

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF TURKEY'S WESTERN IDENTITY DURING
THE COLD WAR

A MASTER'S THESIS

BY

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Bilkent University
September 2002

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**BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the role of foreign policy discourse in the construction of Turkey's Western identity during the Cold War. It examines the concept of identity through a constructivist perspective. In contrast to mainstream theories that treat identities as 'natural', unchanging and inevitable, constructivism maintains that identities do not stand 'out there' to be discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction by way of intersubjective understandings of actors. The thesis examines the construction of Turkey's Western identity by analyzing articles published in the quarterly journal Foreign Policy, which represent the views of academic, political, and—to an extent—military circles on foreign policy issues. Discourse analysis is used to analyze the political representations of foreign policy elites and to understand the systems of signification associated with certain political choices. The thesis analyzes the role of the elite discourse that focuses on Turkey's NATO membership in the efforts to transform Turkey into a 'modern', 'democratic' and 'civilized' Western state (inclusion), in the face of the 'traditional', 'antidemocratic' and 'uncivilized' states of the Eastern bloc (exclusion). In this way, the discursive elements involved in the construction of Turkey's identity that are established upon the notion of 'difference' (namely the closely linked notions of the 'self' and the 'other') are analyzed.

ÖZET

Bu tez, dış politika söyleminin Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türkiye'nin Batılı kimliğinin oluşturulmasında oynadığı rolü incelemektedir. Kimlik konstrüktivist bir bakış açısıyla ele alınmaktadır. Tez, konstrüktivist Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisini kullanarak, kimliği geleneksel Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinin savunduğu gibi önceden verilmiş, 'doğal' ve değişmeyen bir kavram olarak değil, öznelarası ilişkiler sonucu oluşan ve değişebilen bir kavram olarak incelemektedir. Tez, dış politika elitlerinin kimlik temsillerini incelemek ve oluşturdıkları öznelarası anlamlandırma sistemlerini açıklayabilmek için diplomatların, dışişleri bakanlarının, akademisyenlerin ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ne mensup kişilerin makalelerinin yer aldığı Dış Politika dergisinden yararlanmaktadır. Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliği üzerine yayınlanan yazılar incelenerek, karar verme mekanizmalarının bu örgüte üyelik bağlamında devlete atfettiği 'modern', 'demokratik', 'medeni' ve 'Batılı' bir devlet olma 'değerlerinin' ne şekilde Doğu bloku ülkelerine yüklenen 'geleneksellik', 'antidemokratiklik' ve 'gayrimedenilik' gibi karşıt kategorilere dayanan 'içerisi/dışarısı' ayrımı üzerine kurulduğu araştırılmaktadır. Bu şekilde, Türk dış politikası söyleminde 'öteki' ile sıkı sıkıya ilişkilendirilmiş 'ben', yani Türkiye devlet kimliğinin 'fark' nosyonuna dayanan söylemsel yapısı incelenmektedir.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....1

CHAPTER II: CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR THEORY

2.1 Introduction.....	15
2.2 Origins and Definitions.....	16
2.3 Basic Assumptions.....	19
2.4 Constructivism <i>versus</i> Rationalism.....	22
2.4.1 Identity and Interests.....	25
2.4.2 Ideas, Norms and Transformation.....	28
2.5 Conclusion.....	32

CHAPTER III: IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

3.1 Introduction.....	35
3.2 Main Approaches to Identity Formation in IR: Essentialism <i>versus</i> Constructivism.....	37
3.3 Constructivist Accounts of Identity.....	41
3.3.1 The Question of Self/Other.....	45
3.3.2 The Boundary Question.....	50
3.3.3 State Identity.....	53
3.4 Conclusion.....	57

CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN POLICY AS A BOUNDARY PRODUCING PRACTICE

4.1 Introduction.....	59
4.2 The Role of Foreign Policy in the Construction of State Identity.....	61
4.3 Identity as a Discursive Construct.....	67
4.4 Conclusion.....	73

CHAPTER V: REPRESENTATIONS OF NATO IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE DURING THE COLD WAR	
5.1 Introduction.....	76
5.2 Representing NATO as a Cultural Alliance.....	79
5.3 The Cold-War in Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse.....	83
5.3.1 Constructing Western Identity Through Intervention.....	85
5.3.2 USSR as the ‘Other’	90
5.3.3 NATO as a Western Security Community.....	98
5.3.4 Turkey’s Cold-War Identity: Role Constructions.....	106
5.4 Conclusion.....	111
 CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION.....	 114
 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	 125

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

States are identity-bearing entities. If we acknowledge that many characteristics of identity attributed to individuals and social groups can also be ascribed to states, state identity appears as a significant area of analysis in International Relations (IR). Identity is a matter of signification, a sign that obtains meaning by its difference from other signs.¹ It is established by acts of self-representation, but it is also a matter of assertion and persuasion. The extent to which assertions of identity come to be accepted by others makes it strong and persistent. The identity of a state is what foreign policy decision-making mechanisms specify as a 'self', thereby establishing what the state is and what it is not, its distinguishing qualities, and its place in the world among various 'others'. In this sense, foreign policy becomes a mechanism for both constructing and representing a particular state identity.

Foreign policies are formulated by state elites who make utility calculations based on their political goals at both international and domestic levels. This thesis examines the social construction of Turkey's Western identity by analyzing state elites' foreign policy discourse on NATO. It elucidates the role played by the foreign policy discourse of elites in choosing, establishing and manipulating a particular perspective on Turkey's identity. Since Turkey's NATO membership constitutes one of the milestones in the efforts to identify Turkey with the West, I have chosen to look at how Turkey's Western identity was constructed by way of the foreign policy discourse on NATO.

The thesis adopts a constructivist analytical framework to study identity formation in general and the construction of Turkey's state identity during the Cold War in particular. Applying the concept of identity to the analysis, this thesis proposes a different way to study foreign policy from that of mainstream approaches. Mainstream IR theories take identities and interests as given; constructivism takes issue with them. In contrast to mainstream theories, constructivism is about questioning what is taken as natural, unchanging and inevitable by mainstream theories. Constructivists argue that identities and interests do not stand 'out there' to be discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction by way of intersubjective understandings. They maintain that identities and interests result from social interaction among actors. As such, identities are subject to change through the policymaking process. Building upon this constructivist framework of identity formation, the thesis addresses four basic research questions: What is the perspective developed by constructivism on the construction of identity? What do we understand from the concept 'state identity'? What is the role played by foreign policy in constructing a particular state identity? And what was the role played by Turkey's foreign policy discourse on NATO in the construction of Turkey's Western identity during the Cold War?

The thesis argues that foreign policy is not only the conduct of diplomatic practices for the pursuit of well-defined interests of states, but also a practice constructing these states and their interests in the first place. In this way, foreign policy is introduced as a mechanism that reflects and contributes to changes in conceptions of state

¹ Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, Edward Said: The Paradox of Identity, (London: Routledge, 1999), 124.

identity. As David Campbell argues, the identity of each state is performatively constituted by means of boundaries serving as demarcation lines that separate 'inside' from 'outside', 'self' from 'other', and 'domestic' from 'foreign'.² Thus, the politics of otherness, by inscribing boundaries between inside and outside, makes foreign policy possible.³ The thesis takes issue with those views that regard state identities as unproblematic and having prior existence to foreign policy. It is maintained that foreign policy is not the end result of an unproblematic state system or the relations among states, but is an 'integral' part of state construction and international relations.⁴

Campbell views foreign policy as "boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of identity in whose name it operates", rather than "the external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities".⁵ As such, he distinguishes between uppercase 'Foreign Policy' (the conventionally defined task of representing a country's interests abroad), from lowercase 'foreign policy' (the process of constructing the broader context of identity and difference that informs Foreign Policy). Following Campbell's analysis, this thesis views foreign policy not only as the "external orientation of preestablished states with secure identities",⁶ but also as the practices through which the boundaries between the 'inside' and the 'outside' are demarcated. Thus, 'foreign policy' is treated as the practices that construct the 'inside' and the 'outside, the 'self' and the 'other' in the first place, through practices of inscribing

² David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 2nd rev.ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9.

³ Campbell, Writing Security, 60.

⁴ Campbell, Writing Security, 60.

⁵ Campbell, Writing Security, 62.

exterior dangers, whereas 'Foreign Policy', conducted upon these representations, is viewed as the practices that maintain and secure state identity through diplomacy.⁷

A number of sources may be utilized to examine the content of state identity. Thomas Banchoff argues that these sources include the constitutional rules governing foreign policy, "public opinion about a country's international role" or widely adopted images about the state that take place in the "media and standardized textbooks".⁸ Introducing various methods of investigating state identity as such, Banchoff limits the analysis to the discourse of national political elites. He states two advantages of such a limitation. First, national political elites, as representatives of the state, are privileged in articulating their ideas on state identity. Banchoff assumes that these ideas are for the most part shared by the society.⁹ Second, analyzing political discourse is a beneficial way in studies that adopt a constructivist perspective to examine intersubjective beliefs. As Banchoff writes, "[s]tate identity pinpointed in political discourse is primarily a matter of public communication, not private conviction....For a given state identity to be of analytical use...it must be *shared*".¹⁰ This thesis studies the shared aspects of Turkish foreign policy discourse during the Cold War to develop an account on the construction of Turkey's Western identity. Looking at the foreign policy discourse on Turkey's NATO membership, the social construction of Turkey's Western identity is analyzed. Addressing

⁶ Campbell, Writing Security, 68.

⁷ Campbell, Writing Security, 62.

⁸ Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," European Journal of International Relations 5:3 (1999): 268-269.

⁹ Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," 269.

¹⁰ Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," 269. Emphasis original.

the shared characteristics of these discourses, the thesis examines the role Turkish foreign policy representations played in mobilizing a particular view on Turkey's identity.

Discourse analysis is a useful tool adopted in this thesis, as the goal here is to analyze particular representations of identities and social relations. Discourse is a specific way to talk about, understand and make meaning of the world.¹¹ When people talk and write, they represent a particular picture of what they think about their environment. They construct and organize their social reality through speech acts. To the extent that other people share their particular views about the world, these views become part of a collective meaning system. Senjoy Banerjee argues that, even if "not every discourse is associated with a corresponding practice....every practice has a corresponding discourse".¹² Drawing on this understanding, the great merit of discourse analysis is observed in its relation with a particular reality. This takes us to the idea that every practice in international relations has a corresponding discourse. The discourses deployed by policymakers for picturing particular aspects of world politics reveal the meaning system produced by foreign policy representations. What is meant by a meaning system is the social interaction and communication; i.e. speech acts of actors. It is the discursive practices of policymakers that create particular meanings in particular policy areas.

¹¹ Marianne Winther Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, Diskurs Analyse som Teori og Metode (Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method) (Roskilde Universitetsforlag/Samfundslitteratur, 1999); cited in Trine Schreiber and Camilla Moring, "Codification of Knowledge Using Discourse Analysis," 4. Paper presented at Nordic Conference on Information and Documentation, Reykjavik: Iceland, May 30-June 1, 2001. Available from World Wide Web http://www.bokis.is/iod2001/papers/Schreiber_paper.doc. Accessed on 15.04.2002.

¹² Senjoy Banerjee, "The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation: Contending Discourses in Late Colonial India," in Culture and Foreign Policy, Valerie Hudson ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 31.

Through mediation and learning processes, these meaning systems construct a special picture of the world, politics, identities and interests.

An analysis focusing on the discourse of the political elites allows us to understand the way policy goals are named and represented, how processes of interest formation are built up and policy agendas are outlined. A close examination of the discursive elements of foreign policy illustrates the uses of political rhetoric in Turkish foreign policy. Discourse analysis helps us to analyze the political representations of foreign policy elites and to understand the systems of signification associated with certain political choices. In this regard, discourse analysis is a useful tool in studying the construction of Turkey's Western identity by way of the meanings ascribed to its NATO membership.

The necessary first step in the constructivist analysis of state identity is to specify the policy area that will be dealt with. As Banchoff maintains, since "states interact with many other states, participate in more than one international institution and have diverse historical experiences, they can possess multiple identities at any point in time".¹³ For this reason, one must first address the area to be explored that corresponds to a particular identity of the state. This thesis specifies the area of analysis as the construction of Turkey's Western identity by way of the discourse on NATO during the Cold War. It addresses the role played by NATO narratives in representing Turkey as a Western state.

¹³ Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly 37, 1993: 271-296, citing Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," 269.

As Banchoff's argues, the leading elites "situate the state with respect to a given international constellation".¹⁴ They describe their states' place in the international arena in relation to other states and institutions. As such, they "reduce...the complexity of the international arena....[and] define... 'who we are' in terms of 'who and what we stand for'".¹⁵ In the same manner, Turkish foreign policy elites locate Turkey in a particular position in the world, conceptualize particular roles for the state, and thus define state identity. Building upon this understanding, the thesis examines the construction of Turkey's state identity by way of the elite discourse taken from the journal Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy is employed to analyze discourses of NATO that represented Turkey's membership to the organization as an indication that Turkey was a Western state.

Foreign Policy is chosen as the research material since it is a significant resource that publishes the views of policymakers on issues of Turkish foreign policy. It is a quarterly journal published by the Foreign Policy Institute since 1971. As such, it is one of the oldest journals on Turkish foreign policy. The main purpose of the journal is stated as providing "objective analysis of foreign policy issues both to Turkish and foreign readers".¹⁶ Apart from publishing Foreign Policy, the Foreign Policy Institute has organized many seminars and conferences both in Turkey and abroad since 1976. Additionally, it published many books and manuscripts on foreign policy issues.¹⁷ The

¹⁴ Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," 270.

¹⁵ Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," 270.

¹⁶ Seyfi Taşhan, "Foreign Policy Institute, Its 25th Anniversary," Bulletin for the 25th Anniversary of the Foreign Policy Institute.

¹⁷ Seyfi Taşhan, "Foreign Policy Institute."

Institute works in collaboration with the Turkish Foundation for International Relations and Strategic Studies, the academia, media and government institutions. An important task of the Institute is stated as that of reflecting “European norms and *acquis* to the Turkish public opinion and in a similar way convey Turkey’s view points on common European issues to the world public”.¹⁸ Thus, the Foreign Policy Institute expresses views on Turkish foreign policy through research, meetings and publications. The contributors of the journal include ministers of foreign affairs, academicians, diplomats, bureaucrats and members of the Turkish Armed Forces. Except for academics, these people come under the definition of foreign policy elites and have significant impact on the formulation and conduct of Turkish Foreign Policy. Thus, the journal Foreign Policy reflects the views of scholarly, political, and—to an extent—military circles. This is why I have chosen to look at Foreign Policy to study the construction of Turkey’s Western identity with reference to its NATO membership.

By making use of excerpts from the journal’s articles, the thesis examines the foreign policy discourse of Turkey’s elite during the Cold War and how the cause of NATO membership was linked to Westernizing the country. In this way, this thesis addresses the process of the social construction of Turkey’s Western identity during the Cold War. The argument is that, entering NATO not merely indicated becoming a member of a military alliance. NATO membership was also used to represent Turkey as a member of the Western civilization, and thus drawing the boundaries between Turkey and the non-West.

¹⁸ Seyfi Taşhan, “Foreign Policy Institute.”

It is of great merit to analyze the articles of Foreign Policy to illustrate how foreign policy discourses of elites shape state identity. The journal provides an opportunity to illustrate how “social...analysis and political practice appear to permeate one another even if the analysts have no direct personal ties to the security apparatus of the state”.¹⁹ Making use of the journal Foreign Policy, it is possible to observe the representational force of policymakers’ definitions of state identity. In the final analysis, as Ido Oren argues, even when we regard the journal as purely an intellectual contribution to foreign policy,

the line between scholarship and politics becomes blurred to the extent that the ideas articulated by this scholarship (objective though the scholarship’s tone might be) are harmonious with the official foreign policy of the day

[T]he problem becomes more acute when the analyst explicitly uses ideas and concepts, which originated in proximity to the state.²⁰

Ido Oren maintains that scholars who analyze the ‘state sanctioned norms’ promoted by official lines become engaged in the reproduction of these norms, which he ultimately sees as a political act in itself.²¹

Foreign Policy articles are employed in studying the social construction of Turkish state identity in this thesis. ‘The ideas and concepts’ used by the authors are in close ‘proximity’ to the official discourse. To summarize, using a constructivist model of identity formation and employing the articles of Foreign Policy, the analysis that follows focuses on the social construction of Turkey’s Western identity during the Cold War.

¹⁹ Ido Oren, “Is Culture Independent of National Security? How America’s National Security Concerns Shaped ‘Political Culture’ Research,” European Journal of International Relations 6:4 (2000): 546.

²⁰ Oren, “Is Culture Independent of National Security?” 565-566.

²¹ Oren, “Is Culture Independent of National Security?” 565.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The following three chapters present a theoretical framework to study identity formation. Chapter II introduces constructivist theory in International Relations (IR). Constructivism's great merit for this thesis is that it transcends the one-way causal logic and the givenness of identity in essentialist accounts and that it emphasizes the importance of political processes in mobilizing interaction. Constructivism points to the mutually constitutive relationship between identity and interests and stresses the malleability of identity. As such, constructivism induces us to think these concepts through critical lenses. It takes issue with the arguments that treat identities and interests as ever-existing and unchanging phenomena, and observes the political motives behind their construction. Chapter II summarizes the basic tenets of constructivism. Next, the main issues and concepts relevant to the constructivist research agenda are analyzed. Among these are the role of intersubjective beliefs in mobilizing social action and concepts such as identity, interest, ideas, norms and transformation in international relations. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the strengths of constructivism in studying International Relations and its contributions to the discipline. The chapter also aims at providing the theoretical framework to study the social construction of identity.

Chapter III is based on a constructivist analysis of identity formation. IR theory has witnessed the return of the concepts of culture and identity in the aftermath of the Cold War.²² The usage of the concept of identity in IR theory has become popular in the post-

²² Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3-5.

Cold War era both in mainstream and critical accounts. Treated as a 'soft concept' prior to the 1990s, identity became a major area of interest in IR theory after the Cold War. Chapter III presents constructivist conceptions of identity, which conceive identity as dynamic and transforming over time rather than static and complete. This chapter examines identity as a historically bound concept established within a particular field of social values and forms of behavior. It analyzes representations of identities to provide a comprehensive account of their social construction. Presenting a constructivist approach to identity, Chapter III provides a theoretical framework for studying identity in IR. The main argument is that no generalizable account of identity can be developed whereupon we can deduce objective and essential characteristics. Based on constructivist accounts of identity formation, this chapter presents an analysis of how cultural, social, gendered, political and other identities are socially constructed through practices of representation. The chapter also examines the arguments on 'difference' in International Relations. The question of self/other is addressed in order to include a significant aspect of identity formation to the analysis. Finally, the social construction of boundaries between social groups and states as identity-bearing entities are analyzed.

Focusing on foreign policy as a boundary producing practice, Chapter IV adopts an alternative approach to study foreign policy. It looks at the construction of state identity by way of foreign policy representations. Following David Campbell, foreign policy is understood as a practice defining the object and subject positions in inter-state relations. As such, foreign policy becomes a practice constructing 'we' and 'them' and separating the 'inside' from the 'outside'. Drawing on the understanding that states are identity-bearing entities, this chapter introduces the significance of foreign policy practices in the

construction of state identity. It is argued that actor properties are not intrinsic to states, they are socially contingent; they depend on interaction. Chapter IV demonstrates how foreign policy and state identity can effectively be associated. Discourse analysis is adopted as a means for analyzing the role played by foreign policy representations in constructing particular identities.

Chapter V turns to look at how this theoretical construct could be utilized in analyzing the Turkish case. In particular it analyzes how Turkey's Western identity was constructed through the discourse on NATO. The chapter uses foreign policy representations from the journal Foreign Policy to examine the construction of Turkey's Western identity. Focusing on representations of Turkey's place in NATO, the ascription of fixed and stable characteristics to the state by means of dominant discursive practices is examined. As such, Chapter V demonstrates the roles played by policymakers' representations in constructing Turkey's Western identity. The aim is not to discover the 'essence' of Turkey's Western identity but to analyze the processes through which it was constructed through representations by the policymaking elite.

Chapter V maintains that Turkey's state identity has been framed around a process of articulating 'what it is not' and concomitantly defining 'what it is'. In other words, it is argued that foreign policy discourses made 'foreign' what was viewed irrelevant while incorporating what was deemed as constitutive of Turkey's identity. Accordingly, this chapter looks at the construction of the Soviet Union as the 'other' of Turkey—the self. An alternative reading of Turkish foreign policy is presented in this chapter. It is argued that it is unclear whether Turkey has approached the West because it saw the Soviets as an 'other', or *vice versa*. It is argued that the Soviets might have been represented as the

‘other’ of Turkey in Turkey’s elites’ foreign policy discourse since Turkey wished to approach the West.

An alternative reading of the Turkish foreign policy texts also reveal the project of westernizing the country. Elite discourse establishes the border and defines the criteria of difference (inclusion/exclusion) between political identities. Following this argument, Chapter V suggests that the elite discourse on Turkey’s NATO membership demonstrates the efforts to turn Turkey into a ‘modern’, ‘democratic’ and ‘civilized’ Western state (inclusion), in the face of the ‘traditional’, ‘antidemocratic’ and ‘uncivilized’ states of the Eastern bloc (exclusion). It is these binary oppositions²³ that define the boundaries of political identities and political cultures. These binary oppositions create a common language among policymakers, mobilising common understandings and common definitions of identity.

