POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT PATTERNS OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS:
THE CASE OF THE NİZAM/SELAMET MOVEMENT

A Ph D Dissertation

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THE CASE OF THE NİZAM/SELAMET MOVEMENT

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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PARIS

September 2011

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT PATTERNS OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: THE
CASE OF THE NİZAM/SELAMET MOVEMENT

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Focusing on the Nizam/Selamet Movement, this dissertation studies why and how there are variations in the political engagement patterns of "moderate" Islamist movements operating within the same institutional/political context.

Specifically, covering a period from the 1960s through the 1970s, this study examines why and how the Nizam/Selamet Movement emerged and established a political party; produced goals and ideational elements distinct from contemporary and past Islamist movements in Turkey and showed considerable flexibility in its choice of allies, strategies and policies, including formation of a coalition government with the archenemy of the Islamists, the Republican People's Party.

Drawing on the Nizam/Selamet case, this study argues that Islamist movements are complex social phenomena that emerge and survive through an incremental process entailing interacting, complex and even undetermined sets of cognitive, relational and environmental factors. The answer to the research question thus lies in unearthing these configurations through descending up and down the macro

(political field), meso (network and organization) and micro (properties and trajectories of the movement elites and activists) echelons at both national and local levels of the political field and the movement. A historical dimension is also necessary to highlight intra- and extra-movement factors at different life phases of the movement (accumulated resources and inherited constraints), which shape the form and substance of its political engagement; and to take into consideration the influence of one stage over the other.

ÖZET

İSLAMCI HAREKETLERİN SİYASETE KATILMA ÖRÜNTÜLERİ:
NİZAM/SELAMET HAREKETİ ÖRNEĞİ
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Bu tez, Nizam/Selamet Hareketine odaklanarak, aynı kurumsal/siyasal bağlamda aktif olan "ılımlı" İslamcı hareketlerin siyasi katılım örüntülerinde neden ve nasıl farklılıklar oldugu sorusunu soruyor.

Bu çalışma, spesifik olarak 1960-1980 arası dönemi ele alarak, Nizam/Selamet Hareketinin neden ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını; siyasi bir parti kurduğunu, çağdaşı ve önceki İslamcı hareketlerden farklı amaçlar ve ideolojik ürünler oluşturabildiğini ve siyasal strateji ve ittifak seçimlerini (ki aralarında o zamana kadar İslamcıların başdüşman olarak algıladıkları CHP'de vardı) dikkat çekici bir esneklikle yapabildiğini araştırıyor.

Tez, Nizam/Selamet örneğinden yola çıkılarak, İslamcı hareketlerin kompleks sosyal fenomenler olduklarını, ortaya çıkışlarının ve hayatta kalmalarının birbirleri ile etkileşim halinde, çok katmanlı ve hatta belirlenemez, etmenlerin içinde bulunduğu, artımlı bir süreçde gerçekleştiğini savunuyor. Araştırma sorusunun cevabının bu etmenler konfigürasyonunun, makro (siyasi alan), mezo (ağlar ve

organizasyonlar) ve mikro (aktivistlerin özellikleri ve geçmişleri) düzeyler arasında hem ulusal hem yerel seviyede inip çıkarak ortaya çıkarılabileceği gösteriliyor. Buna ek olarak, tarihsel bir boyutun da gerekli olduğu tartışılıyor: ancak bu şekilde hareketin (biri diğerini etkileyen) çeşitli aşamalarındaki, siyasi katılımın içerik ve formuna şekil veren, hareket içi ve dışı etmenler (biriktirilen kaynaklar ve miras alınan engeller) tespit edilebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Hareketler, Siyasi Partiler, Siyasi Katılma, Din-Siyaset İlişkileri, Milli Görüş Hareketi, Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi, Kayseri

RÉSUMÉ

SCHEMA DE L'ENGAGEMENT POLITIQUE DES MOUVEMENTS
ISLAMISTES: LE CAS DU MOUVEMENT NIZAM/SELAMET

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Septembre 2011

A partir du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet, cette thèse essaie d'éclairer les logiques qui sous tendent les différences observées entre les schémas de l'engagement politique des Islamistes « modérés » œuvrant dans le même contexte institutionnel/politique.

Plus précisément, cette étude couvre la période 1960-1980 et examine la *genèse* du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet ainsi que son organisation en tant qu'un parti politique. En outre, a travers ce travail sont mis en évidence ses objectifs et particularités idéationnelles par rapport aux autres Islamistes passés et contemporains en Turquie, ainsi que sa souplesse considérable dans le choix de ses stratégies et alliés, à l'instar du Parti du Peuple Républicain, considéré comme le plus grand ennemi des Islamistes.

En faisant usage du cas du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet, cette thèse soutient que les Mouvements Islamistes sont des phénomènes sociaux complexes qui émergent et survivent à travers un processus incrémental faisant interagir des ensembles complexes voire même indéterminés de facteurs cognitifs, relationnels et

environnementaux. La réponse à la question réside donc dans ces configurations de facteurs qui doivent être découverts en effectuant des allers retours entre des échelles macro (le champ politique), méso (l'organisation et les réseaux sociaux) et micro (les acteurs) aux niveaux à la fois national et local du champ politique et du mouvement. Une dimension historique est aussi nécessaire qui permet d'étudier les facteurs interagissant au sein de chaque phase du mouvement qui lui donnent la forme et la substance de son engagement politique ; et de prendre en compte de l'influence d'une phase sur l'autre.

Mots-clés : Mouvements Sociaux, Partis Politiques, Engagement Politique, Relations entre politique et religion, Mouvement de Vision Nationale, Parti de l'Ordre National, Parti du Salut National, Kayseri/

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This essay examines the political engagement patterns of Islamist movements focusing on the *Nizam/Selamet* movement (the NSM)[1] in Turkey. The NSM was a "moderate/pragmatic"[2] Islamist movement, in the sense that it invested in the existing system and "all[ied] [itself] with distinctly non-Islamist ruling elites."[3] Covering a time period from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, this study seeks to understand how and why the NSM differed in its patterns of political engagement from other moderate/pragmatic Islamist movements of the period operating within the same environmental context and from its predecessors. Specifically, through examining the emergence of its entrepreneurs, the formation of its networks, ideational elements and organization and finally its

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[1] The names refer to the names of the political parties that *Milli Görüş Hareketi* (The National Vision Movement) established with short intervals in 1970 and 1972: National Order Party/the National Salvation Party (the NOP/the NSP). The name *Milli Görüş Hareketi* was adopted later in the history of the movement by the mid 1970s. As the activists of the movement mostly referred to the movement during the years under consideration as *"Nizam Hareketi" or "Selamet Hareketi"* depending on the period of their involvement, here it will also be referred by that name. The NOP was closed down by the Constitutional Court with the claim that its activities were against the Constitution and the secular character of the state and the NSP was established shortly after with the same cadres and drawing on a similar program. As shall be seen, in the first general elections following its establishment, the NSP entered the Grand National Assembly and became a partner to the coalition government with the (by then) the center-left the Republican People's Party (the RPP), the archenemy of the Islamists since the 1920s.

[2] The term moderate/pragmatic does not attribute an essence to the movement. It is rather a practical way to point out that these types of movements shunned from violent challenges to the existing social and political systems in their respective countries during the period that a research covers. Hence, the term does not exclude the possibility that with the changing circumstances in the political field, movement networks, international arena etc. and changes in the movement's ideational and organizational properties, a movement, its offshoots, or some of its members may engage in political violence.

[3] Jillian Schwedler, "The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Polity," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 205.

ordinary/routine political activities, this dissertation asks why and how the NSM emerged; targeted the political field as its primary area of movement activity establishing a political party; produced its ideational elements distinct from contemporary and past Islamist activists in Turkey and showed considerable flexibility in its choice of allies among non-Islamist ruling elites that included the archenemy of the Islamists, the Republican People's Party[4].

For at least three decades Islamist activism has attracted considerable scholarly, journalistic and political attention. While from the 1980s through the 1990s, efforts have been made to analyze and define the factors behind the successful rise and challenge of Islamist movements in different country settings, by the 2000s, particularly following September 11, the focus has become the Islamist political *behavior* and the activities of the local and global Islamist networks.

Notwithstanding the respective subject matters and theoretical approaches of these academic works, the literature since the 1980s has a common strength.[5] Many of these studies lay the epistemological ground for treating the Islamist movements and their activists in relation to specific social, economic, political and cultural factors. They thus successfully challenge the approaches that see an irrational reaction to modernity in these movements and treat "Islam" as a major variable, if not *the* variable, to explain the actions of socio-political actors.

However, among them, the earlier studies, which focus on overlapping social, cultural or economic exclusion and frustration of the periphery, as major explanatory variables[6] tend to neglect the political engagement patterns of the Islamist movements. In these studies, while the movements appear as a "black box" engaged in contentious politics with the state, the political field is reduced to a homogenous entity, the state.[7] Recent studies on Islamist movements adopting

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[4] From 1923 to 1945, when Turkey transitioned from single party rule to multi-party politics, the RPP had governed the country with a heavy hand, introducing massive secular reforms that effectively reduced (not totally removed) the influence of religious rules and traditions in state and social affairs.

[5] Detailed bibliographic and content information on these works will be provided in Chapter 2 that discusses the analytical framework and methodology of the dissertation.

[6] There have been some notable exceptions that paved the way for the present study. These studies will also be referred to in Chapter 2.

[7] It should be noted that this approach to Islamist movements shows a striking difference with the developments in the study of politics in Turkey, which built the ground for this research. For a

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social movement and other theories combining institutionalist and constructivist approaches, on the other hand, undertake the task of dissecting not only the Islamist movements but also the formal and informal political opportunities for and constraints to Islamist collective action in order to discover the mechanisms which enabled these movements to emerge, mobilize their resources and engage in sustained interactions with the state and political elites.

By drawing attention to the existence of variations in types of political engagement (formal and informal, radical or moderate/pragmatic) and organization (political party, informal networks, association, charity organization, a *tabligh*[8] organization) and to the importance of existing political structures in shaping them, the latter studies paved the way to new questions and new areas of research.

One such area is the question of why there are variations in the political participation patterns of moderate Islamist movements mobilizing within the *same* institutional context. In other words, why and how Islamist activists invest differently in the system when they do? Why and how do they create a particular type of organization and differ not only in their goals but also areas, subjects and partners of contestation and cooperation in the political field?[9]

Answering this question through a case study would help to gain further insight into the interplay of extra- and intra-movement factors and dynamics in shaping a movement's political involvement patterns. Further research on Islamist moderate/pragmatic Islamist movements in Turkey and other Muslim majority countries can be built upon the analytical framework and empirical data produced through the study of the NSM case. Focusing on the particular goals, identity, networks and organization (in this case a political party) of a moderate/pragmatic

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pioneer study, which focuses on the action and interaction of cooperating and contesting players and institutions within the political field see Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985). For a work that studies the complexities of the political field and political engagement patterns of a mainstream right wing political party see Ümit Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir ikilemin Anatomisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993).

[8] The name given to proselytizing in Islamic tradition.
[9] Schwedler studies political practices of two moderate movements in Jordan and Yemen. However she focuses on elite level movement activity and on two different country settings in order to discover the mechanisms of further moderation (or the lack there of). As such she does not dwell on these questions. Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Islamist movement, which reflect its engagement patterns, would constitute a step forward to conduct comparative work on different Islamist movements later.

The first argument of this essay is that Islamist movements are complex social phenomena that come into being through an incremental process entailing interacting, complex and even undetermined sets of "causal configurations" rather than a simple causal line (especially important for countries without stable regimes such as Turkey).[10] The study of political participation patterns of an Islamist movement thus necessitates a historical dimension, which would highlight different phases of its lifespan: crystallization of the movement innovators as a group; activist recruitment/conversion and mobilization; formation of ideational and organizational boundaries, movement maintenance through action and interaction with extra- and intra-movement actors. The clusters of action in each phase may appear in different sequential orders and some simltaneously with each other. The sets of factors in each phase include "the usual suspects" of formal and informal power relations and institutions, the agency of the movement activists and impacts of unforeseen historical and political events (contingency); but also earlier outcomes produced in the preceding stages. The structures and dynamics external and internal to the movement need to be specified in each stage in order to assess the available material and symbolic resources and opportunities and constraints in each phase and accumulated across the phases.

The second and interrelated argument of this essay is that in addition to the historical dimension, there is a need to focus at both the national and local levels of movement activity to understand the internal dynamics of the movement, particularly the social networks from which the movement recruits its activists, organizational activities and ideational products. These aspects of the movements at local and national levels do not only constitute a blueprint of political involvement patterns of the movements in and off themselves, but also through creating path dependencies they affect the everyday political engagements of the movements.

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[10] For similar dynamics in the case of left-libertarian political parties, see Kent Redding and Jocelyn S. Viterna, "Political Demands, Political Opportunities: Explaining the Differential Success of Left-Libertarian Parties," *Social Forces* 78 (1999): 503. In studying the formation and relative success of left-libertarian parties in Europe, Redding and Viterna adopt a qualitative comparative analysis and use the term "cluster of causal configurations" to designate combinations of variables.

This essay, then, emphasizes the role of internal dynamics as much as external structures for the patterns of Islamist political involvement. Accordingly, it adopts a qualitative research design that allows a multilayered study of a movement.

The NSM is covered longitudinally (trajectory of the movement over time to capture developmental and incremental processes), vertically (center-periphery relations, organizational hierarchy, clientelism) and horizontally (recruitment, competition and solidarity among the actors of the movement and across the political groups in general) in the *changing* contexts of formal and informal institutions and political opportunities and constraints. A comparative look, which brings into focus other political parties, Islamist movements and/or their members, is also provided to highlight the NSM's properties and differences. In fact, since the fieldwork research leading to the present essay had originally covered two movements comparatively, both the NSM and the *Yeni Asya*[11] (the New Asia), not only a branch of the *Risale-i Nur Talebeleri* (Students of the Epistles of Light[12]*),* but also a movement in its own right. However, the comparative insights will not be delivered through separate chapters, but will be incorporated when necessary in the analyses covering the NSM.[13]

The data is gathered during a fieldwork that lasted with intervals from 2006 to 2009 in three cities, İstanbul, Ankara and Kayseri. In order to examine the movement's internal dynamics and relations with its environment(s), archival research on local and national newspapers, in-depth interviews (and oral histories), movement publications and memoirs of various political actors were used

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[11] From the early 1960s to the 1970, when their newspaper *Yeni Asya* was established, the Yeni Asya movement was previously called the "Kirazlımescit" branch, referring to the address of their "hub".

[12] The *Nur* students was a "new religious movement" with an Islamist outlook. As this issue will be discussed in the following chapters, suffice it to say here that it was organized around the writings and persona of its leader Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1873-1960). Incidentally, the term new religious movement refers to those religious, or spiritual collectivities that display novel and mostly unorthodox teachings and behaviors that may or may not draw upon an established religious institution. The term does not have the baggage of negative connotations that the term "cult" carries.

[13] This is mostly due to time restrictions related to the nature of the field, which will be explained in detail in the methodology section of the next chapter.

complementarily. When needed, court files and parliamentary records were also consulted. [14]

In-depth and oral history interviews were conducted with national and local movement entrepreneurs and activists and local leaders and activists of other groups (alongside the above mentioned *Yeni Asya* branch of the Nur students*, Akıncılar*, *Büyük Doğu*, *Milli Mücadele Birliği*[15]) and non-Islamist parties (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, *Adalet Partisi*, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*[16]).[17]

1.1 The case of the Nizam/Selamet Movement

In addition to its focus on explaining the differences of the political involvement patterns of a moderate/pragmatic Islamist movement, this research also aims at filling a gap in the body of work on Islamist activism in Turkey by examining a relatively less known and studied period from the military intervention of 1960 to the coup of 1980. During this period, the NSM quickly became one of the two leading mass based and nationwide Islamist movements (the other being the *Yeni Asya*) in the 1970s. The NSM sustained regular interaction with the political and state elites through contestation and cooperation at the national level of politics and actively engaged in activist recruitment and consensus mobilization at the local level.

Not only the *Nizam/ Selamet* movement still survives today known as and referred by the name the National View Movement (its political party being the *Saadet Partisi,* the Felicity Party) but it also gave rise to the most powerful political actor of contemporary Turkey: the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (the Justice and Development Party, the JDP). The legacy of the NSM is thus equally relevant for future research to understand the reasons behind its most recent party's relative failure compared to its spin off and to assess the differences and similarities between them.

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[14] It should be added that the author traveled also to Isparta for interviews and conducted several telephone interviews with members of the *Nizam/Selamet* Movement and the Justice Party in Konya and Kayseri. Local newpapers of Konya are also examined.

[15] The Raiders, the Great East and the Union of National Struggle respectively.

[16] The Republican People Party (the RPP), the Justice Party (the JP) and Nationalist Action Party (the NAP) respectively.

[17] Lists of political parties, social movements and civil organizations that are either mentioned or extensively studied in the essay can be found in Appendix E, Tables 3, 4 and 5.

1.1.1 Putting the research question in its empirical context

The NSM, which formally established its first party organization, the National Order Party, in January 1970, had begun to emerge in the mid-1960s when a group of Islamist elites crystallized as entrepreneurs of a movement that sought to establish a new party. Since the NSM emergence, mobilization and engagement in formal politics took place in an institutional environment and at a period that accommodated other informal pragmatic/moderate Islamist movement organizations, (particularly, the Yeni Asya, or Kirazlımescit branch of the Nur students that began its separate informal and formal institutionalization by the mid 1960s, but also the *Süleymancılar* and *Işıkcılar*[18]), pursuing the line of analytical inquiry and theoretical backdrop introduced above, the following set of questions can be raised:

Why did the NSM party entrepreneurs, who had been previously members of various *mukaddesatçı*[19], nationalist and conservative political parties, organizations, networks, associations, or brotherhoods ranging from *Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*[20] to some non-Yeni Asya Nur student movements[21]; from student associations to the JP itself, engage in party building activities? Why did they refuse to satisfy themselves working through the existing formal institutions including the center-right political parties, particularly the JP, following the suit of Yeni Asya or *Süleymancılar*? Why did they prioritize institutional politics over

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[18] *Süleymancılar* was a new religious movement established around the persona and teachings of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan and specialized in the establishment of (during the single party regime, underground) Koranic courses. *Işıkcılar* was the movement that was formed around the persona and teachings Hüseyin Hilmi Işık. While the former emerged in the 1950s, the latter appeared in the 1960s.

[19] During the period under consideration, the groups referred themselves mostly as "*Mukaddesatçı*," which roughly means those who defend and respect "sacred values" of religion. In addition, different subgroups used the term "*İslamcı*" or "*ümmetçi*" which can be translated as Islamist and pan- Islamist (here ümmet refers to all Muslims on earth) respectively. A working definition of Islamism will be provided below in the section that discusses the theoretical framework and the blurring boundaries of nationalist and *Mukaddesatçı* activism will be analyzed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Other *Mukaddesatçı* groups included simple groupings around daily and monthly newspapers, various professional and student associations and semi-clandestine *sufi* brotherhoods. It should be noted that not all religious communities or brotherhoods were necessarily Islamist.

[20] The Association for Fighting Against Communism.

[21] These were the groups formed around some "*Ağabey*"s in some Anatolian towns. In Turkish *ağabey* literally means "elder brother." However, a better translation with religious connotations would be "elder" as it was used to refer to leading *Nur* students). The elders will be discussed further in the following chapters.

grassroots activities and set out to work for the *dava*[22] through a political party despite strong opposition from these Islamist movements in particular and non-Islamist actors of the political arena in general? Did its conditions of emergence and having a political party as an organization influence the NSM goals, identity, allies, policy positions and strategies in day-to-day movement activism?

The answers to these questions lay in the interaction between the institutional context and movement's internal dynamics, which require a periodization of the movement's lifespan and a dual focus on local and national movement activities.

1.1.2 The NSM: born in the political, born to be political

As suggested above, Islamist collective endeavors, as other social movements, are not direct or aggregated results of pre-conceived ideas and beliefs or some macro social and economic phenomena.[23] They emerge and consolidate their institutional and ideational boundaries within the opportunities and constraints that existing political regime presents. From this perspective, the NSM was different from its contemporaries in Turkey. All of its constituents, that is its entrepreneurs, activist networks, ideational elements and its organization, though in an incremental fashion, emerged during a period marked by a relative liberalization of the polity introduced by the Constitution of 1961. The NSM elites and activists sought "power in the movement"[24] and established their movement organization within a relatively open and extremely competitive political field, specifically for political action and through political action. The emergence of its entrepreneurs, the recruitment of its activists, ideational and organizational institutions and everyday practices thus reflected mainly the power relations and formal and informal

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[22] The basic meaning of "*dava*" (Turkish version of *da'wa* in Arabic) is invitation to Islam which is interpreted and deployed by both Muslims and Islamists for different purposes. It may mean the call of the god to individuals, political struggle, armed conflict, or religious proselytizing depending on the context. However, it should also be remembered that *dava* has also two secular meanings and used frequently as such: legal proceeding and (a just) cause. As shall be seen, Yeni Asya and the NOP attributed additional meanings to the word specific to their own version of activisms as well. For a detailed discussion on the concept see Hamit Bozarslan, *Cent Mots pour Dire la Violence dans Le Monde Musulman* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005), *11-12.*
[23] Discussion on the emergence of the NSM in particular and social movements in general and the role of macro phenomena and ideational elements will be provided in Chapters 3 and 4 and 5.
[24] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

institutions of the political field both at the national and local levels.[25] It should also be added that the NSM was also different from most other Islamist movements elsewhere in the Muslim world, such as the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which founded (and supported) political parties later in their lifespan and parallel to their already established grassroots organizations focusing on charity and education.[26]

First, the NSM elites appeared within a lively social movement sector, including other *mukaddesatçıs,* nationalists, ultranationalists, conservatives and leftists of different persuasions. They were incrementally constrained by a specific constellation of political institutions, power relations and contingent events to establish a political party and to compete in the electoral arena.

Specifically, the NSM elites crystallized as party innovators amidst the rise and failure (not necessarily fall as the collective actions continued) of the right wing mobilizations in the mid-1960s that targeted to introduce policy changes on various issues and at the same time to weaken the "liberals"[27] dominating the incumbent mainstream right wing party, the JP. On the one hand, the right wing collective actions had inadvertently connected and brought together the previously dispersed Islamist elites from various right wing organizations (political parties, business, professional, religious and political associations, brotherhoods, the Nur Student branches) and helped them to recruit a new generation of Islamists. On the other hand, the collective actions proved to be extremely inefficient and disappointing for the Islamist elites leading them to seek new channels to influence polity. Thanks to the JP's centralized structure and complex clientelistic relations, the JP liberals had proved to be quite intransient to the encroachments and

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[25] In contrast, while the Yeni Asya emerged as a distinct Nur student and Islamist movement with its formal and informal organization(s) and networks during the same period; its founders, ideational elements and some basic aspects of its informal institutionalization originated in the pre-1960 period. This was a time when, under the leadership of Said Nursi, the Nur students, had, first, emerged under the heavy handed single party rule and then further developed during the initial stage of multi-party politics, in the 1950s. The implications of these differences will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

[26] The NSM was also different from such organizations as the Gama' at al-Islamiyyah, engaging in political violence. The Gama'at had emerged by the 1970s and 1980s in university campuses and grew in peripheral towns as underground organization and thus outside the national level of political field proper. One of the closest examples to the NSM experience was the *Front Islamique du Salut* (Islamic Salvation Front), which had emerged within the political field in 1988 when the Algerian Constitution allowed the establishment of the political parties.

[27] They were more pragmatic and economic liberals than principled political liberals. However, as their friends and rivals perceived them as such, this dissertation will also call them liberals.

influences of extra- and intra-party opposition. Moreover, the NSM entrepreneurs realized that their allies in opposition had their own agendas: while the conservative-nationalists were cutting deals with the liberals at the expense of the Islamists; the ultranationalists were rapidly organizing within the Republican Peasant Nation Party, the RPNP[28], thereby increasing their power vis-à-vis the Islamists. Consequently, having failed to tap into symbolic and material resources generated in and through the political arena, and been disappointed by their allies, the Islamist elites first joined forces with each other to unite under a party organization and then engaged in activist mobilization.

Second, in order to establish their political party, the NSM entrepreneurs sought to tap into the discontents prevalent in the "periphery", particularly within the right wing networks. However, they could attract as their activists only "the periphery of the periphery." The "periphery of the periphery" constituted those social actors marginalized within the *local/*peripheral political, economic and social networks and institutions, and thus had been excluded from the ties that connected the local (the peripheral towns) with the national/central political field (the political, administrative, economic and cultural center(s) such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir). In other words, it was not the exclusion of the periphery from the center *per se*, but the degree and the way in which the peripheral actors were marginalized from the center played a role in the establishment of the NSM networks.

The periphery of the periphery constituted young men of mostly technical professions, (i.e. engineers, workshop owners, small-shop owners, factory foremen,) at the beginning of their careers with no prior political party or informal Islamist organization engagements. JP's internal structure and clientelistic relations that frustrated the party entrepreneurs, had also prevented these young men with limited means to exert influence in the right wing networks in their localities. The NSM provided them a new venue of action, through and within which they could aggregate their limited resources and generate new ones to challenge veteran local politicians and power holders.

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[28] In 1969, the party changed its name as *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,* the Nationalist Action Party (the NAP) following the change of leadership in 1965 and an evolution from a conservative-nationalist outlook to an ultranationalist one.

Third, the ideational features of the NSM also emerged in action and interaction with both the extra-movement actors and potential activists at the national and local levels of politics. They were constructed not only through conscious efforts of the NSM entrepreneurs, but also reflected the ongoing political process and the *habitus* (pre-and post-NSM social trajectories) of both the NSM elites and potential activists. Aiming at establishing and sustaining a political party, the ideational products of the NSM were both differentiating and articulating. They also reflected the existing political context where the elections were free and just but political representation and public discussion was carried "in the name of the nation" which was defined above all as Turkish and Muslim. The NSM defined the nation as primarily Muslim, without discarding Turkishness and demanded political action for its material and moral development. The NSM cadres were juxtaposed with the very essence of this nation and doted with altruism, solidarity and religious stringency.

On the one hand, while acting in the name of such a narrowly defined nation converged the NSM with the orthodoxies of the political field, the emphasis on Muslimness differentiated it from other political parties. On the other hand, while the emphasis on Muslimness of the nation and individual religious stringency put the NSM squarely within the Islamist tradition, its reconstruction and promotion of the Muslim subject as a *politically* responsible and active individual constituted a divergence not only from the non-Islamist Muslims of the right wing networks, but also the contemporary moderate/pragmatic Islamists.

Consequently, at the national level, the NSM as a whole was able to challenge its rivals and legitimately lay claim on the state controlled material and symbolic resources. At the local level, the goals and identity of the movement facilitated the recruitment of its activists, rendering new meanings to their marginalization and reinvigorating their religious, professional and business identities. Finally, through such an ideational production, the NSM connected its members and constituencies with the national political arena, through reframing their particular interests and demands into a noble cause, and empowering them vis-à-vis their rivals.

Finally, as far as the practical aspects of political engagement is concerned, the question of the coalition with the RPP that emerged following the NSP's entry into the parliament in 1973, reveals how the intra-movement dynamics interacted with the changing environmental factors and influenced the policy choices, strategies, and allies of an Islamist movement. Behind the appearance of a unified actor, the micro-properties of the movement elites and activists, the establishment of specific type of movement organization, the ideational elements that are formed during the initial mobilization period and finally vertical and horizontal intra-movement power dynamics, all came into play in the particular decisions and behaviors of the NSM.

The NSM coalition with the RPP in the face of intra-party disputes, heavy attacks from fellow Islamist groups and immense pressure from right wing parties, demonstrates how the NSM both remained a social movement pooling meager resources together to contest the existing distribution of power in the political center and survived as a political party, which had to follow the imperatives of electoral and parliamentary politics. Most important, it illustrates how the NSM ripped the benefits of its double nature and identity.

Over the question of the coalition with the RPP, the NSM founding fathers were divided into two groups; the anti-coalitionist elites eventually left the party and the NSM suffered some electoral loss in 1977, which may or may not be related to the coalition and internal disputes[29]. However, the pro-coalitionist elites managed to sustain the loyalty of majority of the activists, adherents, and voters thanks to the ideational elements and organizational features of the NSM, which had emerged in the early phases of mobilization. First, the NSM collective goals and identity that emphasized solidarity and altruism in the name of the material and moral development of the nation facilitated to portray and see the coalition with the RPP as a responsible behavior that would both put an end to a government crisis and a strategy to introduce targeted changes in the polity. Second, the centralized decision making structure and the ideational elements that was reproduced at the local level empowered the pro-coalitionist elites and helped them pursue their line of action

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[29] The NSP maintained the number of votes it had acquired in the previous general elections, but since its votes were proportionally less than major mainstream political parties, it lost half of its parliamentary seats. Why it is difficult to determine whether or not these factors played a role in this relative failure will be discussed in Chapter 6.

despite internal opposition and external attacks. The local activists did embrace these institutions, since they prevented the institutionalization of intraparty competition, thereby cutting the cost of mobilization and allowing them to concentrate their efforts in electoral and further activist mobilization. Finally, immersing in the political field through a political party organization had rendered the symbolic and material goods attainable through party politics visible and attractive for the individual activists, particularly local party elites. A coalition with the RPP would symbolically connect them to the center and show that the NSM activists were not "reactionaries" but political actors competent enough to govern the country. Materially, it would allow the NSM to tap into resources controlled and generated through politics and redistribute them as selective incentives to its activists in various forms (status, seats in the national and local governmental bodies, bank credits, jobs, import quotas etc.) to strengthen their loyalties.

1.1.3 The legacy and implications of the pre-1980 period

The coalition with the RPP that was pursued by the pro-coalitionist NSM elites and supported by the majority of the activists would prove to be the first step towards not only the consolidation of the NSM's place in the polity, but also the homogenization and growth of the NSM networks and organization. From the 1970s through the 1980s and 1990s, the NSM would constantly oscillate but remain balanced between being a social movement and a political party without anchoring to one or the other. Not only because the *doxa,* or "…the entire set of cognitive and evaluative presuppositions"[30] and the main actors of the political field remained almost intact up until the 2000s, but also because the NSM in general and the incumbent NSM elites in particular continued to harvest the benefits of this dual existence. The NSM was able to regenerate itself to the extent that it could both tap into state controlled material and symbolic resources as a political party and create those of its own as a social movement to survive[31], to satisfy its growing number of activists, and to shape and achieve its long- and short-term objectives within the

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[30] Pierre Bourdieu, *Méditations Pascaliennes* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2003), 145.
[31] Moreover, in Verta Taylor's terminology, being a social movement helped the NSM networks to remain intact in "abeyance" during periods of heavy state pressure. See "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance," *American Sociological Review* 54 (1989): 761-775.

political field. As a matter of fact, the political field and the NSM contributed to the reproduction of each other.

By the 2000s, however, over time and thanks to the advent of neo-liberal economy and the NSM itself, the young provincial men of the 1960s and the 1970s had accumulated enough social, political and economic capital to take over the center of the "periphery." No longer members of the periphery of the periphery, they did not need the limited and unstable resources contingent upon the NSM's oscillating politics. The military and juridical intervention of February 28, which banned two parties of the movement[32] in a short time span ironically constituted an opportunity window for the aspiring young elites and activists of the NSM networks to change their ideational and organizational institutions. With the prospect of the EU candidacy; the demise of the center right parties, whose local branches were still populated by names dating back to the 1950s and 1960s and thus closed to the new comers and with fewer ties to the constituency; and finally a now capital-rich local network seeking stability provided further opportunities for a group of ascendant NSM elites. Having found a fertile ground they were thus able to firmly anchor the new party to being a political party qua political party not a political party qua movement organization.

1.2 The structure of the dissertation

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical approach and methodology of the essay. On the one hand, the theoretical section instead of offering a single theoretical tool, argues for a multi-variant and complex analytical framework to study such multilayered and complex socio-political phenomena as Islamist movements.

On the other hand, the section on methodology discusses the research strategy based on the insights and problems raised in the analytical section. It presents the way in which the data for the essay is gathered and the difficulties and opportunities the fieldwork created for the research.

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[32] The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and its successor the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). The former was established in 1983 and was banned in 1998. The latter, which was established the very same year its predecessor was closed down was also banned following a crisis over the veil of a parliamentarian Merve Kavakçı.

The sequence of the remaining chapters aims at following at least a rough chronology that would ease the reading process, help to avoid repetitions and most important, show how one stage and/or aspect of the movement influence the others.[33] The unorthodox length of certain chapters (particularly 3, 5&6), in turn, results from two difficulties that examining the NSM case from its different angles presents in each chapter. First, studying different aspects and components of the political engagement patterns of an Islamist movement necessitates engaging with and elucidating interrelated but nevertheless distinct meso-level political and sociological theories and perspectives in each chapter. Among them are political process, resource mobilization, network, identity, framing, organization, field and political party theories. The multilayered and complex nature of an Islamist movement, as other collective actors, requires the adoption of these theoretical insights (and analytical grills) to understand the emergence of the movement entrepreneurs, mobilization of the activists for party building purposes, formation of the symbolic boundaries and finally the mundane political practices. The relevant literature review on the Islamist movements and the NSM that needs to accompany the analytical discussion adds to the bulk of the chapters.

Second, since much has been produced on Islamist activism in Turkey in general and the NSM in particular without proper fieldwork research the chapters need to advance enough empirical evidence to refute the established "facts." Ranging from the question of who were the NSM party innovators to the nature of the activist networks of the party; from the formation of NSM ideational products to the NSM's political practices, each chapter not only provides new information based on primary sources but also reinterprets certain events, processes and facts under the light of new data.

Chapter 3 asks why and how a group of Islamist elites emerged as the leaders of a new movement seeking to establish a political party by the mid-1960s. It thus unpacks the initial phase in the lifespan of the NSM and shows that the NSM innovators crystallized within a relatively liberal atmosphere in interaction with the JP, and various other political actors in the national level of the political field and in the religious, social and politico-cultural networks, rather than with the state *per se*

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[33] A chronology of major events and developments between 1960-1980, prepared by the researcher, can be found in Appendix A.

or as a direct result of some macro socio-economic phenomena. Specifically, the chapter discusses the formation of a nationwide loosely connected Islamist network and the subsequent crystallization of a group of Islamist elites amidst the mobilizations of a right wing coalition (conservative-nationalists, Islamists, ultranationalist) against the JP liberals. The failure to introduce policy changes through right wing collective actions would lead the Islamist elites active in the political center to initiate a party of their own. Historical data for these chapters were gathered from movement publications, nationally distributed Islamist newspapers, also in-depth interviews, memoirs and oral histories.

Chapter 4 and 5 inquire as to how and why the NSM elites' initiative succeeded. In other words, they focus on the questions of how and why the NSM could recruit its activists, establish party branches throughout the country and engage in electoral campaigns and further activist recruitment and network building. They tackle the consensus and activist mobilization and formation of the NSM's organizational and symbolic boundaries during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Consequently, not only the chapters draw attention to complexity of the material and symbolic formation of an Islamist movement but also show the contingent (dependent) nature of the macro phenomena themselves on meso- and micro-level factors. The chapters drew their data from the local newspapers of different persuasions, as well as national newspapers, oral histories, in-depth interviews and movement publications.

Chapter 4 studies the formation of the NSM's institutional boundaries through analyzing the activist recruitment efforts and the networks in which the NSM found its activists. Drawing attention to "differential recruitment"[34], or entry to the NSM, this chapter shows that the participation to the NSM as activists was

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[34] The term "differential recruitment" has been advanced by Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson and refers to the recruitment and entry of *some* individuals into a movement but not to others. Both groups of individuals may be within the same social-networks and may experience some common grievances that a movement tries to tap into. The authors ask the following questions to draw the line of analytical inquiry: "Why are some people rather than others recruited into a particular social movement organization? Given the number of competing and functionally equivalent movement organizations frequently on the market at the same time, how is it that people come to participate in one rather than another? Why do some movement organizations attract a larger following and grow at a more rapid rate than others?" David. A Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," *American Sociological Review* 45 (1980): 787.

not a direct and aggregate consequence of some macro phenomena or an *a priori* Muslim identity. The formal and informal relations of power and institutions of the local politics, particularly the JP, had marginalized the relatively young members of the right wing networks who were then at the beginning of their professional lives. Having limited or no social, political and economic capital to exert influence in local political scene and thus lacking connection with the national political arena the potential activists were attracted by a new venue of politics that empowered them. In other words, the chapter presents various generational, meso-level institutional (right wing networks and local political field and political parties) and ideational factors that played a role in the successful institutionalization of the NSM organization at the local level.

Chapter 5 studies the formation of the NSM's symbolic boundaries through action and interaction at the national and local levels focusing on its ideational products. It is argued that the local activists' involvement into the NSM was not an outcome of a preconceived ideological position or belief. While previous identities, beliefs and ideas did provide a fertile ground for recruitment, the NSM ideational production was a process in and off itself. The ideational production and communication did not only help potential activists' participation into the NSM. They also served both to differentiate the NSM organization and activists from other national and local players and articulate the local activists to the national and local politics.

Chapter 6 elucidates the question of the NSM's coalition with the RPP to understand the dynamics and mechanisms of mundane political practices and decision-making in Islamist movements. It reopens the black box of the NSM in the context of daily politics and shows that behind the appearance of a unified actor acting in accordance with some pre-established set of goals, ideational elements and rationally made strategic moves, the NSM's mundane political practices reflected and shaped by complex interactions between environmental factors and the intra-movement dynamics. Through a study of the question of the coalition with the RPP, it is claimed that the environmental factors were interpreted by party elites depending on their structural position within the party, their ideational background and needs of the internal power struggles. Which one of the opposing interpretations would be adopted by the NSM, as a whole, was in turn dependent on

(the reproduction of) organizational and ideational features of the collectivity and the micro properties of the local activists.

The conclusion, the Chapter 7, provides a summary of the research and discusses first its findings in the light of the questions raised in the introduction. Why and how the NSM differed from other moderate-pragmatic Islamist movements in its engagement in the political arena? The dissertation argues that understanding this divergence requires a multilayered and longitudinal look at intra-movement dynamics and the action and interaction among the movement actors and between them and their social and political environment. Second, the last chapter introduces future research questions, or prospects of research that could be developed based on the analytical frames and empirical findings of the present essay.

CHAPTER II

ANALYTICAL FRAMETWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the analytical approach and research design of the essay. The first section will provide first an overview of the analytical framework and working definitions of "political engagement" and Islamism, or Islamist activism. Then, it will build the analytical axes of the essay through a review of the literature on Islamist movements in Turkey in particular and recent scholarly studies on Islamist activism in general, highlighting their respective problems and contributions.

The second section states the research strategy, which is based on the insights and problems raised in the analytical discussion. It first offers a detailed review of the empirical research design; second, considers the logic behind the choice of Kayseri as a case for examining peripheral movement activity; third, discusses the research on the NSM (as well as on Yeni Asya) as a case of moderate Islamist movement. Finally it presents the methodological tools and the difficulties and opportunities the fieldwork created for the research.

2.1 Analytical framework: opening the black box of the Islamist movements

Rather than offering a single meta-theoretical perspective or a theoretical model, this dissertation adopts two intersecting analytical axes to answer the research question. First axe is opening the "black box" of the movement from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives. Opening the black box reveals that an Islamist movement, similar to other social movements, a product of an incremental process, involving such stages and/or tasks as activist recruitment and/or conversion, mobilization, institutionalization (organization building) and movement

maintenance that take place at the national and local levels of movement activism and between the two.

The second axe is adopting a multiplicity of theoretical tools necessary to open and study these stages themselves, on the one hand, and the impacts of one stage on the subsequent stages, on the other. Diverse theoretical tools are necessary not only because *"all methodologies, even the most obvious ones have their limits"* [35] but also because each type and level of movement activity entails interacting and complex sets of cognitive, relational and environmental factors which calls for specific meso-level theories specialized in such areas as cognitive/cultural studies, organizations and networks and macro political and social institutions.

Highlighting the life phase of the movement through opening the black box and studying it deploying diverse theoretical and methodological tools help to see that both external and movement-generated cognitive and organizational structures, and contingent factors affected the political engagement patterns of the NSM. As Giddens puts it a "structure is both constituted *by* human agency and yet it is at the same time the *very* medium of constitution."[36] The organizational and ideational products of the Islamist movements created in action and interaction with intra- and extra movement individual and institutional actors draw the symbolic and material boundaries of the movements, give a pattern to intra-movement dynamics and incite changes in their environments. In turn, the organizational and ideational features and the way in which these interact with external institutions and actors limit and enable the movements and their participants to act the way they do politically.

The study of the political engagement patterns of an Islamist movement necessitates first defining political engagement (or participation, involvement) and Islamism (i.e. Islamist activism). Thus, first subsection provides working definitions of these terms used throughout the essay. Second subsection will discuss

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[35] Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* (London and New York: Verso, 1993), 23. Italic is used in the original.

[36] Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 128-129. Giddens' structuration theory is but one theoretical guide among others deployed to understand how action and interaction among the actors and institutions constructed the NSM's and the Yeni Asya's organizational and ideational patterns, which in turn influenced their political involvement.

the previous body of work on Islamist movements and the analytical framework of the essay in an intertwined fashion.

2.1.1 The question of political engagement and Islamism

This essay defines political engagement as follows: the activities bearing direct or indirect influence on the power relations and institutions of the political arena and the distribution of the material and symbolic resources controlled by the state institutions. Islamism, or Islamist activism, in turn, can be defined as political engagement through the deployment, articulation and interpretation of Islamic sources, traditions, signs and symbols in innovative ways in order to form and/or sustain a collective actor in a given context.[37] Since the main dependent variable of the essay is the difference in the political involvement patterns of an Islamist movement, which created its distinct path but was still part of a single field, that is Islamist activism/arena in general, the definition of political engagement necessarily requires a categorization. This categorization also constitutes an epistemological tool to abandon the label "political Islam" often used in differentiating Islamist groups emphasizing formal and informal political activities and seeking change in state institutions from those Islamists undertaking mainly grassroots activities. The term political Islam, which assumes the existence of two mutually exclusive behavioral and ideational lines of Islamist action, is an impediment to observe the multilayered, multidimensional and complex ways Islamists engage in politics. It not only denies the political nature of grassroots activities but also leads one to overlook the fact that those movements whose primary area of activity are at the societal level may also engage in and with institutional politics.

