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Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu

PARAMETERS AND STRATEGIES OF ISLAM–STATE INTERACTION IN REPUBLICAN TURKEY

Against a historical background marked by “the most radical secular revolution of any state in the Muslim world,”¹ the Turkish state over the past decade has faced an Islamic fundamentalist challenge to its secular basis. The Turkish version of radical Islam, like that elsewhere in the Middle East, has asserted itself effectively in all aspects and at all levels of society, making a stark contrast between the sixty years of the republic and the period since 1980. It is not surprising, therefore, that the causes for the emergence of Islamic political radicalism, its nature, and its possible effects on the system have aroused scholarly interest.

The fundamental contentions of this article are twofold. First and foremost, it is the Turkish state, not the initiative and self-sustenance of grassroots Islam, that has been the most important determinant of the political role of Islam and its relevance in politics throughout the republic. Without necessarily subscribing to an elitist position that would deny the capacity of the masses to stage an Islamic uprising against state authority, it is nonetheless reasonable to assert that the state elite has been in a singular position to influence and structure the political course and discourse of Islam in republican Turkey. Beginning with the transition to a multiparty system in 1946, the secular bureaucracy adopted strategies to marginalize and delegitimize the public role of Islam. Since then, the directive role of the state can better be defined in terms of continuity than of discontinuity. Second, although secular nationalist politics has always been in a position to define the parameters of political discourse, the strategic relationship it has maintained with Islam is more dynamic and complicated. Islam was not simply banished and excluded from the official public sphere. Without changing its basic secularist stance, the Turkish state adopted a double discourse: on the one hand, establishing rigid segregation between Islam and the public political realm; on the other, accommodating and incorporating Islamic politics into the system in various ways.

This article further intends to demonstrate that perceiving the re-emergence of Islam over the past decade as a result of the bankruptcy of the Kemalist modernization project—the project central to the ideology of the republic, named after the founder, Kemal Atatürk—oversimplifies the relationship of Islam to the state. The bankruptcy debate views the rise of radical Islam in Turkey since 1980 as the result of the dramatic diminution of the state’s capacity to dominate and control Islam, a

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process that has been under way for nearly half a century. Proponents of this view claim that the radical break with the past, even more manifest since 1980, has been triggered by the failure of the Kemalist policy of Westernization. In this analysis, secular nationalist politics and Islam are portrayed as polar opposites with two simple modalities of interaction: at periods when Kemalism falls short of achieving its goal of Westernization, Islam tends to rise. As a corollary to that, this analysis frames two conditions—one in which the state totally banishes Islam from the strategic field of politics; the other in which Islam overwhelms and defeats the state, forcing it into accommodation.

This pure model of causality, shared by a cross-section of political analysts with conflicting ideological views,² can be taken as evidence of the influence of the liberal intellectual tradition of social change on Turkish political intellectuals. In line with the dichotomy presented by this paradigm, which suggests an insoluble tension between tradition and modernity, the “bankruptcy” and “discontinuity” perspectives describe an ultimate incongruence between Kemalist modernization and Islam as the chief marker of traditional culture. However, despite the extensive failures of the official modernization project, and the obvious power and assertiveness of present-day radical Islam, the recent tide of Islam in Turkey cannot be understood in terms of Kemalism versus Islamic rhetoric. Instead, one must understand the contingent relationship between the two. This implies that the historical role of Islam cannot be reduced to a simple pattern of resisting and subverting the Westernization process of the republic. Just as the modern secular machinery has historically been compelled to put Islam at the center stage of politics in order to control and minimize its political appeal, Islamic political platforms have also been tainted by elements of Western cosmology, to which they were supposed to provide alternative responses.

This article will show that it has been the Turkish state’s secular character that has defined and set limits on the complex relationship between politics and Islam. In the state’s pursuit of this strategy toward Islam, however, the pendulum has swung within broad margins, moving from repression to accommodation. Thus, the post-1980 period represents yet another modality in a series of complex interactions between Islam and the state.

The enduring capacity of the state to uphold a double discourse with regard to Islam can best be explained by the successful development of a corporate character of Kemalism throughout the republic. Despite changes in the cadres, structures, and power configurations of the state, as well as changes in regime types in the course of the republic, the chief concern of republican nationalism has remained the preservation of the status quo and the manipulation of control. This article will examine the state–Islam relationship mainly from the perspective of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the Kemalist state, modernity, democracy, and secularism, relationships hotly debated at present that deserve separate analyses.

THE OTTOMAN LEGACY

Turkey’s early republican era was the immediate heir to many institutional and intellectual structures and traditions of the 19th-century Ottoman Empire, in particular the secularizing influence of the Tanzimat period (1839–76). Reforms made in the spheres of civilian and military bureaucracy, education, and the judiciary

aimed to strengthen the central state and arrest its decline and disintegration while weakening the religious establishment. Given that the high-ranking religious functionaries, the *ulama*—together with the civilian and military bureaucracy—were part of the state cadres, and that the main source of the state’s legitimacy was in the final instance its observance of the *shari‘a* (religious law), the Tanzimat’s secular modernization caused a serious split within the state between the *ulama* and the other bureaucratic elements. Furthermore, in what became a central impetus to the republican drive to both repress and manipulate Islam, Tanzimat reforms provided the conditions under which the *ulama* could align themselves with popular Islam at the folk level, which itself was characterized by heterodoxy.

This heterodoxy had always been a source of concern to the Ottoman central state.³ Aggravating this tension were the Sufi *tarikats*—organizations or schools set up to search for “divine truth” by using mysticism in their teachings and rituals. Historically speaking, the *tarikats*’ importance to the state arose from the political role they played at the community level by synthesizing the traditional counterculture and its animosity toward the state and producing centrifugal tendencies.

As the secularizing reforms and the political turmoil of the Tanzimat period produced a lacuna for ordinary people in terms of the traditional Muslim idiom of conduct and social relations,⁴ the tendency of the central political authority to contain heterodoxy and the Sufi *tarikats* gained extra momentum. Policies to limit the influence of *tarikats* ranged from closing them down to granting them patronage, establishing a recurrent pattern in the state–*tarikat* relationship that has endured into the 20th century. Another target of frequent repression were the Alevis, who belonged to a sect that was separate from Sunni orthodoxy and represented the Turkish version of Shi‘ism. Fearful of Shi‘a subversion within the empire, orthodox Sunni Islam was constantly alert for Shi‘ism.

How did Islam react to the central state’s political designs during the 19th century? The major political movement embracing Islam emerged in the 1860s among one faction of an intellectual movement known as the Young Ottomans. The Young Ottomans represented a wide spectrum of ideas, ranging from constitutional liberalism and modernist Islam to proto-Turkism—the genesis of radical Turkish nationalism—and socialism.⁵ The Islamist faction within the Young Ottomans, without denying the superiority of European methods in administration, technology, and science, ascribed the decline of the empire to its deviation from the *Shari‘a* and its resorting to the secular reforms of the Tanzimat. They ultimately intended to strengthen the Ottoman state through an Islamic revival. Not surprisingly, during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909), the state again attempted to use Islam as a unifying ideology—if only to rally the remaining Muslim populations behind it. The Hamidian use of Pan-Islamism as a political formula to save the empire also proved futile due to the ineffectiveness of its mobilizing power against the force of nationalism.