Analyzing the texts on Turkey’s NATO membership during the Cold War is a beneficial way of examining the shared understandings of foreign policy elites. Elite discourse legitimizes the attitudes of states toward other states, and thus plays a significant role in the construction of allies and enemies. Drawing upon this understanding, this thesis analyzes the social construction of ‘difference’ in Turkish

²³ Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in the International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations, 5: 2 (1999): 229.

foreign policy and Turkey's Western identity by looking at the meanings ascribed to its NATO membership.

CHAPTER II: CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR THEORY

2.1 Introduction

Advancing a sociological perspective on world politics and offering alternative understandings to mainstream International Relations theories, constructivism has attracted growing attention among IR scholars in the aftermath of the Cold War. Beginning from its introduction to IR theory by Nicholas Onuf in 1989,²⁴ constructivism aroused deep scholarly interest, the reasons of which can be found in the alternative perspective brought by the theory in dealing with a number of central themes of IR theory. Among these themes are anarchy, balance of power, security dilemma, domestic politics and interest,²⁵ as well as relatively new concepts of IR such as identity, norms and culture.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce constructivist theory in International Relations. It presents the basic assumptions of the theory along with the prominent authors of the constructivist school in IR. Additionally, the main concepts and questions relevant to the constructivist research agenda are examined. The objective is to present the strength of constructivism for the study of International Relations and the issues it seeks to explain.

²⁴ Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, "Constructing Constructivism," in International Relations in a Constructed World, Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert eds. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 4.

²⁵ Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security 23:1 (1998): 172.

To introduce constructivism in IR theory, I begin by addressing briefly its origins in social theory and the basic arguments presented by constructivist scholars. Then, a brief literature review of prominent constructivist works in IR is introduced. It discusses the significance of meanings actors attach to circumstances in international politics. The following section examines the constructivist approach in comparison with the rationalist theories in IR. This section presents the dissatisfaction of constructivist literature with mainstream IR theories in dealing with world politics. It purports to show constructivism's strengths in studying concepts such as identity, interests, ideas, norms and change in international relations. Additionally, it analyzes how identities and interests, as well as norms and other political practices in international politics are constructed by actors' interpretations and interactions, rather than given by nature as rationalists argue. Thus, this chapter attempts to develop an understanding of constructivism in IR and its contributions to the discipline.

2.2 Origins and Definitions

Constructivism is a broad movement encircling many schools of thought, such as Kantian idealism,²⁶ the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens,²⁷ and the English school, which anticipated constructivist concerns.²⁸ The classical roots of constructivism in IR theory could be traced back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as its foundations

²⁶ Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 855.

²⁷ John Gerard Ruggie. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52:4 (1998): 862.

were established by the views of the philosopher-sociologists of these periods. John Gerard Ruggie finds the origins of constructivism in Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, since both thinkers argued that what “connect, bond and bind individuals within social collectivities are shared ideational ties”, one of the core assumptions of constructivism.²⁹ They both emphasized the mutual influence of material and ideational factors.

Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist IR scholar, introduces a highly developed account of constructivism. He argues that the core element selected by constructivism from social theory is its ‘idealism’, which means that structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces.³⁰ Wendt maintains that identities and interests of actors are constructed by shared ideas rather than given by nature.³¹ Thus, for Wendt, identities and interests do not stand ‘out there’ to be discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction by way of intersubjective understandings, i.e. the social interactions among actors.

Constructivists of various traditions³² agree on the primary point that “humans see the world through perspectives, developed socially...[and that] reality is social and what we see ‘out there’... is developed in interaction with others”.³³ In this manner, constructivism deals with ‘human consciousness’,³⁴ the perspectives through which

²⁸ A significant contribution of the English School has been its identifying elements of ‘global society’ and its structural and normative features shaping international politics. Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), 58.

²⁹ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 861.

³⁰ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.

³¹ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 1.

³² There are sociological, feminist, emancipatory and interpretive variants of constructivism as well as jurisprudential and genealogical approaches. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 880.

³³ Palan, “A World of Their Making,” 580.

³⁴ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 878-879.

people make sense of their world and the extent to which these perspectives are shared by others. Accordingly, constructivism is an approach theorizing the world based on how human beings see the world, rather than explaining what is actually 'out there'. In line with this understanding, reality is not viewed as objective but as constructed differently by different people. Constructivism examines the intersubjective dimension of human action that is directed towards lending significance to the world.

Constructivism should also be understood within the historical context it was introduced to IR. The development of constructivist theories of International Relations is associated with the end of the Cold War. For Stefano Guzzini, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War attests to the fact that

international structures are not objective....If...constructivism is basically about questioning the inevitability of the social status-quo, then the unexpected fall of the wall gave new legitimacy to such claims, in particular since the change seemed to have been effected by actors who have become self-consciously aware of the dilemma situation in which the Cold War had trapped them.³⁵

As Guzzini argues, the end of the Cold War made clear that international relations and international structures, determined by human action and cognition through language and communication acts, are not fixed but ever changing as their production and reproduction is subject to 'human practices'.³⁶ Viewed as such, the bipolar international structure of the Cold War years was not an inevitable and constant situation in world politics, but was subject to actors' interpretations and representations of relations among them. Thus, the end of the Cold War came about not merely as a result of the changes in power relations,

³⁵ Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 6:2 (2000): 154.

³⁶ Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism," 155.

but also as a result of the policymakers' evaluations of these relations. In this regard, constructivism is a valuable approach in questioning power relations that are for the most part regarded as natural consequences of the world order. Constructivism argues that power relations in international relations are not objective, natural and inevitable, but subject to intersubjective meanings and interpretation. Thus, constructivism is a useful approach to observe how various actors make meaning of their environment and the material structures of international politics. Building upon these theoretical insights and the power of constructivism in explaining the issues under reference, this chapter proposes a constructivist framework for studying international relations.

2.3 Basic Assumptions

Before turning to the basic assumptions of constructivism in IR theory, it should be noted that there are various perspectives within constructivism in International Relations. However, the aim of this section is not to focus upon the different strands of constructivism and the debates among them, but to employ the core arguments of the theory to achieve a better understanding of a particular research problem. Stressing the basic assumptions of constructivism, this section tries to illuminate the common traits the theory is built on.

Broadly defined, constructivism deals with the interaction between material and social factors in international relations. One of the main contributions of constructivism to IR theory is the idea that much of the world we live in is our own making; that is to say,

reality is socially constructed and shaped by our beliefs.³⁷ Drawing upon this argument, the object of study in International Relations is the social order, including the domestic and intersocietal spheres as well as the international and social spheres.³⁸ According to constructivists, international reality is constructed through ideational as well as material means and these ideational factors have normative dimensions.³⁹ Constructivists state that collective as well as individual intentionality shape the world and that the meaning of ideational factors are contingent on time and place; an understanding that depicts reality as relational and situational.

In the same vein, Ruggie finds the most distinctive features of constructivism in the ontological realm. This leads him to the argument that “constructivism is not itself a theory of international relations, the way balance-of power theory is...but a theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations”.⁴⁰ In a similar way, Jeffrey Checkel argues that constructivism is

not a theory but an approach to social inquiry based on two assumptions:
1) The environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as material; and 2) this setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their interests (it can constitute them).⁴¹

Another constructivist account is presented by Emanuel Adler, who argues that “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction

³⁷ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1989); Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1989).

³⁸ Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 105.

³⁹ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 879.

⁴⁰ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 879-880.

⁴¹ Jeffrey Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations,” World Politics 50: 2 (1998): 325-326.

depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”.⁴²

These arguments put emphasis on the social dimension of the interactions among individual actors or larger groupings of people and their shared understandings. It is these understandings that give meaning to the world. Thus, constructivism argues that beside the material aspects shaping our environment, the social/cognitive aspects framing our perspectives should be taken into consideration when studying International Relations.

The significance of ‘intersubjective meanings’ is introduced by Mark Neufeld as follows: “the practices in which human beings are engaged cannot be studied in isolation from the ‘web of meaning’ which is...constitutive of those practices, even as it is embedded in and instantiated through those some practices”.⁴³ The close link between ideas and practice is further highlighted by Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, who hold that ideas are ‘symbolic technologies’ which are “most simply, intersubjective systems of representations and representation-producing practices”.⁴⁴ Then, according to constructivists, ideas are intersubjectively constituted and are themselves constitutive of social reality.

⁴² Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics” European Journal of International Relations 3:3(1997): 322.

⁴³ Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 76. Neufeld defines ‘intersubjective meanings’ as “the product of the collective self-interpretations and self-definitions of human communities”. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory, 77.

⁴⁴ Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 3:2 (1997): 209.

2.4 Constructivism *versus* Rationalism

In order to present a better account of constructivism in IR, it should be examined in comparison with rationalist approaches and with reference to the issues it attempts to apprehend. Constructivism in International Relations addresses many of the issues examined by mainstream approaches—such as balance of power, security dilemma, neoliberal cooperation and democratic peace⁴⁵—though from a different perspective. Constructivism also deals with issues that rationalist theories discount, ignore, or simply cannot explain within their characteristic ontology and epistemology, including issues such as identity, interest, ideas, norms and change in international relations. Analyzing the intersubjective dimensions of social action and social order, and dealing with politics in space and time dimensions, constructivism seeks to overcome the shortcomings of mainstream approaches in studying the interests and identities of actors.

Constructivists criticize rationalists for being extremely materialist and agent-centric. Constructivists see neither agency nor structure as primary. They maintain the mutual constitutiveness of structures and agents. As Thomas Risse argues, constructivism is an approach taking issue with both individualistic approaches giving priority to agents and those privileging structural constraints in constructing the social environment. Instead, he holds that social constructivism “cannot be reduced to or collapsed into...[agents or structures]”.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ For a constructivist analysis of these issues see Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism,” 186-192.

⁴⁶ Thomas Risse, “ ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54:1 (2000): 5

According to mainstream IR theory, identities and interests are given. Constructivism, on the other hand, takes issue with mainstream approaches, which take identities and interests for granted. Constructivists argue that identities and interests do not stand 'out there' to be discovered, but are subject to construction and reconstruction by way of intersubjective understandings. They maintain that identities and interests result from social interaction among actors. Additionally, constructivism deals with international politics as a contingent practice transforming over time. As such, international politics is viewed to be subject to change through the policymaking process.

Since its foundation, the discipline of International Relations has witnessed a number of debates; between idealism and realism, between traditionalism and behaviouralism, between state-centric and transnationalist approaches, and between the three paradigms of Realism, Liberalism and Marxism.⁴⁷ John Hobson presents the recent debate as one between rationalism (including the neorealist and neoliberal approaches) and reflectivism (including constructivism).⁴⁸ Hobson argues that the rise of constructivism has reshaped the 'trichotomy' among realism, liberalism/pluralism and

⁴⁷ See for the debate between Realism and Liberalism Charles Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Jr. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (Longman, 2000); for the debate between Traditionalism and Behavioralism Morton Kaplan, "Variants on six models of the international system," in James Rosenau ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969) and Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism Vs. Science in International Relations," World Politics 19 (1966); for the debate between Realism, Liberalism and Marxism Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977).

⁴⁸ Steve Smith, "The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?" British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2:3 (2000): 376.

Marxist structuralism into a 'dichotomy', meaning that the recent debate is between rationalism and constructivism.⁴⁹

Adler sees constructivism as an attempt to 'seize the middle ground' between rationalism and reflectivism. He considers constructivism as standing at the intersection of the two major debates within the social sciences, that between materialism and idealism, and that between agency-based and structure-based models of the world.⁵⁰ Whether constructivism was introduced to the discipline to replace mainstream IR theories or as an alternative, it is clear that scholarly interest in constructivism has grown as the limits of conventional theories became evident. As Ruggie puts it, constructivism has contributed to IR by widening the theoretical borders of the field, taking actor identities and interests not for granted but problematizing them, and comprehending "the intersubjective bases of social action and social order in the analyses".⁵¹ Accordingly, in addition to introducing new areas of inquiry to International Relations, constructivism has provided a new perspective to existing approaches. In order to develop a better account of constructivism in IR, in the following part it will be examined in comparison with rationalist approaches and with reference to the issues—identity, interest, ideas, norms and change in international relations—it attempts to apprehend.

⁴⁹ John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 145.

⁵⁰ Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," 323-326.

⁵¹ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?" 863.

2.4.1 Identity and Interests

Constructivists take issue with the rationalist claim that state interests and identities are fixed, and hold that they are bound to change. According to Hobson, rationalists regard IR as the product of agents who are oriented with ‘instrumental rationality’, which means that states are rationally power and utility maximizing agents.⁵² Rationalists see state interests as exogenously produced prior to social interaction. Neorealism and neoliberalism, two major IR paradigms, rest on these foundations and consider state preferences as unproblematic and “readily deducible from the objective characteristics and conditions of states”.⁵³ Constructivists, on the other hand, hold that states do not *a priori* know what their interests are.⁵⁴ The assumption that ‘states know what they want’ and that preferences are inherent in states or contingent on material conditions is viewed as misleading by constructivists. As Martha Finnemore maintains, state preferences are malleable and are shaped through processes of social learning and imitation.⁵⁵

In the same vein, Hobson holds that “states are constrained by social normative structures, through which the identities of states are constructed”.⁵⁶ These identities, in turn, define states’ interests, leading to the formation of state policy. Thus, “interests and identities are informed by norms which guide actors (states) along certain socially prescribed channels of ‘appropriate behaviour’”.⁵⁷ In other words, constructivists

⁵² Hobson, The State and International Relations, 145-146.

⁵³ Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 9.

⁵⁴ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146.

⁵⁵ Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 11.

⁵⁶ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146.

⁵⁷ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146.

problematize 'identity' (which rationalists fail to do) and argue that identities change in line with normative structural changes, which ultimately change interests as well.

Ruggie presents a comparative account of constructivism, distinguishing it from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.⁵⁸ He criticizes those 'neo-utilitarianist' approaches that do not answer the basic question of how states acquire their identities and interests. He argues that neo-utilitarianism fails to explain the role of normative factors and states' identities in shaping their interests and behaviors. He criticizes neo-utilitarian approaches' dealing merely with the circumstances that states find themselves constrained with, but not the 'making' of these circumstances. Adopting a constructivist perspective, he asserts that these circumstances are not given (they are not what states find themselves in) but are deliberately created through social interaction. In other words, for Ruggie, the circumstances constraining states are created through the meanings attached to them in processes of understanding, interpretation, and acting upon them.⁵⁹

Wendt also takes issue with neorealist and neoliberal theories of IR since they treat identities and interests of agents as exogenously given.⁶⁰ Rather, he gives prominence to an "intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction".⁶¹ He criticizes the primordialist logic of mainstream theories in dealing with identity and interests. Further, he holds that state identities and

⁵⁸ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?" 862-864.

⁵⁹ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?" 877.

⁶⁰ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46:2 (1993): 391.

⁶¹ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," 394.

interests are malleable to transformation rather than being static and stable.⁶² Thus, Wendt argues that the structures within which action takes place are endogenous to process and that intersubjective meanings will change as practices of interaction change. As to the relationship between identities and interests, Wendt presents a constructivist account in his book:

[I]nterests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is.... Identities may themselves be chosen in light of interests, as some rationalists have argued, but those interests themselves presuppose still deeper identities...[because] without interests identities have no motivational force, [and] without identities interests have no direction.⁶³

Even if Wendt seems to give ontological primacy to identities over interests, in the final analysis, he regards them as having 'complementary explanatory roles',⁶⁴ which means that identities and interests are mutually constitutive.

What we can infer from these constructivist accounts is that, identities and interests are not constant, given and unchanging, but subject to change in particular circumstances. Since it is the social interactions and intersubjective meanings that lend significance to identities and interests, we must analyze them within the framework of the meaning system they are created and recreated. Constructivism passes beyond a fixed, unchanging and inevitable vision of the world that mainstream theories develop to one that is socially constructed. It contributes to the discipline by the way it deals with identity and interest related issues; taking them as ever-changing entities that are constructed by the shared understandings of actors.

⁶² Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," 394.

⁶³ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 231.

⁶⁴ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 231.

2.4.2 Ideas, Norms and Transformation

Another difference between constructivist and rationalist approaches is the way they deal with ideas and norms. Constructivism treats the relationship between ideas and material factors in a way that is completely different from that of rationalists, who see ideas as secondary to material causes.

Ruggie states the critical differences between constructivist and neo-utilitarian approaches as being related more with philosophical issues such as ideas than empirical ones.⁶⁵ He uses Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane's rationalist definition of ideas—beliefs held by individuals—to mark this difference. He challenges the reductionism and methodological individualism of rationalism and argues that constructivism deals with 'intersubjective beliefs'. He makes use of John Searle's concept 'collective intentionality' to explain that ideas are social as well as individual facts, and that 'collective consciousness' is what creates meaning in the international realm.⁶⁶ In order to make his argument more clear, he employs the concept 'sovereignty'. He writes:

The mutual recognition of sovereignty...is a precondition for the normal functioning of a system of sovereign states....[which] exists only within a framework of shared meaning that recognizes it to be valid—that is, by virtue of collective intentionality.⁶⁷

Ruggie points out to the social dimension of ideas having the impact of creating intersubjective frameworks in world politics.

⁶⁵ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?" 869.

⁶⁶ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?" 869-870.

⁶⁷ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?" 870.

With regard to the issue of norms, contrary to the rationalist view that ‘states exactly know what their interests are’, constructivists maintain that states’ behaviors and preferences are circumscribed by social normative structures.⁶⁸ For rationalists, norms are either determined by the interests of states or are granted by a ‘relative autonomy’.⁶⁹ This is another reductionist understanding which treats norms as epiphenomenal, functional vehicles that realize the interests of states. It holds that even if “norms constrain states in the short run, they are ultimately created by states and for states to maximize their long-run power interests”.⁷⁰ Contrary to this rationalist perspective, constructivists attach to norms a more independent role in shaping the interests and identities of power actors.⁷¹ Constructivism regards norms as having constitutive characteristics, rather than just regulating the conduct of policy.

The distinction between constitutive and regulative norms deserves additional emphasis in explaining the differences between rationalist theories and constructivism. Hobson states that neoliberal institutionalism sees norms as only regulating state behavior, rather than constituting it.⁷² According to this argument, neoliberal institutionalists take state preferences as given and constant, thus norms can only adjust policies for the accurate and proper implementation of interests. For constructivists, on

⁶⁸ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146.

⁶⁹ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146-147.

⁷⁰ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146-147.

⁷¹ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 147.

⁷² Hobson, The State and International Relations, 147.

the other hand, norms have a constitutive effect that do not simply regulate behavior, but “help to constitute the very actors...whose conduct they seek to regulate”.⁷³

Like Hobson, Ruggie states that neo-utilitarianism lacks any concept of constitutive rules.⁷⁴ He notes that,

[Neo-utilitarianism's] universe of discourse consists entirely of antecedently existing actors and their behaviour, and its project is to explain the character and efficacy of regulative rules in coordinating them....[thus, neo-utilitarian accounts] are capable of explaining the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of international relations....All are assumed to exist already or are misspecified.⁷⁵

In the same manner with Hobson's argument, Ruggie holds that constitutive rules are the institutional basis for social life and international politics. As he says, “[s]ome constitutive rules, like exclusive territoriality, are so deeply sedimented or reified that actors no longer think of them as rules at all”.⁷⁶ For him, geographical representations of the world are not material ‘facts’ that are readily given by nature, but are intersubjective conceptualizations of humans. To develop his point, Ruggie argues that ‘exclusive territoriality’ is not just “a brute physical act such as seizing a piece of land” and designating where one territory ends and another begins.⁷⁷ Rather, it is a social practice that depends on collective intentionality, namely the collectively shared meanings attached to this conceptualization.⁷⁸ As Hobson notes, the core difference between rationalism and constructivism has to do with the “degree of autonomy [these] theories ascribe to

⁷³ Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, 147.

⁷⁴ It should be noted that Ruggie uses the term ‘rules’ in the same manner with Hobson’s ‘norms’.

⁷⁵ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 871.

⁷⁶ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 873.

⁷⁷ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 873.

⁷⁸ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 873.

norms”.⁷⁹ In the final analysis, constructivism grants much higher levels of autonomy to norms (or rules) and ideas than rationalist theories.

A further issue constructivists attempt to explain is transformation in international relations. They argue that neo-utilitarian models fail to explain systemic transformation in world politics. Ruggie states that neorealists have two arguments on transformation. The first argument asserts that no theory of transformation is necessary, since the nature of international politics is stable; we witness only repetitions in states’ behaviors and preferences. The second neorealist argument maintains that there is no need for a theory of transformation since decisive transformations are not experienced in the world today.⁸⁰ One of constructivism’s strengths is observed here. Contrary to these neorealist arguments, constructivists argue that the dynamic nature of social construction allows for accounts of transformation in the international system. Constructivists, through “historicizing the concept of structure in international politics, that is to say, rescuing it from being treated as the reified residue left behind by long-ceased historical processes”,⁸¹ have added a new dimension to IR theory. The novelty of the constructivist project is that, it treats structures as ever-changing entities, being contingent on time, space and social practices, thus rendering change possible.