To begin with, while political activism ranges from such conventional and peaceful activities as electoral politics to unconventional ones such as guerilla warfare, since the NSM (and its contemporaries) studied in this essay are

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[37] It should be added that most of the Islamist interviewees initially opposed the term "Islamcı," or Islamist. They usually preferred the term "mukaddesatçı," even "nationalist-mukaddesatçı" but most of all they identified themselves with the movement (Nizamcı/Selametçi or Nur talebesi/Nurcu). When the researcher explained them she was exploring the term Islamism as well and offered them a tentative definition, they usually aggreed with the definition and even later used the term during the interview.

characterized by an investment in the existing system and playing by the rules of "the game in town," here the focus is on conventional engagement types. This essay adopts the categories offered by a research project on Britain's democracy[38], which brings together various interdependent forms of direct and indirect political activism: 1) "electoral activity" which includes electoral campaigns, party membership, party activism, candidacy for posts in local and national governing bodies. 2) "pressure activity" which covers such political actions as protests, petitions and lobbying by organized social and political groups; 3) "consultation activity" which is undertaken by governments such as citizens' panels, surveys, focus groups, public forums etc.;" 4) "do-it-yourself political activity" which refers to those activities that seek "social, political or economic change without recourse to methods or processes which aim to influence decision-makers." These activities range from co-operatives and unions to movements aiming at influencing individuals' behavior as in "vegetarianism or anti-racism".[39] As such, even though the original categorization does not explicitly mention, they include those social movements that put emphasis on identity construction processes at the grassroots level.[40]

These categories of political action introduced above are not exclusive in the sense that political actors may engage in any form of activism at the same time or in different time periods. Since the third category is a relatively recent one both in Turkey and elsewhere, it does not apply to the cases at hand. The first, second and fourth categories however, help to underline the difference of the NSM from its rivals in the Islamist field, particularly the *Yeni Asya* branch of the *Risale-i Nur* Students Movement.

Comparing briefly the NSM political engagement patterns with those of the Yeni Asya here would help to highlight the peculiarities of the NSM as an Islamist movement organized in and through a political party. Both the Yeni Asya and the NSM engaged in and with the political arena. However, the NSM built its own

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[38]"Commission Research Paper: The Decline in Political Participation and Involvement in Britain: An Introduction," Power: An Independent Inquiry into Britain's Democracy: 1-15. (Accessed July 4, 2011). http://www.powerinquiry.org/publications/documents/Intro.pdf
[39]Ibid.,12.
[40] Incidentally, the latter type of activity corresponds to the definition and conceptualization of social movements in "New Social Movements" branch (as is called today) of Social Movement studies. See for instance, Alain Touraine, "Les mouvements sociaux: objet particulier ou problème central de l'analyse sociologique?" *Revue Française de Sociologie* 25 (1984): 3-19.

party organization(s), created its own political networks, auxiliary organizations and ideational elements. Its leaders and activists sought to influence political decision-making processes through enlarging and consolidating the party and the movement networks, electoral campaigning and coalition building with other parties.

The Yeni Asya's main and actual avenues of political involvement in turn (as was the case for the *Süleymancıs* as well) were a) "pressure activism," through petitions, lobbying and newspaper publications and b) "do-it-yourself" through proselytizing, conversion and campaigning. The latter form of activity would be consciously adopted by the NSM by the mid-1970s, without however ever taking the form of proselytizing and conversion that is observed in the Yeni Asya's case. Since its substantial development would have to wait the 1980s, it is not considered as a major NSM activity in this essay.

Although the Yeni Asya refused to establish its own party, or to join into the ranks of the NSM, its leaders and activists worked actively within and through the Justice Party (the JP), the major right wing party of the period. Several Yeni Asya members and local leaders, with the encouragement and/or orders from the "elder brothers," or "elders" (*Ağabeyler*) of the movement, joined the ranks of the JP and occupied posts at the national and local governing bodies under the JP banner. Through providing manpower and movement publications, the Yeni Asya also engaged nationwide in the electoral campaigns of the JP. Although the Yeni Asya activists, who worked either temporarily or as registered members within the JP, did not hide their memberships to the Yeni Asya; they were careful in emphasizing that the Risale-i Nur students[41] were not a political collectivity and that they were involved in the JP as autonomous individuals, not as representatives of the movement. Needless to say, they were in fact representing the latter's interests and demands as much as those of the local circles with which they entertained close relations. For the Yeni Asya local and national leaders, this semi-public

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[41] It should be noted here that throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s as the Yeni Asya increased its dominance within the Risale-i Nur networks through incorporating various branches into its own, creating new ones in various localities and finally establishing an informal hierarchical organization with division of labor and various formal "front" organizations such as newspapers, endowments and associations, by the 1970s the Yeni Asya began to be often juxtaposed with the Risale-i Nur movement by not only the movement activists, but also their allies and adversaries.

involvement was a means to support and protect the Yeni Asya's above-mentioned grassroots activities.

The main line of inquiry of the essay on political participation patterns of Islamist movements relates thus to both form and content: a) why and how the NSM engaged in politics under a different organizational form and through different institutions than other Islamist movements; and b) why and how its ideational elements and practices (from identity building to recruitment, from choice of allies to organizational strategies) differed from others. Following is a discussion of previous works, which helped the essay to raise these new questions and the analytical framework that helps to answer them.

2.1.2 Literature Review and Analytical axes

Islamist movements have received considerable scholarly attention for the last four decades both in Turkey and elsewhere. While not providing direct answers to the questions at hand, through the contributions and limitations they presented they helped to formulate the questions themselves. Most important, wittingly or unwittingly, they showed that opening the black boxes of the Islamist movements through time and space and deploying multiple theoretical tools are necessary to address the research question.

Earlier, -now- traditional literature on Islamist movements emerged as an opposition to the treatment of Islamist movements as deviant and unique sociological and political phenomena. These works challenged the previous body of work that had essentialized Islam as the main source of political action for Muslims in general and treated Islamist movements either as transhistorical phenomena, or as embodiments of an irrational reaction to modernity.[42] The traditional corpus, in contrast, argued that such factors as modernization, cultural, social, economic and political frustrations and/or aspirations informed and shaped their emergence and challenge to the existing regimes.[43] As such they contributed to the "banalization"

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[42] For a critique see Salwa Ismail, "The Study of Islamism Revisited," in *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London: I. B Tauris, 2003), 2-11.

[43] For examples of such work on other Muslim-majority countries see Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt," in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 134- 157; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary

of Islamist movements in the sense that they put the Islamist movements in their proper place among other social, political and cultural phenomena that could be studied through social scientific methods; not an easy task given the heated debates and vested interests formed around the subject in the national and international political arenas.[44]

New bodywork followed the lead and produced a number of empirically grounded analyses focusing on "mundane" political questions. However, this recent body of literature criticized in turn its predecessors (the traditional work) as well for their excessive preoccupation with societal cleavages, or macro factors[45] and for "tak[ing] material and cultural factors as additive", neglecting "how they are intertwined and articulated."[46] Drawing mainly on Social Movement Theories[47] but also other institutionalist, interactionist and constructivist perspectives, recent works demonstrated that rather than being direct and aggregate products of societal cleavages, aspirations or frustrations, Islamist movements were the outcome of material and symbolic action and interaction of socio-political actors. Unlike earlier studies, bringing into focus action and interaction that constructed the Islamist movements helped these studies to address many movement related issues such as ideational production and/or moderation, resource mobilization, activist

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Findings*," International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (1980):423-453; Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). For examples focusing on Turkey see Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, *L'Islam dans la Vie Politique de la Turquie*, Publication de la Faculté de l'Université d'Ankara 517 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 1982); Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey," in *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East,* ed. Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), 79-102; Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı* (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985); Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981).
[44] Consider for instance the debates that still revolves around Samuel P. Huntington's (in)famous *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2003).
[45] For a critique of traditional literature from an early paradigm shifter see Ismail, "The Study of Islamism Revisited." See also Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42 (2001): 487-510; Cihan Tuğal, "Islamism in Turkey: Beyond Instrument and Meaning" *Economy and Society* 31 (2002): 85-111 and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach,* ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 1-33.
[46] Tuğal, "Islamism in Turkey," 90.
[47] For examples from and a review of the social movement literature, which includes resource mobilization, culturalist/constructivist and political process/institutionalist theories, see David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, ed., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Malden, Oxford, and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

recruitment, and/or movement impacts on political institutions (and power relations) and *vice versa*. [48]

This essay follows the footsteps of the recent body of work[49] and also argues that the traditional corpus' emphasis on macro-level phenomena prevents the study of those factors, which cumulatively influence the political participation patterns of a moderate Islamist movement. These are the micro- and meso- level sociological, historical and political processes, which bring the individuals to initiate and/or participate/enter into an Islamist movement; formal and informal institutionalization and power relations within movement organizations, that is intra-movement dynamics and finally the process of ideational production, which draws the symbolic boundaries of a movement organization and support it.

With some notable exceptions,[50] which study political action and interaction between the Islamists and the institutions and players of the political field at the national level, the traditional literature on Islamist movements in Turkey analyzes Islamist movements from the perspective of center-periphery dichotomy.

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[48] Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the State Power in Jordan* (Albany: State University of New York, 2001).
For examples of studies on Turkey see Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Berna Turam, *Between Islam and the State: the Politics of Engagement* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), Jenny B. White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: a Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press: 2002). For an early review and critique of works on Islamist activism that adopt social movement theories see Roel Meijer, "Taking the Islamist movement seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement," *IRSH* 50 (2005): 279- 291).
[49] Since the critique of the tradition literature on Islamist movements in other Muslim majority countries have been thoroughly examined elsewhere (as mentioned above), here only those publications studying the cases in Turkey will be tackled.
[50] See, for instance, Hamit Bozarslan, "Boire la coupe jusqu'à la lie: le Parti de la Prospérité au pouvoir en Turquie," *Les Travaux du Centre Marc Bloch* 8 (1996): 5-46; Ümit Cizre, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996): 231-251; Menderes Çınar, *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2005); Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?" *Middle East Journal* 51(1997): 32-45; Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 6 (2005): 167-186.

Notwithstanding their respective emphasis, socio-economic[51] or cultural/religious[52] cleavages; objects of study, the NSM or the *Risale-i Nur* Movement(s)[53], or the period they focus, the 1950s, 1970s or 1980s, even the 1990s; these works maintain that they are the outcomes of a struggle between a hegemonic secular center (the state) and a religious periphery (society) and that Islamist movements emerged because "the periphery" was politically, culturally and economically excluded from the "center."

As far as the question of political involvement patterns of Islamist movements are concerned center-periphery perspective has limited analytical utility. First, since this perspective treats a) the "center" as a corporate entity or closed political field with no or little historical change since its inception in the 1920s and b) Islamist movements as unitary actors, the question of variation in the political participation patterns of two Islamist movements cannot be even raised[54]. Since the changing and ever dynamic properties of the political arena and those of the Islamist movements were overlooked there was no room for inquiring how the political field and the movements interact, and mutually influence each other in time and space. Consequently, the historical specificities of the political context in which a movement is born and developed; how and why a new group of movement innovators emerge and capitalize on the existing social networks; and finally, intra-movement power relations, institutions and activities that subsequently develop, that is those questions pertaining to political engagement, are left unaddressed.

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[51] Ağaoğullari, *L'Islam dans la vie politique;* Alkan, "The National Salvation Party"; Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikasi*.

[52] See for instance Şerif Mardin, "The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey," in *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance,* ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 204-232; Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-elites," *Middle East Journal* 51 (1997): 46-58.

[53] There are very few academic publications treating the *Nur* movement. Among them, Şerif Mardin, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Olayı: Türkiye'de Din ve Toplumsal Değişme* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989) (published first in English as *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)); Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*; Zeynep Akbulut Kuru and Ahmet T. Kuru, "Apolitical Interpretation of Islam: Said Nursi's Faith-Based Activism in Comparison with Political Islam and Sufism" *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 1 (2008): 99-111; Paul Dumont, "Les "Disciples de la Lumière": Le Mouvement Nourdjou en Turquie," in *Radicalismes Islamiques vol. I: Iran, Liban Turquie*, ed. Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont (Paris: Editions Harmattan, 1985), 215-256.

[54] Some even lump diverse movements together as if they are a single entity. While such treatments were usually the result of a chosen level of abstraction, which was no doubt necessary to discern some specific macro-level and enduring historical factors, they nevertheless contributed to overshadowing the variations among the Islamist movements and hence their elites and activists. For instance see, Göle, "The Making of Elites and Counter-elites."

The second and interrelated major analytical problem that center-periphery approach presents is how the ideational properties of the Islamist movements are studied. Melucci's critique regarding "discontent (frustration)=mobilization (aggression)" paradigm[55] can be advanced for the center-periphery approach as well. Similar to other "discontent=mobilization" studies, the traditional literature on the Islamist activism in Turkey assumes, either by implication or directly, the existence of an *a priori* collective identity to the Islamist actors. In these studies, notwithstanding the focus of analysis, economic or cultural cleavages, this identity is "Muslimness," or the collective identity of the periphery, or society. Islamist activism is thus reduced to embodiment or enactments of a pre-conceived identity, which incorporates views, beliefs, ideas and a value system that is "naturally" activated in opposition to the center and/or as a response to some macro phenomena. As such, there is little room for movement level and micro-level studies. Even when these works bring into attention the properties of ideational elements (or the movement activists in general), they use them as evidence to macro-level structures/cleavages, ignoring the meso-level processes, features and functions specific to a movement. As a whole, then, the center-periphery approach potentially nurtures structural determinisms and ideational essentialisms with regard to Islamist movements and their political activities.

In contrast, recent research on Islamist movements in Turkey and other Muslim-majority countries opened the black box of both the political field and Islamist movements. First, it has been revealed that depending on the opportunities and constraints of the political field at any given period (e.g. relative openness of legal structure, the advent of a comparatively liberal ethos in the polity, the changes in the level of state pressure, existence or absence of potential allies among the elites, etc.), Islamist movements have been able to not only *enter* and/or emerge within the political field, but also introduce policy changes, challenge their political rivals, establish alliances and tap into state controlled resources. The recent works thus demonstrated that the political institutions (formal and informal) and various forms of interactions (material and symbolic) within and with the political field; and the incentives and disincentives that these institutions and relations present;

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[55]Alberto Melucci, "Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements," in *International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988), 341.

influence the movements' emergence, recruitment models, organizational and ideational attributes and changes, in short, their political engagement patterns.

Second, the recent body of work opens the black box of Islamist movements through the deployment of various strains of theories, particularly those produced under the social movement research. They discern how the Islamist actors establish relations with each other and their environment and sustain their movements. Most important, they have revealed the agency of Islamist actors focusing on ideational production, activist recruitment, organization building and resource mobilization within the context of existing opportunities and constraints. As a whole, they bring to the fore how the Islamist actors reacted to and creatively dealt with the changes in the political environment; tapped into the existing social networks and discontents, and the available ideational and organizational resources influenced the Islamist movements' engagement patterns.

Finally, and specifically, as far as the ideational elements of the Islamist movements are concerned, the new body of work treats Islam, or Muslimness, not as a preconceived identity of the movements but as a pool of symbolic resources. Drawing on this pool, the Islamists reinterpret creatively Islamic signs, symbols and traditions to construct their identities and action frames. Moreover, these studies show that the latter are not immutable, but prone to changes and renovations depending on the intra- and extra-movement opportunities and constraints.

While this study also follows the perspective of the recent studies on the political field and Islamist movements, it also diverges in; first, introducing a diachronic and multi-level look at both the movement and the fields of political action. della Porta's two interrelated arguments regarding the social movement studies focusing on collective actors engaged in violence also holds true for the works that deploy social movement perspective in analyzing the Islamist movements.[56] On the one hand, macro, meso and micro levels are studied but the interaction between the three are not properly paid attention.[57] In other words,

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[56] For a notable exception Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*.

[57] Donatella della Porta, *Social Movement Studies and Political Violence* (Aarhus: Center for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, 2009), 8. (Accessed July 6, 2011.) http://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/H%C3%A6fte_4_Donatella.pdf

emphasis is put either on macro and meso levels, or meso and micro levels not on the interaction between the three levels. Moreover, and consequently, the relation between the national and local levels of the political field and movement activity is also overlooked. On the other hand, although the organizational and ideational features of the movements are brought into the picture they appear as "a causal dimension, an explanation" rather than as processes[58] in and off themselves and/or as elements of larger sets causal of configurations.

This dissertation argues that a) initial mobilization stage as constrained and enabled by available material and symbolic resources and existing political context informs the organizational and ideational elements of the movements;[59] b) during the following phases of movement development, the intra-movement dynamics within and across national and local levels, that is power relations, solidarity and competition are shaped partly by the organizational and ideational elements introduced at the beginning of the movement enterprise,[60] and partly by the political context, which may or may not have changed since the initial stage, finally, c) organizational and ideational properties, intra-movement dynamics and contingent factors as a set of causal configuration affect movements' interactions with their surrounding environment. As far as the variances of political engagement patterns of the Islamist movements are concerned, without a proper treatment of these configurations and stages the assessment of the goals, practices, policy choices and alliances of social movements could give a partial analysis at best and a description rather than analysis at worst.[61]

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[58]Ibid., 15.

[59] For a study which shows how initial stages of a movement shapes its characteristics see Kathleen M. Blee and Ashley Currier, "Character Building: The Dynamics of Emerging Social Movement Groups" *Mobilization* 10 (2005): 129-144.

[60] In other words established paths within particular conjunctures condition (not determine) the latter developments. Paul Pierson says that "..path dependent processes involve three distinct phases – three stages in a temporal sequence: (1) the initial "critical" juncture, when events trigger movement toward a particular "path" or trajectory out of two or more possible ones; (2) the period of reproduction, in which positive feedback reinforces the trajectory initiated in phase one; and (3) the end of the path, in which new events dislodge a long-lasting equilibrium." "Not Just What, but *When:* Timing and Sequence in Political Processes*" Studies in American Political Development* 14 (2000): 76.

[61] For instance see M. Hakan Yavuz, "Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey" in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2004), 270-288.

Second, this essay also aims at filling what appears to be a lacuna in both the traditional and recent literatures approaches to Islamist ideational production. As mentioned above, the former sees "Muslimness" as the preconceived identity of the Islamists. As Melucci shows studying collective identity (or ideational products), is in fact an essential component of collective action. Collective identity involves having "a unity and consistency" that helps the political actors a) to compare and contrast their "expectations and rewards at different times" b) to render meaning to their frustration in order to direct their mobilization and c) "to recognize the expected benefit as not only desirable but due".[62] However, taking Muslimness as the collective identity of the Islamists is problematic mainly for the following reasons: within a Muslim dominated society, activation of Muslimness would not be enough to create unity and consistency required for collective action. The Islamists need to differentiate themselves from other Muslims through new interpretations and innovations since Muslimness as a collectively shared identity blurs the boundaries between the incipient collectivity and the rest.[63] Through juxtaposing Muslimness, or being a pious Muslim with Islamist activism, the traditional, or center-periphery approach, particularly its culturalist variant, curtails what this dissertation will call "differential entry" (or recruitment) to the Islamist movements at the "Muslim periphery": not only majority of the Muslims do not join the ranks of the Islamists, but also those who do are dispersed in different Islamist movements.[64] Taking collective identity as a process that is formed in action and interaction is thus a necessary epistemological device to inquire about the differential entry of Muslims to Islamist movements. Studying where and how

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[62] Melucci, 341-342. While Melucci attributes these functions to collective identity, or identity-oriented frames, they perfectly define the role of the action-oriented frames, or collective action frames as well. See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 614.

[63] A similar problem occurs for right extremist movements as well. As Kathleen M. Blee argues since "whiteness" is an ambiguous, "unmarked", even an "invisible" category in a white-dominated society where existing policies and goods that benefit the whites "are seldom acknowledged as racial in their intent or consequences" and only "non-whites" are remarked through "otherness, a stigma of difference," the racist groups have difficulties in trying to draw and justify the boundaries of their collectivities in particular and whiteness in general. *Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 56.

[64] Inversely, not all Muslims who join the networks of, or support an Islamist movement and participate to its activities at differing degrees, necessarily acquire an Islamist identity.

Islamist movements recruit their activists in turn throws further light to ideational and organizational properties of the movements.[65]

While the recent works pay more attention to the agency of the Islamist actors in the ideational production, Islam, or Muslimness is seen merely as a resource. With some exceptions, they limit the endeavor of studying collective identity formation to a) a synchronic analysis, b) single level of movement activity (political arena or network level) and/or c) Islamist field/sector in general, overlooking the differences between different Islamist groups and organizations.[66] As Ismail demonstrates neither Islam is ahistorical, nor Muslim society is a homogenous entity.[67] Ismail draws upon Sami Zubaida's analyses that reject the view of Islam as a coherent sociological or political entity and of Islamic cultural products as constants in Muslim majority societies.[68] Zubaida argues that

> …there are certain cultural themes common to most Muslim lands and epochs which derive from religion and common historical reference, but that it would be a mistake to think that the concepts and entities specified by these themes, are sociological and political constants: they are assigned different meanings and roles by socio-political contexts.[69]

In other words, under an apparent unity, which blurs the boundaries, Islam is subject to various rival interpretations at any time and place (across Muslim majority countries and within a single society), and Muslimness while being shared by other members of the society is also a subjectively defined individual identity. Plurality of Islams and Muslimness in turn implies that any redefinition of Muslimness through differentiation process entails a "dynamic process of power

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[65] While socio-political and historical-institutionalist perspectives attribute differential entry to social-economic frustrations and/or aspirations of particular classes having adopted macro perspectives they also forego micromobilization processes and ignore political, institutional, generational, ideational (the saliency of other subidentities) and organizational factors at play.

[66] In rare cases of comparison between two groups, the differences between their ideational elements are not treated as *explanandum*, or something to be explained, but as explanatory factors for other socio-political phenomena. See for instance, Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism*, 112-146. For an excellent recent study that shows how ideational elements and organizational structures are intertwined see Munson, "Islamic mobilization."

[67] Ismail, 15-26.

[68] Ibid, 16.

[69] Sami Zubaida, "Is there a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner's Sociology of Islam," *Economy and Society* 24 (1995): 151.

and resistance."[70] Consequently, it can be argued that Muslimness, or Islam, should be treated not only as a resource but also as a constraint. Treating Muslimness as a "ready-to-use" tool kit produces similar results with taking it as *a priori* identity. It leads to neglect the differentiation processes of particular Islamist movements; the constraints and opportunities that Muslimness and the existence of other Islamist collectivities present for differentiation; and finally a variety of other contextual and contingent social and political factors that influence the way in which the Islamist differentiate themselves. Considering the Melucci's enumerated functions of the collective identity, or ideational products in general, organization- and temporality-blind approach of the recent work is thus as much a hindrance as the reductionisms of the earlier works. Since ideational elements heavily informs intra-movement dynamics and the way in which the movement activists establish relations with "the others", the failure to recognize the existence of a separate Islamist identity and its entanglement with the specific organizational form, in short its peculiarity, would prevent to explain the variances in strategies, policy choices, allies and organizations of the Islamist movements.

In contrast, the present research attempts to reveal how Islamist ideational resources "[are] constructed and negotiated through a repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals"[71] within the movement and with the "others" through time and space. Highlighting this process will show the distinct ways the NSM entrepreneurs and activists (re)interpreted Islamic resources and introduced innovations to Muslimness in order to recruit and maintain their activists and sustain their movement.

As this discussion of the literature demonstrates Islamist movements are complex entities. As dynamic and multi level collectivities Islamist movements emerge and subsist through their diverse components: organizational structure, collective identity, activists, networks and finally various material and symbolic resources. Moreover, they interact with diverse milieus: networks of potential activists, constituents, bystanders, religious networks, rival Islamists, media, civil associations etc. Finally, they operate within and in relation to various forms of formal (and informal) institutions: laws, political parties, various state branches.

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[70] Ismail, 17.
[71] Melucci, 342.

Consequently, a study of Islamist movements and the way in which they involve in politics require attention from multiplicity of angles. This is all the more necessary as Islamist movements have one of those "identities (ethnical or religious) which retrospectively appears as the most "natural" …[exactly] because [these types of identities are] the most naturalized and the most all-encompassing."[72]

To be able to study the complex structure and processes that make an Islamist movement this essay proposes two axes. First axe is to open the black box of the movements through climbing up and down the ladder of abstraction and focusing on the dynamics between and among the national and local levels of intra- and extra-movement activity. On the one hand, such an approach would reveal different aspects and components of the movement and its environment. On the other hand, multi-level analysis puts the economic, social, political and cultural macro-phenomena under a different light whereby their "objective" properties are "treated as differential resources, the importance and meaning of which must be evaluated by the social usages that they are subjected to- that is in their realization."[73] It thus brings to fore the agency of the Islamist actors as well as formal and informal institutions, and the role of action and interaction, in shaping an Islamist movement and its political engagement pattern(s). Moreover, this perspective would prevent recourse to determinism since it construes an Islamist movement and its political engagement through unearthing contingencies as well: "indeterminacy (possible worlds), conditionality (causal justifications), and uncertainty (open futures)."[74]

Second axe is to use available methodological and theoretical tools to understand the complex movement phenomena horizontally, vertically and longitudinally. The corpus of social movement, political party and religious movements researches, are resourceful pools to examine Islamist movements that produce diverse organizational and ideational outcomes. Since social movement, political party and religious movement literatures dwell on such shared questions of

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[72] Michel Offerlé, *Les Partis Politiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), 32-33. This remark for religious political parties can be extended to Islamist movements in general.

[73] Jacques Revel, "Microanalyse et construction social," in *Jeux D'échelles: La Micro-analyse à l'expérience*, ed. Jacque Revel (Paris : Hautes Etudes/Seuil/Gallimard, 1996), 25. See also Offerlé, 34.

[74] Andreas Schedler, "Mapping Contingency," in *Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the Unforeseen*, ed. Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 54.

organization, recruitment, political context, and finally mobilization they help to discern convergent and divergent aspects of the NSM from those of other Islamist activisms in Turkey in the late 1960s and 1970s.

These areas of research, particularly, social movement research, bring together diverse perspectives and disciplines which focus on above mentioned movement components, milieus and contexts and help to open the black box of the NSM. For instance, social movement theories involve three major perspectives: resource mobilization, cultural/cognitive and political process theories which all have their roots in different disciplinary and epistemological traditions. Resource mobilization theory has developed within sociology drawing on Rational Choice theory; cultural/cognitive studies have their roots in anthropological studies and new social movement literature, which is itself rooted in "Frankfurt school [and] structural Marxism"[75]; finally political process theory has emerged within the discipline of political science and bring together Rational Choice and historical institutionalist approaches. To these approaches, one may also add the "Theory of Practice" of Pierre Bourdieu that is occasionally deployed by scholars to study field-level dynamics (political field, social movement sector or social movement organization as a field).

Various studies in social movement literature have empirically and theoretically showed that these perspectives and traditions can be complementarily used to understand various levels, contexts and aspects of movement activity.[76] Considering how Rational Choice theory and Theory of Practice can be used complementarily would be illuminating on how this dissertation will proceed with theoretical multiplicity.[77] Ivan Ermakoff provides a useful discussion on the subject. He argues that the epistemological conflict between two theories loses from its power when one moves away from "paper" and tackles "specific objects

[75] Christian Fuchs, "The Self-Organization of Social Movements" *Systemic Practice and Action Research* 19 (2006): 104, 103-106.

[76] For instance, Beth Schaefer Caniglia and JoAnn Carmin, "Scholarship on Social Movement Organizations: Classic Views and Emerging Trends," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 10 (2005): 201-212; Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, " Collective Identity and Social Movements" *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001):283-305; Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband, ed., *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines* (New York: Springer, 2010).

[77] This choice is not arbitrary since traces and influences of both perspectives can be observed in various political process and cultural/cognitive strains respectively.

constructed as research problems."[78] In discussing the two theories regarding the question of social change he asserts that while the Theory of Practice focuses on the "logic inherent to structural relations at a societal level," to explain change, the Rational Choice deploys "the conjoint effect of multiple strategic actions."[79] He says that these two approaches should be used together if one sets to understand change, say, in the long run.[80] Accordingly,

> The conceptual tools provided by Rational Choice allow us to tackle different moments of this process. These tools highlight incentives to step out from dispositional structures and they highlight the strategic processes contributing to the emergence of normative dispositions. Conversely, the analytical injunctions specific to the Theory of Practice draw attention to the relational patterns from which these strategies emerge, and to the categories of perception making these strategies significant from actors' own viewpoint. Rational Choice complements the Theory of Practice and *vice versa*.[81]

Taken this discussion as a clue this dissertation will use resource mobilization, identity, political process, institutionalist and Theory of Practice perspectives complementarily to understand how social and political actors and institutions act and interact in complex ways so as to give the NSM both an Islamist identity that it shared with others and its divergent goals, organizations, ideational elements, activists, strategies, alliances and policy choices.

2.2 Methodology

This essay is based on qualitative research, which allows a multilayered study of the NSM. Following is a presentation of the research design focusing on units of analysis, Kayseri as a case for local movement activity, the research on the

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[78] Ivan Ermakoff, "Theory of Practice, Rational Choice and Historical Change" *Theory and Society* 39 (2010): 529.
[79] Ibid, 549.
[80] He also explains how these two theories can be combined to explain short run, or abrupt changes. However, for the purposes of this dissertation one example would suffice to make the point.
[81] Ibid, 529-530.

NSM as well the Yeni Asya case and a detailed examination of research tools and data. The research on Yeni Asya is provided since as an Islamist movement whose basic intra-movement institutions had first emerged in the single party period, it highlights the properties of the NSM further. Moreover, the difficulties and opportunities that research faced within both movement fields attest further to the importance of ideational and organizational products of the movements in understanding the behavior of the Islamist activists in general and the NSM in particular.

2.2.1 Units of Analysis

<u>*The Movement and the Dimensions of Analysis*</u>

Since the essay studies the political engagement of the NSM focusing on both intra-movement dynamics and structures and political context, the fieldwork research was carried out at both the national and local fields of movement activity. It thus examined the NSM both horizontally and vertically within its environmental contexts. In addition, since the outcomes of the different phases of a movement activity become factors in other phases the movement is examined longitudinally.

The horizontal dimension highlights the formation of movement networks and organizational and ideational features and political practices. The vertical dimension demonstrates how the NSM harvested the organizational and ideological resources tapped and generated at the two levels in order to sustain the movement to engage in and with the political arena. The longitudinal dimension puts the vertical and horizontal aspects of the movement in its particular intra- and extra-movement historical contexts and thereby shows the continuities and ruptures. It shows that the movement outcomes (e.g. intramovement products such as organizational and ideational features) generated in earlier phases of the movement's lifespan becomes in turn a factor influencing the political behavior of the movement within a formal and informal institutional context at another time in history. Finally, the comparative approach, which brings to the picture the Yeni Asya and other *Risale-i Nur* movements/branches when necessary, allows seeing how the internal dynamics of the movements, particularly their organizational

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forms may generate different political practices in terms of participating into a political party project, the choice of allies, strategies etc.

The form and content of political engagement as units of analysis

As discussed in the analytical section, political engagement is about both form and content. Accordingly, to understand the political involvement of an Islamist movement requires, on the one hand, the study of its institutionalization, or materialization through consensus and activist mobilizations and organization building activities. In other words, it necessitates a focus on the networks from which the elites and activists originate, the recruitment efforts, and finally the networks and organization type that a movement creates. These aspects of an Islamist movement, which relate to its environment and the activities of its elites and activists, reveal not only complex configuration of factors that give rise to its emergence but also available and perceived material and symbolic avenues and means of political involvement.

The crystallization of the NSM entrepreneurs within and through the rise and failure of the right wing mobilizations of the 1960s, the micro-properties of their potential activists who had been entrenched but marginal in various right-wing networks show the inherently political character of the circumstances in which the NSM was born. The NSM was neither an aggregation of some macro social, political, cultural cleavages nor was a political branch of a previously established Islamist or religious organization. The NSM emerged through action and interaction of its entrepreneurs and activists within the political arena. They brought their forces together to tap into material and symbolic resources that could not be reached individually or through existing political parties, associations, informal religious networks etc. (formal and informal institutions) and collective action methods such as street protests, petitions, conferences, lobbying. The NSM in itself was not necessarily the goal, though the organizational survival later became important, but a tool which could be used to initiate changes in the actors' environments which had disempowered them and prevented their access to goods that could only be reached and/or generated through a political party (a novel

institution) and direct/formal electoral and activist mobilization (a novel collective action).

On the other hand, analyzing the ideational elements and political practices of the movement activists as substances of their political engagement, unearths how these features of a movement both influence and are influenced by internal power relations, the form of the networks of recruitment and organization; and finally, interactions with other social and political actors and institutions through time and space.

Analyzing the construction of the NSM ideational elements in relation to environmental and intra-movement factors, demonstrates that movements do not emerge or act politically in a certain way based on preconceived and/or hidden agendas and ideas. The NSM collective action frames and identity called for "Muslim political action," solidarity and altruism in the name of a "Muslim and Turkish" nation, not necessarily Islam as an abstract entity and emphasized material development as well as a moral one. All testify to the contingent nature of the Islamist symbolic production on both the national political arena and the local networks as the activists, as shall be seen in Chapter 5, not only through conscious efforts but also inadvertently responded to the contexts in which they operated. As for studying the political practices of the NSM, in other words, its choice of strategies, allies, policies etc, it reveals that a particular political behavior of an Islamist movement is a product of not only existing external opportunities and constraints[82] but also the interacting intra-movement factors and processes such as intra-elite power struggles, (re)alignment of ideational elements and the organizational structure. These factors and processes, in turn, are informed by the early stages of the movement development.

The process that led to the RPP-NSP coalition displays how the external factors were unfolded at the movement (meso) level. On the one hand, the divergent micro properties and intraorganizational structural positions of the two groups of movement elites and the power relations between the two led to the emergence of pro- and anti-coalition NSM elite groups. On the other hand, the

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[82] For instance a new and more liberal constitution as an opportunity and an increasing marginalization from decision making processes as a constraint.

organizational and ideational elements that had been produced during the early years of the movement enabled the pro-coalitionist elites to pursue their line of action at the expense of anti-coalitionists. The organizational and ideational features that centralized decision-making processes and helped (or promised to) redistribute collective and selective incentives ensured the loyalty of the activists. The latter, with limited or no resources for party politics, themselves needed and (re)produced them at the local level to sustain their electoral and further activist mobilization efforts.

Kayseri as a case for local movement activity

The research was conducted primarily in three cities. While Ankara and İstanbul were the two centers of the NSM (and also Yeni Asya activity), Kayseri was chosen as a case of peripheral town[83], which has both its strengths and weaknesses.

On the one hand, Kayseri, during the years under consideration was a town where one can observe the naissance and structural development of the two moderate/pragmatic Islamist movements, the NSM and Yeni Asya. The initial mobilization, articulation and organization of these two rival movements took place by the late 1960s, particularly the early 1970s, following the development of the Kirazlımescit group into Yeni Asya from 1963 to 1967[84]. This was in tandem with the first consensus and activist mobilization of the NSM in Kayseri during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Moreover, Kayseri while hosting a range of well established right-wing political groups and networks, which create sociological and political continuums and fluidities (blurring boundaries) with Islamist political activism, was *not* a town where Islamist movements were particularly powerful during the years under consideration as it evinced by the dominance of the JP and the RPP in local politics

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[83] Please see Appendix D for the map of Turkey highlighting Kayseri and a map of Kayseri downtown.

[84] From 1967 to 1970, the group was still known as Kirazlımescit, but its basic structure and dynamics that were built upon and complemented the original Risale-i Nur Student institutions had already been in the making when they began publishing İttihad in 1967, the weekly predecessor of the daily Yeni Asya newspaper. The latter would appear in 1970 and gave its name to this new Risale-i Nur movement.

and the substantial challenge of the ultranationalists. This allows seeing the opportunities and difficulties that the NSM faced from its emergence through its development. Considering the fact that both the NSM and Yeni Asya and their spin-offs began to dominate the local political and economic scenery by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the early years of the NSM in Kayseri becomes all the more interesting as subject of study. It should be added that today Kayseri is one of the bastions of both the Islamist movements and the incumbent "Muslim-democrat" Justice and Development Party (the JDP).[85] The town is also one of the so-called Anatolian Tigers, an emerging dynamic industrial center of Anatolia. Most of my interviewees in Kayseri were or had been active participants to these political and economic changes.[86]

In addition, despite its sizeable Alevi and Kurdish populations living in the subdistricts (*ilçe*), Kayseri has never experienced political polarization or violence along the lines of these ethnic and religious cleavages as was the case, for instance, in Maraş. While the networks which both movements mobilized and/or created were definitely of Sunni persuasion and of Turkish ethnicity, there is no evidence that the movements capitalized on any preexisting animosity, if there were any, between these different social groups.

On the other hand, Kayseri has certain limitations as a case. First, the findings of the dissertation on the NSM activities in this town cannot be easily generalized to metropolitan areas such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir where the political actors and stakes were different and more complex. In the latter, where the population density was high, there were not only well-established local religious and ethnic communities and networks, high number of university students, overflow of immigrants from different towns who had formed clustered neighborhoods but also more visible class cleavages which criss-crossed these social groups. The emergence of the local NSM elites and their mobilization and interactions in these metropolitan areas surely entailed similar organizational and

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[85] One of the leaders and founders of the JDP, today the President of the Republic, Abdullah Gül was a native of the city. His father and his mother's uncle were among the local founders and leaders of the NSM. During the fieldwork, the researcher conducted interviews with several of his close or distant relatives and/or friends and discovered the relationship between the President and these interviewees usually during the interviews.

[86] For an excellent study on Islamist politics and local government in Kayseri since 1994, which also study Kayseri's urban history since the establishment of the Republic see Ali Ekber Doğan, *Eğreti Kamusallık: Kayseri Örneğinde İslamcı Belediyecilik* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).

ideational properties. However, their implementation and reception and the praxis of the activists reflected the complex nature of these fields of action. Similarly, Kayseri cannot be generalized for provinces where ethnic and religious communal cleavages were acutely deepened in the 1970s.[87] It should be noted that, findings on Yeni Asya in this town proved to be much more easy to generalize as the interviews and primary sources on Yeni Asya revealed a homogenous and homogenizing movement despite its federative structure.

Be that as it may, studying Kayseri throws light on the inner structure and dynamics of the NSM and how the movement generated social, economic, cultural and political capital at the local level to collect and use them later also at the center. The fact that the nature of capitals and power relations may be different in metropolitan and polarized regions do not undermine what Kayseri case shows: it is the local activity that sustains a movement through human, social, cultural, economic and symbolic capital the local activists produce and aggregate through mobilization.

The Nizam/Selamet Movement as a case

The case selection

The reasons behind choosing the *Nizam/Selamet* as a case of a moderate/pragmatic Islamist movement are multiple. First, when the researcher had to decide for the case(s)[88], the memory of the military intervention of February 28 was still fresh, and despite the Justice and Development Party's (the JDP) electoral success and apparent legitimacy, the dispute over the issue of secularism had not ceased. Given the circumstances, the "retired" and active Islamists would feel safer when they talked about past than the recent events. The research experience did not prove otherwise, in fact, as the quarrel around the JDP's "real intentions" intensified from 2007 onwards, from time to time, the field became difficult: the

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[87] Hence, further research needs to be conducted on the local activities of the NSM in metropolitan areas such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir and in regions where there were deep ethnic and religious cleavages in order to see differences and similarities with provincial Anatolian towns.

[88] As mentioned in the introduction, the fieldwork research was carried on two different movements, the NSM and Yeni Asya. The logic behind the selection of both cases was the same. At the end of this subsection, further information on selecting the NSM over Yeni Asya to include in the dissertation will be provided.

potential interviewees became reluctant in granting interviews. During these periods of intense public debate, the researcher had to wait several weeks or even months to pass to be able to carry out the research under more favorable conditions.

Second, in terms of its organization as a political party, its area and modes of political action, the NSM represent one of the two distinct patterns of moderate/pragmatic Islamist activism in Turkey. While there were few abortive attempts to establish political parties in alliance with conservative-nationalists or purely Islamist political parties in the late 1940s[89], until the emergence of the NSM, since the passage to multiparty system in 1945, Islamist movements engaged in politics mainly through the main center-right party (the Democrat Party of the 1950s or the JP). The NSM became not only the quintessential example of an Islamist movement engaging directly in party/institutional politics but also the first success story. The NSM, shortly after its emergence, came to power through three different coalitions and consolidated its movement through tapping into state controlled resources and capitalizing on its new found visibility and power to enlarge its networks. Throughout the 1970s, but especially by the mid-1980s, the NSM increased its members, activists and auxiliary organizations through the establishment of (some being) semi-autonomous youth organizations, women branches, various publications, blue and white collar worker associations, endowments and finally, its various European branches organized under the name *Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı* (European National Vision Organization).

Third, as evinced from the ongoing disputes and a large body of journalistic and academic work on the NSM and Islamism in Turkey, it had a tremendous impact on the political arena through its activities and spin offs. Despite various juridical and military interventions throughout its history, the NSM survived to this day under different party names but essentially with the name "National Vision movement." Although no longer a major player of the political field since it had

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[89] These parties could not establish nation-wide organizations and attract voters. They were established by some Islamist literary and intellectual figures of the period when multiparty politics introduced in 1945. While some have been banned by the courts, most dissolved themselves having failed to enlarge their activist networks and attract voters in the then existing majoritarian electoral system with multi-member district ("winner takes all") electoral system. From 1948 to its abolition and reestablishment in 1953, the Nation Party was a joint endeavor of the Islamists and conservative nationalist. The *Islam Demokrat Partisi* (IDP, Islamic Democratic Party) that survived only a year before its ban in 1952, was the first major attempt of an Islamist elite group to establish a political party of their own.

lost majority of its activist, member and sympathizer networks to its eventual spinoff, the JDP, the movement is still active through its new political party (the latest successor to the NOP), the Felicity Party. The NSM had proved to be a success story: a collective endeavor that developed from humble origins to a mass based organization commanding extensive resources. The analysis of its early years would not only help to answer the research question but also give clues for future research as to why and how the NSM lost its mobilization power, while Islamist movements in general gained strength in Turkey.

Fourth, the NSM produced rich written material over the years (retrospectively as well) that could be used during the research. In addition, there are diverse and fruitful academic works focusing on both the NSM and different aspects of the political history of the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, which, through their contributions and constraints, provide a fertile ground to carry out research.