THE WAR OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE (1919–22) AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC

From 1922 to 1924, the government abolished the sultanate, the caliphate, the office of *Şeyh-ül-Islam* (the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire), and

the shari‘a courts. Between 1925 and 1930, religious orders and the fez (Ottoman–Muslim head gear for men) were outlawed. Swiss civil codes, Italian penal codes, and the Latin alphabet were adopted. In 1928, the second article of the 1924 constitution—which designated Islam as the state religion—was annulled, and the principle of secularism was inserted into the constitution in 1937.

The unique features of Turkish secularism were epitomized by the creation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, attached to the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry, and designed for the interpretation and execution of an enlightened version of Islam—which could be termed “state Islam”—through its civil-service personnel, notably imams. These prayer leaders were to graduate from state schools and serve in the mosques, which were owned and operated by the Directorate of Evkaf.⁶ The Ankara government never intended to separate the temporal and spiritual realms in the sense of the biblical maxim “render unto Caesar that which belongs to Caesar, and unto God that which belongs to God.” Instead, Islam, institutionalized in the form of a government agency, was integrated into the government structure, quite in keeping with the Ottoman pattern of including ulama within the state. It was, however, stripped of its original meaning in the Ottoman bureaucracy and reduced to a subservient role.

From the beginning, there was a fundamental tension between official nationalism and Islam, emanating from the opposite positions the two ideologies took vis-à-vis Western modernization. In the formative years of the republic, in the first quarter of the 20th century, agents of nationalism were the military officers and the civilian bureaucrats who, as the carriers of Tanzimat reforms, had always been much more open to Western influence. The project they chose, Kemalism, manifested a modern cosmology derived from the Enlightenment. The modernist position of Mustafa Kemal and his cadres involved a firm belief in nationalism as a specifically “modern” phenomenon, which was best represented by European rationalism. For the republican bureaucrats, nationalism became more than an emancipating force: it became a project to subvert the existing cosmology and relations of subordination. Collapsing nationalism into a gigantic project of Westernization was neither accidental nor terribly incoherent; on the contrary, it must have been a conscious political choice to put the bureaucracy into a position of leading and harnessing the establishment of capitalism and a modern state. From the very beginning, nationalist politics in the republic adopted the simultaneous goals of “modernizing” and “controlling” the polity. It is this chain of causality that made Turkish nationalism overtly political and militant.

The secularization process was instrumental in underpinning the transformation at which nationalist politics aimed on both the cultural and political levels. On the first level, secularism became entangled with the definition of the nation as a homogeneous, uni-ethnic (Turkish), uni-linguistic (Turkish), and uni-sectarian (Sunni) entity. However, the crucial aspect of transformation at this level was the need for reliance on the individual’s cultural markers—including religion—as the building blocks of the new construct, the nation. In Benedict Anderson’s terminology, the Kemalist project of Western-style Enlightenment attempted to achieve the difficult task of making individuals come to “imagine” themselves as part of a nation and identify themselves within that “imagined community” of Turkey. This was to take

place without any inheritance of older cultural meanings, the strongest of which was being a Muslim. To that end, the state manipulated the idea of individual identity by encouraging the severance of all links with Islam, “the only source of common identity, superseding an abstraction like the nation.”⁷ Islam was viewed as an inferior cultural marker when compared with a modern Turkish identity based on the principle of citizenship endowed with universal rights. The dilemma posed by the behind-the-scenes role of Islam in shaping the social existence of the individual would be solved through the diffusion of secular ideas. Culture, in other words, became integral to nationalist politics because of the regime’s need to establish popular legitimacy. Through this prism, Islam constituted a threat, because Kemalist Westernization relied primarily on changing the attitudes of individuals whose communal self-identity and emotional security had heretofore been provided by Islam.

Creating a new secularist culture to take the place of the old Islam-oriented one was an onerous and artificial task, causing the crucial problem of legitimacy that the Kemalist elite solved in the early stages by incorporating themes of popular culture and Islamic religion into nationalist discourse. During the War of National Independence (1919–22), which preceded the founding of the republic, Islamic discourse was used as a unifying theme to rally the local Anatolian notables, religious leaders, and the peasantry. The pragmatic manner in which secular nationalists recruited Islam for legitimation is illustrated by the way in which they presented the war against occupying Western forces and the Ottoman state: as a jihad,⁸ or holy war.

In its drive for cultural homogenization and secularization, the Kemalist ruling elite also sought to preclude the possibility of future ethnic and sectarian strife between Turks and Kurds and between the majority Sunnis and the minority Alevis. Events of the 1970s demonstrated the far-sightedness of that concern.

On the level of political transformation, secularization was instrumental in sustaining the political domination of the Kemalist ruling class, which consisted of the same elements as the Ottoman ruling elite, but without the *ulama*. Although an “established Islam” remained, it was integrated into the bureaucracy—a move designed to separate the public–political and private–spiritual realms, thereby weakening a possible move by remnants of the Ottoman *ulama* to mobilize Islam against the regime. In the phase that began following the Kemalist military victory in 1922, and gained impetus after the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1924, the state’s paramount goal was to effect a radical rupture with the *ancien régime*. The abolition of the caliphate, the office of *Şeyh-ül-Islam*, the Ministry of Shari‘a and Religious Foundations, the shari‘a courts, and the system of religious schools were measures intended to consolidate the political power, if not the historical legitimacy, of the new regime.

The state directed its most repressive strategy toward Islam against the Sufi *tarikats* that had remained active after their abolition in 1925, because the ruling elite felt increasingly threatened by these institutions. Their perception was not only justified but magnified by a series of revolts that began with the *Şeyh Sait* uprising in the east in 1925, which was basically an ethnic Kurdish rebellion with religious undertones. This was followed in 1930 by another uprising in the town of Menemen in western Turkey, where the disciples of the *Nakşibendi* order attacked

and beheaded a young reserve officer serving as a schoolteacher. The clearest effect of these insurgencies was a radicalization of the state's response to political opposition, leading to a new phase of militant secularism. This in turn found resonance in the harsher tone employed by Kemal Atatürk toward Islam and the *tarikats*: "The Turkish republic cannot be a country of sheikhs, dervishes, devotees, and lunatics. The truest and the most authentic *tarikats* is that of civilization";⁹ "none of us needs the guidance of 'tekkes',¹⁰ we derive our strength from civilization and science."¹¹

A third strategy toward Islam revolved around an understanding of "double Islams." By distinguishing between an Islam "more complicated, artificial and consisting of superstitions"¹² and one that "does not oppose consciousness or preclude progress,"¹³ Atatürk set in motion the republican tradition of employing Islam to promote the ideas and policies of the secular state. By portraying the latter type of Islam as mild and rationalist, and by leaving intact the secular parameters of the republic, he gave signs of Islam's instrumental position in official ideology: "our religion is fitting reality, intellect and logic"¹⁴ and it is "the most reasonable and the most natural religion."¹⁵

Atatürk identified the former mode of Islam with the reactionary, orthodox, pro-state religion of the *ulama* of the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, he employed the latter to justify official secular commitments on platforms such as modern education, sexual equality, and technological and infrastructural investments: "if Islam and Turkish history are studied, it will be seen that thousands of constraints we assume to restrict us do not exist. In Turkish social life women have definitely never been behind men in science, technology and other aspects."¹⁶ Although the militant phase of secularism that began after 1930 made such recourse to Islam unnecessary and irrelevant, the state, especially the military bureaucracy, has found it politically expedient at certain times since the advent of the multiparty era to appeal to what is popularly perceived to be nationalized Islam in order to legitimize official policy or conduct.