Neorealist theory, on the other hand, provides no explanation for change in international relations. Rey Kaslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil develop a constructivist

⁷⁹ Hobson, The State and International Relations, 146.

⁸⁰ To better elaborate this point, Ruggie presents a neorealist argument that there is no transformative difference between Medieval Europe and the modern system of states since “the conflict groups, striving for advantage, forging alliances, and using force to settle disputes existed in both and were not visibly

account on systemic change.⁸² For the authors, it is misleading to conceive international politics as consisting of ‘immutable’ power structures that are established on “distributions of tangible resources”.⁸³ Rather, they regard these structures as human constructions that are established through ‘routinized practices’, which are regulated by norms.⁸⁴ Thus, change in these systems is possible due to changes in routinized behavior and norms, rather than a change in material conditions and power distributions.⁸⁵ For Kaslowski and Kratochwil, what induces change in international politics is the transformation in shared understandings. They argue that one must focus on the changes in routinized practices and the shared meaning system in order to provide an account of change.

2.5 Conclusion

Constructivism develops a sociological account of International Relations and introduces an alternative perspective to mainstream theories. Developing a theory that focuses on the social, ideational and intersubjective aspects of international politics, it brings a new dimension to the discipline. Constructivism views identities and interests, as well as institutions and structures as the product of meaningful interaction, interpretation and practice. It takes issue with the traditional accounts that take identities and interests as fixed, given and stable entities. Instead, constructivism holds that they are shaped through

affected by whatever common norms Medieval Christendom may have embodied.” Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 874.

⁸¹ Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” 875.

⁸² Rey Kaslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” *International Organization* 48:2 (1994): 215.

⁸³ Kaslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics,” 216,222.

⁸⁴ Kaslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics,” 222.

processes of social interaction that are bound to change. Constructivism deals with the sociological construction of subjects and objects and the “sociohistorical conditions under which language, meaning and social power interact”.⁸⁶ In the final analysis, constructivists’ basic concern is to uncover the interaction between social and material elements of domestic and international politics, which constitute the rules structuring international order and lead to systemic change.

An additional reason to take constructivism seriously in IR theory is demonstrated by Wæver, who argues that: “[constructivism] has a large, almost unlimited potential for integrating other theories within it: all kind of structures, units or mechanisms can be tolerated as long as they are seen as ‘socially constructed’”.⁸⁷ Indeed, constructivism has widened the horizons of IR theory by bringing social theory into international relations, and making possible the shift from an individualist, agent-centered approach to a more structural understanding of IR, encompassing ideational as well as material factors. Consequently, constructivism’s explanatory power stems from the fact that it sees the reality of history, politics and identity to be generated within a particular cultural environment, and that things could be otherwise.

To consider constructivist approaches in more detail, it should be analyzed in association with the concept of identity; one of the central issues constructivism tries to apprehend. This not only has the benefit of situating this thesis within a broader context

⁸⁵ Kaslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics,” 222,223.

⁸⁶ Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smith, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” in *International Relations : Critical Concepts in Political Science* Andrew Linklater ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000),1792.

⁸⁷ Ole Wæver, “Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead of Paradigms,” in *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver eds. (London: Routledge, 1997), 25.

in International Relations. It also points to a key element this thesis discusses, namely the concept of identity, the concept's application to states, and its association with foreign policy practices. These issues are examined in detail in the following chapters. The effort to explore the social construction of identity and to employ it as an analytical concept in studies of foreign policy in general and in Turkish foreign policy in particular has the potential to open new horizons in the discipline of IR.

CHAPTER III: IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

3.1 Introduction

IR theory, as well as social theory in general, has witnessed the ‘return’ of culture and identity in the aftermath of the Cold War.⁸⁸ The growing usage of the concept identity has become evident in post-Cold War IR theorizing both in mainstream approaches—that used to marginalize these concepts—and in critical accounts. Although identity was regarded as a “soft concept suitable for novelists and sociologists”⁸⁹ prior to the 1990s, it became a major area of interest for those studying international politics after the Cold War. Yosef Lapid suggests two reasons for this transition.⁹⁰ The first is the global changes, namely the separatist nationalist movements that demanded scholarly explanations based on cultural accounts. The second reason is the changes experienced within the IR community, which extended the theoretical and empirical horizons of its students.

Identity is not a newly discovered ‘fact’ about international relations, but a concept that has always been present in world politics. Lapid defines the rising interest in culture and identity after the end of the Cold War as a ‘return’ in IR theory since it is not

⁸⁸ Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3-5.

⁸⁹ Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69.

the first time these concepts are used in the discipline.⁹¹ For him, there have always been place for such concepts, however through different perspectives. Lapid maintains that culture and identity are not newly discovered facts about international politics, but are ever-existing phenomena that are viewed and studied in a new way. The problem at hand this time is the ‘tension’ between the essentialist views of identity—treating the concept as self-evident and unproblematic—and the critical approaches that view identity as ‘constructed’, ‘contested’, ‘polymorphic’, and ‘interactive’.⁹²

Drawing upon the sentence “[w]e see things not as they are, but as we are”⁹³ (an account pointing to the differences between positivist and post-positivist perspectives) this chapter is based on a constructivist conception of identity; which assumes that identity should be conceived as dynamic and transforming over time rather than static and complete. This chapter deals with the problem of identity as a historically bound concept established within a particular field of social values and forms of behavior. The major aim is to present identities as powerful and constitutive forces in world politics that are socially constructed. How cultural, social, gendered, political and other identities are formed and accommodated is the underlying theme of the chapter. It focuses on the representations of identities to provide a comprehensive account of their social construction. Offering a constructivist approach to identity, this chapter provides a theoretical framework for studying identity in IR.

⁹⁰ Lapid, “Culture’s Ship,” 4.

⁹¹ Lapid, “Culture’s Ship”, 5.

⁹² Lapid, “Culture’s Ship”, 8.

⁹³ Ken Booth, “Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,” in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams eds (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 88.

The chapter begins by addressing the essentialist and constructivist perspectives of identity formation. It purports to present the major differences between the two approaches on identity. In the following section, constructivist accounts of identity are introduced. This section goes beyond the mainstream accounts of identity, which attribute any identity essential qualities and take them for granted. It focuses on four kinds of identity—personal, type, role and collective—introduced by Alexander Wendt, as they provide a comprehensive account of many aspects of identity formation. This section consists of three parts. First, the question of self/other is addressed as a useful way to study the social construction of identities. Second, the social construction of boundaries between social groups is explored. Finally, building upon the argument that states are identity-bearing entities, the concept of state identity is examined.

3.2 Main Approaches to Identity Formation in IR: Essentialism *versus* Constructivism

Identity can take many forms: racial, ethnic, class, gender, religious, age, income, societal and so on. It has been for the most part ethnic or racial identity that the discipline of International Relations has dealt with. Since culture and identity are broad and complex concepts, it will be difficult to handle the problems of collective and state identity without specifying what is meant by identity. Considering that studying identity is a multidisciplinary effort and that there is “no one methodology for cultural studies”,⁹⁴ diverse perspectives of different scholars may have explanatory power at different

junctures. To this end, prominent constructivist scholars' arguments on identity construction are presented below.

Alexander Wendt argues that “[i]dentities refer to who or what actors *are*”.⁹⁵ For him, “to have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation”.⁹⁶ To elaborate on what is meant by identity one should focus on the main approaches to identity formation in International Relations. Analyzing identity formation with reference to the differences between essentialist and constructivist approaches is a fruitful way of understanding the constructivist account of identity.

Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe state that the three main paradigms of International Relations—Realism, Pluralism and Structuralism/Globalism—are “theoretically and epistemologically [too] constrained” to deal with questions of identity.⁹⁷ As they note, “realists are far too committed to states and military-political affairs; pluralists are far too committed to the empirical nature of transnational processes; structuralists/globalists are far too committed to economics and classes”⁹⁸ to handle issues of identity. The problem with these paradigms is that they view the world as ‘distinct bits of reality’ and as unproblematic.⁹⁹

Traditional approaches treat theory as a tool “either to explain or to understand these pieces of reality, with the added possibility of predicting future international

⁹⁴ R.L. Jepperson and A. Swindler, “What Properties of Culture Should We Measure,” *Poetics* 22:368 (1994): 368, cited in Lapid, “Culture’s Ship,” 11.

⁹⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 231. Emphasis original.

⁹⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 170.

⁹⁷ Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, “Questions About Identity in International Relations,” in *International Relations Theory Today* Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 298.

⁹⁸ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 297.

events”.¹⁰⁰ Such an understanding leads the realist/positivist perspective to take some events as ‘central’ and ‘important’, whereas seeing others as ‘specific’, ‘local’ or ‘irrelevant’. Identity has been treated as the latter in studies of International Relations. Post-positivist theories on the other hand, consider identity as one of the central issues of IR.

In view of the perspective presented above, a basic distinction regarding different approaches to identity formation can be made between essentialist and constructivist accounts. Briefly, essentialists view identities as flowing from a cultural raw material and as fixed. On the contrary, constructivists dispute this essentialist linkage and hold that identities are formed through a political process involving the manipulation of cultural symbols.¹⁰¹

According to the essentialist approach, the basis of an identity is its ethnic core that is given by cultural heritage. Although the degree to which essentialist perspectives adopt primordial assumptions may vary, all share the basic idea that identity formation is mobilized chiefly by ‘cultural background variables’,¹⁰² and that identities remain static through time. The constructivist account, on the other hand, is explained by Lars-Erik Cederman as follows:

Since cultural systems are inherently multidimensional, history does not deliver ready-made packages such as ethnic cores. Instead, it is up to the political activist to select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilized or suppressed.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 297.

¹⁰⁰ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 298.

¹⁰¹ Lars-Erik Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” in Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension, Lars-Erik Cederman ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 10.

¹⁰² Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 10.

¹⁰³ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 11.

Accordingly, a particular identity is viewed as a matter of political choice, rather than a fixed entity standing 'out-there' waiting to be illuminated. The more a chosen identity is articulated and thus circulated around political circles, the more viable it becomes.¹⁰⁴

Using constructivist methods, David Campbell depicts identity as an "inescapable dimension of being".¹⁰⁵ He takes issue with the essentialist accounts of identity, viewing it as being fixed by nature, and having ahistoric qualities. He criticizes the views ascribing an intrinsic dimension to identity such as those that view democracy as an intrinsic characteristic of the United States.¹⁰⁶ Campbell considers this argument as reductionist, for it regards particular features of states as inherent, and sees a highly contestable concept such as democracy as an intrinsic quality.¹⁰⁷

To sum up, constructivists take issue with the one-way causal logic and the givenness of identity in essentialist accounts. Instead, they emphasize the importance of political processes in mobilizing identities, point to the mutual relationship between identity and interests and stress the malleability of identity. In this way, constructivism induces us to think these concepts of international politics through critical lenses, not to treat them as ever-existing and unchanging phenomena, but to observe the political motives behind their construction.

¹⁰⁴According to—what Cederman calls—'instrumentalist constructivism', the causal relationship adopted in the essentialist approach follows just the opposite route. This is to say, the point of departure for instrumentalist constructivists is the political motives inducing identity formation, rather than cultural traits. Regarding culture as a side effect of the process, constructivists emphasize the autonomy of political factors. Cederman, "Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs," 11-12.

¹⁰⁵David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* 2nd rev.ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9.

¹⁰⁶An idea presented in Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security" in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Peter J. Katzenstein ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 59.

3.3 Constructivist Accounts of Identity

It would be appropriate to begin with Alexander Wendt to present the constructivist approaches to identity formation. Wendt provides a highly developed account of the social construction of identities in his book Social Theory of International Politics.¹⁰⁸ He argues that in the philosophical sense “an identity is whatever makes a thing what it is”, and that “it [is]...a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions”.¹⁰⁹ Wendt argues that identities are not constituted only through internal dynamics, namely the ‘self-understandings’ of actors. If an identity is said to have an intersubjective quality, then other actors’ representations of the actor in question should also be taken into consideration.¹¹⁰ That is, the identity of any actor is meaningful only if others also share it. Wendt identifies four kinds of identity through which he categorizes particular social groups and characteristics: Personal or corporate, type, role and collective.

1. Personal—or in organizations corporate—identities are identities ascribed to agents, and thus to states. A personal or corporate identity has two major characteristics, the material quality (the body for human beings and territory for states) and consciousness, or memory.¹¹¹ In the case of states, the latter corresponds to the collective identity of individuals, who have a ‘joint narrative of themselves’ as members

¹⁰⁷ Campbell, Writing Security, 279.

¹⁰⁸ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. See especially 224-233 and 318-369.

¹⁰⁹ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 224.

¹¹⁰ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 224.

¹¹¹ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 225.

of a group that leads to the formation of a corporate identity.¹¹² For Wendt, “[t]he state is a group-Self, capable of group-level cognition”.¹¹³ He views personal corporate identity as possessing certain essential properties, which are “constitutionally exogenous to Otherness”.¹¹⁴

This essentialist claim is highly problematic, since Wendt aims at developing a constructivist account of identity. Making a one to one correspondence with the human body and the state ‘body’, and arguing that the existence of a corporate identity is ‘exogenous to Otherness’, Wendt views states as ‘self-organizing’ actors having existence independent of other states. However, if the narratives and memories of individuals are seen as the constitutive effect behind the corporate identity of a state, than the content and constitutive effects of such narratives on identity should also be problematized. In the final analysis, narratives are the tales of victory and glory for nations who have defeated ‘other’ nations. Although Wendt treats identity as a central concept of his analysis, his way of conceptualizing identity by ascribing to it essentialist qualities endangers his constructivism.

2. Type Identity is a social category referring to the commonalities between actors in “appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills...knowledge, opinions, experience...and so on”.¹¹⁵ An important feature of a type identity is its social content that is established by ‘formal membership rules’.¹¹⁶ These rules change culturally and

¹¹² Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 225.

¹¹³ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 225.

¹¹⁴ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 225.

¹¹⁵ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 225.

¹¹⁶ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 226.

historically, define the type identity and “orient the behavior of Others toward it”.¹¹⁷ Type identities are viewed as ‘intrinsic’ to actors, individual possessions that are transformed into ‘social types’ by including others in their constitution. Thus, Wendt attributes the ‘self-organizing’ and essential qualities of personal and corporate identities to type identities as well.

3. Role Identities, unlike type identities, do not have intrinsic qualities and are formed in relation to others.¹¹⁸ Role identities can only be acquired through social interaction “by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms toward others possessing relevant counter-identities”.¹¹⁹ For Wendt, what defines a role is the interdependence (or intimacy) between the self and the other. “When intimacy is high...role identities might not be just a matter of choice that can be easily discorded, but positions forced on actors by the representations of significant others”.¹²⁰ Accordingly, a state encounters a structural restraint of abandoning its role, since the other resists to see the self in another identity.

Making use of Peter Berger’s views, Ken Booth focuses on role theory as well, since he sees it as central to questions about identity. Berger defines a role as “a typified response to a typical expectation”.¹²¹ Booth interprets this formulation as such: “society provides the script, individuals slip into assigned roles, and the social play proceeds as

¹¹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 226.

¹¹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227.

¹¹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227.

¹²⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 228.

¹²¹ Peter L. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology: A humanistic Perspective* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1966), 140, cited in Booth, “Security and Self,” 88.

planned as long as everybody plays his or her appropriate part”.¹²² In this way, the roles of an actor are shaped by the expectations of other actors, which in turn form and regulate patterns of action. As to the role-identity nexus, Booth states that every role has an identity; some of which “are trivial and temporary, others are not.”¹²³ Drawing on this idea, Booth finds it difficult to change identity, since such a change would lead to the loss of ‘identity-bearing bonuses’ acquired through the roles that identity plays.¹²⁴

4. Collective Identity, for Wendt, is the last phase in the mutually constitutive relationship between self and other, which is defined as ‘identification’. Identification is a cognitive process in which the self is defined with the other. In this way, the boundaries of identification are extended where the self is defined not in opposition to, but along with the other.¹²⁵ Identifying the self in the same terms with the other leads to the construction of a collective identity.

Wendt also introduces the impact of role and type identities in the constitution of collective identities. Like role identity, collective identity “incorporates the Other into the Self”, but different from role identity, collective identity transforms this group into a single identity.¹²⁶ And like type identities, a collective identity contains shared features of the self and the other.¹²⁷ In other words, a collective identity is a combination of role and type identities, through which actors see the ‘welfare’ of the other together with its own,

¹²² Booth, “Security and Self,” 88.

¹²³ Booth, “Security and Self,” 89.

¹²⁴ Booth, “Security and Self,” 89.

¹²⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 229

¹²⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 229.

¹²⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 229.

and thus “calculate their interests in the group”.¹²⁸ Although Wendt’s four types of identity have certain shortcomings as presented above, they provide us with a useful guide to understand different aspects of identity formation. Wendt’s constructivist account on the formation of role and collective identities is of great merit in the analyses presented in the following chapters.

3.3.1 The Question of Self/Other

Examining the self-other nexus is an important component of constructivist research on identity, since social categories are defined in contrast to one another; “we are what we are because *they* are not what we are”.¹²⁹ The boundaries between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ or ‘we’ and ‘them’ are drawn following a differentiation between the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’. As it is stated in social psychology, “[t]he insiders in the we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, an industry, to each other”, whereas all others, with reference to the self’s measures, are downgraded.¹³⁰

Wendt assumes two actors, ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, to explain the mutual interaction process between self and other in identity formation. Ego and Alter are assumed to be actors present in a world without shared ideas and meeting in the ‘First Encounter’, which means they have no prior contact.¹³¹ In the first encounter, Ego and Alter have freedom to choose among various representations of self, which is called ‘role taking’. In

¹²⁸ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 229.

¹²⁹ Marilyn B. Brewer and William D. Crano, Social Psychology (Minneapolis: West Publishing Company, 1994), 449. Emphasis original.

¹³⁰ Brewer and Crano, Social Psychology, 44.

¹³¹ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 328.

this assumption, the particular 'role identity' of Ego is formed in relation to Alter's 'counter-role'.¹³² In the case that representations of Ego are shared by Alter, the First Encounter phase is transcended through the interaction process and shared knowledge.¹³³ From this point on, the relationship between Alter and Ego is one of a 'self-fulfilling prophecy':

[B]y treating the other as if he is supposed to respond in a certain way, Alter and Ego will eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions.¹³⁴

In other words, as Alter and Ego come to share the ideas about who they are, they adapt to the representations of self and other. As they gather new information about each other, they will revise their existing definitions of the situation.

Wendt also notes that Ego's ideas about Alter are not only the perceptions of Ego, "but actively and on-goingly constitutive of Alter's role *vis-à-vis* Ego".¹³⁵ Accordingly, role identities are not just the meanings accorded by actors to themselves, but are also identities that become realized through the interaction process between self and other and eventually the other's acceptance of the self's role-identity. It is the shared understandings developed through social contact that constitutes identity and makes it meaningful.

Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney criticize Wendt's 'Alter/Ego' model. They argue that Wendt's approach produces no account of actors prior to their interaction with others. They take issue with the argument that "states do not have a conception of self

¹³² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 329.

¹³³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 329-331.

¹³⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 331.

and other...apart from or prior to interaction”¹³⁶ (an idea presented above in the Ego-Alter relationship). For Inayatullah and Blaney, Wendt ignores the “motivations, ideas, purposes, intentions, and images actors bring to contact”.¹³⁷ In contrast to Wendt, Inayatullah and Blaney argue that actors are not ‘blank states’-having no idea of the other prior to contact, but are oriented towards acting in particular ways before interaction.¹³⁸

By way of illustration, Inayatullah and Blaney make use of Tzvetan Todorov’s study about the ‘conquest’ of America. According to Todorov, before his actual contact with Americans, Colombus had a particular notion of them gained through what he read in the Bible and other texts. Drawing upon this argument, Inayatullah and Blaney argue that states, as well as other actors, are driven by their particular ideas and preconceptions in their contact with other states. As Todorov states “the other is discovered but never seen”.¹³⁹ This means that even before actual contact, states are inclined to behave in particular ways toward the ‘others’.

Bill McSweeney’s account seems relevant at this juncture. He argues that, differentiating two persons, groups or collectivities, presupposes them being defined in the same terms in the first instance. Two actors, for example, are defined in the same terms before contact, but construct their differences after contact. He states that, “we could not divide into family groups, regional groups, ethnic and national groups unless

¹³⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 335.

¹³⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46:2 (1993): 401.

¹³⁷ Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, “Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory,” in *The Return of Culture*, 73.

¹³⁸ Inayatullah and Blaney, “Knowing Encounters,” 73.

¹³⁹ Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (NY: Harper and Row, 1984); quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, “Knowing Encounters,” 73.

we first shared a sense of common identity”.¹⁴⁰ He argues that identity conflicts should be problematized starting from this common identity. As McSweeney states, “the fracture of common identity into self and other...is a second order accomplishment, achieved by virtue of the fundamental sense of sameness”.¹⁴¹ Thus, the differences between two actors that turn them into self and other presuppose, in the first instance, their ‘sameness’, which is the first order accomplishment. Then, their differentiation as the self and the other becomes a second order accomplishment. This idea contradicts Wendt’s account of the differentiation process between the self and the other, which depicts their construction process as a first order accomplishment. To put it in other words, for McSweeney, it is the contact of two actors that turns them into self and other. The self and the other are defined in the same terms before contact, but they find out their differences and begin to define themselves in opposition to one another after contact.