Finally, one should discuss why the NSM was chosen over Yeni Asya as the focus of this dissertation, despite the fact that the fieldwork research was equally extensively carried out on both movements. As mentioned in the introduction, the dissertation research originally aimed at studying two moderate/pragmatic movements in detail. The reasons provided above for the selection of the NSM as a case also holds true for Yeni Asya. Moreover, if the NSM was the quintessential example of an Islamist movement engaged in institutional politics in Turkey, Yeni Asya was a typical example of those Islamist movements, which engaged in politics through establishing an alliance with a center-right party. During the period under consideration, Yeni Asya, through not only its movement-related activities but also political actions within the JP networks and branches, enlarged its area of maneuver in its target area of activity, increased the number of its converts and sympathizers, and accumulated considerable material and symbolic resources.[90] Although today the name Yeni Asya belongs to a relatively smaller branch, following a breakup first in the 1980s and then in the 1990s into various groups, the movement networks and organizations still exist, now mostly under the control of the branch known as Yeni Nesil. Moreover, as the NSM inadvertently gave birth to the JDP, Yeni Asya produced the Fethullah Gülen movement from amidst its rangs. The

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[90] Further information on the formation and development of Yeni Asya and Risale-i Nur students will be provided in the following chapters, particularly in Chapters 3 and. 6.

latter seems to have developed and sophisticated the formal and informal institutionalization methods it inherited from the Nur Students, even overshadowed them and organized in more than 100 countries.[91] As such Yeni Asya presents a case as good as the NSM to answer the question why and how the political engagement pattern of an Islamist movement differ from other models of Islamist political engagement when it does.

The reason for choosing the NSM as focus over Yeni Asya is rather technical and methodological. The fieldwork research was conducted on these two movements with the purpose of producing a comparative essay focusing on both. However, the research revealed the relative abundance of the second hand sources on the NSM and an overabundance of primary sources that the Yeni Asya produced.[92] It is true that previous works on a subject create analytical obstacles as much as they facilitate research and writing processes. However, the almost complete lack of previous study[93] on Yeni Asya in particular and Risale-i Nur students in general, required the researcher to rely almost exclusively on the huge volume of first hand resources that the movement produced. In other words, without any prior analytical and empirical handles, the researcher had to engage with such publications as memoirs, novels, newspapers and brochures; but also publications on the internet and, finally, the immense corpus "*Risale-i Nur*"[94] written by both the movement leader Bediüzzaman Nursi and his close circle of

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[91] It should be added that whether Fethullah Gülen movement, which was first the İzmir branch under the control of Yeni Asya, can still be considered a Risale-i Nur movement is open to discussion. Most local activists of Yeni Asya (who are now under the "jurisdiction" of Yeni Nesil) and most of the elites of the movement, the latter at least formally, see the Gülen movement as Risale-i Nur students. However, during the interviews the activists and elites of (historical) Yeni Asya defined being a Nur student by reading, producing and disseminating the Risale-i Nur corpus and these are no longer Gülen movement members' priorities. Consequently, the fluidities and ruptures between these movements and, in fact, within the Gülen movement need to be further studied.

[92] This was initially one of the reasons for choosing Yeni Asya over the Süleymancılar who had not produced such documents targeting both the intramovement activists and "the others."

[93] Please see the footnote 37 of this chapter.

[94] The major volumes where Said Nursi intreprets faith related articles of the Kur'an were *Sözler* (the Words) (1926-1934), *Mektubat* (the Letters, 1926-1936), *Lema'lar* (the Flashes,1926-1936), *Şualar* (the Rays, 1936-1949). In addition, there are three volumes of compilation of letters written by Said Nursi and his followers on their daily movement activities. The volumes, which were called *Barla Lahikası* (the Barla Appendix, 1926-1935), *Kastamonu Lahikası* (the Kastamonu Appendix, 1935-1944) and *Emirdağ Lahikası I* and *II* (the Emirdağ Appendix I and II, 1944-1947 and 1949-1953), were later considered as the 27. Letter of the *Mektubat*. Finally, there is *Tarihçe-i Hayat* (The Life History, 1957) that provides a history of Said Nursi based on above mentioned works. It should be added the researcher used the volumes available on the internet and gave here the dates when these volumes were written, produced by hand and distributed epistle by epistle (except the Life History) through underground Nur Student networks.

followers, which constituted hundreds of documents containing highly fragmented data. Most of the analysis of the data on the NSM was finished thus earlier, while the study of the fragmented data on Yeni Asya was still in progress. At the end of the process, although the fragmentary data found in these primary sources have been read and analyzed complementarily with the interviews conducted with movement activists and leaders, devoting to Yeni Asya separate chapters proved to be an impossible mission to accomplish within the available time limits. Instead the NSM was chosen as the main subject of the essay to be analyzed in finer detail than it would be possible in an essay that has two cases.

However, although Yeni Asya is not treated in separate chapters in this essay, the findings on Yeni Asya as a field of research nevertheless informed the analysis of the NSM case. Moreover, analysis on Yeni Asya and other Nur students is provided when necessary, particularly in chapters 3 and 6 where the emergence of the NSM entrepreneurs and the disputes over the question of the RPP-NSP coalition are studied respectively.

The fieldwork research and the two movements

The data produced through interviews with the elites and activists of the NSM was a major source of information to understand the NSM political participation patterns. The interviews conducted with other Islamist and non-Islamist groups were also used in studying the political context and the "Islamist field" and in crosschecking the interviews with Yeni Asya and NSM activists. The Islamist groups included the adherents and activists of other Islamist movements (to be sure, Yeni Asya, but also *Akıncılar*, *Büyük Doğu*, *Milli Mücadele Birliği*[95]) and

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[95] The Raiders was the semi-autonomous youth organization of the NSM. The Great East was an informal network of young Islamists, mostly members of the National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, known by its famous acronyme the MTTB) who regularly met and discussed various political and literary issues around the views of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek published in Büyük Doğu (the Great East) Magazine. The Union of National Struggle was an Islamist organization established in the late 1960s in Konya and Afyon, which allegedly became an ultranationalist-Islamist arm of the deep state forces by the 1970s. The number of the interviews with the activists of these movements/groups are not very high (particularly, from the Union of National Struggle the researcher could only conduct one interview as its activists tend to be very secretive and suspected the researcher to the extend of a paranoia). Although their uneasy and complicated relationship with the NSM has not been addressed within the limits of the essay, their activists, having been in overlapping and crisscrossing networks with the local or national elites of the NSM provided valuable insights and information on the Islamist field and the NSM.

non-Islamist parties (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, *Adalet Partisi*, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)[96] in Kayseri.[97]

Overall 82 face-to-face interviews were conducted[98] and all but one is recorded in Ankara, İstanbul and Kayseri, in addition to 14 telephone interviews.[99] The list of the 96 interviewees from not only the NSM but also other groups includes people from different time periods of the groups' histories, allowing seeing continuities and ruptures in the political context and the intra-movement dynamics. The complete list of interviewees categorized according to the locality and movement/party/group affiliation can be found in Appendix B.

The interview data was used complementarily with publications (including memoirs, newspapers, books, pamphlets), local newspapers, and also wherever necessary court files, and parliamentary records.[100] The research also used other interviews conducted by journalists or movement activists themselves, which appeared in Internet publications, such as movement websites or local newspapers. Moreover, if an unknown event or person was mentioned in an interview, the researcher would incorporate that in other interviews and search in written sources. The interview lists emerged through mainly two ways: a) "snowball" method which starts with a "gatekeeper" and lands the researcher from one interview to another within the movement and organization networks, b) finding the names from the local and national newspapers, party documents, movement publications, yearbooks, encyclopedias, books, memoirs; searching for their phone numbers on the white and yellow pages, calling the person and asking for an interview.

While both methods were used for both cases, for the interviews with the local activists of the NSM, as there were divisions in the movement following first

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[96] The Republican People Party (the RPP), the Justice Party (the JP) and Nationalist Action Party (the NAP) respectively.
[97] Moreover, telephone interviews are conducted with the JP and the NSM activists in Konya.
[98] The actual number of interview sessions reaches to around 100 since with some activists, particularly with those in leadership positions, more than one session was carried out. Moreover with some interviewees the researcher conducted additional telephone interviews, which are not included in the number of telephone interviews provided above. The longest of the interviews were around 10 to 15 hours, only 7 hours of which is recorded.
[99] During the span of three years, the researcher also engaged in various informal but lengthy conversations with individuals and groups (more than 30 individuals) from various Islamist and religious milieus, which helped to learn some idioms, jargons, traditions, stories, insider gossips and jokes, rivalry and cooperation specific to the Islamist field and right wing networks.
[100] Further information is provided below.

by 1977 then the military intervention of February 28 and most activists were now old and long time retired, the need to arrange interviews through phone calls without the help of a gatekeeper frequently emerged. This method involved particular difficulties not to mention the fact that sometimes one needed to call many people (sometimes as high as 20) with the same name to find the right person.[101] The major difficulty was to establish a trust relation since the person on the other end of the line did not see the face of the researcher and there were no references that could be provided. In these cases, the researcher first extensively provided information on her research question, on the schools where she studied, on herself as a student. She also gave detailed information on how she reached the name of the potential interviewee through a study of the archival materials, previous interviews etc. If the interviewee demanded the names of the previous interviewees from the locality or movement (e.g. Kayseri, or the Nur Students), the researcher said that she could not name most of the names as they had wished to remain anonymous. She, however, offered the names of the national leaders of the movements or the names of those local activists who had no qualms about being public. Finally, the researcher gave the phone number of his institution in Turkey so that the interviewee could inquire about her. If the person agreed to interview, sometimes, a second difficulty emerged. Even if the potential interviewee was curious or interested enough to grant a rendezvous, he did not have enough trust to invite the researcher to his office or apartment. In that case, the researcher would offer to meet with the person in a mosque. A mosque was not only a place where the interviewee would feel comfortable, because not only the pious and the Islamists see the mosque as *theirs,* but also being seen alone with a woman in a mosque would not incite gossip. Moreover, from the interviewee's perspective it was also a space where a person with "negative" properties and bad intentions would not even set foot.

The same interview questions with slight changes were used for both the NSM and other groups. The questions focused on the individuals' social, economic, political, cultural and religious trajectories before and after the participation; personal experiences, practices and responsibilities within the movement and in relation to other groups and their attitudes; the interviewees' views on the NSM

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[101] During the process of interviews further difficulties were present. They are discussed below.

parties in particular and political parties in general; their ideas on other movements in the Muslim majority countries; the coalition with the RPP and the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) coalitions[102]; the question of the Amnesty for the left wing prisoners in 1974 and finally the Kurdish and Armenian "issues." An exemplary interview protocol in Turkish and in English can be found in Appendix C.

Among the answers on the coalitions and the Amnesty, only the one about the coalition with the RPP has been treated extensively in the dissertation as an example for illustrating how the NSM decided for interim goals, policy and strategy during its mundane political practices. The answers to the questions on the "Kurdish question" and the "Armenian Question," though not dealt with in and off themselves in the dissertation, helped to understand further the nature of the NSM ideational elements.

It should be emphasized that a considerable number of interviews with movement activists and non-Islamist political party members actually amounted to oral and life histories. While the interview parts were not structured at all where personal stories or a specific event (the TOBB Affair, the election of Süleyman Demirel to the JP's chairmanship in 1964, the establishment of the NOP or the NSP at the local level) was narrated (except for short facilitating questions), the parts regarding movement mechanisms were guided more by specific questions. The telephone interviews conducted with the members of the local JP and chambers of commerce and industry in Kayseri and Konya, were essentially oral histories focusing on the events before and after the TOBB Affair.[103]

Oral and life histories, as narratives of personal stories or specific events contribute to social sciences and specifically to the present interdisciplinary essay weaving together insights from sociology, political science and history, in a number of ways. Since oral and life histories are narratives, Shenhav's discussion on the use of political narratives in social sciences is useful to elucidate briefly such contributions. Shenhav categorizes the content of the narratives into three major

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[102] These were the two coalition governments established by the right wing parties in the Grand National Assembly in 1975 and 1977.

[103] As shall be discussed in Chapter 4, the TOBB Affair refers to the event in 1969 during which "Necmettin Erbakan" and the JP government disputed over the chairmanship of the TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey.) While it is a generally accepted view that Erbakan decided to enter politics following his defeat at the hands of his adversaries, as shall be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, this is not supported by the data acquired on the subject.

groups: a) "events, characters, and background", b) "events in sequence" and c) "causality."[104] He then argues that unless the researcher "denies that political narratives possess any capacity to represent "reality""[105], he/she can use any or all of these elements complementarily with other sources depending on his/her evaluation and perception of the capacity of the narrative to reflect "reality" in each category.[106] Having adopted a perspective, which takes into account the agency and subjectivity of the social actors, this research benefited from each of the three categories, which were also present in the interviewees' narratives. The NSM had left behind very few personal accounts of their experiences as movement activists. Compared to Yeni Asya, there were not even enough official party documents after the ban of their first party (because of the coup d'états in general and court cases against the party in particular). However, the interviewees were more than willing to tell their stories, activities and the difficulties and opportunities they faced as individuals and as a movement.

First, "the events, characters and background" helped to establish individual trajectories of the actors and revealed certain contingent factors or issues that cannot be found in written resources but well known and corroborated by the interviewees from different groups. Second, "events in sequence" told by the interviewees (even those that carried inconsistencies) helped to follow the trajectory of the movement when used together with the newspaper archival research. Finally, both "events in sequence" and "causality" provided by the narrators reflected the subjectivity of the actors, that is the way in which they constructed their mobilization frames, individual and collective identities in relation to their environment.

As shall be explained in detail below, other movement publications, such as newspapers, pamphlets, books and national Islamist publications without particular attachment to an Islamist movement, a center-left daily that most of the interviewees from the NSM networks reported to have followed and finally local newspapers of different persuasions from Kayseri and Konya were employed to study the local and national political contexts in general and the practices and

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[104]Shaul R. Shenhav, "Political Narratives and Political Reality," *International Political Science Review* 27 (2006): 251.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid, 251-254.

attitudes of the NSM (and Yeni Asya) activists in particular. Finally, participant observation though limited helped to concretize and visualize some aspects of the internal movement dynamics, interactions and practices, which were mentioned during the interviews and in written sources.

2.2.2 Data

The fieldwork lasted with intervals from the summer of 2006 to spring 2009 in three cities, Ankara, İstanbul, and Kayseri. In addition, the author traveled also to Isparta for two interviews and conducted twelve telephone interviews with members of the Nizam/Selamet Movement, the Justice Party and Yeni Asya in both Kayseri and Konya. Main sources of the data were: 1) in-depth interviews (comprising also life/oral histories); 2) participant observation; 3) newspapers; 4) movement publications. The following is a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these data sources and a review of opportunities and difficulties the fieldwork presented for the research.

In-depth Interviews

As mentioned above, the most fruitful and valuable data source for the dissertation was the in-depth interviews, some parts of which amounted to oral/life histories. The majority of the face-to-face interviews were recorded. For the phone interviews notes are taken. Despite the fact that most of the interviewees did not wish to remain anonymous, the names of the interviewees will not be disclosed in the essay, except for the national leaders of the movements. The interviewees were selected from those whose experiences and comments could shed light on different periods and different levels of movement activity. Consequently, while the same questions were used, they were adapted to the interviewee's movement/group/party, role in the organization and age.

Before the fieldwork, a research was conducted on the first and second hand written resources on the general history of the period, the NSM (and Yeni Asya)

and the history of Kayseri.[107] Then, before each interview the researcher gathered available information on the interviewee from written sources and previous interviews. Such information was not always available, especially when the respondent was not a high profile activist or when the researcher was sent to a person immediately after finishing an interview.

In Ankara, İstanbul, and Kayseri the difficulties encountered in conducting the interviews were twofold: a) those related to the dynamics external to the research, b) those related to the dynamics between the researcher and the interviewee. First, these problems and their solutions will be discussed than those factors that facilitated the research will be presented.

Kayseri

To begin with, as mentioned above, in the summer of 2006 the memory of the February 28 was still fresh for the Islamists. Those who were convicted during this period were recently released and some court cases were still continuing. This created a certain suspicion as to the intentions of the research. Thus, initially, several activists, especially relatively low profile local NSM activists refused to grant an interview. After having conducted interviews with leading local NSM activists, the activists and executives of other political parties and the leader of the local Yeni Asya branch the researcher had to leave the town. The return to Kayseri took place a year later, in the late summer of 2007, when Abdullah Gül, a native of Kayseri and a young politician from the NSM tradition, was elected as the President of the Republic. His election had created euphoria in the town and relaxed the Islamists, which then facilitated the fieldwork.

This time however, there occurred another difficulty: the leader of the local Yeni Asya, who had been very helpful and encouraging for the research and accepted to be the gatekeeper for both Yeni Asya national leadership and the local movement network, suddenly passed away only a few months before the second trip to Kayseri. Since, the researcher had not known this news before her arrival in

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[107] For a major source of information on Kayseri's history and who's who in Kayseri that does not strictly follow a scholarly methodology, style, tone and content see Abdullah Satoğlu, *Kayseri Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayımları Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2002).

Kayseri, no help had been asked from the center for the local research. A third trip, then, in spring 2009, imposed itself in order to get the names and references first from the central elites of Yeni Asya[108] in İstanbul.

It should be added that the second wave of the *Ergenekon* Affair[109] that started in spring 2008 and continued throughout the summer created unfavorable conditions for continuing the interviews before 2009. First of all, the tension which reigned in the country between the JDP (and allegedly its ally the Fethullah Gülen movement) which openly stated its aim to bring down the paramilitary groups, and some secularist/Kemalist and left wing groups who accused the former for using the Affair to silence the opposition as a whole, would become an additional variable that had not existed in prior interviews. Moreover, the researcher had already been experiencing stress as a result of the military establishments' declarations on the nature of academic research on the Islamists (in the summer of 2006 when the researcher was conducting research in Kayseri, the generals accused the sociologists of helping the Islamists through their work) on the one hand, and the psychological and practical effort she put to ensure the safety and trust of its respondents on the other. The stress level augmented further by the polarization over the Affair in the political arena. The practice of telephone tapping by different rival groups especially worried the researcher. She was making various telephone conversations with those names who were not only at the top of the official list of "most dangerous" individuals for "national security," but also top rivals of an ascending Islamist group. Interestingly enough, the interviewees seemed to be more careful about their rivals than the *Kemalist* establishment. Be that as it may, while the issue was not directly related to the research period or the fieldwork, the author decided to work on the written resources and dissertation writing until the dusts settled.

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[108] As mentioned above, Yeni Asya is no longer united. It has been divided into various groups, the most powerful ones being Yeni Asya and Yeni Nesil. Since the local Nur students were connected to the latter, the leaders of Yeni Nesil, particularly "Fırıncı Ağabey", became the gatekeepers for the Kayseri Nur students following the death of the local leader.

[109] *Ergenekon* refers to the alleged name of a paramilitary organization. Prosecutor of the Republic claimed that the organization had been developing since the 1980s and had formed branches within and outside the state institutions aiming at preventing democratization reforms in general (which meant changing state policies and laws regarding the role of religion and ethnicity in the public sphere) and putting an end to the JDP government in particular.

Another difficulty that posed itself was the age of some of the potential interviewees as a result of the period covered. Some earliest local activists had passed away or were too old or too sick to grant an interview. Thus, despite their low numbers, one could not talk with all of them. Nevertheless, necessary basic information on their birth dates, professions and positions in the movement were gathered from their fellow activists, their families through phone interviews and also court files. The latter was the files of the Constitutional Court case, which banned the NOP in 1971 and which contained official application documents of local party entrepreneurs for the establishment of the NOP. However, since the majority of the local NSM party entrepreneurs and executives were very young during the years under consideration and it was rather a small group, it was possible to reach a satisfying number of interviews.

The years that had passed between the focused period of Islamist activism and when the research was carried out did not pose a problem during the interviews, not only because the activists were relatively young but also because for the respondents their movement activities had taken a great part of their lives that they never forgot. They were still entrenched in the same networks and their memories were still lively. Rarely did they experience difficulty in remembering the events and their sequences. Such easily forgotten matters as dates and names were corrected when necessary by crosschecking the information through other interviews and written documents.

Second, creating trust between the researcher and the respondents was an important step to be able to reach healthy results. For the external reasons mentioned above, the local activists were suspicious of the intentions of the researcher even when they agreed to talk. They thought that the researcher could be working for the National Intelligence Agency[110], or even for the CIA. While those Islamists with no formal or informal body of an organization, such as some members of the *Büyük Doğucular*, had difficulty in trusting the researcher up until the end of the interview, the NSM activists (especially the high profile ones) and the Nur students, having been transformed into "good judges of character" and

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[110] Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (the MIT)

having already experienced various of forms of state pressure, were more willing to trust the researcher who was obviously not an Islamist.[111]

Several factors played a role in building trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. First, the interviewer explained the purposes of the research lengthily to the respondents. That is to understand the differences between the different movements and the difficulties and opportunities they faced individually and as a movement during the period under consideration. Second, the author responded lengthily and frankly all the questions asked about her family and educational background and political views. Regarding the religious matters on the other hand, with one exception, she did not disclose her beliefs stating that this may influence them positively or negatively during the interview. The only exception where she gave clue concerning to her belief system was during her short stay in a *Medrese-i Nuriye* in Kayseri, where she felt the need to be more open to establish trust.

Third, the researcher, while not exactly conforming to the dress rules of the Islamists, or conservative Muslims, did not dress in a way to distract the respondents during the interview. However, the dress code that was needed for both groups were different, testifying to the inward looking and totalizing tendencies within the Risale-i Nur Students and outward looking and articulating practices and ideational elements of the NSM.[112] While a skirt on the knees and a shirt with short sleeves did not pose a problem with a typical NSM local elite who either employed women with similar outfits or had to be in contact with such women during their business and political affairs, for the interviews with the Kayseri local Nur leaders and activists, a long skirt finishing at the ankles and a long sleeved shirt and cardigan proved to be necessary. While the majority of the NSM activists did shake hands, some Kayseri Yeni Asya members avoided even looking at the eyes of a woman. As a matter of fact, not only several interviews with the latter had to be carried through the phone but also some face-to-face interviews were conducted almost without any eye contact. While they were certainly among the most difficult

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[111] Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the timing proved to be crucial to get interviews even from more experienced Islamist activists.

[112] The observation is based mostly on the national and local elites of the movements. The term local elite refers to those who served as the official and unofficial founders of the local NSM branch, the executives and delegates of the NSM parties.

interviews, since they were the last ones, the researcher had already gained enough experience not to dismay and be disconcerted.

It should however be added that Yeni Asya, though quite resistant, is not immune to the changes that takes place in its environment, especially the rivalry of the Fethullah Gülen movement, which attracted most of the available university students in metropolitan and provincial areas. One of the most striking observations of the Yeni Asya's change was related to two sites where the interviews were conducted. It displayed the changes between the generations that occurred at the national level of movement activity. The sites represented two extremes: while an interview with a relatively young Yeni Asya movement leader was conducted in the Bilkent University's pub where alcoholic beverages were served, another interview with a very old Nur student leader[113] took place in a *Medrese-i Nuriye* for men in Ümraniye, İstanbul where the researcher was politely requested to put a headscarf before entering the building. Both were impossible a decade ago and still *impossible* at the periphery, and show not only the importance of generational differences between the movement members in particular but also changes in the interpretation and execution of the *Risale-i Nur* teachings in general. The willingness of the movement to open itself to cease the fears and to attract a new generation of university students seemed to have paved to new interpretations.

Finally, since the author had done her homework before the interviews, she showed particular care not to use language with could be offensive to the respondent. For instance, inquiring the religious education and activities of the NSM activists, instead of "*tarikata girdiniz mi?*" or "*tarikat üyesi misiniz?*"[114], the following formula that is prevalent among the religious is employed: "*tarikat ehli misiniz?*" or "*bir hocaefendiye intisap ettiniz mi veya sohbetlerine devam ettiniz mi?*" [115]

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[113] During the 1960s he was a free floating leader. By the early 1970s he firmly associated himself with Yeni Asya.
[114] "Have you entered a *sufi* brotherhood?" or "Are you a member of a *sufi* brotherhood?"
[115] "Are you from the *sufi* brotherhood people?" or "Have you been attached to a *sufi* leader or listened to his conversations?"

Most of the problems that posed at the local level were not an issue for the movement leaders at the center. Having been granted hundreds of interviews to the researchers and journalists, or having served jail time on various occasions the NSM and Yeni Asya leaders were more comfortable in granting interviews. The fact that, the interviews actually began at the local level and snow balled to the center certainly helped to create the initial trust. There was however other problems that needed to be surmounted at the center.

First, the leaders of the NSM, who had served as ministers or parliamentarians, had a tendency to dominate the interviews, and make party propaganda. However, they were kind and polite enough to change the subject when the researcher reminded them the methodology of the research, which focuses on practices as much as the ideas.

A second difficulty encountered was the busy schedules of the movement leaders. Especially during the Ramazan (the holy month of Islam) or elections, the movement leaders could not be reached. Nevertheless, waiting sometimes several months paid off and quite long and fruitful interviews were conducted.

Finally, a difficulty peculiar to the Yeni Asya should be mentioned, which applies to both the center and the periphery of the movement. The Yeni Asya leaders and activists were extremely kind, helpful and enthusiastic for the interviews. While this was certainly a blessing, it also related to the fact that the movement activists saw the research as an opportunity to legitimize and market their movement through the agency of a Ph D student from what they saw as "the other camp."

The researcher felt to be manipulated in more than one occasion. First, a local activist told openly that the author of the dissertation should publish the work, after having, of course, corrected by them. If not published there was no use to the study. The impossibility of such a correction is politely explained. Second, it has been implied several times that if the study does not contain anything that would hurt them, their movement would be open for further research: an endless resource of publishable articles! Third, a young movement-leader working for the current

government offered the researcher an advisorship position within the cadres of a ministry, which was politely refused. Fourth, the movement activists tried to play to the fears that they assumed the author had of the "*tarikat*," which is actually prevalent among the secular public. They not only compared their community to the brotherhoods frequently but also once took her to see the İsmailağa street, where she could observe with her very eyes the difference between Yeni Asya members' "modern" attitudes and dresses and those of the İsmailağa Naqshbandi (*sufi*) brotherhood (with baggy trousers, long beards etc) which populated the area. During the face to face interviews, however, the researcher, in order to reaffirm and protect her academic independence, stated openly in more than one occasion that though she would not misuse the quotations for some pre-established agenda that would hurt either the individuals or the movement as a whole, there would nevertheless be analysis with which the movement activists could be displeased or disagree. Such an overt statement was welcomed and even used as an opportunity to show the democratic credentials of the movement activists. Their unequivocal response was they would welcome any criticism and they would try to find solutions. That, obviously, was not the goal of the research project.

The behavior of the Yeni Asya activists was strikingly different from that of the NSM activists and illustrates the different ways the two movements established relations with extra-movement actors. The Yeni Asya activists, except for the young Nur student girls with whom the researcher spent a night and two days in a *Medrese-i Nuriye*[116] (*Medrese*), rather then trying to convert, propagate to or persuade their interlocutors, wanted to establish cordial and positive relations with the researcher and capitalize on whatever resource the researcher was individually commanding for the benefit of the movement. To contribute to a movement one does not need to be a core activist, a rank and file member or even an occasional participant. Any capital of any person who is sympathetic to the movement (called *dost* (friend) in the movement) can be put into the movement's use. It should be added that this accepting attitude, which also doubles as a protective wall for the

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[116] The school of the *Nur*, where the core group of Nur students live, sleep, pray, and study Risale-i Nur corpus under the supervision of a movement elder. It was also a place where weekly Risale reading sessions for movement activists of different degrees and extramovement audience were organized. Some of the students who lived in a Mendrese long enough would totally endow their lives to the movement. They would earn their livelihood from the movement working in its various institutions, including supervising a *Medrese*, in their turn.

movement activists, relaxes the interlocutors and helps them to become "accepting" and friendly in return. The NSM activists, on the other hand, while promoting and propagating their world views[117], did not seem to expect much from the researcher except for an "objectively told" story of their movement's history that interviewees from all groups asked and an opportunity to voice their personal histories and contributions to this important power in Turkey's history.

While the fieldwork presented various difficulties there were also factors that facilitated the research both at the center and the periphery. First of all, all movement activists having had extremely difficult periods and painful experiences during their activist lives were more than willing to share their thoughts, emotions and experiences with the researcher once the mutual trust was established. Since the questions were structured to understand the movements through the practices and experiences of individuals within their environments the interviewees felt the need to explain themselves further whenever they deemed necessary. There were in fact many instances when an interviewee decided by himself to disclose an information, though off the record, that was not offered during the early hours of the interview.

Second, all activists appreciated the academic profession as opposed to journalistic endeavors. The works of Şerif Mardin, Nilüfer Göle and Hakan Yavuz, in particular were very well known to the movement leaders and taken as a reference point as to the character of the research project.[118] In other words, these scholars became in a way "gatekeepers" of the Islamist community in general. At one level, this implies that a) the leaders, even those with no or without formal education, have a high degree of cultural capital that allow them to follow intellectual, academic and political debates and b) they prefer non-speculative literature to "hot" ones. At another level, these properties reveal the above-mentioned Nur students' pattern of establishing relations with the movement's environment. The priority is given to those non-speculative and non-hostile works,

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[117] It should be added since most local activists were now supporting the JDP, at times they were also very critical of certain aspects, centralized-decision making, Erbakan's authoritarian tendencies, nationalist economic policies, "radical" discourses etc. of the NSM. However, they all still kept their NSM ideational elements and discourses.

[118] Such critical works on Şerif Mardin, such as Fatih M. Şeker, *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisinin Nakşibendilik Tasavvuru: Şerif Mardin Örneği* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2007) are either ignored or not known by the movement leaders. However, their existence can be considered as signs of a new generation *Nur* students which require further research on the movement's life after the 1980s and 1990s.

which would credibly help increase the movement's legitimacy among the non-Islamist elites of the country even if they contained analysis they are not particularly pleased with.

Third, the JDP's electoral and political successes, despite frequently rising tensions and the memory of the February 28, created a certain relaxation and confidence among the Islamists. In addition, they seemed to have put a distance between their current political and activist positions and their earlier political selves. In fact, it was frequent that they were very critical of some of their previous actions, choices and ideas. The interviews, they said, gave them the opportunity for self reflection.

Finally, being a woman, though an obstacle occasionally, in general, helped to establish trust. Not only because, their gender views did not allow them to see women as threatening as men but also because most had daughters or granddaughters. Their affections and sympathy for them reflected in their attitudes towards the researcher. Especially at the local level, almost all NSM activists, even during the *Ramazan*[119], with the help of their wives, tried to have the researcher eat continuously. Even during the interviews in the offices the activists kept offering drinks and snacks, if not a full-fledged lunch.[120] The researcher in return tried to thank for their interest and the time they consecrated for the interview, and hospitality by flowers, cookies etc. whenever possible.

Participant Observation

Being a historical study the participant observation had not appeared as an option at the beginning of the fieldwork. However, as the research developed, instances and opportunities of observation revealed themselves. The types, sites, strengths and limitations of observation for each case were different and helped to gain insights on the NSM (and the Nur Students) dynamics. Following some

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[119] Ramazan (Ramadan in Arabic) is the holy month of Islamic lunar calendar. During this period Muslims fast from sundown to sunset.
[120] It should be added that in one of the earliest interviews, an interviewee, who owned a factory operating on food industry, even insisted that the researcher accept a quite big box of his products. He finally gave up insisting following a long struggle with the researcher, when she said that she would accept the gift only if he would agree to give the box to a charity.

general observations, two specific ones related to the NSM and Yeni Asya will be mentioned.

To begin with, while there were locally and generationally different interviewees both from the NSM and Yeni Asya, a general observation was that all Yeni Asya members were still deeply engaged in movement related activities and did not have "retirement" as such, as a core Yeni Asya activist worked, ate, slept, married, lived and "played" within the movement.[121] In contrast, the NSM activists were either disengaged or retired, except for those veterans of the NSM's central administration. They still worked as executives of the new NSM Party. For the NSM activists in general, the NSM, though absorbing an important part of their times and energy for a long period in their lifespan, was nevertheless only one social institution among others in which they had invested. The core NSM activists, including those with a Nur student origin (a non-Yeni Asya branch), had their individual careers and jobs; diverse networks in which they were embedded; and surrounded by close and distant family members who may or may not be NSM sympathizers.

Interrelated, for the NSM activists, since most were no longer politically active, the sites of observation were either business offices or houses of the respondents depending on age and locality. The younger local movement leaders were still working and the interviews were conducted in their business offices, which permitted to see their professional activities and environments and to compare it with their accounts of their early years in business and political life (and with Yeni Asya activists). The older local NSM leaders, on the other hand, invited the researcher to their summer houses at the outskirts of Erciyes (*bağ*) or in their apartments in the city if the weather had cooled down. All local activists, notwithstanding their age, were middle class businessmen or merchants, the party executives being apparently better-off. Very few were still active in politics. The

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[121] As shall be discussed in the next chapter Yeni Asya was in fact a total institution for its core (the inner circle) members. It is pertinent to provide here the defining aspect of the total institution that this dissertation adopts: "A basic social arrangement in modern society is that the individual tends to sleep; play and work in different places, with different co-participants, under different authorities, and without an over-all rational plan. The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life." Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1961), 5-6.

executives and leading members of the NSM at the center, on the other hand, were still working in the party premises and received the researcher in their party buildings in Ankara, with one exception, who had been using his law office in İstanbul.

The sites of observation of the local and national Yeni Asya members, in turn, showed that while for the local members the main site of movement activity was the *Medrese-i Nuriyes* for male that was not accessible for a woman researcher, for the national actors there were many organization buildings which served to the movement, alongside the *Medrese-i Nuriyes* in several İstanbul subdistricts. In Kayseri, the interviews initially started in a small library that the movement established for the youth but continued in the business offices or shops of the activists, most of whom had engaged in business activities much later than their initial participation to Yeni Asya. Actually, the majority of the interviews were conducted through the phone. The Yeni Asya members at the center, in İstanbul, on the other hand, chose in general, such public places as offices in the endowment building, cultural centers and publishing houses belonging to the movement.

Second, unexpected observations on how clientelism worked helped to understand further not only the NSM dynamics but also how party politics worked in Turkey. On the one hand, since the issue of clientelism prevalent in the political arena appeared frequently during the interviews and revealed itself as a variable explaining partly both the emergence of the NOP and a part of its internal dynamics, the researcher needed to understand how it was actually practiced. Since clientelism continues to be an important aspect of political life, the opportunity to observe clientelistic exchanges in the making revealed itself on more than one occasion. While, as they were no longer active, the clientelistic practices did not take place during the interviews with the local NSM leaders, the researcher witnessed them while interviewing two veteran politicians, one from the NSM, the other from the JP and two young JDP politicians from the *Akıncı* tradition, who were active in Kayseri and Ankara. In all cases, citizens or party members came to ask for jobs for either themselves or their relatives after telling their stories and left a CV.

The case of the retired JP politician, Saadettin Bilgiç, the rival of Süleyman Demirel was particularly telling. He was now living in his hometown, a small subdistrict of Isparta and his son had become a JDP parliamentarian. In the large salon of his house, where he received the researcher, he had placed a large table where he sit following the lunch and started to "receive the citizens". Administrators from a nearby faculty who needed the extra land next to their campus that belonged to the state, citizens who needed health care or jobs made a line in front of the table and communicated their wishes to the parliamentarian's father. He would in turn either take notes or make immediate phone calls to solve the problems. This was very reminiscent of what the JP's Kayseri elites had told during the interviews: that dealing with the citizens was almost a full time job. They would entrust their jobs to their partners or relatives especially during and after the elections. First, they would work in the election campaign and then devote their time to deal with the affairs of their "clients." Sparing such a time and having such influence was a luxury that most NSM local leaders could not enjoy in the early years of the movement.

Finally, a note on two observations within the Yeni Asya networks is in order. Visiting a male *Medrese-i Nuriye* and joining a female Risale-i Nur reading session in İstanbul and staying overnight and spending two days at a female *Medrese-i Nuriye* helped the researcher not only to visualize the intra-movement activities and "rituals"[122] and to see how the *Medrese-i Nuriye* functioned[123] but also through these observation put finger on above discussed major differences between the NSM, the object of study and Yeni Asya.

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[122] Here ritual is not necessarily used in religious sense, though such religious rituals as "*tesbihat*" (reciting Allah's names with the help of a rosary) did exist. Risale reading sessions can also be considered a ritual both in its secular and religious sense.

[123] The *Medrese-i Nuriye* had started to develop during the 1950s and spread during the 1960s and 1970s following the establishment of Yeni Asya. The visits showed that the accounts of the *Medreses* in the *Risale-i Nur,* the interviews and the memoirs and the current *Medreses* showed continuity. The novelty was the existence of *Medreses* for the female members and richer inner decoration.

Because of the time limitations the researcher chose to focus on basically two categories of newspapers covering the period from 1960 to 1971: a) nationally distributed Islamist newspapers with no particular attachment to an Islamist group (1964-1972) and b) local newspapers of various political persuasions (1965-1972). For the 1970s, because of the dissertation's scope and time limitations, only one major local newspaper is used. Since following the coup of 1971, independent Islamist newspapers disappeared, for the 1970s, only the publications of Yeni Asya and the NSM began to be published in the late 1960s and early 1970s respectively, are employed. National newspapers of different political colors are not researched. As mentioned above, the researcher consulted only the daily Milliyet, a center-left newspaper, that most NSM activists also reported to have read in the 1960s and 1970s and that provided an electronic archive. Instead, scholarly works that extensively discuss the political life of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s based on these newspapers are consulted when necessary.

While the Islamist newspapers of the 1960s helped to understand the political context in the center, the local newspapers of Konya and Kayseri revealed the key political players and stakes of the local political arena during the period when the NSM networks, mobilization and party organization appeared. Except for a newspaper in Konya, the NSM did not have a local newspaper (nor did Yeni Asya). Consequently, for understanding local movement activities, as much as the movement infrastructure the research relied on the interviews.

Movement Publications

The nature and type of movement publications gave clues regarding the organization and ideational production of the NSM. The NSM publications apart from nationally distributed newspapers and some short lived local newspapers, included mostly the seminars, press conferences, interviews and parliamentary speeches of the movement leader, Necmettin Erbakan, attesting to the extremely centralized nature of the NSM. The publications, which were intended for both the

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[124] A complete list of consulted newspapers and magazines can be found in Bibliography.

party activists and the general public, on the other hand, revealed the necessarily double-faced nature of the movement ideational products, which combined conscious efforts with unintended endeavors. While one face sustained inner mobilization and recruitment, the other contested (and cooperated) within the political arena. These publications were used complementarily with the interviews and newspapers.

The Yeni Asya publications that were previously mentioned, that is both the Risale-i Nur themselves, and various novels[125], memoirs and compilation of memoirs and websites, in turn, except for the newspapers and websites, intended mainly for the inner circles of the movement. As such they constituted the main resource to understand the Yeni Asya dynamics along with the interviews.

Finally, it should be added that various memoirs and compilation of memoirs written by independent Islamist figures, non-Islamists, and members of other Islamist circles such as Büyük Doğu and non-Yeni Asya Risale-i Nur movement helped to crosscheck the information found in these movement publications and interviews. Moreover, they helped to understand the boundaries, fluidities, and internal dynamics of the greater Islamist mobilization, or the Islamist sector.

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[125] Novels are actually compilation of memoirs in a narrative form. Their content are similar to those found in the memoirs and highly recommended by the movement members to those who want to understand the movement's history and internal dynamics. Memoirs and novels have thus been written and published with the approval of the movement elders.

CHAPTER III

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW PARTY INITIATIVE AMONG THE ISLAMISTS[126]

This chapter studies how and why a group of Islamist party innovators was formed during the second half of the 1960s. Through a study of formal political institutions and power relations, this section shows that the Islamist party entrepreneurs emerged within the political field, amidst the political mobilizations against the then Justice Party's "liberals" led by Süleyman Demirel, the chairman of the JP and the prime minister. It is maintained that the party innovators, thus the National Order Party and its successor the National Salvation Party, were an outcome of a specific configuration of institutional structures, agency of the socio-political actors, power relations, in short political processes, rather than a natural outgrowth of societal dissatisfaction stemmed from center-periphery cleavages.

The traditional literature on Islamist parties in Turkey suggests that the NOP and its offshoots were the outcomes of a struggle between a hegemonic secular center (the state) and a religious periphery (society), and that Islamist parties emerged because the "periphery" was politically, culturally and economically excluded from the "center." The origin of the NOP is often traced back to an economic and cultural struggle between "Muslim" Anatolian small and medium businessmen (or the ascending middle classes), on the one hand, and the "secular" state, including the JP government, which favored the large commercial and industrial enterprises of İstanbul and İzmir, on the other[127]. Some studies refer specifically to a 1969 clash between Necmettin Erbakan, later the leader of the NOP, and the JP government over the chairmanship of the Union of Chambers and

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[126] I would like to thank Elise Massicard and Nicole Watts for their invaluable insights and suggestions on the findings and discussions of some sections of this and the next chapter.
[127] See for instance Ağaoğullari, *L'Islam dans la vie politique*; Alkan, "The National Salvation Party"; Sarıbay, *Turkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikasi.*

Commodity Exchanges of Turkey[128] (TOBB, in its Turkish acronym).[129] These accounts suggest that the TOBB Affair – as it came to be known-- and the NOP were an aggregation of center-periphery cleavages: the NOP emerged due to Erbakan and his supporters' conviction that the struggle with the state and its allies had to be transferred to the political field.

In some works, the economic dimension is less emphasized and the establishment of the NOP is also attributed to the initiative of the *İskenderpaşa Naqshbandi* community in particular and the Naqshbandis in general, to which some leading party entrepreneurs, including Necmettin Erbakan, belonged. The NOP is thus considered as a tool in the hands of the discontented religious periphery against the encroachments of the secular state. [130]

While rightly highlighting the existing tension and power disparities between the social, economic and political actors of the "center" and the "periphery", these views reify and homogenize both. Consequently, they ignore the action and interaction that took place in the political arena and the micro-histories of the party innovators themselves[131] and consequently fail to explain why and how a new group of party entrepreneurs came into being in the first place, tapped into the existing socio-political discontents, mobilized potential activists and established an Islamist party. Nor does it inform us as to why there was "differential recruitment," or entry into the NSM from the periphery, a subject that will be studied in the next two chapters.

In contrast, this chapter argues that while the existence of societal cleavages between the "center" and the "periphery" needs to be acknowledged, it is important not to take them for granted and essentialize them as the "cause" of the creation of

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[128] The Union was "the highest legal entity in Turkey representing the private sector." Working together with the government, the Union undertook the distribution of state controlled resources in the form of credits and assigned the foreign exchange quotas to various sectors of commerce and industry. http://www.tobb.org.tr/eng/tobbhakkinda/legalstatus.php.

[129] See for instance Ağaoğulları, *L'Islam dans la vie politique;* Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey"; Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikasi.*

[130] See for instance Mardin, "The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey,"; Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity*.