In summary, early republican strategy toward Islam showed two trends—one repressive; the other blending the ideals of secular nationalism with Islamic symbols. The illegitimacy of secular nationalism was the most important historical context producing the appeal of Islam. One way in which the regime coped with this dilemma was by showing limited concern for popular legitimacy; the other was by making a tactical recourse to Islam without undermining the secularizing mission of nationalism. However, the manner in which the state elite employed Islam to fend off opposition—and, in fact, to reinforce the regime—went beyond the meaning of secularism in the West. Rather than being banished from the public political sphere, Islam came to rest at the center stage of politics, and secularism became a politically charged concept.

STATE AND ISLAM IN THE MULTIPARTY PERIOD

The Democratic Party (1950–60)

After World War II, the changing balance of internal and international forces hastened the introduction of competitive party politics. A new center-right political party, the Democratic Party (DP), claiming to represent the periphery against the

secular bureaucratic intelligentsia, came to power in 1950 and stayed there until it was overthrown in a military coup in 1960. In assessing the overall record of the DP in terms of its control over Islam, one must consider three pieces of evidence suggesting that this was a party that shared the commitment of the republican state elite to modernization and progress via secularization, and aimed to achieve this by keeping a tight reign on Islam through the civil-military bureaucracy. More importantly, the same evidence emphasizes that the movement that has been characterized as a revival or resurgence of Islam in the 1950s¹⁷ posed neither a major nor a political challenge to the system.

To begin with, there is no doubt that the positivist-Westernist aspects of secularism were well received by the political support base of the DP. Since the party was basically free-market oriented with a strong dose of Kemalist etatism, its power base consisted of large numbers of landowners and peasants in the more developed regions of Turkey who had been hard-hit by the extensive emergency powers of the Republican People's Party (RPP; the single party of the republic until 1946) government during the war. In addition to the poverty in rural areas that was induced by wartime controls, the confidence of the big farmers in the party had been shattered by the RPP's introduction of the Land Reform Bill in 1945, which broke up big estates and nationalized farms over a certain size. Other strong DP supporters had included urban business and mercantile interests that had made quick wartime profits and had no intentions of returning to interventionist RPP policies in the postwar economy.¹⁸

For these diverse and pluralistic elements making up the power base of the DP, Islam did not represent a political ideology (either in support of or in opposition to the ruling coalition) but, rather, a cultural tradition.¹⁹ The most revealing evidence of this was the nature of the demands made by the rural masses of their party.²⁰ The DP, in power, introduced voluntary religious courses into primary schools; it re-established religious radio broadcasts and the call to prayer in Arabic; it set up *İmam-Hatip Lycées* (prayer-leader and preacher schools) parallel to the secular schooling system; and it established the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University. These were hardly the kind of changes aimed at dismantling the secular state. In any case, some of these permissive measures had already been initiated by the RPP in 1947. What they achieved, however, was to lend legitimacy to Islam and traditional culture in the context of the official politics of the country. After the single party had downgraded the position of culture in politics, the DP, for instrumental rather than ideological reasons, reinstated them.

On the whole, the accusation that the DP was soft on Islam is unconvincing. The party took an unflinchingly tough stand against the anti-Atatürk activities of one *tarikât*, the *Ticanis*. It pursued court cases against reactionaries, Islamist publications, and Saidi Nursi, the leader of the influential and conservative *Nurcu* group. Moreover, it closed down the Nationalists' Association of Turkey, an ultranationalist body, and passed an "Atatürk Bill" to fight the anti-Kemalists.²¹ All these measures confirm the hypothesis that the DP's policy of giving respectability to the traditional culture and Islam did not involve any loss in the scope or intensity of state control over religion.

The second piece of evidence supporting the claim that the DP's position vis-à-vis Islam remained within the broad parameters set by the founding cadres of the

republic can be found in its pragmatist streak. Promoting religion for electoral success was a novel process arising out of the vicissitudes of the political landscape of the 1950s. Lacking a previously cultivated power base at the grassroots, or in the bureaucracy by means of patron–client networks, the DP took steps to appeal to traditional Muslim sentiment for political gain. During the 1957 elections, the DP was faced with economic failures and rising unpopularity, and so tried to enlist the support of the tarikats and the Nurcus.²²

Third, what some refer to as the accommodating approach of the DP toward religion actually served the goals of the state, because it helped the party maintain its political hierarchy, political unity, and national security. Under relatively liberal and prosperous conditions, and with the process of modernization accelerating in the 1950s, Turkish society evolved toward structural and political disparity and diversity. Feeling threatened by the propensity of the political opposition to organize around social class, the secular state resorted to the nonsecular use of religion for checking and blocking communism. This fact was attested to by a well-known current fundamentalist intellectual when he stated: “in the post-1950 transformation the Muslims in Turkey were given a right-wing mission . . . but the legal restrictions which İsmet Paşa [the leader of the opposition party, the RPP] had brought onto Muslims were not lifted. Only the call to prayer was to be Arabic again, but the extremities in the penal code [which outlawed the exploitation of religion for political purposes] remained intact. . . . In the DP’s time, Muslims were not protected in a real sense.”²³

The “Secularizing” Function of Islam and the Military Regime (1960–61)

In many ways, the first coup in the Turkish Republic, in 1960, represented a watershed in its politics, particularly with regard to the role of Islam. The new constitution of 1961 incorporated measures of liberal democracy and political pluralism in reaction to the policies of the DP, which had turned increasingly authoritarian. In discussing the politics of Islam over the two succeeding decades, two points must be clarified. First, political liberalization and democratization in this period facilitated the rising voice and salience of political Islam in national issues, conflicts, and policy processes. The genesis of political versus cultural Islam lies in the formation, in 1969, of the first pro-Islamic political party of the republic,²⁴ whose life span has extended, with interruptions, to the present. Second, however, the growing political appeal and autonomy of Islam did not mean that the state ceased to exercise its control over Islam, only that the regime saw how it could use the popularity of the Islamic movement to its advantage and so became more accommodating to the movement.

Not unlike the state-building elite during the War of National Liberation, the military government between 1960 and 1961 used Islam as an underlying ideological principle of its reform platform. Reminiscent of Atatürk’s early rationalist-positivist appraisal of the mass appeal of the state-interpreted version of Islam, the military junta leader, General Cemal Gürsel, took up the cause of praising Islam not only to secure the political and moral legitimacy of the military regime but

also to check against any reactionary upsurge using Islam: “Those who blame religion for our backwardness are wrong,” he said. “No, the cause of our backwardness is not our religion but those who have misrepresented our religion to us. Islam is the most sacred, most constructive, most dynamic and powerful religion in the world.”²⁵ The military, in short, continued the state’s political tradition of distinguishing between two Islams—one secular and dispassionate, the other reactionary. Based on this line of reasoning, the state focused on training progressive and secular imams and other civil-servant religious cadres to deliver sermons urging political support for its objectives. That this was motivated by a synthetic but pragmatic concern is clear. Enlightened Islam was regarded as the best bulwark against communism and religious fanaticism.

