tsion and Hahalutz aided Jewish transit migration through Turkey during World War II (Bali, 2000: 405; Yetkin, 2002: 40).

[36] The incident known as the Struma case was named after the sinking of the ship Struma, which was carrying to Palestine Jewish refugees who had been expelled from Romania. The Struma was in poor condition and during its course through the Black Sea, it was forced to stop at Istanbul to make repairs. After these repairs, however, the Turkish authorities did not allow the vessel to remain docked because its passengers lacked the necessary immigration documents. Britain refused to provide the entry visas for Palestine, and the Struma went back into the Black Sea. Shortly afterwards, the vessel was struck by a missile and sank. The identity of the attackers remains unknown, but 768 immigrants drowned. There was only one survivor.

The Jews of Turkey, on the other hand, did not go to Palestine en masse as did their European counterparts but rather joined in the wave of immigration in small numbers. The emigration of Turkish Jews to Palestine from 1923 to 1948 was largely illegal and unsystematic. Visas for Palestine were strictly controlled by Britain, and priority was given to applicants from Central European and Balkan countries. Permits for Turkish Jews to immigrate to Palestine were given in very limited numbers by the British authorities. Since married couples were issued a single visa for the entire family, fake marriages were performed among Jews in Turkey in order to obtain this family visa. Apart from legal means of emigration, there were also illegal ways to get from Turkey into Palestine. Some Turkish Jews emigrated there using fake documents or without passports (Bali, 2000: 408).

The main factors behind the emigration of Turkish Jews to Palestine during World War II were the fear that the Nazis would also come to occupy Turkey, Zionist ideals such as helping the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and the Turkification process (Bali, 2000: 405-6).[37] The 1942 Capital Tax also served as a cause of this emigration (Bali, 2000: 406; Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 383; Dündar, 2000: 61; Levi, 1998: 158).[38] In 1943-44, around 4,000 Jews emigrated (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 383). Just after World War II, this emigration fell, but the decrease only continued until Israel declared

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[37] One source suggests that in 1946, only 1% of the Jews living in Istanbul were Zionists (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 292).

[38] The Capital Tax was previously discussed in Chapter II.

independence in 1948. From 1946 to 1948, it is estimated that only 121 Jews emigrated from Turkey to Palestine (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 392). The mass immigration seen after 1948, however, will be discussed in the following parts.

3.4 Jewish Emigration from Turkey to Israel

The establishment of Israel transformed the conventional Jewish movement from Turkey into a mass wave of emigration. Jews in Turkey greeted the establishment of an official state of the Jews with great enthusiasm. Since Turkey's single-party period had ended with the Democrat Party emerging as a strong opposition party which granted more freedom and relaxed some of the more rigorous aspects of secularism, the immediate mass emigration wave to Israel following its founding was mainly due to Israel's attraction (Weiker, 1988: 23).[39] Naturally, Turkish Jews immigrated to Israel not as part of an exchange of populations as had been the case with some Arab countries such as Iraq or Yemen. They were able to return to Turkey and therefore they maintained their ties there.

In the great wave of 1948-51, a total 34,547 Jews – making up nearly 40% of the Jewish community in Turkey at the time – emigrated from Turkey to Israel (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 386; Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003).[40]

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[39] However, it must also be noted that Jews emigrated to countries other than Israel as well. According to one estimate, between 1948-1973, around 20,000 Jews emigrated to countries like France, Austria and American continents (Liberles, 1984: 141).

From May 14, 1948 until that November, 4,362 Jews emigrated from Turkey to Israel (Weiker, 1988: 21). Turkey, having not recognized Israel immediately after its proclamation of statehood, suspended permits to emigrate there in November 1948, in response to objections from Arab countries. However, this restriction did not stop the emigration of Jews through illegal means. In particular young Jews seeking to avoid conscription in Turkey emigrated to Israel, sometimes using Italy or France as transit sites (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 384; Levi, 1998: 157). In 1949 Turkey officially recognized Israel and so cancelled all the travel and immigration restrictions. The Turkish state neither promoted nor obstructed immigration to Israel but after the suspension of permits to emigrate to Israel was lifted in March 1949, a breakneck rush ensued, with around 26,000 going in that year (Weiker, 1988: 21). Jews were able to emigrate to Israel directly from Turkey without having to use transit sites. This wave continued in 1950 with 2,491 emigrants and in 1951 with 1,388 (Weiker, 1988: 22). By early 1951, after even Jews who felt encumbered by business or family responsibilities in their desire to emigrate from Turkey to Israel ended up leaving, the mass migration was completed (Weiker, 1988: 21). After 1951, the emigration of Jews to Israel slowed down but has continued, though in lesser numbers, until today (Tekeli, 1990: 63).[41]

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[40] Israel received many waves of immigrants from various countries since its foundation. The wave of 1948-1951 is commonly known as the "Great Wave," a term used to differentiate the first wave to Israel from the consequent ones. In a similar vein, the migration from Turkey between 1948-1951 is called great wave.

[41] However, not all the Jews in this emigration wave stayed in Israel. In the mid 1950s, 10% of the total immigrants returned to Turkey. Some returnees later re-migrated from Turkey to other countries in Europe and North and South America (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 386).

In the great wave of 1948-51, a large majority of the emigrants came from the lower classes (Liberles, 1984: 142; Tekeli, 1990: 63). They were by and large involved in low-skill occupations with experience in crafts and industry, and they moved to Israel for access to better opportunities to elevate their economic status.[42] These lower classes were less influenced by alliance schools and the republic's modernizing trends. Furthermore, they were less upwardly mobile and more disadvantaged in terms of access to opportunities for economic betterment. Among this group of poor emigrants, there were also those forced under the Capital Tax to sell all their property, becoming lower class in the process (Levi, 1998: 158). In addition to the desire for better life opportunities, there was also the impact of religious beliefs. The lower-class emigrants had a strong Jewish identification deeply rooted in the traditional and religious institutions of the Jewish community. The messianic belief played a role in the emigration of lower-class Jews to Israel. Especially the elderly, notwithstanding illness or advanced years, emigrated to Israel in keeping with their belief in the promised land (Bali, 2003: 266). Still, economic factors were the dominant theme among lower-class emigrants in their motivation to move. Most of the lower-class emigrants did not speak Hebrew, nor had they any knowledge of the conditions they would face upon their arrival in Israel.

Another group of emigrants in the great wave of 1948-51 was that of young Jews. There were many subsets within this group, one being that of upper-

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[42] According to Walter Weiker, in 1935 the occupational breakdown of Jews in Turkey was as follows: 24% in trade, 20.5% in industry and artisanship, 4.4% in the service sector and 45.9% in unidentified occupations. This last group is argued to have had migrated to Israel after its establishment (Weiker, cited in Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 246).

middle and middle-class youth. Most of them had high school and university educations. They also had a strong sense of Jewish identity, but were more influenced by Zionism (Weiker, 1988: 17, 30). As stated above, Zionism was not a powerful mass ideology among Jews in Turkey, though during World War II some Jews, especially younger ones, came to find it attractive. The Turkish state did not believe that the ideology of Zionism posed a threat to its fundamental pillars (Bali, 2003: 352). At that time Zionist associations and groups were weak in terms of both numbers and organization (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 292). The most prominent Zionist organizations in Turkey were *Ne'emanei Tsion*, *Betar*, *Hahalutz* and *Irgun Tsinoi Be Kusta*. These organizations not only aided illegal migration to Israel from Turkey before 1949, when restrictions on migration were lifted, but also spread the ideology of Zionism to young Jews to recruit them to move to Israel and help establish a Jewish state. Apart from Zionist ideals, some of these young Jews, who were either university students or recent graduates of universities in Turkey, emigrated to Israel to pursue careers in public service. As members of Turkey's non-Muslim minority, they believed it would be impossible for them to find positions in civil service due to discrimination against non-Muslims in state recruitment policies. Thus they sought rather to try their chances at forging a public service career path in Israel. Another subset among emigrant youth was made up of young Jewish women. These women were mainly from lower-class families who were unable to pay *drahoma*[43] to Jewish grooms for marriage. So that their daughters could get

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[43] Drahoma is a Jewish custom. It is the dowry paid by the bride to the groom before marriage.

married to Jewish men in Israel without need for drahoma, such families supported their daughters' emigration to Israel (Bali, 2003: 266). Young males at or near the age of conscription made up another subset of this youth wave. These men wanted to avoid being drafted by the Turkish military. Turkey permitted emigration to Israel, and passports were easily obtainable. However, they were given to male citizens only upon proof that their legal military service had been fulfilled. Therefore, these young men emigrated to Israel through illegal means and without the use of Turkish passports (Bali, 2003: 190).

Migrants from Turkey to Israel in the great wave of 1948-51 were settled in various kibbutzim, moshavim, small villages or migrant camps. Some immigrants from Turkey were involved in establishing kibbutzim or moshavim, but their number was low compared to other immigrant communities (Weiker, 1988: 20-21).[44] The infrastructure conditions of these settlements were poor. There was a scarcity of food, drugs and energy. There was also a cultural divide between the immigrants from Turkey and other immigrant groups. Since most of the immigrants from Turkey did not speak Hebrew when they first arrived, in the beginning communication with others was done through translators. Work opportunities were also very limited and priority was given to Ashkenazic Jews. Though there were protests by immigrants criticizing conditions in the settlements, the Turkish Jews chose not to participate in these, presenting instead

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[44] Some of these settlements established with the support of immigrants from Turkey were Hagoshrim, Bet Netef, Burgata, Geva Hakarmel, Gazit, Tel Shahar, Kfar Zeharia, Olesh, Tzuba, Bet Jubri, Nahsholim, Gevulot, Nir Eliyahu and Kerem Ben Zimra (Bali, 2003: 293). The name Hagoshrim, given to the kibbutz where Turkish Jews were most concentrated, means "bridge," thus symbolizing the bridge built between Turkey and Israel.

a more passive outlook in contrast to other groups who questioned the reception policies (Bali, 2003: 292). Only a small number of the immigrants in the great wave stayed in the moshavim or kibbutzim, as most of them moved to small towns, such as the formerly Arab town of Yahud, where they found work and small houses to settle in. Through their immigration, Turkish Jews carved themselves out a place in two sectors they had never been involved in while still in Turkey. One of these was agriculture. Jews in Turkey were mostly urban, and there was no Jewish peasantry in either the times of the Ottoman Empire or the Turkish Republic. Instead, Jews were concentrated mostly in trade and artisanship. However, when they immigrated to Israel, they took up work in agriculture. Another addition to their occupational mix was the defense sector. Although these Jews had not pursued professions in the Turkish Army, among the migrants from Turkey in Israel there were several who were recruited to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as professional soldiers (Weiker, 1988: 81).

The mass immigration of Turkish Jews to Israel in 1948-51 not only affected the immigrants themselves but also caused immense changes in the profile of the Jewish community which chose to stay behind (Bali, 2003: 148). Since Jewish community leaders moved to Israel not in the 1948-51 wave but rather in subsequent years, the ranks of leadership saw no immediate changes. The foremost shift occurred at the mass level, mainly in the class structure. The mass emigration to Israel left the remaining Turkish Jews with a more homogenous class structure. Since it was mainly lower- and middle-class Jews which chose to move, the remaining Jews in Turkey presented a more middle- and upper-class picture, one with a higher socio-economic status.

Another prominent change resulting from the mass emigration of 1948-51 was the disappearance of Jewish communities and neighborhoods from various towns of Anatolia and the Balkans (Andrews, 1992: 223-224). If they elected to stay in Turkey, Jews from these towns usually ended up moving to the bigger cities of Istanbul or İzmir. The development of urban Istanbul and İzmir also played a role in this internal migration. In addition, non-emigrant Jews living in such traditional Istanbul Jewish neighborhoods as Balat, Kuledibi, Galata, Hasköy, Ortaköy largely moved to newer areas such as Şişli, Osmanbey, Taksim, Nişantaşı and Kurtuluş, all districts which took on a higher socio-economic character in the 1950s and '60s (Bali, 2003: 368; Weiker, 1988: 15). A similar pattern emerged in İzmir, where former residents of such districts as İkiçeşmelik, Karataş and Göztepe moved within the city to Alsancak, Basmane, Çankaya and Karşıyaka. These new settlements were distinguished from the previous ghetto-like closed neighborhoods by their more dispersed and integrated characters. Such internal movement also tended to weaken the solidarity of the Jewish community.

The importance placed on community welfare associations by Turkey's Jews was reduced not only by the weakening of community bonds over time but also by the declining number of poor Jews in need of community support, as most of them ended up emigrating to Israel. Since traditional, conservative Jews tended to move to Israel in the mass emigration, this accelerated the adaptation of the remaining Jews to Turkey's secularization and homogenization process (Bali, 2003: 369). In addition, Zionism as an ideology lost its significance for the remaining Jews, especially for the upper class (Benbasse and Rodrigue, 2001: 297). After the mass emigration to Israel, the community leaders remaining

tended to resist any show of support for Israel, fearing that Zionism would threaten the relationship between the Turkish state and the Jewish community. After Israel's founding, moreover, in the eyes of the general public the previous common image of Turkey's Jews as engendering fear gave way to a Jewish image of courageousness (Bali, 2003: 355).

After the emigration of 34,547 Turkish Jews to Israel in the 1948-51 period, up through 2001 another 27,473 made their way to the Jewish state, for a grand total of 62,020 Turkish Jews moving to Israel since its foundation to 2001 (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The subsequent emigrations from Turkey to Israel after the great wave were smaller in number and saw fluctuations in certain periods. A total of 6,871 emigrants arrived in Israel in 1952-60, 4,793 in 1961-64, 9,280 in 1965-71, 3,118 in 1972-79, 2,088 in 1980-89, 1,215 in 1990-2000, and finally just 108 in 2001 (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). As a close look at these figures indicates, Jewish migration to Israel showed increases during and just after Turkish political and economic turmoil, provided Israel's own attraction factors remained stable (Franz, 1994: 333). For instance, following the September 6-7, 1955 Events, the number of emigrants climbed to 1,710 in 1956 and to 1,911 in 1957, as compared to just 339 in 1955 (Weiker, 1988: 22). Similarly, after Turkey's 1960 military intervention, the number of emigrants shot up from 387 in 1960 to 1,829 in 1961 and 968 in 1961 (Weiker, 1988: 22). The 1964 conflict in Cyprus between Turks and Greeks also led to a spike in the number of emigrants, which rose above 1,000 in both 1964 and 1965. The number of emigrants also rose above 2,000 for the four years from 1969 to 1972 as a

result of both the 1971 military intervention and economic woes.[45] Also, when street violence among Turkish leftist and rightist groups reached its worst level in 1979-80, leading to the military intervention of September 12, 1980, the number of Jewish emigrants rose to nearly 1,000 per year (Weiker, 1988: 22).

Post-1951 emigrants from Turkey to Israel were different from those of the great wave of 1948-51. As stated above, the initial mass emigration changed the profile of the remaining Jewish community in Turkey. Therefore, Jews who emigrated after 1951 were mainly from the middle- or upper-middle class. In occupational terms they were mostly tradesman, but there were also many professionals (Liberles, 1984: 140). Job opportunities for Jews in Turkey were very limited due to a process of modernization along with the shrinking economy of the 1970s. Traditionally, Jews would inherit small shops from their fathers or fathers-in-law. At a time when the impact of modern financial and economic mechanisms began to be felt in both foreign and domestic trade, and when foreign exchange was strictly controlled in an import-oriented economy, these Jews saw no future in the jobs they inherited from their fathers. As a result, trying their chances in the rising Israeli economy of the 1970s seemed a better bet. These emigrants were able to continue in similar occupations as those they held in Turkey with the advantage of fitting into previously established communities of Turkish émigrés.

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[45] It should be noted that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War that ended with Israel's victory also drew some of Turkey's Jews to move to Israel. Not only the pride felt on the Jewish side in winning a war in just six days attracted many Jews worldwide – including those from Turkey – to Israel, but also Israel's economy moved into a period of development and prosperity after the war.

Some of the young Jews who emigrated to Israel in the late 1960s did so to attain a better university education. Others arrived in Israel at a younger age to get a good education at Israeli boarding schools at the intermediate or high school level. From the '60s until the 1980 military coup, education at the high school and university level in Turkey was highly politicized. There were severe ideological clashes between the right and left that frequently flared into violence. These young Jews thought that education in Israel would not only be better but also safer. As this violence spilled outside the school walls and campuses into the streets, threatening the daily life of civilians, many Jews who felt endangered by the atmosphere of conflict moved to Israel. Terror began to be a factor spurring emigration, especially after the late 1960s, and it dominated the motivation to emigrate in the late '70s in particular. In 1979-80, emigrants were dominated by families with high socio-economic status who believed Israel would offer a more secure life.

The mass emigration of 1948-51 also caused splits in family ties with the remaining Jews. Therefore, in the subsequent migrations, those who had remained behind in Turkey but then chose to emigrate did so for family unification. The previous immigrants helped these newcomers, either friends or relatives, to find jobs and housing. Most of the post-'60s emigrants settled in Bat-Yam.[46] They were mainly middle-class immigrants from Turkey who maintained close

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[46] Bat-Yam is Israel's most prominent settlement with a majority Turkish émigré population. It lies south of Tel-Aviv along the Mediterranean coast and resembles Turkey's İzmir province on the Aegean. Its populace is generally dominated by lower- and middle-class Turkish Jews. The Russian aliya of the 1990s, however, has brought many ex-Eastern European and Russian Jews to the region.

community ties amongst themselves. Upper-class families who immigrated after the mid-'70s and early '80s tended to settle in Ramat-Aviv or Herzeliya (Weiker, 1988: 43). Although the newcomers had more information about Israel than previous immigrants from Turkey, they were still not prepared in terms of knowing Hebrew (Weiker, 1988: 31). The immigrants of the great wave generally spoke Ladino within their communities and families. However, the subsequent immigrants, who were more integrated into Turkish society, knew Turkish better than Ladino, and therefore they spoke more Turkish amongst themselves or in their households.

Besides emigration from Turkey to Israel, there has also been return migration in the opposite direction. In general, returnees to Turkey were immigrants from all periods who found themselves unable to integrate into Israeli society. The main reasons for return migration to Turkey were as follows: polarization between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews; poor living conditions in the moshavim and kibbutzim; disappointed expectations; misinformation about conditions in Israel prior to migration; and the emerging liberal economic and social policies in Turkey (Bali, 2003: 313). There are no exact, reliable figures on the return rate among emigrants from Turkey in Israel, but estimates put the number at around 3,000 (Weiker, 1988: 6). Upper-class immigrants living in Ramat-Aviv and Herzeliya tended to have a higher rate of return than earlier groups. Their return to Turkey was mainly due to the post-1980s liberalization period. Still, the rate of return migration from Israel back to Turkey can be considered low in comparison to return rates among other immigrants groups and significant in indicating the good integration of Turkish Jews in Israel.

Today, it is estimated that the number of immigrants from Turkey to Israel has reached around 100,000-150,000, including the offspring of the first generation of immigrants, (Franz, 1994: 329; Yetkin, 1996: 56).[47] It is estimated the current number of Jewish immigrants from Turkey living in Israel who have not given up their Turkish citizenship is around 20,000.[48] These immigrants live in Israel either with residence permits or have dual citizenship, both Turkish and Israeli.[49]

In general, Turkish Jews in Israel were integrated into Israeli society and became "invisible" – that is, undistinguishable from other Israelis (Weiker, 1988). As a specific immigrant group they shunned involved in mass movements, protests and political parties but rather conformed themselves to the general milieu. Although mainly Sephardim, they do not affiliate themselves to other Sephardic groups but rather to Turkey and Turkish culture. The process of migration to Israel transformed the Jews of Turkey into Israeli Turks in Israel (Bali, 2003: 341). The Turkish Jews in Israel consider themselves a Turkish diaspora and try to retain their Turkish culture (Yetkin, 1996: 257). Although they do have contact with other immigrants from Turkey and are involved in the activities of immigrant associations, they maintain an identification with the

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[47] According to official Israeli statistics, in 2001 Turkey was considered the country of origin for a total of 82,400 Jews living in Israel (Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). A total of 30,600 Jews out of this figure had been born abroad, and the remaining 51,800 were Israeli born.

[48] These estimates come from interviews conducted by the author with personnel from Turkey's Embassy in Tel-Aviv on June 18, 2003. In subsequent interviews with the personnel of the Turkish Consulate in Jerusalem on June 30, the current number of Turkish citizens who immigrated from Turkey to Israel and currently reside in Jerusalem was estimated at around 1,000.

[49] There are no statistics available on naturalization broken down by country of origin.

Israeli-Turkish community. In general, Turkish Jews in Israel perform a role of lobbying for Turkey's side. Either individually or in immigrant associations, they serve the continued state of good relations between Israel and Turkey. They also serve the official Turkish position in international relations in working to counter the Arab, Armenian and Greek accusations against their former home (Levi, 1998: 159). They have positive feelings towards Turkey, even those who immigrated due to discrimination there. Most of them maintain ties with relatives in Turkey and even if such are lacking, they keep an interest in the Turkish news and customs and a desire to revisit. Generally Turkish Jews, and especially the first-generation migrants who arrived after the 1970s, speak Turkish in their home and with other Turkish Jews in Israel. In addition, since their efforts to learn read and write Hebrew were not as strong as those of some other immigrant groups in Israel, their Hebrew fluency is less than that of other Israelis (Weiker, 1988: 88).[50]

Turkish Jews have formed various immigrant associations. Both *Irgun Olei Turkiya* (Organization of Immigrants from Turkey) and *Itahdut Olei Turkiya* (Association of Immigrants from Turkey) were founded in the late 1950s by immigrants from the mass wave, but they were short lived. These associations helped to establish a forest near Tel-Aviv named after Turkish Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Seventies émigrés took over *Itahdut* and renamed it *Itahdut Yotsei Turkia* (Association of People Coming from Turkey). However, its

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[50] Most Turkish Jews now living in Israel did not know Hebrew when they first arrived. The immigrants who arrived in the wave of 1948-51 learned Hebrew in the migration camps. Immigrants in subsequent years learned the language in the Ulpanim, which are special boarding or day schools expressly established for adult learners of Hebrew.

activities were also few, as its leaders were inexperienced, welfare services traditionally delivered by Jewish communal organization in Turkey were delivered by the Israeli state, and its women members were inactive (Weiker, 1988). Itahdut Yotsei Turkia increased its activities in the mid-'80s with the Ramat-Aviv group. In 1985 the same upper-class group established the *Herzeliya Culture Club* for Turkish émigrés, but by 1990 it had closed. The middle-class immigrants, however, continue their activities in the *Moadon Tarbut Yotsei Turkia* (Bat-Yam Culture Club). The association *Morit* (Foundation for a Center of Turkish Judaism in Israel) was founded in 1986 by immigrants from the 1970s with the aim of promoting Turkish culture, but it too ended operations by the mid-'90s. Israel's only Zionist organization founded by Turkish Jews is *Amutat Yotsei Hatnua Hatziyonit Be Turkiya* (Association of Activists for the Zionist Movement in Turkey). Turkish Jews have also published newspapers and journals in Ladino and/or Turkish such as *La Vera Luz*, *Haber*, *Dostluk*, *Gelişim*, *Sesimiz*, *Bülten* and *Türkiyeliler Birliği Bülteni*.

Besides immigrant associations, Turkish Jews, specifically upper-class ones who immigrated in 1979-80, spearheaded the establishment of a Masonic lodge called the *Nur Masonic Lodge* in 1985 in Tel-Aviv. This was the first Turkish-speaking Masonic lodge formed outside of Turkey's borders with the initiation of Turkish Jews in Israel.

There is also a chapter of *B'nai B'rith International* in Tel-Aviv called the *Yosef Niyego Lodge*.[51] Most of the current members of the lodge are immigrants from Turkey, and the dominant language used in their activities is Turkish.

This brief overview of Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel having concluded, the next section will discuss how Israel and Turkey responded to this migration, with a focus on the policies and legislation pursued by both states concerning citizenship and migration.

3.5 Policies on Citizenship and International Migration in Turkey and Israel

Israel and Turkey are two relatively young states, both established in the 20th century in the Middle East. Yet, the two states have different tendencies in their administrative traditions. For instance, since Israel is a state founded predominantly by Jewish immigration, its policies and legislation regulating immigration are diverse. Towards this end, there is even a special ministry of immigration dealing with the absorption/assimilation of immigrants. On the other hand, Turkey has traditionally been a country of emigration. There is no ministry established specifically for immigration, but the Ministries of the Interior, Labor

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[51] The B'nai B'rith (Children of the Covenant) International Association is a non-profit, non-governmental organization founded by US Jews in 1843 with the aim of uniting Jews in service to their community and the world. Today it has branches in more than 58 countries. The group's activities involve food and clothing drives, creating affordable homes for low-income elderly persons, mentoring the young, and conducting public awareness campaigns on issues such as child safety and cancer (http://www.bnaibrith.org). The first Turkish B'nai B'rith lodge, number 678, was founded in Istanbul in 1911 and its first chairman was Yosef Niyego. However, after the 1938 Law on Associations abolished associations with central organizations outside Turkey, it was closed. Later, the B'nai B'rith lodge established in Israel by immigrants from Turkey was named after Yosef Niyego to honor this prominent leader of Turkish B'nai Brith.

and Foreign Affairs and their various directorates deal with immigrants and emigrants among other issues in their purview. There is no coordination mechanism among these ministries. One can argue that in Turkey there are no established policies on international migration but rather only ad hoc arrangements. Therefore, the question of how Israel and Turkey dealt legislatively and policy-wise with Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel will by necessity be two separate discussions.

Immigration to Israel has been traditionally considered a unique phenomenon by experts in the field (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 10). In international migration, immigrants normally move to a new destination from their home country but in the case of immigration to Israel, Jews are perceived to be initially "in exile" from their home country – Israel – and to be returning to their "original homeland" in the form of return of the Diaspora. The Israeli law regulating Jewish immigration to Israel is even called the Law of Return. The immigration of the Jews is not restricted and Israel's commitment to immigration is based on ideological considerations rather than economic ones (Ichilov, 2002: 5). However, with the 1980s, *sui generis* characterizations of immigration to Israel gave way to illustrations of similarities with other trends in international migration (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 39). Hence, immigration to Israel has begun to be viewed as sharing characteristics with immigration in the European context, against a backdrop of Western countries such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom as well as traditional immigration-destination countries such as Canada, the United States and Australia admitting large numbers of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, foreign workers and persons seeking family unification.

Furthermore, immigration to Israel in the 1990s is more closely connected to economic conditions there than to ideological factors (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 11, 17). Despite post-1980s efforts to draw parallels between immigration to countries in Western Europe and traditional immigration-destination countries on the one hand and Israel on the other, there remains a strong difference – to wit, although immigration to the first set of countries is subject to limitations or quotas, Jewish immigration to Israel has never been restricted but on the contrary is encouraged by Israel.[52] Since the founding pillar of Israel is its status as a Jewish state, Jews, wherever they are, have the potential right to immigrate to Israel whenever they want, upon fulfilling the conditions under the Law of Return (Shuval and Leshem, 1998: 13). The ex-Soviet aliya that brought in its wake an increase in organized crime and prostitution provoked discussions in Israel in the mid-'90s on the possibility of putting restrictions on immigration. Nonetheless, these suggestions remained on the level of mere discussion, and the Law of Return was left unchanged. Today, the Law of Return, first passed in 1950 and later amended in 1954 and 1970, remains Israel's main legislation regulating its reception policies. As described previously, the 1952 Nationality Law, which refers to the Law of Return, also sets forth criteria for naturalization. However, this law underwent few changes, with the last amendment including further stipulations on acquiring citizenship by residence added in 1980.

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[52] There are other forms of migration to Israel besides that of Jews, too. When Israel prohibited Palestinians working in Israel, it opened its gates to guest workers from various countries. These guest workers may turn into permanent workers over time leaving Israel with a task of integrating a great part of this non-Jewish population socially, culturally and politically (Bauböck, 2001).

Although Israel's laws on citizenship by immigration were not altered radically, there were shifts in the state's absorption policy. Immigration to Israel since 1948 to today has not occurred gradually but rather in waves of immigration marked by large number of immigrants in short periods of time (Lipshitz, 1998: 2). These waves of immigration affected not only the country's economic, social, demographic and cultural structure but also that of the entire Middle East. Since the 1950s, the Israeli state has intervened in migration towards its shores and applied a diverse set of reception and absorption policies. Upon the receipt of an immigrant certificate, which is a booklet issued by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption to register all types of assistance given to persons with immigrant status; immigrants were supported with housing, employment, education and welfare in their first years in Israel. In a way, immigration to Israel was strictly planned by the state from above to absorb the immigrants regardless of market forces. Such an absorption strategy was a reflection of the Israeli political economy which has been characterized by centralization, widespread ownership of major enterprises, and strong collectivistic policies (Eisenstadt, 1992: 173)

However, with the recent wave of migration that started in the '90s from the former Soviet Union, the state shifted its strategy of intervention from above using a service-intensive institution to a new strategy of direct absorption (Lipshitz, 1998: 2; Leshem, 1998: 307). Under this new policy, upon their arrival in Israel immigrants were given an absorption package, as it is called, that included a sum of money to cover expenses for a limited period of time as well as other benefits. The immigrants were free to use this subsidy according to their personal wishes and considerations. The aim of this new model was to reduce

immigrants' dependence on the state, speed up the immigrants' integration, and make the absorption process more efficient and flexible. Governmental responsibility for their absorption was transferred to the community and the local government (Leshem, 1998: 307). This change also reflects Israel's switch from centralized economic policies to a free-market based model begun in the 1980s. Since the wave of immigration from ex-Soviet states turned out to be larger than officially forecasts, especially the spike of 1997, the government began to intervene to an extent in constructing new housing units on the territorial periphery (Lipshitz, 1998: 2). Although absorption basket diminished dependency on state and magnifies the importance of more veteran immigrants as source of information as well as assistance, it reinforces former identities and affiliations and slows down integration into Israeli society (Ichilov, 2002: 6).

Today, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption provides assistance to immigrants as broken down into seven categories: New Immigrants, Immigrant Minors, Immigrant Citizens, Children of Immigrants, Immigrant Families, Returning Minors and Returning Residents.[53] Immigrants falling under these categories are provided an absorption basket according to their age and socio-economic status as financial assistance for their initial arrangements, renting an

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[53] The Ministry of Absorption's website at http://www.moia.gov.il describes these categories as follows: new immigrants are individuals who came to Israel and received the status of "new immigrant" from the Ministry of the Interior under the 1950 Law of Return; "immigrant minors" are new immigrants who came to Israel before reaching age 17; "immigrant citizens" are individuals born abroad to Israeli citizens who are therefore eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return if they do not already hold Israeli citizenship; "children of immigrants" are individuals who immigrated to Israel close to the time that their parents did; "immigrant families" denotes families all members of which have immigrant status; "returning minors" are minors who left the country with their parents before age 14 and returned after reaching age 17; and returning residents are Israeli citizens who have spent at least two years abroad.

apartment and living expenses. The absorption basket also covers the period of ulpan study, if the immigrants do not know Hebrew before their arrival. In addition to the financial sum given in the absorption basket, there are also grants that the state provides to immigrants: supplementary grants for rental expenses; customs tax grants for purchasing household electrical appliances; housing grants (i.e. assistance with rental fees, mortgage, and public housing) in cooperation with the Ministry of Housing; and employment grants (i.e. income insurance for six months, licensing, training and retraining courses, advancement and placement in employment). Previously, the absorption basket was granted to immigrants who made aliya from countries in such regions as Eastern Europe, Latin America, and some Asian and African countries. Immigrants coming from a low socio-economic status in their countries of origins were granted a larger amount of financial assistance, whereas immigrants who had better incomes were granted lesser amounts. The decision on how much the immigrant needed was generally given according to the general status of Jews in the country of origin. For instance, immigrants coming from Ethiopia (Abyssinia) were provided with extensive absorption baskets, but those from Turkey would receive smaller baskets, whereas Jews from France received none. The status of Jews in Turkey was considered to be better than that of Jews in North Africa and Central Asia, not only in terms of economic conditions, but also in terms of social and political status. As of 2003, however, the absorption basket became available to all new immigrants from all countries, including France and South Africa. Furthermore, immigrants from Turkey started to receive equal amounts of financial assistance as the other immigrants. Israel, either through municipal administration or central

government (Ministry of Interior) supports immigrant associations or cultural clubs. For instance, financial assistance is provided to publications of the immigrant associations; places for cultural and social clubs for people with similar country of origin are provided by the municipalities; and there are state-sponsored neighborhood clubs where people can come together in their spare time. Turkish Jews get use of these facilities as well. The bulletin of the Itahdut Yotsei Turkia is published under the partial sponsorship of the Ministry of Interior. The place of Bat-Yam Culture Club is provided by the Bat-Yam Municipality.

In addition to changes in absorption policy, there were shifts in the mode of integration Israel went through changes in the courses of its nation-building process and manipulation of immigrants' integration. In the initial years of the state, the "melting pot" was the predominant Zionist ideal for the cultural integrity of Israeli nation. Accordingly, the steps were taken to weld various cultural traditions of many Jewish communities which have gathered from various countries into one amalgamated Israeli culture. The creation of the *Sabra*, the offspring of the immigrants born or reared in Israel, reflected this ideal for a new culture for a new nation. The vision for melting pot has been gradually replaced by a more pluralistic vision of Israeli culture and society (Ichilov, 2002: 6). By 1970s, the influence of particularistic traditions on the nature of public life in Israel began to increase (Hacohen, 2002: 186). Consequently, the diversity among Jews came to be recognized. Today, there is no longer a single definition of identity in Israel acceptable to a majority of the population. Such a shift from an assimilationist to a multicultural model of integration is also observable in other traditional immigration countries like Canada or Australia.

On the Turkish side, Jewish emigration to Israel was not dealt with special provisions or legislation but was rather considered within the general framework of existing policies and laws applicable to all groups of emigrants, regardless of religious affiliation. As stated previously, the Turkish state neither encouraged nor prohibited this emigration. In terms of citizenship, however, there arose certain legal issues that immigrants from Turkey in Israel could not avoid. According to Article 9 of Law No. 1312 (enacted in 1928), any Turkish citizen who had either adopted another country's citizenship without first obtaining official permission from the Turkish authorities or served in the armed forces of another country could have his/her Turkish citizenship revoked through a decision of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, when Israel passed its Nationality Law in 1952, immigrants from Turkey in Israel were faced with a citizenship dilemma. Obtaining Israeli nationality meant termination of Turkish citizenship and the closing of Turkey's doors to them. Many had relatives remaining in Turkey they wanted to maintain ties with. Furthermore, since they were insecure about their future in Israel, they wanted to keep open the option of returning to Turkey (Bali, 2003: 340). If immigrants from Turkey in Israel gained Israeli nationality, they would be obliged to get a visa from the Turkish Embassy in Israel to enter Turkey under the countries' bilateral visa arrangements. However, when they applied for visas with their Israeli passports which included their places of birth, the Turkish Embassy reminded them that they were still Turkish citizens and could only quit Turkish citizenship through official procedures. If no official procedures had been taken to terminate their Turkish citizenship, the immigrants would have to fill out official forms towards this end. However, since the Council of Ministers was the

single institution authorized to revoke Turkish citizenship, the bureaucratic procedure took several years to be finalized and in the meantime immigrants from Turkey in Israel would be denied visas to re-enter Turkey. Therefore, some immigrants tried the option of entering Turkey with their Turkish passports and hence avoiding the visa requirement. This method was usually preferred by immigrants who were able to obtain valid passports before their expiry date. These immigrants were able to renew their passports, just like other Turkish citizens, by applying either to the Ministry of the Interior or General Directorate of Security during their stay in Turkey or to the Turkish Embassy in Israel.

In the case of renewing passports in Turkey through the offices of the Ministry of the Interior, male Jews were checked for having fulfilled their military service as part of the regular official procedure for both obtaining and renewing passports. Male emigrants who had not done their tour of duty would have their renewals denied. Furthermore, they would be immediately conscripted. For immigrants trying to renew expired passports through the Turkish Embassy in Israel, the embassy demanded from them a document from the Israeli Ministry of the Interior certifying that they were not Israeli citizens. Consequently, those who had already obtained Israeli citizenship were not able to renew their passports at the Turkish Embassy in Israel and therefore had to wait for the result of their expulsion procedure through Turkey's Council of Ministers.

Turkey's requirement for the completion of procedure for expulsion from Turkish citizenship was not only due to the state's position of outlawing dual citizenship but also to the Convention to Reduce the Number of the Cases of Statelessness, to which Turkey became a signatory in 1973. Under this

convention, a person could not simultaneously be a citizen of two states and if s/he was, s/he had to choose one or the other. In this person failed or refused to do so, s/he would lose the citizenship of both countries. In order that Turkish citizens holding concurrent citizenships would not lose both of them, Turkey demanded that its own citizenship be revoked. In a way, this revocation was aimed at reducing the number of cases of statelessness. However, Israel's citizenship laws, in contrast, permitted a dual citizenship status. Furthermore, Israel granted citizenship rights to all Jews worldwide under the provisions of the Law of Return. Jews who immigrated from Turkey to Israel would not become stateless, because Israel permitted them citizenship just as it did for other Jews arriving from other countries. As a result of negotiations between Turkey and Israel, in 1990 Turkey abandoned the requirement for entrance visas from Israeli citizens.[54]

Turkey decided to allow dual citizenship for Turkish citizens living abroad in order that they might retain their citizenship and transfer them to their children. The main motivation for this policy change was that the state did not want Turkish citizens abroad to lose their ties to Turkey (İçduygu, 1996c). Towards this end, 1964's Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended on February 13, 1981 by Law No. 2383.[55] The law allowed people seeking the citizenship of another country to first obtain permission documents to end their Turkish citizenship. If they had already obtained another country's citizenship, they would be able to retain their Turkish

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[54] Ekrem Güvendiren, Turkey's ambassador in Tel-Aviv from 1986 to 1992, played a pivotal role in the decision to lift the visa requirement.