[131] It should be added that Banu Eligür's otherwise excellent study on the Islamist Mobilization in Turkey which brings to fore political factors, when it comes to the emergence of the NSM/NOP initiative, which is not the focus of her study, contains empirical inaccuracies and displays certain structural determinisms and ideational essentialisms found in the traditional corpus. This is largely due to neglecting meso- and micro- levels and relying mainly on secondary sources and party documents as primary sources. Eligür, 59-67.

the NOP for the following reasons.[132] First, the center-periphery dichotomy has been used to explain not only the emergence of the NSM, but also other socio-political actors such as the Risale-i Nur students in the late 1920s and early 1930s and the Democratic Party, the DP, the first right wing mainstream party of the multiparty regime. As such, it does not explain how and why the NSM emerged as a particular Islamist movement aiming at establishing a political party as its movement organization. Second, as shall be seen in the following chapter, the discontented periphery was by no means homogenous as the party entrepreneurs themselves discovered. Finally, the establishment of the NOP was primarily an initiative of a group of "political *insiders*" of the "center" (both in geographic and symbolic terms). The new party enterprise was a reaction against a *risk* of marginalization from decision-making processes within the center, not a result of actual exclusion. Rather than an objective condition of exclusion, then, it was the perception of the political actors that triggered the Islamist movement of party innovation.

The emergence of Islamist party innovators was a product of an incremental political process, which consisted of the rise and failure of the right-wing collective actions in the 1960s. The first section of the chapter treats the macro changes in the political landscape in the early 1960s and the emergence of right-wing mobilization that enabled the formation of a new Islamist network. The second section studies the intervening meso-level factors (i.e. the nature of power relations within the JP, the Law of Political Parties and the clientelism) which contributed to the failure of right-wing mobilization thus to the Islamists' disappointment with right wing organizations and collective actions in general and their conservative-nationalist and ultranationalist allies[133] in particular. Only following their disenchantment with the existing right wing political and social organizations and institutions that some Islamist elites sought to establish a party of their own. The final section provides an

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[132] For a recent proposal of paradigm shift in the study of political parties and social divisions see Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai and Cihan Tuğal, "Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India and Turkey," *Sociological Theory* 27 (2009): 193-219.
[133] The conservative-nationalists were economic liberals but conservative in social, political and religious matters. They also differed from the ultranationalists who had openly ethnic nationalist, even racist tendencies and from the Islamists who expressed the wish to introduce policy and legal changes based on their distinct interpretation of religious principles. However as Tanıl Bora succinctly demonstrates the lines between these three political identities were quite blurry and each involved elements from others. See Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998).

account of the crystallization of the prospective NOP leaders and their early party building activities. It also deals with two formerly unaddressed or misaddressed subjects, which further highlight the properties of the NSM innovators and the conditions in which they emerged: the Nur students' division over the question of the direct political engagement and the question of the Naqshbandi involvement in the new party enterprise.

3.1 Right wing activism and the emergence of a new Islamist network in the early 1960s

This section tackles the first step towards the emergence of Islamist party entrepreneurs, thus the NOP: the establishment of countrywide connected informal Islamist networks. During this period, the right wing collective actions created an environment in which the Islamist political, bureaucratic, business and academic elites of the country,[134] dispersed in different right-wing associations and political parties, could meet and develop an increasingly distinct network, political syntax and identity from their conservative-nationalist and ultranationalist allies and generate a new generation of Islamist activists. It is maintained that while it was macro changes in the political landscape, which prepared the ground for the emergence of right wing organizations and activism in general, the intervening factor, which paved the way for the formation of a connected Islamist network was the mobilization process itself.

The macro changes can be categorized under the concept of "political opportunity structure." The latter involves both relatively durable formal and informal political institutions and their perception by the political actors as creating incentives and opportunities for collective action.[135] The constitution of 1961 and the proportional election system can be considered as "general openness"

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[134] It should be noted that Şerif Mardin, when he treats the emergence of the Democrat Party in the late 1940s within the context of center-periphery dichotomy, acknowledges the fact that the Democrat Party founders also consisted of the elites of the "center." "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102 (1973): 185.

[135] For a definition of the concept see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85 quoted in David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity," *Social Forces* 82 (2004): 1459.

structures[136] that allowed the establishment of right-wing (also the left-wing) associations and minor political parties.[137] The retreat of the army from daily politics and the election of Demirel to the JP's leadership in 1964 and the subsequent victory of the JP in the general elections of 1965, in turn, were perceived as opportunities and incentives to act against the JP administration and government controlled by the liberals[138]. The ensuing rise and diversity in right wing collective actions enabled the Islamists of various organizations in different parts of the country to communicate and establish networks of their own.

This section introduces first the institutional context, and the right-wing organizations and social formations. Second, it discusses the emergence of collective actions organized by conservative-nationalist-ultranationalist-Islamist alliance and resulting Islamist network formation.

3.1.1 Institutional context and the right-wing organizations and networks

The establishment of right wing[139] organizations all over the country with centers in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, was crucial for the emergence of right wing activism and Islamist network in the 1960s. The formal and informal organizations and networks provide the "weak ties," that serve as bridges for the information flow, communication of new frames and diffusion of identities.[140]   They thus

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[136] It has been suggested that two different types of structures need to be mapped correctly: the factors, which denote "the general openness" in the polity and "issue specific opportunities" and constraints. See Meyer and Minkoff, "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity," 1458.

[137] Technically most of these parties and associations had already been established before the official inauguration of the new constitution and the new electoral rules. However, both the elites of the political arena, who would become entrepreneurs of these organizations and the general public were quite familiar with the content of the new constitution as the deliberations of the Constitutive Assembly was public and its members and the members of the military government were in constant interaction with the political elites.

[138] The liberals were pejoratively called "*Yeminliler*" (those who sworn in) by their opponents to refer to their unmitigated confidence in and support of Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister and chairman of the JP.

[139] In addition to the term "right wing" these organizations and their activists called themselves *milliyetçi-mukaddesatçı*, reflecting the heterogeneity of their members' identities.

[140] "…the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie." Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *The American Journal of Sociology* 78 (1973): 1361. Granovetter argues that weak ties indicate those interpersonal ties outside the closest circle of friends and family as such they help the individuals to extend their communication to longer social distances. Socio-political and professional organizations and networks and workplaces provide avenues for such communication.

enabled the right wing collective actions in general and the growth of Islamist activism in particular.

To begin with, the constitution of 1961 enlarged the scope of civil liberties such as freedom of association and expression and led to the emergence of a lively sector of right wing associations, informal networks, political parties and publications alongside their left and Alevi[141] counterparts. Among the leading and most vocal right wing associations were the Turkish National Student Union, Association for Fighting against Communism, the Nationalists' Association, and the Nationalist Teachers' Association.[142] These associations, which were at the forefront of all collective actions both in metropolitan areas and in the provinces, brought together ultranationalists, Islamists, and conservatives (or conservative-nationalists).[143]

The religious associations, which were composed of students, alumni, teachers, professors and benefactors of theology institutes; praying leader and preacher schools, *Kuranic* courses; organizations for the construction of mosques and also the short lived Federation of Religious Employees of Turkey,[144] should also be considered as right wing organizations.[145] Not only because they joined right wing activities in addition to advancing professional demands, but also because they included all colors of the right, not only the Islamists.

One should also mention the emergence of certain hubs of informal elite (i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, engineers) meetings where individuals

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[141] The *Alevis* constitute a sizable religious group living in Turkey. They established a political party, Birlik Partisi, or the Union Party, in 1966.

[142] The Turkish names are in the same order: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (the MTTB), Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği, Milliyetçiler Derneği, Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Derneği.

[143] The intra-organizational power struggles within the MTTB throughout the 1960s and 1970s are illustrative of the contest over the definition of the "right wing" that existed at the time in each right wing organization and in the political field. See M. Çağatay Okutan, *Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB), 1916-1980* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 137-200.

[144] This was a federation of the Associations for the Employees of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which was a state institution responsible to the prime minister.

[145] Ahmet Yücekök's study shows that by 1968, there were 8419 associations for construction of mosques and 2311 other above mentioned types of religious associations. The total number of religious associations (10730) made up the %28.4 of all associations in the country. Among other right wing associations numbers are available only for the Association for Fighting against Communism. The total number of these associations was 141, which was %0.4 of all associations. Yücekök tackles these associations in relation to their socio-economic variables and do not dwell on above mentioned connective and socialization mechanisms. *Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968)*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları 323 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971), 119, 141.

from different regional and right wing political backgrounds politicized and socialized. For instance, in Ankara, the store of *Saatçi* Musa, (Musa the Clock Repairer), who was an ex-convict of the Malatya incident;[146] in provincial towns some bookstores were such meeting points. Incidentally, in the 1950s, in Yıldız (close to the Yıldız Technical University), İstanbul, the store of Mehmet Emin Alpkan, "*Milli Bakkal*" (the National Grocery), had served the same purpose. During the 1960s even though the grocery was no longer in place, Alpkan became a very important "node" for the Islamist elites during the party building episode.[147]

In addition to the Constitution of 1961, the proportional election system was a major incentive for the establishment of various right-wing minor parties as it allowed smaller parties to be represented in the parliament. By 1965, there were four right wing parties: the JP, the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, NTP)[148], the Nation Party (Millet Partisi, NP), the Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, RPNP, by 1969 it became NAP). As the latter three also aspired to be the mass party of the right similar to the JP, they contained all colors of the right wing except liberals. Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, all these parties hosted leading Islamist personalities. Scattered in different

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[146] The incident involves the assassination attempt to the liberal journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman in Malatya in 1952. These young Islamists from the Büyük Doğu circles (in the 1950s this magazine had established "Thought" clubs, Fikir Klüpleri, in various cities and organized conferences for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek) acted following the contemporary Islamist publications' long campaign targeting him as a mastermind of a "masonic-jewish" complot. Not only the perpetrators, but also the owners of the Islamist publications, such as Kısakürek and Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti), had also been tried, with no conviction.

[147] Alpkan became the owner of *Bizim Anadolu*, a daily which appeared in 1969 and supported Erbakan and his friends. He also established connections for Erbakan in Konya and Kayseri. However, Alpkan himself, a conservative nationalist, would later withdraw his support from the NSM and approach further the NAP. It seems his close personal friendship with Alparslan Türke, the leader of the NAP dating back to the 1950s was influential (Türkeş was also a student at a military school in Yıldız). The blurred lines between conservative-nationalist, ultranationalist and Islamist political frames and the NSM elites' early cordial relations with Türkeş might have led him to believe that the NSM would eventually converge with the NAP. For a history of relationship between Türkeş and Alpkan families see
http://www.yusufiye.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=310 It should be noted that he was a behind the scenes political figure with a surprisingly long and diverse range of relations. He was also financially supporting the magazine of the Association for Fighting against Communism and had close relations with Milli Mücadele Birliği (Union of National Struggle). According to an ex-member he was a key factor in changing the political direction of the Union from an Islamist one to a more nationalist one with close relations with the state. See
http://yenidenmillimucadele.wordpress.com/2008/04/22/elestiri-3-yeniden-milli-mucadele-sorgulanmalidir-1-necmettin-erisen/

[148] It should be noted that the New Turkey Party had a peculiar position and role among the right wing parties as despite its leaders' Turkish nationalist rhetoric it included a strong Kurdish component and was very powerful, especially until the emergence of the NSP in Kurdish majority regions.

parties, these Islamists had acquired their political identity during the Islamist mobilizations of the 1950s.[149] For instance, Süleyman Arif Emre and Abdurrahman Şeref Laç had been well known lawyers among the Islamist circles since the early 1950s. The former had defended Hüseyin Üzmez and his friends following the Malatya incident[150] and the latter had been defending the Nur students in various proceedings. Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti) was a well known Islamist columnist whose nickname coming from the name of his famous magazine Serdengeçti. Hasan Aksay, as an avid reader of Islamist magazines in his high school years, had been in contact with Islamist circles since his visit to Serdengeçti and Kısakürek in prison. All these names but Laç and Serdengeçti would later become official founders of the NOP.[151]

During the early 1960s, as was the case of the Islamists in the parliament, the Islamists in general were mostly dispersed individuals and groups in various right wing associations who had been politicized during the Islamist mobilizations of the 1950s. The only organized bodies were the *Nur* students and *Süleymancıs* (though illegal under the existing laws), which had developed in the 1950s and Islamist daily, weekly and monthly publications such as, *Babıali'de Sabah* (Morning at Babıali[152]), *Bugün* (Today), *Büyük Doğu* (the Great East), *İttihad* (the Union), *Yeni İstanbul* (New İstanbul), *Yeni İstiklal* (New Freedom).[153] Thanks to collective actions of the 1960s, these Islamists would produce and recruit a new

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[149] The well known Islamist personalities in the Assembly were Hacı Tevfik Paksu, Hasan Aksay, Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti) in the JP; Fehmi Cumalioğlu and Abdurrahman Şeref Laç in the NP; and Süleyman Arif Emre in the NTP.

[150] Malatya incident was the first high-profile and violent Islamist action in the 1950s.

[151] Laç was a conservative nationalist and the Risale-i Nur movement's lawyer with close relations with the Yeni Asya branch. He opposed the establishment of an Islamist party. Serdengeçti though being an Islamist had his roots in ultranationalist circles. He had been tried in the same court in 1944 with Alparaslan Türkeş for *Turancılık* (Turanism, the name the ultranationalist gave to themselves that emphasis their pan-Turkist character).

[152] The name of an İstanbul district that was the center of journalistic activities until the 1990s.

[153] Babıali'de Sabah, Bugün, Büyük Doğu, Yeni İstanbul and Yeni İstiklal were supported by the rich religious and/or Islamist notable families of İstanbul, such as the Topbaş family. At first the Nur students were buying the newspapers such as Bugün and Yeni İstiklal (and Necip Fazıl's Büyük Doğu) in bulk in return for positive news on the movement such as the release of Nur student detainees from the prison. Later, they decided to have a newspaper of their own (first weekly İttihad in 1967 and then daily Yeni Asya) to differentiate themselves more clearly from these newspapers and Islamist movements, which they found too confrontational vis-à-vis the state and the political elites. Moreover, the existing Islamist newspapers "confused" the Nur students who were reading them in Anatolia, that is they blurred the boundaries of legitimate Nur student behavior and thinking. See Mehmet Kutlular, *İşte Hayatım* (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2009), 93-109.

generation of Islamists, augmenting their number and influence within the right-wing associations in particular and in the political arena in general.[154]

For the emergence of collective actions, however, the existing legal structure was necessary but not sufficient. While the new constitution and the election law provided a legal base for the emergence of these right wing organizations and an incentive for collective actions as they lowered the cost of political action, they did not constitute in and off themselves a variable to explain the rise of the right wing mobilization. The political actors engaged in collective action when their self-perception and their perception of opportunities and constraints changed.

3.1.2 The collective actions and the emergence of a new Islamist network

As important as legal and associational change, then, was a broad based sense that politics would now be done differently. By 1965, following such a change in the political actors' perceptions of opportunity, Turkey witnessed a rise and diversity in collective action. There were at least two contributing factors. First, the military's interest in daily politics seemed to have diminished by 1964[155] and then the JP came to power with a majority in the parliament in 1965.

On May 27, 1960, the military had intervened to "dethrone" the Democrat Party (the DP) claiming that the latter violated the constitution of 1924. In 1961, the military established a constitutive assembly, which introduced a new and relatively liberal constitution. However, having experienced two more coup attempts after 1960 (the latest on May 21, 1963), only by 1964, citizens seemed to feel secure enough to enjoy the constitution of 1961. Colonel Talat Aydemir's first attempt on February 22, 1962 had been pardoned. Following his second attempt on May 20, 1963, however, he was executed in June 1964. This execution signaled that the military definitely wanted to turn to its barracks, at least not to engage in

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[154] Jacob M. Landau gives a very lively account of the right-wing (particularly Islamist and ultranationalist) organizations of the 1960s with ties to the 1950s. He however does not dwell into a detailed analysis and present his findings mostly as a historical background to the establishment of the NOP and the NAP. See *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 171-204. For a political and institutional history of the 1960s see Ibid., 1-48.

[155] The military has been active in daily politics since May 27, 1960, when it had intervened to "dethrone" the Democrat Party (the DP).

day-to-day politics. Only, then Turkey witnessed a boost in collective actions, not only in right wing activities but also in *Alevi* and socialist mobilizations.

The JP's electoral victory and forming a majority government in 1965 appeared to have confirmed the military's retreat from daily politics as the JP was considered as a continuation of the defunct DP. As far as the right-wing associations concerned, while they were happy to see "their" party coming to power and felt confident enough to engage in various forms of collective action, they had been discontented with the election of Demirel to the JP's leadership instead of Said Bilgiç in 1964, following the death of the party's founding father, ex-army commander Ragıp Gümüşpala. The conservative-nationalist elites within the JP, with the help of the mukaddesatçıs had previously made a bid for power in 1961 when Ali Fuat Başgil (a well known conservative intellectual and university professor) put his candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic. The election was shortly after the *coup* and Başgil, a vocal critique of the military intervention, was forced to withdraw his candidacy.[156] The right wing group considered the election of a "liberal" candidate, Demirel, a second usurpation[157] despite the fact that he received the majority of the delegate votes[158]. Moreover, they realized that Demirel and his companions were moving fast dominating the JP and weakening the conservative-nationalist leaders, the main interlocutors of the exraparliamentary and parliamentary right wing groups.

Before 1965, the newly flourishing right wing activities had targeted mostly "the left" and "the Greek Cypriots"[159] which also pleased the military, which was wary of the intentions of the Soviet Union and the Greek Cypriots. By 1965, then, supported by their interlocutors in the political parties, the right-wing groups and their mobilizations gradually but energetically turned their attention to the JP's

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[156] He later resigned from the Senate as well.

[157] For instance, Hasan Aksay argued that Demirel's election was a Masonic plot. However, similar to many other interviewees who believed in such a complot, as the interview progressed, he made clear that he did not see leadership qualities in Bilgiç, such as charisma, rhetorical power, and most importantly an ambition to win. Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006 and February 1, 2007. In fact, Bilgiç put his candidacy long after he first endorsed Demirel himself. Saadettin Bilgiç, Isparta, August 14, 2007.

[158] While Süleyman Demirel took 1239 votes, his rival took 175. Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980* (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1994), 237.

[159] The conflict between the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus had incited protests on behalf of Turkish Cypriots. These protests included not only the right wing but also the Kemalists.

leadership[160] in order to influence the leading party in the distribution of the state controlled spoils and also to curb the increasing power of the liberal faction within the JP. In other words, they were "interested in the appropriation of profits guaranteed by," the political party and "compet[ed] for the production of goods to be offered in the political market."[161] The latter, would symbolically and materially increase their capital as individuals and groups.

Accordingly, the right wing associations expanded their activities between 1965 and 1970. These included petitions to the government, street demonstrations, university boycotts, conferences and finally to collective morning prayers of protest that thousands attended. They were organized over a number of issues ranging from the reinstatement of a discharged president of the Religious Affairs to his post to the "communist threat." [162] The anti-left demonstrations kept their popularity because not only the left had also increased its power, but also they served to flex muscles against the JP leadership.[163] The right wing groups propagated that the government needed them to be able to effectively struggle with the left.

These collective actions were the product of joint efforts of various right wing associations in different parts of the country and as such provided venues for communication, interrecruitment and further action among geographically and/or organizationally separate individuals and groups. For instance, the Elmalı Affair was a major mobilization, which brought together the members of the right-wing associations and parties and the parliamentarians (including those within the JP)

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[160] Not only the right but also the left increased their activities and targeted the government. All but the Islamists and the *Alevis* were represented in the Assembly. The Alevi party was founded only in 1966.

[161] Offerlé, 17. Offerlé reminds that these profits are not necessarily political. It should be also added that he refers to individual players and individual interests within a political party, which may overlap with but do not necessarily represent the interest of a segment of population.

[162] In 1968, the right wing organized two major anti-left demonstrations in different parts of the country: "Rise-up Meetings" (*Şahlanış Mitingleri*) and collective morning prayers in mosques (*Toplu Namazlar*). By 1968, there were also clashes between the right and left wing activists, the most (in)famous being the Bloody Sunday of 1969, when right wing activists attacked the left wing during the latter's demonstration against the American 6th fleet. For a detailed account of such right wing (*mukaddesatçı*-nationalist) collective actions see Doğan Duman, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık* (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1999), 244-251. In fact, *Bugün* called its readers to "strangle the red" just a day before the Bloody Sunday see Appendix G, Figure 3.

[163] For instance, a news piece on an upcoming indoor event organized by some associations (Association for Fighting against Communism and the Nationalist Teachers' Association) informs the readers that the purpose of the conference would be to find new ways to fight the leftists and to resist "the governments that put pressure on *mukaddesatçı*-nationalists." "Milliyetçiler Toplantısı Hazırlıkları ilerliyor" *Yeni İstanbul*, August 9, 1967.

against the JP's "liberal" government. The activists demanded the restoration of İbrahim Elmalı, the discharged President of the Religious Affairs to his post[164] through two street protests in İstanbul and Kayseri, the dispatch of representatives from the JP local branches (those dominated by the conservative-nationalists) to Ankara, and joint petitions signed by various right wing associations.[165]

As minor and major collective actions followed each other in different regions of the country as joint efforts of the right wing, a network of Islamists that cut across these institutions and networks (including the Nur students) emerged. Embellishing the right wing activities with religious symbolism, references and demands, the Islamists, without so much giving up on nationalism, reintroduced the Islamist language/ syntax into the public arena[166], differentiated themselves from not only the ultranationalist but also the conservatives in their reading and clothing habits and the role they ascribed to religion in public affairs[167], generated and recruited a new generation of Islamists, and finally contested not only the leftists but also, through leftist-bashing or directly, the dominance of the liberals within the JP.

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[164] Elmalı, an unusually outspoken and headstrong Presidency of Religious Affairs, had been discharged after having criticized the TRT (state radio and television) for its choice of programs and for allegedly having established ties with some religious leaders without the consent of the government during a trip to North Africa. A power struggle among rival groups within the Presidency (Süleymancıs, Nur students and the Prayer and Preacher School graduates) also seems to have played a role. On Elmalı mobilization see Appendix G Figures 4 and 5.

[165] See *Yeni İstanbul*, October 5-15, 1966. For instance, in Konya the following associations signed a joint declaration: the NA, the AFC, the Association for the Graduates of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları Mezunları Cemiyeti), the Student Association of Advanced Institutes of Islam (Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü Talebe Derneği), Green Crescent Association (Yeşilay Derneği, an anti-alcohol use (not anti-abuse) organization). *Yeni İstanbul*, October 5, 1966.

[166] The Islamist frames and discourses of the 1960s were a reproduction of those of the 1950s, which had been themselves a readaptation of the Islamist political discourses of the 19th century. While the 19th century Islamism was mainly an "imperial" political project that targeted keeping together the Muslim "nations" within the Ottoman Empire, the Islamism of the 1950s and 1960s focused on the new nation-state's boundaries. The Islamists identified the nation with "Muslimness" in addition to "Turkishness" and then claimed to be the righteous and true representatives of that nation. Since components of this Islamism were ever present in the NSM frames further information on the subject will be provided in Chapter 5.

[167] It is "the interactive conversations that occur [within prior ties and group structure] and succeed in creating shared meanings and identities that legitimate emergent collective action." Doug McAdam, "Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements," in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 290.

While it cannot be claimed that the newly formed Islamist network and reactivated Islamist frames were "predictors" for the future Islamist party[168], they no doubt contributed to the establishment of the NOP/NSP. Social movement scholars maintain that individuals are embedded in multiplicity of networks and organizations[169] and that there are "multivalent influences at the individual level."[170] As such mobilization of an individual can be impeded by a multiplicity of factors: the "salience" of one collective identity over another, the vested interests (time, money etc) in an organization, professional responsibilities or negative views of family members etc.

Thus, on the one hand, the entry to the NOP from the Islamist network of the 1960s was no doubt differential. Some members had already been involved in an Islamist organization as was the case for the individuals in some Nur branches or for the *Hilalciler* (the Crescent-ists, the Islamists in the ultranationalist NAP). As such, they were less disposed to engage in a new organization. Some Islamists, though having participated in occasional demonstrations, would have been unwilling to commit their energies and time for party activities or simply personally unavailable.[171] On the other hand, the Islamist network served as a pool for recruitment: thanks to their multiple ties and affiliations, those recruited served as bridges between the individuals in other connected social networks and the new party enterprise. Consequently, even those Islamists who did not approve and participated to all collective actions but who were embedded in the right wing networks and had been socialized into Islamist ideational elements could eventually enter the NSM.[172] Most importantly, the collective action process and the Islamist

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[168] The existence of networks and collective identities do not necessarily directly lead to recruitment to movement organizations or collective action. See Mario Diani, "Networks and Participation," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 339-359.

[169] Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 792-795; Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, "Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993): 646-648.

[170] James A. Kitts, "Mobilizing in Black Boxes: Social Networks and Participation in Social Movement Organizations," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 5 (2000): 252.

[171] It should be added that being within an Islamist network did not necessarily mean being an Islamist either. In other words, not all individuals operating within the Islamist networks were necessarily Islamists.

[172] As was the case for most of the prospective NSM activists in Kayseri who, though being avid readers of Bugün in general, were also critical of what they considered "excessive" and "heterodox" collective actions such as collective morning prayers and street clashes with the left wing activists. As shall be seen in Chapter 4, such a critical stance became also a factor why the prospective activists chose the NSM over the NAP in Kayseri.

network brought together the Islamist elites themselves, a crucial step towards the new party.

3.2 Meso-level constraints on the Islamists

Through such broad-based right wing activism Islamists might have found an outlet within the JP, the party in power, but were obstructed by certain party-level factors. The struggle for power within the JP between two major groups, the conservative-nationalists and the liberals,[173] and this party's internal structure impeded the right wing parliamentarians and local party elites to pressure the JP central administration and government to introduce the demanded policy changes. They thus contributed to the failure of two major mobilization efforts and brought the Islamists to the conclusion that they were entangled in an intraparty power struggle in which they had no leverage. Having lost confidence in their allies and realizing their relative vulnerability as scattered individuals and groups within the right wing organizations, the elites of the newly established Islamist networks engaged in party building activities to establish an organization of their own.[174]

The following section discusses first the power struggle between the two groups within the JP and the right wing's two failed major political contestations. Second, it examines the formal and informal internal structures of the JP as additional factors that influenced the outcome of right-wing activism.

3.2.1 The intraparty struggle within the JP and the failure of the right wing mobilization

In the mid-1960s the JP was divided into two main camps: conservative-nationalists, on the one hand, and those known as liberals, on the other. The ultranationalists and Islamists within the JP, in the parliament and the right-wing associations supported the conservative nationalist leaders against their adversaries in the JP. Pejoratively called "*Yeminliler*" (those who have been sworn in) by their

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[173] Two other researchers also trace the genesis of the NOP to the JP's internal struggles without however analyzing it in detail. See Ağaoğulları, *L'Islam dans la vie politique de la Turquie*, 207-208, 220 and Ruşen Çakır, *Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi : Refah Partisini Anlamak* (İstanbul: Metis, 1994), 21.

[174] For a background story of the NOP as told by a founding father see Süleyman Arif Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl* vol.1 (İstanbul: Keşif Yayınları, 2002).

opponents to refer to their unmitigated support for party chair Demirel, the liberals had relatively recently (1966) acquired the majority of seats in the party administration at the expense of conservative-nationalists.

Empowering the conservative nationalists against their liberal opponents was a major goal of right wing activists. However, it was this very struggle for power informed by the dynamics of intraparty politics that rendered major right-wing activisms of the period unsuccessful in acquiring their short-term demands. On the one hand, the conservative-nationalist elites of the JP chose to use the demands of the right wing associations as a bargaining tool in order to secure certain party related concessions from the liberals. On the other hand, the liberals took advantage of the situation in order to weaken the ties between the extraparliamentary right wing groups and the JP's conservative-nationalists.

In 1966, there were two major collective actions, during which almost all right wing organizations mobilized twice against the JP liberals and sought the help of the conservative-nationalist parliamentarians and senators and their allies. These demands were, first, the above mentioned, restoration of İbrahim Elmalı to his post and, second, the inclusion of those convicted under the Article 163/1 to the pending General Amnesty of 1966 (Law no.780).

While these contestations as a whole targeted a symbolic gain against the liberals[175], for the *mukaddesatçıs* in particular, the mobilization for the Amnesty was also a move against the Supreme Court's decision of September 20, 1965 to persecute the *Risale-i Nur* students based on the Article 163[176], a major disincentive to mobilization around religious frames.[177] The Article 163/1 of the Penal Law stated that whoever establishes or organizes an association with the intention of changing "state's social, economic, political or legal basis, even partially, according

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[175] JP's assembly group discussions and parliamentary dealings on the subject can be followed on the press and parliamentary proceedings. For instance during a parliamentary group meeting Bilgiç and Serdengeçti shouted at the liberals "You do not let us speak in the Assembly, nor in the group. Where can we speak?" See "AP Grupunda Kavga," *Yeni İstanbul*, July 15, 1966. See also Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, "AP Grubunda Curcuna ve Sebepleri," *Yeni İstanbul*, July 17, 1966 and *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* [National Assembly Proceedings], Term 2,Volume 8, Session 123, August 3, 1966.
[176] The new Head of the Court reminded the prosecutors this decision in his inauguration speech in 1966. See http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/1966-1967.htm.
[177] Since the political engagement patterns of the Nur students will be discussed in detail below, suffice it to say here that, eager to protect and develop their grassroots organization and the "total institution," the Nur student branch which will later to be known as Yeni Asya, decided to come to an agreement with the Demirel group.

to religious principles and beliefs, against laïcité, shall be punished by penal servitude for three to seven years."[178] As mentioned above, the dispute over the clause was rather symbolic than real. On the one hand, those convicted from other clauses of the Article 163 were included in the Amnesty Law. On the other hand, there were no convicts sentenced for crimes stated in 163/1 since although this clause was more severe in terms of punishment it prescribed than, say, the clause 163/4[179], it was also more difficult to prove the existence of an organization than the propaganda crime that the latter stated.

At any rate, both the Elmalı and Amnesty demands resulted in disappointment for the extraparliamentary right wing groups. Since Demirel had only recently won chairmanship of the party against the conservative-nationalists represented by Bilgiç[180], the demands of the right wing conveyed through their channel constituted a double-edged sword. Demirel's group was forced to consider them seriously as the JP claimed to represent all colors of the right wing.[181] However, the liberals wanted to protect their position vis-à-vis Bilgiç group as well. This group included nationally known figures of the DP-JP tradition and enjoyed strong connections with right-wing groups, institutions and publications.[182] Consequently, any gain on their part on behalf of the right wing groups would further strengthen their symbiotic relationship, thereby reducing Demirel's chances to establish connections of his own. Moreover, Demirel would not want to take the risk of seeing these gains converted to political and symbolic capital during the general party congresses convened every two years.

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[178] Translation by the author.
[179] The 163/4 stated that whoever propagates or indoctrinates using religion, religious sentiments or things held religiously sacred as an instrument to change, against laïcité, state's social, economic, political and legal basis according to religious principles or "to gain and establish political benefit or personal ascendancy, shall be punished by penal servitude for one to five years."
[180] Demirel had won against Bilgiç in the Second General Congress of the JP in 1964. The latter was the candidate of the conservative-nationalist-*mukaddesatçı* party elites' intraparty coalition who accused Demirel for being a freemason.
[181] Plus, right wing collective activities were seen, even used, as a deterrent against the rising tide of the left and syndical movements.
[182] For details regarding relations between the Bilgiç group and right wing associations see for instance Bahri Savcı, "Bir parti içi bunalımından hükümet bunalımına…ve rejim bunalımı," *SBFD* 25 (1970): 287. For a history and analysis of the "uneasy" relationship between the conservative-nationalists and the "center-right," or in this essay's terminology "liberals," see Yüksel Taşkın, *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 79-134

Hence, the liberal group not only refused to comply with right-wing demands but also decided to counterattack. The party leadership and disciplinary committee decided in early 1967, for the expulsion of two parliamentarians from the party, who were the leading representatives of the right wing groups in the Assembly. Osman Turan (an ultranationalist university professor) and Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti (a prominent Islamist columnist) had severely criticized Demirel and his supporters both in newspaper columns and party's parliamentary group discussions.[183] Demirel's refusal to comply with the demands was less because he was a staunch secularist and more because he was a political pragmatist.

For the conservative-nationalists of the JP concrete intra-party gains took precedence over the symbolic and longterm gains that could be harvested through right wing organizations and activities. Particularly, during the mid-1960s, they had two major bargains to strike with Demirel to hold on to their position within the party: first, amnesty for convicted DP members and the restoration of their political rights[184]; and, second, administrative posts within the party and seats in the cabinet to have easy access to resources to distribute to their constituencies. Consequently, they were not willing to pull strings to find solutions to the cases of Elmalı Affair and the Amnesty. Neither did Bilgiç group prevent the expulsion of the leading right-wing parliamentarians from the JP. On the contrary, they used the mobilization demands as leverage against Demirel to achieve their ends, or at least Demirel took advantage of the situation. Consequently, while the Bilgiç group achieved its short-term goals (except for the restoration of political rights of the DP members),[185] they lost the support of the ultranationalists and, most importantly for the purposes of the chapter, the Islamist elites, who then proceeded with their own party building activities.

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[183] Regarding the struggle within the JP see for instance, Serdengeçti, "Bizim Suçumuz -haysiyet divanına verilişimiz dolayısıyla- -iv-," *Yeni İstanbul*, September 29, 1966, Serdengeçti, "Hodri Meydan!," *Yeni İstanbul*, December 9, 1966, Ali Fuat Başgil and Osman Turan, "Osman Yüksel Bey Haysiyet Divanında!," *Yeni İstanbul*, December 26, 1966. The party expelled Serdengeçti in early January 1967 and Turan in June 1967.

[184] If pardoned the ex-DP leaders could enter the JP and challenge the liberals. Thus the latter was unwilling to include the "crimes" of the ex-DP leaders in the Amnesty. Most important, however, the JP liberals might have sought to keep cordial relations with the military who still exerted a degree of influence over the executive. For the "double discourse" of the JP elites, who both claimed to represent the DP legacy and civil politics and adopted policies that would satisfy the military's wishes see Cizre, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri.*

[185] Before their expulsion, Süleyman Demirel had already won a victory in the JP's Third General Congress (November 27-29, 1966) in the face of a long campaign against his group. The conservative nationalists in turn had acquired seats in the central party administration.

The continuing influence of the JP's liberal branch, which frustrated Islamist elites and thereby triggered the process of party formation, lay primarily in the JP's organizational structure. The 1965 Law of Political Parties and clientelistic relations underlined the structural basis of the party, which overpowered the party's central administration and the local executives at the expense of party members and parliamentary group. While the relationship between the local executives and the party center was one of mutual dependence, those in the party center had the upper hand since they controlled the distribution of central state resources in return for loyalty. This structure, with its opportunities and constraints, limited expressions of dissent within the JP and prevented the right wing to influence the party from within through mobilization. [186] In other words, it contributed to the failure of two major collective actions.

The Political Party Law of 1965 established the rules of intra-party competition for local and national administrative seats of the party.[187] Accordingly, local party offices were filled by a two-stage electoral competition. Members of the party could not cast their votes directly for the election of local executives. In subdistricts (*ocak* and *bucak*) and city neighborhoods (*mahalle*), the party members elected the delegates (two or three depending on the size of the district) who would represent them in subprovincial (*ilçe*) congresses. The latter then elected the members of the subprovincial administration and the delegates who would represent the subprovinces in the provincial (*il*) congress.[188] The provincial congress would in turn elect Provincial Administration[189] and the delegates (which automatically included the former) to the General Congress where the leader and the Central Executive Committee members were determined.

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[186] While this structure was not specific to the JP, the fact it was an incumbent party controlling the state resources, seem to have amplified its effects.

[187] This section is based on the text of the Law and the interviews with party delegates. See also Sabri Sayarı, "Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* 30 (1976): 187-199.

[188] The subprovincial executives were automatically sent as delegates to the provincial congress.

[189] *İl Yönetimi*. In this essay the terms "local executives" and "local administration" are used interchangeably to refer to provincial and subprovincial administrations, including the central district.

Within the JP, this procedure, which forced the members of the party to "delegate" their intraparty electoral preferences, at the absence of accountability, quickly degenerated into a system based on clientelistic relations,[190] where the delegates were almost predetermined by local party administrators (usually local founders of the party with ties to the DP period) and also by parliamentarians who had strong local roots and/or clienteles.

Candidates to local party administration in subprovincial and provincial levels, who had been either the local founding members of the party or their friends from the DP period, established alliances with respected, influential or well-off members of the neighborhoods. Under the close scrutiny of the party executives[191], these influential members of local communities would mobilize resources for their own election as delegates and then vote for the party executives and the parliamentary candidates presented by them. In return for their time, money, loyalty to fellow group members and vote, the delegates would acquire different forms of patronage. At best, they could acquire seats in the subprovincial municipal councils[192] or at least, when needed, have access to social, economic, bureaucratic and political resources through the local administrators they had helped get elected.

Having been elected, the local administrators would primarily work as brokers between the capital and the constituencies. The citizens and party members would have demands ranging from such personal affairs as finding a hospital bed or a bank credit to public needs such as bridges, roads, water, etc. The local party elites took great care to deal with these requests personally and prevented the "petitioners" to go to Ankara. There were at least three reasons: 1) to strengthen their individual position within the party branch, 2) to consolidate and increase local organization's power as whole, which would help to strengthen it vis-à-vis the

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[190] As Güneş-Ayata puts it the patronage relations are rather complex. They are neither based on simple exchanges nor totally materialistic. See Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey," in *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society*, ed. Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 60-61.
[191] The local executives would often be present during the election procedure. Telephone interviews with KayJP6, Kayseri, March 17, 2009; KayJP10, Kayseri, March 18, 2009.
[192] The local executives were very careful in determining the candidates to municipal councils. They tried to have candidates (selected among the party delegates) representing each neighborhood. "The decision of the [local executive committee] served as a filter." Interview with KayJP12, Ankara, 24 July 2006.

parliamentarians and the central party administration, 3) to be able to eliminate those wishes who come from non-partisans and non-voters. [193]

In return for their "services," they were nominated and elected to municipal and city councils. For instance, in Kayseri and Konya during the 1960s, the party administrators and the JP's representatives (which constituted the majority) in the municipal and city assemblies almost overlapped. Most would also serve in the executive committee and the assembly of the local Chamber of Commerce or Industry. A seat in a local party administration brought also additional prestige: through a political career, a well off but ordinary trader from local elites would be known and respected by many whom they had helped. Moreover they became part of the state protocol and their opinion and friendship mattered in all city affairs. Finally, those with a university education might hope for a seat in the parliament or the senate.

Local elites' dependence on the party administration for access to resources they themselves used and redistributed rendered them politically vulnerable and thus reluctant to express dissent. In other words, even though they enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy thanks to their control of resources at the local, this autonomy went hand in hand with dependency, until and when the two clashed. A conflict with the central administration (i.e. an "undesirable" parliamentarian sent to Ankara or protesting party decisions) would slow down the distribution of patronage, which would in turn cost local executives lose their seats. In Kayseri, the Bilgiç sympathizers lost their position through democratic means as they failed to redistribute resources efficiently.[194] As a local executive who lost his position put it, "the Demirel faction showed that we had not accomplished anything. They said that Demirel did not support [this local administration]."[195] In Konya, unlike Kayseri, the dominant faction among the local executives were not merely

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[193] Face to face and telephone interviews with JP local executives in Kayseri, August 2006-January 2009. The latter was expressed explicitly only by one of the interviewees, who served long time as the local chair of the central district branch. For instance, if a village came with a public demand such as road or water supply system, he would check his records and if the village had not voted for the JP, he would simply tell them to come after the elections. Interview with KayJP8, Kayseri, September 30, 2006.

[194] They lost the intraparty elections first in 1968 in the Central District Administration and then in 1973 in the Provincial Administration. A JP local executive who had lost his place to Demirel supporters admitted that as an administration they were unable to satisfy the requests of the party members. Telephone interview with KayJP10, January 31, 2009.

[195] Telephone interview with KayJP10, Kayseri, March 18, 2009.

sympathizers of the Bilgiç group but also enjoyed direct clientelistic ties with their strongest members. At least five out of nine JP parliamentarians from Konya were from the conservative group and three were cabinet members: Faruk Sükan, the powerful minister of interior, Hasan Dinçer, the minister of justice and Bahri Dağdaş, the minister of agriculture. Consequently, though under immense pressure they were able to protect their seats longer than their peers in Kayseri.[196] In December 1970, they would quit the JP to join Faruk Sükan and Saadettin Bilgiç's Demokratik Party. Operating under these circumstances and trying to remain in harmony with the balances of power at the party center, the local executives and leaders thus neither enthusiastically supported right-wing demands nor later followed the Islamist party entrepreneurs.[197]

Parliamentarians, on the other hand, were in general dependent on local branches for reelection if they had not been put on the party ticket due to the party center's quota.[198] Both during the primaries and elections the parliamentarians needed the help of the local executives and their delegates. Since there would be very high numbers of candidates in the primaries, only those who can afford the time, money and the support of the local administration could enter the race, let alone the Assembly. Moreover, in the primaries, for easy access to resources, the local executives elected those parliamentarians who could potentially enter the cabinet or at least establish strong connections with the party leaders. For the parliamentarians, being well connected and influential at the capital meant less time spent in the electoral district. They took care of the affairs in Ankara but it was the local administrators who had face-to-face contact with the citizens, members and delegates, which further strengthened them vis-à-vis the parliamentarians. As a

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[196] For instance, a dispute over the intraparty elections for the central district administration continued from 1968 to 1969. Following the elections the Bilgiç supporters rejected the result, which had brought the Demirel faction to power. While the liberals at the party center were reluctant to annul the elections, at the end they conceded, as they wanted to have a truce with the conservative-nationalist leaders before the general elections of 1969. See *Yeni Meram*, November 13, 1968; April 4, 1969; June 28 and 30, 1969; July 29-30, 1969.

[197] As shall be seen in studying the NSM's party building activities in the periphery, the JP's intraparty structure had consequences for the NOP recruitment patterns as well; while the NOP would fail to attract executives and delegates of the local JP organizations who had vested interests in the party. Only a couple of JP executives, and not necessarily from the right-wing faction, would help the NSM during its early stages, and only behind the scenes at that. The NSM leaders would find its potential pool of recruits among people who could/did not have integrated into the JP.