Inayatullah and Blaney ask the question ‘what motivates us to seek others’¹⁴² in an attempt to problematize the ‘other’ as a constitutive element of the ‘self’. According to this argument, our search for an ‘other’ or an ‘alien’ is driven by two incentives. The first is a “desire for confirmation of the worldview that constitutes our self and our culture” asking for “validation that our vision is indeed correct, universal and valuable”.¹⁴³ The second is a sense of suspicion that we are incomplete as to our worldview or our culture. Thus, we search for the ‘other’ to make us complete.¹⁴⁴ In this

¹⁴⁰ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 157.

¹⁴¹ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 157.

¹⁴² Inayatullah and Blaney, “Knowing Encounters,” 65.

¹⁴³ Inayatullah and Blaney, “Knowing Encounters,” 65.

¹⁴⁴ Inayatullah and Blaney, “Knowing Encounters,” 65-66.

sense, the discovery of the other is not incidental but essential for the self's existence and wholeness:

It is within ...[the] space of differences and commonalities that cultural interactions occur....While commonalities may make communication possible, it is the different voices and visions present in the other that make dialogue necessary and valuable. It is by finding links between the 'different levels and parts' of various cultures...that a cultural dialogue can most usefully be established.¹⁴⁵

For Nizar Messari the construction of the other is not realized only through negative differences and antagonism, but also through 'approximation'.¹⁴⁶ In this regard, there are two groups of others, allies and enemies. What Messari calls 'national political identity' is produced and reproduced after contact with allies that create the positive identification of the self, and after contact with enemies that follows a negative identification.¹⁴⁷ Through the contact between the self and its enemy, identity is strengthened by way of specifying "what identity is not", whereas interaction with allies bolsters self's identity through "affirming the links and characteristics that make that specific other an ally".¹⁴⁸

As argued above, studying the self-other relationship is an important component of the constructivist research on identity. Analyzing the concept of identity with reference to the notions of 'self' and 'other' that are defined in contrast to each other is a useful way to understand the construction of social categories and social boundaries. The self/other opposition is established upon practices of inclusion and exclusion, which enables a differentiation between the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders'. Applying these notions

¹⁴⁵ Inayatullah and Blaney, "Knowing Encounters," 79.

¹⁴⁶ Nizar Messari, "Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Islam in US Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, Vendulka Kubalkova ed. (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2001), 227.

¹⁴⁷ Messari, "Identity and Foreign Policy," 227.

¹⁴⁸ Messari, "Identity and Foreign Policy," 227.

to studies of IR is of great merit in approaching interstate relations in a new way. Transcending the studies focusing on the relations among states with fixed, stable and unchanging identities, we can gain a perspective on how these identities were established in the first place. Such an approach is useful in understanding the construction of particular state identities through difference and antagonism, or approximation. Studying identity formation employing the notions of self and other enables us to examine how actors define their particular identities in opposition to 'others'. In this way, states' (as well as other social groups') positive identifications with their allies and their negative identifications with their enemies can be made clearer, which in turn constitutes their particular roles and identities.

3.3.2 The Boundary Question

Another way to study identity formation fruitfully is to take the boundary formation process between the self and other as a point of departure. Such an approach is of great merit for it enables us to examine it in the sphere of social interaction. What is of interest here is not the physical and economic borders, but the social boundaries between human collectivities.

Lars-Erik Cederman employs the notion of boundaries and how they are associated with the social construction of the notions 'inside' and 'outside' as an account of identity formation. Accordingly, social boundaries, mediating between social organizations inside and outside, play a role in shaping collectivities' notion of

selfhood.¹⁴⁹ Cederman presents a number of conceptualizations from diverse disciplines, such as sociology, social psychology, geography and anthropology to provide a comprehensive picture of the boundary question. In this way, he aims to problematize the ‘objectified’ identities of rationalist accounts.

Cederman makes use of Georg Simmel’s conflict hypothesis in order to present a sociological perspective on the issue. Connecting a group’s inside with its outside, the conflict hypothesis suggests that, “external conflict increases in-group cohesion”.¹⁵⁰ Cederman summarizes Simmel’s position as follows: “The boundary is not a spatial fact with social implications, but rather a sociological fact that forms spatially”.¹⁵¹ Simmel thus adopts a constructivist logic treating the ‘boundary’ as a social fact constructed through time and place.

Another sociological theory of the boundary question Cederman makes use of is Bernhard Giesen’s study on nationalism. For Giesen:

Boundaries separate and divide the actual multitude of interaction processes and social relations; they mark the distinction between inside and outside, between the foreign and the familiar, kin and alien, friend and foe, culture and nature, enlightenment and barbarism. Precisely because these boundaries are contingent social constructions that could have easily turned out differently, they require social justification and symbolic clarification.¹⁵²

Giesen, adopting a historical perspective, situates identity in process and social practices, rather than looking for generalizable accounts. He explores the “situational construction

¹⁴⁹ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 4.

¹⁵⁰ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 6.

¹⁵¹ Georg Simmel, Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die formen der Vergesellschaftung, (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1992), 697, quoted in Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 6, author’s translation.

of difference”.¹⁵³ For him, the boundaries underlying the differences between diverse identities are produced through social communication processes. Thus, these boundaries draw the demarcation lines of binary thinking, which are expressed as the dichotomies between ‘inside and outside’, between ‘the foreign and the familiar’, ‘kin and alien’, ‘friend and foe’, ‘culture and nature’, ‘enlightenment and barbarism’.

Political geography is another field that deals with the boundary question. The concept ‘spatial socialization’ is introduced by Anssi Paasi to present boundaries as political issues rather than “static geographic compartmentalizations”.¹⁵⁴ Spatial socialization is defined as a process of socialization for individual actors and collectivities, through which they become “members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities” and develop their collective territorial identities.¹⁵⁵ Boundaries play an exclusionary role not only by separating diverse groups from each other, but also triggering the process of inclusion and bringing about in-group cohesion by regulating inter-group communication.

In sum, employing the notion of social boundaries, the disciplinary accounts presented in Cederman’s work provide an explanation for the social construction of identities. Identity formation is regarded as a “dualistic process involving the manipulation of boundaries and the manipulation of difference for strategies of inclusion and exclusion”.¹⁵⁶ These different perspectives hold in common that identities are

¹⁵² Bernhard Giesen, *Die Intellektuellen und die Nation: Eine Deutsche Achsenzeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 30, quoted in Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 7, author’s translation.

¹⁵³ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 7.

¹⁵⁴ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 8.

¹⁵⁵ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 8.

¹⁵⁶ Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” 9.

categorized through the boundaries enabling the in-group communication process and excluding the environment of differences.

3.3.3 State Identity

The concept of 'state identity' constitutes an important component of the constructivist research agenda. Applying the analysis on identity to states, this part considers 'state identity' as referring to the category of states. The basic argument is that particular characteristics and social categories are attributed to states as well as individuals and social groups. Thus, a state's identity refers to its distinguishing features that render it different from other states.

David Campbell, who takes an opposing view of the arguments that define identity as having a prediscursive, naturalized and unproblematic essence, provides an alternative account on state identity.¹⁵⁷ He argues that like gender, the state is formed through a 'performative' constitution. Campbell's main argument is that, the 'ontological status' of any state cannot be understood independent of the "various acts, which constitute its reality."¹⁵⁸ The discursive acts of policymakers speaking in the name of the state and the 'stylized repetition' of these acts should be taken into consideration in order to provide an account of the construction of state identity.¹⁵⁹

Campbell develops his argument by making use of the 'society of normalization', a concept introduced by Michel Foucault. For Campbell, identity is sustained by the

¹⁵⁷ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9.

¹⁵⁸ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.

¹⁵⁹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.

‘society of normalization’.¹⁶⁰ A ‘society of normalization’ is defined as a process of legitimation through which certain ‘dispositions’ and ‘orientations’ are adopted. This is not a process of the “enforcement of a rule”, but a process of the “imposition of a rule”.¹⁶¹ Hence, state identity can be understood as an identity ‘achieved’ through the repetition of norms, rather than an identity ‘ascribed’ as a foundational quality. States are viewed as unfinished entities, always in a process of reproduction.

A different perspective on state identity is developed by feminist theories. Ann Tickner demonstrates the “gendered identities of states and their relationship to exterior others” and applies this theory to international relations.¹⁶² Attributes of states such as ‘independent’, ‘strong’, and ‘autonomous’ are also characteristics of the sovereign man, developed by the realist perspective.¹⁶³ On the other hand, devalued attributes have an association with feminine characteristics and are depicted as “naïve, unrealistic, irrational”.¹⁶⁴ Thus, just as the sovereign man’s construction of its identity in opposition to the female other, “the state secures its identity through its relationship to identities of devalued and dangerous others”.¹⁶⁵ The Western ‘civilized’ state system, for example, has constructed its ‘uncivilized’ and ‘dangerous’ others since its establishment.¹⁶⁶ Tickner

¹⁶⁰ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Writings and Other Interviews 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 106-107; cited in Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.

¹⁶¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10.

¹⁶² J. Ann Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives,” in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 148.

¹⁶³ Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory,” 151.

¹⁶⁴ Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory,” 151.

¹⁶⁵ Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory,” 151.

¹⁶⁶ Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory,” 156.

argues that such gendered images are still prevalent in world politics, particularly in Western states' portrayals of the South. She writes:

[d]ichotomies, such as modern/traditional, rational/irrational, dynamic/static, and progressive/backward evoke the dyadic characteristics of sovereign man and the female 'other', whose identity is constructed in relation to but inferior to the masculine norm.¹⁶⁷

The portrayal of the North as a 'zone of peace', and the South as a 'zone of turmoil' is an example of this dichotomous construction. Underdevelopment, instability and conflict appear as a part of Southern states' common identity since they have not reached the North's level of development. To sum up, feminists argue that all constructions of identity and difference are gendered, which is also used as a means of constructing particular state identities. National identities are constructed by differentiating the valued ones from the devalued, thus establishing social and cultural hierarchies and justifying expansionist policies, which create the source of insecurities.¹⁶⁸

A similar perspective on state identity is developed by Joan Cocks, who considers state identity to be affected by the regime of 'masculine/feminine', an argument adopted by Campbell. Campbell draws a parallel between 'the body' and the state, since the state is seen as a 'sexed body'.¹⁶⁹ Both the human body and the state are produced by means of the masculine/feminine dichotomy where the former is a dominant, superior and desirable identity, whereas the latter is viewed as inferior and as a deviation of the former.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Tickner, "Identity in International Relations Theory," 158.

¹⁶⁸ Tickner, "Identity in International Relations Theory," 158.

¹⁶⁹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 232.

¹⁷⁰ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 10-11.

Campbell argues that the identity of any state is constructed with 'prior codes of gender', which eventually become norms conducting behavior.¹⁷¹

As to Wendt's account on the issue, he maintains, "states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality".¹⁷² As presented before, Wendt argues that states possess corporate, type, role and collective identities at different junctures.¹⁷³ States possess type identities, as they are categorized according to 'regime types' or 'forms of state'.¹⁷⁴ In this way, states are categorized as 'capitalist', 'fascist', 'monarchial' and etc. He adds, however, "not all shared characteristics become type identities".¹⁷⁵ As an example, he puts forth that two states' having parliamentary systems does not make them alike, and two states with parliamentary and presidential systems may have the same type identity, as both are democratic.¹⁷⁶

McSweeney considers state identity in its inner and outer dimensions, the former referring to 'societal identity' and the latter to 'state identity'. On that account, state identity is constructed through two layers: through the interaction with other states (outer dimension) and the interaction among people comprising the domestic realm (inner dimension).¹⁷⁷ By means of the international negotiating process with other states, a state learns and constructs its outer dimension (state identity). In the domestic interaction process, on the other hand, the state manipulates its resources to ensure that societal

¹⁷¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 11.

¹⁷² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 197.

¹⁷³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224-233.

¹⁷⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 226.

¹⁷⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 226.

identity is consistent with state identity.¹⁷⁶ Thus, McSweeney explains state identity formation in these two dimensions. Just to focus on the outer dimension of identity formation is, for McSweeney, to disregard the domestic layer or societal identity, which provides the legitimacy necessary for the conduct of foreign policy. Merely to emphasize the societal identity, on the other hand, leads us to ignore the “malleability of state identity through international negotiation and to imply...[that] state identity is fixed and unproblematic”.¹⁷⁹

3.4 Conclusion

The use of the concept identity extended in IR theorizing in the post-Cold War era. Constructivism is an approach that brings identity to the center of the study of international politics, rather than treating it as a soft concept like the rationalists regard it. Adopting a sociological conception of identity, constructivists denaturalize the concept to demonstrate that identity is not static and complete, but a dynamic notion transforming over time. In this way, constructivists take an interest in examining the social values and forms of behavior within which identities are constructed, because it is within these fields that identities acquire a meaning through social interaction.

As stated above, many characteristics of identity attributed to individuals and social groups can be ascribed to states as well. In this regard, state identity appears as a significant analytical tool in studying the particular characteristics of states ascribed by

¹⁷⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 226.

¹⁷⁷ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 160.

¹⁷⁸ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 160.

¹⁷⁹ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 161.

state elites through processes of policymaking. Thus, the identity of a state is what decision-making mechanisms portray as a 'self' and establish what the state is and what it is not, its distinguishing qualities, and its place in the world among various 'others'. When we consider that state identities are chosen, manipulated and mobilized by foreign policy elites, foreign policy becomes a mechanism for both constructing and representing a particular state identity. Foreign policies are formulated by elites' preferences and utility calculations. As such, foreign policy is a significant practice in choosing, establishing and maintaining a particular perspective on states' identities. In this regard, apart from the conventional understanding treating foreign policy as merely the diplomatic relations among states, we must analyze foreign policy as an identity constructing practice. To this end, the following chapter analyzes the construction of state identity by way of foreign policy representations. Adopting a constructivist perspective, it is argued that foreign policy is a representational practice that portrays a particular vision of the state and its international relations. In this way, foreign policy is studied as the mechanism through which the state (as the self) is constructed in opposition to various 'others' through practices of inclusion and exclusion.

CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN POLICY AS A BOUNDARY PRODUCING PRACTICE

4.1 Introduction

Studying foreign policy as a boundary producing practice, this chapter examines the construction of state identity by way of foreign policy representations. From a constructivist perspective, foreign policy is viewed as a matter of self-definition; a practice defining what we are and how we see others. The conventional approach takes states' foreign policies as either a function of the requirements of the international system or the conduct of a series of rational choices made by self-interested policy actors. Different from this understanding, this chapter argues that foreign policy is not only the conduct of diplomatic practices for the pursuit of well-defined interests of states, but also a practice constructing these states and their interests in the first place. In this way, foreign policy is introduced as a mechanism that reflects and contributes to changes in conceptions of state identity.¹⁸⁰

Drawing on the understanding that states are identity-bearing entities, this chapter introduces the significance of foreign policy practices in the construction of state identity. An analysis of the relationship between foreign policy and identity is rewarding. This

¹⁸⁰ For this argument see David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 2nd rev.ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations 2:3 (1996); and Weldes, "The Cultural Production of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba," in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, Jutta Weldes et al eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

chapter explores how the two concepts can effectively be associated. It analyzes how foreign policy elites represent their states' identities. The chapter deals with the questions 'how do elites categorize their states' identities and those of others', and 'what behaviors are deemed appropriate for each category'.

The study of discourse analysis becomes significant at this juncture. As stated in Chapter I, discourse is a specific way to talk about, understand and make meaning of the world.¹⁸¹ Through discursive practices, people represent a particular picture of what they think about their environment. Following the argument that "every practice has a corresponding discourse",¹⁸² this chapter examines foreign policy as a practice of policymakers that pictures particular aspects of world politics through particular lenses. Discourse analysis suggests looking at certain types of discourses associated with the construction of a particular identity. Elites create official languages destined to exclude identities that are deemed foreign to the self's identity, and include those that are regarded as part of 'us'. Particular types of representations are employed in foreign policy to portray the self and to distinguish it from the other. This chapter discusses how elites' shared understandings and representations shape the notions of the self and the other to construct a particular identity for the state. Discourse analysis is a useful tool in this

¹⁸¹ Marianne Winther Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, Diskurs Analyse som Teori og Metode (Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method) (Roskilde Universitetsforlag/Samfundslitteratur, 1999); cited in Trine Schreiber and Camilla Moring, "Codification of Knowledge Using Discourse Analysis," 4. Paper presented at Nordic Conference on Information and Documentation, Reykjavik: Iceland, May 30-June 1, 2001. Available from World Wide Web http://www.bokis.is/iod2001/papers/Schreiber_paper.doc. Accessed on 15.04.2002.

¹⁸² Senjoy Banerjee, "The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation: Contending Discourses in Late Colonial India," in Culture and Foreign Policy, Valerie Hudson ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 31.

regard, as its goal is to analyze actors' particular representations of identities and social relations.

4.2 The Role of Foreign Policy in the Construction of State Identity

As argued in the previous chapter, many characteristics of identity attributed to individuals and social groups can also be ascribed to states. Thus, state identity appears as a significant area of analysis in International Relations. The identity of a state is what particular decision-making mechanisms specify as 'self' and thus establish 'what the state is and what it is not'; its distinguishing qualities, and its place in the world among various 'others'. In this way, foreign policy becomes the mechanism for both constructing and representing state identity in international relations.

Bill McSweeney challenges the conventional understanding that takes foreign policy as unproblematic practices of states with fixed identities. He argues that identities attributed to states should be problematized as they are not standing 'out there' to be discovered. What is 'out there' for McSweeney is rather the

identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals, and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating, manipulating or affirming a response to the demand...for a collective image.¹⁸³

For McSweeney, one should look at the process through which state identity is articulated in order to analyze how it was constructed. It is the 'identity discourse' of a number of actors engaged in constituting a particular image for the state that constructs state identity.

David Campbell is another scholar offering an alternative understanding to foreign policy and identity. As stated before, for Campbell identity is formed in relation to difference, in a performative process having “no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation”.¹⁸⁴ Accordingly, the identity of each state is performatively constituted. Campbell argues that identities are constituted by means of boundaries serving as demarcation lines to separate ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, ‘self’ from ‘other’, and ‘domestic’ from ‘foreign’.¹⁸⁵ He states that identities are constructed in particular historical and “spatially defined locations” and in relation to otherness.¹⁸⁶ Thus, the politics of otherness, by inscribing boundaries between inside and outside, makes foreign policy possible.¹⁸⁷

Campbell retheorizes the conventional accounts, the roots of which can be found in Hobbes’ understanding of international politics. “The strategies of otherness” play an important role in Hobbes’ depicting international relations as a realm of anarchy, which Campbell employs to support his point:

The spaces of inside and outside serve to delineate the rational, ordered polity in which good, sane, sober, modest and civilized ‘man’ resides from the dangerous, chaotic, and anarchical realm in which the evil, mad, drunk, arrogant and savage people are found.¹⁸⁸

What follows from this statement in Campbell’s analysis is that, foreign policy is not the end result of an unproblematic state system or the relations among states, but is an

¹⁸³ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 78.

¹⁸⁴ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9.

¹⁸⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9.

¹⁸⁶ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 60.

¹⁸⁷ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 60.

¹⁸⁸ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 60.

‘integral’ part of state construction and international relations.¹⁸⁹ In this way, ‘man’, ‘state’ and ‘international relations’ are not entities having ontological priority over one another, but are ‘mutually constitutive’.¹⁹⁰ Campbell challenges those views that regard state identities as unproblematic and having prior existence to foreign policy. He maintains that it is foreign policy as a boundary establishing practice that constitutes the state and the international system, not the other way round.¹⁹¹ Thus, he takes issue with the accepted views that regard foreign policy as relations between states that are separated by “ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries”.¹⁹²

Campbell, in his analysis, views foreign policy as “boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of identity in whose name it operates”, rather than “the external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities”.¹⁹³ As such, he distinguishes between uppercase ‘Foreign Policy’ (the conventionally defined task of representing a country’s interests abroad), from lowercase ‘foreign policy’ (the process of constructing the broader context of identity and difference that informs Foreign Policy). Such an understanding adds another dimension to accounts on foreign policy. Accordingly, foreign policy is viewed not only as the “external orientation of preestablished states with secure identities”,¹⁹⁴ but also as the practice through which the boundaries between inside and outside are demarcated. In other words, the first understanding (foreign policy) corresponds to the construction of state identity through

¹⁸⁹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 60.

¹⁹⁰ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 60.

¹⁹¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 61.

¹⁹² Campbell, *Writing Security*, 61.