[55] Turkish Citizenship Law No. 2383 was published in Official Gazette No. 17286 dated March 21, 1981.

citizenship provided they presented the required documents within three years after they got the permission papers. The law's Articles 20, 22 and 25 are important in terms of citizenship by immigration:

> Article 20: Withdrawal from Turkish citizenship is subject to permission by the Council of Ministers when citizenship of a foreign country has been acquired in any manner or when there is convincing evidence that someone is going to acquire a foreign country's citizenship.
>
> Article 22: If a person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is at the same time a citizen of another country, the withdrawal documents will be immediately issued to him. If a person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is not a citizen of another country, the Ministry of Interior Affairs will issue him a document of permission. When the person in question produces documents showing that he has acquired foreign citizenship, the same Ministry will give him a withdrawal certificate. In accordance with the rationale set by the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Interior Affairs may issue a permission document to a person who wants to acquire another country's citizenship. The permission document is valid for three years. Those who receive permission documents have to turn over to the competent Turkish authorities the required information and documents within this period.
>
> Article 25: The Council of Ministers may rule that the following persons have lost their Turkish citizenship: ...those who have acquired foreign citizenship without first obtaining permission; ...those persons abroad who are called by the competent authorities to do their military service or, in the time of war, to join home defense but have not done so within three months without excuse...

The new dual citizenship law had an impact on Jewish immigrants from Turkey living abroad. In consequence of Article 25 of the law, Jewish immigrants living abroad, including those in Israel, lost their Turkish citizenship by the

decision of the Council of Ministers of 1981-83.[56] In those same years, a total of 1,171 people, including Jewish immigrants from Turkey in Israel and the other groups falling under Article 25, applied for permission to withdraw their Turkish citizenship (Soyarık, 2000: 187).

After dual citizenship was allowed in 1981, Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 was amended in 1995 with Law No. 4112 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1995).[57] The amendment granted dual citizens the same set of rights as those of other Turkish citizens. The amendment embraced the rights of residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labor, as follows:

> Those who held Turkish citizenship by birth, and acquired another country's citizenship after getting permission to withdraw by the decision of the Council of Ministers and their inheritors, may benefit from the rights of the Turkish citizens in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labor, so long as provisions for the national security and public order of the Turkish Republic are reserved.

As the general framework of the laws on citizenship in Turkey prescribed that withdrawal from Turkish citizenship or obtaining another country's citizenship could only be carried through with the permission of the Turkish state, the amendments allowed dual citizenship for mainly three groups: those who had Turkish citizenship and sought the Turkish state's permission to get additional Israeli citizenship; those who took Israeli citizenship without the permission of the

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[56] It should be noted that it was not only Turkish immigrants in Israel who lost their citizenship; extreme leftists who fled the country due to clashes with rightist groups and the resulting 1980 military coup also shared the same fate (Soyarık, 2000: 190).

[57] Law No. 4112 was published in Official Gazette No. 22311 dated June 12, 1995.

Turkish state but wanted to maintain their Turkish citizenship; and those who had had their Turkish citizenship revoked but wanted to re-earn it.

Apart from the policies adopted by Israel and Turkey regarding citizenship, the state of bilateral relations between these countries also impacted the Turkish Jews in Israel. Relations between Turkey and Israel have long been a contentious issue of domestic Turkish politics. Islamist and extreme nationalist groups within Turkey have utilized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as fodder for their political campaigns, usually taking sides with the dominant Palestinian view and condemning Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East. Criticisms of Israeli foreign policy have been one of the rare areas of common ground between groups on Turkey's extreme left and right. However, official Turkish foreign policy towards Israel differs from the strident voices of domestic politics (Salt, 1995). Turkey has always conformed to the decisions of the United Nations. With respect to Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations, there has been improvement, and several cooperation agreements were signed after the mid-1980s in such diverse areas as culture, education, science, sports, agriculture, hydro politics, trade and defense. One of the most important aspects of cooperation between the two countries concerned the conscription of dual citizens. Conscription is obligatory and universal in both countries.[58] Before 1998, conscription of dual Turkish-Israeli citizens was regulated independently in accordance with the domestic laws of each country. Therefore, male dual citizens were drafted into military service in

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[58] In Israel, conscription is universal and covers both men and women age 18 and older. Turkey, on the other hand, requires military service of men only, age 18 and over.

Israel and Turkey respectively. Under a 1998 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs regulation, dual Turkish-Israeli citizens who had already completed their obligatory military service in Israel were exempted from their military duty to Turkey. The regulation also specified that the exemption was valid only for those who had either been born in Israel or who immigrated and settled in Israel before the age of 18.

In sum, Israel and Turkey, still-young states founded in the 20th century, have regulations and policies on citizenship and international migration which are subject to constant transformation and emendation due to changes wrought by the tide of events. Israel is a country which was founded solely by international migration and consequently, it has a broader scope of legislation regulating the flow of immigration into its borders. Turkey, however, has traditionally been a country of emigration. It started to enact regulations on citizenship and international migration after the 1950s concurrent with its integration into the international community's migratory regime. The migration of Turkish Jews to Israel is an issue that has implications for nations, the sender and the recipient. International relations between these two countries play an important role not only for the flow of Turkish Jews to Israel, but also vis-à-vis the status of both as nations of the Middle East, a region long dominated by years of dispute.

CHAPTER IV

JEWS IN TURKEY: BOTH TURKISH CITIZENS AND A NON-MUSLIM MINORITY

4.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter to discuss how Jews in Turkey perceive and experience being citizens of the country as well as members of a non-Muslim minority group in light of the empirical evidence obtained in the field research in Turkey. The three aspects of citizenship – legal status, identity and civic virtue – are given special focus. Since the Jews' minority status affects their perceptions and experiences of citizenship, the discussion in this chapter aims to explore the relationship between citizenship and minority issues. It attempts to explore the history of Turkey's Jewish minority, as touched on in previous chapters, but here in a more concrete and substantial form. Furthermore, it tries to make a case for the existing discussion on citizenship in Turkey with regard to the empirical evidence obtained in the field research. The discussion in this chapter is presented in *four* parts. In the *first* part, an overview of Turkish citizenship and the status of non-Muslim minorities per se are put forth. This part also sets forth the essentials of Turkish citizenship with its aspects as discussed in the literature. In addition, the paradoxical consequences of the dominant paradigms inherent in citizenship in Turkey regarding non-Muslim minorities are demonstrated. In the *second* part of

the chapter, a portrayal of the general characteristics of the sample group is given. The profile of the respondents is drawn with use of certain sociological categories such as age, gender, socio-economic status and etc. In the *third* part of the chapter, the interviews findings themselves are discussed. The respondents' perceptions of the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of Turkish citizenship are presented. Also covered are the respondents' views concerning membership, belonging and attachment to the Turkish nation-state. The findings also highlight the experiences of the Jewish respondents as a minority group living in a Muslim-majority country. The data is conveyed with an individual-level of analysis. The chapter ends with a short conclusion as the *fourth* part.

4.2 Citizenship and Non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey: An Overview of Paradoxes

Turkey is generally considered an example of a strong state (Heper, 1985). The structure of the state in Turkey, since its establishment, is traditionally rooted in Republican and unitary norms (Barkey, 2000). These characteristics of the Turkish state are reflected in the development of citizenship with its aspects of *legal status, identity and civic virtue.*[1] With the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the *legal status* aspect of citizenship was incorporated in the 1924

[1] The development of citizenship in Turkey does not refer to a coherent and articulate mode of being but rather to a transitional mode of becoming. In other words, modern Turkey's 80-year history does not embrace a single, dominant form of citizenship, and there may be specific cases for different citizenship histories of various groups within Turkish society, i.e. women, workers, non-Muslims, cultural minorities, the handicapped, homosexuals, etc.

Constitution and as part of the Kemalist Reforms, civil, political and social rights were sustained in a protective constitutional shield secured by a legal framework that forms the basis of Turkish citizenship (Bilgin, 1998). However, with the impact of the strong state tradition dominated by Republican and unitary norms, the rights granted to individuals were not fettered with negative freedom – that is, the absence of obstacles or constraints imposed on actions by the state or society confining the personal area of noninterference asserted against the state or other people. Rather, these rights were more societally based within the medium of Republican democracy and more devoted to positive freedom – that is, individuals were granted rights as they were defined in the legal framework (Kazancıgil, 1994). By the same token, the duties and responsibilities of citizens defined in the legal framework prioritized rights and privileges. Therefore, citizenship in Turkey, contextualized in the strong state tradition, tended to emphasize the obligations of individuals in their relation to the state rather than the obligations of the state to its citizens (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998).

The *identity* aspect of citizenship in Turkey is also related to the strong state tradition and monist state structure. Although social movements based on identity politics were more discernible in the political arena after the 1980s, all throughout the Republican period starting in the 1920s claims for the recognition of identities were generally met with suspicion and regarded as disrupting the unity of the Turkish nation (Akçam, 1995; Göle, 1994). Furthermore, any demand for group rights or special interests was perceived as threatening the general interest and the integrity of society, which were guaranteed by the unitary and centric state. Consequently, the use of categories of gender, race, religion,

ethnicity and class in Turkish politics has frequently been restricted in the regulation of state-society relations and in the interests of the stability of democracy. Even more, the politicization of these categories served as grounds to shut down political parties under the Law on Political Parties (Parla, 1991).

The *civic virtue* aspect of citizenship is closely related to the Turkey's history of modernization and the maturation of its civil society. As discussed in previous chapters, Galston classified the civic virtues into four categories, namely the general virtues (i.e. courage, law-abidingness, loyalty), social virtues (i.e. independence, open-mindedness), economic virtues (i.e. the work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change), and political virtues (i.e. capacity to respect others, willingness to demand what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse) (Galston, 1991). The development of civic virtues is extensively interconnected with criteria for modernization such as education levels, socio-economic status and urbanization. Turkey's modernization process did not unfold as the result of class divergences due to industrialization and urbanization (Keyder, 1997). Rather, the conventional means for modernization were provided by the state itself (Keyder, 1989). In other words, Turkey's socio-economic development has been state initiated and directed, which can be evaluated as a natural end of the nation's *étatism* (İnsel, 1983). Therefore, it can be argued that the development of civic virtue in Turkey is a byproduct of the state's modernization policies. By the same token, the strong state tradition in Turkey also served to impede the development of civil society (Uğur, 1998). Despite the growth of civil society since the 1980s, the state of civil organization

in Turkey is very low when compared to levels in advanced Western democracies (Poulton, 1999).

The framework drawn above of the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship in Turkey reflects a state-centric approach to citizenship. How the citizens themselves experience and perceive citizenship in Turkey is a subject generally very much ignored by the social science disciplines within the country. There are many different ethno-religious groups within Turkish society, and studies on the impact of membership in these groups could provide important clues for understanding citizenship at the individual level and hence contribute to the existing literature on citizenship in Turkey. Since Greeks, Armenians and Jews are the only ethno-religious groups officially recognized as minorities by the state, studies on these non-Muslims exploring their citizenship in Turkey would complement the studies in political science. Such explorations of citizenship in non-Muslim groups would not only provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the three aspects of citizenship but also would highlight how citizenship is perceived and experienced by different segments of society.

As stated in previous chapters, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the three major non-Muslim Millets – the Armenians, Greeks and Jews – were granted the status of minority groups under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and protected under the provisions of international law. The transformation of the three major Millets into minority groups refers also to a transformation from Ottoman subjecthood to Turkish citizenship (Ünsal, 1998a). This process of the construction of modern citizenship was accompanied by a process of nation-building. Over time, the presence of these non-Muslim minorities declined due to

population exchanges as well as emigration and so by the early 21st century, there were only around 60,000-65,000 Armenians, 20,000-25,000 Jews and 3,000 Greeks left in Turkey (Karimova and Deverell, 2001).

The process and transformation of nation-building pointed to two major paradoxes concerning the citizenship of non-Muslim minorities. *First*, despite the use of the category of "Turk" as a building block of the nation-state, what this word referred to was initially ambiguous and this ambiguity was to persist, with the definition and content of Turk undergoing changes in different eras, subject to the influence of events and developments (Kadıoğlu, 1998). "Turk" was sometimes used to refer to an ethnic group originating in Central Asia, sometimes to a legal status of citizenship on the basis of identity cards and passports, and sometimes to individuals sharing a common culture, i.e. Turkish culture (Deringil, 2000).[2] As to the religion of the "Turk", Islam was frequently used to define Turks, the Turkish nation and Turkish culture. In other words, Islam provided a reference point in the definition of the "ordinary Turk" (Kirişçi, 2000; Özbudun, 1998; Özdoğan, 1996). As a result, the inclusion of non-Muslims in the normative definition of Turk was problematic in an epistemological sense (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998). What's more, the difference of non-Muslims was recurrently underlined, and not only was their membership, belonging or attachment to the Turkish nation repeatedly questioned and tested, but also their loyalty to the Turkish state (Bali, 2001). If one considers loyalty to the state one of the

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[2] A number of studies on citizenship and nationalism in Turkey illustrate the periodic shifts in the definition and content of 'Turk.' See Bora (1995, 1998), Kirişçi (2000), Poulton (1997) and Soyarık (2000).

predominant hallmarks of Turkish political culture and official nationalism, thus prioritizing loyalty to the Turkish nation (İçduygu et al. 1999), it can be argued that there is an abstraction in the stipulation of non-Muslims vis-à-vis the Turkish state which is frequently revisited.

The *second* paradox inherent in the citizenship of non-Muslim minorities with regards to nation-building is due to the monistic conceptualization of citizenship in Turkey. In the nation-building process, efforts to sustain cohesion have employed a deliberate ignorance of the differences present within society (İçduygu et al. 1999). As a reflection of this ignorance, in addition to Republican norms that invalidated any claims for special rights on the basis of social segments or territorial/local specificity, calling attention to the religious differences of non-Muslims by the non-Muslims themselves was problematical. It should be noted that under Turkey's principle of secularism, religion was strictly confined to the private sphere. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter II, religion and more specifically Islam served as a distinguishing criterion of the center and periphery cleavage in Turkish politics (Mardin, 1990). However, such a confinement of religion to the private sphere aimed not at regulating the status of non-Muslims but rather at that of Muslims themselves in order to prohibit Islamic fundamentalism. Yet, this restriction of religious intentions in the public sphere still had an impact on non-Muslims, one leading to a strict confinement of their religion to the private sphere. Therefore, non-Muslims were faced with the complex dual task of trying to win the use of their communal rights pertaining to the public sphere such as the freedoms of education, organization and expression yet at the same time avoiding drawing attention to their religious differences from

the majority of society. This was another dilemma frustrating the situation of non-Muslims in addition to frequent tests of their loyalty at the hands of the Turkish state.

Turkish society has many different religious communities among its Muslims (i.e., the Alawites, Caferi/Twelver Shiites and Sunnites), and its non-Muslims (i.e., the Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Yezidis and Assyrians). Despite these differentiations, the history of citizenship in Turkey does not point to a broad spectrum embracing the multicultural aspects of Turkish society. In other words, Turkey's administrative system did not develop citizenship policies specific to particular societal subgroups. Furthermore, despite occasional copious praise of the rhetoric on universal citizenship, the actual policies on citizenship changed over different periods. As discussed in Chapter II, these policies were closely related to the conjecture of historical periods in Turkish politics. For instance, although citizenship was more interconnected to the nation-building process in the Early Republican Period until 1945, in the Multi-Party Democracy Period it was more related to changes in the center-periphery cleavage until the 1970s, and in the Post-1980 Period, policies on citizenship were more reflective of globalization. The changes witnessed throughout these periods show that although the basis of citizenship was rooted in the foundation of the Republic and the dominant norms of Kemalist reforms during the Early Republican Period, it was subject to several changes and amendments in later decades. With respect to non-Muslims, these changes signified that consistent and unilateral policies on citizenship had been lacking.

Furthermore, the historical development of citizenship in Turkey was related to the rhetoric of different nationalisms and their definition of Turkish nationhood. The various types of nationalism such as civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism and cultural nationalism were present in every period of Turkish politics (Kadıoğlu, 1996a).[3] According to civic nationalism, those people living within the boundaries of Turkey who consider themselves Turks and who are by nature citizens of Turkey are thereby and therewith Turkish. Turkish citizenship rested on loyalty to the state and therefore, regardless of ethnicity, language or religion, all the majority and minority groups were considered Turkish. Civic nationalism, with its emphasis on territorial citizenship, seems to embrace non-Muslims as Turks. In ethnic nationalism, by contrast, Turks were defined as a coherent and definable ethnic group which was and should be the dominant group in power. Under this conception non-Muslims were not considered ethnic Turks, and their loyalty to the Turkish nation was subject to constant examination. In cultural nationalism, emphasis is given more to the cultural aspects of society, and Turkish culture symbolized more a culture shaped by pre-Islamic Turkic traditions, Islamic ethics and morals and the Turkish language. Therefore, citizens not affiliated with Islamic culture by religion or who did not speak Turkish were excluded from the definition of Turkish national by cultural nationalism. Although there are various kinds of Turkish nationalisms that prescribe different definitions for a Turkish nation or prefer to emphasize certain aspects of the Turkish nation more strongly than others, none of the nationalisms dominated

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[3] For a brief discussion on the civic, ethnic and cultural forms of nationalism, see Kymlicka (1995).

Turkish politics or society in one historical period; rather, most of them co-existed simultaneously, though the acknowledgement or popularity of each differed according to the period. Also, as one analyst argues, there are shifts from one type of nationalism to another, e.g. the shift from an emphasis on ethnic origin to Islamic cultural traits within a single decade (Kadıoğlu, 1996a).

With respect to citizenship in Turkey, it can be argued that although the forces of civic nationalism tried to implement from above identified Turkishness within the medium of territorial boundaries and safeguarded territorial citizenship, it also made use of the cultural aspects prescribed for the Turkish nation. As discussed in Chapter II, language reform or the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign of the 1920s and '30s and the use of Islam as a unifying tool for Turkish society in the Post-1980 period are some examples of the shifts in different nationalisms and hence shifts in the development of citizenship in Turkey. The Republican state led to the creation of an official, monolithic and absolute Turkish identity by ignoring the multiplicity of identities within society (Kadıoğlu, 1996a). At the same time, over non-Muslims it cast a shadow of ambiguity or constant questioning of their affiliation to Turkish identity.

The citizenship of non-Muslim minorities either in different periods of Turkish politics or in different nationalisms in Turkey is generally treated as a specific category. However, trying to put these communities under a holistic differentiation of Muslims and non-Muslims may lead to methodological complications. There are significant differences not only within Muslims but also within non-Muslims. As discussed in the previous chapters, not all of Turkey's non-Muslims are officially recognized; rather, only the Armenians, Greeks and

Jews are. The characteristics of these three minority groups differ from each other. For instance, the Jews are not historically as homogeneous as the other non-Muslims in terms of language and ethnicity, as there are many subgroups among the Jews such as the Ladino-speaking Sephardim (the vast majority today), the Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim, the Karaites who refuse rabbinical tradition, and the Arabic- or Kurdish-speaking Mizrahis. Jews in Turkey display a more urban and middle-class outlook and in terms of education and knowledge of foreign languages, they can be considered to be at a more advanced level than other non-Muslims. Historically, these Jews are economically concentrated in trade or artisanship. Furthermore, since the times of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish community has been known as the most loyal group among non-Muslims, a reputation which it enjoys even today. Although the loyalty of non-Muslims has frequently been tested, the Jews have suffered less from the consequences of this testing than have the Greeks and Armenians. International relations between Ankara and Athens affected in turn the Greek minority in Turkey, as did relations between Turkey and Armenia in the case of the Armenian minority. By the same token, when relations with these countries got rocky, this made the relations of the Armenians and Greeks with Turkish state and society unsteady. But to the contrary, the relations between the Jewish community and Turkish state officials followed a more stable path.

In light of the above-mentioned framework, making the Jewish community the focus of our study promises an in-depth understanding of the three aspects of citizenship in Turkey – legal status, identity and civic virtue. The question of how Jews perceive, experience and interpret their citizenship in Turkey as members of

a specific group has the potential to challenge the state-centric approach of studies on citizenship and the nation-state.

4.3 Profile of the Sample Group in the Field Research in Turkey

In order to explore how Jews in Turkey perceive and experience citizenship, a total of 31 interviews were conducted in field research carried out in Turkey. The structures of the research and its methodological concerns have been previously described in detail in Chapter I of this dissertation. In the present section, we will discuss the results of the research in terms of the general characteristics of the interview respondents. So as to briefly present who the interviewees were, a short profile will be given.[4]

The sample group selected from Turkey's Jewish population presented a diverse picture in terms of *age*, *gender*, *marital status*, *citizenship*, *place of birth*, *place of residence*, *employment status*, *education level*, *socio-economic background* and *ethno-religious origin*.[5] As to the *age* of the respondents when they were questioned, the youngest was 20 and the oldest 89. The mean ratio of all the subjects' ages at the time of the interviews was 52. Out of the 31 total

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[4] For a tabular illustration of the interviewees' profile, see Appendix D.

[5] Some of these characteristics are inherited ones not subject to change over time such as ethnic origin, gender, place of birth, etc. However, others are sociologically dependent ones such as education, occupation and marital status, as they may change during the course of the interview subjects' lives. Therefore, the below portrayal of the interviewees by and large encompasses their characteristics as pertinent only at the time of the interviews.

interviewees, 10 fell into the 20-40 age group, another 10 were in the 40-60 bracket, and the 11 remaining were over 60.

In terms of *gender*, the 31 respondents were nearly evenly split, with 15 women and 16 men. The *marital status* of the respondents also varied: nine were bachelors, two were divorced, two were widowed, and the remaining 18 were married, with just four having entered into a second marriage. The married respondents overwhelmingly had Jewish spouses, with only two married to Muslims. For the respondents with children, most had two, especially among those who were married or had been previously, but at the time of the interviews some had one child or three.

With respect to *citizenship*, all of the 31 respondents had Turkish citizenship. Three had dual citizenship, one Turkish-Israeli and two Turkish-Italian. These foreign citizenships were either gained through marriage or inherited from their parents. The remaining 28 interviewees had only Turkish citizenship. All of the respondents' Turkish citizenship was gained by birth; in other words, all were born in Turkey. Broken down by *place of birth*, all but six of the 31 interviewees had been born in the province of Istanbul, with three born in İzmir, two in Edirne and one in Çanakkale. These birthplaces correspond with regions where the Jewish community in Turkey traditionally settled before the 1950s and '60s. Today, the majority of Jews in Turkey live in Istanbul and İzmir. Hence, by *place of residence*, all of the respondents were living in Istanbul at the time of the interview, though some had recently moved there from İzmir. The districts that the respondents lived in correlated to their income level. Those with high or medium income levels lived in districts such as Beylerbeyi, Levent, Ulus,

Göztepe, Kemerburgaz and Nişantaşı, all of which are typically middle- or upper-class areas. Those with comparatively lower income levels lived in Hasköy and Kuledibi, areas characterized by lower- and lower-middle class residents.

In terms of *employment status*, out of total 31 respondents, nine of the respondents were employed at the time of the interviews. Out of these nine respondents, seven were males and two were females. Among these working respondents, six of them were employed in mostly white color jobs (two economists, one procurement specialist, one lawyer, one academician and one art creator) and the remaining three were self-employed (two traders and one accountant). None of the respondents held positions in state offices, excepting one academic working at a state university. Out of the total 31 respondents, 22 of them were not employed at the time of the interviews with 13 females and nine males. Among the respondents who were not employed, 11 of them were housewives, six of them were retired mostly from blue color jobs, three of them were students, one of them was unemployed but was actively in search of job and one of them was fulfilling his military service. Employment statuses differed markedly according to gender, as most of the female respondents neither worked outside the home nor were seeking jobs at the time of interviews. Those between 20 and 40 years of age were, however, either working or hoped to work at some point of their lives. In contrast, the majority of the male respondents held occupations or professions, and were working, excepting those who were unemployed, fulfilling their military service, enrolled in university, or already retired at the time of the interviews.

The *education level* of the 31 respondents also varied. Two of the respondents had no education at all, two had finished elementary school, three had

finished junior high school, 12 were high school graduates, one had finished two years of school beyond high school (college), six were university graduates, four had master's degrees and one had a doctorate. The education level of all of the respondents was higher than that of their parents. For instance, if a subjects' mother had completed only primary school, the subject herself had gone further than this, by for example graduating high school. Similarly, if the father of an interview subject had finished high school, the subject himself had gotten a university education. Thus the Jewish respondents exemplified a generational educational advancement during Turkey's Republican modernization period.

If one looks at the occupation and education levels of the respondents, it can be argued that the *socio-economic background* of the 31 respondents reflected more of a middle-class orientation in terms of social class stratification. Most of the interviewees were of the middle socio-economic class in terms of income and education levels. Although some were poor, these were mainly older respondents living in nursing homes. The middle-age and younger Jews varied between lower- to upper-middle class.

With respect to *ethno-religious origin*, out of the total 31 respondents, 30 were Sephardic Jews and one was an Ashkenazic Jew. Ethno-religious origin also includes the respondents' profiles in terms of mother tongue and the language used in both private and public spheres. The mother tongues of the respondents were as follows: two had French, 15 had Ladino and 14 had Turkish as their mother tongue. However, the interviewees with non-Turkish mother tongues stated that Turkish was not completely alien to them and that their command of it had improved during their elementary school years. None of the respondents

characterized either Turkish or Ladino as a foreign language. Although either language could be their mother tongue, they did not exclude the predominance of other languages in their lives. All of the respondents knew Ladino, although their level of proficiency varied by age, with the older generations more at home in the tongue. Since Ladino is generally a spoken language and is rarely written, none of the respondents reported knowing how to read or write it. Most of the respondents knew more than two foreign languages, with French as the most common followed in descending order by English, Italian, Greek, Hebrew, German and Arabic. Some of the interviewees who considered Spanish a foreign tongue had taken or were taking courses in it so as to improve their Ladino (due to the latter's heavy Spanish elements).

4.4 How Do Jews in Turkey See Citizenship? Their Experiences and Perceptions

In this part of the chapter, the findings obtained from in-depth interviews with members of Turkey's Jewish community are analyzed in light of the questions guiding this research. The main questions are: How do Jews in Turkey perceive and experience citizenship? How is the interface between the Jews' minority status and Turkish citizenship?; and 'What is the relation between the legal status, identity and civic virtue of citizenship in Turkey in the sample group of Jews? The scope of the findings is diverse and multifaceted due to the in-depth nature of the interviews, but only the data relevant to the main research questions are discussed. The question "How do the interview respondents perceive their

membership, belonging and/or attachment to the Turkish nation-state?" also complements the basic research questions and refines the interface between Jewish minority status and Turkish citizenship. Therefore, the discussion which follows unfolds according to the three aspects of citizenship, yet the findings on membership, belonging and attachment to the Turkish nation-state also supplement the discussion.

The profile of the respondents shows that there have been changes in the general profile of Turkey's Jewish minority since the foundation of the Republic to the present. As laid out in Chapters II and III, the sociological and demographic features of the Jewish minority underwent radical changes due to *two* major phenomena, namely Turkey's process of modernization and westernization and the emigration abroad of Turkey's Jews, mainly to Israel. As a result of these two forces, the changes in the general profile of the nation's Jewish minority followed a sequential and successive track along the course of modern Turkey's own history. In accordance with Turkey's path of modernization and westernization, firstly, in the 1930s and '40s, the Jews' educational level rose due to reforms of secular education; in the '50s, traditional Jewish settlements and neighborhoods were eclipsed by the emergence of new districts in metropolitan areas due to internal migration and urbanization; since the '50s, in particular, the Jews' Ladino and French mother tongues were over time both replaced by Turkish; since the '70s, the occupational and professional spectrum open to Jews expanded; and since the '80s, gender relations grew more liberal over time and the status of Jewish women rose as more women started to receive higher education, take public jobs and gain visibility. *Secondly*, as the result of mass Jewish emigration

to Israel, the remaining Jews in Turkey took on a more homogeneous socio-economic makeup. Most of them moved to cities and metropolitan areas, specifically to İzmir and Istanbul. These changes are also evident in the profile of the respondents given above. For instance, the older generations were born in traditional Jewish neighborhoods, whereas the newer generations were born in cities with no experience of such neighborhoods. Drawing on these research results showing similarities with the historical transformation of Turkey's Jewish minority, one can argue that the age and hence generation of the respondents will be helpful in understanding their experiences and perceptions of citizenship. In other words, rather than an analysis taking into account separately the respondents' gender, socio-economic status and ethnic origin, a general evaluation of the interviews on the basis of generation will be preferred. The special focus on the generation of the respondents will help not only to illuminate the changes in the history of Turkey's Jewish minority and the development of citizenship by period but also to clarify the roots of the differences and similarities between and among the respondents in their ideas, thoughts, values and life histories. Therefore, the analysis of the interview findings rests on a special focus on the respondents' generation as marked by their age groups.

4.4.1 Turkish Citizenship and the Legal Status of Jews in Turkey

Jews in Turkey were granted the status of minority group with the Treaty of Lausanne and hence special social and cultural rights. However, with the enactment of the 1924 Constitution and 1926 Civil Law, the elites of Turkey's

Jewish community voluntarily opted out of Lausanne's Article 42 in favor of accepting the Turkish Civil Code to regulate Jews. In line with their view that the state's regulations on citizenship (as protected by constitutional provisions) put Turkey's Jews in the same legal framework of rights and responsibilities, the Jewish elites rejected special legal treatment towards their community. However, developments such as the Thrace Incidents, the Incident of the Reserves, the 1942 Capital Tax, and the September 6-7 Events cast into doubt the universal nature of the existing legal framework.

In the interviews, it emerged that in terms of the respondents' general historical knowledge, they were unaware of the special rights granted to non-Muslim minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne and the decision to opt out of Article 42. Even more, most of the interviewees thought that since they were Turkish citizens, they had the same rights and responsibilities as their fellow citizens, and that in due course calling them part of a 'minority' group was incorrect or misleading. One respondent who knew little about the status of minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne had this to say:

> We don't have a minority status. I don't know the details, but we don't want to be considered minorities. In the past, we rejected minority status. This was the right decision. As far as I know, the Greeks and the Armenians have minority status, but Jews don't. I don't know for certain, but I think it's like that. I know we're not a minority. (FRIT27, 65, female)[6]

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[6] Each interview subject's code, age and gender follow every interview quotation within parentheses. Individual codes are used to identify every subject. The style for the codes is as follows: 'FRIT' is an acronym for 'field research in Turkey.' The number following FRIT is the number (1-31) given to the interviewee. Therefore, each interviewee code begins with FRIT but ends with a unique number. These codes are listed in Appendix D that gives interview subjects' general profile. The number next to the code refers to the age of the interviewee which is followed by female or male identifying the gender.

When the respondents were reminded about such developments as the Capital Tax which impinged on the equal and universal framework of citizenship, all agreed that such past hostile practices against non-Muslims, including Jews, were unequal and discriminatory in nature and disrupted universal citizenship. Though they generally acknowledged that such discriminatory acts could possibly recur, the respondents largely emphasized that these hostile practices were a thing of the past; that Turkey since its establishment had gone through many phases of its nation-building; in these phases the Jewish community had experienced some occasional hardships; but that these difficulties could be interpreted neither as oppression of nor systematic discrimination against the Jews. However, there were marked variances among respondents of different age groups. The plus-60 elderly respondents knew more about these incidents, as some of them had witnessed them firsthand with their families when they were young or were personally victims of such acts. As two interviewees recollected:

> I lived through the Thracian Incidents myself personally. At that time, my father was away in Istanbul to buy fabric for the shop and I was left alone running it. Then gangsters from other towns came to Kırklareli [where the subject lived- a Thracian province where Jews were concentrated historically] and looted all the shops owned by the Jews. These people even raped the sisters of my relatives in Kırklareli and other young Jewish girls. There was no doubt about these events; they were crystal clear. After looting the Jewish shop a few blocks away from ours, these gangsters came to our fabric shop. [At that time] there was a Tatar tailor who sewed clothes for customers with fabric sold from our shop. His name was Akif. He didn't usually visit our shop a lot but that day, the day that the gang of looters came to rob our shop, by chance he was there. One of the looters told me to open up one parcel of fabric, which I did. Then he asked several pointless questions. I understood that he was trying to start an argument. Akif, who like an angel was watching what the man was doing, asked me whether I was going to keep selling goods or would agree to sell the shop to him. Then

> he went up to this gangster and said, 'This Jewish man is selling the store to me. You can buy fabric from me tomorrow morning.' The gangster was surprised and left the store without taking anything from it. After he left, Akif and I hugged each other. I thanked him for this brilliant idea and for his help. In this way we were saved from the incidents known as the Thrace Incidents. But other Jews weren't as lucky as we were. (FRIT28, 86, male).

> During the time of the Capital Tax, my father had to pay 350,000 liras [around 100,000 US dollars]. We had to sell our apartment to pay this. In those days, all the capital was accumulated by minorities. Jews were very rich. This tax was a policy of the government in power at that time. The government wanted to take capital that was in the hands of minorities and transfer it to Muslims. A person may have nationalistic feelings. This is normal. Why should all the money be in the hands of a particular societal group? I think the Capital Tax was normal but its implementation was unfair because you could neither object to the amount levied nor appeal it in court. They should've also demanded the same amount from the Muslims, but they didn't. The tax rate for non-Muslims was much higher than the rate for Muslims. (FRIT27, 65, female)

Although elderly Jews knew of past discriminatory acts committed against themselves and their community in Turkey, they chose not to transmit this knowledge to subsequent generations, tending instead to either ignore or forget this discrimination. In the words of one:

> These bad events should be forgotten. They don't oblige modern Turkey in any way. These are minor historical details which belong only to the past. (FRIT21, 77, male)

Some of the over-60 respondents thought that Turkey's laws were nearly impartial but that there were specific ones barring Jews from taking positions in state and military offices as well as the Grand National Assembly (Parliament), though when asked to specify these claims, were unable to do so. Those who thought that there were no specific laws of the type mentioned above raised the

specter of invisible social barriers.[7] Two interviewees expressed their thoughts as follows:

> They don't recruit us as public officials. Not in this country. There are very few Jews in Turkey. Nobody in the Jewish community would work to become a state official. We're citizens of this country. When we're drafted they give us weapons. But they don't make state officials out of us. I don't know why. (FRIT8, 83, male)

> Jews can become deputies in Parliament but not president or prime minister. Nobody in our community has said he would want to become prime minister or a state minister. Other people in the political parties wouldn't support a Jewish candidate. There's no legal barrier, but there may be problems among individuals. (FRIT25, 71, male)

It was interesting to note that while some of the elderly respondents believed that the supposed legal or social barriers to Jews taking high state or political office were actually sensible, others criticized the barriers. One defended the supposed restrictions as follows:

> I wouldn't favor Jews holding high state positions, because there are very talented and competent people among the Muslims for these positions. I don't think Jews or other non-Muslims would be proficient to serve the state because they've never done so in the past. They don't know how to administer a state. I would prefer a Turk to administer the state. I also think that in terms of identity, it wouldn't be proper for a Jew to hold a high position. The majority is Muslim and a Muslim should represent this majority. Society wouldn't accept a non-Muslim representing it. They may see a Jew as being different from themselves. There is democracy in Turkey and it's a real democracy. But democracy means that the majority rules society. This is normal. (FRIT23, 77, female)

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[7] In Turkey's legal system, there are no specific laws that bar Jews from taking positions in offices.

On the other hand, there were also strong criticisms of these supposed barriers, like so:

> If you're a Muslim, you can become a state minister but if you're a Jew, you can't. This is unfair. Are there any Jews in state offices? Not a one. There should be Jewish state officials. As the Jewish community we tolerate it but Europe is keeping a file on this. Turkey can't join the European Union unless it recruits non-Muslims to state offices. The European countries want to see Jewish officials in Turkey. Democracy also demands this. Everybody knows this for a fact, but we can't see what's right under our noses. (FRIT29, 81, female)

Interview respondents who were middle-aged (40-60) at the time of the interviews pointed to a transitional generation in terms of similarities and differences with the preceding and rising generations. These interviewees were better educated than those over 60. However, they also lacked knowledge of the special rights granted to them by Lausanne, nor were they well informed about past discrimination such as the Capital Tax, as they had learned very little from their families about this history or had been very young at the time. However, in contrast to their elderly counterparts, the middle-aged group generally believed that accounts of past discriminatory acts should be transmitted to future generations so they could learn about the history of Jews in Turkey:

> I heard about the Capital Tax not from my own family but from my mother-in-law, whose family became poor after paying the tax. I'm of the opinion that every incident in history, whatever it may be, must be told to the young generations. This isn't like raising children in hatred or enmity but everything must be made open to them. We can forgive but we'll never forget. This must be the basic principle for every issue. (FRIT30, 45, female)

The middle-aged interviewees by and large considered themselves to be Jewish-origin Turks and Turkish citizens. Most of them believed that on the legal level, there were no special provisions for Jews and that furthermore, all the laws were equal for Turkish citizens, all of whom had the same sets of rights and responsibilities despite religious differences. However, they also said that at various times there might have been social barriers blocking Jews. Such barriers would have involved not being recruited to the professional ranks of the Turkish Armed Forces, discrimination in seeking driver's licenses or involving the draft, and being passed over in political and bureaucratic promotions. Some of the points mentioned by the respondents are as follows:

> The laws are generally equal but there are restrictions. For instance, Jews in Turkey can't be police officers. I don't think this is a big problem because I guess no Jew in Turkey would want to be a police officer but every Turkish citizen should have the same rights as others have. (FRIT30, 45, female)

> A Jew can become a bureaucrat or a minister if they're capable but first they have to change their name. A person named Solomon can't serve as a state minister in Turkey, but a Nedim or Selim could. (FRIT11, 52, male)

> Jews can't be parliamentary deputies because they can't bring more votes to their party. If a Jew was elected to Parliament, I think the Islamists and rightists would be unhappy about this. Some years ago there was a Jewish deputy but he was beaten by other deputies. A Jew can't become a military officer, first because he wouldn't want to because Jews earn good money in other fields, and second he wouldn't be recruited to the army even if he wanted to. However, we have Jewish state officials. For example, there are academics in state universities. (FRIT14, 50, male)

For most of the respondents, the term 'Turk' referred to their citizenship status. Although many of them mentioned that Muslims were the majority in Turkey, they argued that Turk was a more appropriate term to use for the nation's

citizens. Most of them agreed that a Turk and hence a Turkish citizen was a person who was born in Turkey, was living in Turkey, spoke Turkish and shared the same culture and history as the society in Turkey.