*Political Functions of Religion for the “Liberal”–Conservative Line:
The Justice Party Period (1961–80)*

The Justice Party (JP), heir to the DP, conceived the place and role of religion in politics in a way remarkably similar both to the secular outlook of the military regime that preceded it and to the rationalist–positivist ideas of Atatürk. The party dominated political life for the following decade and a half (1965–80), either on its own or as part of a ruling coalition.

The JP formulated and resolved the question of the political role of Islam under three constraints. To begin with, the party was limited by its liberal–Westernist stance, which tied the legitimacy of the political system to popular sovereignty and eliminated Islam from the public sphere: “we want a Turkey . . . where . . . the barracks, school and mosque should be freed from politics . . . and where there is respect for the religion, beliefs and religious conduct of the citizen.”²⁶ Thus, by postulating a neat fit between tradition and modernity, and between Western civilization and religiosity, the party stemmed all potential opposition to its modernization platform. As a result, like its military–Kemalist predecessor, the JP supported and built new İmam-Hatip schools to train enlightened men of religion. Süleyman Demirel, the party leader, voiced this Kemalist concern for Westernization when he stated: “Is civilization atheism, immorality, decadence, undisciplined behavior? . . . Since the religious organization is placed within the state apparatus, Muslims expect the state to fulfill religious functions. The unrest stems from the state not satisfying the people in this sphere. . . . [N]othing was done for nearly 30 years to train enlightened religious personnel.”²⁷ Whereas there were only twenty-six such schools in the early republic up until 1965, the JP opened forty-six new İmam-Hatip schools between 1965 and 1971, when it was in sole power, and 147 between 1975 and 1977, when it led the ruling coalition.²⁸

The second constraint on JP policies regarding official Islam was the pressure exerted by the armed forces, which, during the two decades the JP was in power, exercised substantial power to sanction and intervene in the political process, and did so in both 1971 and 1980. Being heir to a party overthrown by the military in 1960, the JP was never free of the intellectual and pragmatic challenge of having to distinguish its political image from that of its predecessor in the eyes of the civil military elite. While not radically departing from the periphery-oriented traditional

discourse of the DP, the JP sought a more secular-liberal identity, and this had direct consequences on the form and substance of its policy toward Islam. In this regard, the exceptionally rapid socioeconomic development, increasing prosperity, and welfare benefits that the JP governments managed to bring about in the 1960s helped the party increase its legitimacy within the secular-bureaucratic elite.

Finally, beginning in the late 1960s until the most recent intervention by the military in 1980, Islam became an exceptionally powerful weapon against communism in the hands of the JP and its right-wing allies. What gave impetus to this development was the growing social tension emerging from the uneven impact of industrialization during the 1960s. The old center-periphery cleavage tended to be superimposed onto a left-right division with corresponding sets of ideologies, while both the left and the right acquired a religious connotation. Whereas communists were placed in the anti-Islam front, which could include liberals in favor of political pluralism, anticommunism became an ingrained component of the radical conservatism of which Islam was a part.²⁹

As a result, the JP adopted a policy of implanting a new genre of politically conservative technocrats, mainly engineers of provincial background and Islamist persuasion, in the bureaucracy and some political posts in an attempt to close the cultural schism between its rural provincial popular base and the state elite. However, the role and impact of these Muslim technocrats were largely limited by the fact that they never intended to subvert the existing hierarchies. To the extent that their primary aim became the increased efficiency and effectiveness of the state, they acted within the parameters set by Kemalist nationalism and remained a subculture within the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, in the following decades their power and influence expanded.

All in all, the JP's policies concerning Islam did not clash with the long-evolving policies promoting the state's *raison d'être*: secularism, capitalist development, and modernization. This "macro stand" necessitated adopting a double discourse regarding Islam. The first discourse incorporated strict secularism on the official level and excluded Islam from the public sphere by declaring it irrelevant for political and economic development. The second, however, meant taking a more permissive stand concerning issues of personal piety. As part of this movement to recognize Islam as a respectable form of piety and morality, Süleyman Demirel was the first prime minister to institutionalize the prime minister's Friday congregational prayer, conducted with an entourage of traditionalist deputies from within the party. The party's relations with the *tarikats* and also with *Nurcus* revolved around the central issue of cultivating electoral support. In the final analysis, these seemingly conflicting official policies toward Islam did not negate republican norms. In fact, this double discourse probably constituted a firmer guarantee for long-term stability, because it satisfied the aspirations of both the hard-line Kemalist secularist camp and the provincial-rural periphery that formed the safe support base of the JP.

The 1970s: Toward New Modes of Co-optation

The emergence and impact on the regime of the pro-religious Turkish political parties that have succeeded one another from 1969 to the present reaffirms the basic

premise of this article that throughout the lifetime of the republic, it has been the state that has steered the political course and discourse of organized expressions of political Islam. True enough, these parties represent the Islamic opposition of the grassroots movements against the secular Kemalist state. It is also true that Islamic movements have succeeded in promoting the importance of Islam in Turkish politics. Nonetheless, the genesis and development of the two most important of these political parties, the National Salvation Party (NSP; 1972–81), and its successor, the Welfare Party (WP; 1981 to present), depended more on the organizing principles of the dominant culture and institutions of politics (i.e., Kemalism) than on the moral and political aspirations of their followers. This thesis will now be examined within the framework of two limited aspects of the NSP: its power base and discourse.

The power base for the NSP emanated from the Muslim Sufi *tarikats* and Islam on a popular level. A distinctive feature of the NSP's *tarikat*-based support was the existence of a strong body of *Nakşibendis* throwing their organizational weight behind the party. This was the first time in Turkish politics that *tarikats* had played a crucial role in backing a pro-religious political party. However, the *tarikats* soon withdrew their support on the grounds that the party had been co-opted by the political system, especially after it formed a coalition with the social-democratic RPP in 1974. Furthermore, the *tarikats* accused the party of deviating from true Islamic principles and adopting the norms of the prevailing regime.³⁰

The next level of the NSP constituency, too, cannot be examined without considering the extent of state influence. The standard argument for the genesis of political Islam in the 1970s emphasizes economic grievances³¹ along with the cultural alienation of small merchants, businessmen, and artisans.³² Traditional–conservative elements in the periphery, often culturally alienated and economically deprived, have been depicted as the natural electoral base for the party.³³ This argument contends that, as socialist ideology became palatable to a large proportion of the working class, perhaps threatening the very existence of Islam, Islam became a platform for rallying both socioeconomic and cultural discontent.³⁴

It is true that both the NSP and the WP, its successor in the post–1980 era, scored the highest percentage of votes in the least developed regions in eastern Anatolia.³⁵ Some would also argue that the rise of the NSP demonstrates the limits of secular nationalist politics, so that, as was shown in the March 1994 local elections, when the official ideology suffers a setback due to the failure of governments, Islamist political parties rise in popularity. Despite the elements of truth in this view, it is incomplete without considering the impact of Kemalist policies on the development of the NSP–WP line. There are two levels at which the imprint of Kemalist secular development on the NSP and WP can clearly be seen. The first is the changing and broadening clientele of the religious parties; the second is their discourse. It must be noted that the NSP not only appealed to the disenchanting traditional sectors but also to voters in the most rapidly developing areas.³⁶ One interpretation of this empirical evidence is that the massive expansion of modern secular education and economic development led to rising expectations on the part of these segments, which were unfulfilled by existing political parties or other organizations.