¹⁹³ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 62.

difference, whereas the second (Foreign Policy) is associated with the maintenance and reproduction of the identity through conventional diplomatic practices. Thus, 'foreign policy' constructs the 'inside' and the 'outside, the 'self' and the 'other' in the first place, through practices of inscribing exterior dangers, whereas 'Foreign Policy', conducted upon these representations, maintains and secures state identity through diplomacy.¹⁹⁵

McSweeney criticizes Campbell for his "implicit causal argument" that understands foreign policy as driven by state identity alone thus ignoring the role of interests in the identity formation process.¹⁹⁶ For McSweeney, Campbell neglects the role played by domestic interests in the formation of state identity and security policy. McSweeney emphasizes the crucial role played by interests in identity formation, viewing interests as the motivational factors in presenting particular situations as dangerous, and specific others as threats. McSweeney argues that bureaucratic and military interests influence greatly the cultural environment and the self-understandings of actors, which, in the end, have an impact on the formulations of state identity.¹⁹⁷

Another scholar giving foreign policy an autonomous role in the construction of state identity is Nizar Messari. Messari maintains that "[f]oreign policy is...an identity-making tool that erects boundaries between the self and the other, defining in the process what are national interests".¹⁹⁸ Arguing that identity is constructed upon the opposition between the self and the other, he views 'difference' as a prerequisite for identity to

¹⁹⁴ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 68.

¹⁹⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 62.

¹⁹⁶ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 129.

¹⁹⁷ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 130.

¹⁹⁸ Nizar Messari, "Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Islam in US Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, Vendulka Kubalkova ed. (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2001), 227.

exist.¹⁹⁹ Messari stresses the importance of specific representations of the world through foreign policy, namely the “practices of speech” in making meaningful the environment we live in, and permanently constructing and reconstructing our identity.

Different from Campbell (who holds that difference is converted into otherness in the identity formation process) Messari argues that this conversion is not realized unidimensionally, but has two faces: assimilation and otherness.²⁰⁰ For Messari, identity is either assimilated or transformed into an other:

On the domestic stage, difference is maintained as if it were indifferent, that is, as the confirmation of identity only. On the...international stage, whenever identity is threatened, or has to be otherwise secured, there follows either the transformation of difference into otherness, or the assimilation of difference as a friend.²⁰¹

For Messari, the construction of identity is conducted through ‘alterity’. In this manner, the self might place itself either in an equal or superior position to the other. In cases where the other is inferior to the self, ‘politics of annihilation’ is likely to take place. Accordingly, through moral justifications, the self tries to keep the other in restraint. Messari writes: “Justifications of annihilation vary from ‘it was in self-defense’ to ‘it was necessary’ to ‘there existed a serious threat which now has been eliminated’”.²⁰² Thus, violence toward the other is legitimized through devaluing it and emphasizing the moral superiority of the self.

A further constructivist perspective examining the role of foreign policy practices in the construction of state identity is introduced by Michael Shapiro. Shapiro views

¹⁹⁹ Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 228.

²⁰⁰ Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 230.

²⁰¹ Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 230.

²⁰² Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 232.

foreign policy as a process producing the ‘foreign or exotic’ and, in this way, the other. He holds that foreign policy discourse is regulated by a geopolitical and historically developed representational practice, which is a way of constituting the other and downgrading it in a lesser moral space.²⁰³ Shapiro argues that the construction of the other is “not an innocent exercise in differentiation”, but a political practice that is “closely linked to how the self is understood”.²⁰⁴ The understanding of the different as the ‘other’ is a politically oriented practice and is value driven. In other words, considering who is different as part of ‘us’ or ‘them’ is realized through particular acts aiming at a particular end. Drawing upon this view, Shapiro states the results of the self/other classification as follows:

[A]ny other that is accorded the same status as the self...will be accorded the same prohibitions and restrictions from harm or interference as well as the same entitlements. However, to the extent that the other is regarded as something not occupying the same natural/moral space as the self, conduct toward the self becomes more exploitive.²⁰⁵

According to this argument, those deemed part of ‘us’ are elevated to the same level of the ‘self’, whereas those situated as ‘others’ are downgraded to a lesser moral space; a categorization that legitimizes exploitive behavior towards those particular ‘others’.

Building upon this understanding, Shapiro draws a parallel between foreign policy and gender policy. Both are regarded as practices of lowering the status of the other. He argues that

²⁰³ Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) 101-102.

²⁰⁴ Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, 101-102.

²⁰⁵ Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, 101, 102.

[g]ender policy, as it is practiced in everyday life is...foreign policy”, since it is the practice of making “strange something which one could instead identify or accord the status of another self with equal dignity and importance”.²⁰⁶

Thus, foreign policy is associated with gender policy that is based on drawing boundaries between differences and then according unfair roles to each side, rather than regarding them as equally important.

To sum up, foreign policy is the mechanism for both constructing and representing state identity in international relations. Transcending the conventional understanding that take foreign policy as unproblematic practices of states with fixed identities, it is argued that foreign policy is a performative process constructing the objects and subjects of policy conduct in the first place. It is maintained that state identity is performatively constituted through foreign policy practices that draw the boundaries between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, and the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’. Thus, it is through the politics of otherness/difference (inscribing the boundaries between the inside and the outside) that makes foreign policy possible.

4.3 Identity as a Discursive Construct

The study of identity formation is a crucial component of constructivist studies, and thus the role of language and discourse becomes significant. Discourse analysis constitutes a useful way of conducting constructivist research. As maintained in Chapters II and III, constructivism treats identity—whether individual or group—not as deriving from the ‘nature’ of the world, but as a situational and relational social construction. Identities are

²⁰⁶ Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*, 101.

not self-evident, natural or inevitable entities, but are the “products of deliberate calculation”.²⁰⁷ On that account, identities are constructed through discursive practices. To provide a thorough explanation of this issue, the role played by language in particular foreign policy representations should be discussed.

Rhetoric is important in constructivist studies, since it is speech-acts that constitute the basis of social relations. Iver Neumann criticizes the Foreign Policy Analysis literature for ignoring the study of language. He argues that the basic shortcoming of these studies is their understanding of language as an unproblematic means for transforming information among individuals. He holds that in order to understand social relations, language should be the ‘object of study’, since language is more than just a “vessel for the transformation of meaning”.²⁰⁸

Language, as Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe argue, is not only a naming device, but also a means of production. Language has the power to create meaning.²⁰⁹ The language used by defense intellectuals in representations of nuclear weapons and war, for example, “plays a central role in constructing part of strategic identity”.²¹⁰ Following Carol Cohn, Zalewski and Enloe maintain that the use of euphemisms and abstractions such as “clean bombs, surgical strikes...SRAMS (short range attack

²⁰⁷ Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, “Questions About Identity in International Relations,” in International Relations Theory Today Ken Booth and Steve Smith eds (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 288.

²⁰⁸ Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 8.

²⁰⁹ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 290.

²¹⁰ Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense,” Signs 12:4 (1987): 704; cited in Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 290.

missiles)” aims at camouflaging the destructive capacities of these weapons.²¹¹ Accordingly, strategists represent US nuclear defense policy in such a way that public support becomes possible. Thus is prepared the ground for the establishment of US strategic identity.

It is further argued by Zalewski and Enloe that strategic discourse is fundamentally gendered. The language of masculinity plays a central role in identity formation and war, which was the case in the Gulf War. By representing the United States as the ‘righteous protector of the world’, Iraq as an ‘evil destructive force’, and Kuwait as being ‘raped’, the positions of the respective states with regard to one another were depicted in a way to gather public support for the war.²¹² This is the politics of constructing a negative image of the ‘other’ “in favor of the self”.²¹³ In the final analysis, as Zalewski and Enloe argue, the Gulf War “took place against that image, against the representation of Iraq, not Iraq itself”.²¹⁴

Jutta Weldes is another scholar providing a constructivist account of the discursive production of identities and interests. She maintains that national interests are social constructions established by the representations of foreign policy decision-makers that work on behalf of the state.²¹⁵ These policy-makers portray particular representations for their state, for other states, and for the international system, “to make sense of

²¹¹ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 290.

²¹² Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 292.

²¹³ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 292.

²¹⁴ Zalewski and Enloe, “Questions About Identity,” 292.

²¹⁵ Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2:3 (1996): 280-281.

international relations” and to be able to “act in a particular situation they face”.²¹⁶ The self and the other are identified by their particular identities, such as ‘leader’, ‘aggressive’, ‘hostile’ and ‘peaceful’. Thus, “well-defined relations among” states are set up which help to draw the boundaries between the states that are part of ‘us’ and those that produce threats, and in this way are deemed part of ‘them’.²¹⁷ By establishing the identities of states in relation to one another and portraying their relations in particular ways, the guide for policy conduct is established.

Weldes further argues that meaning is produced through the connotations ascribed to linguistic elements that are already in use in a society. Representations of the world in particular ways becomes possible by the meanings attached to linguistic elements.²¹⁸ To illustrate her point, Weldes argues that the word ‘totalitarianism’ was used as a connotation of ‘expansionism’ and ‘aggression’ in US foreign policy discourse during the Cold War, mostly to picture the Soviets.²¹⁹ Weldes maintains that the world can be differently represented and constructed since

linguistic elements can be disarticulated and then rearticulated in different ways....Objects, actions, events and relations...do not simply present themselves to us in an unmediated or self-evident fashion. Instead, their meaning for us is created; it is produced by articulating different linguistic elements so as to create and render persuasive one particular description or set of associations and not another.²²⁰

According to Weldes, after specific relations are positioned in relation to one another in this way, individuals come to identify themselves with the subject positions that make

²¹⁶ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 281.

²¹⁷ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 282.

²¹⁸ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 284.

²¹⁹ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 284-285.

²²⁰ Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 286.

sense to them. Hence, not only the subject position of a state, but also the community in whose name it operates is created.²²¹

The basic features of a discourse are presented by Weldes and Diana Saco. The authors maintain that a discourse is both linguistic and intersubjective:

It is linguistic in that language is a central sign system that provides the resources out of which representations are constructed. It is intersubjective in that the language through which people construct meaning is necessarily shared.²²²

The intersubjectivity of a discourse is expressed by William Connolly as well. For Connolly, a shared language is the 'medium' through which "ideas, judgements, purposes, and emotions are constituted".²²³ According to this argument, intersubjectivity constructs the common ground by the agency of which people "share a range of criteria for making distinctions, picking out objects [and] reaching judgments".²²⁴

Weldes and Saco further state that a discourse is not merely a linguistic practice. They argue that it may also be non-linguistic. As to the non-linguistic aspects of the US discourse on the Cuban Missile Crisis²²⁵, they present practices such as "blockading an island, implementing an embargo, infiltrating cover action units, organizing a counter-revolutionary underground movement, and engaging in acts of economic and industrial

²²¹ Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," 288.

²²² Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, "Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of 'The Cuban Problem', 1960-1994," *Millenium* 25:2 (1996): 373.

²²³ William E. Connolly, *Appearance and Reality in Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 110, quoted in Weldes and Saco, "Making State Action Possible," 373.

²²⁴ Connolly, *Appearance and Reality*, 110.

²²⁵ The Cuban Missile Crisis, the reason of which was the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, constitutes one of the most important conflicts between the US and the USSR of the Cold War period. For a detailed analysis of the discursive construction of the Crisis see Weldes and Saco, "Making State Action Possible."

sabotage”.²²⁶ They regard these non-linguistic practices as having equal significance with linguistic ones in the construction of state identities.

Jonathan Bach is another scholar who attaches special importance to discourse. He argues that discourse has the power to create and sustain meaning in social relations. He views the discursive representations of events, situations and histories through narratives as central to national policy formation, since narratives define the subjects (individual or collective) in the international arena. Shared narratives are seen as the driving force behind collective subjectivity and the construction of identities.²²⁷

The study of narratives acquires further emphasis in Bach’s work. He sees a narrative as both constitutive of collective identity and the “context in which politics is played out”.²²⁸ According to him, “reality is a narrative experience” created through the language practices of policymakers.²²⁹ Language gives narratives and identities a direction. Formulated in a particular way, they establish ‘a coherent story’ which provides the ‘material base’ of a ‘salient identity’.²³⁰ In short, narratives play a crucial role in giving direction to and shaping a particular identity. So long as these narratives are perpetuated in both public and international realms through repetitions, they create around themselves “a cloak of normalcy”.²³¹ And “[w]hat is normal seems natural”.²³²

²²⁶ Weldes and Saco, “Making State Action Possible,” 374-375.

²²⁷ Sanjoy Banerjee, “Constructivism in International Studies: Cognitive Science, Interaction, and Narrative Structure,” 1996. Paper presented at International Studies Association, April 16-20, San Diego, California, 10, cited in Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, 56.

²²⁸ Jonathan P.G. Bach, Between sovereignty and integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity After 1989 (Munster, Germany : Lit Verlag ; New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999): 44.

²²⁹ Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, 47.

²³⁰ Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, 48.

²³¹ Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, 50.

²³² Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, 50.

Thus, narratives provide policymakers with the institutionalized stories that legitimize the conduct of their policies.

Discourse analysis is a useful tool in examining the social construction of state identity. By analyzing the particular meaning systems associated with particular identities, it provides the analytical framework for the discursive construction of state identities through foreign policy discourses. Foreign policy discourses of elites shape a particular worldview about a state's place in the world. A particular state identity is mobilized through shared discursive practices. Foreign policy is the mechanism through which these practices are conducted. As such, discourse analysis becomes a significant tool in studying state identity as a discursive construct of foreign policy elites.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter argued that state identities are formed through foreign policy practices; namely the discourses articulated around political circles and the public domain. As such, identity becomes a matter of political choice and manipulation, rather than being fixed with essential qualities. Different aspects of a state's identity formation process are presented in this chapter. Treating foreign policy as a boundary producing practice that constructs the objects and the subjects of international politics, this chapter focused on how foreign policy becomes a means for producing and reproducing state identity. It analyzed the way policymakers portray their states' identities through foreign policy discourses.

The study of discourse analysis becomes a useful tool in examining the social construction of state identity through foreign policy representations. It suggests looking

at the particular meaning system associated with a particular identity. Discourse analysis provides the analytical framework for the discursive construction of particular state identities through foreign policy representations. States as well as other social groups and individuals, are considered as identity bearing entities as argued in the previous chapters. Foreign policy is the mechanism through which particular representations, and the identities of states are constructed. Foreign policies and identities of states are not independent of policymakers' interpretations and representations. Deliberate calculations of policymakers shape a particular worldview about their state's place in the world. They become meaningful through shared discursive practices. Foreign policy becomes the mechanism through which this worldview is articulated. Thus, the study of discourse analysis becomes one of the central themes of constructivist research.

Identity discourses of political leaders have the power to create particular images of their states in particular and the world in general. Drawing upon this understanding, constructivism adopts a different perspective on foreign policy practices from that of conventional approaches. According to the constructivist approach, foreign policy is not just a function of national interests pursued in line with rational choices. Rather, it is the practices constructing the actors and interests in the first place. Foreign policy discourse constructs the basis of the identities of the 'self' and the 'other' through portraying them in particular ways. Once identity is constructed, it becomes the guide to foreign policy conduct in the conventional sense, i.e., diplomatic relations among states.

As argued in Chapter II, constructivism maintains that social structures, relations, practices and institutions in international relations are not 'natural' and objective 'facts', but ever-changing entities deliberately created through social interaction. They are

created through the meanings attached to them in processes of understanding, interpretation and acting upon them. Turkey's NATO membership and the meanings attached to the alliance is no exception to this process. NATO membership acquired meaning in Turkish politics by way of the shared understandings of state elites. By ascribing a Western identity to the organization, elites represented Turkey's NATO membership as an indication that Turkey was a Western state. The next chapter analyzes the construction of Turkey's Western identity during the Cold War via NATO discourse. It demonstrates how policymakers represented Turkey's entering the Atlantic Alliance as an indication that Turkey was a Western state.

CHAPTER V: REPRESENTATIONS OF NATO IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE DURING THE COLD WAR

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an alternative way to study Turkey's NATO membership during the Cold War. In Turkish political discourse during the Cold War, the cause of NATO membership has been linked to Westernizing the country. According to this understanding, by entering NATO, Turkey not only became a member of a military alliance, but also a member of the Western civilization. This civilization was deemed to symbolize modernity, liberalism, democracy, the rule of law and secularism. These were the attributes ascribed to Turkey's membership in NATO by the Turkish foreign policy discourse during the Cold War.

A close reading of Turkish foreign policy texts reveals the project of westernizing the country. This chapter suggests that the discourse produced with regard to Turkey's NATO membership brings to view the efforts of elites to turn Turkey into a 'modern', 'democratic' and 'civilized' country. As Nilüfer Göle argues, the 'Westernization' and 'Europeanization' of Turkey are expressed through participation in Western institutions (one being NATO) and the adoption of ideas and manners from the West.²³³ Policymakers represented the adoption of Western political and administrative institutions as an indication that Turkey was a Western state. Thus, analyzing the texts on Turkey's

NATO membership is a beneficial way to examine the representations of Turkey as a Western state.

NATO discourse in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War fits into the general context of Cold War politics. Turkish foreign policy discourse represented Turkey as a part of the 'Western self' that was exalted in the face of the 'Eastern other'. NATO membership symbolized Turkey's Westernness, its dedication to modernity, democracy and human rights. It became a means for drawing the boundaries between the internal (the West) that manifested enlightenment, civilization and development and the external (The East) that represented autocracy, underdevelopment and corruption. These are some of the most conspicuous forms of the Cold War discourse in Turkish foreign policy, which are analyzed in detail in this chapter.

Making use of the arguments expressed by Turkey's foreign policy elites and academics published in the journal Foreign Policy, this chapter analyzes how NATO was represented not only as a military organization, but also as a cultural one manifesting a Western identity. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section introduces a brief discussion of the works in IR literature studying NATO as a 'cultural alliance'. In the second section, I turn to the representations of the Cold War in Turkish foreign policy discourse. Here, the argument is that, Turkey's NATO membership during the Cold War was understood not merely as a military guarantee against the Soviet 'threat', but a means for identifying Turkey with the Western states.

²³³ Nilüfer Göle, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity," available from world wide web <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/bozdogan06.html>. Accessed on 15.04.2002.

The second section is divided into four parts. The first part presents a revealing analysis of Turkish policymakers' decision to participate in the Korean War along with the Western states in 1950. In light of Jennifer Milliken's argument that the Korean War was of symbolic value that served as a means for constructing the Western collective identity, it is argued that Turkey's participation in the intervention was a symbolic act as well, designed to demonstrate Turkey's dedication to Western values. The following part examines how the Soviet Union was represented as the 'other' of Turkey as a constitutive component of the Westernization discourse. This section examines the role played by the narrative of 'Soviet threat' in Turkish foreign policy discourse as a significant element in the establishment and perpetuation of Turkey's Western identity. It is examined how creating an 'other' (Soviets) whose way of life is different from that of the self (Turkey) made it easier to draw the boundaries of Turkey's Western identity. Next, the chapter introduces NATO as a security community. This part explores how elites portrayed NATO as a cultural alliance that was represented as an indication of Turkey's Western identity. Finally, the roles—and thus the identity—accorded by elites to Turkey as a member of NATO is analyzed. Elites' role conceptions for Turkey by way of focusing on its NATO membership are examined. Statements ascribing Turkey a particular 'role identity' in opposition to the Soviet Union's counter-role are analyzed. It is argued that elites' role constructions confined the boundaries of Turkey's identity as well as its behavior.

5.2 Representing NATO as a ‘Cultural Alliance’

NATO was designed after the Second World War to provide mutual defense to its members in the case of a military attack. As to Turkey’s NATO membership, however, Turkey’s foreign policy elites represented the alliance not simply in military terms. Through promoting a standardized discourse representing the alliance as the champion of Western strategic identity, they added a cultural dimension to NATO. In this way, they constructed bounds of identification with the West.

Turkey’s NATO membership constitutes one of the milestones in the efforts to identify Turkey with the Western identity. As of 1952, the year of Turkey’s accession to NATO, Turkey became a committed ally of the Atlantic Alliance, serving in the southern flank as a counterweight to the Soviet ‘threat’. As stated above, NATO was conceived as a military organization to provide collective defense to its members in the case of a military attack. Being the meeting platform of ‘Western democracies’ in the bipolar world, it also turned into a champion of ‘Western strategic culture’, where culture was “distinctly placed within a militarily maintained identity against the adversarial ‘other’”.²³⁴

The emergence and endurance of NATO was ensured thanks to the narratives on NATO’s identity.²³⁵ Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, in their article ‘From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity’ develop a study on the relationship between identities, narrative structures and institutions in the social construction of ‘security communities’. Their basic argument is that, the narratives on

²³⁴ Gülnur Aybet and Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey’s Problematic Relationship with Europe,” *International Journal* 55 (2000): 575.

NATO portrayed the organization as the ‘military guarantor of Western civilization’, the coherence of which rested not only on the common Soviet ‘threat’, but also on ‘cultural and civilizational’ ties.²³⁶ Adopting a constructivist perspective, Williams and Neumann argue that it was a ‘symbolic position’ that NATO occupied, where its members attached the organization a security role through articulating the ‘threats’ toward their existence.²³⁷ It was by means of the discourse on threat that the solidarity of the alliance and the coherence among its members was ensured. These shared understandings and interests led to the articulation of a collective identity.

Williams and Neumann argue that NATO’s narrative included “[c]laims about the cultural and political nature of the Alliance and the Cold War”,²³⁸ a point presented clearly in the preamble of NATO’s founding treaty. Here, the signatories defined themselves “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of other peoples, founded upon principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”.²³⁹ Thus, Williams and Neumann maintain that NATO has been the manifestation of a broad cultural context amalgamating members of common cultural traits. With reference to the shared ideals and interests stated above, they maintain that NATO has served as a means for constructing its members’ particular identities by marking their differences from the Eastern bloc states. These ‘ideological rationalizations’²⁴⁰ secured

²³⁵ Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity,” *Millennium* 29:2 (2000)361.