> The citizens of Turkey are Turks. I don't believe people who say Turks came originally from Central Asia. These are just made-up stories. In my opinion, 'Turk' doesn't mean the same as 'Muslim.' Of course, 99 percent of the Turks in Turkey are Muslims but when someone mentions a Turk, I don't immediately think that that person is a Muslim. 'Turk' sounds like a secular adjective, one separate from religious identity. In my opinion, a Turk is a citizen of the state of Turkey. (FRIT12, 45, male)

> For me, there's only one criterion for being a Turk, and that's holding a Turkish identity card. It's a legal status prescribed by citizenship. Looked at this way, all the people living in Turkey are Turks. I don't make distinctions of religion, race or language within Turkish society. Of course there are some people who have two passports at the same time. They are also Turks. For instance, there are Turkish citizens living in Germany. Not only we, but those people in Germany are also Turks. (FRIT10, 49, female)

The respondents age 20 to 40 see themselves as Turks having Turkish citizenship, as we see in these interview excerpts:

> The word 'Turk' brings to my mind people who were born in Turkey, live in Turkey and hold Turkish citizenship. I think citizenship is the basic criterion for being Turk. Some say that 'Turk' by nature means Muslim. I disagree. There are many people in Turkish society who aren't Muslims. Turkish citizens who live under the Turkish flag are Turks, in my opinion, whatever their religion. (FRIT3, 27, female)

> The first thing that comes to my mind about 'Turk' is Turkish citizen. Turk means culture, in my opinion. Of course it's important to speak Turkish, but ethnic background isn't. People generally believe that Turks came originally from Central Asia, which is wrong. This is a very cosmopolitan society with people from different places. I don't think Turk is an ethnic origin. Speaking generally, it's true that most Turks are Muslims. But this is how it looks like when seen from outside. If we look from inside, we see that Turks are

> people holding Turkish citizenship. Citizenship marks the basis of being Turk. (FRIT1, 35, male)

Although these young interviewees acknowledge their difference of faith, they think that society in general is composed of different ethno-religious or social backgrounds yet that these differences need not lead to disparities in treatment, either legally or socially. Although some of the respondents admitted that they had experienced, witnessed or heard about incidents that reminded the Jews of their difference of religion, they thought these incidents did not weigh so heavily on their lives in Turkey. Almost all these young respondents believed that there were no special legal provisions which discriminate against citizens of Jewish origin. However, some also made points about social barriers to the recruitment of Jews to politics or state administration:

> I'd like to get a post at the Foreign Ministry but I know that since I'm a Jew, I can't. It was so obvious that I wouldn't be recruited to the Foreign Ministry so I didn't even apply. No law in Turkey would ever say, 'Jews can't take the Foreign Ministry entrance exams,' but I know deep down that they wouldn't let me pass it. This is a violation of my citizenship rights, but I can't show this it's discrimination that's provable in a court of law. (FRIT4, 23, female)

When asked about past incidents which worked against Jews and non-Muslims in general such as the Capital Tax or the September 6-7 Events, the young respondents showed in their responses that their families had not told them about these incidents, electing instead to remain silent. Therefore, most of the respondents lacked relevant information about these historical events. Most of them said that they had heard about these incidents only very recently either

through seeing movies on the Capital Tax or by books discussing these issues. After getting information from these secondary sources, they asked their families about what happened in Turkish history against the Jewish community. One interviewee had this to say:

> I hadn't had any information on these issues before. Frankly, they weren't discussed in my family. Of course, this is partly due to the general character of Turkish society. We tend to forget our history, our past very quickly. I mean, not only Jews but also Muslims forget their history. Recently, I read some books about these issues and learned about them. (FRIT1, 35, male)

When the interviews focused on the legal aspect of Turkish citizenship, the common theme that arose across all age groups was that equality was a right of citizens. In other words, the respondents from various categories of age, gender, socio-economic status, etc. generally emphasized equality as a basic norm of citizenship. Furthermore, they identified equality as a fundamental right of citizenship. Equality, in their understanding, referred to a legal matter of equality before the law. Concerning equal and universal citizenship in Turkey, they pointed to the rights to be treated like others, to not be classified differently, to be subject to the same provisions and practices as other citizens and to not be distinguished by their differences of religion. Some of the interviewees had this to say:

> To start with, one needs to be equal with others in every respect. One needs to have the right to obtain property, work, have access to health services, vote, and be nominated in elections. (FRIT15, 28, male)

> One needs to have all the constitutional and legal rights. That's what citizenship is as I understand it. The basic right that I have, in my opinion, is being equal with others. This is what I look for. (FRIT5, 52, female)

> Not being discriminated against and being treated equally are basic rights. Since we're born here, in this country, we demand the same rights that others have. (FRIT28, 86, male)

In this regard, it can be argued that when the Jewish elite opted out of Article 42 of the Treaty of Lausanne, this action did not indicate a contradictory position on the part of the Jewish community. Even more, one can argue that such a strong emphasis on legal equality by members of a minority group reflects a desire to be assimilated into the general public not through their difference in religion but rather their sameness in having Turkish citizenship. Some of the respondents went so far as to claim that the inclusion of citizens' religion on the identity cards – e.g. writing 'Muslim' for Muslim citizens and 'Jew' for Jewish ones – threatened the concept of equality of Turkish citizenship. All the respondents also pointed out that they were not in favor of special group rights for the Jewish community. They thought that such special rights would stand in the way of equal and universal citizenship.

Concerning the responsibilities entailed by Turkish citizenship, it must be noted first of all that the respondents mainly associated citizenship with responsibilities rather than rights, especially in the middle-aged and older generations. Generally, paying taxes and military conscription were regarded as the basic responsibilities borne by Turkish citizens. Furthermore, it was also frequently stated in the interviews that the responsibilities of citizenship were loyalty to the state, obeying state laws and regulations that are applied equally to

all its citizens, conforming to the existing legal framework and fulfilling the prescribed duties. These views referred to a passive understanding of citizenship in Turkey, as shown by these interviewees, both over 40:

> There are no rights but duties. I think citizenship has more to do with responsibilities. For instance, a citizen should obey the laws, fulfill his draft duty and participate in helping to solve social problems as much as is possible. (FRIT25, 71, male)

> Loyalty to the state is important. Citizens should be loyal to the state. Also, citizens should pay their taxes. Military conscription is an obligation that must be fulfilled in any case. Voting is not a right but a responsibility. In short, we do what we have to, what the state requires of us. This is our duty. (FRIT18, 57, female)

However, with the younger generations, the responsibilities of citizenship in Turkey were not separable from the rights granted by the state to its citizens. These interviewees mainly emphasized that since they were fulfilling their responsibilities such as obeying the draft or paying taxes, they also had the right to social security, education, health care, etc. in return. Their understanding of citizenship pointed to a more active citizenship. For instance, although the older respondents did not mention the possibility of the Religious Affairs Directorate boosting its budget/allocating money to synagogues and for Jewish religious affairs, the other respondents said that since they were paying taxes, their synagogues should receive funds from the state budget. Some statements by a younger respondent below referred to a more active understanding of responsibilities with regards to citizenship in Turkey, like so:

> The draft is the primary responsibility. Also, citizens must represent their country very well in other countries. I understand these issues as citizenship. I know from my male friends that when they say that they're Turkish, girls have nothing to do with them. The image of Turks abroad is depressing. What do we try to do in Turkey? Don't burn the flag, protect your flag, and sing the national anthem every morning or similar silly things. Of course these are also important but though Americans wear their flag as underwear they're still patriotic about their country and their flag. Our people do like their country, but we can't be like them. Those people are very loyal to their country. Citizenship is not only about rights and responsibilities. The state shouldn't frustrate its citizens to further its own interests. The state shouldn't block its citizens like a wall. A citizen should be united with the state in the same body. Citizens shouldn't fear the police walking down the street as if they were fearing God. On the contrary, when they see a police officer, they should first think that the police are there to protect them. Why do I fear them? Why? (FRIT17, 23, male)

4.4.2 Turkish Citizenship and the Identity of Jews in Turkey

The various cultural, educational and social policies initiated after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey during its nation-building process sped up the integration process of its Jews to society at large. The findings of the field research on Jews in Turkey reflected a similarly gradual process of integration. One of the most significant changes seems to have been in the use of language among the Jews. Turkey's Jews traditionally used either French, Ladino or Turkish as their mother tongues, depending on their socio-economic status, i.e. upper-class Jews preferred French or Turkish, but the less-educated lower classes favored Ladino. However, the use of French and Ladino diminished over time as Turkish started to displace the other languages. Turkish eventually became the dominant language used in the private sphere. The spread of the use of Turkish among Jews of various classes was mainly due to the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign launched in 1927 and the national educational reform. Most of the

respondents argued that each country should have a single dominant language, which in Turkey naturally would be Turkish. Furthermore, they were of the idea that Turkish needed to be learned by citizens who lacked it as their mother tongue. Having set proficiency in Turkish as a requirement of living in Turkey, they stressed that the nation's Jews, especially older members of the Jewish community who lacked Turkish or preferred not to use it, should speak Turkish in the public sphere and in relations with people outside the community. However, most of them also emphasized that the spread of Turkish need not take the form of pressure or obligation but rather could be done in a spontaneous and gradual way, without the imposition of the state or society on those who lack Turkish. Most of the respondents knew about the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign. Although some of them lacked solid information about the campaign itself and thought of the stipulation to speak Turkish as a social trend in evidence since the early years of the Republic through today, they thought that either in as a campaign or a social trend, Turkish was considered as one of the essential norms of public life in Turkey. Yet, for them it need not be imposed by force or pressure but rather could be part of a gradual transition. The pressure to speak Turkish was felt most keenly by less-educated Jewish women from the lower and middle classes who were generally housewives. Since they were confined to the private sphere with limited access to the public sphere where Turkish was more dominant, they generally did not know any Turkish. Some of the views on mother tongues and the languages used by Jews in Turkey are as follows:

> Everybody should speak Turkish on the streets. When people visit the grocer, they shouldn't ask for a kilo of potatoes in some other language.

> You can speak whatever language you like at home but on the streets communication between people needs to be in Turkish. (FRIT22, 23, female)

> Due to the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, after a certain period families started to send their children to Turkish schools so they could learn to speak good Turkish. My father and mother were speaking Ladino with each other, but my brother and I would speak Turkish. Even when they were speaking Ladino to us, we would answer them in Turkish. This was an attempt at integration. We wanted to become integrated. My grandmother and grandfather were living with us when I was a child. My grandmother didn't know any Turkish. She was speaking Ladino. I used to mock her for being unable to speak Turkish. Poor grandma! (FRIT12, 45, male)

> I knew about the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign. No one ever warned me to speak Turkish because I knew how. But people raised in Jewish neighborhoods didn't know any Turkish and so this campaign hurt them. They would have spoken Turkish if they had known any but they didn't. They tried speaking but after a certain age they couldn't learn well. They were speaking very funny Turkish. For instance, we had an Armenian neighbor and she wrote, 'Do park in front of the house!' on the wall of her house. Actually she meant, 'Don't park in front of the house!' and she got angry at the cars parked in front of her house because everybody who read her sign parked there. I think the campaign was natural but you know, both parties were right. Those who wanted Turkish to be spoken were right but those who couldn't speak Turkish were right as well. Today nobody can compel others to speak a certain language. But those times were different. In those times the state was pulling itself up. (FRIT21, 77, male)

The respondents were also asked whether they saw any difference between the Turkish terms 'Musevi' and 'Yahudi.'[8] Most of the respondents said that they did not see any difference between the two terms, as both referred to believers of the religion Judaism and its prophet, Moses. However, some of them contended

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[8] Musevi is a Turkish word used frequently to refer to the followers and descendents of Moses (Musa in Turkish). Yahudi, also a widespread term, has the same connotation but refers more to believers in Judaism. Similar Turkish terms used for Christians are İsevi referring to the followers of Jesus (İsa) and Hristiyan referring to Christians in general. Yahudi is generally considered a negative term and commonly used in daily life to degrade the Jews. Musevi on the other hand is accepted as a more polite term in the Turkish society. The findings in the field research confirmed the distinction as well.

that Yahudi carried a more pejorative meaning than Musevi. Yahudi, according to them, was used in a context of denigrating Jews along the lines of 'cowardly Jews' or 'dirty Jews,' whereas Musevi was a more polite and respectful term. Likewise, some of them preferred that Musevi be used so as to free the term from any negative connotations, but there were others who felt no partiality. The following interview quotations demonstrate both views:

> For me, Judaism is a religion. I'm not so religious, so I see it partly as a religion and partly as a culture. I'm a Jew. Being called Yahudi never bothered me. Actually Yahudi is the correct term. Musevi is the name coined by Atatürk for Jews, referring to the followers of Moses. I learned this very recently during a conference organized by a Jewish organization. The person giving the speech said, 'You're actually Yahudi. Musevi is the name given by Atatürk.' I agree that Yahudi has traditionally been used to belittle Jews. But in my case, either Musevi or Yahudi, it makes no difference. (FRIT3, 27, female)

> I define myself as a Jewish Turkish citizen. Judaism is a religion. Of course, religion brings with it a Jewish culture as well, but the term Yahudi annoys me. Yahudi sounds like a label for degrading Jews. I prefer Musevi. Musevi sounds like a religion and nothing more. I see it like that as well; it's only a religion and has no other meaning. (FRIT2, 32, male)

When asked whether being a Jew meant belonging to a religion or national/ethnic groups, the respondents' replies varied according to their age group and affiliation with Israel. For instance, older respondents seemed to perceive their status as Jews as meaning belonging to an ethnic or a national group.

> Musevi and Yahudi are the same. Actually Musevi is a new word. All the Jews, the Jewish nation was born in Egypt. (FRIT6, 89, male)

Those interviewees who at some time had emigrated to Israel then later returned to Turkey seemed to identify Jewry with nationhood or national/ethnic identity, like so:

> Musevi and Yahudi are different things. Musevi refers to a religion, but Yahudi represents a nation. Israel is a state founded as the result of this voluntary unity. Now Israel is under attack. Its sovereignty is under question. As long as the existence of Israel is questioned, there will be Jews who will fight for the unity of the Jews. Jews in Turkey seem to be in the midst of an identity crisis. Some of them say, 'We're Turks.' And others say, 'We're Jews.' There are also people in the community who refuse both identities and see themselves as citizens of the world with no affiliation or identity. I'm not a religious person, but I believe in the nation of the Jews as long as Israel exists. (FRIT11, 52, male)

The younger respondents, however, tended to emphasize the religious aspect of their being Jews, overshadowing any national aspect. The following quotations are examples of this self-perception:

> The term Yahudi sounds more like a person who dogmatically and strictly sticks to the rules of religion. Yahudi reminds me of such a conservative person. I'm more a Musevi. I'm a modern Jew. I believe in Judaism but I'm not dogmatic. My practice of Judaism is flexible. For me, there are no hard rules in Judaism. (FRIT20, 31, female)

One of the most significant issues that emerged in the field research with members of the Jewish community was the varying level of integration across different generations. When we look comprehensively at all the interviews with various age groups, it becomes clear that in terms of the opinions, worldviews and self-perceptions voiced in the interviews, over time, by the newer generations, Turkish identity as a "super identity" has been displacing or squeezing out Jewish identity. This Turkish identity comes from being born and living in Turkey and

therefore covers the sharing of a mutual culture and history with society at large, according to most of the respondents. Jewish identity seems to have been more emphasized by the older generations and Turkish identity more by the younger ones. However, it must be noted that all of the respondents referred to the presence of both identities in a kind of dual-identity. The following quotations from different age groups are examples of this dual-identity:

> I define myself as a Turk. I mean, a Turkish Jew. But Turkish comes before Jewish and not vice versa. I'm first of all a Turk and then a Jew. (FRIT4, 23, female)

> In terms of identity, our situation is more complex than other ordinary Turkish citizens. To start with, I'm a Turkish citizen. Let me put it better: I'm a Turkish citizen with a Jewish origin. Judaism is my religion. As an identity, I belong here. I'm a lawyer and a member of the Bar Association. I started to question my identity only after I became an adult. It's true that I'm a Turkish citizen but one with a Jewish origin. I think I'm not alone in this feeling of divided identity. (FRIT12, 45, male)

The Jewish community faced the problem of intermarriage, especially after the 1980s and '90s, as an apparent result of this integration process. Although most of the respondents affirmed integration at the level of values, they tried to resist the idea of intermarriage on the argument that the rising intermarriage rate was threatening Jewish identity as well as on the specter of the already declining Jewish population. As a result of this resistance to intermarriage, said the interviewees, Jewish families constantly and persistently urge their children not to marry non-Jews, which results in pressure on the children. This pressure on young Jews seemed to be felt more among young Jewish women than young men, as one young single Jewish woman related:

> I've had Muslim boyfriends before. I like a Muslim guy right now but I can't introduce him to my family. How can I when I can't admit that I like him even to myself? Religious difference is a very complex issue and every young person in our community suffers from it. Some young Jews have even tried to kill themselves when prevented from marrying their gentile boyfriend or girlfriend. My mother and father would be extremely upset if I married a gentile. No matter what you do, bring a Jewish child into the world! – That's their main concern. It's a huge burden on young people and very hard to bear. There's more pressure on the women of the Jewish community because they need to raise the future Jewish generations. There's [also] the pressure of assimilation on us. Since there's always this pressure on us not to intermarry, you always make more mistakes than you would otherwise. The community always tries to play matchmaker so they offer you five potential husbands. [But] one of them is blind, one is handicapped and another is uneducated. There are very few Jews in Turkey anyway. Who's left? No one. People shouldn't get married on the basis of religion but the families don't understand this. I really don't want to see Jews disappear from Turkey in 100 years. I'd like my community to survive. But for that survival, they want us, the young people, to sacrifice ourselves. I'd marry a French Jew or an Israeli Jew. It wouldn't matter but of course, the ideal situation would be marrying a Turkish Jew because you know, the whole language thing is very important. Also spouses' sharing the same culture in marriage is important. (FRIT4, 23, female)

Other single young women interviewed expressed sentiments about intermarriage similar to those above. However, the views and feelings of the single men were different in that they seemed more relaxed about the issue and did not take it as seriously as the young women. However, this does not mean that they felt no pressure or anxiety. Rather, the pressure on the young men seemed to be felt less than that on the young women. The following excerpt from the interview of a single young man shows this:

> Whether I marry a Jew or a gentile isn't a concern for me. Of course my family wouldn't be happy about me marrying a Muslim but they know they can't interfere in my life. Sometimes I suggest to them jokingly that I could marry a Muslim. Intermarriage isn't accepted by our community so my mother doesn't laugh at this, but instead says seriously that that would make

> her very unhappy. I do invite my Muslim girlfriends home and introduce them to my mother. But if I introduced one of them as, 'Yes mother, this is the girl that I'm going to marry!' my mother would be angry at me. I know that. I don't think they would cast me out of the family. If they did, I would reject them as well. My family should understand me. I can't marry a Jewish girl just because she's Jewish. Right now I have more Muslim friends than Jewish ones. I broke through the boundaries of the Jewish community. This happened after I graduated from high school. I learned a new life which was more interesting and full of life. I don't want to go back to my past life when I only had Jewish friends. I say this to my family openly. (FRIT17, 23, male)

The reason for the difference in the pressure felt by the young men and women could lie in Judaism's status as a matrilineal religion, that is, one carried down by birth through the mother, not the father. Thus girls might be raised with a concern that their choice of marriage partner would be important for the Jewish community as a whole and their Jewish offspring. A more likely explanation, however, is a sociological one seen in the field research in Turkey, namely how Jewish culture is transmitted and disseminated mainly by the women of the community. In other words, women are the fundamental agents of the protection and survival of Jewish identity, religion, tradition and culture. The Jewish community's religious rituals, ceremonies, customs and social relations are maintained mainly by its women. For instance, Jewish women are more active than the men in preparing kosher food at home, organizing for the religious festivals, raising children according to Jewish traditions and values, doing volunteer work in Jewish groups and associations, and acting as matchmaker among Jewish young people. As a result of the role filled by Jewish women in practicing and spreading Jewish culture and identity, daughters of marriageable age may feel a stronger pressure to marry Jewish spouses than do the sons. Another reason for the anxiety among female Jews may be rooted in their

community's patriarchy. Jewish families may see their daughters as being more controllable, pliable and obedient than their sons and hence may exert more pressure on them. The daughters, on the hand, may be internalizing the pressure put on them by their families more than do the sons.

In addition to the conflict between resisting intermarriage on the one hand and advocating integration into Turkish culture and society on the other, the Jewish community in Turkey seems to be suffering from another conflict that springs mainly from the nation's official secularism. The principle of secularism, since the establishment of modern Turkey, has provided a barrier against the influx of Islamic norms in the public sphere. It not only assumed an important place in the nation's legal and constitutional framework but also served as a fundamental pillar of Turkish democracy and its institutions. However, the principle of secularism and its reflection in reforms since the establishment of the Republic at the same time restricted the place of religion in society. In other words, secularism strictly confined religion to the private sphere. The appearance or use of any symbols of religion, either Muslim or non-Muslim, was kept on a tight leash. Furthermore, with the fear of Islamism, a movement thought to threaten the ideals of westernization and modernization, Islam was not only disallowed from the public sphere but also stringently regulated and controlled through institutions such as the state's General Directorate of Religious Affairs. Although the prohibition of Islam in the public sphere enabled a more secure and liberated environment for non-Muslims, one free from the threat of an Islamic order, such restrictions on Islam and all other religions in the public sphere also curbed the religious identity of the Jews.

Secularism is generally perceived as loyalty to the Kemalist reform program aiming at westernization and modernization and therefore, the Jewish community in Turkey also placed importance on the principle of secularism. Under secularism, however, symbols of Judaism itself were also restricted from appearing in the public sphere. Although the Treaty of Lausanne provided religious freedom to the Jews as well as to the Greeks and Armenians, this religious freedom was limited by secularism. For instance, under Lausanne and other domestic legislation, the wearing of religious attire in the public sphere was allowed only for leaders of the religious communities. Consequently, for Muslims, wearing the turban was disallowed to all but the director of the Religious Affairs Directorate; for Jews, attire symbolizing the religious leader was allowed only to the chief rabbi; and for the Armenians and Greeks, garb symbolizing their religious leaders was only allowed to the patriarchs. The wearing of the common religious skullcap known as the *kipah* (or yarmulke), normally worn by ordinary Jews on the streets, was restricted. In sum, it can be argued that secularism had a dual role for the Jewish community in Turkey. On the one side, it served as a buffer against Islamism and Islamic tendencies in the regulation of society and public order and also secured liberties for non-Muslims. On the other side, it served the secularization of Judaism as well, paving a path for the confinement of religion to the homes of Jews and thus pushing for more a moderate practice of Judaism. The findings obtained in the interviews pointed to this phenomenon.

Almost all of the respondents identified the principle of secularism as the major guarantee on behalf of non-Muslims living in a Muslim-majority country.

They emphasized that secularism is a vital norm that prohibits Islamic fundamentalism and hence provides liberty to the Jews. In a similar fashion, most of the respondents stressed that the rise of Islamism as a movement in Turkey and the coming of the Islamic parties to government after the 1980s threatened the nation's secularism. The following statements from interviews are reflections of the discontent with the rise of Islamism and anxiety felt towards the loss of secularism:

> I see secularism as a safeguard of my religion. Turkish society is an open one. Muslims and non-Muslims have lived in harmony. Especially with the Özal era [1983-87], values and worldviews became liberal. However, in the last five years, I've seen a retreat of secularism. The [mid-1990s] rise to power of the Welfare Party, the ideas of its leader Necmettin Erbakan gaining popularity and this whole Islamism irritated the Jewish community in Turkey. These Islamists don't practice religion but rather politicize it. Not only non-Muslims but also most Muslims feel offended by the rise of Islamism. Now the Justice and Development Party, which is part of a similar movement, is in power [as of November 2002]. Although the party seems to be conforming to the secular rules, I have suspicions as to whether it will continue to do so. In my opinion, religion should be completely separated from the state administration. We shouldn't have to wonder after every election whether the government in power will disrupt secularism or not. (FRIT20, 31, female)

> In fact secularism is a guarantee for all of society but in my case it provides a further guarantee, because if there was no secularism we would be forced to convert to Islam or as women we would be forced to wear headscarves. If such laws began to be enforced, I would immediately emigrate from Turkey. (FRIT3, 27, female)

> Secularism is definitely important. It should be put in the Constitution. How are things in Iran? The hanged several Jews there. There are no Jews in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia or Algeria today. They are very horrible countries. But in Turkey, we had Atatürk. Atatürk gave secularism as a gift to us. Secularism is needed, especially for Muslim countries. (FRIT19, 67, female)

Most of the respondents also argued that religious belief is a matter between God and the individual, making third party interference of any form (i.e. other people, communities, institutions, or the state itself) wholly unacceptable. The field research found that Turkey's Jewish community adopted secular norms of Judaism and generally did not approve of strict adherence to religious norms and principles in daily life. Among the interviewees, it was found that the practice of Judaism had diminished over the generations. The elderly seemed to practice Judaism more, and in contrast a loose practice of religion seemed to be more prevalent among the younger respondents. For instance, the frequency of fasting, visiting synagogues and praying, and performing religious rituals was higher among the older respondents than the younger ones.

4.4.3 Turkish Citizenship and the Civic Virtue of Jews in Turkey

The civic virtue aspect of citizenship was explored through various questions in the interviews concerning political participation, membership in civil society organizations, dealing with social problems on an individual level, fulfilling the responsibilities and duties of citizenship, and trusting other individuals in society.[9] Though the research questions tried to cover various types of civic virtue such as general, social, economic and political, during the course of the research it was realized that studying Turkey's Jews as a minority group necessitated a further elaboration of civic virtue.

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[9] For the structured questions on civic virtue, see Appendix A.

First, the findings demonstrated that *civic virtue as an attitude* is different from *civic virtue as behavior*. In other words, the reflection of civic virtue in the attitudes of the respondents seemed to signify a broad range of ideas, thoughts, deliberations and values which, however, do not necessarily correlate to civic virtue behavior in reality or in actual life. The attitudes of the respondents may not always result in concrete actions, and the respondents may not themselves always perform or illustrate what they think a good citizen would or should do. In short, a prescription for virtuous citizenship may not always result in its faithful performance. For instance, a respondent may argue that one should contribute to the state budget so the national debt can be paid down, but the same respondent may fail to make such contributions in addition to taxes. Therefore the following discussion on the civic virtue of the Jews will consider separately the matters of attitudes and behavior regarding virtues of citizenship.

Second, the field research found that the domain of civic virtue was twofold. It seems that as a result of the interface between Jewish identity and Turkish citizenship, the attitudes and behavior regarding civic virtue developed in separate domains. As a result of Jewish identity, the respondents seemed to have concerns about their membership in Turkey's Jewish community such as participation in community affairs or good representation of the community. This may be called the *communal domain* of civic virtue. Apart from Jewish identity, however, the respondents also seemed to have concerns about their membership in Turkish society such as contributing to the nation's development or participation in the social and political mechanisms of general society. This domain may be called the *societal domain* of civic virtue. The following discussion of civic virtue

draws on the above-mentioned specifications of civic virtue as attitude and behavior in the local and national do in Turkey in Turkey mains.

In the *communal domain*, the civic virtue developed on the basis of Jewish identity, it must be noted at the outset that the respondents' level of membership and participation in Turkey's Jewish organizations is very high. Most of the interviewees are keenly involved in both the religious and social activities of their synagogues and various Jewish groups such as sports clubs, cultural clubs, local organizations and welfare associations. The older respondents showed sensitivity to fulfilling religious duties such as keeping the number of male worshippers to at least 10, the minimum required for praying in a synagogue. Since the Jewish population and hence the number of worshippers who regularly visit synagogues has declined over time, most of the synagogues face the threat of the termination of their religious facilities. Therefore, the older respondents, especially the men, keep an eye on the religious facilities of the synagogues and try to participate in them as much as possible:

> Every day I go to the synagogue to pray. I used to go to the synagogue twice a week. On Saturdays [the Sabbath which is the resting and praying day for Jews] especially, as a Jewish citizen, I go to the synagogue. (FRIT9, 79, male)

The middle-aged respondents seemed to be more involved in the management of the communal institutions.[10] Leadership positions in organizations and the like are generally held by middle-aged Jewish men, and women who usually take part in the same groups as volunteers fill hierarchical positions in

only the women's branches. Among the female respondents, there were women who had been involved in volunteer work for several years and were heads of the women's branches. In the words of one:

> I've done volunteer work for this association for 18 years. When the former head of the women's branch resigned, the association chairman proposed that I take over, and I accepted. In the past, I used to come here once a week but now, since I became leader of the women's branch, I come here four days a week. (FRIT18, 57, female)

The participation of the young respondents age 20-40 was concentrated largely in youth, sports and culture organizations. The field research also found that young Jews mainly remained active in these organizations until they reached age 18. The families of young Jews generally encourage their children to take part in the activities of these organizations so they become socialized into Jewish culture and community through gaining Jewish friends, acquiring Jewish culture and values, and eventually marrying Jewish spouses that they met in the groups. However, since integration with society at large becomes inevitable after age 18 by way of university education or employment, the young Jews' participation and interest in these Jewish organizations tend to fall over time. Some of the younger respondents explained their relations with Jewish associations as follows:

> All my friends are Muslim now. I used to have only Jewish friends. For instance, I used to go to one of the Jewish youth clubs every weekend and I had friends only from the Jewish community. I went to Jewish school so my friends were all Jews. I didn't have the chance to make friends from different environments. School during the week and youth club during the weekends, that's how my life went until I graduated from high school. Now

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[10] Information on some of these communal institutions was given in Chapter I.

> I can say I've got more Muslim friends than Jewish ones. My entire social network has changed. I don't go the Jewish associations anymore. I didn't even go to the Jewish high school annual alumni reunions. (FRIT17, 23, male)

If the positive presentation of Jewish culture to society and dispelling stereotypes about Jews are considered exemplary acts of civic virtue, the respondents seemed to value this type of virtue. Most of the respondents think that every Jew in Turkey should get involved in actions that would present them as good Jews or virtuous Jewish citizens to both themselves and the nation's gentiles. They also think that Turkey's Jews should try to refute anti-Semitic claims against themselves and their community. These views can be considered examples of civic virtue as attitude. At the level of values and views, the respondents seem to project a more active position in terms of Jewish identity. However, civic virtue as attitude, as in positively representing the Jewish community to general society or defying the unjust claims raised by others against the Jewish community, seems to not always translate into actual behavior or actions. More precisely, although most of the respondents value good representation and defense of their Jewish identity, most of the time they do not actually get involved in individual acts towards this end. Civic virtue as behavior regarding Jewish identity may vary depending on the person or people towards whom the act is directed. Most of the respondents seemed to prefer passivity or to not take sides when they encounter anti-Jewish claims from people they do not know personally, for instance somebody on a public bus. However, if these claims are raised by the friends of the respondents, most of the subjects apparently

choose to tell their friends that what they said was wrong or at least did not give the full picture. In the words of two of the respondents:

> If a person who says bad things about Jews happens to be my friend, I would immediately tell them that what they said is wrong. Maybe my friend has prejudices about something but doesn't know enough to know better. In those cases, I would intervene and help my friend to overcome this prejudice. However, with people that I don't know or have no relationship with, I never intervene or interrupt when they're speaking badly about the Jews. I shut my ears and pretend not to hear them. (FRIT13, 48, male)

> If my friends start joking about the conventional stereotypes attributed to Jews, I make fun of my friends in turn. I don't stay silent but try to make them understand how I may feel with this teasing. (FRIT31, 26, male)

Most of the respondents apparently prefer to show civic virtue as behavior more openly within the Jewish community than within the general public or among gentiles, especially strangers. This may be due to a lack of trust in society at large which seems to decrease in the younger generations. The quotations below are examples of this insecurity felt about the general public:

> My mother always warns me. She says, 'You meet different people. You don't know who they are. There are many kinds of people in society. You should be careful because you're a Jew.' I understand why my mother is warning me, since there's a risk of meeting anti-Semitic people by chance. However, the Jewish community in Turkey is both notorious and respected. Before something bad happens, the community takes its precautions. There's no unrestrained behavior in the community. This of course loads responsibilities onto the shoulders of its members. You're expected to behave properly so you don't attract much attention. Because of this, Jewish mothers warn their children. They fear the outer world. They're hesitant about their actions in public and they demand that we do the same. I don't agree with my mother. I have lots of Muslim friends. Even I must admit that I've got more Muslim friends than Jewish ones. Things change. We have to adapt ourselves to these changes. (FRIT24, 20, female)

> I remember that when I was at elementary school, I used to hide my religion. I wouldn't openly say that I'm a Jew. I no longer try to hide my

> Jewishness. Maybe it's because of my age now, I don't know. But I see that my sons don't try to hide their identity either. They're very conscious about things and they have self-confidence. The teachers are also very conscious now. Nothing bad has happened to my sons at school, for example. (FRIT30, 45, female)

Civic virtue as behavior positively representing the community to the public sometimes seems to carry the meaning of not upsetting society or not showing Jews' differences with society so that gentiles do not get annoyed or so the Jews do not become targets of accusations. One of the respondents exemplifies this goal as follows:

> When we were living in Şişhane [in Istanbul], we had celebrations that we carried out onto the streets. There were many Jews in Şişhane then, but most of them later emigrated to Israel. Now there aren't many Jews in Turkey. Everybody knows each other. It's a very small community. Today, we can't celebrate our religious festivals on the streets. Jews can't even wear their kipahs [yarmulkes] on the streets. If we see somebody wearing the kipah outside or somewhere else, we immediately warn him to take it off. We say, 'Why are you wearing your kipah? What are you doing? Are you nuts? Wearing it isn't smart.' Somebody could come up to him on the street and ask him why he's walking around with that hat. A Jewish man may feel irritated when confronted like that by such negative responses. To avoid such unwanted incidents, we, the people in the community, always warn each other about proper behavior. We shouldn't be singled out by society. (FRIT26, 43, female)

It seems that the respondents do not display civic virtue on behalf of Jewish culture and community in the public sphere at the individual level. Rather, they prefer to put the responsibility for this mission of defending Jewish culture and presenting it to the public on the shoulders of the Jewish community elites. These elites are not only heads of Jewish organizations but also respected figures who perform the role of leadership within the community. The institution of the Chief Rabbinate deals mainly with religious issues and the chief rabbi represents

the Jewish community in relations with the society and the state. However, other members of the elite usually accompany him at appropriate occasions and official ceremonies such as the celebration of the foundation of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Memorial Day, or the reception of courtesy visits of foreign ambassadors in Turkey. When asked if they had reacted personally to newspaper reports about or containing biased stereotyping, most of the respondents replied that they did not act individually but rather told community leaders about the news so the leaders could respond on the Jewish community's behalf. As two of the respondents explained:

> We, the Jews, have no problem. First of all, we have very good relations with state officials. For instance, if a new governor is appointed, our leaders visit him or her to establish rapport. Our leader of the community thinks that there is no anti-Semitism in Turkey. I don't agree with him. The anti-Semitism isn't explicit but hidden, which in my opinion is not very important. [By way of comparison] I may want to kill you but I don't actually do it. Reality isn't what I want to do but what I actually do. If you look into people's souls, you may not like what you see. You have to see the outlook of things and not their contents. Our outlook is good towards the Turks, and the Turks' outlook is good towards us. I think our community leaders do an excellent job in protecting the community. They don't appear in the newspapers or on TV but they scold journalists or producers when they put out anti-Semitic publications or programs. They always tell us to be anonymous in public. For example, they warn us not to wear very expensive jewelry. Young Jews criticize the community as a closed one. But I think things should be like this. (FRIT19, 67, female)

> Since they think that we're a religious minority, they usually avoid attracting attention. The media is always after us. Therefore, our community leader sometimes gives warnings to the community such as, 'Don't do this, don't go there, don't spend a lot of money, don't attract the attention of the society by spending on luxuries, and don't seek the public spotlight.' (FRIT21, 77, male)

The respondents seemed also to not react to verbal claims directed against them at the personal level by others. Seeking legal redress for such accusations or claims against them was a strategy very seldom used by the respondents. Although the respondents underlined that they did not take proactive actions to defend their dignity or identity, they emphasized that the Jewish community as a whole did react and the elites performed this role on behalf of the community. As can be seen in the community newspaper Şalom, public discussions moving dangerously close to anti-Semitism were not left unanswered or unrefuted. Regarding this point, it can be argued that the civic virtue aspect of Jewish identity is closely related to the organizational structure and hierarchy of Turkey's Jewish community. The following quotations are examples of how both the community as a collective and the respondents individually usually reacted to verbal or written accusations against Jews:

> In Turkey there are many mixed groups of people. The people are very different from each other. Every kind of people lives in Turkey. There are extreme nationalists and extreme Islamists. There are all kinds. There are certain TV programs on various channels that frequently and deliberately broadcast themes of hostility towards the Jews. These programs bother me a lot. Reactions are made to these programs not personally but rather collectively. I mean, the community takes measures. I've never taken an individual action myself but if I came across such a program when watching TV, I tell one of my Jewish friends about it and he tells others and so the community leaders learn about the program. Since we're a small community, everybody knows each other and the grapevine is fast. (FRIT1, 35, male)

> Our community immediately raises its voice against such broadcasts and notifies the producers. We never permit such TV programs. Our community considers these to be serious matters and so immediately responds. (FRIT18, 57, female)

> I often come across such programs. Some of the news in some newspapers identifies all Jews with Israel. Our Jewish community isn't a party to the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. Of course, there is an attachment to Israel due to our faith but if people don't like Israeli foreign policy, they should simply say so. However, instead of expressing their opinion on Israeli foreign policy, these people tend to condemn world Jewry as a whole. The Chief Rabbinate denounces writings against Jews in Turkey. I've never personally denounced these offensive writings but the community leaders do. Our community leader finds a friend or colleague of the author who wrote the offending article and demands that he tell the author to stop misinforming the public and sowing discord. (FRIT21, 77, male)

In the *societal domain,* civic virtue, which is more related with membership in general society as regular Turkish citizens, is arguably closely related to modernization. Both today and in years past, Jews make up a group within Turkish society which has taken a leading role in modernization and westernization. They were one of the groups in the forefront of willingly adopting modern norms. The adoption of Western culture and values demarcated the social ranks within the Jewish community, e.g. with the upper-class Jewry speaking French, raising their children with the help of maids, going to prestigious colleges for education, etc. and the lower classes speaking Ladino, attending ordinary Jewish schools, and showing a more 'oriental' outlook.