[198] The researcher could not establish the exact nature of the JP quota.

matter of fact, the local executives would keep a record of parliamentarians' performance in Ankara and of their attitudes toward the local organization.[199]

Consequently, only those parliamentarians who had strong connections with influential members and families of the subdistricts and neighborhoods, long history and enough social, economic and political capital to distribute could launch an effective struggle against the party leadership, or independently legislate without risking their political career. At any rate, even locally well rooted parliamentarians could not disregard the balances of power between the liberals and conservative-nationalists. Consequently, similar to local party administrators, in fact, following their lead, the parliamentarians refrained from acting upon right-wing policy demands and did not support Erbakan against Demirel's government.

3.3 The emergence of Islamist party entrepreneurs[200]

For the *mukaddesatçıs* the failure of right-wing activisms, the expulsion of two of the leading opponents of Demirel from the JP and the reelection of liberals in party offices in the party congress revealed the power distribution within the JP and their respective vulnerability. Demirel group demonstrated that it could successfully influence legislation in the parliament and even decrease the support his main rival, Bilgiç, could garner in the parliament and party organization.

The realization that Demirel was hard to defeat or to influence through an intra-party struggle supported by collective actions and the absence of eligible party alternatives led the Islamist elites to party building activities.[201] By 1967, the Islamist leaders engaged in a series of political activities, which would culminate in the establishment of the NOP in 1970. As shall be seen, neither the Naqshbandi

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[199] IGS: Would the parliamentarians do whatever you wanted from them as local executives? The interviewee: Not always, but then we would not forget [if] that [happened]…We would take a note of it (*Bir kenara yazılır*). Interview with KayJP11, Kayseri, October 1, 2007.
[200] The term "entrepreneur" though borrowed from the disciplines of finance and economy do not emphasis rationality of the political actors in this study. This term will be used interchangeably with "innovator" and "initiator." It helps to single out those political actors who first elaborated and developed the idea of the new political party and/or acted upon this idea, sometimes undertaking a certain risk (financial, social or political), to actually form and organize a party. Thus, they were not merely elites of the party, including those who have entered the party later or official founders, entailing those who have been invited by the party entrepreneurs to strengthen the new enterprise.
[201] As shall be seen, the same observation led Yeni Asya and the Süleymancıs, who were mainly interested to protect their movement's grassroots institutions and proselytizing activities from state encroachments however means possible, to approach and establish ties with Demirel's group.

Sheiks were among the party entrepreneurs, nor Risale-i Nur students as a whole opposed the new party initiative. As a matter of fact, while some leaders and elites of the Anatolian Risale-i Nur branches were themselves among the party entrepreneurs, there were Naqshbandi leaders who even refused to give their votes to the NSM, let alone being party entrepreneurs.

3.3.1 Pioneers and their early activities

One would expect that, having been defeated at the hands of the liberal group and "sold out" by their conservative-nationalist allies in the JP, the Islamists join one of the minor right wing parties. However, the Islamist elites, though they considered this option as well[202], opted to work towards "a brand new" political party.

There were at least two factors, which alienated them from the minor parties. First, the RPNP and NTP had joined a coalition with the right wing's archenemy Republican People's Party right after the coup of 1960. Moreover, the RPNP was conquered by Alparslan Türkeş[203], who was at the time still considered "suspicious" because of his role in the coup of 1960. Second, they were considered as "*şahıs partisi,*" a term, which refers to a party established around the persona and connections of the party leader. The fact that their party programs and frames, except the newly developing ultranationalist discourse of the RPNP under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, were not fundamentally different from the JP reinforced the Islamist conviction that these parties were mere instruments for political ambitions of their leaders. As such they were seen as a) incapable of accommodating a *dava* that could have attracted activists and voters and b) unstable as a result of their leaders' erratic choices: while the leader of the NP resigned several times, the chairman of the NTP had quite a few attempts to resign.

The establishment of a new party would not only brought organizational power to the Islamists but also through institutionalization enable them to distinguish their developing political identity and to put forward their demands and interests with clearer lines from the existing right wing forces. Specifically, as

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[202] Interviews with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006; Süleyman Arif Emre, January 30, 2007

[203] As a result the leader of the RPNP, Osman Bölükbaşı, established the NP.

Boltanski argues institutionalization, or "objectification" of a social group in a juridical entity and that of the juridical entity in an institutional apparatus brings two major benefits to the incipient collective actor: first, institutionalization consolidates its existence and thus renders it both "stronger and lasting" than the aggregation of the actors who claim to represent and sustain it. Second, identity formation and framing [204] that accompanies institutionalization gives the collectivity a certain "structural stability." The latter helps the collective actor to resist the blurring of its boundaries within its (social and political) environment and the tension that arises from its internal heterogeneity.[205]

Consequently, as early as January 2, 1967 in the daily *Yeni İstanbul*, where Serdengeçti had a column, a news item appeared which denied the allegations that parliamentarians from various right wing parties were going to establish a new party, suggesting exactly that there were such attempts.[206] A few days later, probably reflecting the JP rulers' discontent by such activities as well, Serdengeçti, a prominent columnist and a JP parliamentarian was banished from the party. On June 6, the latter hinted for the first time the emergence of a new party in his column. A day before Osman Turan had tabled a motion of censure against the government, a move that sealed his fate and gave further impetus to party innovation. On June 8, Serdengeçti proposed three names for the new party: the National Movement Party, True Path Party and Democrat Party.[207] He complained that the word Islam could not be used for legal reasons. By July he was comparing and contrasting the prospective party with the existing ones deploying metaphors alluding to the "religiousness" of the new party.[208]

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[204] Boltanski uses the expression "stylizing the group properties."

[205] Luc Boltanski, *Les Cadres: La Formation d'Un Group Social* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1982), 235-236.

[206] "Yeni Parti Icin Vakit Erken," *Yeni İstanbul*, January 2, 1967.

[207] Milli Hareket Partisi, Doğruyol Partisi, Demokrat Partisi. "Yeni Parti Hakkında" Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, *Yeni İstanbul*, June 8, 1967. These names were later adopted by future right wing political parties with slight changes. Earliest example is Republican Peasant Nation Party (the RPNP) of Türkeş which acquired the name Nationalist Action Party during their general congress of February 1969. Ironically enough, it seems the term "National Order" adopted by the Islamists as their party name was used for the first time at the same congress by Mustafa Özdağ. "CKMP'nin Yeni Adı: Milli Hareket, Başkanı: Türkeş" *Yeni İstanbul*, February 10, 1969.

[208] "Parti liderleri" Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, *Yeni İstanbul*, July 9, 1967.

Some of the interviewees were witnesses to the "open-secret" meetings where the new party was planned.[209]As one of the founders of the NOP, Süleyman Arif Emre, who was then the Deputy President of the NTP and a parliamentarian, narrate, their initiative started when with a group of his friends, including Serdengeçti, they requested from Professor Ali Fuat Başgil, to initiate and lead their movement. It should be noted that the Risale-i Nur elites Ahmet İhsan Genç and Hacı Tevfik Paksu were also involved and had also been actively lobbying for the establishment of a new party.[210] When Başgil died soon after that meeting,[211] they went to Professor Osman Turan with the same demand. Osman Turan proved to be "too intellectual" to lead a new political organization. He was taking it so slowly that as a result of the protests of his comrades he resigned from the role of the leader.[212] Finally, having listened to his speeches in various *mukaddesatçı*-nationalist gatherings, following his activities in the TOBB, and thanks to his impressive CV, the party entrepreneurs proposed that Erbakan lead the activities for the establishment of a new party.

Necmettin Erbakan was a young professor of mechanical engineering, partner to a small motor manufacturing company and finally a pious disciple of the revered Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku. He did not have a previous experience in formal party politics. However; first, as the head of the industry department and then the general secretary of the TOBB, he had acquired the necessary skills as an outspoken critique of government policies with regard to the allocation of resources.[213]

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[209] Interviews with Hasan Aksay, November 22, 2006, Süleyman Arif Emre, January 30, 2007, Muzaffer Deligöz, July 24, 2007. Some younger interviewees (mostly engineers) witnessed TOBB Affair episodes of these meetings. Interviews with Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu, August 23, 2006, Turhan Utku, November 8, 2006. Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu would be become one of the founders and the first chairman (and the last) of the Akıncı Association and Turhan Utku would enter the Assembly as Çorum deputy in 1973.

[210] Reportedly, non-Yeni Asya Nur student members of Armutçuoğlu family provided the initial finances for the establishment of the NOP. Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, July 24, 2007.

[211] The date of his death help to establish the chronology further: April 17, 1967. Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1976), 327.

[212] Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007. It should be added that it seems Osman Turan was not willing to lead such a movement as he was leaning more on the ultranationalist circles. As a matter of fact, he would later join the NAP of Alparslan Türkeş.

[213] As mentioned in the introduction, together with the government, the TOBB undertook the distribution of credits and assigned the foreign exchange quotas, to various sectors of commerce and industry.

On various occasions he was invited to conservative-nationalist activities[214] where he claimed that the large businesses of İstanbul and İzmir were favored at the expense of Anatolian small to medium enterprises and got most of the foreign credits, bank credits and investments. At the time he was approached by the party innovators, as the general secretary of the Union, he was struggling for the implementation of his policy proposals. He accepted the responsibility of leading the new party, reportedly, following a brief consideration with his spiritual mentor, the powerful Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku and getting his full support.[215]

At first, the gatherings among the members of the parliament and the senate from the right-wing parties, some *Risale-i Nur* student branches in Anatolia[216] and some civil servants[217] and engineers (usually owners of civil engineering and building contracting companies) were loosely connected. In other words, the idea of a new party matured first within small groups of close friends (strong ties), which were connected to and communicated with each other through acquaintances and colleagues (weak ties) from various right wing organizations and activities.[218]

The Islamist parliamentarians had already established close friendships with each other since the early 1960s, even the 1950s. They increased their contact with

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[214] For instance, in August 1967, he was invited for an upcoming event of the right wing organizations in Bursa alongside such nationalist university professors as Faruk Kadri Timurtaş and Tahsin Banguoğlu. "Milliyetçiler Toplantısı Hazırlıkları İlerliyor, " *Yeni İstanbul,* August 9, 1967

[215] Interviews with various national level NSM entrepreneurs and activists. It should be noted that this story is told in a different tone by the NSM-Nur elites. In their accounts they emphasis that Erbakan would not even engage in party building activities or accept leadership if the Sheikh did not give his tacit approval. Such a perspective seems to reflect their attempts to overcome the dominant account of the NOP's foundation, which overemphasize Erbakan's role and overshadows those of the Nur elites (Oğuzhan Asiltürk also says that Erbakan would backdown. But as shall be seen, his motivation seems to be different from those of the Nur students).

[216] These were some of the groups formed around some "Ağabey"s (leading Nur students) in some Anatolian towns. Among them best known group was the followers of Hüsrev Altınbaşak (Üstad-ı Sani-the Second Master). They were called Yazıcılar (the Scribes) as they insisted that the Risale-i Nur needed to be written by hand and then distributed. These groups will be studied in detail in the next subsection in comparison to Yeni Asya which supported the JP.

[217] These civil servants who had made public their piousness were called pejoratively *takunyacılar* (clog-wearers) in the press as they were imagined wearing clogs during ablution. An interviewee who also worked as a civil servant during the 1970s told me he never wore clogs, but flip-flops!

[218] While there is still an ongoing debate among the scholars regarding the relative role and effectiveness of the strong and weak ties for mobilization process, it seems the mobilization of the Islamist elites for a new party reflects the observation of McAdam and Paulsen: "…the ultimate structure for a movement would be one in which dense networks of weak bridging ties linked numerous local groups bound together by means of strong local interpersonal bonds." Doug McAdam and Ronnell Paulsen, "Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism, *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993): 640-667.

the Nur students through Hacı Tevfik Paksu, a JP senator and Nur student from Maraş, who, with the help and encouragement of a leading Nur student of the period, Ahmet İhsan Genç organized meetings in an apartment rented in Ankara.[219]

Most civil servants and engineers[220] knew each other and Erbakan from their university years in İstanbul where they studied in the same engineering faculty of İstanbul Technical University.[221] They had come close through not only the university life and sharing similar professional interests but also their participation in the religious conversations of the Naqshbandi Sheikhs Mehmet Zahit Kotku (İskenderpaşa community) and/or Mahmut Sami Ramazanoğlu (Erenköy community).[222] One should also add the previously mentioned "Milli Bakkal" of Alpkan close to Yıldız Technical University. Finally, they met with Islamist parliamentarians and Nur students either through Erbakan or during the activities of right wing organizations. For instance, Oğuzhan Asiltürk maintains that most of the official and unofficial founders of the NOP had been working in various religious benevolent organizations established to build a Prayer Leader and Preacher School or a mosque.[223]

The informal meetings within and among these groups quickly evolved into regular and formal meetings, particularly after Erbakan agreed to lead the movement, and the party innovators began to prepare the party program and in-

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[219] A Nur elite who had engaged in party building activities says that the apartment rented for Paksu was specifically aimed at bringing together the elites of the various sectors of the Islamist network. RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008. This leader says that the main purpose of the place was to initiate a party for the Islamists. However, Mehmet Kutlular, one of the *Three Mehmet*s who administered Yeni Asya first under the leadership of Zübeyir Gündüzalp (and Bekir Berk) and following his death, by themselves, says that the apartment was a Medrese-i Nuriye (see the below discussion on the Nur students), designed to establish strong connections and friendships (*dost yapmak*) between the right wing parliamentarians and the Risale-i Nur students. Kutlular, *İşte Hayatım*, 132-133. It was called *Parlamenterler Dershanesi,* or Parliamentarians' Training Center. It should be noted that at the time the term *dershane* was recently gaining popularity as a shortened way to refer to Medrese-i Nuriye.

[220] For instance Cevat Ayhan, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Recai Kutan.

[221] For example, Gündüz Sevilgen, a Nur student, who joined the NSM officially during the establishment of the NSP was a classmate of Asiltürk, and Turhan Utku who was part of the process that crystallized the party entrepreneurs (he would become a parlimantarian in 1973) was a roommate with Cevat Ayhan. Interview with Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 1, 2006.

[222] As shall be seen in the discussion on the Naqshbandis in the following subsection, participation to these conversations did not require being a Naqshbandi disciple.

[223] "Most of [these people] had previously been in various benevolent associations. [These were] individuals, who served the people. Some were administrators in the associations for Prayer Leader [and] Preacher [schools], some make the construction of mosques. These [people] are known in the community. There was a certain previous affinity." Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk October 5, 2007. Hasan Aksay and Muzaffer Deligöz have also confirmed this observation.

laws. Despite these preparations, the Islamist elites did not expect to compete in the upcoming municipal and senate elections of 1968 or the general elections of 1969.[224] It was impossible to establish the number of local branches that the law required in time at several places and then convene six months later the first general congress.[225]

Such a task, above all, required that the party innovators in the administrative center launch a consensus and activist mobilization for this specific cause all over the country. Collective actions such as the "Rise-up meetings" (*Şahlanış Mitingleri*), "collective morning prayers"[226] or seminars of Şule Yüksel Şenler inviting women to veil throughout 1968 and 1969[227] (all supported by the most read Islamist newspaper Bugün)[228] no doubt created an atmosphere and network conducive for the new party. However, as shall be seen in the following chapter, it would be the party innovators' symbolic (ideational) production and recruitment efforts that would attract the potential party activists and through them the prospective voters.

3.3.2 The Risale-i Nur Student involvement and non-involvement in the new Islamist enterprise[229]

In a rare scholarly comparison on the Nur students and the NSM, a tautological argument as to their political engagement patterns is advanced.[230] According to this argument, the Nur students was a grassroots movement that prioritized changing the society over changing state institutions following the religious teachings of their esteemed leader. Accordingly, they had refused

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[224] Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007 and telephone interview with Hasan Aksay, February4, 2009.

[225] Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007; "Yeni Parti Hakkında" Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, *Yeni İstanbul*, June 8, 1967.

[226] For a photograph from one of the largest collective morning prayers see Appendix G, Figure 6.

[227] Şenler organized conferences in December 1967 as well. She would be imprisoned for insulting the President of Republic in 1971. For the photo of a conference in 1969 in İstanbul at the MTTB, see Appendix G, Figure 7.

[228] It should be noted although most interviewees were avid readers of Bugün, most did not appreciate and thus participate to the collective morning prayers, thinking that they were too provocative.

[229] This subsection is based on the interviews with the elites and activists of the Yeni Asya and non-Yeni Asya Nur student branches and publications.

[230] Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity*. See also Kuru and Kuru, "Apolitical Interpretation of Islam."

engaging in active politics, satisfying themselves with lobbying activities and supporting the right wing parties through their votes. This claim, which takes ideational elements as a departing point, is problematic on two grounds.

First, it does not explain why different Nur movement branches, that increasingly grew autonomous, and organized separately diverged in interpreting the same teachings in the post-1960 period. While the Yeni Asya elites chose to stick with the JP despite the failure of right wing mobilizations and consecutive law suits against the Nur students in general, the elites of some Nur Students branches in Anatolia directly or indirectly took part in the new Islamist party enterprise. There are only vague references to intra-Risale-i Nur Student power struggles to explain the differences, which implies that the pro-NSM Risale-i Nur Students misinterpreted the teachings as a reaction to rising prominence of their Yeni Asya counterparts. Second, this approach ignores the fact that although the Yeni Asya's primary area of movement activity was right wing grassroots, they actively took part in electoral politics and in public discussions over a number of issues. Its local elites and activists did not simply vote or influenced others to vote for the JP. They actively worked in the JP local chapters[231] and joined in electoral efforts both as candidates to offices and as party activists.

Consequently following questions need to be answered. Why Yeni Asya members did not join the coalition that made up the NOP, the first party of the NSM and instead engaged in institutional politics through the JP? That is, why Yeni Asya supported and actively worked for the center-right Justice Party (the JP, the party in power from 1965 to the coup of 1971) and vehemently opposed the NSM, particularly following its entry to the Assembly? Why did they prioritize spreading the *"dava"* by grassroots work over institutionalized politics? Finally, why did other elites of the Nur students choose to establish and support the NSM instead of joining their fellow Nur students in Yeni Asya?

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[231] They even established formal youth associations as informal JP youth chapters, first in Ankara, Kayseri, Adana, Trabzon, Erzurum and Gaziantep. İslam Yaşar, *Serencam* (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2000), 398-401. It was probably the youth in these associations later formed the basis of "Hür Genç," the formal youth branch of the JP in the 1970s. One of the the interviewees was at the head of Kayseri "Hür Genç." Interview with KayYA12, Kayseri, May 4, 2009. See also, Appendix G, Figure 8.

The establishment of the Yeni Asya's informal hierarchical organization with a clear division of labor, its goal of "Islamizing" the society not the state institutions, its opposition to the NSM and alliance with the JP's liberal clique, and political positions over a range of issues throughout the 1960s and 1970s stemmed from three interrelated needs: a) the need to recreate and sustain "total institution" character of its core institution, the *Medrese-i Nuriye*, that had appeared in the 1950s amidst their religious network and reproduced new ones in the periphery b) to ensure the continuity of movement's grassroots activities which sustained the total institutions in tangible and intangible ways c) to avoid alienating the JP's large electoral base which provided a pool of social, economic and political resources. The informal organization of Yeni Asya was, thus, not primarily a strategic response to the existing political opportunities and constraints of the 1960s. It was rather guided by the consequences and imperatives of a previously established organization model that had been formed *within* the *inner* circle of a network of *devotees* of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi during the previous repressive periods.[232]

Common institutional and ideational roots of the Risale-i Nur Students

Emergence and informal organization

To begin with, the basics of the Nur students' organization, that is its three layered federated networks,[233] had emerged during the repressive regime of the single party period and enlarged during the relative liberalization of the 1950s. Following the *Şeyh Said Rebellion* in 1925 in Kurdish regions, the single party regime had accused and suspected Said Nursi[234] harboring anti-regime and Kurdish

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[232] It should be emphasized that the total institution here refers to one particular group in the inner circle of the *Risale-i Nur* movement , who would later undertake the organization of the Yeni Asya movement. However, this inner group succeeded establishing new Medreses that is total institutions for new recruits who entered the first cycle as well.

[233] This description is advanced by Ziad Munson who also observes a similar movement structure in studying the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. "Islamic mobilization," 500.

[234] He was also known as Said Kurdi. He was born in *Bitlis* in 1873 and was a graduate of religious *medreses* in the *Kurdistan* region under the Ottoman Empire. During the late 19th century, he attended classes of the leading religious scholars of the time and mastered Islamic disciplines at a very young age. During the early 20th century, apart from being a prolific writer and a talented debater which earned him the name Bediüzzaman (the Wonder of the Time), he had an active and adventurous life ranging from demanding the establishment of a university in the East from the Sultan (that ended him in a mental hospital to pay for his boldness) to supporting the 1908 Constitutional Revolution as a reformist Islamist and from being captured by the Russian army in

Nationalist activities and ideas and exiled him to Burdur[235], a small town in the West of Turkey where he established his first circle of followers and wrote the first epistle of the Risale-i Nur corpus: *Nurun İlk Kapısı* (The First Door of the Light). Thus began the Risale-i Nur movement's' emergence as a peculiar religious *medrese,* or a school of religious education. Gradually, this "school" would turn into a grassroots Islamist movement with "a three-tiered membership" federated structure[236].

The secular reforms and modernization policies of the state that ban traditional local institutions of religious education and activity had effectively pushed the *medrese* and *tarikat* (brotherhood) activity, at least in the West of Turkey, to underground and even inactivity. While the former provided classical education in Islamic disciplines, the latter trained individuals in spiritual development (Islamic mysticism). The ban on *medrese*, was a direct challenge to religion in and off itself. Moreover, since it objectively created an environment that was conducive for questioning some basic religious behavior, if not the beliefs, it posed an indirect challenge as well. The ban on *tarikats*, in return, shut all access to religious authorities and a popular pass time activity of religious conversations. As such, an institution that could serve as an outlet to cease all sorts of anxieties emerging in the face of secular encroachment was lost.

Religious exchange through letters between Said Nursi and his circle of growing followers thus served to fill the lacuna that these banned institutions left. These communications would lead Said Nursi to write his epistles, and both the communications and the epistles (until the mid-1950s) would be reproduced through handwriting and, later mimeographed, to be disseminated within the circle and to potential members of the circle. Said Nursi rejected the above-mentioned traditional avenues of religious exchange, not only because he saw a need for a new type of religious activity but also mostly because up until the late 1940s, he was

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1916 during the First World War to opposing the Sultan and taking sides with the Ankara government during the War of Independence. His active political life came to an end by the establishment of the new republic, the subsequent secular reforms and increasing Turkish nationalism. Accused and suspected by the ruling elites by anti-regime and Kurdish Nationalist activism he was exiled to Burdur, a small town in the West of Turkey where he established his first circle of followers and wrote the first epistle of the Risale-i Nur corpus: *Nurun İlk Kapısı* (The First Door of the Light).

[235] This, despite the fact that the Court had acquitted him.
[236] Ibid.

under constant pressure and surveillance unable to bring physically together his followers under one roof to carry out some underground *tarikat* or *medrese* activity. While the ensuing network of written communication was as a whole called *Medrese-i Nuriye* (Medrese of Lights, in its shortened name Medrese), especially by the 1950s when Said Nursi for the first time began living and working together with his students under the same roof, and the leaders of the local branches opened houses where students can live and study together, the term began to specifically refer to these places (houses or apartments) where the Nur student activities took place.[237]

Specifically, from the late 1920s through the 1960s, the continuous state repression that exiled Said Nursi to different towns (Barla, Kastamonu, Emirdağ) led to the emergence of separate circles communicating Risale-i Nur writings, which came to be connected and bonded through not only material and symbolic exchange of letters but also shared prison terms. Said Nursi either sent his students to different regions of the country to establish new networks or received students from elsewhere who would later go back to establish their circles. Since the reproduction and dissemination of the Risale-i Nur corpus needed to be carried out secretly because of state pressure, apart from the communication of new letters or epistles, these branches grew autonomously from each other led by a leader who had personal correspondence with Said Nursi. The leaders of the branches would personally supervise the reproduction and dissemination of the Risale-i Nur writings and recruitment of new members.

Each network was comprised of mainly three layers consisting "*talebeler*"[238] (the students), *kardeşler* (the brothers) and *dostlar* (the friends).[239]

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[237] For a study of a new religious movement formed and developed around publication (publishing, reading and disseminating religious books and other reading materials) in the Christian world see Arnaud Blanchard, *Les Témoins de Jéhovah par leurs Imprimés* (Yaoundé: Presses de l'UCAC, 2008). Other forms of social networks can also emerge as a result of publication and dissemination of religious publications. For instance, the dissemination of religious books through specialized bookstores helped the formation of Muslim networks and a Muslim public space in certain Parisian neighbourhoods by the 1980s. Soraya El Alaoui, *Les réseaux du Livre Islamique: Parcours Parisiens* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2006).

[238] Talebeler was also a generic term for all who were reading, helping to the writing/reproducing and disseminating the Risale-i Nur corpus. Incidentally, the layers of the Muslim Brotherhood are called (unlike this study Munson starts with the outer layer and calls it the first layer): the assistants, related and active. Since the Brotherhood is a formal organization, the assistants are regular due paying cardholder members.

The first, inner, layer (talebeler) included those who devoted majority of their resources, time, money, labour, even their lives in movement activities, particularly the publication and dissemination of the Risale-i Nur corpus. The second layer included first, regular readers of the Risale-i Nur, who participated in weekly Risale-i Nur studying sessions but contributed to the movement mainly financially; and second new initiates to the movement who might or might not move into the first layer. The final group constituted religious members of the local community or national political elites, who occasionally read the Risale-i Nur and supported the activities of the Nur students. The non-members who were hostile to the activities of the Nur students were divided into two: the "*menfi*" (negative), mostly secularists and the *münafık* (hypocrites), the religious opponents of the movement. As far as the present discussion is concerned, the most important layer was even a smaller inner core group within the *talebeler* (the first layer), with direct and regular relations with Said Nursi. They were called *has talebeler* (royal students, among them also *Varisler*, or Said Nursi's designated inheritors of his legacy, including the publication of the epistles[240]). They constituted the leaders or prominent members of the local branches and/or those who were in Said Nursi's personal service. They were called "*Ağabeyler*," or elders.

The three-layered structure of the movement was essentially a result of close state surveillance. Through differentiating the degree of devotion among the members and creating very strong bonds in the inner circle they would impede state intrusions.[241] Later, this structure acquired a second function as the activists; particularly the first circle experienced growing ideational and, for some, physical rupture from the rest of the Muslim population. The layers served as compression chambers for the initiates to the movement, who would incrementally go into the depths of the Risale-i Nur teachings, which as shall be seen bordered heterodoxy

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[239] It should be noted that Mardin denies the existence of these layers referring to Dumont's work. Dumont, though confuses the layers and their respective names and attributes and mistakenly assumes the existence of certain "rites," gives a basic idea on how the layers function as a hierarchical system. He himself relies on a work in German. Ursula Spuler, "Zur Organisationsstruktur der Nurculuk-Bewegung," in *Studien zur Gescgichte und Kultur des vorderen Orients*, ed. Hans R. Roemer and Albrecht Noth (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1981), 423-442, quoted in Dumont, 243-246.

[240] Said Nursi, however, also emphasized several times that the Epistles were "public good," that is *Umumun Malı*. As such, over the years numerous Risale-i Nur movements published the epistles, even those who had not been originally counted among the "inheritors."

[241] Not only Said Nursi and his students wanted to ensure the continuity of their activities but also believed that the state was trying to poison Said Nursi.

for ordinary pious Muslims and even other Islamists, and have to shoulder more pressure from outside and responsibility inside as activists at each layer. Munson also provides a similar explanation for the function of these layers saying that the layers helped the Muslim Brotherhood to cope with and recruit individuals with "variety of different beliefs and levels of motivation for collective action."[242] To this it should be added that these also enabled the members of the first and second layers to both acclimatize to the outer society, and "leave" the movement smoothly all the while remaining within the Nur circles.

Ideational institutionalization as a "new religious movement"

Stark and Bainbridge defines religious movements as "social movements that wish to cause or prevent change in a system of beliefs, values, symbols and practices concerned with providing supernaturally-based general compensators."[243] The new religious movements in turn are understood as unconventional religious movements, which may or may not be born within an established religious tradition and community. Those which are off-springs of an established religion, would provide heterodox interpretations, which would gradually either dominate the religious market or become marginalized.

Not only the above mentioned activities but the ideational properties of the Nur students attest that it was a new religious movement, with distinct interpretations and beliefs, produced through the writings of the Said Nursi and the letters of his students.[244] First of all, the Risale-i Nur corpus focused on faith based articles of the Koran not only because, under the circumstances, it was the safest thing to do so[245], but also because, as Şerif Mardin emphasizes it throughout his work, it helped the Nur students to deal with their rapidly secularizing environment.[246]

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[242] Munson, "Islamic Mobilization," 499-500.
[243] Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Prelimanry Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 18 (1979): 124.
[244] In fact at the time for non-movement Muslims this interpretation and accompanying behavior almost bordered heterodoxy.
[245] Unlike medrese and tarikat activities, talking and writing about the basics of faith was not considered a crime, at least in theory.
[246] Mardin, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Olayı*.

However, the interpretation of the faith based articles constituted only a part, albeit an important one, of the Nur students' ideational features. A close reading of the letters and writings accumulated in the major volumes of the Risale-i Nur corpus and the memoirs of the Nur students attests to self-replicating ideational regime and activity and an exclusive identity. The corpus included not only an interpretation of certain articles of the *Kuran* but also the accounts of Said Nursi's life, the Nur Student activities and the movement's relations with the state forces. Said Nursi and his students believed that to become and remain faithful Muslims, these epistles should be written, read and disseminated repeatedly. In fact, the movement members, especially, those in the second and inner circles refused to read or rarely read (only those who were in a religious profession) religious interpretations or materials, not to mention secular newspapers or books, other than the *Risale-i Nur*.

Since the writings that the students read, wrote, studied and disseminated covered the stories and letters of the Nur students themselves, the implication was that to acquire and protect the faith as a Muslim, one had to read not only the *Kuranic* interpretations of Said Nursi but also his life and the movements' struggles with the state. Moreover, a good Muslim with true faith had to do his best to disseminate these writings or at least avoid putting obstacles on their way. Those who opposed the Risale-i Nur writings, or who were simply uninterested were nominal Muslims at best, and *münafik* (hypocrite) at worst. As it is apparent, being a (real) Muslim was closely associated, even identified with being a Risale-i Nur student, especially among the members of the first circle.

A second implication or related development was that the practices of reading and writing passages from the corpus and their dissemination, in fact any activity related to the movement, including personal service to Said Nursi came to be seen as an act worship, or religious service (*ibadet*). The Students argued that the Risale-i Nur was an interpretation of the *Koranic* articles and hence when they served the epistles they actually served the *Koran*. Reading passages from the epistles or other practices were thus *ibadet* by proxy. However, the fact that the Risale-i Nur overwhelmingly contained the activities of the movement members

themselves,[247] referring to *Risale* related practices as *ibadet* and equating them with reading the *Koran* blurred the boundaries between the sacred and the mundane and created a rupture between the mainstream religious community and even groups such as the *tarikats*.

To clarify further, even in such "heterodox" spiritual groups as the *tarikats*, (at least before their transformations in the 1980s in the line of the Nur students) the members attribute sacred or celestial qualities only to the religious leader not to themselves or their own mundane activities. Moreover, in a *Naqshbandi* brotherhood, for instance, zi*k*r and *sohbet* as *ibadet* aim at connecting to the God and the religious leader is the only one who had experienced such a connection. In the case of the *Nur* movement, on the other hand, *ibadet* was *not* essentially a tool of the believer to connect with God. It rather became a tool of the God, since they believed, He worked through the *Nur* students and their activities to take part in the struggle between the secularization and its proponents (*deccal*[248]) on the one hand, and the religious forces on the other.

Any reference to a religious struggle between the *deccal* and the believers needs a comparison of the *Nur* movement with the *Mahdist* movements in the Muslim world. The latter wait and prepare for the coming of the *Mahdi*, the religious leader who would defeat the *deccal*. While the attribution of *Mahdism* to *Said* Nursi is still a subject of discussion within the movement, rather, it is the Risale-i Nur corpus, hence the movement itself that is perceived as the quintessence of *Mahdi*. The movement, therefore, annihilates the expectation of a *Mahdi*. Thus, in that sense, the Nur movement cannot be considered a continuity of the long list of *Mahdist* movements in the history of Islam (the most famous ones being in Iran and Sudan), which, however, also perfectly fit in the family of "new religious movements."

Be that as it may, it seems, teaching and propagating "the faith" under heavy state persecution enabled the Nur students to acquire an eschatological view

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[247] Only *Sözler* exclusively contains interpretations of the *Kuran*. It should be added that the letters had always been downplayed, especially recently, since the movement engaged in activities over the internet. However, if one passed from one layer to another deep into the movement, they are more comfortably discussed. At any rate, those Nur Students who are further attached to the movement through such juxtapositions do not need them anymore, as they became leaders themselves.
[248]In Christianity a parallel entity that cross the border between the physical and metaphysical worlds is the antichrist.

of history[249]: they drew similarities between themselves and the state elites and the early Muslims and the "*kafirun*," thereby rendering it easier to attribute certain sacredness to Said Nursi and by proxy to themselves. As such even the most mundane activities of the Nur students (such as sleeping) were themselves sacred. In fact, the Nur students not only believed the epistles were written with "divine inspiration" to Said Nursi and but also used certain exoteric 'tools' in order to explain the "secrets" of the *Koran* which they believed pointed out the *Risale-i Nur* and the students' activities by name.[250] It should be added that to the extent that the state and its policies made part of this theology and they daily faced the direct power and pressure of the state the movements and activists' actions acquired also a political character.

Finally, related to the exclusivity of the practices and ideology of the movement was the necessity of conversion of the regular Muslims to the teachings of the movement. Conversion in turn could not be achieved through public propaganda but through close and frequent association with the potential recruits. The *Medrese-i Nuriyes* that will be introduced below provided the perfect social spaces for such interaction.

Divergent origins of the elites of the Risale-i Nur Students

The elites of the Risale-i Nur movement, who began or continued to administer various Nur students branches following the death of their leader in 1960, could be divided into two groups: those, who had lived and continued to live in *Medrese-i Nuriye* (Medrese) as a total institution, and those who had just administered without actually immersing in it. This essay argues that the divergent behavior of the Nur student leaders on the NSM enterprise was ultimately tied to their respective Medrese-i Nuriye background. Following is an account of the *Medrese*s development within the three-layered federated structure of the Risale-i Nur Student grassroot networks.

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[249] Bozarslan, *Cent Mots*, 115-116.
[250] These tools are called "*ebced*" and "*cifir*", which assign numbers to the Arabic letters. Through intricate calculations of the numbers found in a given verse of *Koran*, various *batıni* (allegorical and/or anogogical) meanings can be derived. Throughout the history of Islam both, but particularly *cifir*, have been subject to controversy, rejected by the majority of the established orthodox scholars. Ebced, in turn, has been used for practical purposes as well, for instance in the Ottoman State to date official documents.

In the scholarly and journalistic accounts of the division between the Risale-i Nur Students on the issue of the NSM, the emphasis is put on the "Readers" (*Okuyucular*) juxtaposed with Yeni Asya, and the "Scribes" (*Yazıcılar*) who are treated as a marginal group. The latter was the branch formed under the leadership of Hüsrev Altınbaşak (known also as *Üstad-ı Sani*, or the Second Master), in his early years Said Nursi's closest follower and friend. They were called the Scribes, as they insisted that the Risale-i Nur needed to be written by hand in Ottoman Turkish and then distributed. The Readers on the other hand were those who, by the 1950s began printing the Risale-i Nur in Latin script. Instead of writing the Risale-i Nur volumes as a ritual, they would just read the printed epistles in regular intervals individually or as a group during the day. It has been suggested that the Scribes' support of the NSM was actually a reaction to their marginalization within the Risale-i Nur movement, which had started when Said Nursi was alive. The "Readers" were following the path of Said Nursi, who had publicly supported the DP.

This view is problematic on two grounds. First, the leader of the Scribes, although administrating the largest network that could rival Yeni Asya, was not the only Risale-i Nur branch that contributed to the emergence of the NSM. As such, the analysis focusing on the dispute over "writing" versus "reading," curtails those "Reader" Risale-i Nur groups and their leaders[251] who either played a major role in the NSM establishment or supported the NAP. Second, since Yeni Asya, eventually conquered their networks, or established more powerful parallel networks throughout the 1970s, the situation of flux during the 1960s is forgotten. The argument that Said Nursi had also supported a mainstream party, reduces those who joined the party building activities to an anomaly and portrays Yeni Asya's political engagement pattern as the norm for the Nur students.[252]

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[251]Among them there were both elders who had had direct regular contact with Said Nursi and those who only briefly corresponded with him. Among them Said Özdemir, the leader of an Anatolian branch centered in Ankara, Ahmet İhsan Genç of Antep and Maraş. Mehmet Feyzi Pamukçu and his networks in Kastamonu supported the NAP.

[252] For instance, though aprobably not as much worked and as much known as Bekir Berk of Yeni Asya, a lawyer defending Said Nursi and the Nur students all around the country from the 1950s to 1970, Hüsamettin Akmumcu, one of the Nur student entrepreneurs of the NSM, was also very close to Said Nursi. In fact, Akmumcu was also granted power of attorney in all his affairs. See Appendix F for the notary public signed document.

Following is an examination of Medrese-i Nuriye and its role in the divergent political attitudes of the Nur student elders and groups.

<u>The emergence of the *Medrese-i Nuriye* as a total institution</u>[253]

The process of the transformation of Medrese-i Nuriye into a physical body and a total institution began following the liberalization of the polity through multiparty politics and after the Afyon court[254] acquitted both the Nur students and their "books" in the early 1950s. Said Nursi was now aged and tired of years of loneliness[255] and suppression. When the state pressure was relatively lifted he started living with a group of his "royal students," who not only took care of his personal affairs but also ensured his communication with the branches where the Epistles of Light were reproduced and disseminated. He urged the establishment of similar spaces under the supervision of the leaders from the first circle, which would become the movement's contact points and basis of local activity.

From then on, Medrese-i Nuriye did not only refer to the "*şahs-i manevi*" (moral entity) of the movement, but also and increasingly specifically to these Risale-i Nur institutions. They constituted "total institutions." Goffman defines the total institution as an "all encompassing" social organization and recommends the following definition not for "immediate analytical use" but as a guiding conceptual tool:[256]

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[253] In one of the rare and succinct scholarly discussions on the Medrese-i Nuriyes (using its modern name *dershane*) Yavuz studies only its public features. However, as shall be seen, while Medreses double(d) as public places, they were (and still are) private spaces for the inner layer members. M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Renaissance of Religious Consciousness in Turkey: Nur Study Circles," in *Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran, and Europe*, ed. Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2006), 148-151. He also makes references to Gülen movement dershanes. It should however be noted that it seems while the two converges on being both a total institution and public space, they diverge on their ideational and institutional structures.

[254] The Risale-i Nur Students and the Risale-i Nur corpus were prosecuted five times from 1935 to 1952. The Risale-i Nur corpus was first acquitted by Denizli Court but the state prosecutors nevertheless started two more proceedings against Said Nursi and his followers for disseminating the books.

[255] Exiled from his home, he had been living away from not only his family and friends but also his language and people.

[256] Goffman, 5. It should be added that since the 1950s when Goffman developed the concept, scholars from different disciplines studied a variety of sociological subjects contributing to the refinement of the concept. For a review of the history of the concept see François Steudler, "Les institutions totales et la vie d'un concept," in *Erving Goffman et les Institutions Totales*, ed. Charles Amourous and Alain Blanc, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 283-314.

A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.

In other words, the members of such an institution differ from the ordinary members of the modern society, who are necessarily entrenched in different institutions and networks and work, live and play (leisure activities) in different spaces. As such they came to contact and challenged with different world views. To be sure, not only a total institution is never totally total but also a social movement as a whole cannot be considered a total institution: there were circles that can be totalized and there are others that are left (intentionally or unintentionally) outside this dynamic.[257] The Medrese was a total institution for its regular dwellers as long as they lived in it, since it exclusively absorbed individuals' resources and in turn enabled them to live, work, and "play" in the same physical environment, devoting themselves solely to their religious activities. Moreover, it constrained the way in which its members had contacts with the outer society. The Medrese-i Nuriye members would communicate with the movement's environment through the members of the two layers, who lived outside the *Medrese*s, and *within* the physical space *Medrese*s provided[258], or when a fellow Risale-i Nur student accompanied them. Finally, the contact with the extra-movement environment would involve only movement related issues.[259]

Specifically, those who lived in *Medrese*s, that is the prospective Yeni Asya entrepreneurs and those leaders, who eventually took the Yeni Asya's side on the

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[257] Moreover, while this was not the case for the Yeni Asya group's leaders, there are periods of "totalization" for certain organizations, as in the case of some armed political groups (for instance the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s). As Davies' shows if "(1) the degree of openness or closeness of each institution, (2) the official explicit purpose of the institution though this may (deliberately or incidentally) be ambiguous, and (3) the dominant modes of eliciting compliance employed by the staff as perceived by the inmates" are taken into consideration in the study, the problems of definition and application of the concept that may occur in studying a case can be solved. Christie Davies, "Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticism and Revisions," *Human Studies* 12 (1989): 83.

[258] Potential recruits would be invited in a Medrese-i Nuriye.

[259] In an extreme case in the mid-1960s' Yeni Asya, a young Medrese dweller and his partner, as an attempt to follow the advice of Zübeyir Gündüzalp, which was not to look at "display windows," meaning also cars, women and cloths, decided to wear glasses covered with tissue paper. The experiment, which had rendered "people indistinct, like a painting," did not work despite "their best efforts" as it created danger while they were carrying the books in and off the depot, etc. İbrahim Kaygusuz, *Zübeyir Gündüzalp: Hayat-ı Mefkuresi* (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2007), 385.

dispute over the choice of political engagement pattern, [260] had lived *commune* lives, eaten and slept under the same roofs and invested *exclusively* in the movement at an early age. Following their entry to the Nur student networks, they would quit their jobs, schools, sometimes even their families (parents or wives and children[261]) and even their names.[262] Until the early 1970s[263], unless they had already been married, their marriage was frowned upon, and at times even forbidden by Said Nursi if it would potentially hurt the commitment of the particular student. In short, they endowed their lives to the reproduction, dissemination and reading of the Risale-i Nur corpus, hence, the name "*Vakıf*" (endowed) that came to be used for such Risale-i Nur Students.