In this sense, the party voiced “not the reaction of the tradition but the protest of those who wanted a large political and economic role in the expanding world of

modernity.”³⁷ In the case of the WP, this feature of its power base is even more pronounced. The party, unlike the NSP, has been broadening its constituency to include youth, women, and those who have been suffering under the economy’s market conditions since 1980. A leader for change within the WP has defended this catch-all strategy as an effort to “[transcend] the statist and status-quoist line of the party.”³⁸ Still another prominent leader, formerly the head of the Istanbul party organization and now the mayor of Istanbul, has confirmed the need to diversify the power base on the grounds that a homogeneous constituency would limit the party “and cut down the effectiveness of its universal message.”³⁹ It is, however, this pragmatism that has caused a controversy over the Islamist stance of the party.⁴⁰

Having to cope with a new genre of clients, one that is more oriented toward modern aspirations, the two parties dealt with this dilemma by using a political discourse heavily influenced by Kemalist tenets. Not surprisingly, both parties developed a double discourse by espousing a combination of religious and non-religious, or “pragmatic with value-laden” themes,⁴¹ to bridge the gap between traditional elements in society who held deep religious beliefs and a nationalist-conservative outlook, and the modern aspirations of its diverse power base. To the first group, the NSP–WP tradition fitted in with its advocacy of a return to a strict Islamic polity in terms of moral and religious values. The two parties appealed to the other group with a program of scientific and technological development, industrialization, and social-justice-oriented redistributive policies.

The overall effect of this double discourse was an avoidance of radicalism. Rethinking modernity in light of Islamic maxims, the NSP–WP continuum adopted a reformist posture and operated within the system rather than trying to bring about a radical transformation of society along the lines of the shari‘a. Furthermore, despite their refutations and private denials, officials of both parties publicly supported secularism and paid homage to the principles of popular sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, political pluralism, human rights, and individual liberties.

The overwhelming internal influence of the Turkish state ruled out any possibility of a threat to its authority and legitimacy emanating from the NSP in the 1970s, when the party and the Islamic movement, due to the difficulties imposed by having to operate against the system from within, were amenable to state co-optation. Whether or not the same conclusion holds true for the political Islam of the 1980s and 1990s is a critically important question worth examining closely.

THE POST–1980 PERIOD: THE STATE AND THE STRATEGY OF THE ISLAMIZATION OF SECULARISM

The Substance and Power Base of Radical Islam

It should be stated at the outset that one essential feature of Turkey’s political Islam, which is also common in neighboring Islamic countries, is its lack of unity and coherence. There are a range of Islamic groups and platforms expressing different interests, priorities, goals, and sentiments. Despite its diversity, “modern political Islam has become a dominant idiom in the politics and culture of the region.”⁴² As such, the use of this “idiom” in reference to an Islamic movement in its entirety should not be taken as an attempt to obscure its plural character.

Since the military's intervention in politics in 1980, the form, substance, and power base of the Islamic movement—and more important, state policy toward it—have changed radically. The secular left and right are alarmed by the increasing manifestations of Islam as a radical religiopolitical movement claiming to be a political alternative to Kemalism, socialism, and capitalism, and the end of the historical tradition of Islam's identifying itself with the status quo. Indeed, one primary characteristic of Turkish radical Islam is its critical outlook toward all other expressions of Islam, including the Sufi *tarikats*, the pro-Islamic line of established political parties, the pro-state orthodox Islam of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and popular Islam. Instead, in an ideological and political tone, the new Islamic stance calls for a restoration of the Islamic spirit and the dismantling and re-establishment of the state on the basis of the *shari'a*. It also crystallizes new Islamic answers to issues of Westernization, independence, sovereignty, women's rights, and the distribution of power within the state.

The power base of the new Islam in Turkey has been an important element in its successful articulation of contemporary materialist values encompassed within an abstract ideology. It consists of young people educated in second-rate secular institutions, urban- rather than rural-born, upwardly mobile and desperately in need of an identity and economic security that a crisis-ridden Turkish economy can offer at only meager levels. Popular Islam, which in the past had allowed one to combine personal devotion to Islam with political secularism, has been transformed into an ideologically hardened Islam. There is a parallel in Turkey with what Sami Zubeida observed of fundamentalists in other countries of the Middle East in terms of the process through which the discourse of Islamists is transformed: "their ideas are not extensions of traditional loyalties and cultures, but modern creations, constructed in relation to current politics. . . . This religious piety can only attach to modern Islamic politics precisely because it has been detached from its traditional anchoring in village, mosque and brotherhood."⁴³

There is, however, one major characteristic of Turkish radical Islam that distinguishes it from earlier movements and yet, at the same time, represents a historical continuity with the NSP. The movement has created an opportunistic symbiosis between non-Islamic modernism and Islamic orthodoxy, allowing it to respond to the modernist aspirations of its power base and to broaden its political constituency by embracing diverse elements both within and outside electoral channels. The increasingly comprehensive program promoted by the WP seems to have borne fruit in terms of electoral gains in 1992 and 1994.⁴⁴

The levels of organization within political Islam have distinguished their new platforms from the monolithic but heterodox popular Islam of the past in several ways. There are, first of all, the *tarikats*, which were elevated to the critical position of making or breaking the electoral fortunes of political parties both in the center (the Motherland Party, or MP, which ruled from 1983 to 1991) and on the religious right (the WP) in the post-1980 landscape. The MP successfully obtained most of the mainstream support of the *Nakşibendi* and *Süleymanî* *tarikats* and the *Nurcu* groups, giving them semi-legal status and increasing their political effectiveness even further. Parallel to that development, the Islamic movement, in time, split between those moderate traditionalists who preach a re-creation of society according to the pristine 7th-century principles of the Prophet and the radicals.

While the moderates try to compete in the modern world by incorporating a modernist component into their discourse, the radicals see a revolution as the only sure route to power. This radical antiestablishment wing makes up for its lack of numbers with its readiness to resort to militancy, stemming from its rejections of all levels and forms of political Islam that it considers diluted by Western influences. The Islamist movement also shelters under its umbrella a group of Muslim intellectuals organized around radical journals, each trying to carve out a clientele among the believers while keeping critical thinking alive.⁴⁵ Unofficial Turkish Islam is internally divided, as was manifested visibly in its reactions to the Gulf War in 1990. However, whether advocating gradualism or an antiestablishment extremism, it is united on one issue: society must be purged of Western influence, and the ensuing state and society should be reorganized on the basis of the shari^ca.