As discussed in Chapter III, the emigration to Israel of most of Turkey's Jewish population resulted in the homogenization of the remaining Jewish minority in terms of socio-economic status. Those who stayed in Turkey were middle-class Jews or above who adopted a more Western, modern and urban outlook as compared to other groups in Turkish society and the Jewish emigrants to Israel. Furthermore, their level of devotion to the norms of westernization was used by the Jews to signify the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims.

For instance, Jews generally denigrated the rural, uneducated, 'oriental' and traditional masses while praising urban, Western, middle- and upper-class mass culture. As a result of the willing embrace of modernization by Turkey's Jewish community, it is plausible that the Jews internalized the liberal-democratic criteria on several issues of state-society relations such as democratic participation, human rights, women's rights, protection of the environment, secularism, transparency of the state administration and accountability in democratic mechanisms. The findings of the field research also confirmed such a tendency, as the following quotation shows:

> The state should be transparent. It should be democratically governed. Corruption should be nonexistent. There are many problems in Turkey but they should be solved by the leaders that we choose. Of course the citizens should help them. For example, there are many things that citizens can do such as using public transportation for clean air and less traffic, taking care not to damage the parks and roads, throwing garbage into garbage cans only, taking a stand against corruption and refusing to pay bribes. I myself am very sensitive about environment. I don't throw away garbage pell-mell. I organize my garbage and put the paper and glass in separate bags for recycling. If only everybody else did the same! Millions of dollars go to waste when we already have lots of national debt. (FRIT10, 49, female)

None of the respondents were active members of non-governmental organizations active at the national level. For instance, some of them volunteered at Jewish-run nursing homes for Jews but not at state-run homes open to all citizens. What two of the interviewees said about this lack of interest in associations at the national level helped to illuminate how being a Jew affected volunteer or charity work in a Muslim-majority society:

> I heard about a group that provides shelter to women who are victims of domestic violence. I'd like to work in that group as I think I could help those victims of violence. But I didn't volunteer because I feared that the association would make an issue out of my Jewishness. Let me explain it to you like this: I have a daughter. She was inspired by my volunteer work for people in need and she volunteered to be a caring mother in the House for the Protection of Children. Her name is Esther, so it's very clear that she isn't Muslim. The house didn't allow her to look after the orphaned children. They told that they didn't need any volunteers. How can that be? I know very well that they need people to work as volunteers there. I was very disappointed. My daughter was born in Turkey, grew up in Turkey, and was raised in Turkish culture. I think this is a case of discrimination because friends had told me that the house needed volunteers. Why do they say no? Why do they discriminate against people? My daughter is a 20-year-old young lady. She wants to devote herself to helping others. Either a Muslim becomes a 'volunteer mother' to children or a Jewish one does, what's the difference? (FRIT10, 49, female)

> I had a co-worker in my office. He no longer works in the same office because he resigned, but this incident happened before that. This person was giving me nasty looks. I could sense it. With this incident I'll tell you about, his mean feelings towards me came to the surface. This person had a sister who had a car accident. She was taken to the hospital. She needed a blood transfusion. I used to donate blood regularly to help other people who were in need of blood. But after the spread of HIV, I stopped doing it. I told my co-worker that I could give blood to his sister who needed an emergency blood transfusion. He turned me down. This man was from Çanakkale. In years past there were many Jews living in Çanakkale. So this man knew about Jews. He had actually told me before that he had known Jews. I believe that he refused my offer to donate blood for his sister because I'm a Jew. He didn't say this directly or mention my Jewishness but instead said, 'We don't need your donation.' (FRIT12, 45, male)

The field research found that most of the respondents seemed to have a high level of civic virtue in the societal domain, at least on the level of values. In other words, most of them praised liberal-democratic criteria as cornerstones of democracy. However, the research also showed that the value placed on democratic ideals did not always produce actions taken directly on the individual level. In other words, although most of the respondents advocated that the entire citizenry uphold civic virtue to support a democracy that meets Western

standards, these values did not correspond to actions taken in the same regard per se. The respondents mainly remained passive in taking both collective and individual actions to help to resolve problems that they saw. As one of the respondents said:

> For example, a cellphone network company put a base station on the roof of the mosque next to my children's school. It's a public school. All the parents protested this by circulating a petition. However, nothing has changed. That base station is still on the roof of the mosque and it still threatens the health of our children. No matter how hard we fight, unfortunately it's very hard to change things in Turkey. A person holding power can deal with things quicker and more easily than hundreds of people gathering for the same purpose. If I could be sure that everybody would behave ethically and act as good citizens, I'd do the same. I see that everybody tries to solve their problems by finding someone powerful. If I knew that everybody would wait their turn in the queue, for instance in banks, I'd wait my turn as well. But [instead] I find a person I know at the bank and skip the queue. Everybody does this. Other people would even call me nuts if they knew I had an opportunity to jump the queue and didn't use it. This is how things are in Turkey. (FRIT20, 31, female)

The respondents also seemed to be not interested in active politics. They did not work in political parties and furthermore, they did not have any plans to work in a party or to become a candidate in elections. Most of them stressed the importance of political parties for democracy but they seemed to refrain from entering political life by way of membership to political parties. Some of the respondents mentioned that the Jewish community in Turkey was in general apolitical and only participated by voting, especially to center-right parties. One of the respondents explained their observations about the Jewish community as follows:

> The Jews in Turkey are very passive in politics. There is timidity among the community. Most of the Jews think, 'We should not go for politics. We are very comfortable in this country. We earn our money. Nobody disturbs us. Go and open your store on the street market. Nobody would oppose. Why would you go for politics or want to become a military officer?' We should break this chain of thinking. I criticize the Jewish community in Turkey for this. We are not courageous in politics. Maybe it is an inheritance on us. Maybe it has roots in the past. I don't know. But at least, people should give fight for this. Maybe the community fears that such a change in political attitude would be interpreted as a revolt. (FRIT13, 48, male)

There may be other reasons, but the main one for the mismatch between the values espoused and actions taken in terms of civic virtue seems to lie in the minority status of the respondents. They generally refrained from presenting any generalization on behalf of the Jewish community at large through their individual attempts. Most thought that society at large would not recognize their good will and sincerity in contributing to the development of society and democracy and would judge them not as ordinary citizens but would rather focus on their Jewish identity. Being a Jew, according the respondents, overshadowed their individuality and gave rise to societal prejudices against all of Jewry. Thus, most of the respondents seemed to not be actively seeing through their values on civic virtue. They were generally swayed by the idea that they should not stand out in performing acts of civic virtue but should instead remain silent and invisible to shield themselves from criticisms from society at large. The following quotations reflect how most of the respondents thought:

> Jews in Turkey are generally quiet people. They don't raise their voices on social or political issues. They don't gather in the city center for protests. They don't want to be singled out as Jews. (FRIT22, 23, female)

> Jews in Turkey don't generally make themselves stand out. Rather their deeds are usually controlled and hesitant. They act with caution. For instance, they very much conform to the laws and rules. No Jew wants to go to jail. But there's something else I should mention. If the state asked for a share of every citizen's income to save the national economy, what will be the criteria to calculate how much everybody pays? Most probably they'll set up commissions to determine each individual's share. Then there'll be a problem for the Jews because these commissions might ask them for a higher rate of contribution like with the Capital Tax. Because of that, I mean, because of that the contributions won't be on equal footing, I'm against such procedures. (FRIT15, 28, male)

> Most of the time, Jews think, 'We should be cautious about our deeds and words in public.' They don't want to stand out. Our differences shouldn't bother others. We should conform to society's rules and not challenge them. (FRIT10, 49, female)

> Generally Jews hold back their identities. Most of the Jews in Turkey live in Istanbul. They usually think about doing what others do, nothing more, and nothing less. They think, 'Our differences are for ourselves. Other people shouldn't see that we're different.' They do whatever an ordinary Turkish citizen does. They don't like to stand out or be noticeable. They're afraid that in the midst of daily life they may draw reactions, or they shrink from appearing in the media. (FRIT16, 57, male)

To sum up the findings on the civic virtue aspect of citizenship, it can be stated that the civic virtue of the respondents was twofold, namely that performed vis-à-vis the Jewish community and that vis-à-vis society in general. Civic virtue exemplified as defending and protecting Jewish culture and identity via the institutions of Turkey's Jewish community is high. However, civic virtue shown within society in general as ordinary citizens is high only at the level of values, as these values are not always translated into action, and the fulfillment of civic virtue remains limited due to the discomfort that minority status entails for the Jews.

4.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter discussed how members of Turkey's Jewish community experience and perceive Turkish citizenship through its aspects of legal status, identity and civic virtue. The research found that the differences in opinions and experiences of the respondents were mainly determined by their differences in generation or age groups. The focus on generations also served as a helpful tool to highlight the changes in the historical development of citizenship in Turkey. Since the Jews who remained in Turkey after the late 1940s mass Jewish emigration to Israel presented a homogeneous group, the generations of the respondents serves as an instrumental medium for understanding how citizenship in Turkey, specifically the citizenship of its Jews, transformed over time. Due to this homogeneous outlook, generation/age group as a category seems to be closely linked with other sociological categories such as gender, class, education and ethnic origin in the case of contemporary Jews in Turkey.

Within the state-centric approach to citizenship, it has been discussed previously that in the legal status aspect, responsibilities prioritized the rights in Turkish citizenship; in the identity aspect there was the dominance of the unitary and monistic structure; and in the civic virtue aspect, civil society was underdeveloped and state-directed modernization paradigms continued to exist. In this study of how Turkish citizenship was experienced and perceived at the individual level in the case of the nation's Jewish minority, the findings demonstrate that the state-centric approach to citizenship has reverberations in the experience of Jewish individuals. Such a reflection of the legal status, identity and

civic virtue aspects of Turkish citizenship using a state-centric approach within a minority group traditionally known as 'the loyal nation' in Turkey might be considered natural. It can be argued that the will to maintain identity and the will to integrate have caused a dilemma for the Jews. However, whether this dilemma is significant only for Turkey's Jews or valid for all minority groups in other nation-states is an important issue which needs further exploration. How other nation-states deal with minority-majority relations and how citizenship as a means for governance is treated, juxtaposing the dilemma between cultural authenticity and assimilation, may provide important signals for democracy and help to direct policies on citizenship within Turkey.

CHAPTER V

TURKISH JEWS IN ISRAEL: SIMULTANEOUSLY CITIZENS AND IMMIGRANTS

5.1 Introduction

The main purpose of the current chapter is to discuss how Turkish Jews in Israel perceive and experience citizenship through the course of migration. The three aspects of citizenship – legal status, identity and civic virtue – are given special attention. In Chapters II and IV, the history of Turkey's Jewish minority and the relationship between minority status and citizenship were discussed. In this chapter, supplementing the brief history of the Jewish emigration presented in Chapter III, the relationship between international migration – that is, migration from Turkey to Israel – and citizenship is taken up. The discussion is built on the findings of the field research in Israel and focuses on the Turkish Jews' changes in perception of citizenship accompanying the impact of their experience migrating to another country. This task proceeds in four parts. The *first* part presents an overview of citizenship and international migration in Turkey and in Israel. The dominant paradigms both in Turkish and Israeli citizenship as well as the transformations in citizenship policies with respect to transformations in the area of international migration are discussed. In the *second* part, the general characteristics of the sample group in the research are illustrated. The profile of

the respondents is drawn using sociological categories. In the *third* part, the findings of the interviews are discussed. The respondents' perceptions of the aspects of legal status, identity and civic virtue of citizenship are covered separately in turn. The *fourth* part concludes the chapter with a short discussion on the three prongs of the sending country (Turkey), the receiving country (Israel) and the immigrants (Turkish Jews).

5.2 Citizenship and Emigration from Turkey to Israel: A Comparative Overview

It is generally accepted that theories of international migration were widely developed by the disciplines of demography, economics, sociology and anthropology. The discipline of political science was a relative latecomer to the field of international migration, one that contributed to the field studies of state sovereignty and citizenship (Faist, 1997: 249, 251). By the same token, studies of the relationship between citizenship and immigration complemented earlier research on the significance of citizenship questions for democracies feeling the strain of globalization.

As there are various forms and types of international migration, there is a corresponding variety of statuses of immigrants and hence citizenships. For instance, regarding the relationship between citizen status and immigration, Bauböck historically categorizes three typologies, namely *dependent immigration*, *colonizing immigration* and *citizen immigration* (Bauböck, 1991: 26-32). In *dependent immigration*, the immigrants lack the right to immigrate and settle in

the country for an extended period. In most cases of dependent immigration, neither the sending country nor the receiving country entitles individuals the rights of immigration, but when they enter the receiving state, for instance as guest workers, these immigrants find themselves under a reduced citizenship status within the new country's legal and political system. In *colonizing immigration*, the sovereignty of the country of immigration is severely restricted by the country of emigration, as in the colonization schemes of sub-Saharan Africa. In *citizen immigration*, individuals hold an independent right to immigrate, generally by obtaining an internationally valid passport. The countries of immigration grant these individuals immigration rights, even to people who have not been formally registered citizens before immigration. The best-known cases of such countries are Germany and Israel, both of which grant immigration rights to people who meet certain criteria of ethnic origin (Bauböck, 1991: 26-32). Apart from the status of formal citizens, citizen immigration-type immigrants may be given the status of *dual citizens* or *denizens*.

Dual citizenship in citizen immigration may be granted to immigrants if both of the states in question legally allow dual citizenship. Prior to recent decades, dual citizenship was generally legally prohibited by most states, and corresponding measures were taken to discourage it. Despite these international efforts to limit dual citizenship, the number of people holding more than one citizenship has climbed in recent decades, with international migration being one of the key reasons for this. The opposition to dual citizenship is rooted in conceptions of the well-ordered international world as follows: every person belongs to one and only one state; dual citizenship is to be avoided in order to

protect the unity, cohesion and strength of the state; dual citizenship is incompatible with loyalty to the state; dual citizenship may cause problems in cultural and national identification; dual identifications may threaten both national unity and nations themselves; and dual citizenship threatens national security and democracy. Traditional antipathy to dual citizenship springs from a tendency to evaluate the relationship between citizens and the state from the latter's point of view. From the point of view of individuals, however, it is contended that the inconveniences of dual citizenship are minimal and outweighed by its advantages (Hammar, 1989: 86-93).

Another status category of immigrants in cases of citizen immigration is *denizens*. Citizens are members of a state who have certain rights and duties in their relationship with it. However, apart from formal citizens, there may be other individuals in the society who have rights and duties similar to those of other citizens, yet may not be endowed with formal citizenship status. In some cases, either the sending or the receiving countries may not allow dual citizenship. In order not to lose their citizenship rights in the sending country, these immigrants may opt for permanent residency. They may have the right to enter the state's territory from abroad, to settle in the country, to take up work there, to receive social benefits and to vote in local elections. These "privileged non-citizens" are called, in Tomas Hammar's definition, "denizens" who have certain work, residence and welfare rights just like ordinary citizens (Hammar, 1989: 83). The naturalization of denizens includes not only their reception into legal citizenship status but also contains the political, social, cultural and psychological dimensions of membership and belonging to their resident state (Hammar, 1989: 85).

Immigration to Israel may be considered an example of citizen immigration, as all the world's Jews have the legal right to immigrate there. It also entails, as discussed in Chapter III, unique features in comparison to other examples of citizen immigration. It is primarily made up of large immigration waves which gathered Jews from various parts of the world and concentrated them in a small portion of former Arab lands in the Middle East, a development that led to conflict with the Palestinians over the territory that rages even today. The establishment of Israel was the result of a historical will which had roots even in ancient Jewish history. It was founded with the aim of establishing a democratic Jewish state and since its early years, the features of the state have been prolonged and commonly supported by its own resident Jews and those of the diaspora. As a result of this historical formation of the state of Israel, one can therefore argue that the development of citizenship in Israel has two determinants that serve as the backbone of citizenship, namely immigration and Jewish ethno-religious identity.[1]

The immigration of Jews is Israel's *raison d'être*. With respect to citizenship, immigrants of Jewish origin are granted Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return, which also permits dual citizenship.[2] The state of Israel accepts dual citizenship so that Jewish immigrants do not lose their rights, specifically the rights of inheritance or property, in their sending countries. In cases where the

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[1] For the purposes and limitations of this study, the discussion of Israeli citizenship ignores the nation's minorities, covering instead only its Jewish population.

[2] For details of the Law of Return permitting dual citizenship for Jewish oleh, see Chapter III.

sending countries do not permit dual citizenship, as with immigrants from Turkey in decades past, these immigrants either gave up their previous citizenship in favor of Israeli citizenship or maintained their previous citizenship while assuming permanent residency status, the latter as denizens of Israel. Denizens, Jewish holders of permanent residence permits who seek to reside in Israel, have all the privileges of Israeli citizenship except the right to vote in general elections and carry an Israeli passport.[3] It should be noted that full citizens are not immediately issued passports either. Although citizenship is acquired immediately upon establishing residence in Israel (unless the immigrant refuses to accept citizenship in 90 days), an Israeli passport is normally issued only after one year of residence.

The Law of Return is the basic legal documentation that allows Jewish immigrants to settle and earn citizenship in Israel. In line with Israel's foundation as a Jewish state, the law prioritizes bloodlines and ethnic origin for citizenship. The emphasis on Jewish ethno-religious identity in the making of the state and the development of citizenship has provoked debates among Jewish expatriates from Israel over the role of religion in the public sphere and the inheritance of Israeli citizenship. Although democracy is considered one of the pillars of the Israeli state, the impact of Judaism in the regulation of the Jews' civic life has raised questions of secularism in Israeli democracy which persist to this day (Arian,

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[3] Under the category of denizens in Israel, there are 'potential immigrants,' or persons entering Israel on potential immigrant visas. According to the 1969 regulations of Israel's Ministry of the Interior, a potential immigrant is a person entitled to an oleh's visa under the Law of Return who intends to stay in Israel for more than three months. In 1991, the three months-plus provision was replaced by one reading "up to three years to examine the possibility and the conditions of settling in Israel as an immigrant."

1998: 10). As to the blood principle's dominance in Israeli citizenship, various amendments to the Law of Return and the related procedural adjustments over the years began to introduce the territoriality principle to citizenship, though only for emigrants from Israel. Accordingly, emigrants who moved from Israel and reside in foreign countries can maintain Israeli citizenship, as can their children, but the grandchildren of such emigrants do not automatically inherit Israeli citizenship.

Jewish immigration from Turkey to Israel is an example of the citizen immigration type, but in contrast to some other Israeli immigrant groups, i.e. the Yemenites, it is also an example of voluntary immigration, as this was neither part of a population exchange nor a refugee flight provoked by the Holocaust or anti-Semitism. Jews in Turkey experienced a more liberal and tolerant attitude in contrast to the harsh discrimination faced by some of their counterparts in other countries.[4]

The migration experience to Israel influenced the Turkish Jews' perception of citizenship. On the *legal status aspect of citizenship*, it must be stated foremost that Turkish Jews were easily accepted by Israel due simply to their Jewish status, and furthermore that Turkey did not prohibit this Jewish emigration. Therefore, the rights of immigration were granted to Turkish Jews going to Israel by both the sending state and the receiving one. Since Turkey did not recognize dual citizenship until 1981, most of these emigrant Turkish Jews obtained Israeli citizenship and gave up their Turkish one. At the same time, those who chose to

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[4] Yet both political and economic factors lay behind the immigration from Turkey to Israel. These reasons can also be observed in the profile of immigrants according to their dates of arrival, as discussed in Chapter III.

retain their Turkish citizenship received Israeli denizen status with the same sets of rights as other formal Israeli citizens including the right to vote, but only in local elections. After Turkey passed dual citizenship legislation in 1981, these denizens began to apply for Israel citizenship in addition to their existing Turkish citizenship. In addition, Turkish Jews who had previously obtained Israeli citizenship started to apply for additional Turkish citizenship.

Another change in the legal status of citizenship occurred in the minority/majority status of immigrants from Turkey. Turkey's Jewish community was officially recognized as a minority group, but after immigration and arrival in Israel, former members of a minority group became members of the majority group in a Jewish state. In other words, immigrants who were once a Jewish minority in Turkey were turned into part of the Jewish majority in Israel.

However, the changes in the *identity aspect of citizenship* after arrival in Israel do not correlate to a direct change from a minority group into a majority. The Jewish population of Israel falls into two major ethnic categories, the Ashkenazim of European and American descent, and the Eastern or "Oriental" Jews of North African and Near Eastern origins. There is a social divide between these two categories. The Oriental Jews, including both the Mizrahi Jews of the Middle East and the Sephardic Jews of the Mediterranean, make up more than half of the population, but they control relatively few economic, political and social resources (Lewis, 1985: 133). The Oriental immigrants, who have tended to remain concentrated in homogeneous communities, largely fall into the lower

societal strata. In contrast, the Ashkenazic Jews have gradually evolved into a unified socio-cultural group which is predominantly middle or upper class.[5]

Although there are variances in self-perception depending on when they arrived in Israel, it can generally be argued that Turkish Jews were predominantly seen as Oriental Jews by other Israelis. As other Israelis have perceived and denigrated them as Oriental Jews, Turkish Jews in Israel have begun to identify themselves as Sephardic Jews who are distinct from both European-origin Ashkenazic Jews and Middle Eastern-origin Mizrahi Jews (Benbassa and Rodrigue, 2001; Weiker, 1988). Although the Ashkenazim-Sephardim polarization has lessened since the 1960s and '70s, it still has a place in Israeli society's social memory. It must be recalled, however, that the identification of Turkish Jews in Israel varies according to their year of arrival. Furthermore, as discussed in earlier chapters, these Turkish Jews have ties with Turkey not only in terms of citizenship and familial attachments, but also in terms of Turkish culture.

Concerning the changes in the *civic virtue aspect of citizenship* among Turkish Jews in the immigration process, two points must be mentioned. *First*, similar to the Jewish community in Turkey, Turkish Jews in Israel frequently utilize the strategy of invisibility in which they refrain from showing their differences and displaying virtuous citizenship in the public sphere. Turkish Jews are generally evaluated as well integrated into Israeli society as they are "unseen" or unmarked by their differences (Weiker, 1988). They are regarded as well adapted to the norms of the democratic Israeli state and as conforming to the

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[5] Despite the strong correlation between ethnic affiliation and class, some immigrants from Middle Eastern and African countries have achieved upward social mobility (Ben-Rafael, 1985: 57).

existing rules and laws. They show little involvement in public protests or social movements.

Second, as İçduygu (1996a) mentions, studies on international migration and citizenship need to consider the three actors involved in the process, namely the sending country, the receiving country and the immigrants. By the same token, the civic virtue aspect of citizenship is closely related to the positions that the states uphold in response to societal issues such as civil society, basic rights of organization and protest, freedom of expression, and liberties for all types of identities and status, including ethno-religious identity and immigrant status. Therefore, the question of the civic virtue of the Turkish Jews in the process of international migration is an issue that also falls into the hinterland of the positions that Turkey and Israel take vis-à-vis civic virtue. In a similar line of thinking, it can be suggested that the strong state tradition in Turkey feeds the common idea among the Turkish public that the state is the ultimate, fearsome, authority-wielding supreme power, whereas in Israel's political culture, the state has no similar meaning. Yet, it must be noted that Israel is counted among states that have strong capabilities to initiate and enforce the rules of the game in their societies. However, it is also acknowledged that the Israeli state is more successful in making people obey its rules once they are made than in making such rules in the first place (Migdal; 1989: 3). The Turkish Jews, with their obedience to the general norms of order as part of the political culture they inherited in Turkey, can be considered as contributing to the success of the Israeli state. In other words, the reading of Turkey's strong state tradition in the eyes of

its Jewish community that prevailed in Israel after their immigration may have resulted in rewards for Israel's state tradition.

Readers of the below discussion on Turkish Jews' perception and experiences of citizenship should keep in mind one of the perennial key dimensions of Israeli politics, that is, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since its establishment Israel has weathered a series of wars with its neighboring Palestinians and Arab states, and the question of Palestine has left a deep impression on not only domestic but also international politics. The conflict has resulted in such security problems as terrorism greatly influencing daily life in Israel. Universal conscription of Jews is obligatory and, in comparison to other countries, quite lengthy. It still plays a vital role for the socializing of immigrants. These security problems impact citizenship in Israel and furthermore shape the perceptions and experiences of its Turkish Jews on issues as varied as majority-minority relations, nationalism, the limits of democracy and threat perception.

In addition to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the changing nature of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel has contributed to the shaping of perceptions of citizenship. Turkey and Israel started to establish close trade and defense ties in the 1980s and '90s. These relations in turn seem to have played a role in the perceptions of citizenship in the eyes of Israel's Turkish Jews, as will be discussed later. Last but not least, the changing integration policies of Israel over time need to be kept in mind when reading the perceptions and experiences of the Turkish Jews below. Israel's early years were characterized by efforts to plant firm roots for the Jewish nation and state. *Sabra*, the idealized stereotype of a courageous, strong-willed Jewry, was introduced in this period. However, after

the 1970s, the ideal of a common identity for all Israelis began to be challenged by the recognition of different identities and ethno-cultural backgrounds in Israeli society. Changes in immigration policies reflected this new multiculturalist trend. Along the same lines, experiences and perceptions of citizenship at the individual level also changed. The Turkish Jews felt these changes too.

5.3 Profile of the Sample Group in the Field Research in Israel

In this section, before discussing views on and experiences of citizenship, a profile of the interviewed respondents will be drawn.[6] In addition, the general migration history and group characteristics broken down by periods of migration will be introduced. A total of 34 interviews were conducted with the sample group in the field research in Israel. All of the respondents were first generation, Turkish-born immigrants who moved to Israel at some point in their lives. The sample group selected from the population group of Turkish Jews in Israel reflected diversity in terms of *age*, *gender*, *marital status*, *citizenship status*, *place of birth*, *place of settlement in Israel*, *employment status*, *education*, *socio-economic status*, *ethno-religious origin* and *year of migration*.[7]

As to the *age* of the respondents when they were interviewed, the youngest was 45 and the oldest 79. Out of the 34 Turkish Jews, 21 were between 40 and 60

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[6] For the characteristics of the interviewees in the field research in Israel, briefly summarized in Appendix E.

[7] The below portrayal of the respondents encompasses their profile at the time of the interviews only.

years of age at the time of interviews, and the 13 remaining were over 60. The average age of all the respondents when interviewed was 61. The mean ratio of age at the time of immigration from Turkey to Israel was 24. The respondents' age variety helped the researcher to obtain a mixture of immigration stories from the respondents.

In terms of *gender*, the 34 respondents were evenly split between 17 women and 17 men. The *marital status* of the respondents also varied: two were divorced, one woman was widowed and the remaining 31 were married. Out of the 34 respondents, only two were married to non-Turkish Israeli Jews. The remaining 32 respondents had chosen Turkish Jews as spouses. Most of the respondents had two children, though some had three or four at the time of the interviews.

With respect to *citizenship status*, eight of the respondents out of the total 34 had dual citizenship – Turkish and Israeli. All of these eight dual citizen respondents had begun as Turkish citizens exclusively, but after the enactment of the law on dual citizenship in Turkey in 1981, they applied for an additional Israeli citizenship. Five out of 34 respondents had Turkish citizenship only. Although it had been several years since they arrived in Israel, they had not changed their citizenship status even after Turkey changed its law to accept dual citizenship. A single respondent had only Spanish citizenship. Though he was born in Turkey and had no affiliation to Spain, he gained Spanish citizenship during the 1917 occupation of Istanbul by Western forces, and even after the foundation of Turkish Republic, the respondent's family chose to retain the old citizenship, as did he. He kept it after settling in Israel as well. The remaining 20

respondents out of the total 34 had Israeli citizenship only. All of these Israeli citizens opted out of Turkish citizenship for practical reasons such as avoiding the Turkish military draft, being able to visit Turkey as tourists without incurring the legal obligations of Turkish citizenship, and the considerable expense of extending their Turkish passports.[8]

As for the *birthplaces* of the respondents, all but one were born in Turkey, as follows: one was born in Bergama, one in Menemen, one in Kırklareli, two in Edirne, 13 in İzmir and 15 in Istanbul. These are all places in Turkey where historically Jews were concentrated. Only one respondent was born in Israel; his family immigrated to Israel in 1943 during World War II, but returned to Turkey after the war's end.

As to their *places of settlement*, the respondents who migrated to Israel in the mass wave of 1948-51 came largely to reside in Tel-Aviv or else Farsaba, Haifa, Sahala or Yahud.[9] The respondents who migrated between the years 1951 and 1980 settled in such regions as Tel-Aviv, Bat-Yam, Natanya, Ashdot, Or Yehuda and Ramat-Aviv.[10] At the time of the interviews, the respondents were

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[8] The effect of Turkey's laws and policies on citizenship and emigration on the status of Turkish Jews in Israel was explored in Chapter III.

[9] Israel is territorially a small country, about 1/40th the size of Turkey. Tel-Aviv (Tel-Aviv Yafo) is its biggest city, and was capital for eight months in 1948, when Jerusalem was given that designation, though most other countries have kept their embassies in Tel-Aviv, effectively refusing to recognize the controversial move. The other areas mentioned are small settlements or villages, mostly former Arab property.

[10] With urbanization, population growth and the building of highways between towns, some of these towns became townships of Tel-Aviv. In addition, new suburbs were established but most of them are concentrated in the Tel-Aviv hinterland.

living mainly in Bat-Yam, Herzeliya, Ramata Hasharon, Ramat-Aviv, Rishon Lezziyon, Yahud or central Tel-Aviv.

The *employment status* of the respondents also reflected diversity among the sample group of Turkish Jews in Israel. Out of all 34 respondents, 18 were employed at the time of the interviews. Among these working respondents, 13 were women and five were men. Six out of the total 18 working respondents were employed mostly in white-collar jobs (one bank manager, three accountants, one university academic and one technician), and the remaining 12 were self-employed (one dry cleaner, one photographer, five small retailers, two contractors, two lawyers and one trader).[11] A little less than half, 16 out of the total 34, were not employed at the time of the interviews. Most of these non-employed respondents were women, with only four men. There was considerable variance among this non-employed group: seven were housewives, another seven were retired (mostly from white-collar jobs), and two were unemployed but actively seeking jobs.

The *education level* of the 34 respondents also varied. A single respondent had no education at all, three had finished elementary school, six had finished junior high school, 13 were high school graduates, three of them had finished two years of education beyond high school (college), six were university graduates, one had a master's degree, and one had a doctorate. Advancement can be seen in the education levels of the Turkish Jews as compared with their parents' education level. The *socio-economic status* of the respondents in terms of education and

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[11] The two small retailers of the 12 self-employed were former IDF officers who opened shops after retiring from the military.

income levels was mainly in the middle range, though some had a lower or higher status.

In terms of *ethno-religious origin*, all of the 34 respondents were Sephardic Jews. Two of the respondents had French as their mother tongue, 20 had Ladino and 12 had Turkish, but all knew both Hebrew and Turkish. Almost all of the respondents knew Ladino very well, excepting two who knew none at all. Most of the respondents knew English and some knew Italian as foreign languages in addition to Ladino, Turkish, French and/or Hebrew.

In terms of their *year of migration*, out of the total 34 respondents, 11 arrived in Israel during the great wave of 1948-51. The other 23 migrated from Turkey to Israel in the period of 1952 to 1980. Out of these 23 later arrivals, 13 migrated between the late 1960s and early '70s, and 10 of them came in the late '70s. Their dates of arrival in Israel pointed to sub-group characteristics and differences in migration history by periods of migration. At the outset, it should be clearly underlined that the sample group illustrated group characteristic tendencies very much like those of the Turkish Jews in Israel discussed in Chapter III.[12] Hence, the immigrants who arrived in the mass wave of 1948-51 were a significantly different immigrant group compared to those who arrived after 1951.

The interviewees who arrived in Israel in 1948-51 generally had a lower socio-economic status than those who came in subsequent migratory flows. Most of them had low education levels and were by and large involved in low-skilled occupations concentrated in crafts and industry. The female respondents had no

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[12] In Chapter III, the reasons for migration as well as the profile of the immigrants were laid out according to the existing literature on Jewish migration from Turkey to Israel.

working experience when they were in Turkey but after arriving in Israel, they began working. The main reason for migration was to get access to better opportunities to raise their economic status, which they apparently achieved after their arrival in Israel. Among the respondent group of immigrants from 1948-51, there were also some who migrated out of Zionist ideals or due to the pressure that the Turkification process put on Turkish Jews. These interviewees came mainly from the middle class, and after graduating from universities in Turkey, they moved to Israel to contribute to the Jewish state and/or to pursue careers in the public sector, which they thought would be impossible in Turkey due to their Jewish status. One of the respondents from this group said that she had migrated to Israel so she could get married without paying the drahoma (dowry), a sum beyond her means in Turkey.

After their arrival in Israel, the respondent group from the 1948-51 wave was settled first in migration camps or *kibbutzim*. The living conditions were poor. After a couple of years, when they found jobs outside the camps, most of the respondents moved to other places and settled in very small houses. As their earnings rose, they expanded these houses and established a better living for their families. Most of the respondents had Ladino as their mother tongue, but they learned Hebrew over time. In contrast, their children learned Hebrew as their mother tongue, and Turkish remained very limited, in comparison to the low level of Ladino. They established social networks with other Israeli Jews, especially the Sephardim, as well as with other Turkish Jews.

The interviewees who arrived in Israel after 1951 generally had higher socio-economic status than the previous immigrants and were generally from the

middle or upper-middle class. In occupational terms they were mostly tradesmen, but there were also some professionals. By taking advantage of the already established Turkish immigrant communities, members of this group were able to continue in occupations similar to those they had held in Turkey. As stated previously, some also went on to take positions in the nation's military or police, something with no precedent in Turkey itself. The main motivations for migration for them were family unification, better economic and educational opportunities in Israel, higher standards of living, Turkey's general economic woes, Zionism, sharing Israel's pride as a Jewish state (especially after the 1967 Six-Day War), and the extreme rightist-leftist terror plaguing Turkey.

The respondents who arrived in Israel after 1951 differed among each other as well. The Jews who arrived in Israel in the late 1960s and late '70s varied in terms of class and reasons for migration. Those who came to Israel in the late '60s were mainly from the middle class, whereas those who came a decade later tended more towards the upper-middle class or upper class. It should be noted that the remaining Jewish community in Turkey showed a gradual upward mobility due to the gradual emigration of lower-class Jews. In other words, as the lower and middle classes emigrated, the remaining Jews in Turkey moved towards the middle and upper classes. Such a trend in the Jewish community in Turkey occurred gradually. As of the late 1970s, the remaining Jews in Turkey were more upper class than previous members of their community who emigrated. Moreover, rising political violence throughout the decade resulted in an atmosphere of great insecurity and was the main motivation for emigration for most respondents who arrived in Israel in the late '70s.

The settlement patterns of the respondents who arrived in Israel after 1951 seems to be the result of their social and familial connections with previous emigrants, the increased state aid to the newcomers, and the buying power of their socioeconomic class. The respondents who arrived in the late '60s settled mainly in Bat-Yam, and those in the late '70s settled in Ramat-Aviv or the Herzeliya region. All the post-1951 respondents spoke better Turkish and conversely less Ladino. However, this group also used Turkish more often in their lives and maintained closer relationships with other Turkish Jews than did their predecessors. Furthermore, maintaining Turkish citizenship was more common in this group of respondents than with immigrants who came in the great wave.