²³⁶ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 361.

²³⁷ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 365.

²³⁸ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 367.

²³⁹ NATO, *North Atlantic Treaty* (Brussels, 1949) cited in Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 367-368.

²⁴⁰ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 385.

the borders between the 'East' and the 'West', elevating the Western values to the highest level, while downgrading the Eastern way of life.

In the same vein with Williams and Neumann, Jennifer Milliken maintains that the Cold War was a conflict not only between the two superpowers, but one encompassing broader "groupings of states...the 'West' and the 'East'".²⁴¹ She argues in her study entitled 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea' that the 'insecurities' of these two blocs were "not given, but...(re)constructed through discourse".²⁴² For Milliken, it was the "ordering of terms, meanings, and practices" that established the categorizations of Cold War.²⁴³ Her basic concern is to highlight how policymakers, through security discourses, represented Korea as constituting a threat to the Western world.

According to Milliken, it was the "discursive construction of danger...by authorities" that intervention in Korea was made possible.²⁴⁴ The articulation of a 'threat' towards the 'collective identification' of the West enabled the participation of other states that deemed themselves part of the West in the intervention.²⁴⁵ U.S discourse employed a number of binary dichotomies to justify Western intervention. Western states were represented as 'democracies', 'liberal and moderate', whereas Eastern bloc states were portrayed as 'totalitarians' and 'puppets' of Moscow.²⁴⁶ Additionally, U.S. state

²⁴¹ Jennifer Milliken, "Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea," in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 92.

²⁴² Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 92.

²⁴³ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 92.

²⁴⁴ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 93.

²⁴⁵ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 92.

²⁴⁶ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 100-101.

discourse represented “[t]he survival of the United States...dependent on the survival of an ‘us’ of the democratic West”.²⁴⁷ Such was the ‘West’ constructed in Korea, through ‘hailing’ ‘followers’ of the ‘Free World’ to participate in the war.

Since Turkey was the ‘southern bastion’²⁴⁸ of this cultural posture, Turkish policymakers have come to represent Turkey along the same cultural traits. As Ali Karaosmanoğlu has argued, Turkey’s accession to NATO was a significant step towards Westernizing the country. He writes:

Beyond the Soviet threat after the Second World War, Turkey’s decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems. NATO membership solidified Ankara’s Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West.²⁴⁹

Accordingly, Karaosmanoğlu states the major rationale behind Turkish membership in NATO as its ‘Western orientation’. For him, policymakers had an interest in turning Turkey into a Western state, and membership to NATO was of great importance to this end.

Drawing on Milliken’s argument that the Cold War was not only a military conflict, but also the political ‘battleground’ of the East and West, the following parts address the representations of the Turkish State as part of the West during the Cold War. Focusing on Turkey’s NATO membership and the Soviets as the ‘other’ as a significant component in this construction process, the standardized discursive practices of elites and academics are analyzed.

²⁴⁷ Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 102.

²⁴⁸ Aybet and Baç, “Transformations in Security and Identity,” 575.

²⁴⁹ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54-1 (2000): 209.

5.3 The Cold-War in Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse

As argued before, the Cold War was a confrontation not only between the US and the USSR, but one including a larger ‘political-economic’ area where the ‘West’ challenged the ‘East’.²⁵⁰ Two different groups of states manifested a cultural positioning in opposition to each other. Being a part of the ‘West’ entailed dedication to ideals such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘development’, whereas the East was associated with ‘autocracy’, ‘totalitarianism’, ‘corruption’ and ‘underdevelopment’. The discourse of the Cold War in which Turkish policymakers were involved was conducted on these sets of dichotomies. Although Williams and Neumann argue that the NATO narrative, expressing the cultural features attached to the alliance “achieved a new prominence” in the aftermath of the Cold War era—a view presented as the rationale behind NATO’s endurance²⁵¹—this part suggests that this narrative was prominent in Turkish Foreign Policy discourse during the Cold War period as well.

The Cold War insecurity that Turkey was settled within was not an objective and natural situation, but a social and cultural production. However, this argument does not suggest that a material threat did not exist. What this part deals with is the representations of danger in particular ways; how Turkey participated in the widely shared meaning system of the Cold War discourse and the politics of representing Turkey as a Western state.

²⁵⁰ Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 91.

²⁵¹ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 368.

Turkey's NATO membership throughout the Cold War can be understood as a process of self-identification as part of a democratic security community. This process also denotes acts of stereotyping the Soviet 'other.' In this way, NATO membership became a means of expressing a common Western identity *vis-à-vis* the socialist 'other'. Through metaphors that summoned images like 'communist totalitarianism' and 'undemocratic and uncivilized' state systems, NATO discourse turned out to be the nodal point around which Turkish Cold War discourse was maintained.

Locating Turkey in the 'Western geography', where the 'West' confronted the 'East', was a preference of the policymakers. They adjusted the political system to their concerns of 'Westernizing' and 'civilizing' the country. During the Cold War, the Soviet 'threat' became a repetitive theme in Turkish foreign policy discourse, providing the basis for the politics of inclusion and exclusion. The far-reaching "discourse of 'ideological geopolitics'"²⁵² of the Cold War settled the world in "two alternative models of political-economic organization, the 'East' and the 'West'"²⁵³, that contributed to the politics of locating Turkey on the side of the Western world. The way Turkey has dealt with the Soviet other became a constitutive component of its self-identification, and the very categories created within Turkish foreign policy's 'representational repertoire'²⁵⁴ secured the boundaries of Turkey's Cold War identity.

²⁵² John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998), 119, cited in Pinar Bilgin, "The Making of the 'Mediterranean' Region: Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era," Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, March 20-24, 2002, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 1.

²⁵³ Bilgin, "The Making of the 'Mediterranean' Region," 16.

²⁵⁴ Bradley S. Klein, "Deterrence as a Social Practice," chap. in *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 140.

In the following parts, different means of representing Turkey as a Western state are analyzed. Employing excerpts from the journal Foreign Policy, I begin by looking at Turkey's participation in the Korean War. This section argues that the intervention aimed at demonstrating Turkey's dedication to Western values. Then, I examine how the Soviet Union was represented as the 'other' of Turkey and how this representation became operative as a constitutive component of the Westernization discourse. In the following part, I examine the arguments representing NATO as a security community. This section explores how policy makers portrayed NATO as a cultural alliance, which in the end was shown as an indication of Turkey's Western identity. Finally, I analyze the roles accorded by policymakers to Turkey as a member of NATO. This part argues that policymakers' particular role conceptions for Turkey within the alliance made clear its position *vis-à-vis* other states. This, in turn, has drawn the boundaries of Turkey's identity.

5.3.1 Constructing Western Identity Through Intervention

The discursive practices of foreign policy associated with being/becoming a Western state in the post-war years can be traced back to the Korean War. Along with other Western states, Turkey sent troops to Korea, which was then the battleground between the 'East' and the 'West'. Milliken regards the UN-led Western intervention in Korea as "a cultural process of collective identity formation".²⁵⁵ The intervention was indeed a symbolic act that constituted Western collective identity in opposition to the 'socialist other(s)'.

²⁵⁵ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 91.

The following statement by Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, a professor of history, indicates how Turkish policymakers understood participation in the Korean War:

[T]he prominent members of the Turkish government...decided to take part in the Korean War. In the first place Turkey had taken such a decision in response to the appeal of the United Nations to safeguard the integrity and independence of South Korea in accordance with the principles of the [UN] Charter....But behind this decision Turkish aspirations for joining the Atlantic Alliance were also in mind. It was because the theatre of war in Korea prepared the ground for the Turkish forces to set an example for their fighting ability with the up to date weapons.²⁵⁶

Kurat's statement points to two 'logics of appropriateness' for Turkey's participating in the Korean War. First, defending the independence of a sovereign state was seen as the appropriate behavior for a member of the United Nations, since complying with the stipulations of the UN Charter was regarded the relevant norm. In a sense, Turkey was constrained by the 'social normative structure'²⁵⁷ of the UN system. Turkey's interests and identity was informed by the widely held international norms of the UN, which guided the state along certain socially prescribed channels of 'appropriate behaviour'.²⁵⁸ Turkey, as "a country which refrains from unilateral action in times of crisis and works through institutional and diplomatic channels"²⁵⁹ participated in the intervention in order to secure this very identity. As Haluk Bayülken, former Representative of Turkey to the United Nations noted, Turkey advocated "the supremacy of the principle of sovereign equality of all peace loving states", which constituted the basis of the UN Charter²⁶⁰ and

²⁵⁶ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "Turkey's Entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *Foreign Policy* 10:3-4 (1983): 74.

²⁵⁷ Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, 146.

²⁵⁸ Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, 146.

²⁵⁹ Aybet, "Turkey and European Institutions," *The International Spectator* 34:1 (January-March 1999): 110.

²⁶⁰ Ü.Haluk Bayülken, "Turkey and the United Nations," *Foreign Policy* 1:3 (1971), 100.

“has never lost her faith in the ideals and principles of the Charter”.²⁶¹ The author further stated that

[t]his belief of Turkey in the ideals embodied in the Charter was a major factor deciding Turkey’s position in the Korean War....It was the adoption of...[the UN] resolution which enabled the United Nations to send forces to Korea.²⁶²

In this way, Bayülken explained Turkey’s participation in the Korean War on the grounds that there was “an act of aggression” and “a breach of peace” in Korea, which necessitated UN intervention.²⁶³ Eventually, Turkey, as a ‘reliable’ member of the UN and a state wholeheartedly advocating the “maintenance of international peace and security”,²⁶⁴ participated in this collective security operation, since it was regarded the appropriate behavior for a sovereign member of the UN system. Participation in the Korean War was deemed as an international ‘duty’ for the elites. It was the discourse of ‘duties’ that constituted the legitimate reason for Turkey’s sending troops to Korea. Turkey was represented as a state pursuing principles of sovereign equality, collective security and international justice. These were the norms constitutive of ‘the West’. Thus, sending troops to Korea was deemed a symbolic act demonstrating Turkey’s dedication to international law and Western norms.

The second logic of appropriateness observed in Kurat’s statement on Turkey’s participation in the Korean intervention is that it was deemed an appropriate behavior for the states that asserted an identity on the part of the Western states to challenge the invader. In the Korean War, North Korea, the invader, was represented as “a ‘puppet

²⁶¹ Bayülken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” 102.

²⁶² Bayülken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” 102-103.

²⁶³ Bayülken, “Turkey and the United Nations,” 103.

state' of the Soviet Union".²⁶⁵ Turkey, on the other hand, became the 'supporter' of the collective action in the eyes of US policymakers.²⁶⁶ This point is an indication that, particular norms associated with an identity have a persuasive effect on state behavior. To clarify the point, states behave in accordance with the roles ascribed to them, since such behaviors verify and strengthen their particular identities. The Korean intervention was based on the shared norms and understandings of the Western collectivity. As the 'supporter' of the intervention, Turkey pursued a policy consistent with the policies of other Western states. Through participating the war, Turkey acted in conformity with the norms of being a 'Western state'.

Three related representations emphasizing the correlation between Turkey's participating in the Korean War and becoming a NATO member are presented below. In Metin Tamkoç's words,

The invasion of South Korea provided an opportunity for [President] Bayar to demonstrate his strong desire for solidarity within the West. He decided to send a contingent of 5,000 troops to Korea. The immediate dividend of his investment was the association of Turkey with NATO.²⁶⁷

Here, Tamkoç presents the Korean War as an 'opportunity' to certify Turkey's 'solidarity with the West'. In this way, the Korean War became a means of 'collective identity formation' in the face of a common threat.²⁶⁸ Furthermore, Tamkoç argues that it was of great benefit for Turkey to participate in the war since in the aftermath of the war Turkey was accepted to NATO.

²⁶⁴ Bayülken, "Turkey and the United Nations," 100.

²⁶⁵ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 96.

²⁶⁶ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 105, 117.

²⁶⁷ Metin Tamkoç, "The Impact of the Truman Doctrine on the National Security Interests of Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 6:3-4 (1977): 29.

In line with Tamkoç's view, Şükrü Elekdag (retired ambassador) associates Turkey's NATO membership with its participation in the Korean War. He writes: "After Turkish participation in the Korean War, Turkey...became a member of NATO, benefiting from strong American support".²⁶⁹ Accordingly, the respective statements attach the Korean intervention an instrumental rationale. They maintain that Turkish support in the war provided Turkey's acceptance to NATO.

Seyfi Taşhan, the Director of the Foreign Policy Institute, adopts the same line of reasoning for Turkey's participation in the Korean War: "[T]urkish participation in the Korean War and the skillful diplomacy that was followed culminated in the membership of...Turkey...within NATO".²⁷⁰ What all these statements suggest is that, policymakers viewed Turkey's participating in the Korean intervention as a means for Turkey's acceptance as a 'Western' state. In other words, the common argument of these three respective statements is that Turkey's 'contributions' in the war enabled its identification with the West. Consequently, the representations of Turkey as a "'dependable' ally and a crucial part of the US-led collective security effort" were aimed at providing Turkey's acceptance to NATO.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Milliken, "Intervention and Identity," 91.

²⁶⁹ Şükrü Elekdag, "The Future of Turkish-US Relations," *Foreign Policy* 11:3-4 (1984): 11.

²⁷⁰ Seyfi Taşhan, "Turkey's Relations with the USA and Possible Future Developments," *Foreign Policy* 8:1-2 (1980): 15-16.

²⁷¹ Bilgin, "Turkey and the European Union: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?" in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd & Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001), 41.

5.3.2 USSR as the 'Other' of Turkey

As argued before, the conflict between the 'East' and the 'West' dominated the political order after the Second World War. This was the case in Turkey as well, where the foundational texts of foreign policy discourse were shaped by the US-USSR confrontation, illustrated in the form of an East-West conflict. In what follows, excerpts from these foreign policy texts are examined. They manifest how the Cold War was represented and the Soviets were depicted as the 'other'.

The worsening relations between Turkey and the USSR after the Second World War and the subsequent application of Turkey to enter NATO are mostly associated with Soviet demands on Turkish territories:²⁷²

Ever since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish leaders, Atatürk and İnönü had considered the Turco-Soviet relations as the bedrock of Turkish foreign policy. Ever mindful of the territorial designs of the Soviets on Turkey and the Soviet drive toward the Mediterranean and Middle East, Atatürk and İnönü saw to it that Turkey did not remain isolated against the Soviet Union. To that end they established friendly relations with the major powers of Europe.²⁷³

This utterance traced back the strained relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, thereby representing the Soviets as a foundational threat. The 'Soviet threat' is shown as the basic reason for Turkey's search for close relations with the European states. It is further argued by Sezai Orkunt (retired Admiral) that

²⁷² In 1945 the Soviet government put forth some stipulations for Turkey to renew the Turco-Soviet Friendship Pact of 1925. These were, the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviets, the grant of bases on the Turkish Straits to the Soviets, and the revision of the Montreux Convention on Straits that would engender greater Soviet control on the Straits. Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 179-180.

²⁷³ Tamkoç, "The Impact of the Truman Doctrine," 19.

Turkey had joined the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of the Soviet demand for military bases on the Turkish Straits. This demand is one that would entirely destroy Turkish independence. There is, as yet, no change in the conditions to lead Turkey to think otherwise.²⁷⁴

Here, it is argued that the territorial allegations of the Soviets constituted the major reason behind Turkey's asking for cooperation with the Western states and NATO. These allegations are understood and depicted as a threat to 'Turkish independence' that were seen to undermine the state's sovereignty. Arguing that '[t]here is, as yet, no change in the conditions to lead Turkey to think otherwise', Orkunt represents the conditions in the outset of the Cold War as continuing in the 1970s,²⁷⁵ during the period of détente in East-West relations. As such, Orkunt causes the Cold War narrative of the 1940s to endure in the 1970s. He demonstrates the permanence of Turkey's policy towards the Soviet 'other' across time. Because identity is not a situational feature of the state, he locates its enduring character in time. In other words, he upholds a narrative to sustain a particular account of the self (Turkey). As Thomas Banchoff argues,

[t]hrough narratives, the roots of a state's relations with other states and institutions and their present situations are depicted. In this manner, narrative discourse defines 'who we are' by way of articulating 'where we have been'.²⁷⁶

To uphold a narrative means to sustain a particular account of the self. As long as this narrative makes sense to others, as well as the self, the identity of the self is maintained in public domain. This point is important in that, the perpetuation of the master narrative of the Cold War—that represented the Soviet Union as the 'other' of the Western 'self'—engendered a justification for Turkey's continuing cooperation with the West. This means

²⁷⁴ Sezai Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 4:1 (1974): 87.

²⁷⁵ The article was published in 1974.

to say that, through the NATO narrative, Turkish policymakers enhanced the bounds of identification with the West.

Kamran İnan (former senator and diplomat), in line with Orkunt's argument, maintained that

Turkey wanted to join the organization right from the beginning because she felt that she was in danger, claims were made against her territories and shadows were cast over her sovereignty, and she found resistance against these threats all by herself to be rather difficult....[As a result,] we forced the door in order to enter...[NATO], and this has proved to be a very wise decision.²⁷⁷

Accordingly, İnan finds the most effective resistance against the Soviet allegations within the security guarantee of NATO, which for him proved to be 'a very wise decision'. This line of reasoning was also picked up by Haluk Bayülken. Bayülken, after noting the Soviet demands on Turkish territory went on to argue that,

Soviet attempts to expand their empires to Anatolia and the Middle East determined Turkey's basic policy lines during the decade following 1946.

The ideological orientation of the Turkish leaders ruling the Republic were directed to the democratic principles of the West....Ankara made every effort on her part to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the post war developments induced Turkey to seek full participation in the military, political and economic system of Atlantic and European integration.²⁷⁸

All these arguments are consistent with what Bradley Klein calls 'the basic story',²⁷⁹ on the creation of NATO, which justified the establishment of the organization on the grounds

²⁷⁶ Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," European Journal of International Relations 5:3 (1999): 270.

²⁷⁷ Kamran İnan, "Turkey and NATO," Foreign Policy 4:1 (1974): 71.

²⁷⁸ Bayülken, "Turkey and the United Nations," 99.

²⁷⁹ Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO," International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990): 312.

that a war-torn and war-exhausted Western Europe could not, on its own resources, mobilize a successful response to the challenge posed by postwar communism, a challenge posed in the dual form of political subversion and Stalin's armed forces.²⁸⁰

This politics of rationalization justified Turkey's participation in a collective response against the 'Soviet threat'. By positioning Turkey against the Soviets, the ties linking the state to the West were enhanced. Thus, as the 'other' of Turkey, the Soviets became the basic constitutive component of Turkey's Cold War identity.

However, it is unclear whether Turkey approached the West because it saw the Soviets as an 'other', or *vice versa*. A different reading of Turkish foreign policy may bring to view the other side of the coin. An alternative reading might be that since Turkey wished to approach the West, it 'chose' to represent the Soviets as the 'other'. In both manners, however, Soviet territorial claims were represented as the legitimizing cause behind Turkey's search for close relations with West.

We should problematize these threat perceptions. The 'Soviet threat' became instrumental in associating Turkey with the Western side of the East-West conflict. This choice aimed at a particular political end. As Thomas Risse argues,

[t]hreat perceptions do not emerge from a quasi-objective international power structure, but actors infer external behavior from the values and norms governing the domestic political processes that shape the identities of their partners in the international system....Soviet power...became threatening precisely because Moscow's domestic order identified the Soviet Union as 'the other'.²⁸¹

Accordingly, Turkey chose the Soviet Union as the 'other', as it did not possess the qualities to become part of 'us'. The basic requirements to become part of 'us' (the

²⁸⁰ Klein, "How the West Was One," 312.

West) were dedication to Western values such as modernity, democracy, freedom and market economy that the Soviets state system was said to lack.

The territorial claims and the characteristics ascribed to the Soviets were represented as carrying a considerable weight of danger. It is through the process of representing the Soviet state system in opposition to the Western state system that the Soviet Union was made the 'other.' By way of the 'threat' it was supposed to pose, the Soviets were of concern to policymakers in formulating Turkey's posture in the world. NATO was represented as a political instrument of the Cold War that aimed at blocking Soviet expansionism and communism.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union was illustrated as the initiator of Cold War and in this way, the basic rationale behind the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance. As Muharrem Nuri Birgi (former ambassador) argued in his following statement,

[t]ime has shown that the principal factor leading the highly developed powers in Western Europe to firmly embrace their less developed allies within NATO...was the fear for life created by the probability of an armed invasion by Soviet Russia.²⁸²

Like Birgi, Duygu B. Sezer argued that "the raison d'être of the Atlantic Alliance is the existence of the 'Soviet threat'".²⁸³ These statements indicate that Soviet territorial claims were the main motive behind Turkey's search for Western assistance and its participation in the Western power structure. In a similar vein, it is stated that "NATO was conceived as a defensive alliance borne out of the will of its members to resist communist

²⁸¹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Peter Katzenstein ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 367.

²⁸² Muharrem Nuri Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic Community and Turkey," Foreign Policy 3:4 (1973): 72-73.