It was the *Medrese-i Nuriye* in particular and the movement in general that took care of the daily needs of the *Nur* students through a) 1/5 of the income coming from the selling of the *Risale-i Nur,*[264] b) the charity of the wealthy *Nur* students or pious people sympathetic to the movement *(himmet ehli)*, c) the individual resources of the *hizmet ehli* pooled in the movement.

First, as far as the income coming from the *Risale-i Nur* was concerned, as Muzaffer Arslan tells in his memoirs, during the 1950s, the students were entitled to a) %12.5 of each book they sold and b) 9 Turkish Lira per month, called *tayinat,* or ration.[265] Arslan, who travelled the country to sell the books and establish Nur circles and *Medrese*s, says that the cost of a book would be calculated and %12.5

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[260] Zübeyir Gündüzalp (before Said Nursi changed it Ziver) and Bekir Berk were the leaders of the Kirazlımescit branch, in İstanbul. following the death of their leaders. Later together with a young generation of Nur Students, the three Mehmets, Mehmet Kutlular, Mehmet Birinci, and Mehmet Güleç became the entrepreneurs of Yeni Asya that formed around the movement's two newspapers: Ittihad and Yeni Asya. The three young leaders would take over Yeni Asya following Gündüzalp's death. All but Bekir Berk, who was a lawyer and had joined the movement later in his life, had been living in Medrese-i Nuriye. Those leaders who eventually supported and joined them, such as Mustafa Sungur, Bayram Yüksel, Hüseyin Bayram and Tahiri Mutlu (he was the first to accept Gündüzalp as the leader in the mid-1960s) had also been living in this institition.

[261] For instance, to visit their sick parents or attend the wedding of a brother they needed to ask permission, which was not necessarily guaranteed.

[262] Said Nursi had assigned some of them new names. This was not only a security measure but also a token of their new lives.

[263] In the early 1970s Bekir Berk, the famous lawyer of the Nur students, was accused by some Risale-i Nur students with homosexual activity and had to leave the country for Saudi Arabia to turn back only in the 1990s.

[264] Said Nursi, "Umum dostlarıma ve Nur kardeşlerime bu vasiyeti ilân ediyorum" in *Emirdağ Lahikasi-II*, http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=3996 (Accessed June 25, 2011) see also Said Nursi, "Vasiyetnamenin bir zeyli," in *Emirdağ Lahikasi II*, http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=3988 (Accessed June 25, 2011). It should be added that as shall be seen below the amount 1/5 was a rounded up number.

[265] Ömer Özcan, *Ağabeyler Anlatıyor 2* (İstanbul: Nesil, 2008), 376.

would be added to that amount. Then he adds that this amount would then be spent to other costs, though he does not specify the actual selling price of the book or the other costs that he mentions (he says they did not seek profit). Similarly, an *Ağabey*, Ahmet Aytimur, who had started publishing the Epistles in İstanbul when Said Nursi was still alive, recounts that the resource for the distribution of the ration was also the Epistles. Those who published the books sent 1/10 of the cost of each book to Said Nursi, whether or not they actually sold the book.[266] Under the light of the information provided above on the share that a bookseller was entitled to for each book, it can be deduced that publishers later added this percentage to the cost and the amount of the ration.[267]

Second, it is difficult to ascertain how, from whom and under which conditions the Nur students accepted financial help from 1950 to 1960. Since the finance of the movement and the *Medrese-i Nuriye* is a very delicate subject and both Said Nursi and the early students were at pains to prove that they did what they did for God's sake and consent (*Allah rızası*) and that they did not accept money or presents from others because of their principle of *istiğna,*[268] the written sources which mention the subject are scarce and the elders, who had lived in a Medrese-i Nuriye and still live with the income coming from the movement, prefer not to talk about it. It is a fact that both the Master and his students lived in poverty (as would be the case during the 1960s and at least until the mid-1970s), however the income of the *Risales* alone would not support the students and their master and would not have sufficed to publish and disseminate the books. The explanation provided by the movement members if "*barakat.*"[269] Be that as it may, when Said Nursi died, he left a basket full of gold, reportedly only *tayinat* money, which was then given to Hüsrev Altınbaşak as he was the eldest. Kutlular says that Altınbaşak never returned the money and established an endowment (i.e. *Hayrat Vakfı*). The money was substantial enough and together with contributions from individuals who "respected" Altınbaşak, first helped to enlarge his networks and then sustain it

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[266] Ömer Özcan, *Ağabeyler Anlatıyor 3* (İstanbul: Nesil, 2009), 60-61.
[267] It should be added that %12.5 (income from each book that an individual sells) plus 1/10 (the amount of ration) equals to %22.5 of the book's actual cost, which is more than 1/5 of a book that Said Nursi says and less than 1/4.
[268] *Istiğna* is an Arabic word meaning contentedness, being financially independent etc.
[269] God's blessing bestowed upon those He loves.

throughout the years to come.[270] Today, the leading *Nur* students' financial needs (individual and/or movement related) are provided partly by the income of some factories in İzmit owned by the movement.[271]

The available resources show that Said Nursi and his students were indeed very careful in accepting gifts and preferred the charity of the wealthy Risale-i Nur Students that is those who had either converted to the teachings of the movement, or were part of the Nur student circles. The memoirs published by the approval of the current leaders, who were then members of the *Medrese-i Nuriye(s)*, show that early students of Said Nursi such as Hüsrev Altınbaşak, Tahiri Mutlu, Mustafa Öztürk, Said Özdemir and Çalışkan Dynasty (known as *Çalışkan Hanedanı*) spent an important part of their wealth for the publication of the Risale-i Nur in general and for Said Nursi in particular. Until the late 1950s, such needs of the movement as paper, ink, mimeograph, typewriter, car, housing etc were provided by them, which helped to publish and disseminate the Risale-i Nur in large quantities, the income of which remaining to the *Risales*, Said Nursi and his students.

Third, every student whether rich like Hüsrev Altınbaşak or not would contribute the movement's pool of finance. Consequently, they would invest, their meager income from the savings of their previous lives or from humble family holdings, if any to the movement and movement related activities.

Those Risale-i Nur Student elders, including Hüsrev Altınbaşak, on the other hand, who directly and indirectly took part in the NSM mobilization and institutionalization, in turn, had never been part of the initial total institution formed around Said Nursi despite being part of the inner circle within the first layer.[272] Nor did they live in a Medrese-i Nuriye in their own localities. They merely supervised the movement activities and the activists who were parts of this institution. They heavily invested in the movement materially and symbolically and also believed

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[270] Kutlular, 81-82.

[271] Interview with a Risale-i Nur leader, whose name or identifier cannot be provided. He did not however specify whether or not the factory belonged on paper to a movement endowment or to movement leaders. As the leader gave this information on the basis of unanimity and the names of the movement leaders are provided with the date of interview, the details will not be communicated here.

[272] It should be noted that there were also some elders who had not lived in a *Medrese* but who acted with the Yeni Asya or who supported the NAP. However, this does not disprove the argument that the Medrese-i Nuriye background was a factor in their political engagement patterns. On the contrary, it shows that they were not constrained by this factor in their choices, as all Nur student elders with a Medrese-i Nuriye background ended up with establishing an alliance with the JP.

that being a good Muslim could only be achieved through reading, reproducing and disseminating the Risale-i Nur corpus. However, the members of these branches had regular families, jobs and incomes, which were not associated with the movement. Though their focus was on the Nur students, having personal network of followers, they had also invested in various social, professional, associational and political networks in the right wing milieus as the rest of the NSM entrepreneurs. This was in fact how they had established ties with the latter. In short, they did not have a symbiotic relationship with the movement.

<u>The Medrese-i Nuriye background as a factor in the political engagement patterns of the elites of the Risale-i Nur Students</u>

When faced with the intransigent attitude of the liberals in the face of the right mobilizations and the frequent pro(per)secution of the Nur students in different regions of the country, the Nur student elders gave different reactions. While the elites with Medrese background tried to establish good relations with the JP liberals during a time when the latter faced increasing opposition from the right wing milieus, the non-Medrese elders began to contemplate on how to struggle with the JP more effectively. Despite the rift between the Scribes and Yeni Asya, then Kirazlımescit, up until early 1970s, the "Reader" groups, still shared their networks and the members of one branch worked in another's formal and informal institutions, such as Medreses, publication houses, newspapers, endowments, etc. The elders of the Nur student branches, except Altınbaşak, were members of the *Meşveret,* or the deliberative assembly established following the death of the leader. While Yeni Asya elites vehemently opposed their NSM entrepreneurship in private, in their publications they satisfied with supporting the JP. Their serious attacks against the NSM began around 1973 general elections and increased following the the NSM's entry to the Grand National Assembly. They simply worked for the JP's electoral success and observed a wait and see policy. The Scribes and other elders, on the other hand were well immersed in party building and mobilization activities. What was the reason for this difference?

To begin with, as a result of their Medrese membership, Yeni Asya entrepreneurs lacked diverse and rich range of individual cultural, social and economic capital necessary to engage in institutional politics apart from those they

derived from and through the movement activities. Moreover, they had come to firmly believe that within the conditions of modernity they could save their faith and lifestyle not only by reading and disseminating the corpus of *Risale-i Nur* time and again, but also living within Medrese-i Nuriyes.

The change of political climate in the 1960s revealed, then, a reversal of means and ends for the Yeni Asya entrepreneurs. As members of the previous total institution formed around their deceased leader, their goal was not to Islamize the society over Islamizing the state institutions as such.[273] They sought to reproduce the "total institution" of the 1950s for themselves and for new and older "converts" in various localities. They protected the total institution in particular and the movement from "imploding" in general, through establishing an alliance with the incumbent JP in order to avoid state encroachments (military and judicial). They concentrated on grassroots mobilization and regulation and standardization of the movement activities of printing, reading, and coordinating the dissemination of the *Risale-i Nur* corpus, newspaper publication, endowments, the Medrese-i Nuriye (Medrese) activities, legal issues, political relations, and the like.

The JP liberals, in turn, trying to consolidate their power in the face of internal and external opposition, were happy to find such allies. The Nur students seemed much more powerful, united and numerous, partly thanks to the RPP's, the Supreme Court's and media's statements and news that exaggerated the influence, activities and numbers of the Nur students. Yeni Asya and the JP established their relationship gradually. First, by 1966, the police and gendarmery raids and court proceedings against the Nur students had increased following the Supreme Court's

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[273] Yeni Asya elders and others, who supported the JP and opposed the NSM were relying on some writings of Said Nursi and particularly his two expressions (which ever the situation necessitated), that represented his two different attitudes in two phases of his life: his "second Said" period under heavy handed single party regime between 1926-1945 and his "third Said" period during the Democrat Party period between 1950-1960 (the periodization of his life is his). During these two periods he said, respectively, a) "May god protect me from the evil of the Satan and politics" (*Şeytanın ve siyasetin şerrinden Allah'a sığınırım*) and b) "..if we ever have to be forced to interest in politics, out duty is to make politics an instrument and a friend to religion, so that we win our three hundred and fifty million brothers' friendship" (*bizim siyasete bakmamıza mecburiyet-i kat'iye olduğu zaman, vazifemiz siyaseti dine âlet ve dost yapmaktır ki, üç yüz elli milyon kardeşlerin uhuvvetini bu vatandaki kardeşlere kazandırmaya sebep olsun*). It should be added that the last part of the second expression, which had pan-Islamist tendencies was usually omitted. See "Yirmiikinci mektup", *Mektubat*, (accessed June 25, 2011). http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=1004 and "Reisicumhur Celâl Bayar, ve Heyet-i Vükelâsına" (A letter to the President of the Republic and his committee of ministers), *Emirdag Lahikasi-2*, (accessed June 25, 2011) http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=3834.

declarations of 1965. The JP Minister of Justice tried to influence some prosecutors to accuse the Nur students not with the clause 163/1 but with 163/3, which would be included in the pending Amnesty. If unsuccessful, the Minister changed the area of jurisdiction of ongoing court proceedings whenever he could, sending the case to another court in another district.[274] Then in 1969, the JP agreed to shelve the draft law for the "Protection of the Constitutional Order," which had outraged not only the Islamists[275] but also the left wing activists. Finally, first the military intervention of 1971, then the NOP's ban by the Constitutional Court convinced the Yeni Asya elites further to join their forces with the JP.

The Yeni Asya elites had two major concerns as far as their grassroots activities were concerned: one related to the national arena of politics, the other to the local right wing networks. At the national level, they realized they needed a strong and mainstream ally like the JP, even if no longer incumbent. Engaging directly with existing distribution of power, the NSM could attract the wrath of the military and the judiciary further.[276] At the local level, compared to the newly emerging NSM networks, the JP networks were larger and richer in capital. They would not like to alienate the sympathizers and activists of the JP[277]. Remaining unprotected under state pressure and alienating the JP circles would mean slowing down of proselytizing activities, the dispersion and/or distraction of the *hizmet ehli*[278], and finally, the scarcity of financial contributions from *himmet ehli*[279] during a period when the movement was making investments in newspapers,

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[274] Telephone interview with a then local Nur elite, RNelder1, İstanbul, January 3, 2009.

[275] See Appendix G, Figure 9, for an example of Yeni Asya's mobilization against this draft law.

[276] It should be noted that Yeni Asya tried to establish cordial and even close relations with the military as much as possible and as long as it found a listening ear. For instance, they heartily supported the military intervention of 1971 and particularly Faik Türün, the Commander of the Martial Law in İstanbul. See Appendix G, Figure 10.

[277] The Yeni Asya's relatively quite attitude until the elections may be related to the leaders' wish to see the degree of support to the new initiative within the JP networks.

[278] "People of service." They are those movement activists who devote, their lives (time, labour and in some cases also money) to the movement.

[279] "People of benevolence." This name refers to the well off and respected members of the local communities who enjoy helping "less fortunate" and/or see a religious duty to help those who work for the religion regardless of their specific attachment. While the term is frequently used by the movement members, it is not exclusive. Various religious groups have used the term and competed with each other for the symbolic and material help of the *himmet ehli*. The *Yeni Asya* group systematized and regularized their efforts to attract the religious benevolent members of the local communities, hence the usage of the verb "marketing" for *Yeni Asya*'s efforts to attract them.

publishing houses etc.[280] In other words, they would risk their very material and moral livelihood, the here and hereafter.

Conversely, for those leaders of rival *Risale-i Nur* branches with no Medrese-i Nuriye background the costs of opposing the JP were lower. Both themselves individually and their networks could handle temporary blows on grassroots activities, as was the case during the period from 1960 to 1963. During this period, those with a Medrese background were dispersed all around the country, and disconcerted trying to return to their families, to find a place to live or to get a job. The future pro-NSM Risale-i Nur Student elders, in return, though experiencing prison time and exiles (e.g Said Özdemir and Hüsrev Altınbaşak), kept their networks, Risale-i Nur publications and dissemination running, and the Medrese-i Nuriye's that were under their supervision intact. They were well entrenched within their neighborhood, family and business networks who continued to help them. Consequently, they did not want to be an "amulet" (*muska*). According to the non-Yeni Asya Nur students the JP used this amulet to prove its religious credentials in return for small concession and protections all the while ignoring the majority of their demands, and allowing the judiciary and military to regularly harass them.

In the long run, as the political landscape changed, especially following the coup d'état of 1980, the loyalty that Yeni Asya developed to the JP left the elders without a political "patron." The room that was opened in the political arena in the absence of the JP and Yeni Asya would be filled by new comers: the Anavatan Partisi[281] and the Fethullah Gulen movement. As for the Nur student-NSM elites, as they engaged in party activities, their networks never disappeared but remained smaller or weakened vis-à-vis Yeni Asya.

3.3.3 The Question of the Naqshbandi Role in the New Party Enterprise

As mentioned in the introduction, some versions of the NOP's foundation argue that the Naqshbandi brotherhood (*tarikat*[282]) in general and the *İskenderpaşa*

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[280] In fact from 1960 to around 1963, these elders of the Nur students had experienced exactly this situation.
[281] The Motherland Party.
[282] Tarikat literally means path. Entering a specific tarikat is choosing a path to travel to the God.

Naqshbandi community in particular were the real force behind, even the initiator of, the NSM parties. While a more detailed fieldwork focusing exclusively on the Naqshabandis is needed to understand the relationship between the Naqshbandi brotherhoods and politics, it can safely be argued under the light of the new data this claim appears unfounded.[283] In addition to the discussions of the previous sections which show the complex constellation of political variables that gave rise to the NOP, this subsection maintains that not only the Naqshbandis were not party entrepreneurs but also the Naqshbandi and non-Naqshbandi NOP activists perceived party politics and *tarikats* as different and autonomous registers of individual action. The *tarikats* constituted a social network among others from which the prospective NOP leaders tried to recruit adherents and activists. Moreover, recruitment did not only occur one way. Once the party established, its networks became a pool for Naqshbandi recruitment in turn. The NSM-Naqshbandi relations were thus multi-faceted and multi-linear.

First, it will be demonstrated that the Islamist party entrepreneurs merely sought the blessing and "human capital" of the Naqshbandi leader(s) after having progressed in party building activities. Second, the Naqshbandi networks will be revealed as a social pool in which a renowned Naqshbandi leader's "endorsement" of the NOP neither guaranteed the activism or electoral support of his disciples nor enabled other Naqshbandi leaders to give their support and blessing to the new enterprise. Finally, a hypothesis will be advanced: the nature of the relationship between the Naqshbandis and the NOP seem to conform to the respective *modus operandi* of the Naqshibandis and party politics.

To begin with, the works which see the NSM parties as a Naqshbandi enterprise rely mainly on an article[284] written by Esad Coşan *Hocaefendi[285]*, the son-in-law of and heir to Zahid Kotku *Hocaefendi,* the *mürşid* (the Master in the

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[283] This essay then disagrees with the following work: Mardin, "The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey"; Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity.* In a more recent study on the Justice and Development Party, Metin Heper's treatment of the establishment of the NOP agrees with the previous work as well. See "A "Democratic-Conservative" Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development Party," in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 347.

[284] "Bir Parti ve Biz" http://esadcosan.awardspace.com/arsiv/fetih/g900526.htm (Accessed June 25, 2011).

[285] It roughly means "master-teacher." This word is usually deployed to refer to those Islamic scholars (not necessarily *tarikat* leaders) who have a considerable following and influence among the religious.

Sufi brotherhoods) of Necmettin Erbakan[286] and some other NSM leaders (for instance Recai Kutan). It is argued that this article constitutes an evidence to the entrepreneurial role of the Naqshibandis in the NSM. Consequently, before presenting further evidence from the fieldwork, one should adress the context in which it was written and its content.

This article was written following the death of Zahit Kotku in 1980, when Erbakan refused to even pay lip service to Esad Coşan's moral authority. Through this article, Coşan claimed such an authority over the party affairs, a deed his master had never even attempted despite his close relationship with the NSM leaders. Since it is a product of a certain power struggle between its writer and Erbakan, its content should be read cautiously.

The article seems to deliberately adopt an ambiguous style and contains contradictory information. On the one hand, Coşan maintains that the party was the "action" of the brotherhood (*dergahımızın bir aksiyonu*), implying that they initiated the party. On the other hand, he relates the event as follows: "People came to our Master, and said 'Master, should we do this type of things?' He ordered and showed the way: 'Do it! He told; [and] they did." This account inadvertently shows that the Master, Zahit Kotku actually learned about the new party project when the party entrepreneurs sought his blessing, and his role as a *tarikat* leader was to bestow his blessing (thus his religious capital) upon the party entrepreneurs, not to initate the party.

Underscoring common points in the interviews (though much more bluntly), Hasan Aksay's (not a Naqshbandi disciple) following statements not only confirms this observation but also shows that the party activists place politics in an autonomous register:

> You cannot ask whether you should engage or not in [party building activities]. You have already engaged. What would you do if he says no. No this [such a question] is not possible: 'Should I? Shouldn't I?' You have already engaged,

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[286] It should be added that it is possible that Necmettin Erbakan had two *mürşid*s: Kotku and Mahmut Sami Efendi (Ramazanoğlu), the leader of Erenköy Naqshbandi community. During the fieldwork in Kayseri, it has been suggested quite a few times in passing that Erbakan was a *murid* of Mahmut Sami Efendi. Although it is rare in "modern" times, historically an individual could have two or more *mürşid*s, even from a different *tarikat* such as the *Qadiris*.

ready, full of information. [Then] you go. Without any preparation, you cannot go and ask: 'should I establish a political party?' ...If it is all in the air yet (*fol yok yumurta yokken*) the Man would think you are mocking with him. You engage, you arrive at a certain stage and then you request his *blessing* [not approval]: would you pray for us? Then he says: "May God render [the establishment of the new party] a beneficient and blessed (*hayırlı*) occasion for the nation and the motherland. Well, he should say so if he is in his right mind (*aklı başındaysa*).

[Plus] this is the establishment of a political party, you [call] the nation, you tell them come with me comrades, follow me, I will go and serve you. And, then, [how could you say that] oh, by the way, I just talked to someone [special] he told me to turn back from this path, so I will turn. You son of a gun (ulan eşşekoğlueşşek) why did you step forward in the first place? These shameless people [referring to their secularist opponents) attribute such things only to Muslims: whether he asked this person or that person [what to do].[287]

Aksay, let alone mentioning any entrepreneurship on the part of the Naqshbandi leader, refuses even the claims that the prospective NSM leaders sought his approval before engaging in party building activities. What they sought was blessing rather than approval and not *before* but after engaging in party building activities. Politics, Aksay argued, was the "art of decision-making" demanding thus individual responsibility from the politicians and required information, which would be available only to them.[288]

Second, the question as to whether Kotku's blessing, or "endorsement," guaranteed the support of other Naqshbandi leaders and or the activism of the disciples in general, need to be tackled. As Kitts reviews a social network may facilitate participation in an organization or movement through information flow, a collective identity that could partly overlap with that of the recruiting organization/movement and/or moral and material incentives that already recruited members could provide to others in the network. However, he also reminds that, as discussed earlier, an individual is embedded in multiplicity of social networks,

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[287] Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, February 1, 2007.
[288] Aksay gave the example of the party chairmanship. He said that even if someone replaced Erbakan for few months as the party chair, he had to decide for various issues, as the required information would be available only to him. Ibid.

which not only differentially affect the life of an individual but also are subject to his/her positive or negative assessment[289] (unless of course he/she is in an encapsulating organization and identity as was the case for the activists in the first circle of the *Nur* students). Accordingly, the Naqshbandi brotherhood circles potentially facilitated the recruitment to the NOP as it had created a religious collective identity that would render individuals sympathetic to the NSM frames and provided the "weak ties" which informed the Naqshbandis on the new party enterprise. However, the nature of the Naqshbandi organization in general and the relation between a *mürşid* and the *mürids* in particular, did not allow neither the *mürşid* nor the *mürids* to extend rewards and sanctions (moral and material selective incentives) to their fellow brothers regarding their (non)involvement to the NOP unless the Naqshbandi tie was combined with the collective identities and information provided by some other social ties (i.e commercial, neighborhood, family etc).

It seems the masters, at least in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing mainly on the spiritual development of the disciple, trying to protect their integrity as religious authorities and local notables[290] and finally being aware of multiplicity of social "pulls and pushes" over modern individuals, refrained from directly communicating their political position to their disciples or fellow masters, unless they were in the closest circle.[291] For instance, when asked whether Erbakan would change his mind if his Master had not approved his engagement with party building activities, all the interviewees to whom this question was adressed, both *Naqshbandi* disciples and non-disciples, except Oğuzhan Asiltürk[292], maintained that this question is

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[289] Kitts, 242.

[290] To see how a Naqshbandi group (İskenderpaşa) evolved into a "corporation" like entity see Hakan Yavuz, "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order," in *The Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul Transactions 9 (London: Curzon Press, 1999), 138-146.

[291] For a detailed account on how a Naqshbandi leader tried to achieve a balance between his own spritual and social responsibilities, on the one hand, and worldly and spiritual needs of both his disciples and the local community on the other, see Fulya Atacan, "A Portrait of a Naqshbandi Sheikh in Modern Turkey," *The Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul Transactions 9 (London: Curzon Press, 1999), 153-157.

[292] Asiltürk was not a Naqshbandi disciple but had often attended Kotku's conversation cycles. His statements regarding Erbakan's hypothetical attitude if Kotku had not permitted him entering party politics seem to reflect his eagerness to portray the NSM parties (he is still active in the Felicity Party, Saadet Partisi) as respectful to religious authorities. However, he also agreed with other interviewees that the Master would never interfere with such decisions unless he saw an imminent danger. Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 5, 2007.

irrelevant, since a Nasqshibandi leader would never overtly state his political views to his disciples. Not only, he would not know anything about politics (which is seen as a "dirty" business at the end of the day) but would see such an act beneath his position.

To be sure, emprically the situation was much more complex. A *Naqshbandi* leader could and did show his political choices, though in a subtle way: letting his son or closest disciples become parliamentary candidates or party activists. As Oğuzhan Asiltürksay reports Erbakan personally visited all religious leaders around the country: "...he did not neglect even those who surrounded themselves with only twenty-thirty person. He met them, he talked to them, he told them." Erbakan requested their moral support, if they granted, then he wanted activists from their cadres.[293]

What a master would not do, however, was to reveal his negative opinion on the political choices of his disciples. This subtlety, silent approval through symbolic acts and absolute refrain from stating negative opinions, gave freedom to the disciples, especially if there was a spatial distance between the master and the disciple and no other ties with fellow Naqshbandis, in interpreting the attitude of the master.

The experience of a founding delegate of the NOP in Kayseri illustrate these dynamics: having listened one of Erbakan's conferences in Kayseri in 1969, he was recruited to the prospective NSM through his acquaintances in his professional environment (he was working as a technician in a military factory), local religious networks (he had taken religious classes in local mosques) and his friends who had been involved in right wing activities in the 1960s.[294] As a disciple of Mahmut Sami Efendi of Erenköy (his grandfather and father were also disciples) he was a pious person and as an avid reader of Büyük Doğu (Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, or NFK) familiar with Islamist frames. When asked whether he sought the approval of his master before his engagement to the party, he vehemently refused and praised Mahmut Sami Efendi for his avoidance to voice his opinion in political matters. However, he also complained stating that many among his disciples in Kayseri

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[293] Ibid. Incidentally this is also an evidence which shows that there is no Naqshbandi initiative as such. Asiltürk says Erbakan talked also to the "aghas" (feudal landlords) in the "east".

[294] These networks will be studied in detail in the following chapter.

"abused" this attitude by attributing to his "silence" a status of non-approval and refused to vote for the NSM parties let alone becoming new party's activists. [295] Only when Sami Efendi's son-in-law became the NSP's parliamentary candidate from Kayseri in 1977, these disciples might have voted to the NSP, though it is difficult to ascertain how the disciples interpreted this symbolic act. But this time a number of *political* factors, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, weighed in the decision of local NSP activists: they did not work for their own parties' candidate.

As for the question whether a leading master's endorsement of the NSM is indicative of other masters' support, while Erbakan was able to convince some leaders, some others refused to comply despite the recommendation of the powerful Zahit Kotku. The article of Coşan itself confirms this information. Kotku had "advised" the *Naqshbandi* leaders such as Ali Efendi from Suluova (he was Kotku's disciple himself) and Mustafa Bağışlayıcı from *Samsun* to support the new party. However, since these local *Naqshbandi* masters' political preferences lied elsewhere (in Demirel and the NAP respectively), they proved to be unwilling to follow his lead.[296]

Regarding the relationship between the Naqshibandi networks and the NSM it should finally be added that the recruitment did not occur one way. Once the NSM established its own network, the brotherhoods were able to recruit from its ranks. For instance, a NSP Kayseri executive, who became involved in party work following his recruitment to the party through an offer of parliamentary candidacy in 1973, followed the recommendation of his fellow activists to visit a local Naqshbandi master, Yahyalılı Hacı Hasan Efendi, a disciple of Mahmut Sami Efendi himself. Following couple of visits and after having participated to his conversations, he was impressed with his religious authority and knowledge and became a disciple. Similarly, during the late 1970s, younger members of the Akıncılar Association (the Raiders, the unofficial youth group of the NSM), were collectively brought to Hacı Hasan Efendi. Most of them became his disciples and reportedly thanks to him were able to distance themselves from street violence.[297]

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[295] Interview with KayNS5, September 27, 2007.

[296] M. Esad Coşan, "Hocamız'dan hatıralar," http://www.dervisan.com/yazi/hatiralar.html (Accessed June 25, 2011)

[297] Interview with KayAkın, Kayseri, September 24, 2006.

To sum up, under the light of the fieldwork data following conclusion and hypothesis may be advanced. Neither Zahit Kotku nor the Naqshbandis in general were the party entrepreneurs. In fact, being a Naqshbandi did not necessarily lead to being an NSM activist (or voter for that matter) even if the master supported the movement. The Naqshbandi brotherhood served as a recruitment pool and "weak ties" for the NSM and vice versa. As such the Naqshbandi-NSM relationship could potentially produce various outcomes depending on the existence of other social, political and individual factors. For instance a) a disciple could be recruited thanks to his fellow disciples with whom he shared other collective identities and social environements; b) a disciple could refuse to vote or work for the NSM[298]; c) an NSM activist could become a disciple; d) an individual could be in touch with a Naqshbandi network without being one and recruited to the NSM.[299]

It can be argued that the multiplicity of possible results was related to the *modus operandi* of the Naqshbandis. Naqhsbandis constituted neither a centralized nor a federated organization, which allowed the disciples and masters dispersed in different localities to make autonomous decisions. Moreover, the Naqshbandi leaders, at least during the 1960s and 1970s, were mainly interested in their individual ties with the disciples rather than formation of political and economic capital. According to the *tarikat* tradition the maintenance of this tie was essential for spiritual advancement, not the ties among the disciples (though they would help one). Imposition of a political preference, or any view unrelated to spiritual advancement without explicit demand on the part of the disciple could weaken that tie. With the thought of an hypothetical imposition of political views, a very devote Naqshbandi interviewee reacted: "Who are you to interfere that much? Have I not matured enough to vote myself?"[300] As a matter of fact, as even Esad Coşan relates, Zahit Kotku would not insist on an issue (then not to mention politics) if his disciple refused to accept his advice. He would say: "Friendship is based on saying all right [then]" (*Arkadaşlık pekiyi demekle kaimdir*).[301]

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[298] It should be noted that a disciple might as well disengage from the brotherhood altogether.
[299] The last was the case of the son of one of Mahmut Sami Efendi representatives in downtown Kayseri. Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.
[300] This was the same interviewee who complained that Naqshbandis had not shown as much interest as he expected. Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007
[301] Coşan, "Hocamız'dan hatıralar."

3.4 Conclusion

Through studying macro and meso-level formal and informal institutions, power relations and contingent events on the one hand, and the properties and agency of the actors at the micro-level on the other, this chapter showed the complex and political nature of the factors that gave rise to the emergence of a group of Islamists as party entrepreneurs. The relevance of the findings of the chapter for the study of the Islamist political engagement patterns is twofold.

First, in and off themselves, the findings demonstrate that the perspective which takes macro economic, social, political and cultural phenomena as factors fails to explain both the emergence of a particular Islamist movement and its specific "form" of organization the movement entrepreneurs establish. The NSM entrepreneurs emerged within the context of a relative liberalization of the polity that had allowed various modes and forms of socio-political mobilization. They constituted the elites of Islamist milieus, which became connected through nation wide right wing collective actions.

They felt marginalized from political decision making processes, not necessarily because the state repressed them in absolute terms, but because such existing institutions as associations, informal Islamist organizations, publications and most important their main avenue to access the decision making structures, the right wing JP, proved to be inadequate to exert influence in the polity. Their disappointment with their allies within the political parties, the efficacy of existing grassroots Islamist movements and collective actions of various sorts, led them to seek a new avenue of politics. A political party would potentially bring together dispersed Islamist individuals and groups to aggregate their resources nationwide, tap into the existing discontents and finally acquire enough right wing votes to challenge their rivals, particularly the JP. Such a mobilization would likely change their unstable existence in the center: "a large plot" occupied by a nationally organized political party in the political field was easier to protect and enlarge than several plots inhabited in and through various right wing organizations.

Second, the internal dynamics, action, interaction within the political arena, the JP and the right wing networks and the properties of the NSM entrepreneurs that this chapter observed in this early phase of the movement, set the stage for the

upcoming phases of the NSM activities. Specifically, it shall be seen that the dynamics of the JP and the right wing networks were factors that directly (as the NSM continued to interact with these actors) and indirectly (as they partly shaped the material and symbolic resources of the local activists) influenced the NSM recruitment process and ideational production. In addition, the micro-properties of the NSM entrepreneurs make part of a configuration of variables that explains how the NSM reacted to the prospect of a coalition with the RPP.

CHAPTER IV

THE NIZAM/SELAMET MOVEMENT IN THE MAKING:
ACTIVIST RECRUITMENT AND PARTY BUILDING

The emergence of Islamist party entrepreneurs in the political arena and their behind the scenes activities were necessary but not sufficient for the establishment of the NSM parties. The party entrepreneurs had to create "a consensus among a subset of the population"[302] (consensus mobilization) around their initiative and recruit activists among those who sympathized with their endeavor (activist mobilization).[303] This process involved symbolic and material construction of the prospective party in a competitive religious and political environment and depended both on the agency of political actors and existing formal and informal institutions in the administrative center and the geographical periphery. It was the second and final steps towards the emergence of the NSM parties.[304]

The study of this political process at the local and national levels demonstrates that the route to the NSM parties was neither linear nor predetermined and that the emergence of the Islamist party cannot be considered a direct and aggregate result of societal cleavages or Muslim collective identity.

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[302] Klandermans calls this process as "consensus mobilization" and differentiates it from "consensus *formation*" which is "unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures." Bert Klandermans, "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus," in *International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988), 175.

[303] As Klandermans puts it social movement organizations mobilize support through two different tasks: "consensus mobilization and action mobilization." Ibid., 176.

[304] A recent comprehensive research and academic project led by Elise Massicard, which includes conferences, seminars, a book and several articles makes a strong case for a sociological approach for the study of political parties. Similar to recent studies on Islamist movements, this project also demonstrates the fruitfulness of inserting intra- and extra- movement/organization/network, that is meso-level factors, into the analysis in relation to macro and micro levels. For the pre-discussion of the project, which has now come to conclusion see Elise Massicard, *L'Étude des Partis Politiques en Turquie: Bilan des Travaux et Pistes de Recherche,* http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/16/44/74/PDF/problematique_site.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2011)

This chapter, then, rather than assuming a prior identity or societal cleavage, studies the consensus and activist mobilization efforts of the party entrepreneurs on the one hand, and the local social and political contexts within which they found their activists, on the other. It was at the conjunction of these two axes that the NSM leaders could recruit their activists, institutionalize their party and, as shall be seen in Chapter 5, engage in the symbolic construction of the NSM.

First section will examine the first collective action of the party entrepreneurs during which they undertook the consensus and activist mobilization and laid the ground for the new party. Second section will study the local social networks that facilitated the communication; collective action frame and identity formation and finally, the information flow at the local level and the properties of the potential NSM activists.

4.1 Mobilization of the party innovators: towards the National Order Party

The event, which came to be known as the TOBB Affair was a public conflict between Erbakan and the JP government over the chairmanship of the TOBB that resulted in the latter's victory. As mentioned earlier some scholars have argued that the TOBB Affair reflected the center-periphery cleavages and as such constituted the genesis of the NOP. According to this view, Erbakan and his friends decided to found a new party following this incident.

However, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, the party innovators had already emerged and party-building activities had started as early as 1967. This section argues that the Affair's explanatory power regarding the emergence of the NOP does not lie in its being a reflection of economic or cultural cleavages *per se* but in its functions as a "collective action" during which the party innovators produced the NSM "frames"[305] to challenge their opponents and bring about a consensus and action mobilization around the new initiative. Not only the TOBB Affair was intertwined with the first electoral campaign of the prospective party elites, the Movement of Independents of 1969 (*Bağımsızlar Hareketi*), but

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[305]Frames are "meaning construction[s]" produced through collective action. Benford and *Snow*, 614. Further discussion of frames and frame making will be provided in chapter 5, examining the NSM mobilization frames and collective identity.

also became the launching pad for future political action: party foundation and maintenance activities throughout the 1970s.

4.1.1 A History of the TOBB Affair

(Re)telling the history of the TOBB Affair helps to go beyond the TOBB "metaframe"[306] and reveals the agency of the Islamist actors. This subsection suggests the need to reconsider this episode in the history of the NSM as an instance of collective action, partially the result (not the cause) and fully a constituent of an already started political struggle towards the Islamist party.

According to the standard formula, as a candidate to the Union's chairmanship, Erbakan asserted himself as the spokesperson of "the Anatolian capital" which, he argued, had long been denied the fair allocation of the resources in favor of the big bourgeoisie of İstanbul and İzmir and thus prevented the "material and moral development" of the country. Based on a previous cabinet decree that had stipulated the postponement of the General Assembly and its elections, the JP government did not recognize the election results. Erbakan, then, applied to the JP to become a parliamentary candidate from the district of Konya in the general elections of 1969. Having been vetoed by Demirel, he launched his political career as an independent parliamentary candidate from Konya, entered the parliament and established the NOP.[307]

While the basic facts are there (except of course the causal relations between the foundation of the NOP and the Affair), such an account overshadows the fact that the Affair was not a single man's struggle and that it lasted not couple of days but months that entailed a protracted social movement, or *collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction*

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[306] A "metaframe" is a frame used not only by a specific movement but also by its opponents and the bystanders for different purposes. The Affair has been deployed by the NOP leaders and activists (legitimation); their opponents (delegitimation); and scholars (analyses based on center-periphery dichotomy) as the story of the NOP's emergence. For the study that developed the concept see Donatella della Porta, "Protest, Protestors, and Protest Policing: Public Discourses in Italy and Germany from the 1960s to the 1980s," in *How Social Movements Matter,* ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 66-96.

[307] See for instance, Ayşe Buğra, "Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context: Strengths and Weaknesses," in *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, ed. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002), 121-122.

with elites, opponents and authorities." [308] The Affair started from Erbakan's election in May 1969, extended through the party entrepreneurs' first electoral campaign[309] from August to October 1969 and ended in January 1970 when the Union elected a new chairman and the NOP was established. It was a process involving not necessarily coordinated and premeditated but surely political actions of the party innovators. As Süleyman Arif Emre puts it, the TOBB "struggle was intertwined with party building activities and gave us and our environment even more determination, faith and speed."[310]

The background history of the Affair can be traced back to April 1968 when Erbakan resigned from the office of Secretary-General of the Union and declared his candidacy from the JP for a seat in the senate from Konya only to be vetoed by the JP administration.[311] According to Emre, during this period, when the preparations for the future party were underway, conquering the JP from within was still considered an option for some party innovators. It seems that the conservative-nationalists persuaded the Islamist elites for this candidacy in an attempt to close ranks in the right wing against the JP liberals. Be that as it may, following the veto, instead of becoming an independent candidate, as would be the case in 1969, Erbakan chose to compete against Demirel's candidate, Sırrı Enver Batur, for the chairmanship of the Union.[312]

Though Erbakan could not win, he managed to enter the Executive Committee, landing in a position that facilitated his election to the chairmanship in 1969. Following his election in May 25, 1969, based on its previous order of postponement, the government ordered the administration of Sırrı Enver Batur to keep intact. However, Erbakan, having acquired the political support and legal advice from his fellow party innovators[313], defied the government and for two

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[308] Italics are in the original. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 3-4.
[309] Since the party was not legally established, the candidates were independents, hence the campaign name *Müstakiller Hareketi,* or the Movement of the Independents.
[310] Emre, *35 Yıl* vol.1, 168.
[311] See Appendix G, Figure 11 for the news of Erbakan's candidacy to the Senate.
[312] For news items concerning the parliamentary and Union candidacies see *Yeni İstanbul*, April 6 and 10 1968, *Bugün*, April 6, 10, 12, 17 1968.
[313] Interviews with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006 and Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007. While Emre provided the legal help, Aksay and Paksu tried to mobilize conservative-nationalist and ultranationalist parliamentarians.

months acted as the actual chairman.[314] During these two months, Erbakan continued his visits to Anatolian towns such as Kocaeli (İzmit), Erzurum and Kars,[315] which had begun before his election as chairman[316]. Erbakan was invited to Anatolian towns by various organizations (usually the local chambers of commerce and industry, but also the Advanced Institute of Islam or Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) and gave speeches on such topics as "Islam and science." In Erzurum and Kars his visits coincided with those of Demirel, which gave him further opportunity to ridicule the government's decision and crystallize his own position.

Since Erbakan had declared that he would not leave the post unless a court decides in government's favor and acted as the actual chairman giving speeches and press conferences, the JP leadership felt compelled to take countermeasures to enforce its authority. These measures were extremely drastic that strengthened the frame of "historical injustice" that Erbakan was constructing. First, by June 1969, the government began to impose financial pressure on the delegates. The Ministry of Trade took complete control of the allocation of foreign exchanges.[317] This measure, which was only revoked shortly before the TOBB General Congress of January 1970, when Medeni Berk was elected, had delayed the access of businesses to foreign exchanges and thus the payment of dues and debts to the Union, prompting litigations against them.[318] Next, from August 4 to 8, based on a disputed interlocutory court decision, Batur moved on to "reconquer" the Union by a police intervention [319] that brought an end to the "resistance" at the TOBB.[320]

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[314] It can be argued that the open-secret party building activities leaked to the press were the real reasons for Demirel's opposition to his chairmanship. Interestingly enough some of the gatherings for the party initiative did not only take place at Tevfik Paksu's apartment but also in a room in the building of a private high school (Yükseliş Koleji) owned by Demirel's brother Ali Demirel. Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 24, 2007.

[315] See *Bizim Anadolu*, June 29, July 24 and July 25, 1969 for Kocaeli, Erzurum and Kars visits respectively.

[316] For instance, from late April to his election to the Chairmanship, Erbakan had visited Eskişehir, Adana and twice Konya. See *Bizim Anadolu*, April 24, May 11, and May 17 1969.

[317] *Bugün,* June 20, 1969.

[318] The speech of Medeni Berk in the congress is short but illustrative as to why the TOBB delegates had experienced a sudden change of heart only 7 months later than Erbakan's election. TOBB, "Medeni Berk, 25. Genel Kurul, 30-31 Ocak 1970*,"* in *Başkanların Genel Kurul Konuşmaları 1*. http://www.tobb.org.tr/Documents/yayinlar/1ciltyeni%20(2).pdf (Accessed June 25, 2009)

[319] *Yeni İstanbul*, August 9, 1969. See also Appendix G, Figure 12.