5.4 How Do Turkish Jews in Israel See Citizenship? Their Experiences and Perceptions

After our brief presentation of the profile of interviewees in the field research in Israel, in this part of the chapter the focus shifts to an analysis of the findings concerning the Turkish Jews. Since the interviews were in-depth, the data collected covers a broad spectrum of issues concerning citizenship and international migration, a full discussion of which is impossible in a dissertation. Therefore, the discussion here is limited to only exploring the research questions within the medium of the research paradigm set forth in Chapter I. The main research questions addressed are: "How is the interface between international migration and citizenship?" and "How does the experience of international migration affect the relation between the legal status, identity and civic virtue of

citizenship in Turkey and in Israel among the Turkish Jews in Israel?" The question "How do the respondents perceive their membership, belonging and/or attachment to the Turkish nation-state and/or to the Israeli nation-state?" also complements the basic research questions and refines the interface between international migration and citizenship.

In the interviews, it became clear that the year of migration was the main determining factor of the similarities and dissimilarities between and among the respondents. The immigrants differed among themselves significantly according to their dates of arrival in Israel, which coincided to a large extent with the profile of the immigrant groups presented above. Therefore, our analysis of the findings concentrates on the breakdown of the respondents by year of migration to Israel, i.e. immigrants that arrived in 1948-51 and those who arrived post 1951.

5.4.1 Citizenship and the Legal Status of Turkish Jews in Israel

All of the first generation immigrant respondents had, prior to migration, experiences of being members of a minority group in Turkey. Their perceptions and experiences regarding the legal status of citizenship before migration were directly related to their minority status while still in Turkey. After they arrived in Israel, they became members of the Turkish-Jewish community in Israel. Such a move to Israel inevitably led the respondents to compare and contrast their former lives in Turkey and present lives in Israel.

Looking back at their former membership in the Jewish minority, most of the respondents said they generally had not experienced anti-Semitism while in

Turkey but rather had had peaceful and harmonious relations with the dominant Muslim, Turkish society. They frequently mentioned their good relations with their neighbors or co-workers. Most of the respondents seemed to have a warm nostalgic feeling about their past life in Turkey. When asked directly about their legal status as Jews in Turkey, most of the respondents reiterated their optimistic views and evaluations, emphasizing that they had been on equal footing with other Turkish citizens and had not faced overt discrimination rooted in citizenship law. Most of them emphasized that the legal framework of basic rights and responsibilities applied equally and universally for every subject of the Turkish state. However, despite such a general tendency to accentuate the positive conditions and relations affecting Jews in Turkey, differences in opinion among the respondents emerged according to their year of migration. Although most of the respondents emphasized that they had not faced discrimination in Turkey on account of their Jewishness, the degree of emphasis on the equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in Turkey varied accordingly.

The interviewees who migrated between 1948 and 1951 mainly argued that while non-Muslim minorities in Turkey had faced difficulties in the 1930s and '40s, this was an archaic problem which had since disappeared. These respondents had experienced firsthand such events as the Thracian Incidents, the Capital Tax and the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, or at least heard about them from fellow Turkish Jews. Even though they believe these incidents put pressure on Jews and other non-Muslims living in Turkey, they also believed such events would not recur, for a variety of reasons: today very few Jews remain in Turkey, over time the nation had become modernized and developed, and Israel as

the protector of world Jewry would not allow such incidents to happen. Even when recalling these incidents, the respondents seemed to steer away from any harsh criticism of Turkey or Turkish society, and instead, in a forgiving tone, framed the incidents as things of the past. They also characterized the incidents as anomalies in Turkish history partially attributable to the environment of World War II. The following comments are an example of this tolerant attitude towards such incidents:

> I didn't live through the Thracian Incidents myself, but my parents told me about it. What happened was passed down by word of mouth. The Capital Tax, I do remember. They took everything in our house away. They also took my father to a camp. Those were very hard conditions. Some people even died in those camps. I didn't favor the Capital Tax. I think it was unequal, but those were difficult times. Even the Turks themselves lived in fear. The [Nazi] Germans were at the borders preparing to invade Turkey. But İsmet İnönü protected us from the Jews. He said, "They won't touch the Jews!" İnönü and Atatürk protected us. İnönü imposed the Capital Tax because he needed to do something to protect us from the Nazis. But I must admit that İnönü was a bit religious. He was more religious than Atatürk. Some people claim that İnönü was anti-Semitic, but I don't believe it. On the one hand he protected us and on the other, he imposed the Capital Tax on us. He was also fearful. He needed to do something to protect us. (FRIS12, female, 1948 immigrant)[13]

Other than these historical incidents, the respondents who arrived in Israel in 1948-51 said that they had experienced some anti-Jewish discrimination in Turkey, but their stories fit in with the attitude laid out above. Here are two other accounts of discrimination:

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[13] FRIS is the abbreviation for 'field research in Israel.' The number beside it refers to the number given to each interview.

> In high school, some teachers discriminated against us as Jews but despite this, I was very happy with my life in Turkey. I needed to do perfectly in every course so that nobody could discriminate against me. This actually turned into an advantage for me. I became very successful at school and was able to attend university as the result of my hard work. There were also other ways Jews were discriminated against. For instance, there was discrimination at work. Jews at that time were mainly doctors, lawyers or traders. I was the first Jewish girl living in İzmir who went to Istanbul for a university education. I was afraid my father wouldn't let me go since we had no relatives in Istanbul. We knew that the state dormitories weren't accepting Jewish students at the time and so I didn't even apply. I lived in a guesthouse but a friend who was going to the same school lived in the state dorm. There was no written rule, but everybody knew that the state dorms wouldn't admit Jewish students. Things are very different in Turkey now. Times have changed. You're a new generation. Maybe you're hearing about these things for the first time in your life, but these things did happen. (FRIS30, female, 1951 immigrant)

> I never experienced any discrimination. When I was 10 or so, there were bastards in the street who said "Dirty Jew!" to me but over time Turkey learned to be respectful. We didn't face any hardships in Turkey. If you read about the things Jews in other parts of the world had to face, you see that they faced very hard times. But we, the Jews in Turkey, didn't have to deal with such things. We had very good conditions. Nobody in Turkey ran after us, threw us into the sea or did anything to insult us. What saved us was Turkey, and this fact always stayed with us. We'll never forget that Turkey saved us. (FRIS7, male, 1948 immigrant)

The respondents who arrived in Israel after 1951 emphasized more strongly than previous immigrants that legally speaking, there was full equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Although they conceded that there might have been some incidents against Jews and other non-Muslims in the past, they themselves had not suffered from discrimination. In addition, they frequently recalled the tolerance that society in general showed them. Such a positive evaluation of the past both in terms of legal status and social relations with society at large seemed to be connected to their nostalgia for the country and society they grew up in. Similar to the immigrants of 1948-51, this group of respondents

seemed to recall their past life in Turkey in largely positive terms. Even though some respondents argued that there were instances of anti-Semitism during their time in Turkey, they declined to tar either Turkish society in general or the state with the taint of anti-Semitism, underlining that these were but small incidents that did not add up to a picture of large-scale anti-Semitism. Incidents such as the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, the Thracian Incidents, the Capital Tax and the September 6-7 Events were generally heard about from other Jews, either in Israel or in Turkey. As they did with their own experiences, most of the respondents did not believe that these incidents could be interpreted as out-and-out racism or other severe forms of discrimination. The following quotations from two Jews illustrate how they see these incidents and their previous life in Turkey:

> We had a very beautiful life in Turkey. I didn't feel any discrimination. Nothing bad happened to my family or to me personally. I only heard rumors of past incidents. It was like a wave and it came and went. Nothing happened to me. I only heard [about these] but didn't experience [them] myself. (FRIS24, female, 1970 immigrant)

> I haven't heard about the Thracian Incidents. I know that with the Capital Tax, they took everything from the Jews. Some people lost their homes. I think it was a bad tax and it would have been better if it had never existed. I hear about the September 6-7 Events and the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign. But you have to recognize that all these events occurred during World War II. Because of European influence the attitude in Turkey towards Jews changed at that time, but later everything was resolved. In Europe, they burned six million Jews but not even a single Jew died in Turkey. There is a Holocaust museum here in Israel. They list the number of Jews who died in every country. For Turkey it says "zero," which means no Jew died in Turkey during World War II. This is a very important point. Things should be considered from this perspective. (FRIS22, male, 1964 immigrant)

The emphasis put on legal equality and the harmony between Jews and other segments of Turkish society rises with the migrants who arrived in the late 1970s. It can be argued that the tendency to describe their past life in Turkey in affirmative, optimistic terms as citizens and as Jews solidifies for the respondent group of late '70s immigrants. The following quotation is an example of this strong emphasis on equality between Jews and other Turkish citizens:

> I was never bothered in Turkey for being Jewish. Sometimes there would be bad jokes, but that was it and nothing more. There was no enmity against Jews. There was the distinction between the [Muslim] Alawites and Sunnites, and this conflict disturbed me the most. In the '70s there was ideological polarization, especially among the workers. I assigned Alawite workers to one factory and the Sunnites to another because the Alawites were leftists and the Sunnites were rightists. It was a sectarian as well as an ideological conflict. Neither Erbakan [leader of the extreme Islamist National Salvation Party at the time] nor the assassination of Elrom [then chargé d'affaires at Israel's Embassy in Istanbul] worried me.[14] Erbakan caused me no concern because I was already doing business with conservative Islamic people. Furthermore, those religious extremists had no hopes of realizing their goals because the Turkish Army would never ever let them get hold of power... No, I won't complain about Turkey. It would be very silly to complain. Today there are problems in Israel and there were the same problems in Turkey at that time. This is how things are. In Turkey I was on the same footing as Muslims, and that's it. I had no greater cause for complaint about Turkey than I do for Israel. (FRIS5, male, 1979 immigrant)

As for their post-immigration legal status in Israel, the respondents were as one in strongly and frequently stressing the equality among citizens of Israel. The

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[14] Here, the respondents draw out a general picture of the political conjecture in 1970s marked by conflict between leftist and rightist groups among Turkish society. Despite military intervention in 1971, the conflict continued until the next intervention in 1980. National Salvation Party, which was a conservative-Islamic party headed by Necmettin Erbakan started to gain weight in the same years. The assassination of Efraim Elrom that the respondent told about occurred in May, 1971. One of the illegal socialist organizations at the time, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi (Turkey People's Independence Front) which was influenced by the Palestininan movement, kidnapped and killed Elrom, Israel's ambassador in Istanbul. Some of the leaders of the Organization were executed in 1972.

respondents argued that democracy in Israel provides equality and freedom for all its citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin. In their opinion, Israel's minorities – i.e. Muslims, Christians and Druze – are treated without any discrimination and under the same set of legal provisions. Some of the respondents also argued that the laws and policies on citizenship provided equality not only to ethnic and religious groups but also to women, the disabled and the elderly. Regardless of their year of arrival in Israel, the following are exemplary of the respondents' view of equality under Israeli law:

> The laws are equal for everybody. They thought about everybody's needs. For example, my husband is very old. He gets a retirement pension. Now he's very ill. The state sends a nurse to our house every day to look after him. (FRIS14, female, 1951 immigrant)

> There are courts under the law, and they are very just. Women, men, everybody is equal before the law. The Arabs also benefit from these laws. Women's rights in Israel are very advanced. (FRIS20, female, 1965 immigrant)

However, with respect to equality between Jews and Arabs, complicated views about military conscription emerged. Conscription in Israel is not universal, as it is obligatory for Jews only. Arabs can serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) only if they volunteer, and if they are then accepted. This issue arose in some of the interviews. The non-universal nature of conscription was not interpreted as a form of inequality, but rather as a requirement for the security's sake. One respondent expressed his views like this:

> The laws in Israel are equal. It's true that for security reasons, the military investigates non-Jews more. For instance, if a Christian Arab wants to join

> the military, they would investigate him more. If that person proves his loyalty, he can reach a high position in the military but if there are doubts about him, they won't let him in to begin with. For ordinary citizens, there's no difference in the laws. Arabs have all the same rights that we have. I think that it's they who don't want equal rights. The state has certain rules. Nobody bothers Arabs as long as they stay in their villages. They can build where they want to. They have the right to vote, but few do. (FRIS33, male, 1970 immigrant)

The aid provided by Israel to Jewish immigrants was argued to be just in the sense that Jews who needed more received more. For instance, Jews coming from underdeveloped countries or ones where there was severe anti-Semitic discrimination got a larger share of the absorption basket than those from countries where Jews generally enjoyed a high socio-economic status.[15] Along such lines, Turkish Jews were considered to be less privileged than Jews from the United States but more so than Iraqi or Yemeni Jews. Past migrants, especially those of the migration wave of 1948-51, mentioned that there was discrimination against Sephardic Jews by Ashkenazic Jews. In the migration camps and kibbutzim, for instance, they claimed that Ashkenazic Jews were favored for open positions, with Sephardic Jews thought little of. Since Turkish Jews were put alongside other Sephardic groups, they were certain incidents of discrimination against them, as one respondents related:

> In the beginning, those who came from Turkey were discriminated against a bit. But later this stopped. We're a very warm people. We believe what other people tell us. This is Turkish style. Here they call us "Turco." At the start, there were the Ashkenazim who came here before us. They already had houses and jobs. They knew more than us. They knew the country. When we came, we knew nothing. We didn't know the language. Nobody

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[15] For further information on the absorption basket, see Chapter III.

> helped us, I mean the Ashkenazim. There was this Ashkenazim-Sephardim distinction. They knew us as Sephardim, and there was some discrimination against us at that time because of this. (FRIS12, female, 1948 immigrant)

At the present, all new immigrants receive the same share from the absorption basket. Most respondents know that in the past there was discrimination between the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, but they said that over time it disappeared and today no such inequality remained. Even the way in the past immigrants from Turkey received less government support than Jews from Morocco or Argentina was viewed as a just procedure, not a form of inequality. One of the post-1951 immigrants laid out his views as follows:

> Everybody gets a different amount of support, and this is determined according to people's needs. This isn't unfair. The Turks were in a better situation, but those from Russia or Abyssinia [Ethiopia] were not, and that's why they got more support from the state. (FRIS16, male, 1980 immigrant)

The respondents compared their experiences in Turkey and in Israel, regarding citizenship as well. The respondents were asked several questions about the reasons for their current citizenship status. These questions not only highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of changing citizenship but also revealed how they compared citizenship in Israel and citizenship in Turkey. The respondents with only Israeli citizenship said that they had not wanted to revoke their Turkish citizenship but had had to do so for practical reasons. Those who kept their Turkish citizenship emphasized that doing so was important for them as an indication of their social/familial ties with Turkey as well as of their bonds of loyalty to their former home country. One of the respondents, a Turkish citizen, told the meaning of his holding a Turkish passport like this:

> I don't need dual citizenship. Every time I come to Turkey, the policeman at the passport control asks us: "You're living in Israel and come to visit Turkey every year, so why don't you get an Israeli citizenship?" I tell him, "I was born a Turk, so let me die a Turk." Then the conversation changes, of course. That policeman doesn't question my Turkishness because I'm a Jew. What he questions is my long years of staying in Israel and maintaining my Turkishness. This is what surprises him. "Are you living in Israel? Are you living in Tel-Aviv? How can you remain a Turk after many years?" are some of the questions they ask. I've been away from Turkey for so many years, but I'm still a Turk. I can't see myself as an Israeli. My mind and my heart belong to Turkey. When I come across something about Turkey, for example on the TV or when I'm walking down the street, my ears automatically prick up. For example, customers who are Turkish come to our bank and I'm more interested in them. I pay more attention to them. I'm more sympathetic towards them. I sit and chat with them about Turkey. We didn't cut off our ties with Turkey and we never wanted to. (FRIS23, male, 1970 immigrant)

The respondents explained the advantages and disadvantages of holding Turkish citizenship in practical terms. They said that it was hard to get visas with their Turkish passports. However, when visiting some Muslim countries that Israel has been at odds with, they preferred Turkish passports. Since Israeli-passport holders are denied visas to some Middle Eastern countries such as Dubai, Turkish Jews use their Turkish passports to get these visas. Another interesting issue that arose during one of the interviews was the security afforded to Turkish passport-holders in contrast to Israeli citizens and passports. As is commonly known, Israeli citizens and Jews are targets of terrorist attacks not only in Israel but also in other countries. But in dangerous situations such as a plane hijacking, a Turkish passport provides proof of its bearer being neither Israeli nor a Jew and so affords a degree of security. One respondent explained the security that Turkish passports provide as follows:

> I wanted my wife to get dual citizenship. An Israeli plane had been hijacked on its way to Uganda. The hijackers released the foreigner passengers but kept the Israelis on board. One of our friends was on the plane. He was holding a Turkish passport, and he was among those who were released. I told my wife, "You should get a Turkish passport. When we go abroad and if our plane is hijacked, at least you can be released with your Turkish passport." (FRIS31, male, 1949 immigrant)

In the interviews, quickly and easily obtaining visas from European countries was held up as the foremost advantage of holding Israeli citizenship. Some of the respondents said that they had applied for dual citizenship and obtained Israeli citizenships so as to get voting rights (permanent residents in Israel can vote in local, but not general, elections).

When the respondents compared citizenships in Turkey and in Israel, the common theme that emerged was Turkey's lack of a notion of social welfare and hence social rights. In contrast, Israel was characterized as a country where citizens' rights were more advanced, the social welfare system was better quality and social rights granted to its citizens cover a broad range of needs and services. Oft-cited services delivered in Israel are its free, modern healthcare system, the existence of an unemployment insurance system, and good post-retirement living standards owing to high pensions.

Whatever their year of arrival, the respondents characterized Turkey as a place marked by the supremacy of the state over individuals, whereas in Israel, there were human rights, and the value placed on individual citizens was higher. The basic responsibility of state officials in Israel, they said, was to serve the citizens. The respect and professionalism of state officials in Israel was also mentioned. On the other hand, Turkish state officials, especially police officers,

were characterized as acting in a heavy-handed and authoritarian manner. Such a difference seen in citizenship rights in Turkey and in Israel seems to come from the perception that Israeli citizens are clients of the services delivered by the state, whereas Turkish citizens have limited power vis-à-vis state officials and the state apparatus. The following provides an illustration of this difference:

> Here [in Israel], if my citizenship rights were violated even by a police officer, I can file a complaint against him/her. If the same thing happens in Turkey, I would fear the police and wouldn't do anything to protect my rights. This isn't because I'm a Jew. In Turkey, everybody is afraid of the police. Nobody would raise their voice against the police in Turkey. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)

Another issue that arose during the interviews when the respondents compared citizenship in Turkey and in Israel was the recruitment of minorities to powerful or decision-making positions. Generally, as was shown above, the respondents emphasized the equality among Muslims and non-Muslims in Turkey, though the degree of emphasis varied according to the year of arrival in Israel – it was lower among immigrants who arrived in the great wave, and higher among post-1951 immigrants. When asked about the prospects and conditions for Jews in Turkey to be recruited to high state or political positions, the opinions paralleled the year-of-arrival trend of views about equality. Immigrants from both the great wave and its aftermath said that there were no legal prohibitions in Turkey blocking Jews from holding high positions such as the prime ministry, other ministries, the bureaucracy, the chief of general staff or deputies in

Parliament.[16] However, the great wave immigrants also mentioned that certain legal restrictions had existed in Turkey in the past, but that such restrictions no longer existed today. One of them explained this issue as follows:

> It's possible in theory but in practice, it can't be done. Hardly any Jews in Turkey are involved in politics. Once there were some Jewish deputies in the Parliament but there are none today. There's no legal restriction, but the Jews themselves aren't interested in politics. There used to be some legal prohibitions like restrictions on the recruitment of the Jews or Roma [Gypsies]. Although every man is drafted by law, Jews who were put in jail weren't registered as Jews but as Roma so that they wouldn't be drafted. Roma were not drafted at the time. This was not written in the laws but they were not drafting Roma or Jews under prison at the time. (FRIS28, male, 1951 immigrant)

The common theme emerging in the interviews with the immigrants of both 1948-51 and afterwards was that despite the absence of legal barriers, invisible social barriers did exist to Jewish candidates attaining those positions of power. They furthermore argued that Jews in Turkey were not interested in state affairs or politics but rather preferred professions in the private sector.

The resulting invisible barriers for Jews in Turkey were, according to the respondents, natural and rational. The respondents believed that in any given society positions of high power ought to be filled by members of its majority. In Turkey, the majority is of course Muslim. Correspondingly, the majority in Israel is Jewish. The respondents argued that it would be "rational" and "the normal way" that in Israel the chief of general staff or president would be a Jew, and in

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[16] In fact, as stated earlier, there are no legal provisions barring the recruitment of Jews to any state position. The views mentioned reflect perceptions only.

Turkey a Muslim. In particular, the respondents argued very strongly that the chief of general staff position should be occupied by a member of the majority. Some of the respondents conceded that there could be Parliament deputies or Cabinet ministers from minority groups provided they were chosen using the normal procedures. They gave examples of both Jewish deputies in the Turkish Parliament and Arab parliamentarians in Israel's Knesset. Below are some of the immigrants' views about the recruitment of minorities to high government or political positions in both Israel and in Turkey:

> No Jew can become chief of general staff, and this is normal. I compare the situation in Israel with Turkey. It would be impossible for an Arab to become Israel's chief of staff, and it's the same in Turkey, it would be impossible for a Jew to hold such a position. For instance the Druze in Israel, none of them could become chief of general staff. There's no legal prohibition but they wouldn't allow it. In my opinion, whoever's in the majority should govern the country. If a Jew became Turkey's chief of general staff, this would be unwise. Turkey is a conservative country and some people wouldn't like this. I would understand their reaction. No, it wouldn't be right. (FRIS22, male, 1964 immigrant)

> Jews could become deputies, but not anything more. They also can't serve as chief of general staff, and this is very understandable. Turkey's chief of general staff should be a Muslim Turk, because Turkey is Muslim country. This is the normal way, in my opinion. For example, a Muslim Arab can't become Israel's chief of general staff. I believe that the majority should rule. Besides, Jews in Turkey are interested in trade and wouldn't prefer a profession in the military. But more than that, I think it should be someone from the majority. (FRIS2, female, 1979 immigrant)

5.4.2 Citizenship and the Identity of Turkish Jews in Israel

During the interviews, the identity aspect of citizenship was explored through various questions and points related to the cultural formation and re-

formation of the respondents due to their experience of international migration. One of the impacts of immigration as a process on Turkish Jews was a change of names. Although most of the immigrants had Jewish names taken from the Jewish mythology or theology, after they arrived in Israel they changed these names for ones which better suited Hebrew phonetics. These new names carried meanings similar to their previous ones. For children, almost all the respondents chose Israeli names. Customarily, Jews in Turkey named children after their forebears – more usually, after their mothers and fathers. This custom was maintained in Israel as well, but the names given the children were adapted to Hebrew phonetics.

Another crucial component of identity is language. The mother tongues of Turkish Jews varied according to their year of migration and socio-economic status. Among Turkey's Jewish community, French was common as a mother tongue among higher socio-economic status Jews, with Ladino more common among those of lower socio-economic status. The use of Turkish existed in every generation of the Jews, yet its status as mother tongue became more prevalent after the 1950s. Hebrew was not among the foreign languages that Turkey's Jewish minority knew. It was used only in synagogues prayers, and the rabbis generally knew and used it for religious purposes. Therefore, the Jews who migrated to Israel in the great wave of 1948-51 mainly had Ladino as their mother tongue, with a limited use of Turkish. Hebrew was nearly unknown to them. Since most of the immigrants were of a lower socio-economic status, the use of French was rare. These early immigrants learned Hebrew in Israel and continued to speak mainly Ladino amongst themselves, though Turkish was also used when needed.

When Israel's community of Turkish immigrants grew due to the subsequent migrations, especially in the 1970s, earlier immigrants from Turkey spoke Turkish with these newcomers, who by that time had mostly adopted Turkish as their mother tongue. The children of these early immigrants learned Hebrew, which became the dominant language used in the household. They understood Ladino as well, but used it little. Their level of Turkish remained very limited; some of them learned only a couple of words or expressions. One of the respondents who arrived in Israel in 1948 explained the linguistic changes resulting from migration like this:

> When we first got here, we used to speak Ladino amongst ourselves. Then Hebrew came into the house. When we didn't want the children to understand us, my husband and I used Ladino. The newcomers, I mean those who came after the '70s, speak Turkish. But when we arrived, there wasn't much Turkish spoken. We used Ladino or Hebrew. It was with the newcomers we began to talk Turkish. (FRIS6, female, 1948 immigrant)

The Jews who arrived in the 1970s, however, had Turkish as their mother tongue. Although their level of Ladino was also high, the Turkish tongue had been more dominant in their lives in Turkey. They transmitted Turkish to their children, though Hebrew came to be used frequently at home. If these Jews married fellow Turkish immigrants, the use of Turkish was more frequent. These respondents, like other Turkish Jews, had not previously known Hebrew but learned it mostly in Israeli *ulpän* language schools. Both the use of Turkish and its transmission to children is more common among respondents who arrived in the late '70s. It should be recalled that these respondents are from the upper-middle and upper class, and some had French as their mother tongue.

The research also showed that most of the respondents follow news related to Turkey and tune into Turkish television channels. Moreover, the immigrants who arrived in the great wave said that their Turkish improved after watching these channels, which were available only after the 1980s with Turkish media deregulation. The habit of reading Turkish-language publications also varied according to year of arrival. The immigrants who arrived in 1948-51 did not read and write in Turkish, but those who arrived later, especially after the '70s, followed some Turkish-language publications such as daily newspapers and magazines, especially after the widespread availability of the Internet in the 1990s. However, the reasons for this difference in reading and writing ability seem mainly to lie in the education levels and socio-economic status of the respondents, as the less-educated and lower class respondents' proficiency in Turkish was low. It should also be remembered that general literacy rate of Turkish society in the 1940s was lower than in the '70s. Therefore, reading and writing in Turkish among the Turkish Jews may be related to other factors, not only to their year of arrival.

Concerning attitudes towards the use of one language in one country, it can be suggested at the outset that most of the respondents from across the migration waves think that all members of a nation should learn and speak the country's dominant language. They also saw the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign as a means of the Turkish nation-state to achieve this goal. However, with regards to the state's methods of making citizens not versed in the dominant language speak it, views once again varied according to year of migrations. Respondents who arrived in the great wave were more familiar with the

Turkification policies of the Early Republican Era. In addition, neither their families nor they themselves knew Turkish very well. Such a campaign for spreading the use of Turkish in the public sphere put them under pressure. For that reason, although they agree with the aim of the campaign – to make Turkish the language of the newly founded state – they were concerned that such campaigns were futile, and that language courses or education in Turkish schools would serve better this aim. As one of the respondents who arrived in the great wave had this to say:

> I remember the Campaign. They even sent postcards saying "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" to shops. I think it was a wrongheaded campaign. I agree that there should be one language spoken in a country, but the Turkish authorities didn't understand that making people who've spoken a different language for 500 years start speaking Turkish overnight was simply impossible. (FRIS9, male, 1951 immigrant)

Jews who arrived in the late 1960s and early '70s argued that every country should have one dominant tongue and that every member of its society should learn and use this tongue in the public sphere. They also added that the state, either through campaigns or other means, should promote the use of the dominant language. As individuals, they advocated the use of Turkish among Turkey's Jewish community. The following quotation is an example of such thoughts:

> I was in elementary school. The school principal, for example, used to put a key in our pockets if we were caught speaking Ladino. Whoever was caught speaking a foreign language was given a key and as punishment was made to write 100 times in their notebook, "I will speak Turkish." I never got the key since I knew Turkish. The school was right to impose such a

> punishment. It's a school and in every school, the students shouldn't speak some foreign language. It would be very rude to speak in a language that other people don't understand. I think the campaign to make people speak Turkish was in the right. (FRIS19, male, 1961 immigrant)

The respondents who arrived in the late 1970s shared the opinions of other Turkish Jews in Israel in strongly supporting the principle that everybody in one state should speak the same language. Some had never heard about the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign. Here is how one of the respondents reacted, surprised when the interviewer asked her about the campaign:

> I never heard about that. What is it? We sometimes play games on the Internet, with Turks mainly, but sometimes some foreigners join us. We're friends with a lot of people on the Internet. We usually play bridge. If there's a British player but the remaining three players are Turks, we start speaking Turkish among us. This is rude, and we remind each other of this using a joke: "Citizen, don't speak Turkish!" But it's a private joke. I never thought it was ever a campaign. Is there a campaign like that in Turkey? (FRIS2, female, 1979 immigrant)

The findings in the interviews seem to suggest that the respondents' ideas and values about one language in one state were influenced by their experience of migration. Hence, most of the respondents seemed to make a comparison of their previous lives in Turkey and their current lives in Israel. In other words, they seemed to have developed a comparative perspective with regards to their attitude about languages. Most think that as Hebrew is the dominant language in Israel, so Turkish is the dominant one in Turkey. Along these lines, immigrants to Israel should learn and use Hebrew, just as Jews in Turkey should learn and use Turkish. Such a comparative perspective was valid among all the interviewees, regardless of their year of arrival. Some of the respondents supported their views with

examples from the Russian aliya of the 1990s. Below is an example of this comparative perspective:

> It annoys me when I hear a Russian [immigrant] speaking Russian. I believe that in one country the language that everybody understands should be spoken. (FRIS21, female, 1974 immigrant)

The respondents were also asked whether they perceived any difference between the terms Musevi and Yahudi.[17] Almost all replied that they saw no difference between the terms, as both carry the same meaning in denoting both a religion and a nation. Only a few respondents, great wave immigrants, mentioned Musevi's more polite connotation and that they preferred that Yahudi be used.

As to how they perceived themselves with respect to identity, almost all of the respondents regardless of their year of arrival in Israel called themselves Jews and Israelis but of Turkish origin. There was a difference of stress on the Turkish origin part: immigrants who arrived in the great wave emphasized their Turkish roots less, while those who arrived later emphasized them more strongly and frequently.[18] In the following quotations, one can see how the immigrants identify themselves as Jews and Israelis but of Turkish origin, as well as the differences in the degree of stress on Turkishness:

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[17] The same question was adressed to the sample group of respondents in Turkey as well. In Chapter IV, there is a discussion of the terms Musevi and Yahudi.

[18] It should be noted that by the 1970s, there was a shift in Israel's immigrant absorption policies in terms of its nation-building process. In the early years, the 'melting pot model for socio-cultural integration was the dominant norm, but this gradually gave way to a more pluralistic notion of Israeli culture. This shift to the acknowledgement of multiculturalism corresponds to the identification of Jews from Turkey as Turkish Jews.

> I see myself as a Jew, a Jew of Turkish origin, and at the same time as an Israeli. (FRIS31, male, 1949 immigrant)

> I see myself as a Jew of Turkish origin, because we were born and grew up in Turkey, and this didn't leave us. We've been here for 30 years and this how we still are. We never lost our Turkishness. (FRIS24, female, 1970 immigrant)

> I see myself as an Israeli of Turkish origin. Our culture, our heritage is very different. We stand out in Israel because we're Turkish by custom and tradition. We've raised our children the same way. They are easily noticed among other Israeli children... Turkish culture means listening to what others say, being patient, not being aggressive and behaving politely towards others. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)

Only two of the respondents, late '70s arrivals, specified that they perceived themselves as Sephardic Jews in addition to the labels of Turks and Israelis. They said that in Turkey they had been unaware that they were Sephardic Jews but after their arrival in Israel, they discovered a distinction between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews. In the words of one respondent:

> I see myself as a Jew of Turkish origin and a Sephardic Jew. Before we came to Israel, I wasn't even aware that we were Sephardic Jews because there was no other Jewish group other than the Sephardim in Turkey. I only knew that the Jews in Turkey came from Spain 500 years ago. When we came to Israel, we saw that there was a distinction between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jewry. They put us into the group of the Sephardim. I learned that I was a Sephardic Jew and internalized this identification. (FRIS34, female, 1979 immigrant)

The difference in the degree of emphasis on Turkishness seemed to be reflected in the level of interaction with other immigrants from Turkey in Israel. Those who arrived in the great wave seemed to have social networks with other

Jewish immigrants from various countries, though not with the Arabs living in Israel. Those who arrived in subsequent decades forged social networks primarily with other Turkish Jews. Social ties with Arabs were also weak to nonexistent with this group of immigrants. The maintenance of social networks among Turkish Jews could be seen in the Turkish Jews' immigrant organizations. Most of the Jews who arrived after 1951, especially after the '70s, were involved in the activities of these immigrants' organizations or at least attended them irregularly.

Across all immigration periods, immigrants from Turkey in Israel maintained ties with their relatives who stayed behind in Turkey. Either their relatives in Turkey came to visit them in Israel, or vice versa. The frequency of visits seemed to rise especially after the 1980s, when Turkey adopted a more liberal economic regime and restrictions on foreign exchange were lifted. The aftermath of the 1980s also witnessed a rise in tourism between Israel and Turkey, especially due to cheaper airfares and tourist site options in Turkey. As the respondents said, bilateral tourism not only allowed the immigrants to take vacations and visit their relatives in Turkey at the same time, but also brought other Israeli tourists to Turkey. Although Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, before the '80s Israelis had little information about this giant to its north. However, with the rise of the Turkish tourism sector, more Israelis visited Turkey and learned about Turkish culture and even more came to appreciate the hospitality and the warmth of the Turkish people. As they grew more familiar with native Turkish culture, Israelis also began to get to know Israel's own Turkish Jews better, seeing in the process what this group had inherited from its former homeland. Furthermore, diplomatic ties between Turkey and Israel

strengthened after the 1980s, and cooperation in a host of fields had a positive influence on the perception of Israelis towards Turkey and immigrants from Turkey in Israel. Such a change in the Israeli perception of Turkish Jews coincided, again, with the general profile of the immigrants by year of arrival. As the respondents related, Turkish Jews were initially seen as Oriental Jews coming from the lower socio-economic strata. However, the post-1970s aliya brought with it an improved image of Turkish-origin Jews. Turkish Jews were seen more and more by other Israelis as sympathetic and kind people after the late '70s. Below are some quotations summarizing how the change in the Israeli perception of Turkish Jews changed over time:

> Turkish Jewry's sick and jobless came to Israel – that's how it was in the first years. They left a negative mark on the image of Turkish Jewry. When others started to come in the '70s, the Israelis got confused because these people didn't look like the earlier immigrants from Turkey. These newcomers, who were mostly educated professionals, changed the image of Turkish Jews. (FRIS29, male, 1950 immigrant)

> There was a stigma left by those who came in 1948. In that time, porters, carriers and other workers came to Israel. They were from the lower classes. They were uneducated. Due to this stigma, Turkish Jews were not known well by others. But the image changed with the immigrants who came in the '70s. There was also more tourism between Israel and Turkey. They learned more about Turkey. Relations between Israel and Turkey also improved. Now Israelis like Turks. (FRIS5, male, 1979 immigrant)

Migration to Israel, as a process, also seems to have impacted attitudes towards intermarriage. Since Jews are the majority in Israel, the respondents said that their children would most probably marry other Israeli Jews. In this regard, there was no problem of intermarriage for Turkish Jews in Israel as there had been with Turkey's Jewish minority, who regarded intermarriage as a threat to the

survival of their group's cultural characteristics. The respondents in Israel told how while in Turkey their community tried to avoid intermarriage. When they arrived in Israel such concerns vanished, as the former minority group members overnight became members of the majority group – Israel's Jews. The respondents also said that in Israel the tradition of drahoma (dowry) had died out. Some of the respondents told like so how intermarriage was seen among Turkey's Jewish community before their migration:

> When I was in Turkey, there was no intermarriage. It was the normal way to marry among the Jews. At least, it was the expectation. In Edirne, both the Muslims and the Jews were conservative and religious. A Muslim girl marrying a Jewish man was considered 'lost' by the Muslims. The same was true for the Jews, too. (FRIS28, male, 1951 immigrant)

> There were few cases of intermarriage at that time. Families would oppose such marriages. But today, more intermarriages are seen in Turkey, more in Istanbul and fewer in İzmir. (FRIS21, female, 1974 immigrant)

Although intermarriage is no longer seen as a problem by the Israeli immigrants from Turkey, when asked to evaluate a hypothetical situation about the marriage of Jews to gentiles, the respondents who arrived in the great wave seemed to oppose the idea of intermarriage more strongly than the post-1951 immigrants. The latter respondents also confessed that they would not favor their children marrying non-Jews but would respect the decision of their children in the end.

The research demonstrated that the meaning of intermarriage changed during the course of migration. Prior to immigration, it meant marrying a gentile in Turkey. However, after moving into a Jewish majority, intermarriage seemed to

have earned an additional meaning for the respondents – marriage among fellow Jews who yet had different ethno-cultural backgrounds. Almost all of the respondents would prefer that their children marry Turkish Jews. The immigrants said that they raised their children as Israelis yet maintained Turkish culture to a certain extent, and that if their offspring were to marry other Jews of Turkish origin – including Jews currently living in Turkey – they would get along better as the food, values and quotidian habits would be similar. The closest culture to that of the Turkish Jews was seen to be the other Sephardic Jews from Iran, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Ashkenazic Jews were seen as "cold" and "alien" to the culture of the "warmer" Jews of the East or the Mediterranean. Particularly the respondents who arrived after 1951 seemed to be more adamant that it would be better for Turkish Jews in Israel to marry spouses sharing a similar mentality and cultural background. The below quotations are examples of such thoughts about intermarriage – that is, marriage to Jews who are not from Turkey:

> My daughter has a Turkish origin boyfriend and I'm very pleased about this. It's easier for us because Israel is very mixed, since many people around the world have come here. Our Turks wish to marry among the Turks. They prefer it because of the culture and the food cooked at home. (FRIS18, male, 1967 immigrant)

> Everybody is Jewish here. There is no risk [of interfaith marriage]. We prefer our children to marry among Turkish Jewry. Some of us even tried to play matchmaker with the children in the Herzeliya Culture Club. (FRIS2, female, 1979 immigrant)

The respondents not only saw the Turkish Jews in Israel bearing a distinctive cultural and historical inheritance but also made a distinction between them and Israel's Orthodox Jewry, the former being more secular and moderate in

terms of religion and the latter being strict in religious observance. The Haredim, an ultra-Orthodox group in Israel which strongly advocates Messianic belief and questions the sovereignty of the state, were frequently mentioned as exemplifying the distinction. Secularism appeared to be an important concern for the respondents. According to the respondents, religion should not be a reference point in the organization of public life. Furthermore, secularism as a principle was seen as a requirement of modern democracy both in Turkey and in Israel. Most of the respondents said that they were uncomfortable with the rise of Islamism in Turkey and were closely watching its conservative government (as of the fall 2002 elections). For Israel, they seemed to have similar concerns about fundamentalist Jews and argued that these extreme religious groups threatened not only Israel's democracy but also the harmony of Israeli society. They also contended that Israel should learn from Turkey's experience in dealing with religious extremists. Some of the respondents were even of the idea that Turkey was a secular country but Israel was not.[19] They believed that religion was a matter best confined to the private sphere and that political abuses of religious beliefs should be prohibited by law, as is the case in Turkish democracy. To illustrate:

> There is secularism in Turkey – religion and the state are separated. But they don't separate them here that much. I think secularism is a problem in Israel.