²⁸³ Duygu B. Sezer, "The Atlantic Alliance in Crisis," Foreign Policy 10:1-2 (1983): 81.

expansion”,²⁸⁴ and that “the Soviet Union was aggressively pursuing the goal of creating a new communist world order by direct and indirect means of intimidation, subversion and conquest”.²⁸⁵ Therefore, NATO was represented as having been “established as a result of the Cold War”,²⁸⁶ “against intimidation, pressure, and aggression by Communist Russia”.²⁸⁷ These are the reasons why İnan thinks, “many people would admit the truth of what Mr. P.H.Spoak, former Belgian Prime Minister, said: ‘The founder of NATO is Stalin’”.²⁸⁸

The images of Soviet ‘repression’ and ‘totalitarianism’ used by Turkish policymakers are further expressed in the following paragraph:

The communist world is growing and gaining in strength. This increasing strength facilitates the operating of geopolitical rules in favour of the Soviet Union. H.J.Mackinder’s [sic] “world island and heartland” concept which was adopted by the geopolitical school of Nazi Germany before the Second World War is now being applied by the Soviet Union.²⁸⁹

Thus, Orkunt bolsters the negative image of the Soviets by drawing a correlation between Soviet politics and the expansionist policy of Nazi Germany. In other words, Orkunt’s representation places the Soviet Union in the same category with Hitler’s Germany. Soviet ‘expansionism’, whether or not it points to any concrete reality, is tied to a loathed period of German history in order to ascribe the Soviets fixed, stable and unpleasant

²⁸⁴ Publisher, *Foreign Policy* 4:1 (1974), Introduction.

²⁸⁵ Tamkoç, “The Impact of the Truman Doctrine,” 18.

²⁸⁶ Altemur Kılıç, “International Relations in a Changing World,” *Foreign Policy* 1:2 (1971): 137.

²⁸⁷ Tamkoç, “The Impact of the Truman Doctrine,” 27.

²⁸⁸ İnan, “Turkey and NATO,” 70.

²⁸⁹ Orkunt, “The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” 83. Mackinder’s concept is simply expressed as follows: “Who rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland. Who rules the heartland commands the world island. Who rules the world island commands the world.” Sir Halford John Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (London, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1919) 150; quoted in Orkunt, “The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” 83.

characteristics. This politics of exclusion contributes to representations of the Soviets in particular ways and the expression of a common identity *vis-à-vis* the socialist other, as observed in Sezai Orkunt's statement:

The accusation of 'imperialism' which the Soviet Union throws at the West and particularly at the US is an expression motivated by the fanatical view which the Soviet regime has subconsciously bred....

[T]here is no [such a] policy...in the West. The members of the alliance are opposed, for example, to the colonial policy of Portugal.

If it is to be claimed that imperialism has now slid into other areas, then it would be necessary to concede that the Soviet Union, with the applications of its entire policy, is an imperialist state. The Soviet behaviour up to date is in conformity with the above definition.²⁹⁰

This statement portrays the USSR as an 'imperialist' state striving for further expansion.

Orkunt also argues that the principle of 'peaceful coexistence' initiated by the USSR is a "propaganda oriented precept".²⁹¹ Instead, Khrushchev's argument that "we shall bury you" is viewed as the "truthful explanation of what is behind the Russian mind and constitutes the substance of the entire Russian foreign policy".²⁹² This appears to be more consistent and appropriate a Soviet intention for Orkunt. Accordingly, the endurance of NATO is legitimized in the face of Soviet desires.²⁹³ Through moral justifications of devaluing the Soviet system and emphasizing the moral superiority of the West, the authors tried to legitimize the politics of excluding the Soviets and taking a collective stand against it.

However, what is problematic in all these statements is that, there is no empirical evidence presented as a justification for the capacity of the Soviet threat. The authors

²⁹⁰ Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," 84.

²⁹¹ Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," 80.

²⁹² Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," 80.

present no criteria to check the limits of Soviet threat, leaving aside somewhat ambiguous expressions such as,

the frightening scale of increase in Soviet arms, their establishment of naval superiority in all seas...their...activities for creating division among the allies and...for destroying every one of them...should be considered as evidences...that the danger of Soviet invasion is [not] over.²⁹⁴

These are statements presenting no data, but supplying Turkish foreign policy discourse with “the codes of attribution and intentionality which were to guide”²⁹⁵ the policies toward the Soviets. Such texts provided the ‘interpretive grounds’²⁹⁶ upon which authors portrayed a specific sight of the self (Turkey) and the other (the Soviets). What is at issue here is not the actual military capabilities and intentions of the Soviets. Rather, it is argued that this ‘interpretive scheme’ gave priority to particular aspects of ‘Soviet behavior’ over others, “and thereby disable[d] competing accounts which might be more critical of”²⁹⁷ Turkish foreign policy.

We should take a critical look at the Cold War representations of the Turkish foreign policy discourse. Although the Cold War was initiated as a military conflict between the two blocs, comments related to the Soviet social and political life overweighed those related to Soviet military capabilities. This is because the military contention of the Cold War “derive[d]...its power from...[its] affinity with widely circulated representations of cultural and political life”.²⁹⁸ In this sense, it was an

²⁹³ Orkunt, “The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey,” 80.

²⁹⁴ Birgi, “Developments within the Atlantic Community,” 73.

²⁹⁵ Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order*, 117.

²⁹⁶ Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order*, 117.

²⁹⁷ Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order*, 117.

²⁹⁸ Michael Shapiro, “Representing World Politics: The Sports/War Intertext,”; quoted in *International/Intertextual Relations*, J.Der Derian and M. Shapiro eds. (Lexington, MA:Lexington Books, 1989) 69-96 in Klein, “How the West Was One,” 314.

‘imaginary war’²⁹⁹ in which Turkey found itself, where the West came to believe in a Soviet ‘threat’, and where the ways of overcoming this threat were presented as ‘military preparedness’, belief in nuclear weapons to provide protection, ‘anti-communism,’ and ‘Western unity’.³⁰⁰

Bradley Klein, building upon the assumption that the narrative of ‘Soviet threat’ was a constitutive element in the “creation and perpetuation of NATO”, suggests that the Western military strategy was not directed against a specific ‘Soviet force’, but to the “fears of vulnerability which attended the uncertainties of the postwar order”.³⁰¹ Creating in the first place an ‘other’ whose ‘way of life’ was absolutely different from that of the self made it easier to draw the “boundaries and limits of Western identity”.³⁰² In this way, the representations of the Cold War in Turkish foreign policy as a struggle between different identities becomes significant.

5.3.3 NATO as a Western Security Community

It is argued earlier that Turkey’s entry into NATO constituted a critical moment in its identification with the West, for it was more a ‘cultural undertaking’³⁰³ than a military one. In this sense, NATO was widely represented as a security community, which manifested the common values shared by its members. İnan, states this point aptly:

²⁹⁹ Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 109.

³⁰⁰ Kaldor, *The Imaginary War*, 109.

³⁰¹ Klein, “How the West Was One, 313.

³⁰² Klein, “How the West Was One,” 316-317.

³⁰³ Klein, “Beyond the Western Alliance: The Politics of Post-Atlanticism,” in *Atlantic Relations: Beyond the Reagan Era*, Stephen Gill ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) 196-197.

Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important stride in our westernization movement. We have obtained a place and a say within the Atlantic community. The frontiers of Europe now begin from Eastern Turkey. In the context of our historical development, this constitutes an important achievement and a milestone. In this world of ours that has been made smaller due to advances in...technology, nations are compelled to come together and form solidarity groups....[T]he countries which have similar political systems, and close values and views of life and common intrests [sic] generally come together. The cooperation...grows in time and creates an atmosphere of community. This has been the case in NATO.³⁰⁴

In this statement, İnan represents Turkey's NATO membership along with the cultural dimension it signifies. In İnan's terms, Turkey's membership in NATO is a step taken in the efforts to Westernize the country, thus it is defined as 'an important achievement and a milestone' in Turkey's 'westernization movement'. Viewed as such, NATO becomes part of an endeavor to construct Turkey's Western identity. This identity indicates "the making of a whole way of life and a distinct civilizational project"³⁰⁵ in which Turkey took part. For İnan, the acceptance of Turkey to the Atlantic Community is a confirmation of Turkey's Westernness by leading Western states.

İnan, in a sense considers NATO as a 'security community'. A security community is a group of states united around a set of 'core values'³⁰⁶ and "normative understandings across [their] national boundaries"³⁰⁷ that engenders "a sense of 'we-ness'"³⁰⁸. Security communities are socially constructed entities that are established upon intersubjective understandings and common norms. Their constructedness derives from

³⁰⁴ İnan, "Turkey and NATO," 72.

³⁰⁵ Klein, "Beyond the Western Alliance," 204.

³⁰⁶ Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium* 26:2 (1997):255.

³⁰⁷ Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities," 252.

³⁰⁸ Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities," 255.

the fact that they are established and maintained through “communication, discourse and interpretation”.³⁰⁹ The ‘mutual recognition’³¹⁰ of specific patterns of behavior has a constitutive effect on the construction of the community’s common identity. Thus, a ‘cognitive structure’ is developed where members express their identities and interests identical with those of the community.

As Gülnur Aybet has argued, the Western Security Community (NATO) cannot be limited to its material/military dimensions, but must be analyzed within a broader cultural context. For Aybet, members of this community are tied up with social and cultural links as well as their military commitments. Building upon this argument to analyze Turkey’s membership, she states that the Western Security Community represents a particular ‘way of life’, where Turkey participates.³¹¹ That ‘way of life’ is composed of Western values shared by members of the community. İnan’s argument is an example of what Aybet says. He represents NATO as a ‘solidarity group’ consisting of states sharing common ‘political systems’, ‘close values’, ‘views of life’ and ‘interests’. For İnan, through cooperation among these states, ‘an atmosphere of community’ has been created, an understanding evaluating NATO as a security community. Accordingly, İnan identifies Turkey with the Western collective identity.

Alexander Wendt’s definition of collective identity is a useful example to develop İnan’s argument. Wendt defines a collective identity as a means of identification for

³⁰⁹ Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities,” 258.

³¹⁰ John Gerard Ruggie. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization* 52:4 (1998): 870.

³¹¹ Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy* (London: Macmillan Press 2000), 1.

members of a group who have internalized a common culture and have an interest in maintaining it.³¹² He sees the prerequisites of any collective identity formation (whether within or outside international relations) to be the same: “redefining the boundaries of Self and Other so as to constitute a ‘common in-group identity’ or ‘we-feeling’”.³¹³ Accordingly, İnönü, arguing that the ‘frontiers of Europe’ had come to include Turkey after its accession to NATO, is representing the state as part of Western collectivity.

Güven Erkaya (late Vice Admiral) considered, though implicitly, NATO as a security community as well. He wrote:

I am not one of those who consider NATO to be solely a military organization, of those who do assume and argue that the diminishing military threat from the Warsaw Pact renders NATO obsolete. I believe this argument to be misleading, ignoring as it does the dominant role of NATO’s political functions. I believe NATO was established to demonstrate the political will and cohesion of Western society to those who threatened its interests within the defined Alliance area. NATO has connected the two sides of the Atlantic by establishing and reinforcing a common political cause which has preserved its integrity and withstood changes in the Government of member countries.³¹⁴

Beside pointing to NATO’s military aspects, Erkaya argues that one should not lose sight of the political features of the organization. As he maintains, the basic reasons bringing NATO countries together had been political ones. NATO is argued to be established upon the common interests of the ‘Western society’. Thus, NATO is represented not simply as a military organization, but as an alliance possessing the cultural characteristics of a security community.

³¹² Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 337.

³¹³ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 338.

³¹⁴ Güven Erkaya, “Turkey’s Defense Requirements in the 1990s,” Foreign Policy 15:1-2 (1991), 29.

Osman Olcay (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) regarded NATO membership as one of the 'cornerstones' in Turkey's relations with the West (the other being relations with the European Economic Community), and considered the alliance as a security community as well. He wrote:

The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance constitutes a framework which provides the means for conducting our cooperation with the Western countries in the areas of security and foreign policy in an effective way and on the basis of mutual respect and interest. The constructive role which the Alliance plays in the realization of peace on the European continent, to which we belong, has an aspect which corresponds to our own aims.³¹⁵

Here, NATO is depicted as the social normative structure through which Turkey conducts its relations with the Western states. Olcay attaches to the Northern Alliance the role of securing peace in Europe. Since Olcay views Turkey as a European state, he links NATO members' interests in securing peace in Europe to Turkey's interests. In other words, Olcay defines Turkey's identity and interests as identical with those of the Western states. Thus, Turkey's identity and interests become endogenous to processes of representing Turkey as a Western state by way of its membership in NATO.

In line with Olcay's argument, Seyfi Taşhan (Head of the Foreign Policy Institute) states that

Turkey looked towards NATO membership as establishing a definitely Western identity long cherished by Atatürk...and...gave prominence to Allied interest which were considered as Turkish interests as well.³¹⁶

Taşhan draws a parallel between NATO membership and Western identity. For him, being a NATO member means being a Western state. Moreover, Taşhan regards membership to the Atlantic Alliance as a historical and foundational aim of the Turkish

³¹⁵ Osman Olcay, "Turkey's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 1:2 (1971): 80-81.

Republic, as it was 'long cherished by Atatürk', the founder of the Republic. In this way, he presents the efforts towards Westernization as being in a historical continuation. Finally, he presents Turkey's interests as common with its allies, and thus identifies the state with the collective identity represented by NATO.

General Necip Torumtay links Turkey's search for cooperation with the West to the quest for a Western identity as well:

Soviet Union's refusal to renew the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality and Nonaggression of 1925, the tension caused by demands on the Turkish Straits and territorial claims from Eastern Anatolia immediately after the W.W.II and the ensuing defense requirements impelled Turkey to look for new arrangements for its security apart from neutrality. This quest has ended in 1952 when Turkey joined NATO. This choice also reflects my country's European vocation.³¹⁷

Through this statement, Torumtay associates Turkey's NATO membership not only with the need to cooperate in the face of Soviet claims on Turkish territory, but also with Turkey's 'European vocation'. A similar view, representing NATO membership as an essential component of being a European state, holds that Turkish entry to the organization

not only did end the Turkish anxieties caused by the change in the friendly Soviet policy to the Republic since 1939, but also brought Turkey to the Western security system as a fully recognized European state.³¹⁸

For Kurat, Turkey's acceptance to NATO was an indication that Turkey was recognized as a European state. Through his above statement, Kurat placed Turkey in an equal position with other Western states. According to him, by way of membership to the

³¹⁶ Taşhan, "Turkey's Relations with the USA," 16.

³¹⁷ Necip Torumtay, "Turkey's Military Doctrine," *Foreign Policy* 15: 1-2 (1991): 20.

³¹⁸ Kurat, "Turkey's Entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 77.

Alliance, Turkey secured both its borders against Soviet aggression and its place among the Western states. A similar argument was presented by Metin Tamkoç, who argued that

[w]hen Turkey became a member of NATO, President Bayar's success was twofold; he not only obtained a formal commitment from the United States to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union, but he also secured formal acceptance of Turkey into what was then known as the 'Western-Christian-Democratic family of European Nations' which hitherto had kept the door shut to the Moslem Turks of the Middle East.³¹⁹

Tamkoç, like Kurat, argued that NATO membership provided not only a means for preventing the 'Soviet threat', but also the 'formal' evidence that Turkey was a member of the 'Western-Christian-Democratic family of European Nations'. In these respective statements above, the authors define Turkey's interests as identical with those of other members of the alliance and posit the state within the framework of NATO identity, which, in turn, was regarded as an affirmation of Turkey's European/Western identity. As "shared international and transnational understandings, identities...norms"³²⁰ and "shared political purposes or interests"³²¹ of its members have constituted the foundations of NATO as a security community, Turkey's membership attested to the 'fact' that Turkey was a Western state.

A related statement defining the core values constituting the basis of the Western Security Community is expressed by Turan Güneş (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) as follows: "The real strength of the NATO countries is formed by their solidarity based on democracy and respect of human rights, social progress and justice".³²² Turan Güneş put

³¹⁹ Tamkoç, "The Impact of the Truman Doctrine, 30.

³²⁰ Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities," 276.

³²¹ Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities," 277.

³²² Turan Güneş, "Changing World Conditions, NATO and Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 4:1(1974): 65.

forth as the core values bringing states together in NATO as their ‘modern’ state structures, i.e. their dedication to Western ideals such as democracy, human rights, social progress and rule of law. In a sense he regarded NATO membership as—what Alexander Wendt calls—a ‘type identity’. That is, membership to the alliance was viewed as referring to the commonalities among the allies in “behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills...[and] opinions”.³²³ For Güneş, NATO was an alliance speaking for a ‘modern’, ‘industrial’ and ‘capitalist’ way of life striving for ‘progress’ and ‘development’, viewed as the “norm[s] for global civilization”.³²⁴ As such, NATO was seen not just as a military alliance standing against the ‘threat’ the USSR produced, but also as a means of identification for the ‘Western Civilization’ denoting the common cultural traits of its members.³²⁵

These statements indicate that, part of NATO strategy was viewed as securing a ‘modern’, ‘civilized’ and ‘democratic’ collective identity, and thus constructing the ‘West’, in opposition to the ‘undemocratic’, ‘communist’, ‘authoritarian’ ‘East’. In this way, security was established along cultural lines.³²⁶ By looking at Turkey’s elites’ NATO discourse, we can observe how organizations constitute identities by way of demanding conformity to the norms of a common identity. Linking a set of values and Western liberal principles to NATO membership, the authors presented a particular picture of the organization, which enabled Turkey’s identification with the West.

³²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 225.

³²⁴ Klein, “Beyond the Western Alliance,” 196-197.

³²⁵ Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 361.

5.3.4 Turkey's Cold-War Identity: Role Constructions

Turkey's identification with the West by means of its NATO membership should also be analyzed by considering the roles adopted within the organization. This point deserves special attention since it is Turkey's 'role-identity'³²⁷ that confines the boundaries of its behavior and the mutual expectations of other states. The roles accorded to Turkey settled Turkey into its 'unique' position *vis-à-vis* 'others', whether in the sense of friends or foes. In the following excerpts, statements ascribing Turkey a particular 'role identity' in opposition to the Soviet Union's 'counter-role'³²⁸ are presented.

İnan, in the following comment, defined Turkey's role in NATO as one of an essential military ally, which contributed to peace by preventing the Soviet danger from expanding:

Turkey has occupied an important role [in NATO] and made important contributions [to peace as a deterrent force]. If Turkey today is represented at the European Security and Cooperation Conference in Geneva, and at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Conference in Vienna and has a word in these conferences and gained the opportunity to defend its national interests, this is the result of our membership in NATO.

Our collaboration in the military field has been to the advantage of all parties and has proved to be beneficial for peace. The determination and decision of all powers to react jointly against common danger has preserved peace and has created the most powerful deterrent force in the world.³²⁹

³²⁶ Williams and Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community," 370.

³²⁷ Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5-6 in Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy," ARENA Working Papers WP99/8 (15.02.1999) Available from World Wide Web http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_8.html Accessed April 12, 2002. See also Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 329.

³²⁸ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 329.

³²⁹ İnan, "Turkey and NATO," 73.

İnan saw Turkey's NATO membership as beneficial both to the organization and to Turkey, as they shared common interests and the "security of each [state was]... perceived as the responsibility of all".³³⁰ For İnan, NATO membership has not only granted Turkey a say in the international fora, but also rendered it an indispensable partner for the protection of 'peace'. In this way, Turkey was no more viewed as "[t]he sick man of the East" but a "strong and dependable power of the West", which can make us only 'proud'.³³¹ İnan maintains that "we have contributed to the preservation of peace, and we have played a constructive role".³³²

By the same token, Orkunt pointed to Turkey's contributions to NATO. He argued that, by means of the secure border Turkey created in the face of Soviet expansionism, and as an "advance warning and alarm platform", Turkey contributed to the protection of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thus the Western world.³³³ These were presented as the reasons making Turkey a significant ally that deserved appreciation.³³⁴ Orkunt defined Turkey's role as an 'ally' which indicated Turkey's strategic partnership with the Western democracies. In trying to explain why NATO membership was indispensable for Turkey, Orkunt argued that

[w]ith this geography, neutrality outside the blocks...is not possible. A Turkey outside NATO can hardly save itself from falling into Moscow's orbit. If Turkey does not want to sail in Moscow's orbit it has to preserve its place in Western Europe, not be affected by adverse propaganda, and keep in step with the West.³³⁵

³³⁰ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46:2 (1993): 400.

³³¹ İnan, "Turkey and NATO," 77.

³³² İnan, "Turkey and NATO," 71.

³³³ Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," 89.

³³⁴ Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," 89-90.

³³⁵ Orkunt, "The Interalliance Relationship and Turkey," 90.

Orkunt, viewing Moscow as an 'orbit' that pulled states through 'adverse propaganda', situated the Soviets in opposition to the West—to the privileged and desired destination. Arguing that the alternative to being Western was "falling into Moscow's orbit", he built an either/or dichotomy between the two choices that he saw as mutually exclusive. He located Turkey within the Western group of states. The reasons behind such a division seemed unproblematic for Orkunt and he took them for granted, since such bifurcations were regarded as both natural and unchanging.