The peak of the Affair was reached when the *very same* day of police intervention, accompanied by a large group of journalist, Erbakan applied to the JP as a parliamentary candidate. When the news of the veto came, he was in Konya, seeking the support of not only the local JP branch,[321] but also other potential activists for his cause. [322] Following the veto Erbakan declared his independent candidacy[323] with 34 of his friends and launched the Movement of Independents, the first electoral campaign of the prospective Islamist party.

4.1.2 From the Affair to the New Party

The new party, as the sum of a new political network of individual activists and members producing and carrying a collective identity, was not a direct and aggregate result of an existing discontent at the societal level against economic or secular policies. Nor were the local branches of the party autonomous initiatives of the citizens in different localities who then articulated their collective endeavor with that of the party entrepreneurs at the administrative center, as had been the case of the establishment of the Democrat Party in 1946.

This subsection argues that in a very competitive political environment with eight political parties (four being right-wing party and one being in power), the formation of party networks and identity began with labor-intensive political action on the part of the party entrepreneurs.[324] As Süleyman Arif Emre observes and the practices of the party leaders attest, "the organization (*teşkilatlanma*) of [the NOP]

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[320] While the "commandos" of the NAP were at times physically present to "help" Erbakan, the Association for Fighting against Communism declared its support to Erbakan's cause "in the name of 24 nationalist organizations". *Bugün*, August 4-8, 1969.

[321] *Yeni İstanbul*, August 15, 1969.

[322] It should be noted that by early January 1970, the court decided in Erbakan's favor. However the Union elections were renewed and the government's candidate won.

[323] Emre recounts that the leader of the NP, Osman Bölükbaşı, invited Erbakan and his friends to his party and offered parliamentary candidacies. For the reasons provided in the previous chapter this offer was rejected. Emre, *35 Yıl* vol.1, 169-170.

[324] Frédéric Sawicki arrives at a similar conclusion regarding the role of the leaders, when he observes that under an apperance of homogeneity, the political networks, which made up the federations of the Socialist party in France, ensure their unity and continuity (objective reality) through as much the action and interaction that take place within these networks as the symbolic production of the local and national leaders. *Les Réseaux du Parti Socialiste: Sociologie d'un Milieu Partisan* (Paris: Belin, 1997), 29.

was not like transforming an unclaimed piece of land into a farm. It was more like acquiring a plot in an already…parceled out…place like Taksim Square."[325]

The process of party formation started first with the TOBB Affair and then enlarged its scope only *after* the NOP acquired a *juridical* entity status in January 26, 1970. First the conferences and meetings organized around the TOBB Affair and then the party innovators' creative invention of "opening ceremonies" of local branches in districts and subdistricts, enabled the crystallization of the NSM and its *dava* as it provided an opportunity to directly communicate and establish ties with the potential activists and members. In addition, they provided a space for interaction among the potential activists and members of different districts and networks. These were thus the initial "recruitment contexts that served as the microstructural basis for [the potential activists'] decisions to take part" in the movement."[326] The party entrepreneurs began their efforts before Erbakan's application to the JP and continued until early April 1971 when the trial of the party in the Constitutional Court began.[327]

This subsection will, first, very briefly study how the Islamist party innovators "assign[ed] meaning to, and interpret[ed], relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists."[328] Since the new party's frames and collective identity will be examined in detail in Chapter 5, as the micromobilization process, here only their main features will be provided. Then, the two stages of action mobilization (i.e the TOBB Affair and the formal party building periods) where the party innovators formed unmediated ties with individuals in the social networks through face-to-face communication will be taken up.

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[325] Emre, *35 Yıl vol. 1*,192. Taksim square is a central locality in İstanbul and its land plots are considered among the most expensive in Turkey.
[326] McAdam and Paulsen, 662.
[327] The party building activities thus continued even when the chief Prosecutor of the Republic (*Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı*) opened a case against the party in March 10, 1971. The party leaders even requested from the activists to learn the electoral rules and make preparations for the upcoming mid-term senate elections as late as April 1971 (the elections did not take place). See the party newspaper "Siyasi Partiler Kanununun Dördüncü Kısmı," *Tek Nizam*, April 15, 1971.
[328] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in *International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action*, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988),198.

<u>The TOBB Affair period as an informal recruitment context</u>

The TOBB Affair would have been a mere controversy without political consequence unless the party entrepreneurs acted collectively, engaged in "framing activity" and concurrent activist recruitment. The TOBB frame combined together and "simplif[ied] and condens[ed] aspects of"[329] their particular struggle and the earlier right-wing mobilizations against Demirel's liberal group dominating the JP. The TOBB frame drew on the earlier right-wing "master-frames"[330] of nationalism and Islam, a significant feature of which being the argument that Demirel and his colleagues did not represent the nation and its values (Islam and Turkishness). Erbakan and his comrades associated Demirel and the large businesses with freemasonry, by implication (in Turkish politics) with being non-Muslims and fifth columns.

The struggle over the TOBB, in turn, breathed a new life to this frame through its economic dimension and the discourse of injustice that the party entrepreneurs constructed. [331] On the one hand, the TOBB frame claimed the country's resources on behalf of Anatolian Muslims and a cultural and economic reform: a "material and moral development" of the nation. On the other hand, the JP's refusal to recognize Erbakan's chairmanship and the veto of his parliamentary candidacy were framed as the very symbol of the negative experiences of the "Anatolian Muslim businessmen" in particular and Muslims, or the "nation" in general.

During the TOBB Affair and the subsequent Movement of Independents, Erbakan and his friends targeted to win the hearths and minds of the right-wing "audience", particularly those within the JP local branches. Through Erbakan's application to the JP, the party entrepreneurs hoped to strengthen the injustice frame, to demonstrate that a new party imposed itself upon the Islamists, and to overcome the critic that they were weakening the JP against the rising left and the

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[329] Benford and Snow, 614.

[330] "…Master frames are to movement-specific collective action frames as paradigms are to finely tuned theories." David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1992), 138.

[331] The question of economic justice had already been introduced to the public agenda as the left-wing movements gained momentum by the mid-1960s.

state elites.[332] Erbakan explained in the country's most read Islamist magazine within the Islamist and, in fact, even ultranationalist circles, *Büyük Doğu*, that applying to the JP for a parliamentary candidacy had been envisaged on their part as a win-win situation (*Bu iki taraflı kazanç yolunda ilerledim ve AP adına adaylığımı istedim...*). If his candidacy were accepted they would be able to struggle within the JP, hence there would be no need for a new party. If refused, that would demonstrate that "the JP did not tolerate the right of a nationalist and a *mukaddesatçı* to manifest [his views] in the party."[333] While one may argue that the Islamist elites still held hopes for conquering the JP from within, as Süleyman Arif Emre did[334], having been vetoed a year earlier and engaged in a heated contestation against Demirel government, his act should be seen, as other party entrepreneurs did, mostly symbolic serving aforementioned purposes.

Neither this maneuver nor the Affair as a whole, however, helped to attract the JP members and delegates.[335] While the TOBB frames might have influenced some of them and helped them to reinforce or create their perception of the political developments of the period, in practice, reminding the inertia of the JP's conservative-nationalist parliamentarians during the Affair despite their behind the doors promises to help Erbakan[336], the protests in the JP branches against Erbakan's veto were merely sporadic and less than loud. As a matter of fact, through 1970, the participation to the new party from the JP rank and file would be minimal.[337]

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[332] Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006. It should be noted that in contrast, the NSM-Nur students saw his candidacy as evidence of his personal ambition and relative lack of interest in establishing a political party. It is not clear whether or not the non-Nur student group of entrepreneurs communicated their justifications and reasons for his candidacy to the Nur students. Be that as it may, based on such a perception they would later perceive Erbakan's developing power and influence as a usurpation of the party. Interviews with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008 and Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 24, 2007.

[333] See "Vesikalarla Büyük İfşalarımız Dedektif X Bir: Prof. Necmeddin Erbakan'ın Türkiye Çapında İfşaları," *Büyük Doğu* 5 (1969): 9.

[334] Emre, *35 Yıl* vol. 1,169. In fact, Emre also acknowledges that Erbakan's candidacy did not stand a chance under the light of developments.

[335] Further discussion on the lack of support among the JP branches will be provided in the next section.

[336] Interviews with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006, Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007.

[337] Mukaddesatçı newspapers, particularly Bizim Anadolu, sympathetic to Erbakan and his friends, reported neither noteworthy protest in local branches nor sizeable groups of delegates and executives (except in few small subdistricts in some cities) leaving the JP to join the NOP. The reasons for this lack of interest will be studied in the next chapter.

Nonetheless, the Islamist elites had already been working behind the scenes to recruit activists outside the JP circles in the meetings organized around the TOBB Affair in Ankara and in the provinces. These meetings though essentially aimed at creating a consensus mobilization, also constituted the first grounds of activist recruitment. In these meetings Erbakan either explained his conflict with the JP government or gave his one of now famous "conferences"[338] treating the subjects of moral (*İslam'da Kadın*, or Woman in Islam) and material (*İslam ve İlim*, or Islam and Science) development.

The conferences and meetings organized by party entrepreneurs enabled them to directly communicate their frames to an already sympathetic audience at best, to a curious public at worst. Most importantly, they gave them the opportunity to employ face-to-face recruitment method. As Passy and Giugni argue the "status of recruiters" in a movement is one of the factors that influence individuals' decision to participate in a movement and the degree of their involvement. The party innovators, as being "centrally located" in the movement, were able to provide first hand knowledge which in turn "reduce[d] the uncertainty related to participation" and as "true believers" worked harder to convince their audience to join their endeavor. [339]

For instance, following a conference, a smaller group could be formed at an intimate setting where the actual recruitment took place. "The first and last leader" of the Islamist youth group *Akıncılar*, the Raiders, Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu, recounts that his first encounter with the party innovators, and especially Erbakan, was during such a conference that he and his friends (mostly engineering students) attended. Following the conference, Erbakan invited the young students for coffee and tea and noted their phone numbers. Having been vetoed and ready to launch the Movement of Independents, the party innovators later contacted Çavuşoğlu and many others who studied in Ankara or İstanbul and sent them to their hometowns

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[338] These were rather lectures. However since the movement elites and activists call them conferences, this essay will also refer to them as such.

[339] Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, "Social Networks and Individual Perception: Explaining Differential Participation in Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 16 (2001), 129.

for consensus and activist recruitment and/or Konya for electoral mobilization of 1969.[340]

Out of 17 Kayseri NSM activists that the researcher interviewed, nine were recruited after attending such a conference. While four of them first engaged while they were engineering students in Ankara, five attended Erbakan's conference in Kayseri. One out of the remaining eight interviewees was the main interlocutor of the party entrepreneurs in Kayseri (his brother was one of the official founders of the NOP) who at the time lived in Ankara and had already been in close contact with such figures as Erbakan, Hasan Aksay and Mehmet Emin Alpkan.[341] Among the rest, four engaged in the NSM through their connections to those who had already been recruited and three became activists after the NSP offered them parliamentary candidacies in 1973. Those who engaged following Erbakan's conference in Kayseri later joined the electoral efforts in Konya, without even being called upon revealing the incipient NSM collective identity before the establishment of the NOP.[342]

During the TOBB Affair, the party innovators not only looked for activists but also independent candidates. Since such future party elites such as Aksay, Emre and Hüsamettin Akmumcu chose as a strategy to become candidates from their previous parties[343] (the JP, the NTP or NP), the innovators needed independent candidates who would represent the collective nature of the conflict with the JP. For instance, İsmail Müftüoğlu, later the Minister of Justice in the "First Nationalist Front" government (1. *Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti*, or 1. MC) joined the NSM as a result of such recruitment in Sakarya.[344]

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[340] Interview with Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu, Kayseri, August 23, 2006. A news item in Islamist daily Bugün informs its readers that the "lightening groups of Erbakan" (*Yıldırım Ekipleri*) visited 82 villages within two days. *Bugün,* September 16, 1969.
[341] As shall be remembered Alpkan was the publisher of *Bizim Anadolu* and an important node for Erbakan in Konya as well. This future local NSM leader (first unofficial, then official leader) met him in the 1950s when his store, known as "the National Grocery," was an informal hub for right wing engineering students in İstanbul.
[342] Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, Septembre 17, 2007.
[343] Telephone interview with Hasan Aksay February 2, 2009 and interview with Hüsamettin Akmumcu August 15, 2007.
[344] Interview with İsmail Müftüoğlu, İstanbul, April 14, 2008. In 1969 general elections, there were a total of 35 independent candidates.

<u>Recruitment during the formal party building period</u>

The final stage of the party foundation came after the official establishment of the NOP. Following the TOBB Affair and the Movement of Independents, not only the TOBB frames but also those recruited during these phases of the party foundation, were deployed to recruit further activists and most importantly party members in the "periphery". The party was legally established in Ankara and local party entrepreneurs (officially *Müteşebbis İl İdare Heyetleri*, or the Entrepreneur District Administration Committees) were present except in "eastern and southeastern provinces".[345] However, the party leaders were dismayed since there were no local party branches and party members.[346] In other words, apart from few core local activists recruited during the TOBB mobilization, the NOP had not become a "natural" site for expressing religious, economic or political grievances of the periphery. In order to complete party foundation and organizationally institutionalize the party through party congresses, including the General Party Congress, the NOP needed party branches and members. Consequently, the party leaders decided creatively to organize "opening ceremonies" for the local branches with the help of the local party entrepreneurs.[347]

The party leaders carried out these ceremonies not only in large cities but also in small towns and subdistricts and announced them even in the villages.[348] They took the form of large or small meetings depending on the demographics of the geography. In a typical opening ceremony, which took place either in a cinema theater or in a wedding hall, in addition to the local party entrepreneurs, at least two current or ex-parliamentarians[349] would be present in addition to a representative from the youth branch of the NOP and a local executive from İstanbul or

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[345] Emre uses the term "eastern and southeastern" regions. In Turkish politics this refers to provinces where there exists ethnical heterogeneity with Kurds constituting usually the majority. Emre, *35 Yıl* vol.1, 190-191.

[346] Ibid.,182

[347] Ibid.,183. In Kayseri the opening ceremony took place on December 13, 1970. *Hakimiyet*, December 14, 1970. See Appendix H for the placard prepared for İstanbul branch's opening ceremony and the flier for Sivas branch's opening ceremony.

[348] Emre, *35 Yıl* vol.1,183.

[349] These parliamentarians were usually Akmumcu, Abbas, Paksu and Aksay. The former two had been elected from the JP ranks in 1969 but joined the NOP as soon as the latter was officially established. The latter could not have been elected as they had explained their constituencies that they would join the prospective Islamist party.

neighboring large district.[350] Erbakan would usually be present in these meetings. It appears that travelling from town to town the party leaders would stop by in small subdistricts as well where Erbakan and the parliamentarians would first go to the main mosque and pray and then call the mosque community to a coffee shop where they would give their speeches.[351]

The opening ceremonies and Erbakan's playing a leading role in recruitment proved to be very valuable especially in 20 districts in "eastern and southeastern" regions where the teams sent by the party center were not able to find even local party entrepreneurs.[352] Only after Erbakan, Akmumcu and Abbas visited these towns, could the NOP form its local branches. These visits illustrate further the power of face-to-face recruitment. Emre recounts that following Erbakan's speeches, which were always the last one, while everyone was preparing to leave the room, Erbakan would leave the stage, run to the door and lock it with a key he had acquired before the ceremony and shout at the crowd: "Where are you going, you cannot leave, nothing doing (yağma yok), this country is not only mine, it is ours, for better or for worse. Return [to your seats], I will register you as members." Following this announcement, first membership registration would be completed and then local party entrepreneurs would be elected among these new members.[353]

McAdam and Paulsen argue "for a much stronger effect of organizational (or other- wise collective) as opposed to individual ties in mediating entrance into collective action."[354] Both the conferences and meetings organized around the TOBB Affair and the party chapters' opening ceremonies enabled the party innovators to establish direct ties with and among their prospective core activists.

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[350] See *Milli Nizam Partisi Partisi Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davası*, 1971/1 (Anayasa Mahkemesi, 20 Mayıs 1971), Ekler Dosyası [*The National Order Party Political Party Closure Case*, 1971/1 (Constitutional Court, 20 May 1971), Appendix files]. (The files and pages are not numbered separately. Only on one of the files the numbers "1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9" are noted altogether) These files contained the police and witness reports of the opening ceremonies and the transcriptions of the recorded speeches of party entrepreneurs, in various towns in addition to application documents for the establishment of local party branches.

[351] See for instance the documents on their Boyabat visit in September 18, 1970. *Milli Nizam Partisi Parti Kapatma Davası, Ek dosyalar*. In Boyabat, Cumalıoğlu informed also the "*kaymakam*", or governor of the subdistrict who was at the time in the "city club," (*şehir klübü*).

[352] Emre, 35 Yıl vol.1, 190-191. A further study in these provinces is needed in order to understand why the NSM initiative failed at the beginning. The fact that these provinces were considered as the strongholds of the NSM in the 1970s (relative to other provinces not relative to other political parties) , this question becomes all the more interesting.

[353] Ibid., 191.

[354] McAdam and Paulsen, 662.

These were thus the micromobilization contexts in which political socialization and collective identity formation processes took place among the potential recruits and party innovators. Obviously, not all audience, even those registered as members, would become active or even vote for the NSM parties. There may be a number of reasons: they could be there only out of curiosity or for recreational purposes; they could have already engaged in a political formation and unwilling to change their loyalties; personal unavailability; the NSM frames lacking "empirical credibility"[355] on their part etc.

However, those who did become active, everything being equal (i.e lack of possible obstacles), participated thanks to the collective movement identity formed within these contexts. In other words, while the potential recruits arrived to these political settings through their individual connections and prior socialization, it was within and through these contexts that they decided to participate in the NSM.

4.2 The Early Networks "Feeding" the NSM in Kayseri: A Meso-level Analysis

Scholars working on social movements and political parties have shown that preexisting local social networks and organizations facilitate and inform the recruitment and mobilization processes.[356] As diachronically and synchronically constructed sets of interpersonal relations networks provide "structural connection" and "socialization functions"[357]. On the one hand, they help information flow and contacting individuals and on the other, through prior socialization render their constituent members predisposed to sympathize with certain ideas and frames.

While the properties of networks may change depending on the locality, the Kayseri case shows that for the establishment of a political party, whether Islamist or not, "the articulation of the global and local, the particular and the general"[358], a

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[355] This concept refers to social actors' perception of the movement frames as congruent with the "events in the world" based on their subjective experiences or observances. The frames' "empirical referents lend themselves to being read as "real indicators of the diagnostic claims." Benford and Snow, 620.
[356] For instance see Diani and McAdam, ed., *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Sawicki, *Les réseaux du Parti Socialiste*.
[357] Passy and Giugni, 127- 128.
[358] Sawicki, 28.

political process, needed to take place. Prior to their engagement to the NSM, the activists in Kayseri had been entrenched in some specific professional and business relations, religious, friendship, neighborhood and family networks. Moreover they had been embedded in right wing political and ideational milieus: either themselves or their families, close friends and neighbors supported and voted first the DP and then the JP, most had been reading right-wing, particularly Islamist publications, and if not they, their close circles, at least once visited right-wing associations and/or participated in a conference, meeting or demonstration related to right-wing demands discussed in the previous chapter. The study of the networks, thus, highlights, these "frontiers of the *milieu partisan* [the social settings of the party activists], which is considered as the set of relations consolidated between groups whose members, though not necessarily aiming at participating in the construction of the political party, contribute to [its establishment] through their activities."[359] Such a conceptualization of the "milieu partisan" in turn implies the existence of differential recruitment/entry on the part of the members of these networks. As a matter of fact, the study of the networks reveals that, not all, in fact few, of its members could be recruited as activists.

This subsection argues that while the interpersonal ties within particular social networks provided the structural connection and socialization functions that contributed to the activist recruitment of the NSM in Kayseri, three interrelated intervening factors seem to explain the differential recruitment from the networks and rightwing milieus in particular and the "periphery" in general. First, it was *not* individuals' position within the social, economic and political structures of the country *per se*, but within their own locality seem to have played a role. It was those who were marginalized vis-à-vis the periphery's center joined the NSM. Second, being at the periphery of the periphery did not render the members of various professional, business and religious networks readily available for recruitment: the NSM could recruit among only those who lacked any prior engagement to or identification with a formal or informal political or politico-cultural group. Third, everything being equal, generational factor seemed to have played a role: the political parties had not been able to accommodate (within their parties, in the strict sense of the word, the organization proper, and within the

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[359] Ibid., 24

clientelistic networks) the generational turn, or the emergence of young men at beginning of their social and economic careers, that took place between the late 1960s and the early 1970s.[360]

The following is a study of, first, the structure and substance of the networks and, second, some common properties of the NSM activists and adherents, which differentiated them from other individuals who shared the same social settings.

4.2.1 The Networks of the NSM Activists in Kayseri

The study of the networks from which the NSM enlisted its activists and through the latter their voters is based on not a quantitative work but a qualitative one. The frontiers of these networks appeared through an ethnographic study based on interviews conducted with NSM, JP and NAP activists and non-NSM Islamists. In addition to their personal trajectories, the NSM interviewees provided information on the now deceased or aged early local official and unofficial entrepreneurs and activists of the NSM (information on their professions and approximate age and their social relations with them), which was crosschecked and compensated with official application documents of the NOP and news, appeared in the daily local press. Overall, data gathered on 38 NSM activists, 12 JP activists[361], four NAP activists and 17 non-NSM Islamists[362], helped to see the right wing milieu as a whole in Kayseri in the 1960s and 1970s and highlighted the networks from which the NSM could recruit its activists.

In Kayseri, the NSM found its potential activists and adherents within and through mainly four overlapping and crosscutting professional, business, religious, and "native" Kayseri family (*yerliler*) networks. During the interviews, the NSM activists frequently referred to their acquaintances or friends within these networks

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[360] In the following pages, why the young men which joined the NSM had not joined the newly developing NAP (or its predecessor the RPNP) will be discussed in detail.

[361] Based on six face-to-face and six telephone interviews. Among them two were from Konya. Though the information gathered on Konya case is not used, it helped to understand Kayseri case better.

[362] Among them six followers of *Büyük Doğu* (*Büyük Doğucular*), one member of Milli Mücadele Birliği and 10 local Yeni Asya Nur students (those who were not born and in Kayseri during the NSM mobilization period are excluded).

who informed them regarding Erbakan's upcoming conference, exchanged views on Erbakan and the new movement or invited them to join the ranks of the party.

These networks were the "creeks," that integrated to form the river that irrigated the NSM. They overlapped through the multipositionality of the social actors and cross cut each other through direct and indirect ties. Granovetter argues that "the fewer indirect contacts one has the more encapsulated he will be in terms of knowledge of the world beyond his own friendship circle."[363] The networks were resourceful pools of not only direct but also indirect weak ties (acquintances), necessary for information and frame dissemination to longer social distances. These relations were forged and reinforced in certain social (associations and *oturma*[364]) and spatial (workspace and mosques) environments where right-wing worldviews and frames were produced and reproduced.

The differentiation between professional and business networks is not arbitrary but serves to analytically distinguish different relational types from each other. On the one hand, professional connections may or may not entail business relations. For instance, individuals exercising similar or related professions may know each other from school, factory or from some other social setting in which their professional affinity and common areas of interest (including religious subjects and occupations) bring them into contact.[365] On the other hand, business relations may take place within the same professional milieu but also across different sectors. Following descriptions of each network, this subsection will show how these were overlapped, intertwined and connected in particular social and spatial settings.

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[363] Granovetter,1370.

[364] Since the features and role of the *oturma* will be discussed below suffice it to say here that it involved regular informal meetings of a group of men or families.

[365] Although Turhan Utku is not from Kayseri his succinct description of how this mechanism works for him helps to illustrate this point. He says that as a freshmen at the University he had not been decided which Associations' activities he wanted to follow: The "Atatürkist" Association or the Nationalists' Association. He first chose to go the Nationalist Association (his father was a state employee and a dedicated RPP supporter) and having observed students who were doing their regular daily prayers, he decided to stay. He says "...if you do your prayers you feel closer to those who do the same...if someone is from your hometown (*hemşehri*) you feel close; if he is from your school you feel close. For instance you [meet someone] who is engineer [you suddenly feel like] your are friends for the last 40 years." Interview with Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 1, 2006.

To begin with, four main categories of profession appeared among the studied 37 NSM official and unofficial[366] leaders and executives in Kayseri: civil engineers/building contractors (8), skilled craftsmen working in factories or in their workshops (mostly ironworkers, machinists, and fitters[367], but also carpenter or woodworkers) (6), traders in fibers, textiles and/or carpets (6) and finally men of religion (4)[368] working either in mosques or religious vocational schools.[369]

While these categories are analytically useful, it enables one to see only partly the depth and range of actual interpersonal relations as they do not do justice to the complexity of the individuals' positions within these categories. For instance, civil engineers and skilled craftsmen can be listed under the same professional category since most civil engineers were the graduates of the same vocational schools[370] with skilled craftsmen with whom they might have forged lifelong friendships, business relations, or family ties. Nor do these categories show the intricacies of the business activities of individuals. Civil engineers also traded in building or raw materials, or previously worked as a state employee. Some craftsmen first worked in factories, then opened their own workshops, or engaged in totally different sectors. Textile or fiber traders could also work as building contractors or tailors. Finally, in one extreme case, a famous local preacher was also a trader in building materials (he owned a hardware store).

As far as the NSM activists are concerned, those working in the same sector or having the same profession knew each other either at least by name. For instance, the local NSM entrepreneur had already been known and respected by all other younger civil engineers since he was older, successful and one of a handful early graduates of one of two civil engineering faculties of the 1950s. Similarly,

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[366] Not all initial leaders of the local NSM took executives posts in Kayseri.

[367] *Demirci*, *tornacı* and *tesviyeci*, respectively.

[368] It should be noted that this number rises to five when one includes the first NSP parliamentarian who had previously been the director of the Prayer Leader and Preacher School and a high school literature teacher in a vocational in school in Kayseri before moving to Ankara.

[369] There were also three trading in auto parts or repair, one trading in wood, one worker (unspecified), six professionals (two pharmacists, one optician, one technical draftsman, one manager and one lawyer), one grocery store owner, and one trader (unspecified).

[370] In Kayseri, there were three major vocational schools established to produce skilled workers for the existing military institutions (previously factories but later airplane and tank repair centers known as Hava İkmal and Ana Tamir respectively) and civil state factories (textile and sugar): Çırak Okulu (Apprenticeship School of three years within Hava İkmal), Kayseri Sanat Okulu (Kayseri vocational school trainning blacksmiths, fitters etc.) and Yapı Meslek Lisesi (Vocational school of construction, training skilled plasterers, masons, etc.). Yıldız Technical University had a special quota for the graduates of the latter two.

graduates of vocational schools were mostly familiar with each other's skills and careers.

Second, as far as the business relations are concerned one should take into account the economic context of the late 1960s and 1970s. During these years, in Kayseri and in its vicinities, there was a quantitative and then qualitative increase in building sector[371] (professionalization in the sense that the construction of houses and buildings were now delegated to professionals)[372] and a quantitative increase in small workshops oriented towards production of "windows, doors and frames, metal railings, furniture, etc."[373] Consequently, there was a lively commercial activity among civil engineers/building contractors, skilled craftsmen (for woodwork or ironwork), transporters, traders in building materials such as paint, plaster or in raw materials such as wood and iron.[374] Parallel to the rise in building sector, which was itself partly related to internal migration, there was a rise in the furniture sector entailing relations between furniture makers (carpenters) and traders in "formica, hardboard, foam and rubber, upholstery textiles, etc."[375] Obviously, business networks were not limited to the confines of particular sectors and professions. A grocery store owner might have to establish business relations with building contractors; engineers, blacksmith, etc. if he decided not only to sell spices but also to engage in spice processing business: he would need to build a factory and machines. For instance, unable to buy machinery for packaging, one of the interviewees worked together with skilled craftsmen and engineers to replicate the necessary packaging machine for his products.[376]

The business relations were referred frequently during the interviews in accounting how they had come to know the NSM. For instance, as one interviewee, who was himself a skilled factory foreman and who later opened his own workshop

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[371] Nermin Abadan-Unat et al., discuss the growth of the building sector in Boğazlıyan (a subdistrict of Yozgat bordering Kayseri) and Kayseri. *Göç ve Gelişme: Uluslararası İşgücü Göçünün Boğazlıyan İlçesi Üzerindeki Etkilerine İlişkin Araştırma* (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık, 1975), 290-304.
[372] Ibid., 299.
[373] Leo Van Velzen, *Peripheral Production in Kayseri Turkey* (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Press, 1977), 173.
[374] For similar business relations in Boğazlıyan see Abadan-Unat et al., 290-303. For a short but vivid account of relations among carpenters, building contractors and wood dealers in Kayseri see also Van Velzen, 53.
[375] Van Velzen, 57.
[376] Interview with KayNS2, Kayseri, August 16, 2006.

has maintained that the engineers and shop owners (traders or artisans) "had partnerships, business relations. For example, the man is also a building contractor; from one person he buys cement, from another iron. Naturally, in the meantime, political views are exchanged, a communication is certainly established."[377]

Third, the religious networks involved personal and professional relations between professional and "amateur"[378], men of religion and lay Muslims. The local mosques, the Advanced Institute of Islam, the Prayer Leader and Preacher School were the main institutions where the religious men were employed by the state. In the mosques scattered around the town, or in their homes traditional religious scholars also continued teaching various religious subjects. The *Naqshbandi* disciples of Mahmut Sami Efendi of Erenköy or Yahyalılı Hacı Hasan Efendi formed another religious network, which was connected and sometimes overlapped with the latter two. Not only the students, graduates of the religious schools and religious employees and scholars but also above mentioned traders, small shop owners, engineers, artisans etc., who supported and benefited from the religious services, made up a dense and lively religious network.

During the 1960s and 1970s, in Kayseri, these religious networks were considered as traditional and "proper" religious milieus and until the mid 1970s the religious activities of the *Nur* students were neither well-known nor appreciated[379]. The following recollection of an NSM activist, in his words a "traditional Muslim," illustrates this point: "…then they heard the call to prayer. Abdullah *Hoca*[380] said let's go to the mosque. The mosque was apparently close. They [the young *Nur* students) said, Master, we have a *mescid*[381] right over here, we pray there. [Abdullah Hoca] used to use slang words. He said: Man (*lan*) your prayer would not be accepted…If you do not go to the mosque who will? You should not break apart from the public (*umum*), from the mosque community."[382] This storyline,

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[377] Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007.

[378] Amateur here refers to those men of religion who do not gain their livelihood through religious activities, at least not officially or directly.

[379] The Kayseri Nur student community was quite small, no more than ten to fifteen first circle members up until 1970. By mid-1970s they would grow to have 70 active members. Telephone interview with KayYA9, undisclosed location, May 4, 2009.

[380] *Hoca* can roughly be translated as master referring to a preacher or scholar.

[381] Here refers to a small room designated for prayer.

[382] Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.

notwithstanding its empirical reality,[383] reflect the views of these "traditional" Kayseri circles of the 1960s and 1970s regarding the Nur students.

The religious networks fortified not only business relations but also personal friendships. But most important was the informal right wing political activism of some influential local religious leaders[384] who began working for the NSM by 1969. Among them, a) Necmettin Nursaçan, a young preacher at Hunat Camii during the late 1960s, became an NSP parliamentary candidate in 1977 and deputy president of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in the mid-2000s; b) Abdullah Saraçoğlu, a Kayseri native, a respected religious authority with an informal education, leader of various *oturma* groups and founder of Kayseri branch of Büyük Doğu Club. Though he became the *müftü*[385] of first Bursa in 1966 and in Kocaeli in 1968, he never cut his ties with his native town until his return in 1974 as *müftü* of Kayseri. He was one of the unoffocial founders and leaders of the NOP and the NSP.[386]; c) H. Mehmet Çorakçı was a very famous unofficial preacher (and a hardware store owner). While whether or not he ever officially enlisted in the NOP or NSP is not clear, as a well-respected preacher and chair of the Philantropic Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling he enjoyed a very diverse social capital, which he mobilized for the NSM from the very beginning.

Four, the network of "native" Kayseri families (*yerliler*) as a source of NSM activist recruitment needs to be mentioned. In Kayseri, families which claimed to be original habitants of downtown Kayseri consisted a network apart, which transcended political, social and economic positions and statuses of individuals.

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[383]It should be added that it was not necessarily the case that Nur students avoid mosques. In fact, mosques were the initial environments where they found audience for their *Nur* classes. However, it is true that Nur students from the first circle rather than going to a mosque would prefer praying in their *medreses*.

[384] The information provided here were brought together from bits and pieces of data gathered from several local newspapers and interviews. Two official biographies published on http://www.tasciogluhafiz.com are also used.

[385]Highest official religious authority in a district or subdistrict under the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

[386] He was from an eminent trading family of Kayseri. His brother, a trader in watches and eye-glasses, was also one of the local leaders of the NSM and an official founder of the local NOP. In 1962 he became one of the founders of a local religious school (course) for memorizing Kur'an. In 1965, he was a teacher at Kayseri Prayer Leader and Preacher School. For more information on Saraçoğlu see http://www.tasciogluhafiz.com/?pid=35 (Accessed June 25, 2011) http://www.kocaelimuftulugu.gov.tr/Sayfa_Modul.asp?nedir=sayfa&id=92 (Accessed June 25, 2011)

They all knew each other at least by name and had some connection with each other through marriages and business partnership. "Vineyard house" neighborhood was particularly effective in creating relations among the natives since the tradition to move to vineyard houses (bağa göçmek) in the outskirts of majestic Erciyes Mountain for the summer season existed only among the natives.

The natives distinguished themselves from others mostly symbolically by emphasizing their difference through subtle and not so subtle ways. To begin with, the "others" consisted of "peasants" (köylüler, coming from the subdistricts or villages of Kayseri, Yozgat etc.) and "outsiders" (they were referred by their city of origin, i.e Adanalı, Malatyalı etc.). Even immigrants from Talas, a very large subdistrict just seven kilometers away from downtown Kayseri, were considered peasants.

The distinction between the natives and the peasants appeared during the interviews as the natives constructed sentences like "I was a child of a certain Kayseri family;" "I had friends in the NOP, people we know of as Kayseri people;" or answered the question on their family origins, as "we are Kayseri natives (yerlisiyiz), regretfully nowadays only few of us are left."[387] Inquired further they would do such comments on their status as follows: "Though their numbers dropped…the natives are the owners of this city, Kayseri….They are the men who see Erciyes in their dreams."[388]

In addition to the natives' remarks, the so-called "peasants," also emphasized that the natives were distinguishing themselves from others. In addition to some painful childhood memories from their first couple of years of education in Kayseri, they mostly referred to the dominance of the natives in the political parties in particular and in the city life in general. The most striking example they gave was the fact that while the funeral prayers of the natives were performed at Camii Kebir, the largest mosque in Kayseri downtown, in the middle of the marketplace, from the Seljuk period, those of the peasants were performed in Hunat Camii, a smaller mosque from the same period close to the marketplace.

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[387] Interviews with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006 and KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2009.
[388] Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.

These symbolic differences did not mean, however, a strict exclusion of or discrimination against the peasants in political, business, social and religious life. The natives tried rather to assimilate them and the "peasants" tried to blend in. On the one hand, for the natives, producing and reproducing "nativity" meant maintaining a specific party of their social capital, just one set, albeit an important one, of interpersonal relations at their disposal that could be mobilized for various individual and social symbolic and material needs. The inclusion of the others amidst them would thus mean diversification and extension of their overall social capital without undermining the former.[389] The native activists did not refrain marrying their children, at least their daughters, to "successful" peasants. As a matter of fact, some eminent families of the period had originally come from nearby villages, such the Kızıklı or Karakimseli families[390]. Another evidence for such "acceptance" was that though the natives' funerals were not performed in Hunat, the peasants' funerals could also be conducted in Camii Kebir.

On the other hand, coming from different regions and villages, "the others" despite their professional skills, education, and their economic capital ensued from the latter, lacked such a ready to use social capital [391] unless they established close relations with the natives. The 13 "peasants" among the 38 NSM local leaders[392] were high-achieved men (relative to their fellow village men) in their respective professions (engineering, technical or religious) and were connected to or embedded in native networks through marriage, political alliance, friendship or religious bond.

Finally, to get a better grasp of the social tissue that fed the NSM one needs to see how the relations established within professional, business, religious and

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[389] Their strategies and practices to reproduce their nativity, to "reconvert" their capital accruing from being a native is very diverse and needs a further study. To understand how such processes as reproductions and reconversions of "nobility" (as being native in Kayseri is defined in terms very similar to being a native) occur in a rapidly changing and challenging environment see the pioneer study Monique de Saint Martin, *L'Espace de la Noblesse* (Paris: Métailié, 1993).

[390] These two examples were given by an activist from a similar native-with-a-village-origin family. Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006. These families traced their origins to certain Ottoman governors who were given land in the greater Kayseri region, which might have facilitated their rise to power. However, the fact that their origins are still pronounced point towards the natives' insistence to protect their own "purity."

[391] The social capital that accrued from relations with fellow villagers could be important, in other walks of life, but could not be transformed into social, symbolic or economic capital in their relations with the natives.

[392] The number includes the Kayseri NSP deputy as well. 19 were natives. The origin of six activists could not be established.

native family milieus were reinforced, connected and overlapped in some major social and spatial settings. It was mostly within these contexts that the right wing ethos prevailed and reproduced.[393] In addition to their role in creating further weak ties (acquintances, political alliances, business deals) that eased communication, these settings enabled the members of these particular networks to get to know each other better, that is, to create and strengthen strong ties of friendship.

There were two such major social settings, one formal and the other informal: civil associations and *oturma*. First, civil associations can be categorized under three headings: professional, religious and politico-cultural associations. While within the former two members carrying left-wing, or at least RPP identity could possibly be present[394], the right wing members, thus ideational elements, were dominant. While the leaders of the professional (and also the religious) associations were either JP executives themselves or had clientelistic relations with them,[395] the rank and file members displayed all the colors of the right wing. Beside their professional goals, these associations provided the social spaces within and through which political and business alliances were formed.

Aside from the associations for professionals of religion, the religious associations[396] gave men of religion (including scholars and their students) and lay Muslims to get acquainted and form relations outside the boundaries of religious

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[393] For a study which challenges a homogenous view of civil society as a fully autonomous force from the state and political parties and which draws attention to various expressions, usages and functions of the right wing ethos (mostly shaped around nationalism) in "civil society" see Günter Seufert, Karin Vorhoff and Stephane Yerasimos, ed., *Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey* (İstanbul: Ergon, 2000.)

[394] Particularly, since the membership to professional organizations was required by law, they contained members with different worldviews. Since religiosity was not peculiar to the right wing it may be argued that the religious associations also contained some RPP sympathizers. However, historically, the establishment of the religious associations went hand in hand with an opposition to the RPP policies of religion and with the initiative of DP and JP activists or supporters. It is thus safe to assume that they were not frequented much by the RPP members.

[395] Since the properties of power relations within professional and religious organizations and the relations between them and the JP help to discern the peculiarities of NSM activists, they will be discussed in the following subsection.

[396] For instance the Association of Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu or, the above mentioned Philanthropic Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling. The former was a private school (course) under the authority of the Ministry of Education training its students to completely memorize the Koran.

practices (i.e prayers, funerals, and rituals) such as political alliances and friendships.[397]

As far as the politico-cultural associations are concerned since they were established to promote ultranationalist and/or Islamist worldviews they did not contain RPP or left-wing sympathizers. They were open to anyone who were interested in their activities, and were particularly popular among the young men who sought recreational activities. Not necessarily card carrying members, high school (including vocational school) students, students studying in Advanced Institute for Islam or of Education, young men working in the factories, marketplace or the industrial zone attended conferences of famous right wing poets and writers (particularly Necip Fazıl), read right wing and Islamist publications (especially *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti*, *Bugün*) or just chitchatted with each other in association headquarters.

During the 1960s either the organizations as legal entities or their members took part in the early country-wide right wing mobilization that were discussed in the previous chapter and involved in certain collective actions limited to Kayseri[398]. For instance, a news that appeared in a local ultranationalist daily, on the Rise Up (Şahlanış Mitingi) meeting of 1968 in Kayseri provides a laundry list of these right-wing or right-wing dominated civil associations. As shall be remembered, the Rise Up meetings were organized in order to protest the left. The local newspaper informs that the "freemasons," implying the JP liberals, were also the target of this collective action.[399] The participant professional organizations were the Nationalist Teachers' Syndicate, Association of Religious Employees, which can also be

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[397] Yücekök shows that Kayseri, similar to other more developed cities in the country (except industrial regions such as İstanbul and Adana), hosted the highest number of professional and religious associations. In 1965, there were one religious association for every 2311 individuals (national average is 7143) and one professional association for every 10470 individuals (national average is 14006). In 1968, in the greater Kayseri district there were 359 religious associations including 263 organizations for construction of mosques. However, Yücekök analyzes these associations in terms of regional socio-economic development and concludes that in more developed regions such as Kayseri they indicate a rising reaction of those traditional traders and shopowners who cannot adapt themselves to new conditions, and in less developed regions the reproduction of the existing status quo of traditional forces. Yücekök, 178-188 and the Appendix.
As shall be seen, this chapter brings an alternative perspective and tries to show that the prospective NSM activists were well adopted to industrial development but faced difficulties as result of exclusion from decision making mechanisms in professional organizations and the JP.
[398] For instance, the street protest of the Prayer Leader and Preacher School students and graduates in 1968 for the right to enter universities with their diplomas, or the mob-like action against the left-wing TÖS (Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası, Teachers' Syndicate of Turkey) congress in 1969.
[399] *Yeni Sabah*, March 30, 1968.

considered a religious association, The Association of Craftsmen Unions (Esnaf Birlikleri Derneği), Associations of Hotel-keepers, stove-makers, ironworkers, woodworkers, Kayseri Chamber of Commerce and TEKSİF (Turkish abbreviation for Textile, Tricotage, and Clothing Industry Workers' Syndicate of Turkey). As can be seen, this list mostly overlaps with that of the professional networks from which the NSM recruited its members. The religious associations which participated the Rise Up meeting were the Association for the students of Advanced Institute for Islam and the Association for the Graduates of Prayer Leader and Preacher school. The politico-cultural organizations were Nationalist Teachers' Association, Turkish Cultural Association (*Türk Kültür Derneği*), the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*) and Büyük Doğu Club. The members of these civil associations not only sympathized with rightwing frames but also reproduced and disseminated them at the local level.