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[19] Some of the issues casting doubt on Israel's secular status are the legal sanction for public sphere observance of the Sabbath and Jewish holidays; the almost exclusive jurisdiction granted religious courts over matters of family law; state support for religious educational institutions largely autonomous of the general educational system; and various privileges granted Orthodox individuals, most importantly, their exemption from compulsory military service granted Orthodox women and Orthodox yeshiva students.

> For example, if someone wants to get married, the marriage has to be religious. El Al [the Israeli national airline] doesn't fly on Saturdays [the Sabbath]. There's no public transportation on Saturdays. These are all contrary to secularism. But recently we've seen some opposition. In the last elections, the religious parties didn't attract many votes. (FRIS13, male, 1973 immigrant)

As most of the respondents said that they were opposed to any form of religious fundamentalism, they added they were not as religious as they had been in Turkey. In Israel, the food sold outside is kosher, resting and praying was already reserved officially for the Shabbat (Sabbath) and wedding ceremonies were not held in synagogues but in secular entertainment settings. Therefore, the frequency of visits to synagogues and strict observance of the Shabat and casherut declined over time, according to most of the respondents. Although respondents from the great wave seemed to practice religion more, which may be due to their advanced age, immigrants who arrived in later decades reported less observance. Migration to Israel, a Jewish-majority country, seemed to be the major reason for the declining religious observance. One of the respondents told about the change in religious practice like so:

> We only go to synagogues on Yom Kippur (fasting day) and Bar Mitzvah ceremonies. The marriages aren't held in synagogues here. We used to go to synagogues more often when we were in Turkey. If we had stayed there and hadn't migrated to Israel, we would have gone to synagogues more in order to keep our religion and to be able to transmit our religious culture to our children. But here in Israel, everybody is Jewish so we don't feel obligated to transmit Judaism to our children. We're among Jews here and that's enough I guess. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)

5.4.3 Citizenship and the Civic Virtue of Turkish Jews in Israel

The civic virtue aspect was explored through various interview questions concerning political participation, membership in civil society organizations, individual efforts to address social problems, and cooperation with other members of society in order to solve and fulfill the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.[20] Though the research questions initially tried to cover various types of civic virtue such as general, social, economic and political virtue, it later became clear that this case study necessitated the differentiation of *civic virtue as attitude,* on the one hand, and *as behavior*, on the other.

Again, in the field research in Israel, it emerged that the attitudes and behaviors regarding civic virtue had developed in two domains distinguishable as the *communal* and the *societal domains*. The communal domain is closely related to the identity of the respondents as members of Israel's Turkish Jewish community. As the result of their immigrant identity, the respondents seemed to have concerns about their membership in this community in such areas as participation in community affairs, good representation of the community in front of other Israelis, and promoting Turkish culture and Turkey in Israel. The societal domain is related to the immigrants' settlement in Israel and membership in Israeli society at large. In the societal domain, the respondents seemed to develop attitudes and behaviors about civic virtue regarding Israeli politics and societal affairs.

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[20] For a list of the structured questions concerning civic virtue besides identity and legal status, see Appendix C.

The research uncovered a familiar pattern in that the civic virtue of the respondents in the *communal domain* varied significantly according to their year of arrival in Israel. The association of Turkish Jews, *Itahdut Yotsei Turkia* (Association of People Coming from Turkey), was founded in 1960 by immigrants of the great wave who belonged to the educated subgroup of Turkish Jews. With the 1970s, when a different profile of Turkish immigrants started to arrive in Israel, the association renewed itself. These newcomers contributed to the rooting of the sense of 'coming from Turkey' and of 'sharing Turkish culture' among the community. The trend of the acknowledgement of multiculturalism in Israel provided these newcomers with an environment conducive to realizing their identity aims. The Turkish Jewish immigrant identity was further expanded with the subsequent immigrants who came in the late 1970s. Since these immigrants had higher income levels, they were better able to financially support Turkish Jewish immigrant organizations such as Itahdut Yotsei Turkia and Herzeliya Culture Club.[21] The respondents said that even if they were not active members of these groups, they had at least heard about some of their activities and taken part in a few. The associations organize such activities and programs as concert and theater performances in Ladino and Turkish, sports and games competitions, fundraisers for students and other community immigrants needing community support, guidance for newcomers from Turkey, celebrations of important days relevant to Turkish history in Israel, aid drives for Turkey in times of need such as after the 1999 earthquake, and publication of special publications for fellow

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[21] Information on these organizations was given in Chapter I.

Turkish immigrants. The respondents acknowledged these activities and affirmed affiliation in these associations at least on the level of values. The immigrants who came in the 1970s often seemed to take positions of responsibility in these associations and their activities. One respondent who arrived in 1970 told about her membership in the Bat-Yam Culture Club as follows:

> We go to the Bat-Yam Culture Club twice a week. Every year we put on a play, and we perform it for two or three nights. Around 1,800 people come to see it in total. In every play there's a chorus. This year, there's a chorus which will sing some Turkish songs. We started the Bat-Yam with Turkish-language plays, but later switched to Ladino because we realized we're the only group in Israel that can do it. Ladino is a language facing the threat of extinction, which is why we stage these plays. We take part in the culture club because it was founded by Turkish Jews and it has artistic activities. If we were in Turkey, we would go to the Göztepe Culture Club. We love theater very much. (FRIS24, female, 1970 immigrant)

Another respondent who arrived in 1979 adds to the above points:

> I attend the meetings of B'nai B'rith twice a week. B'nai B'rith is a world organization, but a Turkish-speaking lodge was founded in Israel. My husband is also an active member of the Nur Masonic Lodge. When we first came here, we didn't know any Hebrew. These lodges were founded for the Turkish speaking community in Israel. We also take part in Itahdut Yotsei Turkia. There was also once the Herzeliya Club but after 10 years, it is closed down. I met a lot of new people there. It was important for us to get socially acclimated. (FRIS1, female, 1979 immigrant)

The respondents believed that in general, Israeli society likes Turkey and its people, including the Turkish Jews in Israel. The increase in tourism between Israel and Turkey has contributed to the positive image of Turkey itself and Israel's Turkish Jews. By the same token, most of the respondents said that they did not often encounter publications or public accusations directed against

Turkey, Turkish culture or Turkish Jews in Israel. On the contrary, they frequently mentioned in the interviews that they came across positive sentiments, publications and verbal assertions about Turks and Turkey in Israel. They added that in the past they used to hear more often about biases against Turkish people but that now these were very rare. The decline in accusations against Turkey was related like this:

> The attitude towards Turkey is very positive here. They love Turkey a lot. In the past, it wasn't like that because they didn't know much about Turkey. In the past, Turkey was seen as an oriental country and the Turkish people were even denigrated, though we would speak up and protest such talk. After tourism between our two countries developed, they started to get to know Turkey and they liked what they saw. Today, every Israeli has visited Turkey and they tell us, "You have a beautiful country." They like its nature and its people. Turks are famous for their hospitality. (FRIS32, female, 1951 immigrant)

In the few cases where they came across negative claims about Turkish people or Turkey itself, the respondents said that they countered these arguments by explaining about Turkey and the Turks to those who voiced such claims. These verbal explanations can be interpreted as civic virtue as performance in the communal domain. One of the respondents told about how they react to negative talk about the Turkish people as follows:

> When we first came, the Turkish Jews were looked down upon as being lower class. Now that view has changed. They think that the Turks are very kind people. Tourism played an important role in this. The change in the view towards Turkey has positively influenced the image of Turkish Jews. (FRIS27, female, 1969 immigrant)

The immigrant associations also take collective actions to counter arguments raised against Turkey. In the post-1980 context, these immigrant organizations contributed to good relations between Israel and Turkey and moreover served as lobbying groups on Ankara's behalf in Israel. Especially immigrants who came in the late '70s took active part in these associations and led their associations to take on this lobbying role. The major lobbying issue seems to be claims that Turkey perpetrated genocide of Armenians during World War I. For instance, some Armenian groups and immigrants living in Israel periodically try to bring up the issue in Israeli newspapers, national ceremonies or places commemorating the Holocaust. In response, associations founded by Turkish Jews try to prevent these claims from being aired in public and attracting attention including means of indirect cencorship, as these accounts show:

> Once the movie Midnight Express [a controversial 1978 dramatized account of conditions in Turkish jails] was going to be shown on TV, but the Itahdut Yotsei Turkia intervened and called the station and the movie wasn't shown. Also, every year there is this Armenian Memorial Day in Jerusalem where they also mention the 'Armenian genocide' in Turkey. The Itahdut also blocked the ceremony from being broadcast on television. (FRIS4, female, 1979 immigrant)

> In the Itahdut and the Herzeliya Culture Club, we try to stop the airing of accusations against Turkey in the public or media. Actually, there aren't too many cases but we still resist them. For example, recently there was the case of an Armenian nurse who wanted to light a candle during a ceremony in Jerusalem to protest the 'Armenian genocide' in Turkey. The Turkish Embassy in Jerusalem, the leader of the Jewish community in Turkey, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Itahdut Yotsei Turkia joined forces to stop this from happening. We contacted the Intelligence Directorate of Israel's Ministry of Internal Affairs, and that young nurse wasn't allowed to light the candle to publicize the genocide claims. (FRIS10, male, 1980 immigrant)

Though the respondents told how biased publications and public speech against Turkey or the Turkish people were seen infrequently in Israel, yet in contrast they did encounter Turkish sources slanted against Israel and the Jewish people. Most respondents attribute this to a lack of information among Turks about Israel and a lack of understanding of the roots of Israeli foreign policy towards Palestine or the Palestinian question itself. They also say that they don't take action either individually or collectively to correct these views but rather mostly maintain their silence and inaction about such slanted accounts:

> I haven't come across such anti-Turkish, anti-Turk talk [in Israel], but I've very frequently seen the reverse, I mean I've seen a lot of writings in the Turkish media against Israel and the Jews. Despite the warm feelings that Israelis and even American Jewry have towards Turkey, people in Turkey don't seem to appreciate these kind feelings. They aren't very interested in Israel or the terror that is going on here. What's more, there are some people who burn the Israeli flag in Turkey. This means to me that the Turkish people don't understand the affinity that Israelis feel towards Turks. (FRIS31, male, 1949 immigrant)

> I've come across cases of the reverse. For example, on Turkish TV channels, there's anti-Israeli news. It seems that the Turkish media takes sides with Palestine. This isn't anti-Semitism because that doesn't exist in Turkey, but only editorializing on behalf of Palestine. (FRIS33, male, 1970 immigrant)

In the *societal domain*, immigrants from Turkey in Israel show little sign of involvement in non-governmental organizations founded at the national level or in addressing society in general. In other words, one could contend that their membership in organizations working for the general interest or open to everybody is lower than their membership in immigrant associations founded by Turkish Jews. The respondents mainly preferred organizations related to their

professions, such as bar associations for lawyers and medical associations for doctors. Although most of the respondents expressed a belief in the importance of collective action and organizations, such abstract praise did not correspond directly to high levels of membership in organizations at the national level.

A similar tendency can be seen in political participation among Turkish Jews. Most of the respondents said that they placed importance on voting, with some even citing the desire to vote as the main reason for their choosing dual citizenship after living in Israel for several years. Apparently none of the respondents were involved in social movements, nor did any cast votes for extremist parties espousing extreme leftist or rightist ideologies. By the same token, none of the respondents voted for religious parties but rather stood strongly for secularism in Israel, by their account. Rather, centrist parties – social democrat or liberal – were preferred. Although voting as a political act got overwhelming acknowledgement, membership in political parties or pursuing political careers in those parties faced a contrasting lack of interest or favor. These points seem to support the invisible quality of Turkish Jews, the roots of which may extend into both Turkey's political culture, as membership in organizations in Turkey is also very low, and into the invisibility of Jews on Turkish soil. It should be noted, however, that there were a few respondents who had taken active part in Israeli political parties. They said that they had not stood as candidates themselves but rather hoped to attract the votes of Turkish Jews to their parties. However they felt unsuccessful in their attempts and so with disappointment quit active politics.

When the respondents were asked what they see as Israel's most pressing socio-political problem, all focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict

was generally considered to be a problem of terrorism, an issue of peace and war, a conflict over territory, or the product of reckless Palestinian hatred of the Jews. They found the half-century-plus persistence of the conflict unexpected, and most felt pessimistic about a solution being reached. Almost all of the respondents believe that individuals are powerless to resolve the conflict, which should be dealt with by governments at the state level. Most of the respondents also were of the idea that the Palestinian government needed to take steps towards peace. The below quotations are illustrative of these opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the futility of individual efforts for its resolution:

> It's the Palestine issue. Nobody can do anything. The state officials aren't working on the question. This problem is nothing new, but in fact dates back centuries. We know what a problem this is. We give everything to them, but they continue the terrorism. This is actually a problem of terror. (FRIS18, male, 1967 immigrant)

> The biggest problem is the one between Israel and Palestine. Individuals can't do anything about it. It's a very complicated problem. Even the state authorities can't do anything, what can individuals do? It's very hard to live in this environment. Security is the biggest problem in Israel. (FRIS4, female, 1979 immigrant)

Some of the respondents added that since Palestinian children were taught to hate Jews in schools or by their families, the conflict would not be solved in the near future. The following quotations reflect this pessimism:

> The basic problem is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this conflict to be resolved, both sides need to compromise. It's not a problem that can be solved in just a day. The Palestinian children are raised with hatred against the Jews. They should stop this. Children shouldn't be taught hatred. (FRIS23, male, 1970 immigrant)

> It's the question of Palestine. If this is resolved then every other problem, our economic problems will be solved, too. There's nothing that can be done on the individual level. I wish there were, but I have no hope. This is completely an issue that needs to be tackled on the state level. In schools, Palestinian children are taught hatred and wrath against the Jews. This shouldn't be allowed. As I said, it's a matter of the states only, not individuals. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)

Besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, some of the respondents also pointed to economic issues or environmental problems as pressing problems for Israel. For the unemployment problem, the respondents consider it the state's primary duty to resolve it. Although individuals are thought to have some role in protecting the environment, the respondents again think that the state should educate the masses to be environmentally aware and act responsibly. What two of the respondents said here sums up the common view about the state's duty towards the environment:

> The biggest problem, in my opinion, is the economy. Individuals go on strike to solve the problem but I never joined in. But the strikes didn't help our economic problems. I think the state's welfare benefits, like unemployment payments, make people lazy. I think the state shouldn't help people that much. There's a lot of work out there but nobody is taking the jobs. (FRIS32, female, 1951 immigrant)

> Environmental pollution has begun. In school they should teach children to be aware of the environment. They should start from the beginning. (FRIS27, female, 1969 immigrant)

When asked to evaluate general civic virtue in Israeli society, the respondents argued that Israel was similar to other countries in the sense that there was a wide range of people, both respectful of others and not, within the society. Furthermore, the respondents seemed to contrast Turkish culture with Israel's in

order to illustrate how Israelis treat others with disrespect whereas in Turkey people are kind, caring and respectful. As one of the respondents described Israeli society in terms of civic virtue:

> I think society here doesn't apply the rules strictly. Of course there's bribery and nepotism in Israel. Israelis don't wait for their turn in the queue. People in Israel are generally impatient. They ignore the traffic rules. The punishments are very light. People don't respect each other. The children are raised along similar lines. They are selfish and disrespectful. They are very open-minded, though. They aren't like children in Turkey in terms of discipline. Maybe this way is better because in Israel there's a struggle every which way you turn, and so people don't behave politely towards each other. (FRIS32, female, 1951 immigrant)

However, the respondents also said that participation in social matters and active citizenship was better established in Israeli society than in Turkish society. For instance, Israelis, according to the respondents, have a better idea about social problems in Israel and cooperating with public officials to help overcome them. In one respondent's words:

> They are very good citizens. For example, we have a friend who was born here. She phones the mayor's office at city hall when she sees a garden without flowers, and they send some workers to flower up the garden. The people frequently write complaints to the authorities. You may come to the conclusion that everybody in Israel is a politician because they are very interested in all of society's problems. They have a view on every issue and when they see a problem, they try to do something. (FRIS17, female, 1980 immigrant)

In the interviews, it appeared that the basic obstacle to the full performance of virtuous citizenship was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of the respondents believe that the war, insecurity and terror environment hanging

over Israel have put Israeli citizens into stress and hence led them to be harsh and rude to others. What a female respondent observed about Israeli society reflects the impact of terror in Israeli daily life:

> There are laws and if they disobey them, there are punishments. Like every other country, there are good and bad citizens in Israel. The new generations in Israel see life differently. For example, they may get on a bus and one of their friends may get killed by a bomb attack on the bus. This has had a huge effect on the younger generations. War is changing them. Actually this is not war but terrorism. And terrorism changes people dramatically. This is why they become selfish and shortsighted. When you ask a boy on the street why he's acting rudely, he says, "Life is short. How do I know how long I'm going to live? So I'll do whatever I like." In the past, things weren't like this. People have changed. (FRIS7, male, 1948 immigrant)

The respondents, as members of the first generation of immigrants in Israel, identified themselves more with Turkish culture than Israeli in terms of civic virtue. They argued that Turkish Jews in Israel, especially the first generation of immigrants, maintained the characteristics of Turkish culture with respect to civic virtue. According to them, the virtues inherent in Turkish culture are: respecting others, honoring the elderly, loving children, helping out those in need, acting politely, speaking and communicating politely, not calling others using their 'bare' names only but using such titles as Ms. or Mr., doing what teachers say and respecting them, obeying the rules, etc. The following quotation provides an example of how the respondents see the influence of Turkish culture on virtuous citizenship among Turkish Jews in Israel:

> The people who came from Turkey are serious citizens. Turkishness means the mentality and discipline, cultivated in Turkey. When I say Turkish discipline, I mean Ottoman discipline like respecting one's parents. In the

> past, nobody would smoke in front of their parents. This was a sign of respect for them. Here, every child can do whatever they want in front of their parents. When I first came here, I wanted to hit my son when he did something wrong but they warned me not to do. In Israel, if you hit your child they can take you to the police. Beating is prohibited in Israel, but not so in Turkey. We even have a saying in Turkish, "Beating is from Heaven." This is the culture we were brought up with. For example, you give your seat to the elderly on public busses. The way you talk, respecting others, these are all components of Turkish culture. You ask people how they are every time you meet them. Here nobody respects others and they don't care how you are. Everybody is selfish. It's like Europe. In Europe, everybody is selfish. (FRIS8, male, 1971 immigrant)

The respondents also pointed to the low levels of political participation among Turkish Jews. They stated that the Turkish Jews were generally apolitical and so decline to take part in political movements or public protests. Generally, Turkish Jews are seen as mute and inactive in Israeli politics. They have not formed political parties in order to attract the votes of Turkish Jews, nor would they vote for candidates based on their Turkish Jewish heritage. By and large, the Turkish Jews exemplify an invisible group of immigrants who are well integrated into general Israeli society and who do not exploit their differences in terms of cultural background for political purposes, but rather conform to the mainstream rules and norms of Israeli society. The following quotations are taken from the interviews to illustrate the political passivity of the Turkish Jews:

> People of Turkish origin aren't involved in politics. They aren't interested. This is the first point about Turkish Jews in Israel. Secondly, they don't cause problems. You won't see a Turkish Jew arguing on the streets as you can see people from other countries do. People from other countries hold meetings and demonstrations on the street, but you won't see Turkish Jews among them. Those who come from Turkey aren't interested in protests, and they aren't politically active. (FRIS28, male, 1951 immigrant)

> The people who come from Turkey have been living like in a closed box in Turkey for more than 500 years. They've lived a socially and politically passive life. Among them, there were some who didn't know Turkish. They didn't get into politics. They were generally a silent community. Because of this, you can't expect them to become active when they come to Israel. It's impossible. Turkish Jewry just don't act like this. This is why we're not as active as other communities in Israel. For example, here you can see a volunteer night watch program, but you won't see any Turks among the volunteers. The Itahdut Yotsei Turkia has a number of activities, but they are mainly for Turkish Jews. For example, you won't see a Turkish origin person doing volunteer work in an Israeli hospital. (FRIS3, male, 1979 immigrant)

One of the crucial findings in the interviews about civic virtue among Turkish Jews is an apparent notably low level of lawbreaking. In other words, Turkish Jews are portrayed by the respondents as generally obeying the law and rules and refraining from getting involved in criminal deeds or acts of disobedience. For instance, the respondents said that they were very dutiful in paying their taxes. They also remarked that you didn't see murders or other fatal criminal acts committed by Turkish Jews. The following quotations are examples of the respondents' sensitivity to conforming to their adopted homeland's laws and rules:

> We don't want to fight the law. We place importance on paying our taxes and we check whether or not our accountant adds up our fair share and does his/her job. Those who come from Turkey are generally good citizens. God bless us, there's no wickedness among us. There are people coming from other countries, the Russians, for example, they kill somebody everyday. (FRIS15, female, 1949 immigrant)

> We follow the rules more. Because of the discipline we learned in Turkey, we don't oppose. We try to cooperate. The crime rate among Turkish immigrants is very low. We're hard working, disciplined, polite and respectful. Yes, this is generally how we are. (FRIS24, female, 1970 immigrant)

> Those who come from Turkey listen to orders and follow the rules. We're a bit more disciplined and decent. For example, if somebody tells me not to do something, I would never make that person say it twice. If somebody says something to me and teaches me something, I listen to it. I would never make somebody have to come to me to tell me again. (FRIS11, female, 1978 immigrant)

They also frequently mentioned that Turkish Jews respect the state as the ultimate authority and therefore refrain from breaking its rules. They argue that in Turkey, people learn to respect and even fear the state, and that Turkish Jews brought this characteristic over when they migrated to Israel. Acknowledgement of the state as the ultimate authority is claimed as one of the defining characteristics of Turkish Jews. In the interviews, the class or gender of the respondents seemed not to be matter in these commonly expressed views. The following excerpts from interviews are examples of the commonality of this view:

> People with Turkish origin are better citizens. They are more careful. Here, the Israelis are sympathetic to the Turkish Jews. Most of the Turkish Jews here are silent. They don't raise a ruckus. They don't defend their rights too much. This is because of the discipline and decency that they learned in Turkey. We were trained like that and it continues within us. Turkish Jews haven't broken out of this social climate. Today, they are still like this. We're not problem causers. We generally conform to the environment. Others may be shrewd or may violate the rules, but I wouldn't. I think to myself, if I do things properly, I'll avoid future headaches and possible conflicts. In Turkey, the state is both respected and feared. In Israel, the Israelis don't fear the state, but people from Turkey shy away from the state. They don't want to be a party to problems. Actually, this characteristic of Turkish-origin Jews changed over time. The Ashkenazim here came here because of the Holocaust, but we Turkish Jews come from a different environment. This is Turkish culture. There was no problem in Turkey. We, the Jews, were very comfortable there. That's why we're low profile here. You'll see us in every sort of profession. We settle in any district of Israel. We're not interested in politics. We mainly think, "Take it easy, relax and try to get along." This is what we generally try to do. (FRIS22, male, 1964 immigrant)

> Those who come from Turkey – us, I mean – fear the state. This is inherent in us. We try to do everything according to the law. This must have been drilled into us during our childhood in Turkey. If the law orders something, we do it without question. For example, there's this new tax imposed by city hall to provide for security, but most people don't want to pay it. But I paid it immediately because I don't want to oppose the law. I think this is an important distinction that differentiates us from the others. Whatever the law is, we're loyal to it. (FRIS18, male, 1967 immigrant)

It is interesting that although most of the respondents recognized the cultural characteristics that they inherited in Turkey and maintained after arrival in Israel, none pointed to a relation between their minority status and their respect for state authority when they were in Turkey. In other words, they did not regard their minority status in Turkey as a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the state. Rather, they characterized their obedience to the law and rules in affirmative terms, and evaluated carrying this trait within themselves to Israel as an asset. They generally believed that respecting the state, obeying the law and keeping a low profile in Israeli society were the values that Turkish Jews were proud to inherit and maintain. The following is illustrative of their pride in such values:

> Turkish Jews are more moderate and sincere. They aren't aggressive. They don't have huge ambitions. They are passive in politics and the military. In Israel, they are the same. What they learned in Turkey, they kept up in Israel as well. Turkish Jews in Israel aren't ambitious and don't aspire to high positions. They aren't like the other Israeli Jews. This is why recently they turned out to be the community most liked by others. Those who come from Turkey are better citizens. This is the main difference between the other Jews and us. We're more moderate and we obey the law. We don't push to the extremes. We leave everything within its limits. We don't like to be stand out. We're moderate. (FRIS10, male, 1980 immigrant)

5.5 Concluding Remarks

The research indicated that the respondents' views and experiences differentiated according to their year of arrival in Israel. The immigrants who arrived in Israel in the great wave of 1948-51 were not only different in profile than the immigrants who arrived in subsequent years up until 1980, but were also distinguished in their views about citizenship as well as their experiences regarding immigration. Therefore, our discussion of the research findings has put special focus on immigrants by their immigration periods, as broken down into those who came in the great wave, then in the early 1970s and finally the late '70s.

The results of the field research in Israel also revealed that the subjects involved in international migration - sending country, immigrants and receiving country – all shape up citizenship and play determining role on the three aspects of citizenship. Turkey's policies toward citizenship both with respect to internal affairs and to international migration seemed to determine immigrants' citizenship in the receiving country. Although Israel was ready for naturalization of Jews coming from Turkey, the immigrants did not end up their ties with Turkey voluntarily and some of them preferred to become denizens in order to be able to maintain their Turkish citizenship.

In addition, the immigrants were still under the influence of political culture cultivated in Turkey, though the receiving country – Israel – had different roots to its political culture. An essential component of the political culture cultivated in Turkey seemed to be immigrants' former minority status. As

discussed-above, since the immigrants were members of Turkey's Jewish community before migration, perceptions regarding citizenship covered certain experiences related to their former minority status. This does not however mean that immigrants were not exposed to any change. On the contrary, the socio-political conjecture in Israel, and basic principles of state formation and nation-building had reflections on the Turkish Jews in Israel as well. Citizenship perceived and experienced on the individual level designated that state was read by first generation of Turkish Jews as an supreme authority figure but such an abstraction covered not only Israeli State but Turkish state as well.

CHAPTER VI

CITIZENSHIP, MINORITIES AND IMMIGRANTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters of the thesis, a theoretical and empirical viewpoint was expanded on the layers of a) citizenship and minority, and b) citizenship and international migration. In this chapter, these two layers will be linked to each other in a discussion that utilizes the elements of legal status, identity and legal status aspects of citizenship. Thus, a comparative outlook will be instigated. The flow of the discussion leans on four parts. *Firstly*, the layer of citizenship and minority, and the interaction between the aspects of citizenship are scrutinized in the case of the Jewish minority in Turkey.[1] In this part, the empirical evidence obtained in the field work in Turkey composes the center of attention. *Secondly*, the discussion elaborates the layer of citizenship and international migration, and the interaction between three aspects in the case of Turkish Jews in Israel.[2] The

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[1] As was stated in Chapter I, in this study the Jewish minority in Turkey is generally referred to as "Jews in Turkey" or "Turkey's Jews" for simplification in wording.

[2] In this study, Jews who were born in Turkey, later emigrated to Israel, and currently living in Israel are simply called "Turkish Jews" in order to prevent any confusion with Turkey's Jews who currently live in Turkey.

field study in Israel is highlighted in the discussion. *Thirdly*, after having elaborated the cases of minority and immigrant groups, a comparison of the two groups is made that reflects on the similarities as well as the differences between them in terms of their experiences and perceptions on citizenship. *Fourthly*, the discussion puts the immigrant and minority groups under the same rubric of citizenship and links the empirical framework to the theoretical one. The comparison built between these two groups serves an abstraction to be made on the three aspects and their relationships; hence, a close-up on citizenship is presented.

6.2 Citizenship and Minority: Turkey's Jewish Minority

As was mentioned in Chapter IV, citizenship as legal status mainly referred to an equal formal framework in Turkey. The research pointed out that individuals adopted the norms of the existing legal framework. On the aspect of *legal status*, the research indicated that the respondents refused any special treatment and were satisfied with the universal framework of Turkish citizenship, one covering all citizens regardless of any difference in ethnic or religious origin. Most of the respondents emphasized that equality was a right and that Turkish citizenship safeguarded the constitutional and legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly, they rejected any difference regulated by legislation. The respondents thought that any group rights granted to Jews would make them conspicuous in society and would consequently provoke anti-Semitic propaganda or action at the hand of certain groups such as extreme nationalists or Islamists.

The subjects' views on recruitment to state offices and democratic institutions mark the generational differences. The prevalence of the assumption that legal provisions exist that restrict Jews from recruitment to state offices or democratic institutions shows a decline in the younger generations. However, even the belief that there are social barriers to the Jews also seems to have less of a hold on the younger generations. The perception of citizenship more in terms of its responsibilities than its rights also pointed to the different generational views on citizenship as well. Paying taxes and fulfilling one's military service (for men) were argued to be the basic duty of every Turkish citizen by nearly every respondent. A passive understanding of citizenship was apparently prevalent among the respondents, though with the younger generations, a more active idea of citizenship with notions of welfare seemed to be gaining ground.

On the aspect of *identity*, the research uncovered a process of integration which is less internalized by the older generations but more so by the younger ones, with the middle-aged being a transitional generation. For instance, over time Ladino and French seemed to be displaced by Turkish as the mother tongue. Turkish is generally accepted as the normative and dominant language of the public sphere. The interaction between Turkish and Jewish identities also provided clues to the success of integration within the Turkish society and nation. The older generations seemed to stress their Jewish identity; with the middle-aged, the existence of dual identities became apparent; and with the young, Turkish identity started to be emphasized more strongly, yet Jewish identity seemed to be prevalent at least in the form of a secular understanding of religious identity.

By the same token, secularism, another arena of the interaction between Turkish and Jewish identities, seemed to provide a tool for the Jewish community to have access to the definition of a Turkish nation. The respondents believe that secularism safeguards Turkey's Jews by making an Islamist regime unlikely to come to power. However, the same secularism seems to be contributing to the community's assimilation. As the numbers of the Jews fell over time, intermarriage emerges as one of the major threats to the Jewish population figures in Turkey. In other words, assimilation brings by increase in intermarriage which in return threatens Jewish identity. All of the respondents seemed to be aware of this threat though the younger generations, especially the young women, emphasized the pressure they felt not to marry non-Jews.

On the aspect of *civic virtue*, research focusing on the case of Turkey's Jewish minority necessitated that a distinction be made between, on the one hand, civic virtue as attitude and on the other, actual behavior in the communal and societal domains. In their communal domain, the research found that civic virtue both as attitude and as behavior developed on the basis of Jewish identity was high. More specifically, the level of membership and participation in Jewish organizations was remarkable, though the older interview subjects' involvement seemed to focus on religious activities, that of the middle-aged focus on social and communal activities, whereas the young subjects' involvement in associations remained limited and largely took place while they were still under 18. Although most of the respondents said that they place importance on the good esteem of the Jewish community in the general public's eyes and the need to not tolerate anti-Semitic rhetoric, acts towards these ends were not taken at the individual level but

rather performed by community leaders. One of the significant reasons for this discrepancy between attitude and actual behavior seemed to lie in the minority psychology and distrust felt towards general society.

In the societal domain of civic virtue which is related to universal norms of Turkish citizenship, it seemed that membership and participation in non-Jewish associations at the national level, if any at all, was very low. The research found that most of the respondents, especially the younger ones, seemed to give weight to liberal-democratic values in state-society relations. However, the actual performance of virtuous citizenship remained limited, as most of the respondents said that Turkey's Jews generally refrained from taking an active stance due to anxiety over being picked out and condemned by general society as Jews.

Regarding the interaction between the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship, several points emerged in the course of the research. For *the interaction between legal status and identity aspects of citizenship*, the interviews pointed to the insistence of preserving ethno-religious difference, which was strongly resisted in the ideas developed on the aspect of legal status. The equality which was strongly emphasized in relation to the legal status of Turkish citizenship referred to equality in the public sphere. The identity aspect of citizenship, however, was conceived by difference. The difference in ethno-religious identity refers to a difference secured by secularism, one meaning the right to preserve and practice religious beliefs and transmit them to future generations.

It can be argued that the Jewish and Turkish identities co-existed but that with the younger interview subjects, the affiliation with Turkish identity was

prioritized more and came to supersede Jewish identity. Jewish identity seemed to refer to an identity confined to the private sphere, and Turkish identity referred more to a societal and public identity. However, the respondents seemed to suffer from a conflict between the will to equality and the will to difference. Although the will to equality referred to an issue of the public sphere and the will to difference to an issue of the private, the boundaries between the two spheres seem to be fluid and ambiguous. The Jewish community has many institutions present in the public sphere founded with the aim of maintaining Jewish identity and culture. All these institutions are positioned in the public sphere but since they are restricted to Jews only, this Jewish-experienced public sphere seems to be smaller in scope than the public sphere designated for all of society at the national level.

The conflict between the will to equality and the will to difference felt by the respondents seems to be connected with integration and assimilation. On the one hand, the subjects support the unitary and homogenized conceptualization of Turkish citizenship but on the other, they resist this homogenization for reasons of religion and culture. The respondents tried to ameliorate the effects of this dilemma through two main strategies. The *first* is the strategy of calling attention to the historical loyalty of the Jewish minority to the Turkish state. Most of the respondents emphasized the importance of being loyal to the state and the need to frequently demonstrate this loyalty so that their will to difference avoided any connotation of threatening the integrity of the Turkish Republic or its basic norms. The Jewish minority's claim as the most loyal and dependable non-Muslim group throughout Turkey's history is also frequently cited in the Jewish community's publications and declarations by the community elite. For that reason, the

respondents stress equality in legal status and perceive it not only as sufficient to protect their minority position but also as a natural outcome of their historical attitude as a community towards the integrity of the Turkish state.

The *second* strategy that the respondents frequently used to soften the conflict between equality and difference is that of invisibility in the public sphere. Most of the respondents thought that their difference lay in their religion, a matter which had already been dealt with by the dominance of secular principles in the public sphere. Therefore, any form of public visibility such as frequent emphasis put on Judaism or Jewish identity in public intercourse with non-Muslims is something to be avoided. The respondents seemed to resist any form of action – either verbal or written – that could serve to identify them in the public eye as Jews. In other words, they seemed to refrain from acting or speaking in the public sphere in any way that uses claims of identity or difference.

These two strategies – loyalty and invisibility – correspond to the interviewees' contempt for special group rights and contentment with the basic individual rights granted by the universal legal framework. In this regard, it can be argued that the research showed the legal status and identity aspects of Turkish citizenship for the nation's Jews were not complementary but rather undermined each other. The findings suggested that legal status denoted a universal framework of basic rights and responsibilities in the public sphere, and identity denoted a difference to be confined to the private sphere. The wills to equality and difference were accompanied by the will to loyalty and invisibility towards the aim of integration to society at large. Such an integration process, one more

evident among the younger respondents, serves to hinder the claims for identity and special legislation on the basis of a distinct category of minority.

For *the interaction between civic virtue and the aspects of legal status and identity*, it must be mentioned at the outset that although the legal status aspect supports the civic virtue aspect, the identity aspect hinders it. Most of the respondents said that they rejected any special status for Jews but approved the universalistic appropriation in Turkish citizenship. If the views of legal status were reproduced in the aspect of civic virtue, it could be easily assumed that upon the derivation from universalistic norms of citizenship, the respondents would not be hindered from developing or realizing civic virtue expressed through ideas and deeds. However the findings showed that they refrained from performing civic virtue to the full extent. This may be due to the intervention of the identity aspect of citizenship on the civic virtue aspect. Consciousness of Jewish identity and insecurity felt towards general society for exploiting this identity for the purposes of anti-Semitic propaganda or other discourse biased against the Jews seems to discourage the respondents from performing acts of civic virtue.