Radical Islam and the Post-1980 State

Beginning with the post-1980 military regime and during the ensuing MP governments from 1983 to 1991, state policy toward Islam underwent radical changes in style and substance. Official discourse articulated and tolerated Islamic elements in the political-public realm that had until that point been under the monopoly of secular standards and criteria. In the first place, religious instruction in primary and secondary schools was made mandatory in the 1982 constitution, a document that was largely drawn up by the military, whose own legitimacy was rooted in the secular tradition. Today, the sociopolitical activities of the Sufi tarikats, which had been banned in 1925, have reached peak levels; their members have now penetrated all ranks of political society, including the parties, government, civil service, intelligentsia, and the business and banking worlds. The Süleymanî and Nakşibendi orders are allowed to run unofficial Qur^ʿan courses and youth hostels to educate needy youngsters who have come from provincial and rural areas to be educated in the cities. The publications of tarikats and other religious groups, each disseminating its specific views on and methods of returning to the shari^ca, have mushroomed. Saudi capital has made inroads into Turkey by means of finance companies, projects, and religious foundations.⁴⁶

In explaining the daring posture of radical Islam since 1980 in Turkey—the most secular of all nations with a Muslim majority population—there are three fundamental but related areas of debate:

1. Why has political Islam crossed this threshold in the last decade?
2. Has the capacity of the Turkish state to set limits on the political and social role of Islam faltered in the face of grassroots Islam?
3. Is the vigor and dynamism of political Islam a direct result of the failure of the Kemalist state to promote secularism as a pillar of the republic?

It would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the rising tide of Islamist forces owes its momentum entirely to the dynamics emanating from the grassroots of society. It would also be wrong to conceptualize it as a simple revival of the historical grievances that had resurfaced twice before, in the 1950s and 1970s. Post-1980 Is-

lamism in Turkey has not been a response to a single stimulus, nor can it be interpreted as a sign of diminution of the state's power to hold political Islam in check. The Islamist movement over the past decade has developed in a context in which the state–society relationship has been dominated by the state. As a result, the movement has developed not only in response to pressures exerted by the masses, but also as a direct consequence of the designs and policies of the Turkish state, which acts to further its own aims in a changed environment, not in an attempt to appease the Islamists.

The increased assertiveness of radical Islam in the last decade or so reflects deeper changes on domestic and international levels. The international convergence of neoclassical development and economic liberalism, spurred by the collapse of the Soviet Union, highlighted a series of crises for Turkey, as it did for much of the developing world. The first crisis revolved around the limits reached by *étatist* economic policies, predicated on control of protected domestic markets. Instead, the new economic orthodoxy, with its market-oriented reforms and stabilization measures, made necessary foreign competition and greater integration into the world economy. In this sense, national capitalisms entered into a crisis.⁴⁷

In the second and closely related crisis, the global code words of the new era—market economy and individualism—negated the old forms of bureaucratic domination and state–society linkage in Turkey. Tensions produced by liberalizing the economy aggravated the growing influence of ethnic and Islamic social and political forces. These forces challenged the modernization formula of the old national capitalist state and insisted on a new social consensus based more on cultural than political differences. Thus, in the emerging state–society relationship, the state had to reestablish its legitimacy on a new basis, rooted less in the insularity of the secular–modernist project and more willing to incorporate the most important marker of local identity, Islam, into the official discourse. In other words, defining modernism in terms of a Westernist project became anachronistic.⁴⁸ At the same time, the Iranian model provided radical Islam with strong political appeal.

The state's new strategy of keeping control over the secular parameters of the republic required a more formalized relationship between the state and Islam as well as a redefinition of secularism. A unique synthesis was made as an "economistic" liberalism was promoted through an agenda more conservative than liberal. The adoption of this formula provided the context for the creation of a new type of community in the 1980s, which would "consolidate social unity and solidarity and thereby eliminate the conflicts of opposing ideologies."⁴⁹ Control of Islam became the main vehicle through which the state reshaped modernity in line with the ideology of marketization while also resolving the problem of legitimacy: "State planning of religious and moral life was seen as the prerequisite for promoting a national culture that could secure unity of purpose and homogeneity of ideas, together with the necessary safeguard of the market economy that was to be created."⁵⁰ One of the former policy makers of the defunct NSP pointed out this motive for the injection of a moral basis into politics when he asserted, "the capitalist structure in Turkey tolerated some religious manifestations in order to have its program of economic liberalization accepted by the masses; in other words, it took Islam into its reserve."⁵¹

General Kenan Evren, leader of the military government that was in power between 1980 and 1983 and president of the republic between 1982 and 1989, was particularly adept at using Islam to rationalize his new program of restructuring the Turkish political system on more authoritarian principles. However, his references to Islam and the Qur^ʿan were used to support concepts such as “literacy,” “science–knowledge,” “civilization,” “positivism,” and “secularism” and highlighted his attempt to support the fundamental secular goals of the regime through Islam, but without changing the position the state held in its relationship with society.⁵²

Similarly, to stem the rising tide of Islam, and in the belief that the growing influence of Islamic religion was due to insufficient “enlightened” religious education, the state introduced compulsory religious instruction into primary and secondary schools. President Evren openly explained his reasoning:

[T]his religious education cannot be given to children by every family. In fact, even if the family tried to do so, this would be improper since it may be taught wrongly, incompletely or through the family’s own point of view. . . . I asked you . . . before . . . not to send your children to illegal Qur^ʿanic courses. Thus, we made this a provision of the constitution. In this way, religion will be taught to our children by the state in state schools. Are we now . . . against the cause of secularism or serving it? Of course we are serving it. . . . [S]ecularism does not mean depriving Turkish citizens of religious instruction and exposing them to exploiters of religion.⁵³

It is crucially important to note, however, that the manipulative power of the state over Islam in this period was at least partially possible because of the ideological and political vacuum left by leftist forces. Furthermore, during the military regime, all channels of secular opposition—for example, political parties and interest groups—were closed down. Important business sectors also helped the regime in its restructuring and in its effort to control Islam. Business regarded the incorporation of Islam within official parameters as the best way to restrict the power of political Islam. One leading businessman, Vehbi Koç, submitted a letter to General Evren on 12 October 1980, positing that “A nation with no religion is not possible. This time religious affairs should be regulated in such a way as not to allow the political parties to exploit it.”⁵⁴ In addition, one conservative institutional source, the *Hearth of Intellectuals*, which had been involved in the formation of the regime’s ideology since the 1970s, gained official stature in the 1980s when it proposed that a synthesis between conservative elements of Turkish nationalism with Islam could be the foundation of the state.⁵⁵ However, both were rebuffed by Islamists for being agents of American imperialism and for supporting the status quo.⁵⁶

The post-1980 civilian governments of the MP, which succeeded the military government, shared the military’s vision of reconstructing the relationship between state and society so it could be controlled by the state. In the first few years after the 1980 coup, before communism had been globally discredited, both the military high command and the MP believed that the failure of Turkish political pluralism was, more than anything else, due to the influence of communist ideology and the foothold it had gained in Turkey in the 1970s. Because the communist menace was thought to be many times worse than religious obstructionism or reactions, Islam was incorporated into official state ideology “to arrest politicization among the

young,”⁵⁷ believed to have a direct correlation to the strength of communism in the universities.