With reference to Turkey's role in NATO, Birgi stated that there were special requirements to fulfill in order to remain as part of Europe and NATO:

[I]f we are a part of Europe and if we are a member of the Atlantic Community, all that this necessitates should be carried out. The problem is beyond being an issue of pride or prestige. It is a matter of serving the needs of our foreign policy and of our basic interests.³³⁶

Birgi argued that being a part of Europe and NATO brought many responsibilities to the state. The fulfillment of the requirements of NATO membership were viewed as important in meeting the requirements of Turkish foreign policy and interests. Thus, Turkey's role identity was associated with a particular behavior. Birgi proceeded to express the appropriate behavior for Turkey's role identity as follows:

To become part of the community formed by the developed members of the Atlantic Community, which is the brain and main source of the present civilization where technology, industry, commerce and culture play an extremely important role, requires an early approach to their level of development. Otherwise, there are bound to be differences between us, and the effects of these differences will be felt at the most unexpected moments.³³⁷

³³⁶ Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic Community," 76.

³³⁷ Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic Community," 76.

The basic requirement, which was represented also as the prerequisite of Turkish foreign policy, was expressed as catching up with the Western 'level of development' in technological, industrial, commercial and cultural fields.³³⁸ For Birgi, this was the appropriate route to follow for a state that occupied a special place within the Atlantic Alliance. Such an approach identified the state "with a particular role...[which] limit[ed] its behavior in accordance with the expectations and demands that role generates".³³⁹

Necdet Tezel (former Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) viewed Turkey's role within the alliance with reference to Turkey's military capabilities and territorial and demographic advantages *vis-à-vis* other member states:

Among the Western European countries Turkey has the largest area. We are one of the five most populated Western European countries.

Turkey has the largest army in NATO after the United States and the largest frontiers with the Warsaw pact among all the NATO members.

Turkey's ability to ensure an effective defense in southern flank of NATO and to continue to play the important role as an element of stability in the region is closely connected with the rapid development of her economic and military capabilities. Turkey is spending great efforts in these fields.

Turkey spends from her budget each year large sums for defense purposes. We are among the leading countries in NATO with respect to the share of defense expenditures in the budget and in the gross national product.³⁴⁰

This perspective that stressed Turkey's 'unique qualities' in the military field, defined Turkey's role as 'an element of stability'—a vague yet lofty expression. The repetitive references to military sources also pointed to Turkey's great responsibility in the southern

³³⁸ Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic Community," p.76.

³³⁹ Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly* 37(1993): 274.

³⁴⁰ H.E.Necdet Tezel, Opening speech in the Seminar on Eastern Mediterranean Security: NATO Perspectives, 13-15 November 1985, İstanbul in *Foreign Policy* 13:1-2 (1986): 6.

flank, which aimed at showing how legitimate and appropriate Turkey's role in NATO was. Touching upon the defense spending with reference to its percentage in gross national product, both Turkey's deep commitment to the alliance and its indispensable role as a considerable force were emphasized.

In a different article, Turkey's geographical location was stressed as well, since it was deemed a significant element in according Turkey a particular role within the Alliance. İhsan Gürkan, a retired General, presented Turkey "as the most critical NATO country in the eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe".³⁴¹ The merits brought by Turkey's membership were further presented as follows: "Turkey's place within the Alliance makes supply routes to client states in Africa and the Middle East insecure".³⁴²

What all these statements share in common is that they employed concepts of the realist tradition such as 'national interest', 'common danger', 'deterrent force', 'effective defense', 'element of stability' and 'defense purposes'. All spoke of commitments, duties, functions and responsibilities, which indicate expectancy of a certain kind of foreign policy behavior. Additionally, Turkey's role was defined as an ally and a 'promoter of security' that emphasized military capabilities and responsibilities.³⁴³ NATO membership was presented as a 'role identity',³⁴⁴ which was constituted in opposition to the 'Soviet threat'. In this sense, Turkey occupied a position within the social normative structure of NATO that entailed particular "behavioral norms toward others possessing relevant

³⁴¹ İhsan Gürkan, "Security Environment in the Mediterranean," Seminar on Eastern Mediterranean Security, *Foreign Policy* 13:1-2 (1986): 32.

³⁴² Taşhan, "Turkey's Relations with the USA," 22.

³⁴³ Aggestam, "Role Conceptions," 16.

³⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227.

counter-identities”³⁴⁵ Thus, the reproduction of the ‘Soviet threat’ in various foreign policy texts and discourses became a means for reconstructing Turkey’s ‘unique’ position and identity.

5.4 Conclusion

The “standardized rules of interpretation”³⁴⁶ presented in the excerpts above account for the construction and maintenance of a particular identity of Turkey. Under these standardized discursive practices, a specific understanding of Turkey’s identity is internalized and institutionalized both in domestic and foreign politics, which in turn constitute a guide to foreign policy conduct. Turkish state identity was constructed in the first place with reference to its association with the ‘West’ and its differences from the ‘East’, which correspond to David Campbell’s lowercase ‘foreign policy’.³⁴⁷ This understanding of foreign policy refers to the politics of exclusion and inclusion; constituting particular “objects as ‘foreign’”³⁴⁸, as part of ‘them’, and particular others as part of ‘us’. After defining the self and other(s), Turkish foreign policy was conducted upon these specific actors. Turkey’s state identity was reproduced by diplomatic practices that corresponded to Campbell’s uppercase ‘Foreign Policy’.³⁴⁹ In an active process of interpretation, the authors espoused shared meanings of the circumstances and portrayed a particular picture of what they saw. In this way, discursive practices attempted to

³⁴⁵ Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 227.

³⁴⁶ Klein, “Beyond the Western Alliance,” 200.

³⁴⁷ David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 2nd rev.ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 68-69.

³⁴⁸ Campbell, Writing Security, 68-69.

construct, perpetuate and justify Turkey's identity, maintaining that Turkey belonged to the 'West'.

The 'Soviet threat' was the 'constitutive other' of Turkey's identification with the West. However, the statements above are far from answering what constituted the Soviet threat. Threats were presented as the ideology (communism) and military expansionism of the Soviet Union that were at the same time introduced as the *raison d'être* for establishing NATO. But the empirical grounds of this threat remain unclear. As Bradley Klein argues, "in the absence of reliable intelligence estimates was a series of discursively constructed claims about the nature of the Soviet totalitarian state and about its implacable global purposes".³⁵⁰ The arguments published in the journal Foreign Policy are in line with this understanding. They maintain that the Soviets produced a significant threat to the independence and integrity of Turkey. However, they introduced no credential for the capacity of the Soviet military 'threat'.

To reiterate Nizar Messari's argument, 'national political identity' is produced and reproduced after contact with both the allies and the enemies that constitute two groups of 'others'.³⁵¹ Turkey's identification with the NATO allies was a positive identification, whereas the Soviet Union as the 'enemy' constituted a negative identification for Turkey. The oppositions created in Turkish foreign policy discourse with reference to the 'Soviet threat' are appropriately presented in Michael Shapiro's words: "A self construed with a security-related identity leads to the construction of

³⁴⁹ Campbell, Writing Security, 69.

³⁵⁰ Klein, "How the West Was One," 313.

³⁵¹ Nizar Messari, "Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Islam in US Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, Vendulka Kubalkova ed. (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2001), 227.

otherness on the axis of threats...to that security”.³⁵² Following Shapiro, it could be argued that Turkey’s Cold War identity was a ‘security-related identity’ constructed upon the threat the Soviet Union supposedly produced. Differentiating the characteristics ascribed to the Soviets from those of Turkey’s, Turkey’s identity was represented by way of ‘what it was not’. On the other hand, “affirming the links and characteristics that make that specific other an ally”,³⁵³ Turkey’s identification with other NATO members was enhanced.

³⁵² Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 101-102.

³⁵³ Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” 227.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

Turkey's membership to NATO constitutes one of the milestones in the efforts to identify Turkey with the West during the Cold War. Building upon the argument that states' identities are constructed through the foreign policy discourses of elites, this thesis analyzed the construction of Turkey's Western identity through NATO discourse during the Cold War. The thesis maintained that Turkey's membership to NATO became instrumental in the efforts of the Turkish elite to locate Turkey on the side of Western nations in the face of the Soviet 'threat'. By ascribing cultural characteristics to the organization, the elites portrayed NATO membership as an indication of being a part of the 'West'. Thus, they represented Turkey as a member of the Western 'self', in opposition to the Eastern 'others' that were viewed as the Warsaw Pact countries. Drawing on these self/other representations in Turkish foreign policy, the thesis explored the social construction of the 'iron curtain' between the 'East' and the 'West', and how Turkey was depicted by foreign policy elites as playing its part on the Western scene.

The thesis suggested that states' foreign policies could be understood and studied in a new way different from conventional studies. State identity is employed as a useful analytical concept for studying the construction of Turkey's Western identity. It is maintained, however, that the concept of state identity does not have a fixed and stable definition, but is subject to social interaction and interpretation. Challenging mainstream International Relations theories, which take the state as a given and unitary entity, this thesis argued that states are socially constructed through foreign policy representations as well as practices. States are viewed as unfinished entities, always in a process of

reproduction. The construction of Turkey's Western identity is analyzed with reference to the foreign policy discourses on Turkey's membership to NATO during the Cold War. The thesis examined how NATO was widely viewed as an organization manifesting a Western collective identity. As such, the way Turkey's membership to the organization was represented as an indication of Turkey's 'Westernness' is analyzed.

Employing the constructivist theory in IR, this thesis adopted a sociological perspective to study International Relations. As stated above, constructivism is an approach that theorizes the world based on how human beings see the world, rather than explaining what is actually 'out there'. Constructivism argues that humans see the world through particular perspectives, and that what we see 'out there' is developed in interaction with others. It is an approach that examines the intersubjective dimension of human action that is directed towards lending significance to the world. As such, constructivism does not view reality as objective but as constructed through the interpretations and social interactions among actors.

Constructivist accounts of IR demonstrate how claims of truth are born out of historical understandings and social networks, how they are legitimized through discursive practices and operated in the service of particular ideologies to fashion structures of power and privilege. They offer a new way of seeing what is taken for granted by mainstream theories. Bringing issues such as the interaction between material and social factors and the significance of intersubjective understandings to the forefront, constructivism provides a useful framework for analyzing concepts such as identity, interests, norms and change, which have been central to this thesis. Instead of taking the

circumstances that constrain actors for granted, constructivism problematizes the making of these circumstances.

The study of the social construction of identities is a significant component of constructivist research, which this thesis is an example of. The thesis examined the social construction of identities—one of the central issues constructivism tries to apprehend. Identities, as products of deliberate calculation, are considered as situational and relational social constructs. The thesis analyzed identity formation with reference to the differences between essentialist and constructivist approaches. It pointed to the basic difference as the one-way causal logic of essentialist accounts that take identity as given. Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of political processes in the construction of identities, the mutual relationship between identity and interests and the malleability of identity. In this way, the thesis viewed identity not as an ever existing and unchanging phenomena like the essentialist approaches do, but observed the political motives behind its social construction. The thesis treated the concept of identity as a political issue (that is part of a representational practice through which the self-images of actors are constructed), rather than a taken-for-granted reality. The social construction of state identity is examined and used as an analytical concept in examining the construction of Turkey's Western identity.

Conceptions of identity guide action and mobilize foreign policy behaviors of states. These conceptions are produced through discourses. A discourse is defined as a specific meaning system wherein various actors' views are in continuous interaction. It is argued that the discourse of Westernization/modernization was the main axis of the meaning system created with regard to Turkey's NATO membership. Thus, the politics

of Westernizing the country revolved around the maintenance of the discourses of Westernization that maintained dedication to Western values. This is not to suggest that the discourse of Westernization went unchallenged, but that these discourses were articulated in a relatively autonomous realm, that is the policymaking realm, where policymakers had the power to privilege certain representations of Turkey's identity over others.

This thesis argued that representations of state identity produce particular manifestations of inter-state relations, for instance cooperation or conflict. It examined the role of foreign policy representations in the construction of state identity in general and Turkey's Western identity in particular. Foreign policy is examined as a boundary producing practice that draws the boundaries of the state's particular identity and secures it from 'others'. Accordingly, foreign policy is treated as representations depicting the state in particular ways. The thesis explored the foreign policy discourse that was implicated in the making of Turkey's Western identity. How the narrative of 'Soviet threat' in Turkish foreign policy discourse was a constitutive element in the creation and perpetuation of Turkey's Western identity is examined. In doing so, what this thesis has dealt with is not the physical existence of a 'Soviet threat', but the social construction and the meanings attached to such a 'threat'. Practices of representation and articulations of danger through foreign policy are examined as the basic means through which the reproduction of identity is achieved. It is demonstrated how creating an 'other' (Soviets) whose way of life was different from that of the self (Turkey) made it easier to draw the boundaries of Turkey's Western identity.

Turkey's foreign policy discourse was articulated by state elites, people responsible for the formulation and conduct of Turkish foreign policy. Since elites were able to frame the terms in which Turkey's foreign relations would be discussed, debated and acted upon, they had the discursive authority to fix meanings and identity in relatively stable ways. The way Turkey was represented is deeply indicative of the power of this political discourse. An example of Turkey's foreign policy discourse takes place in the journal Foreign Policy, as many of its contributors consist of Turkey's foreign policy elites. A major theme in this discourse has been the representations of Turkey's Western identity. Meanings attached to Turkey's NATO membership aimed at representing Turkey as a modern and civilized Western state. This reveals the way each elite is embedded in a particular meaning system.

The thesis has dealt with the 'East' and the 'West' not in terms of fixed geographical settlements, but as notions created through language practices. In this sense, the views arguing that the notions of the 'West' and the 'East' refer not simply to geographical divisions of the world, but to cultural compartments separated from each other by practices of exclusion are demonstrated. This thesis posed critical questions as to how binary oppositions were employed in the construction of Turkey's state identity during the Cold War. The foreign policy representations involved the privileging of the Turkish 'self' in the face of 'others'. These categories created within Turkish foreign policy discourse secured the boundaries of Turkey's Western identity. The 'superiority', 'rationality' and 'order' of the 'West' in opposition to the 'inferiority' 'irrationality' and 'disorder' of the 'East' were the self-confirming parameters of the Westernization discourse of Turkish foreign policy.

The discourse of inclusion/exclusion examined in the Turkish foreign policy texts of the Cold War illustrates the making of the Turkish 'self' in opposition to the communist 'others'. In these texts, the 'inside' and the 'outside' both constitute and undermine each other, as the notions of the 'other/outside' was a prerequisite for the constitution of the 'self/inside'. Thus, identity and difference are taken as intimately bound up with each other. The thesis examined how the symbols for Turkey's Western identity were sought in the 'West' where concepts such as democracy, civilization, and modernity were established. An active strategy of Westernization through incorporating Western institutions was a means of identification for Turkey with the 'West' while cutting of the ties with the 'East'. The border that separated Turkey from the 'East' was defined in ideological terms. This border separated Turkey's present from its past, order from chaos and modern from traditional. In this sense, the drawing of Turkey's eastern border during the Cold War was more of an ideological issue than a geographical undertaking. With their "value-references tied to binary oppositions",³⁵⁴ policymakers sided with the 'Western' side of the world's geographical compartments. With reference to its NATO membership, Turkey was defined in the category of liberal democratic states. NATO membership was regarded as a crucial step in the process of adopting the norms that were deemed relevant to becoming a Western state.

During the Cold War, identity was defined primarily along the East/West division that was designated through strategic lines. By means of 'static geographic

³⁵⁴ Nilüfer Göle, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity." Available from World Wide Web <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/bozdogan06.html>.

compartmentalizations'³⁵⁵ that divided the world into 'East' and 'West', those deemed different from the self were excluded from the process of socialization that brought about in-group cohesion. As argued above, Cold War politics in Turkey was conducted around the representations of the West as the 'self' and the East as the 'other'. In the post-Cold War era, however, identity is defined for the most part with respect to "historical, religious, cultural, and civilization-oriented" characteristics.³⁵⁶ Since the end of the Cold War, we have been witnessing a debate on new formulations of role and identity for the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey, having lost one of the foundations its identity was established upon (that is the East-West confrontation), has already taken its place in these debates.

Güven Erkaya (late Vice Admiral) argued that "the West...[was] in the happy role of victor" after the Cold War.³⁵⁷ Turkey, like other members of the Western security system, was "proud of having 'won' the Cold War".³⁵⁸ However, as the Communist 'other' and the perceived threat vanished in the early 1990s, Turkey's identification became questionable.³⁵⁹ The end of the Cold War brought about not only the eradication of the political boundaries between the 'East' and the 'West', but also an ambivalence as to what these geographical locations signified in meaning and content. With regard to its NATO membership, Turkey has lost its relatively stable identity of the Cold War years, since the role accorded to it—the 'southern bastion'—is no more viable. In other words,

³⁵⁵ Cederman, "Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs," 8.

³⁵⁶ Aybet and Bac, "Transformations in Security and Identity," 576.

³⁵⁷ Erkaya, "Turkey's Defense Requirements," 28.

³⁵⁸ Klein, "How the West Was One, 311.

³⁵⁹ Bilgin, "The Making of the 'Mediterranean' Region," 18,20.

Turkey's current place in the world in the aftermath of the Cold War is not as clear-cut as it was presented during the war.

Turkish foreign policy discourse during the Cold War articulated the basic points around which Turkey's place in the East/West confrontation was framed. NATO discourse illustrates the attempts to side with the 'West' and as such construct Turkey's Western identity. The 'Westernization' and 'Europeanization' of Turkey were expressed through participation in Western institutions and the adoption of ideas and manners from the West.³⁶⁰ Foreign policy discourses represented the adoption of Western political and administrative institutions as an indication that Turkey was a Western/European state. The theme of Westernization at the heart of NATO discourse during the Cold War has also been articulated with reference to Turkey's membership to European institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union. In the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, it is stated that

Turkey began "westernizing" its economic, political and social structures in the 19th century. Following the First World War and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, it chose Western Europe as the model for its new secular structure.

Turkey has ever since closely aligned itself with the West and has become a founding member of the United Nations, a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD and an associate member of the Western European Union. During the Cold War Turkey was part of the Western alliance, defending freedom, democracy and human rights. In this respect, Turkey has played and continues to play a vital role in the defense of the European continent and the principal elements of its foreign policy have converged with those of its European partners.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ Nilüfer Gölc, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity," available from world wide web <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/bozdogan06.html>. Accessed on 15.04.2002.

³⁶¹ Available from world wide web <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htm>. Accessed on 07.08.2002.

This excerpt indicates that Turkey's entering Western/European organizations was deemed a way of identifying the state with the West. Haluk Bayülken (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), for example, maintained that "[t]he Council of Europe is an institution within the movement of European integration which can only be participated in by democratic countries".³⁶² By way of Turkey's membership to the European Council, Bayülken represented the state as a democracy that is involved in the process of European integration. Osman Olcay (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) defined European Economic Community and NATO as the "cornerstones in our relations with the West".³⁶³ He further stated that "the significance of our membership in the Common Market...is in harmony with Atatürk's vision and our transitional political objectives" of becoming a Western state.³⁶⁴ In this way, membership to Western European organizations was deemed as manifesting a European identity.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) discourse, serving as a representational practice indicating Turkey's Europeanness replaced the NATO discourse of the Cold War. Representing Turkey as a European state through its long-lasting relations with the European Union and the efforts to make it a full member has become an extensive theme in Turkish foreign policy discourse. Turkey's 'just and legitimate place in Europe' has become the major theme of a far-reaching discourse in Turkish foreign policy especially after the Helsinki Summit of the EU (1999) where Turkey was recognized as a candidate for becoming a full member of the Union. Faruk

³⁶² Ü.Haluk Bayülken, "Turkey's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 3:1 (1973): 71.

³⁶³ Osman Olcay, "Turkey's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 1:2 (1971): 80.

³⁶⁴ Olcay, "Turkey's Foreign Policy," 81.

Loğoğlu (ambassador, then Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) argued that

The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 ushered a new era in the relations between Turkey and the EU....Helsinki was in a way proof of the Turkish society's European vocation and vindication of its constant quest over the past centuries for modernity and progress.³⁶⁵

As such, Turkey's recognition as a candidate to membership to the EU is represented as 'evidence' that Turkey was successful in its quest for 'modernity and progress', which are traditional Western categories. Turkey's 'constant quest' for EU membership is represented as a long-lasting effort that has begun many centuries ago. Thus, Turkey's association with the West is bolstered and represented as 'natural'.

This is not to suggest that elite discourses misrepresent the world, and that they show things differently than they actually are. This thesis argued that things come to be known the way they are represented to us. Politics of representation might reveal some 'truths', while concealing some others. In this regard, what this thesis suggested is not that there is one Turkey with a single and homogenous identity. Rather, it examined the processes through which Turkey's identity was understood and represented by foreign policy elites in a particular way.

Just as Turkish foreign policy representations that focus on Turkey's NATO membership were central to the constitution and maintenance of Turkey's Western identity during the Cold War, the EU discourse has become the underlying theme of Turkey's Europeanness in recent years. Turkey is now trying to enter the European

³⁶⁵ Faruk Loğoğlu, "Our Membership in the European Union," *Foreign Policy* 26: 1-2 (2001): 1.

Union. So long as identities are defined along binary oppositions that entail antagonism toward the 'other', policymakers will need to challenge new 'others'.

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