The intention to stay invisible was also valid in the relation between Jewish identity and civic virtue. Most of the respondents said that in cases where visibility of Jewish identity was a necessity – such as countering anti-Semitic accusations, clarifying certain issues of Jewish culture or correcting misinformation about the Jewish community in Turkey – the Jewish elites represented their community in the public sphere and took on visibility on behalf of its members. The transformation of values into actions at the individual level, however, remained limited as the respondents avoided taking active positions due

to their minority status. In other words, the subjects did not take actions in daily life in accordance with their values on civic virtue since they feared society would react negatively by highlighting their minority status. The strategy of invisibility, in this regard, can be argued to be the major determinant of the interaction between civic virtue and the aspects of legal status and identity. It seems that the universal, monolithic framework of Turkish citizenship provides Turkey's Jews a tool for invisibility, one so they are equal and no difference can be picked out to differentiate or distinguish them from society at large. These views of legal status and civic virtue highlight that Turkey's Jews mainly fulfill the basic responsibilities of citizenship but avoid taking part in active citizenship or civic virtue to a full extent.

To sum up, it can be argued that the experience of Turkish citizenship at the individual level is closely related to the minority status of the respondents. In a society where the population is overwhelmingly Muslim, being a non-Muslim minority plays a significant role in: a) the appropriation of the monist and universal conceptualization of citizenship in the legal status aspect; b) the endeavor to maintain Jewish identity despite the inevitable consequences of integration and assimilation in the identity aspect; and c) the discrepancy between values and actions in the civic virtue aspect.

6.3 Citizenship and International Migration: Turkish-Jewish Immigrants in Israel

In Chapter V, the discussion elaborated the perceptions and experiences of Turkish Jews in Israel concerning citizenship. Accordingly, on the aspect of *legal status* regarding their former lives in Turkey, the immigrants said that their minority status had not resulted in inequality or discrimination against them. For citizenship in Israel, respondents from across all migration periods strongly emphasized the just and equal legal framework in Israeli democracy, though they accepted that sometimes for security reasons there might be one set of policies for minorities and another for the nation's Jewish majority. Also they apparently had adequate information on the rules, legislation and policies affecting them.

When the respondents compared citizenship in Israel to that in Turkey, the common theme that emerged was that they preferred dual citizenship. Almost all of the respondents said that Israel's social welfare system, human rights situation, and the value placed on its citizens were all better than in Turkey. In comparison, Turkey was seen as a safer country for its residents than Israel. Most of the respondents believed that the minorities of any country, be it Israel or Turkey, should not hold positions of high power, leaving rather individuals from the majority group should do so. It was seen as "normal" and "rational" that neither Jews from Turkey nor Arabs living in Israel were recruited to top state or military offices.

On the aspect of *identity*, the research covered various components of identity formation and its re-formation. The respondents mainly identified

themselves as Jews of Turkish origin. Those who arrived after 1951 underlined their Turkish origin strongly and more frequently. There were also some who recalled that after they arrived in Israel, they realized that there was a distinction between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewry and that they belonged actually to the former. The immigrant organizations founded by Turkish Jews seemed to have become active after the '70s with the arrival of newcomers. These newcomers also contributed to the positive image of Turkish Jews, as did tourism between Israel and Turkey, which leapt after the 1980s. Good relations between the two countries contributed to the positive image of both Turks and Turkish Jews. The immigrant associations also took active roles in promoting Turkey and Turkish Jews to Israeli society and sometimes scored points by lobbying on issues such as resisting the Armenian genocide claims.

As to attitudes towards intermarriage, as the Jews are the majority in Israel, most of the respondents seemed not to feel any threat of the extinction of Jewry. The immigrants mentioned that they would prefer that their children form unions among Israel's community of Turkish Jews if possible, and if not, to do so among Turkey's Jews or Israel's culturally similar Sephardic Jews. In this regard, migration can be said to have changed the meaning of intermarriage. Secularism also emerged as an issue on which great stress is placed. Both the rise of Islamism in Turkey after the 1980s and Israel's fundamentalist Jews seemed to trouble the immigrants. The respondents also told how their degree of religious observance declined after their arrival in Israel.

On the aspect of *civic virtue*, two categories emerged, namely civic virtue as *attitude* and *behavior* in the *communal* or *societal domains*. For civic virtue in

the communal domain, which is related to the immigrant identity of the Turkish Jews, all of the respondents believed that immigrants associations perform constructive roles in both raising community aid and supporting group identity, especially as the immigrants who arrived after the '70s took on more responsibility and turned this attitudinal value into actual behavior in this regard. Most of the respondents from all waves said that they came across verbal accusations or publications in the public sphere directed against Turkish Jews or Turkey rarely.

For civic virtue in the societal domain, Turkish Jews had little apparent involvement in social movements or in non-governmental organizations founded by other groups in Israeli society. They also saw the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a hindrance to actively realizing civic virtue because it took precedence over every other social issue in Israel. They considered the resolution of political problems to be beyond the capacities of individuals or civil society but rather were the exclusive purview of the state. The common theme that arose with respect to other crucial problems in Israel was that the state, as the supreme power-wielding authority, was the only body accountable to overcome these problems, yet at the same time Israeli society was considered more political and participatory in social matters than Turkish society. The influence of Turkish culture among the Turkish Jews also came up frequently in the sense that they were inactive in politics and instead generally accepted and conformed to the existing rules and norms of Israel's society, state and political order.

With regards to the interaction between the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship, several points emerged in the course of the research.

For *the interaction between the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship*, the findings pointed to how the immigration experience was a determining factor in shaping the views related to both of the aspects, both separately and indeed in interaction between them. The immigrants seemed to be developing a *comparative* perspective in evaluating their legal status and identity through the process of immigration. The immigrants seemed to not only compare Turkey and Israel and hence their life in both countries, but also to compare themselves as Turkish Jews with other Israelis from various countries.

These comparisons shaped the perceptions of the aspects of legal status and identity. For the pre-immigration period when the immigrants were still members of the Jewish community in Turkey, it seems that interplay of forgetting and remembrance is in play. That is, the respondents see their past in Turkey through a nostalgic lens in which historical incidents against non-Muslims or other daily incidents that might have raised questions of discrimination or anti-Semitism are subject to active forgetting or else are remembered using optimistic retrospection. Therefore, even immigrants who experienced some negative aspects of the Turkification process in the Early Republican Period interpret their legal status in Turkey as being on equal terms with other citizens.

One of the major reasons for this selective remembrance and forgetting as well as optimistic retrospection is the comparative perspective that the immigrants developed in Israel. The respondents frequently mentioned that many Jews in Israel have harsh, bitter memories such as living through the Holocaust or expulsion from their home countries. However, they themselves never faced such tragic experiences. They compare themselves with these other Jews, and thus the

good relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and equality in Turkey emerge as the dominant theme as the result of this optimistic retrospection, thus tending to overshadow any instances of discrimination. For the period after immigration, it must be emphasized that the respondents seemed to have acquired sufficient information on the procedures and policies that affected them. The respondents compare themselves with other Jews in Israel and know about the difference in absorption policies once applied to immigrants by country of origin. Migration, as a process, can be argued to have had an instructive effect on the immigrants.

As the result of this comparative perspective developed towards their previous life in Turkey and current life in Israel, it can be argued that the Turkish Jews in Israel have come to retrospectively tolerate problems pertaining to citizenship in Turkey (e.g. the lack of welfare programs, the Capital Tax and discrimination in state dormitories) parallel with their nostalgia felt towards life in Turkey. Jewish identity in Turkey is not problematized – that is, generally the respondents seem to ignore their difference in identity, and Turkey's equal legal framework supports this perception. Citizenship in Israel is generally regarded as more advanced than Turkey in terms of its welfare policies, immigrant absorption policies and wide range of rights and freedoms in the legal framework. Claims for identity in Israeli citizenship can be easily raised in the public. As the result of this comparative perspective, the respondents perceive themselves as being different from other Israelis and identify themselves more with Turkish culture than Israeli. Israel's democracy is also perceived as being more advanced than Turkey's, but secularism seems to be the main hindrance to the quality of democracy in Israel, in the respondents' eyes.

Turkish Jews experienced a change of status with their immigration to Israel, a reversal from minority status to majority status. The former members of Turkey's Jewish community were members of a minority group there. After they immigrated to Israel, they became members of the majority group, Jews in Israel. Such a change seems to have impacted their perception of citizenship and the interaction between legal status and identity. Although the legal statuses in both Israel and Turkey are generally defined as equal, the identity aspect in both countries is evaluated generally within majoritarian norms. In other words, the respondents seemed to voice the norms of the majority in both countries. This is evident in the remarks of the respondents expressing tolerance for problematic issues of both Turkish citizenship and Israeli citizenship. The best example would be that most of the respondents argued that only members of the majority group in both of the countries (Muslims in Turkey, Jews in Israel) should be recruited to high state offices.

For *the interaction between civic virtue and the aspects of legal status and identity in Israel*, it can be argued the legal status dimension supports the civic virtue dimension. Israeli democracy entails a broad range of rights and freedoms in the legal framework. Furthermore, in Israel, a country of immigrants, there is tolerance for different identity claims by Jews. In other words, difference in identity in terms of country of origin among Israel's Jewish majority is not only unavoidable, but also accepted. Jews are free to set up associations pertaining to the culture of their former home country. They may maintain their cultural backgrounds and languages, though the dominant language of the public is Hebrew. The Turkish Jews, therefore, feel themselves in a liberal environment for

performing civic virtue. They believe that Israel's state structure and democracy provide the conditions for encouraging civic virtue. The Turkish Jews perform civic virtue partially. However, despite the opportunities provided in the legal framework, the respondents seem to shrink from performing civic virtue to its full extent, which is related to the interaction between the aspects of identity and civic virtue.

The impact of identity aspect on civic virtue is twofold. On the one hand, the Turkish Jews' identification with Turkish culture seems to influence their civic virtue positively. Characteristics attributed to Turkish culture such as respecting others, honoring the elderly, loving children, and acting and speaking politely can be considered examples of cultural virtues. In this respect, these cultural virtues pertaining to Turkish Jews seem to promote the civic virtue of citizenship. No matter how tempting it might be to make a generalization on these two types of virtues, though, one should be wary of reaching overly hasty conclusions. Although they may sometimes overlap with each other at an abstract level, civic virtue and cultural virtue are two distinct categories. There may be counter-cases where cultural virtues do not promote civic virtue and even sometimes hinder it. In the case of Turkish Jews, however, the identification with Turkish culture and the characteristics attributed to it seemed to support civic virtue.

On the other hand, as Weiker (1988) found in his own study of Jews from Turkey in Israel, the respondents in this study also seem to prefer to be unseen. They do not want to raise their voice or question existing policies. They are little involved in non-immigrant associations and political parties. They are not

interested in social movements and do not show their political will on extra-electoral platforms. They seem to be content with the general structure of state-society relations. The state is an authority figure in the eyes of the immigrants and therefore, individual or group contributions to democracy find little favor. The immigrants seem to be "very Turkish" not only in the sense of identity but also in the sense of civic virtue as they pay continued obeisance to a more traditional state-citizen hierarchy.[3] This may be due to the dominant political culture in Turkey through which the respondents were socialized in their pre-migration lives. In other words, the underdeveloped nature of civil society and low level of political participation in Turkey may have influenced the respondents, just as other Turkish citizens were so influenced. So as they were steeped in Turkey's political culture, in Israel the respondents may then have preferred to fulfill only their basic responsibilities and duties but not push their civic virtues assertively. There may be other reasons as well. Marshalling the findings of the field research in Turkey, one could think that the root cause of being unseen and performing limited civic virtue is the preservation of the Turkish-cultivated strategy of invisibility in Israel even after migration. Turkey's Jews wanted to be invisible in the public sphere and so have refrained from performing active civic virtue since they feared society would react negatively by highlighting their minority status. In a similar vein, Turkish Jews in Israel may have internalized these concerns and

[3] Israel's unstable security environment, including the ongoing terrorism, seems to have contributed to the understanding of the state as the ultimate authority to which individuals transfer their sovereignty in exchange for security.

carried them to Israel, even while the original justification for such a strategy was left behind in their former homeland.

To sum up, the interviews conducted with Jews from Turkey in Israel pointed out that despite long years of residence in Israel, the immigrants have preserved the political sensibility they grew up with and learned when they were in Turkey. However, moving into a country where they became members of the majority group seems to have impacted their perceptions and experiences regarding citizenship and played roles in: a) the appropriation of democratic norms defined by majoritarian terms in the legal status aspect; b) efforts to maintain their Turkish identity in cosmopolitan Jewish-Israeli society in the identity aspect; and c) the preference for complying with the general norms of Jewish-Israeli society and conversely excluding a proactive understanding of virtuous citizenship.

6.4 Citizenship on the Individual Level: A Comparison from Turkey's Jewish Minority and Turkish-Jewish Immigrants in Israel

Having discussed the nexus of citizenship-minority and citizenship-international migration separately, in this part a comparison of the immigrant and minority groups composed of Jews is made. The comparison does not cover every point made previously on the two groups; rather it involves only major results of the research and expands on some of the similarities and the differences between them.

6.4.1 Individual Characteristics

The sample group composed of Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel is limited and generalization on both groups cannot be made methodologically.[4] Nonetheless, in light of previous studies as well as the results obtained in this field research, one might argue that the group Jewish community in Turkey illustrates a more homogeneous outlook than the immigrants in Israel. The group in Turkey is generally middle-class oriented and there are very few poor Jews (Liberles, 1984: 142) whereas there is a more significant variety of class background, from lower-class to upper-class, among the group in Israel.

The same variety is also valid for employment status. In the Israeli group, the occupations that the respondents, either currently employed or unemployed, hold indicate a range from workers, to state officials, to military officers and to business men in the public and private sectors. Turkey's Jews however were mainly involved in private sectors and there were no military officers among them. There was only one state official who was working as an academician in a Turkish state university. Another marking difference between the two groups was the employment of women respondents. The Jewish women in Turkey were mainly housewives, yet there were some women among the younger generation who either worked or wanted to work at some point in their lives.[5] However,

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[4] For the profile of the sample groups in Turkey and in Israel, see Table 1 and 2 in Appendix D.

[5] According to one estimate only in 1966, 95% of the Jewish work force was employed and only 10% of that work force was composed of women. Majority of Jewish men were salesmen, merchants or held administrative or managerial positions whereas Jewish women were involved in secretarial and clerical fields (Liberles, 1984: 142).

among the immigrant group, there were more women working outside their home despite their middle ages.

The main reasons for these differences in occupational and class variety as well as women's employment seemed to be related to minority and international migration. As was mentioned in Chapter III, after migration of huge numbers from Turkey to Israel composed mainly of the uneducated and/or the poor, the remaining Jews illustrated a more homogeneous portrait, mainly of middle-class. Furthermore, Turkey's Jews had not hold positions in state bureaucracy or professional military. The research revealed that positions in state and military offices were not preferred by the Jews either because they were thought to be closed to the Jews with invisible social barriers or the salary rate of these positions were not found to be attractive. The change in women's profile in terms of employment seems to be related directly to the experience of international migration. The women who were housewives or who did not have any plan to work when they were in Turkey started working after they migrated to Israel. This may be due to the hard conditions of life in a country that was suffering pains of birth in a geographical environment that needed enormous human labor. Furthermore, the strong collectivist tradition and highly solidaristic citizenship ideology in Israel (Abraham, 2002), might have encouraged women's working. Last but not least, the work ethic and the strong labor movement in Israel (Histadrut movement) might have played role in changing the gender ideology and the value attributed to work among Turkish Jews in the course of migration.

6.4.2 Integration and Assimilation

Another similarity between Turkish Jews in Israel and Jews in Turkey is their experience in modes of integration/assimilation showing similar historical trends in nation-building process in both countries. In the Israeli case, the Zionist vision of "melting pot" in which various Jewish identities from different sources of countries would be transformed into an Israeli one, over time, left its place for a more limited insistence on Hebrew as the common language and for a more pluralistic vision of Israeli culture and society (Bauböck, 2001; Ichilov, 2002: 6). This shift is actually the transformation from an assimilationist to a multicultural regime of integration that started in 1970s and speeded up after 1980s.

A similar nation-building process has occurred in Turkey. Since its establishment, the official ideology rested on a unifying concept of Turkishness by which diversity among the society in terms of ethnicity, religion or language or existence of minority groups was ignored persistently. Assimilation of sub-groups were directed "from above" which turned into pressures from time to time. With regards to the Jewish minority, although they were acknowledged formal recognition, their assimilation was also promoted taking sometimes obligatory faces by campaigns like "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" Even the term "Musevi" was commonly used instead of "Yahudi" to refer only to religious difference and to deny any national connotation. After 1980s, multiculturalism started to be pronounced and it started to be identified as an asset of Turkey after the 1990s. General society became interested in non-Muslims and Jews in return started to articulate their Jewish identity more easily in the public when compared to

previous decades. An interest in Ladino as a language to be protected has gained weight among the Jewish community. Discussions on past record of policies towards non-Muslims in Turkey attracted wide attention evidenced by the proliferation of publications on them. Intermarriage speeded up and conversion to Islam no more occurs as it had been in intermarriages before 1980s. Now, spouses maintain their own religion after marriage.

It must be noted that there are other factors in the mode of integration of Jews over time. The Jewish population of Turkey has diminished to a great extent especially after mass migration to Israel. Furthermore, Jews were acculturated already when it came to 1980s and the gap in difference between "Turkish" majority and Jewish minority had become minimal. Furthermore, there were pressures that the European Union accession process put on Turkey.

In the research, there arose a difference in values regarding recruitment of minorities to politics and state administration between the immigrant and minority groups. Both of the groups mainly argued that individuals had the right to become members of the parliament or cabinet irrespective of their majority/minority backgrounds. However, when the discussion came to hold of high positions in the state, i.e. president or chief of general staff, Turkish Jews in Israel seemed to resist, more than Turkey's Jews, to the idea of an individual from a minority group holding such a position. The group in Turkey was generally of the idea that there would be hidden barriers in front of minorities for high positions in the state but it did not try to legitimate Muslims occupying those positions as requirement of democracy. In contrast, the group in Israel played with the idea of majoritarian

democracy and set the majority group ruling and protecting the country as the norm.

6.4.3 Construction of Identities

Identity seems to be a determining factor in defining the boundaries of minority and immigrant groups. Turkey's Jews seemed to identify themselves with being "Jewish" and "Turkish". Turkish Jews in Israel has a more variety of sources of identification - one that varies from "Jewish", "Turkish", "Israeli" to "Sephardim". The Jewish community in Turkey seems to be fighting for survival, and its religious life is diminishing while intermarriage and assimilation are increasing (Liberles, 1984: 127, 169). In order to preserve the Jewish identity, several measures are taken on the community level, yet the forces of assimilation and the domination of supra-Turkish culture compose pressure for inclusion, which especially for the younger generations gets hard to resist.

The endeavor of preserving Jewish identity seems to be replaced by the Turkish identity in the group of immigrants in Israel. Even the level of religious observance seemed to decrease among Turkish Jews with migration to Israel. As Bhatia (2002: 56) sets forth regarding several cases in international migration, the immigrants, rather moving from culture of the home country into the culture of the host country mix cultures in the process of moving. Furthermore, over time, many immigrant groups develop cultural hybridism - that is mixing the culture of their home countries with the ones adopted from the host culture (Remennick, 2002). Similarly, with the experience of migration, the Turkish Jews in Israel

seem to combine the culture inherited in the home country with the one adopted in the host country.

The research illustrated that Turkish Jews in Israel experienced an identity crisis which can be correlated to the one that Turkey has been experiencing. Turkey is neither oriental nor western; neither developed nor underdeveloped; neither European nor Middle Eastern. By the same token, first generation of Turkish Jews in Israel cannot identify themselves fully with other immigrant groups in Israel. They see themselves neither belonging to the Ashkenazim Jewry nor to the Oriental Jewry; neither showing characteristics of upper stratum of Israeli society nor of lower stratum; and neither having European origin nor Middle Eastern origin. They see themselves "in between" of these categories, yet they mentioned that the Israeli society in general had false perception on Turkish Jews and saw them belonging to the latter set of categories: Oriental, lower stratum and Middle Eastern. Since all the immigrants without Ashkenazic origin are put under the same category, the diversity among the group called the Oriental/Sephardic/Mizrahi is often neglected (Bernstein, 1980). This study, in this sense, challenges the conventional generalization.[6]

Both the groups defined themselves as Turkish. Turkishness, for them, resulted primarily from being born in Turkish lands first of all. In addition to this territorial definition, the respondents in Israel and Turkey suggested that the title "Turkish" enclosed a distinguished culture having various features that include way of looking at life, manners, values, preference in aesthetics, styles of raising

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[6] It must also be noted that according to socio-economic indicators the non-Ashkenazic Jewry is overcoming the gap with the Ashkenazim (Sheffer, 1997b: 121).

children, food, songs, etc. which were identifiable with respect to other countries' cultures. Even some religious habits of fasting or not eating pork are attributed as a commonality in Islam and Judaism. The minority group also emphasizes sharing the same history as a determinant of Turkishness, which is not very much recalled by the immigrant group, yet they emphasize socialization in young ages to become a Turk. Both of the groups admit that majority of the Turks are Muslims but add that not every Muslim was a Turk nor every Turk was a Muslim. They make a distinction in Islamic world between Arabs and Turks and argue that real Islam, a holy religion, is that of Turks and not of Arabs. The "extreme Islamists" in Turkey are exemplified as people who are under the influence of dogmatic Islam exercised in the Middle East. Muslim Turks, in their opinion, are people who interpreted Islam according to the needs of contemporary age.

Secularism emerged as a common theme for respondents in Turkey and Israel. Almost all of the respondents strongly advocated secularism and defined it as a major democratic principle. The respondents seemed not to be satisfied about secularism in the countries that they live. The minority group mentioned that they were contempt the rise of Islamism in Turkey and added that they did not want to have worries about secularism after change of governments in every election. The immigrant group, on the other hand, considered Turkey as a country where secularism is established firmly with strong roots and rose questions about secularism in Israel. Most of the respondents in Israel mentioned that they felt uneasy with the rise of Jewish fundamentalists in Israel.

6.4.4 Invisibility

Invisibility emerged as one of the common problematiques in both groups. The Jewish minority avoid attracting attention from the general society. Respondents claim that they are Turkish in terms of being born in the Turkish lands, culture, history and language. They reject that they compose a minority group and assert that the only difference is in religion. Jews seemed to be annoyed with individual responses which recall their differences. They do not want to be picked out and illustrate a tendency to conform to the general norms of the larger society. They refrain from getting involved in politics, civil society organizations or state administration with the fear that their Jewishness would be abused or disrespected. Their loyalty to Turkish state is under constant questioning and therefore, they fear that their affiliation to Israel would be made an issue by others. In result of this hesitation and lack of full thrust toward the society, they drawback their difference from the gaze of the public and try to make themselves unseen.

Such a result obtained in the research confirms other studies on Jewish community which set forth invisibility as one of the important characteristics of Jews in Turkey. Yumul (2001) argues that Turkey's Jews bring up their children with values like not complaining, not demanding from the society, and tolerating injustice rather than opposing it. The Jewish community in Turkey is generally acknowledged as a apolitical community, one which does not criticize nor take sides (Bali, 2001b: 125). Liberles (1984) adds the Jewish community in Turkey does not want to publicize its activities and the consensus is that the slightest

publicity might endanger the status quo. Meetings are closed to the public and no membership cards, certificates or other symbols are distributed. Conversion to Judaism is still not handled by the Chief Rabbinate in Turkey (Liberles, 1984: 146, 149). It must also be noted that only recently the Jewish community in Turkey started to open its doors to media and researchers for interviewing.

The research in Israel points to Turkish Jews sharing a similar political culture with that of their counterparts in Turkey. Although the political culture of Israel has been characterized by a high level of public involvement (Hacohen, 2002), Turkish Jews in Israel do not illustrate a tendency alike despite their well-integrated appearance. There is marked decline in membership to political parties, national and communal organizations such as government bureaucracy, labor movement, kibbutz and moshav movements in 1990s Israel (Sheffer, 1997b: 123). Turkish Jews were already less involved in these activities when compared especially to veteran groups. Remennick (2002) in her research on Soviet Jews in Israel observes that the development of active citizenship and other features of civil society among former Soviets in Israel are rather slow due to political and mental legacy that attained in their home countries. One might argue in the same way that Turkish Jews in Israel inherited the legacy of the political culture of Jewish community in Turkey which rests on invisibility. As the field research highlighted, citizenship seems to be still a sphere of the state rather than the individuals and citizenship in Turkey was perceived generally as set of responsibilities whereas citizenship in Israel as set of rights. However, one must note that since the majority is composed of Jews in Israel, Turkish Jews became members of the majority group with migration. Therefore, their "unseen"

characteristic, using Weiker's (1988) term, might not be in the same level and degree with that of Jewish minority in Turkey.

Concerns on security also seem to have a relationship with invisibility. Previously, the link between invisibility and civic virtue was discussed. There also seems to be a link between insecurity and invisibility. The research highlighted that having experienced attacks on synagogues, one in 1984 and another in 2003 and due to frequent anti-Semitic themes in extreme rightist and Islamist circles, Turkey's Jews refrain from performing actions that would put them in an outstanding position in the society. Even some of the respondents presumed the possibility of such events like 6-7 September or the Capital Tax reoccurring in the future. Similarly, the immigrant group of Turkish Jews in Israel frequently mentioned the threat of terrorism in public life and order and emphasized state's role in resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. Security, as an arena still under the sovereignty of states, seems to impact both the performance and quality of civic virtue on the individual level. Thus, insecurity environment leaves little room for individuals to perform civic virtue.

6.4.5 Loyalty and Dual Loyalty

The *minority group* refrained from professing their interest in Israel openly in the interviews. When asked directly about feelings towards Israel, most of them mentioned that because they had relatives there, they had good will on Israel. Some of them also pointed to Israel being a safe land for the entire world Jewry. In light of the past experiences in World War II, the respondents strongly

underlined the protectionist role of Israel for Jewry. They had information about Israel obtained either through visits or relatives living there. They believed that Israel was a better democracy in terms of social, political and civic rights when compared to Turkey. Yet, when it came to loyalty felt for Israel, the respondents seemed to emphasize Turkification of the Jews in Turkey and they were loyal to the Turkish state. Feeling loyalty only to Israel was completely ignored or refused but the possibility of dual loyalty was not. Most of the respondents in the minority group admitted the prevalence of dual loyalty that is felt for both Turkey and Israel. They were of the idea that since Israel and Turkey had good relations and mutual interests, dual loyalty would not be under strain. Further examples of dual loyalty were provided on Turkish workers in Germany and Turkish Jews in Israel.

The *immigrant group* expressed their affiliation and loyalty to Turkey more openly and more vigorously. They emphasized their strong psychological, cultural and social ties with their home country. Even more, they seemed to be proud of having roots in Turkey. They thought the same with that of the minority group and argued for the possibility of dual loyalty. They explained that they voted for Turkey in the Eurovision music contest and when the Turkish singer won the first place, they were proud of Turkey once more and even some of them received congratulation phone calls from their Israeli friends. Some of them added they maintained Turkish citizenship or applied for dual citizenship in order to preserve their Turkish origin.

Loyalty to state is not only a part of state tradition in Turkey but in Israel as well. Although it is argued that there is reduction in loyalty to Israeli state and its various organizations due to growing individuation, the norms of Jewish state

are still in force (Sheffer, 1997a: 114; Sheffer, 1997b: 137). Furthermore, under globalization, international migrants are becoming transmigrants and loyalty to one country and one culture is no longer self-evident (Remennnick, 2002). Since Israel is country of immigration, loyalty to both home and host countries does not seem to cause tension on Turkish Jews in Israel. However, minorities who seek to preserve their distinct ethnic identities in nation-states are expected to perform their civil obligations and exercise civil rights as well as to show loyalty to the state. Yet, they still remain marginal to the political community and their loyalty remains suspect (Cohen, 1989). In light of this, the respondents in Turkey might not have found it easy to profess their dual loyalty for both Israel and Turkey without stressing and prioritizing their loyalty to Turkey.

6.5 Citizenship at the Nexus of International Migration and Minority Issues

Generally, across the globe, rules for formal access to citizenship derive mainly from two principles: *jus sanguinis* (law of the blood) based on descent from a national of the country concerned and *jus soli* (law of the soil) based on birth in the territory of the country. In practice, most countries have citizenship rules based on a combination of these two principles. However, citizenship is an issue beyond formal accession that brings the individuals into the same set of formal rights and responsibilities of a state concerned. Furthermore, it is the entire mode of incorporation of individuals and groups into the society (Shafir and Peled, 1998). Citizenship, in this regard, pinpoints participation in the political community. It concerns the learning of a capacity for action and for responsibility

as well as the performance of that capacity. Therefore, passive and active dimensions of citizenship are inherent to citizenship (Turner, 1992). Passive citizenship is the acceptance of a certain order which in return leaves a broader space for the involvement of the state. Active citizenship, which is closely related to civil society, is political membership by which citizens get involved in public affairs with a sense of moral obligation and commitment to society and reproduces them through institutions and individual behavior (Migdal, 1993).

The incorporation of individuals and groups into the society within the medium of democracy poses difficulties especially with regards to two distinct ethno-cultural groups: ethnic immigrants and national minorities. Ethnic immigrants become citizens of liberal states through immigration but lack the capacity to create the institutions of social, political and economic life. National minorities are however collectively incorporated (Choudhry, 2002: 55). Furthermore, from the viewpoint of cultural citizenship, national minorities posses and are capable of possessing societal cultures whereas ethnic immigrants possess their own societal cultures in their countries of origin (Delanty, 2002).

Jews in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Israel do not illustrate perfect examples for national minorities and ethnic immigrants and they cannot be regarded as pure cases in the discussions on citizenship and the incorporation of these two distinct ethno-cultural groups. The Jewish community in Turkey does not correspond to a national minority as its number is very low. Furthermore, its group boundary, either from the perspective of the state with regards to the principles of officially recognized minorities according to Lausanne Treaty or from the perspective of the community itself, as this research indicated, is strictly

defined in terms of religion excluding any national connotation. Likewise, Turkish Jews in Israel do not compose a refined ethnic immigrant group simply because being a Jewish state is still one of the fundamentals of Israel and majority of its population is still Jewish. For these reasons, the immediate use of the term "ethnic" for Turkish Jews in Israel is complicated.

However, the cases of the Jews in Turkey and in Israel are significant for discussions on citizenship's role in incorporating minorities and immigrants. Although Turkey's Jews do not compose a national minority, they are at the periphery of national majority - that of "Muslim Turks" - regardless of the changes in its definitional construction from time to time. They are susceptible to the discourses and maneuvers of exclusion and/or inclusion. Their loyalty to Turkish state and their membership to the Turkish nation are questioned. In addition, as Cohen (1989: 67) puts forth, substantial participation of minority in the political community is limited to the condition of its members joining to the majority by changing their ethno-religious identity. In view of that, although the status of Jews in Turkey are contained in the universal and equal legal framework, their identity risks assimilation and their civic virtue confronts setback. All in all, minority status of Turkey's Jews feeds the passive dimension of citizenship leaving more places for state action on matters of citizenship. In continuum with statist tradition of political culture in Turkey, citizenship becomes a sphere dominated more by the state and the involvement of citizens gets limited.

Turkish Jews in Israel do not compose a Weberian ideal case for an ethnic immigrant group. However, as this research signified, first generation immigrants reformulated their identities as Turkish after their arrival in Israel. Using

Kastoryano's formulation (2000), international migration turned the Jewish immigrants from Turkey into a transnational community; Turkey became a source of identity and Israel a source of rights for them; and the emerging space of political action combined Turkey and Israel. This is not a unique situation for Turkish Jews. Previous research has shown that the modes of behavior and value relations of each of the groups that compose Israeli society were mostly imported from the immigrants' country of origin (Hacohen, 2002; Ichilov 2002). Turkish Jews became part of the dichotomy of Oriental-Sephardic-Mizrahi versus Ashkenazim Jewry in Israeli society. If integration is understood as the inclusion of newcomers as well as the internal cohesion of societies and political communities that are transformed by immigration (Bauböck, 2001), the identification of immigrants from Turkey as "Turkish Jews" and "Sephardim Jewry" illustrate the significance of the difficulty of integration for Israel. Israel has directed its absorption policies more for a type of "multiculturalism" and encourages cultural activities through migrants' associations where identities are organized and redefined but internal cohesion is under question. Israel society is considered to be deeply split along religious and ethnic lines (Bauböck, 2001; Hacohen, 2002). Therefore, although Turkish Jews has become part of majority and enjoys the majoritarian norms of the "ethnic democracy" in Israel (Smooha, 1997), they still have close identity ties with Turkey and they are not proactive in the field of citizenship.

The research on Jews in Turkey and in Israel also indicated that citizenship mainly involved two main actors - citizens and states - but the general framework of citizenship was generally drawn by the states rather than the citizens.

Individuals were in receptive position vis-à-vis the policies on citizenship which were primarily shaped and dominated by the states. It must also be noted that an individual being an immigrant or a minority plays a role in being responsive to the policies on citizenship governed by the states. In other words, individuals are not neutral subjects who only earn the designation of citizen in their relations with the state and in the medium of citizenship. Their status, identity as well as their civic virtue characterizes the scope of relations with the state. Immigrants and minorities are groups vulnerable to states' authority and power. For that reason, they are more permissive to the actions taken by the state and furthermore, they are more passive in shaping up the policies with respect to citizenship and in participating in the political community.

The research also noted reading citizenship on the individual level necessitated understanding the dominant citizenship paradigms within a given country. Israel and Turkey, both being new states founded in the 20th century in the Middle East dominated by statist tradition, possess different roots to citizenship. Below, the dominant paradigms of in citizenization process in Israel and Turkey are reviewed.

Israel is generally accepted as a case by itself and therefore omitted in comparative studies. Israel has been suggested to be an example for an ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1997), yet such modeling has not been left without criticisms (Jāmal, 2002). Still, two characteristics of Israel are prominent in shaping up the state structure, democracy and citizenship in Israel. *First* is Israel being a Jewish state. The concept political community in Israel is also ethnic (Joppke and Roshenhek, 2001). Even, political parties that deny the Jewish

character of the state are disqualified to run in elections. Such a construction brings various internal and international challenges to the sovereignty of the state. In addition to the pressures of globalization, Post-Zionists who advocates Israel to be a democracy in liberal norms, Haredi Jews who are dominated by messianic belief and religious fundamentalism, and Israeli Palestinians who demand de-ethnicization of the state, challenge the sovereignty of Israel internally (Sheffer, 1997b: 125-132). These challenges are reflection of the decrease in loyalty to the state and its various organizations (Sheffer, 1997b: 137). Due to the growing individuation among Israeli society, there is also a reduction in solidaristic citizenship ideology (Abraham, 2002). Therefore, the state encounters difficulties in imposing its policies on the citizens and it is becoming less effective in its ability to perform its traditional functions (Sheffer, 1997a: 114; Sheffer, 1997b: 141).

The *second* prominent characteristic of Israel, which is closely related to the first one, is the importance of security and military. Since Israel has gone through various wars since its establishment and due to the conflict over Palestine, participation in war and military service serve as the major signifier of full membership in the Israeli political community. Hence, there is close linkage between civic and military virtues (Helman, 1999; Shafir and Peled, 1998). The notion of "good citizen" in Israel exceeds beyond basic duties of tax payment, voting and military service and include the virtue of contribute to state goals such as strengthening of national security, the increase of Jewish majority, the geographical dispersion of the Jewish settlement, the development of Jewish culture, advancement of economic independence, etc. (Smooha, 1997). Citizens

are expected to be active rather than passive in pursuing their rights and performing their duties (Sheffer, 1997b).

In view of the above characteristics, citizenship conception in Israel is eclectic. It demonstrates a combination of liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship in Western political thought. The strong affiliation to democratic norms signifies the liberal discourse; the dominancy of Zionism represent the "pioneering" civic virtue of the republican discourse; and the identity based on Jewish descent is part of ethno-nationalist discourse (Shafir and Peled, 1998). Such a assorted understanding of citizenship serve to further the cleavages in Israel between citizens and non-citizens, between Jews and non-Jews, between men and women, and between Ashkenazim and Mizrahi (Shafir and Peled, 1998). Even more, it causes tensions between secular norms of nation-building and religiously grounded definition of membership (Bauböck, 2001) and causes controversies on whether Jew is race, nation or religion (Joppke and Roshenhek, 2001).[7]

Citizenship in Turkey, however, was officially taken a major element of successful nation-building from the very start (İçduygu et al. 1999). State played the determinant role not only in nation-building but also in the development of citizenship. Therefore, the notion of citizenship implied belonging directly to a national community based on loyalty to the state (İçduygu et al. 1999). Two characteristics of Turkey are significant in shaping up the state structure,

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[7] The Law of Return, in the amendment of 1970, widened the scope of membership to Jewish nation and permitted the right to immigrate to Israel for the close relatives of Jews despite their religion. The widening in the definition of Jew did not create debate until 1990s with the massive Russian aliya.

democracy and citizenship. *First* is Turkey being a secular state. Secularism is one of the basic paradigms in Turkey which is constitutionally secured. The political parties that advocate religious fundamentalism or disrupt the essentials of the Republic including the notion of secularism are banned from politics. Secularism generally targets the Muslims in the society which composes the majority. This has been mainly due to the othering process in the nation-building process. As Bora (1998) puts forth, the other in nation-building is the Ottoman past. With the establishment of modern Turkey, secularism served as a justification for a new Turkish identity. Religion, which had been traditionally a source of identity for the Muslims as well as the non-Muslims, was perceived detrimental to modernity. In this regard, non-Muslims were also put on equal footing with Muslims. *Second*, in the establishment of the norms of the Republic, the principle of universalism dominated the framework of state-society relations. The term "Turk" has referred to subjects who were attached to Turkey with citizenship bonds. Any legal definition or mention of racial, ethnic, class, gender or religious affiliation was omitted. Such a universalistic conceptualization excluded group rights or claims for difference.