If, however, one difference between the military and the MP was that the historic assault of the MP governments against bureaucracy and the populist state was blended with a democratic political project, another difference was the MP’s enforcement of a policy of Islamization without the disguise of a Kemalist discourse. The MP mobilized Turkey’s traditionally conservative constituencies and some Islamic platforms around the cause of economic liberalism, integrating them with the existing order in the process.⁵⁸

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Although the post-1980 period may at first sight seem to have been a revolutionary break with the traditional political management of Islam by the state, it only represents another mode in the state–Islam relationship, which has not changed in its basic secular orientation or in the primacy of the role of the state. Whether viewed as a crisis of the bureaucracy’s political legitimacy or as a sign of a lessening of state autonomy, the new *modus vivendi* is based on accommodating the Islam “outside the state” with a view toward rendering it not necessarily “against the state.”

The end of the cold war gave rise to contradictory developments in Turkey—namely, the very forces that facilitated the rise of radical Islam in the last decade and a half also led to the primacy of secular–democratic ideas in society. Economic liberalization and greater international integration have fueled the Islamic movement because of the structural and, most important of all, cultural dislocations they have created. The recent influx of new liberal democratic norms from the West has stimulated a true desire for democracy and free choice not only in consumer behavior and culture but also in everyday politics. This democratic impulse also gave impetus to the growing self-confidence of Islamic platforms in the civil society acting as opposition forces and giving voice to issues related to societal disorganization, social despair, and frustration with the conventional mechanisms of representative democracy. However, the new wave of Westernization has also been detrimental to radical Islam because it is irreconcilable with even the most ingenious blending of Islam and modernity. Arguments for pluralism, human rights, freedom of expression and association, equality of minorities, women’s rights, and protection of the environment seem to have captured the imaginations of most people, positioning them not only against the secular political authoritarianism of the past but also against the emergence of an Islamic political platform invoking antidemocratic religious tradition and impinging on emerging ideas of expanding freedoms and a socially diverse and pluralist form of modernization.

The most important features of Islamic political platforms, however, are their ambivalence toward the political realm and their adoption of an intensely cultural stance in its place. Islamic platforms seem to be driven by the need to overcome the corrosive influence of transnational values, which brought the problem of identity and culture to the forefront. In response to the increasingly culture-oriented tone of the 1990s, the WP’s platform, for instance, has focused more on defining

and sustaining the cultural–moral parameters of a Muslim Turk and freeing him from Western contamination than on developing concrete and credible policies and stands on socioeconomic issues. There is, therefore, a widespread belief that “the Islam of the WP is not political but cultural populist Islam,”⁵⁹ committed more to promoting gradual, long-term cultural change than to altering the legal and prohibitionist framework of the political system.⁶⁰ At a time when existing ideologies and political structures are going through a crisis, the party benefits from not being in power. At the same time, it also runs the visible risk of promoting political naivete, shallow and ineffective causes with no responsibility for their implementation. The conditions of the opposition politics within which the WP operates make its symbolic–cultural visions seem like real politics.

Furthermore, the post-1980 synthesis reached between Islam and the conservative elements of official nationalism was also based on a shared understanding of the need to maintain the unity of the state and the status quo. In the 1991 general elections, the WP joined an electoral alliance that included the most radical nationalist party of the Turkish right, the former Nationalist Labor Party (NLP), which had reverted to its original name—the Nationalist Action Party (NAP)—during the 1970s. If we note that the ideology of the NAP has since been incorporated into official politics, the purpose of the 1991 alliance between secular nationalism and Islam becomes clear. The electoral alliance ended soon after, but in the 1994 local elections the WP increased its strength in the predominantly Kurdish regions of the southeast. It would be a gross mistake to think, however, that the antiestablishment nature of the Kurdish vote amounts to the Islamization of the Kurdish question. Because the Kurdish Democracy Party (KDP) withdrew from elections, the results reflect more the election-indexed pragmatism of the WP, the alienation of the voters from the system, and general hostility toward other political parties, than a consensus that Turkish politics should be based on Islamic principles.

The state-friendly posture of many forms of political Islam is related to the existence of a political culture that puts a higher priority on the preservation of the state than on the consolidation of democracy. It is also a legacy of the past political configuration when the *ulama* were part of the state elite. The pro-state orientation of the Sufi *tarikats* provides further rationale for a synthesis between Islam and the nationalist principle of the state’s territorial integrity. However, the Kurdish problem has provided one of the basic parameters that has had a conservatizing effect on the strategy and discourse of mainstream politics in the country. In this context, nationalism is used by all political forces on the right and left—including the Islamic forces—as a unifying terrain. As a result, the historic formula of an official syncretic Islam, as the basis of a strong sovereign national state committed to integration with the West, still has a powerful appeal.

CONCLUSION

In all, despite its changing strategy toward Islam, one of the most enduring features of the Turkish state has been the way it has continuously maintained control over Islam. Since the transition to a competitive political regime in 1946, the state has shown an awareness of, and a capacity to adjust to, a new context by opening up

the political system to Islamic platforms and voices. As a result, the grievances and appeal of radical Islam have been less effective than they would have been had the movement and parties been banned, their leaders imprisoned, and their adherents tortured, persecuted, and forced underground. This is not to say that the religious-political message does not find a receptive audience among a cross-section of the people. All it implies is that the political success of the new brand of radicalism has been limited, mainly because of the low-key position the state has taken in relation to the manifestations of Islam throughout the period. A significant characteristic of the process of accommodation has been its gradualism. There have not been cyclical fluctuations between co-optation and official panic and crackdown but, rather, an ongoing, official double discourse, which has secured political stability within a relatively competitive period in the face of rapid social and economic changes, and increasing social mobility and political participation.

NOTES

¹George S. Harris, "Islam and the State in Modern Turkey," *Middle East Review* 11 (Summer 1979): 21.

²Some cross-sectional examples can be given. For a viewpoint from among the "Islamists" emphasizing the total failure and bankruptcy of Kemalist secularism, giving rise to the revival of Islam, see A. Faruk Yanardağ, "Siyaset'te Din Faktörü," *Kitap Dergisi* (Mart-Nisan 1992): 3–10. A prominent writer in the "leftist" camp, Ömer Laçiner, and like-minded writers also argue that radical Islam owes its broadening appeal to the "bankruptcy" of Kemalist Westernization. See Ömer Laçiner, "Dini Akımların Yükselişi ve Türkiye'de Islamic Hareket," *Birikim* (Ekim 1989): 6–14. Similarly, most writers within the "liberal" camp believe that radical Islam is the revolt of the petite-bourgeoisie, and that the fundamental factors responsible for its growth are the republican principle of secularism and the process of modernization. For two representative articles, see İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition* 18 (1983): 421–41; and Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey," in *State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1988), 119–36. Another writer, stretching this line of thinking to its conclusion, claims that in the years following the 1980 military intervention there was a tacit admission of the failure of Kemalism, which led to a "departure" from strict traditional secularism. See Richard Tapper's introduction to *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, ed. Richard Tapper (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 1–27.

³Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in *Atatürk: The Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancıgil (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 193.

⁴Idem, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 13.

⁵İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1987), 213.

⁶Turkish plural of the term "Islamic charitable trust" or "foundation."

⁷Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right," in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. Irvin Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 219.

⁸Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27 (January 1991): 6.

⁹*Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 225 (from a public speech Atatürk made in Kastamonu on 30 August 1925).

¹⁰Islamic dervish, sufi lodge, or convent.