Although secularism and universalism were set as basic paradigms of democracy, state and citizenship in Turkey, they contradicted other paradigms which surfaced from time to time. For instance, although the political community is strictly defined in secular terms, it is generally the membership of the secular Muslims which is at stake. Furthermore, the influx of Islam in the public sphere was permitted to a certain level as was in the case of Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the aftermath of 1980 military takeover to deactivate other perceived threats such

as communism or racism. Similarly, the principle of universalism was questioned by various groups of different identity categories within the society.

Despite their different roots to citizenship, Turkey and Israel both have membership and belonging to the political community as one of the themes in citizenship construction. How citizens perceive and experience citizenship is related to not only who those citizens are (i.e. whether they were native born citizens or immigrants and belonged to the majority or minority groups) but also how these citizens establish attachment to citizenship predominantly shaped by others let it be the states or other individuals and groups. The degree of attachment to citizenship is directly related to definitions of membership in the political community. Citizenship of Turkish Jews in Israel and Jews in Turkey is closely linked to their acceptance as full members of the political communities respectively. The discussions on whether a Turk by definition is Muslim or not, and in a similar vein, whether an Israeli by definition is Jewish or not, are reflections of the centrality of membership and belonging to the question of citizenship. Even more, they highlight the paradox of citizenship inherent in both countries.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Citizenship is one of the core concepts in political science. It is an essential component of state-society relations as it sets formal rights and responsibilities, incorporates the individuals and groups into the society and regulates the boundaries of political community and accession to it (Shafir and Peled, 1998). Participation in the political community and its objective as well as subjective norms which vary across different settings and historical contexts are intrinsic to citizenship. In this regard, it is evident that citizenship is one of the vital concerns in democratic theory and any question relevant to citizenship inevitably instigates further questions on the quality of democracy.

Citizenship underscores two major principles for modern nation-states (Cohen, 1989). One is citizenship in the state that points to the formal and equal participation in the political community. This refers more to the universal framework of rights and responsibilities in citizenship. The other principle is membership of the nation by which substantive participation in the political community is open to a full extent for certain groups within the society and limited to for some other groups like minorities who are different from the majority group in various respects. In this regard, it can be argued that citizenship is not merely about legal status determined vis-à-vis the state but covers also other aspects that shape up the boundaries of membership and participation in the

political community. Individuals are not neutral subjects who only earn the designation of citizen in their relations with the state and in the medium of citizenship. Their legal status, identity as well as their civic virtue and even more the interaction between these aspects characterize the scope of relations with the state.

As globalization puts nation-states under strain, citizenship becomes more exposed to questions of international migration and minority issues. The increase in the claims for recognition of identities and changes in international migratory flows on the global level introduce additional tensions on the incorporation of citizens in the political community. Accordingly, the incorporation of the minorities and immigrants become central to question of citizenship. However, these two groups have distinct characteristics of their own (Choudhry, 2002). In cultural terms, national minorities posses societal cultures whereas ethnic immigrants posses their own societal cultures in their countries of origin (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Therefore, the studies on the citizenship of minorities and of immigrants generally treat these groups separately.

The studies on citizenship of minority groups usually deal with individual rights within a broader range of human rights and discuss certain needs and rights pertaining to minority groups. They point to the tension between group rights and individual rights. In a similar vein, the question of whether individual rights are capable of covering certain needs of minorities or group rights inhibit integrity and have the potential for secession dominates the discussion on citizenship of minorities (Soner, 2004). On the other hand, the studies on citizenship of immigrants by and large focus on the incorporation of ethnic immigrants and the

naturalization processes. The impact of migration on the sending countries, receiving countries and the immigrants themselves is central to the discussions on the triangle of citizenship, nation-state and international migration (İçduygu, 1996a).

This study combined minorities and immigrants in one analytical skeleton and made a comparative investigation on citizenship of a specific minority group in Turkey – the Jewish minority, and a particular group of immigrants - first generation of Turkish Jews from Turkey in Israel. The three aspects of citizenship – legal status, identity and civic virtue – and the interaction between them were explored empirically and analyzed on the individual level with use of this comparative case study. The research highlighted certain key points with regard to citizenship in Turkey and in Israel.

Citizenship in Turkey is one of the major instruments of nation-building in Turkey and the state had been the main determinant and actor in the development of citizenship (İçduygu et al. 1999). Inheriting the multicultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey had regarded citizenship as a regulatory tool of the relations between newly founded state and the cosmopolitan society. In addition to the complimentary role to nation-building, citizenship served as an instrument in modernization and establishment of modern roots to democracy, secular governance and integrated society despite its multicultural components. Therefore, studying citizenship of Turkey's Jews who were officially recognized as a minority group besides the Armenians and the Greeks provided significant highlights not only on citizenship on the individual level but also on the

boundaries of universal citizenship discourse commonly assumed to be covering all groups within the society.

Turkey's Jews can also be considered significant in the sense that despite their profound history in Turkey, they have been subjected to exclusion from the definition of Turkish nation from time to time due to their difference in religion. Even with a recent example, the terrorist attacks in November 2003 that can be considered as Turkey's September 11 events were directed against synagogues. In the case of these attacks, we witness discussions on Jews' citizenship in Turkey. By the same token, not only for Jews but for all non-Muslim minorities, the relationship between citizenship and minorities which is not compatible with the European Union norms is frequently questioned. The European Union accession process requires Turkey to adapt multicultural policies with respect to its minorities. In light of these issues, one can argue that citizenship of non-Muslims and specifically Jews is noteworthy in understanding the place of Islam and the impact of secularism in nation-building and hence Turkish citizenship.

Citizenship in Israel is central to discussions on democracy. Although Israel has been founded foremost as a Jewish state, a principle that maintains its validity until today, there have been rising questions on the ethnic nature of the state. On the one hand, there are arguments for Israel being an archetype for ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1997). On the other hand, norms of ethnic democracy are challenged on the ground of liberal democratic criteria (Jamal, 2002). Citizenship in Israel deals not only with the majority-minority question and security issues posed by terrorism and wars but also faces challenges by international migration. Israel is a traditional immigration country and receives

Jewish immigrants regularly and most of the time in big waves, incorporation of these new immigrants to the Israeli society poses questions to Israeli citizenship. Migratory flows signify the multicultural variation among the Jewish majority as well evidenced by various dichotomies, i.e. between Ashkenazim and Sephardim/Mizrahim/Oriental Jewry; between men and women; between religious fundamentalists and secularists; between Jews and non-Jews; and between citizens and non-citizens. Therefore, studying Turkish Jews in Israel highlights the dynamics of nation-building, migration and citizenship in Israel.

Research on the comparative case of Turkey's Jews and Turkish Jews in Israel rested on field work conducted in Turkey and in Israel which combined various qualitative techniques in a semi-anthropological approach. In order to attach a closer focus, contacts were established with both of the communities in Turkey and in Israel respectively. In-depth, unstructured interviews were conducted with key informants. Participant observation complimented the key informant interviews during visits to communities' institutions. The analysis, however, rested mainly on survey interviews with the sample group composed of members of Jewish minority in Turkey and immigrants from Turkey in Israel. In addition to a questionnaire, ad-hoc questions were addressed to the respondents and in total 65 in-depth interviews (31 in Turkey and 34 in Israel) were conducted. Since the results of the research have been discussed in-depth in the previous chapters, only some essential points are summarized below.

The in-depth interviews with the sample group composed of Turkey's Jews first and foremost indicated that the experience of Turkish citizenship was associated with the respondents' minority status. Being a non-Muslim minority in

a Muslim dominated society seemed to have resulted in the acknowledgement of universal conceptualization of Turkish citizenship in the legal status. However, paradoxically, despite the will to equality in terms of rights and responsibilities in the legal framework that would exclude any group rights, the respondents had will to difference - that is the motivation to maintain and reproduce their ethno-religious group boundaries and cultural identity. The civic virtue aspect was related to minority status as well. The respondents refrained from taking leading roles in performing civic virtue though they valued virtuous citizenship. They feared to attract negative responses from the society and to be reminded of their minority status. Kymlicka and Norman (2000) argues that minorities, who have secured public recognition and support for their ethnic identity, have the confidence to interact with others in an open way where as those who do not, tend to be more defensive about their culture. Jewish minority in Turkey seems to be falling into the first group of minorities. This does not however mean that they do not face assimilation or integration felt more with younger generations. Secularism seemed to contribute to assimilation, a point that also emerged among the respondents in Israel with respect to integration into Israeli society.

The in-depth interviews with the first generation of immigrants from Turkey in Israel indicated that the respondents generally preserved culture as well as the political socialization that they obtained in Turkey. The Turkish Jews show differences in identification across year of arrival in Israel. Still, Turkish Jews in Israel compose a specific immigrant group that has ties with Turkey not only in terms of citizenship or familial attachments but also in terms of Turkish culture. However, the experience of moving from a country where they were minority into

another one where they became majority seemed to affect the respondents' views on citizenship. The respondents emphasized democratic norms in the legal status, yet they seemed to define these norms more according to majoritarian terms. On the identity aspect, they were affiliated more with the culture of country of origin – Turkey. Although there are variances in self-perception across year of arrival in Israel, the respondents mentioned that other Israelis regarded Turkish Jews more as Oriental Jews. On the civic virtue aspect, similar to Turkey's Jews, immigrants from Turkey in Israel generally refrained from proactive illustration of civic virtue and complied with the general political norms in Israel.

The research investigated the perceptions and experiences of Turkey's Jews and Turkish Jews in Israel on the individual level. However, it was found that citizenship was perceived to be falling in states' sphere of influence. The idea of state being dominant in determining the general framework of citizenship was dominant in both of the communities in Israel and in Turkey. The openness to multiculturalism, as in the case of Israel as a traditional immigration country, and hegemonic norms of unified citizenship and Republicanism as in the case of Turkey, seemed to have reflections on the respondents' views with regard to citizenship. It must also be noted that such priority given to states in matters of citizenship does not mean that citizenship, which was perceived to be defined and exerted by states in the eyes of the respondents, converts autonomous individuals to citizens. To put it more clearly, individuals' affiliation to groups, in this research to immigrant and minority groups, impact on the perceptions and experiences with regards to citizenship. In this regard, it can be suggested that individuals' status – immigrant or minority – affect the citizenship link built

between the states and citizens. By the same token, the legal status, identity and civic virtue aspects of citizenship are contingent on individuals' group membership. These aspects are subject to change by experience of international migration and by minority status, as evidenced by the research results.

The study conducted on citizenship of Jewish minority in Turkey and immigrants from Turkey in Israel has implications for individuals, communities and states associated with the subject matter of the research. For *individuals*, the research indicated that despite their common perception on citizenship as an issue under the influence of state(s), citizenship implied a combination of aspects above and beyond the legal status. In other words, citizenship is more than formal rights and responsibilities whether defined in universal framework as in Turkey or defined in ethnic democratic norms as in Israel. It covers the identities of the citizens as well, not to mention the civic virtue aspect which is closely related to aspects of legal status and identity. The experiences of citizenship are subject to change by different positions taken in the society such as membership to a minority group or an immigrant group.

For *communities*, both in Israel and in Turkey, the research indicated that integration and assimilation posed significant questions for group identities. For the Jewish community in Turkey, although integration is highly acknowledged and any recall of the difference of Jews from the general society is met with suspicion, assimilation endangers the prolongation of Jewish identity and community. Similarly, although first generation of immigrants acknowledge the well-integrated outlook of the Turkish Jews in Israel, they at the same time try to maintain Turkish culture. The research also indicated that there are differences in

individual characteristics and perceptions and experiences with regards to citizenship between and among the members of the communities. For example, the profile of Turkey's Jews seemed to change significantly across generations whereas the immigrants' profile seemed to vary across years of arrival in Israel. Therefore, inner-group differences and dynamics that play role in perceptions on citizenship should be watched closely. In addition, the research revealed that the concept of invisibility and the question of loyalty were noteworhty issues for both of the communities as well as for both of the states in focus – Israel and Turkey.

For the *states* in focus, the research revealed that citizens are neither neutral nor autonomous in their relationship with the state. The group identities of the citizens challenge universal conceptualizations of citizenship or homogeneous definitions set by nation-states. It seems that universal and uniform framework designed for citizenship becomes short of grasping all the citizens. In addition, as nation-states are challenged by the forces of globalization such as international migration and minority issues, the states need to focus on new governance strategies in citizenship that would question conventional definitions of loyalty (loyalty to nation and/or state or multiple loyalties covering more than one country), and political community (enlargement of political community, emergence of transnational communities). Last but not least, the research also highlighted that security, a primary responsibility of the states, is a major concern in citizenship. The respondents in Turkey did not want to demonstrate their difference and their participation in the public remained limited. They did not want to be picked out by the society at large. The respondents in Israel also had

concerns for security and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict that frequently take violent forms seemed to be a determinant of citizenship.

The current study contributes to the field of social science in many respects. With regards to research methodology, the study investigated citizenship from the perspective of citizens themselves with an individual-level analysis. Citizenship is generally perceived to be an issue of governance, hence falling into the domain of states. This current study, however, tempted to question state-centric approach prevalent in most studies by adding a citizen-centric approach. Such an approach did not put all the research subjects into a single category of "citizens" but intensified them with their group membership - that is the variety within the category of citizen was taken into consideration in the study. By the same token, the subject group of Jewish minority in Turkey and first generation of Turkish-Jewish immigrants in Israel was explored with an eye on their multiple identities, loyalties and characteristics. Furthermore, the methodology assisted a deeper focus to be attached on citizenship. It did not treat citizenship as one homogeneous unity but embraced its aspects – legal status, identity and civic virtue – hence making a profound examination of citizenship possible. The research methodology was also distinctive with the techniques used. Although the primary source of data rested on the survey interviews consisting of questionnaire and in-depth interviews conducted with the sample group, in-depth interviews with key informants as well as participant observation complimented the research and provided a multifaceted profile of the communities in focus.

The current study is also significant with its subject matter. It combined two groups – minority and immigrant - in one analytical framework. As was

discussed before, the citizenship studies generally deal with minorities and immigrants separately but this study adjoined them which made comparative analysis possible. Regarding Jewish minority in Turkey and Jewish immigrants from Turkey in Israel, this study is the first one in the field that unites both groups. Although there have been studies on them disjointedly, there have been no research on both of the groups that treated them as one analytical category in one research scheme until this current study.

Another asset of the study with regards to subject matter is its focus on the contemporary era. Turkey's Jews have attracted interest by the researchers only recently. Yet, most of the studies concentrate on the Ottoman or the Early Republican Period and only a few rests on empirical verification or field research. Likewise, Turkish Jews in Israel or migration from Turkey to Israel point to research areas which are even less studied in contrast to detailed social scientific research on emigration from Turkey or Turkish immigrant communities in many countries like Germany, France or Australia. As was discussed previously, the existing studies either reflected on the great wave with use of archival research (i.e. Bali, 2003) or were conducted in 1980s (i.e. Weiker, 1988). In this regard, this study contributes to existing literature by providing new empirical evidence and by highlighting on the contemporary era.

Naturally, this study contains certain weaknesses and shortcomings besides its strengths. The field research in Turkey mainly covered Jews living in Istanbul. Therefore, key informant interviews, participant observation and sample group interviews covered respondents or community institutions in Istanbul. Although some of the respondents in the sample group interviews were born in

İzmir, Edirne or Çanakkale, all of them has moved to Istanbul at some point in their lives and were living there at the time of the interviews. Istanbul is the main site of living for majority of Turkey's Jews. However, there are other communities, yet smaller, in other cities like İzmir, Antakya, Ankara, Adana, Antakya, Bursa, Çanakkale and Şanlıurfa. These smaller communities might have different group characteristics than that of Istanbul. In view of that, it can be suggested that field research on Jewish communities dispersed all over Turkey would have made research on contemporary Turkey's Jews more unyielding since variety of sources and hence variety of information would have had increased.

Another weakness by location of the field research in Turkey is that the researcher herself resided in Ankara but most of the study has taken place in Istanbul. Therefore, establishing contacts with the respondents and community institutions took greater effort and what's more, it became impossible to follow every social, religious or cultural activity that the community institutions held. The same was true for the field research in Israel. If it would have been possible to allocate more time for Israel, the contacts with the immigrants would have been more intense. Furthermore, the study in Israel covered only first generation of immigrants who arrived in Israel between 1948-1980. The immigrants who arrived before or after these dates were omitted. In addition, the second and third generations are excluded from the study. For that reason, the term "Turkish Jews in Israel" used in the dissertation does not embrace the second and third generation immigrants, which is a weakness of the study.

An additional weakness of the study arose due to the "minority" identity of the respondents. The respondents, either in Turkey or in Israel, were not very

much eager to illustrate critical perspective against Turkey or Turkish people. Therefore, the interviews with the sample group needed several additional questions for further elaboration and inspection of the consistency in respondents' ideas, values and even sometimes memories. In order to cross check and ensure reliability, same questions or similar ones by rewording of already asked questions were addressed to the respondents at different instances in the interviews. These testing questions most of the time disrupted the flow of the interviewing process and additionally tired both the interviewer and the interviewee.

The strengths and weaknesses of this study may provide helpful points for future studies in the field. The current research questioned citizenship on the layers of international migration and minority issues in the comparison case of Jewish minority in Turkey and Jewish immigrants from Turkey in Israel. It would be contributory of future research to contemplate on citizenship by building up other comparisons. For instance, comparing young generation among Jewish minority in Turkey with second/third generations of Jews from Turkey in Israel would filter the relationship between citizenship and assimilation on the layer of minority; and the relationship between citizenship and integration on the layer of international migration.

As a matter of fact, emigration of Turkey's Jews is a fruitful exploration site on its own. Israel is the primary receiving country but Turkey's Jews had other destinations as well. However, there is nearly no study conducted on them but only minor comments. For instance, an observer of Turkish community in Germany informs that the Muslim immigrants from Turkey had various

associations in Germany founded on the basis of Turkish identity whereas their non-Muslim counterparts such as the Turkish Armenians, Greeks and Jews did not have any (Şen, 1997: 246). The non-Muslim immigrants from Turkey in Germany instead preferred communal actions in synagogues or churches on the basis of their religious identity. Beyond these comments, studies exclusively on Jewish immigrants from Turkey in countries other than Israel (i.e. France, Germany, Italy and/or Switzerland) would contribute to literature to a great extent. Comparing these communities with the one in Israel would help further elaboration of the distinctive characteristics of Turkish Jews in Israel.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE INTERVIEWS WITH THE SAMPLE GROUP OF JEWS IN TURKEY

Interview No:

Respondent's:

Name:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Citizenship:

Gender:

Marital Status:

Jewish Origin (Sephardim/Ashkenazim):

Education:

Occupation:

Work Place:

Occupation of the Parents:

Mother Tongue:

Foreign Language:

Contact Information:

Date of the Interview:

Place of the Interview:

Duration of the Interview:

General Environment during the Interview and Comments:

1) I would like to start with general questions. What is your social/cultural/religious background? How do you perceive and define yourself?

2) How do you see *Musevilik* and *Yahudilik*? Do you see any difference between them?

3) Is your name Turkish or Jewish? Do you have any nick names that you use among the Muslims? When you tell your name, do you receive any responses that your name is not understood? If you do, how do you feel?

4) When did you understand that your religion is different from the majority? How did your family explain it?

5) Where did you earn your religious knowledge and values from other than family, i.e. For example, Jewish schools, youth clubs, vacation centers or associations?

6) Do you think you are a religious person? Do you go to synagogues? How often? Do you practice your religion?

7) Do you think that the Jews in Turkey face any legal or social barrier when practicing their religion?

8) How do you see secularism in Turkey in laws and in practice? Do you think it of it as a guarantee for your religious rights?

9) Did you experience any discrimination or oppression for being a Jew in Turkey? If you did, how did you respond?

10) Does your Jewish identity affect your work life in Turkey?

11) Have you experienced any discrimination during conscription in the military?

12) Do you follow Jewish publications such as Şalom weekly, books on Jews, Göztepe Culture Journal or Tiryaki Journal?

13) On what levels do you have relations with the Jewish community in Turkey? For instance, do you attend meetings or activities? Do you participate in the activities of the Jewish community? What do you think is the biggest problem that the Jewish community in Turkey is facing?

14) How are your relations with the Muslims or Christians in Turkey?

15) Now, I would like to ask you a question about the trust that you feel for the other people. Do you trust your friends who are not Jews? Did your friends change their behaviors when they learned that you were a Jew?

16) If you were given a chance to live your life again, where would you like to born in? Would you prefer to reborn as a diaspora Jew, for instance in Turkey, or would you like to reborn as a Jew in Israel or would you think it would not have had mattered? Why?

17) Now I am going to ask you questions on marriage and intimate relations. Have you had any girl/boy friend of different religious origin before? How did it affect your relationship? How did your family respond? How would you react to your children marrying spouses of different religion?

18) The following questions aim to understand your relations with relatives abroad. Do you have any relatives who emigrated from Turkey? When and how did they emigrate? Do they visit you in Turkey? Do you visit them? How often?

19) Have you been to Israel? When did you visit Israel first? What are the reasons of your visits generally? How often do you visit and how long do you stay there?

20) For example, you visited your relatives abroad. Do you see yourself as a Jew or as a Turk in those countries? Could you explain how you perceive yourself when you are out of Turkey?

21) Do you have any plans to emigrate, for instance to Israel or to other countries? What do your children think about emigration from Turkey?

22) Do you think all the Jews on the world are loyal to Israel?

23) Do you think the Jews in Turkey are loyal to Israel? If you think so, do you think that loyalty to Turkey and loyalty to Israel construe a contradiction or consistency with each other?

24) Now I am going to ask you general questions on citizenship. In your opinion, what is the most essential eligibility criterion of citizenship, i.e. to be born in the same country, to be a member of the same ethnic group, to speak the same language or to be subject to same sets of laws and etc?

25) What are the rights and responsibilities of citizenship for an ordinary citizen?

26) What are the rights, responsibilities, advantages and disadvantages of Turkish citizenship?

27) Who is a Turk in your opinion? For instance, is it a culture, a language, an ethnic group, a religion or a citizenship status?

28) Are the Jews in Turkey considered to be part of the Turkish nation? Do the Jews in Turkey see themselves as part of the Turkish nation?

29) Do you think the state treats citizens equally? Do you think there are any differences in the application of laws?

30) Have you come across situations when you thought that your citizenship rights were being violated? How did you respond to these situations?

31) Have you ever thought of becoming a state official? Why or why no?

32) In your opinion, is it possible that a Jew in Turkey can become prime minister, minister, chief of general staff, representative in the parliament or bureaucrat? If it is not possible, do you think the Jews should fight for it?

33) When you were in Turkey, how were you treated in state offices? Were there any differences in treatment by the state officials? If there were, how did you respond?

34) Have you ever come across any publication or broadcast against Jews in Turkey? What did you think about them and how did you respond?

35) If somebody close to you says something against the Jews, what would you do? If that person was somebody that you did not know before, would your behavior change?

36) In your opinion, is there any anti-Semitism in Turkey?

37) Have you heard about the historical incidents like the 'Thracian Incidents', 'Capital Tax', 'Campaign for Citizens Speak Turkish' or '6-7 September Events'? What do you think about them? Do you think such event may happen again?

38) Now I am going to address to you questions on participation. Do you vote? Which parties do you vote for? Do the policies, programs, campaigns or discourses of the political parties on the Jews affect your voting behavior?

39) Other than voting, do you participate in politics? How?

40) Are you a member of any civil society organization? If you are, how often do you take part in the activities of those associations? Are you an active member?

41) Do you make donations to charity foundations? Which ones?

42) What do you think is the most important social problem in the society? Are there any actions that the citizens may take in order to solve these problems?

43) In your opinion, do the Turkish citizens perform civic virtue which is generally considered as active participation, fulfilling the duties of citizenship, contributing to the civil society and trying to solve the social problems as citizens? For instance, are they sensitive about not throwing garbage on the streets, not violating rules and laws, respecting others, obeying the traffic rules, warning others to conform to the rules, learning about citizenship rights and responsibilities and performing them.

44) In your opinion, how are the Jewish citizens compared with the general society with respect to performing civic virtue? Can you give examples, please?

APPENDIX B

PROTOCOL GUIDELINE

The Nature of the Study

This study composes the field research part of the doctorate dissertation entitled "Citizenship Questioned by International Migration and Minority Issues: A Comparative Study on the Jewish Minority in Turkey and the Jewish Immigrants from Turkey in Israel" which is conducted for degree purposes at Bilkent University, Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. The dissertation is conducted by Şule Toktaş under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Ahmet İçduygu in the same department.

Purpose of the Study

This study mainly deals with citizenship and aims to contest it on the layers of international migration and minority issues. The three aspects of citizenship, which are legal status, identity and civic virtue will be covered in this study and will be put under investigation within the parameters of international migration and minority issues. In order to scrutinize the theoretical framework, a field research highlighting empirical findings is conducted. In due course, in-depth interviews will be carried out with the Jews in Turkey and the Jews emigrated from Turkey to Israel. The findings gathered by the interviews in

Turkey and in Israel will be evaluated according to the theoretical framework on citizenship. All of this research process will construe the main subject and content of the doctorate dissertation.

Procedures to be Followed

The people drawn from the above mentioned population groups will construe the sample group. Using qualitative research technique, an estimated number of 80-100 questions will be directed to the respondents in a time period of approximately one or two hours. The interviews will serve to understand the perceptions of the respondents towards citizenship with respect to their minority and/or migrant status as well as their individual experiences and interpretations regarding international migration and minority issues. The research in Turkey and in Israel will be finished in about two years.

Confidentiality

Since this study collects and accumulates data using qualitative research technique, the findings will be limited to the sample group. Therefore, the generalization of the data to broader communities beyond the limitation of a small representative sample group is not viable. In addition, the findings will be used only for scientific purposes and will only be utilized in the doctorate dissertation and the related academic publications/presentations. Furthermore, the identities of the respondents will remain confidential. In other words, the knowledge obtained in the study will be transmitted only in a form and style that cannot be identified

with the respondents. If the respondents participating to this study have any questions about the research, they may contact Şule Toktaş.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE INTERVIEWS WITH THE SAMPLE GROUP OF TURKISH JEWS IN ISRAEL

Interview No:

Respondent's:

Name:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Citizenship:

Date of Arrival in Israel:

Origin/Destination of Migration:

Gender:

Marital Status:

Jewish Origin (Sephardim/Ashkenazim):

Education:

Occupation:

Work Place:

Occupation of the Parents:

Mother Tongue:

Foreign Language:

Contact Information:

Date of the Interview:

Place of the Interview:

Duration of the Interview:

General Environment during the Interview and Comments:

1) I would like to start with general questions. What is your social/cultural/religious background? How do you perceive and define yourself?

2) How do you see *Musevilik* and *Yahudilik*? Do you see any difference between them?

3) Is your name Turkish or Jewish? Have there been any changes in the name that you use when you arrived in Israel? What kind of names you gave to your children in Israel?

4) Do you think you are a religious person? Do you go to synagogues? How often? Do you practice your religion?

5) If you were given a chance to live your life again, where would you like to born in? Would you prefer to reborn as a diaspora Jew, for instance in Turkey, or would you like to reborn as a Jew in Israel or would you think it would not have had mattered? Why?

6) Now I am going to ask you questions on marriage and intimate relations. Have you had any girl/boy friend of different religious origin before? How did it affect your relationship? How did your family respond? How would you react to your children marrying spouses of different religion?

7) I would like to learn about your life in Turkey before migrating to Israel. These questions are more to do with your minority status. Then, I will continue with questions about your life in Israel. When you were in Turkey, have you come across situations in Turkey that you had thought your citizenship rights have been violated? If there had been such situations, how did you respond?

8) Did you experience any discrimination or oppression for being a Jew when you were in Turkey? If you did, how did you respond?

9) When you were in Turkey, how were you treated in state offices? Were there any differences in treatment by the state officials? If there were, how did you respond?

10) Did your Jewish identity affect your work life in Turkey?

11) When you were in Turkey, have you ever thought of becoming a state official? Why?

12) In your opinion, is it possible that a Jew in Turkey can become prime minister, minister, chief of general staff, representative in the parliament or bureaucrat? If it is not possible, do you think the Jews should fight for it?

13) Have you experienced any discrimination during conscription in the Turkish military?

14) Have you heard about the historical incidents like the 'Thracian Incidents', 'Capital Tax', 'Campaign for Citizens Speak Turkish' or '6-7 September Events'? What do you think about them? Do you think such event may or may not happen again?

15) In your opinion, is there any anti-Semitism in Turkey?

16) I would like to hear about your migration story. When and how did you migrate from Turkey to Israel? What were the reasons? How did you decide to migrate? Did you have any relatives or friends in Israel? Could you tell about how those years were like and your migration history?

17) What did you hear about Israel when you decided to migrate to Israel? Do you think the information you gathered about Israel turned out to be true? What were your expectations? Were they realized after migration to Israel?

18) Was Israel the country that you wanted to migrate most? What were the other countries that you thought about migration and why?

19) When you arrived in Israel, what did you notice first in terms of citizenship?

20) Did you have any intention to return to Turkey? Under what circumstances would you return?

21) After you migrated to Israel, did you think about migrating to other countries from Israel? Why?

22) Did you stay in the first place in Israel that you migrated? Where did you move to and what were to reasons? How long did you stay in these settlements? Did you receive any help when changing settlements?

23) What was your job in Turkey? Did you change your job after migration? Who helped you?
24) After you migrated, did you presume your relationship with Turkey and in what terms?

25) When did you first visit Turkey after migrating to Israel? How often do you visit and how long do you stay? What were the main reasons in your visits?

26) Would you recommend your relatives in Turkey to migrate to Israel in terms of citizenship rights?

27) Do you have any relatives in countries other than Turkey? Do you see each other and how often?

28) For example, you visited your relatives abroad. Do you see yourself as a Jew, a Turk or an Israeli in those countries? Could you explain how you perceive yourself when you are out of Israel?

29) Do you have any plans to emigrate from Israel, for instance to Turkey or other countries? What do your children think about migration from Israel?

30) In terms of citizenship, is your life in Israel or in Turkey better? Why?

31) When you compare you migration history with other immigrants in Israel, what would you say? Did you experience the same things with other Israelis who came from other countries? What were the differences? How would you evaluate?

32) As you know, there are four groups of people in Israel. They are the Jews who came from Turkey, the Jews who came from other countries, the Jews who were born in Israel and the non-Jews. How are your social relations with these four groups?

33) Do you follow what happens in Turkey? Are you subscribed to any newspapers, journals or TV channels in Turkey?

34) Are you a member of an immigrant association? Are you involved in the activities of the Jews from Turkey in Israel? How often do you take place in these activities?

35) Do you continue your relations with your friends or relatives who returned to Turkey?

36) Have you come across any publication or broadcast against Turkey in Israel? If you have had, what did you think about them and how did you respond?

37) Now I am going to ask you general questions on citizenship. In your opinion, what is the most essential eligibility criterion of citizenship, i.e. to be born in the same country, to be a member of the same ethnic group, to speak the same language or to be subject to same sets of laws?

38) What are the rights, responsibilities, advantages and disadvantages of Israeli citizenship?

39) Do you think the State of Israel treat its citizens equally?

40) Do you think there are any differences in the application of laws?

41) Have you come across situations when you thought that your citizenship rights were being violated? How did you respond to these situations?

42) Do you think being an Israeli means being a Jew or being an Israeli citizen?

43) Do you think all the Jews on the world are loyal to the State of Israel?

44) Now, I would like you to compare and contrast Israeli and Turkish citizenship. According to your own experiences, what are the similarities and differences?

45) Do you think the laws in Turkey are equal? Are there any differences in the application of the laws?

46) Do you think dual citizens may feel loyalty to two states?

47) Do you think the Jews from Turkey in Israel are loyal to Turkey? If you think so, do you think it is a contradiction or consistency?

48) Now I am going to address to you questions on participation. Do you vote in Israel? Which parties do you vote for?

49) If you are a dual citizen, do you vote in both of the countries?

50) Other than voting, do you participate in politics? How?

51) Are you a member of any civil society association? What kind of associations are they? How often do you take part in the activities of those associations? Are you an active member?

52) What do you think it is the most important social problem in the society in Israel? Which social issues are you sensitive to? Are there any actions that the citizens may take in order to solve these problems?

53) In your opinion, do the Israeli citizens perform civic virtue which is generally considered as active participation, fulfilling the duties of citizenship, contributing to the civil society and trying to solve the social problems as citizens? For instance, are they sensitive about not throwing garbage on the streets, not violating rules and laws, respecting others, obeying the traffic rules, warning others to conform to the rules, learning about citizenship rights and responsibilities and performing them.

54) In your opinion, how are the Jews from Turkey in Israel compared with other immigrant groups and the general society with respect to performing civic virtue? Can you give examples, please?

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE GROUP OF JEWS IN TURKEY: PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Code	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	Education	Employment Status
FRIT1	35	Male	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	University	Working/Self Employed
FRIT2	32	Male	Married	İzmir	Turkish	Master	Working/Employed/ White color
FRIT3	27	Female	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	University	Working/Employed/ White color
FRIT4	23	Female	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Not working/Student
FRIT5	52	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Junior High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT6	89	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Elementary School	Not working/Retired/ Blue color
FRIT7	83	Female	Bachelor	Istanbul	Ladino	None	Not working/Housewife
FRIT8	83	Male	Widowed	Istanbul	Ladino	Elementary School	Not working/Retired/ Blue color
FRIT9	79	Male	Widowed	Istanbul	Ladino	None	Not working/Retired/ Blue color
FRIT10	49	Female	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT11	52	Male	Married	Istanbul	French	University	Working/Self Emplyoed
FRIT12	45	Male	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	University	Working/Employed/ White color
FRIT13	48	Male	Divorced	Istanbul	Ladino	University	Not working/ Unemployed

Code	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	Education	Employment Status
FRIT14	50	Male	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	Master	Working/Self Employed
FRIT15	28	Male	Married	İzmir	Turkish	Master	Working/Employed/ White color
FRIT16	57	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Doctorate	Working/Employed/ White color
FRIT17	23	Male	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Not working/Student
FRIT18	57	Female	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	Junior High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT19	67	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Master	Not working/Housewife
FRIT20	31	Female	Divorced	İzmir	Turkish	High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT21	77	Male	Bachelor	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Not working/Retired/ White color
FRIT22	23	Female	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Working/Employed/ White color
FRIT23	77	Female	Married	Çanakkale	Ladino	High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT24	20	Female	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Not working/Student
FRIT25	71	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	College	Not working/Retired/ Blue color
FRIT26	43	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT27	65	Female	Married	Istanbul	French	Junior High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT28	86	Male	Married	Edirne	Ladino	High School	Not working/Retired/ Blue color
FRIT29	81	Female	Married	Edirne	Ladino	High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT30	45	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Not working/Housewife
FRIT31	26	Male	Bachelor	Istanbul	Turkish	University	Not working/Drafted

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE GROUP OF TURKISH JEW IN ISRAEL: PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Code	Year of Migration	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	Education	Employment Status
FRIS1	1979	51	Female	Married	Istanbul	French	University	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS2	1979	46	Female	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	College	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS3	1979	46	Male	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS4	1979	63	Female	Married	İzmir	Ladino	High School	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS5	1979	58	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS6	1948	73	Female	Married	İzmir	Ladino	Elementary School	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS7	1948	73	Male	Married	İzmir	Ladino	High School	Not Working/ Retired/ White Color
FRIS8	1971	67	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS9	1951	73	Male	Married	Kırklareli	French	Master	Not Working/ Retired/ White Color
FRIS10	1980	58	Male	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS11	1978	58	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Junior High School	Not Working/ Unemployed

Code	Year of Migration	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	Education	Employment Status
FRIS12	1948	73	Female	Widowed	İzmir	Ladino	Elementary School	Not Working/ Retired/ Blue Color
FRIS13	1973	45	Male	Married	Menemen	Turkish	Junior High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS14	1951	75	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Elementary School	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS15	1949	65	Female	Married	Bergama	Ladino	None	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS16	1980	60	Male	Married	Israel	Ladino	Junior High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS17	1980	55	Female	Married	İzmir	Ladino	Junior High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS18	1967	50	Male	Married	İzmir	Turkish	High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS19	1961	58	Male	Married	İzmir	Turkish	High School	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS20	1965	56	Female	Married	İzmir	Ladino	Junior High School	Not Working/ Unemployed
FRIS21	1974	51	Female	Married	İzmir	Turkish	High School	Not Working/ Housewife
FRIS22	1964	54	Male	Married	İzmir	Turkish	College	Working/ Employed/ Blue Color
FRIS23	1970	60	Male	Married	İzmir	Ladino	High School	Working/ Employed/ White Color
FRIS24	1970	52	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Working/ Employed/ White color
FRIS25	1970	60	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	Junior High School	Not Working/ Retired/ Blue Color

Code	Year of Migration	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Birth Place	Mother Tongue	Education	Employment Status
FRIS26	1970	57	Female	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	High School	Working/ Employed/ White Color
FRIS27	1969	51	Female	Married	Edirne	Turkish	College	Working/ Employed/ White Color
FRIS28	1951	79	Male	Divorced	Edirne	Ladino	University	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS29	1950	79	Male	Married	İzmir	Ladino	University	Not Working/ Retired/ White Color
FRIS30	1951	77	Female	Married	İzmir	Ladino	University	Not Working/ Retired/ White Color
FRIS31	1949	79	Male	Married	Istanbul	Ladino	University	Working/ Self Employed
FRIS32	1951	69	Female	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	University	Not Working/ Retired/ White Color
FRIS33	1970	60	Male	Divorced	Istanbul	Turkish	Doctorate	Working/ Employed/ White Color
FRIS34	1979	55	Female	Married	Istanbul	Turkish	High School	Working/ Self Employed