¹¹Necati Çankaya, *Atatürk'ün Hayatı, Konuşmaları ve Yurt Gezileri* (Istanbul: Tifdruk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1989), 249 (from a public speech the same day in Çankırı).

¹²*Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 93 (Maurici Pernet's interview with Atatürk on 29 October 1923).

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Atatürk'ün *Söylev ve Demeçleri II*, 98 (from a speech Atatürk made in the Pasa mosque in Balıkesir on 7 November 1923).

¹⁵Ibid., 94 (from a public speech Atatürk made in İzmir on 31 January 1923).

¹⁶Ibid., 90 (from the same speech).

¹⁷For the antecedents of this view, see Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," *International Affairs* 28 (1952): 38–48.

¹⁸See Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy* (London: C. Hurst, 1977), 8–11.

¹⁹See Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 8 (1954): 267–82.

²⁰Harris, "Islam and the State," 23.

²¹Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment*, 367–68.

²²Harris, "Islam and the State," 24.

²³Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Laiklik," *Yeni Gündem* (1 and 15 November 1985): 18.

²⁴The first pro-Islamic party to be formed was the National Order Party (NOP) in 1969, which was dissolved after the military intervention in 1971. It was followed by the National Salvation Party (NSP) in 1972, which became a key partner in three coalitions between 1974 and 1977, and was the third-largest party in the political system in terms of seats occupied in the National Assembly. Following the dissolution of the party in 1981, after the 1980 coup, the Welfare Party (WP) was formed in 1981.

²⁵Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment*, 374.

²⁶*Ekim 1974* (Ankara: n.p., 1974), 107 (speeches made by Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the JP).

²⁷*AP'nin Dini ve Manevi Hizmetleri* (Ankara: n.p., 1977), 15 (from a speech made in Kayseri on 31 May 1965).

²⁸Ibid., 37.

²⁹Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment*, 376.

³⁰Toprak, "The Religious Right," 230; Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 176.

³¹İlter Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey," *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 45.

³²Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 175; Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 21.

³³Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1983), 219.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵The situation remained the same for the WP with, however, the composition of its constituency moving toward youth, women, and workers in the outskirts of big metropolises. This became even more manifest in the partial local elections in 1992, and the local elections of 1994 (for more on these two elections, see note 44). The NSP received 11.8 percent of the total votes in 1973 and sent forty-eight deputies to the assembly. This figure fell to 8.4 percent in the 1977 elections, with the number of deputies down to twenty-four. The WP first competed in local elections in 1984, receiving 4.4 percent of the votes. In the 1987 general election it scored 7.1 percent, and in the 1989 local elections it received 9.8 percent of the votes. The party participated in the 1991 general elections as part of a nationalist "alliance" with the other extreme-right-wing parties, and the alliance received 16.9 percent of the total votes.

³⁶Toprak, "The Religious Right," 229.

³⁷Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 438.

³⁸See the interview with the vice president of the WP, Bahri Zengin, in *Yeni Zemin* 6 (June 1993): 41.

³⁹Interview with Tayyip Erdoğan in *ibid.*

⁴⁰Ruşen Çakır, "Refah Çalıştı, Haketti, Kazandı," *Sabah*, 12 April 1994, 16.

⁴¹Ergun Özbudun, "Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The Case of the National Salvation Party," in *The Islamic Impulse*, ed. Barbara Freyer Stowasser (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988), 146; Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey," in *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Metin Hepar and Raphael Israeli (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), 86, expresses the same view. On the WP, for the same discourse, see Nilüfer Göle, "İslami Dokunulmazlar, Laikler ve Radikal Demokratlar," *Türkiye Günlüğü* 27 (Mart-Nisan 1994): 13; and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Refah Partisi'nin Ardındaki Sosyo-Politik Dinamikler," in *ibid.*, 20.

⁴²Sami Zubeida, "Is There a Muslim Society?" *Economy and Society* 24 (May 1995): 182.

⁴³Idem, *Islam, the People and the State* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 159.

⁴⁴In the 1 November 1992 partial local elections, one wing of political Islam, the WP, made unexpected gains by increasing its votes in Istanbul (the projected average national increase being 9.41%) as a result of its conscious effort to expand its political constituency and of its making inroads into “liberal” and “social-democratic” segments. This was the first sign of the comprehensiveness of the WP’s program of transforming itself along the lines of mass parties and thus diluting its radicalism. See *Aktüel* (5 and 11 November 1992): 166–70. Similarly, in the 27 March 1994 local elections, the WP increased the percentage of total votes it scored in the election of mayors for greater cities from 9 percent in 1989—there were eight greater cities then—to 22.4 percent in the existing fifteen greater cities. On the level of provincial local councils, it managed to double the 9.7-percent representation it received in 1989 to 19 percent in the 1994 elections.

⁴⁵For discussions from three of the most eminent Muslim intellectuals (Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, and İsmet Özel), see Michael Meeker, “The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey,” in *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 189–219.

⁴⁶On the growing role of Saudi capital, see Uğur Mumcu, *Rabıta* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1993). For a discussion of how non-governmental international Muslim bodies take global measures to promote Islam, see Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 276–303.

⁴⁷Çağlar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (Istanbul: Metiş Yayınları, 1993), 32–49.

⁴⁸Göle, “İslami Dokunulmazlar,” 17. See also Cengiz Çandar, “27 Mart: Demokratik Metamorföz veya Yeni Türkiye’nin Doğum Sancısı,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 27 (Mart-Nisan 1994): 28.

⁴⁹Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, “The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey,” *Praxis International* 13 (July 1993): 195.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 196.

⁵¹*Cumhuriyet*, 9 March 1990, 6 (interview with Şener Battal).

⁵²Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren’in Anıları*, Cilt 4 (Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), 301.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 309.

⁵⁴“Evren’in Anıları Dizisi,” *Milliyet*, 23 December 1990.

⁵⁵İlhan Tekeli, “Türk-İslam Sentezi Üzerine,” *Bilim ve Sanat* 77 (Mayıs 1987): 5–8; Saylan, *İslamiyet ve Siyaset* (Ankara: Verso Yayınları, 1992), 68–69.

⁵⁶Hüseyin Hatemi, “Açık Oturum: Din ve Siyaset,” *Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi* 21 (Şubat 1987): 17–37.

⁵⁷Ahmad, “Politics and Islam, 18.

⁵⁸Ruşen Çakır, “Devlet İslamı İstiyor,” *Birikim* 55 (Kasım 1993): 33, 38.

⁵⁹Sarıbay, “Refah Partisi’nin Ardındaki Dinamikler,” 21.

⁶⁰Article 163 of the Penal Code until very recently militated against Islamists quite visibly. It prohibited the formation of and membership in associations engaging in propaganda directed at transforming the fundamental order of the state based on religious principles. Even now, despite the repeal of the article on 31 January 1991, there are other back-door provisions that have the same effect, such as the constitutional provisions Law for Struggle Against Terror passed in April 1991 and the present Law on Political Parties. For the historical evolution of the core ideas of the article see Çetin Özek, *Devlet ve Din* (Istanbul: Ada Yayınları, n.d.), 500–507; İştah Tarhanlı, *Müslüman Toplum*, “Laik” Devlet: *Türkiye’de Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1993), 52–166.