Second, *oturma*, was the other main social setting, a major local informal institution, which brought together members of different associations, professional, business, religious and native family networks in the intimate setting of individuals' homes. *Oturma,* as shall be remembered, was the name given to regular informal meetings of a group of men or families, which harked back as long as 50 years in some cases.[400] While civil associations usually accommodated weak ties, *oturma* was the embodiment of strong ties *par excellence*. Originally a "native" tradition, *oturma* was the social context that enabled men who had got acquainted and grew affection for each other within various contexts to deepen their relationship into life-long friendships. Men might have different *oturma* groups (neighborhood, apartment-building, or mixed groups from the workplace, school and business networks) with different dominant themes such as classical Turkish music, literature or religious conversation. A typical *oturma*, however, involved around 10 to 20 person, an informal "leader" moderating the conversations (usually the oldest or a man of religion), drinking a soup peculiar to the Central Anatolia (*Arabaşı*) or tea and conversations and discussions on various subjects of interest such as religious issues, business experiences, and the like.

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[400] The longest standing *oturma* group mentioned in the interviews has been around for 52 years.

Since the members of an *oturma* were not necessarily from the same business, professional, or regional milieus and their party allegiances could differ, this institution provided an ideal context for exchange of news and ideas on the city's social, economic, and political life. However, despite the differences in party allegiances, the participants as a whole were either from right wing or left wing milieus. Consequently, the *oturma* provided an additional context for the sympathizers of the right wing to reproduce and disseminate the right wing frames (Islamist, ultranationalist, etc.) that emerged during the collective actions of the 1960s.[401] Consequently, not only the oturma hosted a potential pool of activists with whom the NSM frames could resonate, but also helped the NSM entrepreneurs to reach their potential local elites and activists through providing structural connection. The national NSM elites were able to get access to some influential local men who had been frequenting various oturma groups in town. Their acquaintances and friends of Kayseri origin in the Islamist engineer-civil servant circles in Ankara and İstanbul formed the early bridges between the national and local levels. Once a relationship is established the latter began to serve as a platform where the NSM ideational elements, notwithstanding the actual rate of participation into the NSM and the way in which specific actors receive them, could freely circulate and penetrate into the right wing networks.

In addition to these formally and informally institutionalized social environments, two socio-spatial setting, the workspace and the downtown mosques, need to be tackled as well since unlike civil associations and *oturma*, which convened in intervals, they constituted the every day context of most future NSM activists in particular and the members of the above mentioned networks in general. A workspace can be defined as a geographical or spatial setting in which people work and establish a variety of ties, which are not limited to professional and business relations. In the case of Kayseri, the ancient marketplace (*çarşı*) in

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[401] An insightful discussion on oturma demonstrates how this institution has evolved over the years as to substitute for formal and informal open public channels of local policy making such as political parties, associations, urban spaces such as coffeehouses. Oturma helped to create, what the author calls, a "provisional public space" (*Eğreti Kamusallık*) where only those who commanded a certain economic and social capital could shape or influence the policies of public investment, urban development and reconstruction. Ali Ekber Doğan argues that while previously the oturmas were social resources for political parties, today they (particularly those of the rich that come together at the outskirts of Erciyes) became the dominant institutions overpowering even the political parties. See his *Eğreti Kamusallık,* 242-252.

downtown and the industrial zone (*sanayi*) built in 1956[402], were the two workspaces geographically very close to each other in downtown. In these places, tradesmen, small shop and workshop owners not only working in the same sector and having business dealings, but also in different sectors and having no business or professional ties whatsoever could establish relations by virtue of, usually, being neighbors, but also belonging to a native Kayseri family, coming from a same subdistrict of Kayseri or frequenting the same mosque for mid-day and afternoon prayer.[403]

The mosques within or close to the marketplace (Camii Kebir and Hunat Camii) were part of the workspace but also separate spatial settings not only because they brought together the vicinity's small traders, craftsmen, engineers etc. for prayers during the day but also because they provided a relaxing environment for the mosque community where small talk, exchange of information and news, regularly took place. It should be added that a major right wing protest action of the late 1960s, collective morning prayers organized by the daily *Bugün* all over the country, took place in Hunat Camii as well, bringing together not only the regular mosque community but also participants from greater Kayseri and neighboring towns.

An incident that took place on July 8, 1969 in Kayseri is a powerful example that illustrates how the complex web of professional, business, workspace, and mosque relations within the marketplace and industrial zone carrying a right wing ethos could rapidly disseminate information and produce collective action within a very short time frame. That day Kayseri witnessed a major right-wing mobilization: thousands of shop owners and workers from the marketplace and industrial zone, also high and middle school students frequenting the Nationalists' Association and Association for Fighting Against Communism[404] marched towards the *Alemdar* cinema theater where the general congress of left-wing TÖS

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[402] van Venzel, 17.

[403] Please see the Appendix D, Figure 2, for downtown Kayseri, industrial zone, the market place and the two major mosques, Camii Kebir and Hunat Camii.

[404] The information regarding the involvement of these two politico-cultural associations is provided by a then ultranationalist activist (today an independent Islamist intellectual figure in town), who participated in the mobilization. Interview with KayNAP3, Kayseri, September 4, 2006.
It is interesting to note that he was from a notable (native with a village origin) family of Kayseri who had sent its first parliamentarian to the Second Grand National Assembly (1923-1927). In the 1960s and 1970s, the family was supporting the JP.

(Teachers' Syndicate of Turkey)[405] was taking place. The night before, following a peaceful first day of the congress, there were explosions in two mosques (Sümer Örnekevler Camii, Mimar Sinan Camii), Prayer Leader and Preacher School and Turkish Cultural Association.[406] It appears that early in the morning, first the news, or rather the buzz, that the left-wing militants were responsible for the explosions traversed the marketplace and the industrial zone and, second a consensus appeared to protest, even drive out the TÖS members out of the town. Early in the morning a large crowd was formed outside the theater protesting the teachers, and some groups resorted to violence, breaking down glasses of nearby restaurants, attacking the teachers, a left-wing bookstore, a church[407], a brothel and a woman with mini-skirt.[408]

Following the incident, leaders of a number of civil organizations published a declaration in the Islamist magazine *Büyük Doğu*[409], criticizing not the violence but the mainstream newspapers, which had found the attacks outrageous and reactionary (*gerici*). They asserted that the notables (*şehrimiz ileri gelenleri*) of the town and members of the associations, though they tried their best, could not entirely calm down the people (it should be noted that most of "the people" were actually their members). They were happy that there were no injured or dead[410], but more sorry that this incident happened. But they were even more sorry that some circles tried to portray these regretful events as a reactionary movement.[411] It was a

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[405] *Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası*.

[406] For the places of explosions, the cinema theater where the congress took place and their proximity to the above mentioned workspaces please see the Appendix D, Figure 2.

[407] Kayseri was an ancient city, which hosted sizeable Armenian and Greek-orthodox communities during the Ottoman Empire until the early 20th century. Although the Armenians were forced to migrate from the town in 1915 and the Greeks were obliged to leave for Greece following the establishment of the Republic, there were still some Armenians living in town up until the 1970s and their church was intact. The last few Armenians of Kayseri left for İstanbul during these years.

[408] According to *Milliyet*, there were around six to seven thousand protestors. "Kayseri'de tahribat," Milliyet, July 9, 1969. The above mentioned young ultranationalist reports that those who actually tried to burn the theater and attacked the bookstore were the youths from the Nationalists' Association and the Association for Fighting against Communism. He also says that the family, the Top family, who owned the bookstore eventually moved out from Kayseri: "What happens if you raid their store each week. There were lots of socialist and communist publications. We would just destroy their windows, glasses and books…They could not stand it anymore and they left." He says that a family member was actually his classmate at high school. KayNAP3, Kayseri, September 4, 2006. It should be added that following such incidents (the TÖS incident was his first arrest) they would be arrested for a short period and let go.

[409] "Bildiri," *Büyük Doğu* 3 (July 1969),18, 32.

[410] There was at least one injured, the mini-skirted woman that some protestors attacked.

[411] "...bazı çevrelerin müessef hadiseleri Kayseri de bir gerici hareketi gibi gösterme gayretleri ise olaydan fazla üzücü ve insafsız bulunmuştur."

fact that one has to be proud, that Kayseri people, like the Turkish nation as a whole, were very attached to their religion. Having been religiously offended, they gave a minor response (*küçük bir mukabele*) as opposed to what would Christians in Europe do as a result of such an attack to their churches.[412]

The declaration[413] was signed by the leaders of the following, some by now familiar, right wing, or right wing dominated, organizations: Chamber of Industry, Craftsman's Cooperative (*Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi*), Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu, the Philantropic Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling, Turkish Cultural Association, the Association of Craftsmen Union (*Esnaf Birlikleri Derneği*) and Associations of Shoemakers, Stove-makers, Ironworkers, Copperworkers, Barbers and Coiffeurs.

The event and the list of associations show the mobilization potential of the existing right-wing networks, and the power of the right-wing mobilizing frames in Kayseri based on Muslimness and Turkishness.[414] The structural and socialization functions of these networks helped the NSM to reach first its activists, and then through their associative ties and electoral efforts, the voters: in 1973, in downtown Kayseri the NSM acquired 20, 81% of the votes[415]. However, this event also highlights a sharp contrast between the numbers of potential sympathizers of the NSM frames (which included the TOBB frames) and the difficulties the party innovators faced in recruiting its local leaders and activists and maintaining a stable electoral base. Having been unable to recruit from the local JP branch, its main

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[412] Ibid., 18. For an example of how this incident was receieved and reflected by a nationally distributed Islamist press (Yeni Asya) see Appendix G, Figure 13.

[413] As shall be remembered the right wing collective actions of the 1960s in general involved frequently petition signing campaigns and joint declarations on the part various associations. Here it should be added that as in many democratic states such collective actions are part and parcel of social movements and mobilization as "repertoires of action", in Turkey too these actions are closely tied to the enlargement and democratization of the political arena dating back to the Ottoman Period. For instance, Aykut Kansu shows that prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, for two years, from the east to the west there were petition campaigns and declarations against a tax law targeting the Sultan's administration, which in turn formed structural and socialization basis for the upcoming constitutional revolution. See his *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1997).

[414] It should be added that since the researcher realized the analytical utility of the TÖS incident towards the end of her interviews with the NSM activists, the question of whether or not the interviewee actually took party in the protest could be asked to only last five interviewees. Only one reported participation. Be that as it may, among the previous interviewees, there were many who discussed the event without mentioning whether or not they had actually participated. This event had unintended consequences for the NSM mobilization.

[415] http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?il_id=472&ilce_id=5037&x=31&y=14&yil_id=7&sonuc_getir=TRUE

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target, as was the case in other regions, the NOP leaders had to organize opening ceremonies in Kayseri to attract members and activists. Moreover, while they were able to capitalize on the existing right wing potential in the general election of 1973, the loyalty of activists, thus voters was still contingent on a number of issues. Due to vertical and horizontal intraparty conflicts, the party activists would not deliver the necessary electoral effort and the NSM would not protect this electoral base in 1977: in downtown Kayseri, the NSP would get only 10,03 of the votes[416].

4.2.2 Differential Recruitment/entry[417] to the NSM in Kayseri

The right wing ethos and a peripheral position vis-à-vis the administrative and economic centers were common to all the members of the above-discussed networks. Yet, relatively few joined the NSM as activist. This section aims at examining differential recruitment/entry to the NSM from these networks and, through this study, highlighting some common properties of the NSM activists.

Here it is argued that at the local level there were at least three intervening factors that influenced the differential entry to the NSM. First, individuals' structural position within the local economic and political networks needs to be taken into account. It is not the marginalization vis-à-vis the "center" *per se* but the relative marginalization seems to account for different levels of interest to the new party initiative.[418] Though, economically dynamic, the NSM activists were peripheral within the economic and political networks that tied the periphery to the center. Second, being peripheral at the periphery did not necessarily urge individuals to join the NSM. A prior engagement to or identification with a political party, group or organization or their lack thereof affected such a decision. Third, the generational factor and political parties' formal and informal institutions, *ceteris*

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[416]http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?il_id=405&ilce_id=4399&x=24&y=10&yil_id=8&sonuc_getir=TRUE

[417] As discussed earlier the concept differential recruitment/entry refers to the question of divergence in entering an incipient or long standing movement among the individuals populating a common area, network, group, social class, etc. In other words, it deals with the question of why and how a movement can recruit some individuals but not others.

[418] For an excellent work on how structural positions of the local elites in a given network and their respective relations with the "federal patronage" and "local clients" influence their allegiances and political actions (their involvement or not in the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790s in the United States) see Roger V. Gould, "Political Networks and the Local/National Boundary in the Whiskey Rebellion," in *Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Michael P. Hanagan (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 36-53.

paribus, have contributed to the participation to the NSM. The potential recruits were politically and organizationally unattached. As far as the JP is concerned, a) this party and its clientelistic network were neither able nor willing to integrate young men, or latecomers to the political, social and economic scene, to positions of power where they could directly influence decision making processes and benefit more from the distribution of state controlled material and symbolic spoils; b) at the beginning of their social and economic careers, these young men were not in a position to individually force their way up within the JP. As for the NAP, though it was institutionally more open, its frames and its activists' practices had repelled the future NSM recruits.

These factors then narrowed down the properties of the NSM activists as follows: they were socially and economically upwardly mobile, relatively young, shopowners, artisans, engineers and traders. On the one hand, as Binnaz Toprak also observed focusing on the NSP parliamentary candidates[419], they were professionally successful and well educated (formally or informally in their own branches) young men, and by no means traditional shop owners and artisans "who have been adversely affected by modernization and turned to religion as a means of registering their discontent"[420]. On the other hand, they had limited and dependent access to political and economic resources compared to small-medium[421] and medium scale business owners. The latter was frustrated by the alliance of the large businesses and the government[422], but controlled the economic and political resources available for the periphery. What differentiated the NSM activists from them were their relatively young age, their lack of a previous identification with a collectivity, and their difficulties in influencing economic and political decision-making processes. Thus, in contrast to Toprak's argument, it was *not* their "deep interest in religion" which distinguished them from their counterparts.[423] They

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[419] Toprak, Islam and Political Development,107.

[420] Şerif Mardin claimed that the NSP was the party of the small shopowners and artisans who remained "unassimilated into the "modernist center"" because of "the social and economic failures, with whom Kemalism has proved unable to cope." "Religion and the Turkish Social Transformation" (paper presented at the conference on "The Republic of Turkey, 1923-1973: Studies in 20th Century Nation-Building," University of Chicago, December 1973), quoted in Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, 105.

[421] van Venzel considers enterprises with 25 to 100 employees small middle-scale. van Venzel, 67.

[422] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay argues that the NSP was a product of a clash of cultural and economic interests and represented the small and medium size "provincial capital." Sarıbay, 96, 219.

[423] Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 107-108.

shared the same religious networks and used the same right wing frames with those who did not enter the NSM. They did not constitute a "counter elite" with deeper religious sensibilities as of yet, since the latter, as shall be seen in the next chapter, was itself a product of the NSM collective identity formation.

Whither periphery?

In the first press conference following his veto, Erbakan asserted that he had applied to the JP to help his friends within the party and that his veto is not a simple matter but prone to produce important outcomes. While he did not specify what would those outcomes be, he seemed to imply they would be related to the JP's future: a possible division within the party. In the same conference, he also emphasized that the economic development of the country is possible through the development of Anatolia but that the bank deposits of Anatolian entrepreneurs are spent to finance the imports of the İstanbul merchants.[424] As discussed in the previous section, and this press conference demonstrates, the party entrepreneurs primarily aimed at mobilizing the JP local branches and the local economic elites associated with this party in Anatolia. Through their recruitment, it would be much easier to reach right wing milieus, thus attract their clients and voters and establish local party organizations.

Despite the potential appeal of the TOBB frame, the discontented JP local executives (owners of small and medium businesses) and delegates and members (mostly small merchants and craftsman) did not quit their party and when few did, they went to the NAP which had been reorganized within the last few years[425]. While the commercial and industrial businesses in Kayseri were as a whole peripheral vis-à-vis, say, İstanbul, İzmit or İzmir, the owners of small-medium and medium scale enterprises, were at the center of the socio-economic and political life of Kayseri. Though they were vulnerable compared to large enterprises, through the medium of the existing political parties, particularly the JP, they controlled the socio-political and economic networks that linked the center and the periphery,

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[424] "Müracaatımdaki büyük faydayı kavrayamadılar," *Bizim Anadolu*, August 21, 1969.

[425] It seems, in Kayseri, the NAP (then its name was still the RPNP) had been on the rise between 1967-1969. Some discontented conservative-nationalist elites of the local JP branch, for instance, KayJP6 and Fikret Erel, joined the NAP by late 1969. Interview with KayJP6, Kayseri, March 17, 2009

which reinforced their economic, social and political power at the local level. Even a person who expelled from the JP could continue enjoying the advantages of these networks. For instance, Mehmet Kaşıkçı, the leader of the (Mehmet) "Çalık faction", one of the three factions competing within the local JP, after having been dismissed from the JP by disciplinary action[426], landed to the chairmanship of the board of directors of zinc processing factory, Çinkur, a joint venture of public and private sectors in Kayseri.[427]

There are three indicators, which help distinguishing "the center of the periphery". First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in Kayseri the JP local executives also served in the Municipal and General District Assemblies.[428] Moreover, as owners of small-medium and medium size businesses they also dominated the local chambers of commerce and industry (they were executives and/or assembly members) at the expense of small-scale enterprises[429]. Second, in addition to their dominance within the local chambers, some had sidestepped the existing laws (the government turning a blind eye)[430] and enlisted also in and controlled the professional associations established for small shop and workshop owners. For instance, the head of the Craftsman's Cooperative (*Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi*) and the local chamber of industry was the same person, Cemal Bilgin.[431] The annual congress of the Cooperative in 1969 was directed by names[432] who were also at the administrative positions both within the JP and the local chambers.[433]

Thus, the JP executives who already had easier access to state controlled resources through their political connections and control of the local chambers also acquired "credits, subsidies, and special import quotas that had been earmarked for

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[426] "Mehmet Kaşıkçı A.P den tamamen ihraç edildi," *Hakimiyet*, February 25, 1969.

[427] See *Hakimiyet*, February 11, 1970.

[428] For who's who in the local chambers of commerce and industry, General District Assembly and Municipal Assembly see *1968 Kayseri İl Yıllığı* (Kayseri: Kayseri Valiliği [İçişleri Bakanlığı], 1968).

[429] The Chamber of Industry accepted "production-oriented businesses with more than 5 employees." van Venzel, 46

[430] Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 249.

[431] "Bildiri,"18.

[432] "Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifinin yıllık kongresi dün yapıldı," *Hakimiyet,* March 28, 1969.

[433] See the local newspapers, *Hakimiyet* and *Yeni Sabah*, for the names elected for the offices of the local chambers and the JP between 1965-1971.

small traders and artisans."[434] Moreoever, small producers, whether artisans or small scale enterprises, were depended on traders not only to buy raw materials but also to market their finished product, or to take loans.[435] Small traders experienced similar difficulties vis-à-vis medium traders in Kayseri. For instance, a small textile trader could not buy the best or latest fashionable fabrics as the distributor in İstanbul would prefer a bigger company in Kayseri with whom he had long established trust relations.[436]

Though a more focused study is needed, some news pieces that appeared in a right wing national daily suggest that during the late 1960s, small enterprises, members or non-members of the chambers, operating within particular sectors became particularly vulnerable within this structure. For instance, in June 1969, the government prohibited the import of "textile machinery." Only factories that had contracts with the state could import "industrial sewing machines."[437] This meant that a large business which produced military and police garments for the state, such as the company of a leading JP, then NAP, executive in Kayseri, could improve its business, or that above mentioned chair of Craftmens' Cooperative, who produced sewing machines, would be protected and increase his profit. But a small textile trader who wanted to, say, transform his enterprise to a small manufacturing company would be unable to do so as they would not be able to buy an affordable industrial machine for the institutional reasons provided above. Another example is on the sector trading or using iron and iron scrap. It appears that, until 1969, there had been an iron shortage and a resulting iron and iron scrap black-market.[438]   The government policies on iron importation had no doubt affected primarily smaller actors within the building sector: building contractors, hardware stores, and ironworkers.

That there was a reaction to these and similar policies was evident during the TOBB Affair. As the renewal of TOBB elections approached following Erbakan's departure, some sectors[439] mobilized against the government, inviting

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[434] Bianchi, 136. It should be added that this has been the case since the 1950s.
[435] van Velzen, 53-59.
[436] Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.
[437] "Ticaret Bakanlığı Batur'un emrinde mi?" *Bizim Anadolu,* June 19, 1969.
[438] "Sanayi Bakanlığı inşaat demiri ithaline başlıyor" *Bizim Anadolu* June 24, 1969.
[439] It is reported that the mobilized sectors on behalf of Erbakan were knitters, paint, wood, textile, fiber traders, printing businesses and hotel owners. See *Bizim Anadolu*, November 13, 1969.

thereby an intervention. For instance, in İstanbul, the district electoral board (*İl Seçim Kurulu*) abolished the election results of the following groups: iron traders, hardware store owners, and knitters.[440]

To sum up, while the party innovators had targeted the right wing milieus and manufacturers and merchants of Anatolian towns as a whole, they could recruit only those individuals who were *marginally* situated in the networks that tied the center to the periphery. These individuals were fully embedded in the right wing milieus through acquaintances, friendships or family ties, but situated at the "periphery of the periphery" in terms of political and economic relations.

Salience of identity

McAdam and Paulsen argue that prior ties lead to activism if "they (a) reinforce the potential recruit's identification with a particular identity and (b) help to establish a strong linkage, between that identity and the movement in question. …In the absence of these processes, prior ties do not appear to be predictive of participation."[441] The election of Erbakan to the chairmanship of the Union showed that the "injustice and exclusion" and "material and moral development" frames of the party innovators were potent forces of mobilization not only among the members of the periphery of the periphery but also the center of the periphery. Both local elite groups shared the same social networks marked by right wing frames and had a view of themselves as being marginalized. Yet, both the center of the periphery and many members of the periphery of the periphery remained aloof to the new party initiative.

This, in turn, suggests the existence of "multivalent influences at the individual level."[442] While some social ties may encourage activism some others may prevent an individual from joining a movement. In other words, some identities acquired through social ties may be more salient than others. The identity

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[440] See *Bizim Anadolu*, December 24, 1969. Previously, among the 230 and odd İstanbul companies, which supported Erbakan during the police intervention, hardware stores, iron workshops and related building sector businesses (electrical appliances, paint traders) were numerous. The exact number of the latter, and which other sector representatives signed the declaration, are not clear as many companies did not specify their sector in their names. See "Polis Odalar Birliğini basıp, kapılarını kırdı" *Bizim Anadolu*, August 9, 1969.
[441] McAdam and Paulsen, 663.
[442] Kitts, 252.

invoked and reinforced by a movement may not be an individual's most salient identity.[443] The NSM, then, could recruit only among those who lacked a prior "positively valued" collective identity, and collective ties that opposed the participation to the new party initiative.[444]

As a matter of fact, out of 17 local NSM interviewees only one had previously been embedded in a formal or informal political or politico-cultural organization. Even in that case, the ties had already been weakened as a result of some political and contingent events.[445] There were four people who had relatives among the local/JP elite circles and two others who briefly frequented, or sympathized with, the NAP. But among them only one identified himself with a party, the NAP. But then again, he did not have a direct tie with this party's members: he was a state employee at the time and followed the party activities through media (radio and newspapers).[446]

Here, a particular group among the early NSM activists needs to be introduced as they had made a previous failed attempt to build local JP branch in 1961. This group was made up of around ten people, slightly older men than other activists but still younger than the JP executives.[447] Deeply entrenched in all the above discussed networks and also tied with the Islamist circles that had emerged during the earlier right wing mobilization, they had more social capital than younger NSM activist but marginalized vis-à-vis the JP elites. While some became official executives of the NOP, most remained unofficial leaders. Be that as it may, leading members of this group had previously made a failed bid to establish the local JP branch in Kayseri. Having found out the news that two political parties, the

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[443] McAdam and Paulsen, 645-646.

[444] Kitts, 252.

[445] This interviewee had been invited to the JP by his uncle. As a member of the JP's youth branch, first the marginalization of an ultranationalist Kayseri parliamentarian (Mehmet Ateşoğlu) within the party, then a traffic crime that went unpunished, which involved a JP executive and his family, alienated him and many of his family members from the JP. While most joined the ranks of the RPP, he, as a factory foreman, was attracted more to the NSM frames. Interview with KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2006.

[446] Interview with KayNS8, September 14, 2006.

[447] Unfortunately, since they were either death or very old the researcher could conduct an interview with only one member of this group, who was also the primary contact person of the NSM elites in Kayseri. Since he was both the leader of the said group and their close friend, he was able to provide some information on the group and its members. In addition, necessary information on some individual members of the group is gathered from the local newspapers and some other interviewees (among them not only other NSM activists, but also a follower of Büyük Doğu (who was the son of one of the members) and a prominent JP executive (the brother of one of the members).

NTP and the JP, were being established, they went to Konya to see which party was popular among the citizens. Having been convinced that the JP was the true heir to the DP, they had begun party building activities in Kayseri. However, they could not even apply to the party's center to acquire the official document that entrusted them with the task of local party foundation. Another and older group, who had been junior official or unofficial activists from the DP period had already completed forming unofficial organization and got the formal permission from the party center to build the local branch. As the local entrepreneur puts it, at the time they were too young and too inexperienced to undertake such a task.[448] However, he also implied that as the other group did not call them to join in, they felt hurt and excluded and never ever attempted to join the JP.[449] This is all the more interesting when one considers the fact that two members of this group had an older brother and an uncle among the founders of the JP. If entered the JP, being much younger, thus inexperienced and lacking enough political, economic and social capital next to their older relatives, they could not have been executives but just regular activists depending on local party leaders. The NSM initiative gave them the opportunity to level themselves up with the JP executives who had previously excluded them from decision-making positions, not because they were pious Muslims, but because of the generational hierarchy and their limited capital.

The NSM was thus able to attract part of the JP's electoral base through the "non-attached" members of the right wing milieus, in other words the activists who were *not* ex-JP members. The party innovators' injustice and exclusion frames were influential on the JP executives and member and non-member adherents to the extent that they did not jeopardize their relationship with the JP. For the JP's local party executives and activists, some as pious as or more pious Muslims than the potential NSM activists,[450] or situated in a similar peripheral position in the periphery, joining the NSM would mean betrayal of their cause and their history. They had acquired a strong sense of party identity since the DP years against the

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[448] Telephone interview with KayNS17, Kayseri, May 29, 2010.
[449] Interview with KayNS17, September 6, 2006.
[450] The pious JP activists belonged to the same local religious networks and worked in the same religious associations with the Islamists. For instance, there were many JP executives and members either chaired or worked for religious associations. Among them were Mehmet Soyöz, (chair of the Association for the Prayer Leader and Preacher School Graduates); Atıf Gözübüyük, Hacı Mustafa Ömerli and Mehmet Küçükçalık (respectively a chair, a benefactor and founder of the Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu). See *Yeni Sabah*, May 22, 1968 and http://www.tasciogluhafiz.com, respectively.

state elites represented by the Republican People's Party and the military and endured their immense pressure following the 1960 coup d'état.[451] Moreover, operating within the circles of the party in power, which controlled the flow of resources, they would be unwilling to give up their relative political, economic, and social affluence acquired throughout the past years.

As an interviewee puts it, if one was not happy with the party, he would simply quit the party.[452] For instance, one ex-JP executive, a supporter of Bilgiç, who left the active party life following an unsuccessful bid to parliamentary candidacy did not even think about joining the NSM despite the fact that his brother was one of the national official founders of the NOP and his nephew (their age was close) was *the* connection of the NSM in Kayseri. He satisfied himself publishing pamphlets for the new party (may be as a revenge) without slightest sympathy, to say the least[453], with its cause.

Those who left the JP constituted thus an exception to the rule. Very few actually switched parties and when they did, they preferred the NAP, or later, in late 1970, the Democratic Party (DkP) of the Bilgiç group. While further research is needed among the NAP leaders and members in Kayseri, the following two arguments can still be advanced regarding their choice of party. First, those who joined the ranks of the NAP had previously been active in certain ultranationalist politico-cultural organizations such as Turkish Culture Club and Nationalists' Association. They had even helped elected an ultranationalist deputy (Mehmet Ateşoğlu) and senator (Hüsnü Dikeçligil) from Kayseri. They had thus a parallel ultranationalist collective identity even while they were JP executives. When these JP executives lost power to Demirel supporters by 1969, and their representatives in the senate and the assembly were marginalized within the JP, their natural address was the NAP itself. As for those who left (or forced to leave) the party for the DkP (they were almost non-existent in Kayseri), they would not feel like betraying their

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[451] The supporters of the coup d'etat used various derogatory terms, such as *düşükler* (the fallen ones) or *kuyruklar* (the tails, or the remaining parts of the DP), for the ex-DP members and sympathizers during the early 1960s. Some local DP administrators were even jailed by the military government.

[452] The interviewee was himself a rare example. He joined the NAP after he quit the JP. Telephone Interview with KayJP6, Kayseri, March 17, 2009.

[453] He found the party too "reactionary" for his taste. Interview with KayJP9, Ankara, July 19, 2006.

cause as the DkP claimed to be the authentic carrier of the DP tradition: it was the JP that had lost its true identity.

<u>Generational, institutional and ideational obstacles to political participation before the NSM activism</u>

Local NSM entrepreneurs who would devote and aggregate their energy, time, financial and social resources for the establishment and growth of the new party from 1969 onwards were relatively young men, most at the beginning of their social and economic careers. Since they had not been previously engaged in a political party or acquired a specific collective identity, their recruitment to the NSM was thus relatively easy. Rather than assuming that the potential NSM activists had been particularly religious than their counterparts in other parties or already acquired an Islamist identity waiting for their party to appear, one needs to scrutinize their subjective and objective conditions, which had prevented them from prior political party engagement.

Two objective conditions seem to have played a role as far as the JP was concerned: the generation factor and the formal and informal institutions of the JP. To begin with, the NSM executive/activists[454] were relatively younger than the executives and activists within the JP. Compared to the JP elites, they were not only late comers to the existing right wing political networks which had been constructed as early as the 1950s; but also being at beginning of their social and economic careers, lacked the necessary capital to *individually* compete with them.

On the application documents for the NOP, the average age of the NOP's Kayseri Central District committee, which consisted of 11 individuals, was 28,5 in 1969.[455] When the ages of the 15[456] interviewed NSM activists are added to this list, the average age of the NSM activists in 1973 was 31.8. Studying the NSP

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[454] It should be noted that as observed by the researcher and reported by the activists themselves, within the NSM, since the number of activists were, relatively low, almost all activists also served in executive roles at some point during the 1970s.

[455] See the party application documents in *Milli Nizam Partisi Parti Kapatma Davası, Ek dosyalar.* The average age of founders of the NOP's Konya Central District organization was 39. Understanding the age difference between Konya and Kayseri requires further demographic research conducted in both cities, which could not be done within the limits of this study.

[456] One interviewee is already included in the official document, one interviewee's age could not be specified. Hence, the added number of interviewees is not 17 but 15.

parliamentary candidates in 1973,[457] Binnaz Toprak also found that "the age distribution of the 450 candidates was heavily biased in favor of younger people (62.8 percent between the ages 30-45).[458] A study on the local branches of three parties (the JP, the PRP and RPNP) in the 1960s further confirms the observation that the NSM elites were younger than their counterparts. In 1964, the average age for party executives was "the early 40s" and "over half were engaged in industry and commerce or skilled artisans."[459] By 1969, then, these local party executives had not only aged and but also prospered, particularly those of the JP following the JP's victory in 1965.

The future NSM activists, if entered the JP, had to *individually* struggle within a quite demanding and competitive environment against middle-aged men with well-established economic, social and political relations in both the center and periphery dating back to the DP period.[460] Not only these young professional men were relatively poor in these capitals, but most also lacked time: a valuable asset for intraparty struggles. Still at the beginning of their careers as shop owners or engineers, they had to attend their businesses individually unlike those JP activists who could delegate their rather managerial roles to business partners, managers, or family members.

These objective conditions seem to have contributed to the potential NSM activists' perception of politics within and through the JP as pursuing only self-interest. Notwithstanding the fact that the JP activists perceived themselves as promoters of development and democracy and felt a deep and sincere loyalty for their party and their fellow party members, the factional disputes, the manipulation of delegate selection[461], and finally the failure of right wing mobilization to influence the JP administration in general, convinced the potential NSM recruits to

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[457] It is probable that most of these candidates, except may be for the national leaders and those who ranked at the top of the party's list of candidates, were activists themselves as was the case in Kayseri.

[458] Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 107.

[459] Frank Tachau, "Turkish Provincial Party Politics," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis,* ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 286.

[460] For the intraparty politics in JP's local branches see Chapter 3. By the late 1960s unlike the JP, the RPP appears to have integrated younger generations to its ranks and allowed them to come to executive posts.

[461] It should be added that these features of intra-JP dynamics were part and parcel of the JP's collective identity. During the interviews, the local JP executives made clear that they particularly enjoyed the thrills of intraparty competition.

stay away from the JP. While pursuing self-interest had been portrayed and understood as morally wrong, their critique also reflected the fact that pursuing self-interest individually through the JP required considerable resources.

As far as the RPNP/NAP is concerned, from 1965 to 1969, one witnesses an evolution from a rather mainstream conservative-nationalist party to an ultranationalist one, during which the party, as opposed to the JP, became relatively open to new players. Thus, rather than its institutional structure, its ideational aspects and mobilization practices need to be taken into account to understand as to why the future NSM activists had not been attracted to, even repelled, by this party.[462]

First, the NAP/RPNP's mobilization frames, as they were reflected at the local level, were found too unsophisticated on the part of the interviewees. Similar to the NOP of the time, the NAP frames also contained Islam and Turkishness as symbolic resources and targeted to undermine the "power" of both "the freemasons and Communists." However, while the NOP's "diagnosis" advanced economic, social and political causes for the emergence of "internal enemies" and its "prognosis" primarily aimed at eliminating these causes, for the NAP the enemies were *the* problems in and off themselves. The "solution" was thus limited to their physical and symbolic elimination from the political scene. As such, the NAP frames left little room for individual ideational contribution and creativity and simply demanded implementation. This was a real handicap as the potential recruits enjoyed and were used to religious, ideological and quasi-philosophical discussions from their, say, *oturma* settings. As one interviewee recalls an NAP conference he attended was "too shallow…too superficial…I even tell [my friends from the NAP]: among you neither science, nor wealth, nor knowledge could develop…"[463]

Moreover, as Bora and Can put it, especially by 1970, the "anti-freemason" discourse of the NAP, which was very attractive for the small entrepreneurs at the

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[462] It may also be the case that informally the situation was more fluid than one could imagine, with individuals entrenched in different circles, going from one party to another. However, if this is the case this should have rather been for the rank and file members at the networks, rather than the activists and elites whose number was already limited enough to develop mechanisms of close scrutiny, affection and stigmatization to prevent free riding and easy exit-reentry. Such frequent circulation and fluidity potentially weaken the resolve of the activists through blurring the boundaries of identity and legitimate behavior necessary for a functional organization.

[463] Interview with KayNS9, September 25, 2006.

periphery of the periphery, rapidly disappeared in favor of a purely one-dimensional anti-communist one.[464] The latter was more "empirically credible" for those ex-JP members who joined the NAP by 1969 than for the small shop owners and engineers. They owned small-medium and medium enterprises, which faced rapid syndicalization. Finally, the NSM activists referred to the racist dimension of the NAP frames, which they, vehemently, disapproved. However, as shall be seen in the next chapter, though the NSM activists were critical of the NAP's racism, a study of the NSM mobilization frames and their own statements reveals that for most of them, a racist frame was not repelling to the extent that it did not involve any Muslim/Sunni ethnicity as a target or an outright statement of the superiority of the Turks over, say, the Kurds.

Second, in Kayseri, the practices of the NAP's local entrepreneurs were congruent with their frames, which only further alienated their targeted audience, those critics of the JP liberals. Almost all the NSM interviewees, when asked why they did not care joining the NAP, mentioned the violent acts perpetrated by the NAP commandos (later the Idealist Youth, *Ülkücü Gençlik*) during the late 1960s and 1970s. They carefully emphasized that (and not only them the JP activists as well) in Kayseri, it was *not* the left-wing groups, which initiated or undertook political violence, but almost always the ultranationalists who engaged in such activities. Particularly, the TÖS incident of 1969, seem to have marked their perception of the NAP as a violent organization for good. As discussed above, those who mobilized against the TÖS members, in general, the smaller groups that committed violent attacks on civilian targets in particular, believed/argued that the explosions at religious buildings were "Communist" acts. The right wing milieu as whole, whether or not participated in the incident initially agreed with this view. However, shortly after, it became an open-secret within the right-wing circles that the culpable was not the "communists" but the NAP activists.[465] As an NSM

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[464] Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergah: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 55-56.

[465] As a matter of fact, a prominent local NAP leader, who is still effective in ultranationalist circles, voluntarily provided the information that it was the NAP who had planned and instigated the explosions and following mobilization. It should be noted that he did not assert this boastfully but rather casually when the researcher asked him what he knew about the TÖS incident.

activist, who was among the crowd that day, puts it, they felt "betrayed" and manipulated.[466]

While the NAP hence failed to convince socially and economically upwardly mobile young men, at least in Kayseri, it seems it recruited from even younger generations[467] and precariously employed[468]. The traditional shop owners and artisans "who have been adversely affected by modernization" thus probably turned not to Islamist parties as Mardin argues[469] but to the NAP.[470] However, as maintained by an NAP leader, they targeted mainly the youth, particularly university or high school students who could neither vote at the time, nor bring votes, not even those of their father who voted for the JP (*oy sahibi olan yoktu*).[471] An example he gave illustrates the two attributes of a typical NAP activist in the late 1960s: "One day, a child told me why he became an idealist. He said that his father was a porter and that they were two brothers. Because of the cold, during the nights they would wrap their arms around each other to sleep. He told me that he had nothing to lose, he could easily become a Communist, but his moral values were too strong, he became an idealist."[472] Porters had in fact become particularly vulnerable in Kayseri by the late 1960s as the transportation opportunities increased and the JP mayor exiled both the porters and street peddlers from the downtown area to peripheral neighborhoods.[473]

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[466] Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.

[467] Bora and Can also says that the NAP was a platform where younger children of the provincial JP supporters initiated themselves into politics.

[468] It is not totally clear whether the NAP turned to these groups because they failed to mobilize the former, or they failed because they initially targeted these groups.

[469] Mardin, "Religion and the Turkish Social Transformation," quoted in Toprak, Islam and Political Development,105.

[470] Bora and Can mentions "traditional" traders and artisans as main supporters of the NAP as well. But they include small manufacturers into this group, and argue that the NSP attracted provincial traders and industrialists. It has however been demonstrated that while the latter remained within the JP, it was rather small manufacturers who supported the NSM. Bora and Can, 86.

[471] In contrast to Bora and Can's claim that this youth turned to mainstream parties once they became older, this leader said that they owed the rise of their votes in 1977 to the fact that these activists had grown up, married and became professional men with certain social capital. He was proud of them. Telephone interview with KayJP6, Kayseri March 17, 2009.

[472] Telephone interview with KayJP6, Kayseri March 17, 2009.

[473] As a result the porters and street peddlers organized a protest march. "Kayseri'de hamal ve işportacılar yürüyüş yaptı," *Yeni İstanbul*, July 1, 1969.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter studied the two axes through which the NSM emerged: consensus and activist mobilization efforts of the party entrepreneurs and the local social and political contexts in which they recruited their activists. The examination of these two axes reveals differential recruitment to the NSP and the difficulties the party innovators faced in activist recruitment at the local level. It thus refutes the existence of an *a priori* collective identity and a direct causal line between socio-economic, political and cultural frustrations of the "periphery" and Islamist political activism.

In contrast, it highlights the interaction between the social structures and the agency of the political actors in the emergence of the NSM. On the one hand, at the local level the social networks and political parties appear not only as structural units where power relations take place but also as areas where various forms of socialization and identity formation take place. On the other hand, the study of the party innovators' efforts within the constraints and opportunities of the formal and informal political institutions underline the fact that individual and social discontent at the local level do not naturally translate into Islamist party activism.[474]

Finally, the Kayseri case demonstrated that it was the young small shopkeepers, owners of workshops, traders, engineers, factory foremen, who, unlike the notables of the JP, had weaker ties to the center joined party building activities. They had nothing to lose but lot to gain if the new initiative succeeded. Having been marginalized in the local political and economic games, the injustice frame, the call for material and moral development, Erbakan's command of technical issues[475] and the face-to-face recruitment methods attracted them. As shall be seen in the following chapters in detail, as a young and pious professor of

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[474] It also showed that this agency did not necessarily entail a rational assessment of formal and informal institutions and of other political and social players' actions. Success of the party might be intended but not foreseen.

[475] At different occasions the interviewees, who were skilled workers or artisans commented on some engineers that they have met in the workplace and their "deplorable" lack of knowledge on simplest matters concerning the production of a certain item, use of a machine, problems with a machine etc. When the subject was Erbakan, though very critical of his recent actions etc., all emphasized and admired his deep knowledge of machines, machine cutting techniques and the smallest of problems that a small shop owner could face in day-to-day workshop production. In most of his speeches published in the movement newspapers, Erbakan, in fact, revealed his interest, enthusiasm and knowledge on such issues.

engineering and as an entrepreneur Erbakan (and his comrades) not only spoke their religious, technical and entrepreneurial language but also offered morally and potentially materially rewarding opportunities: "a noble cause" to fight for and leadership positions in the local branches.

CHAPTER V

THE FORMATION OF THE NSM SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES: COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES AND IDENTITY

This chapter develops further the line of argument introduced in Chapter 4, which draws attention to differential recruitment/entry to the NSM from the right wing networks. It states that the NSM institutional and symbolic boundaries were produced in action and interaction within the political field. It tackles the production of the NSM's ideational resources that enabled and sustained activist recruitment and mobilization from 1969 through the 1970s, and beyond. Specifically, it disentangles action-oriented and identity-oriented features of the NSM ideational products, which together drew the symbolic boundaries of their endeavor and helped them, as stated in Chapter 2, to observe, recognize and/or interpret their relations, histories with their environment and each other and to project a better, and thought to be a well deserved, future.[476]

Studying the crystallization of the NSM's symbolic boundaries reveals that rather than being preconceived, in this case pre-political, ideational elements, the NSM collective action frames and identity were shaped as a result of objective conditions and perceptions of the NSM activists, within the political arena, both at the national and local levels of politics.

This chapter argues that as the ideational products of a movement that emerged within a relatively liberal and extremely competitive political arena and that aimed at building and sustaining a political party, the collective action frames and collective identity of the NSM, which drew its symbolic boundaries, proved to be differentiating and articulating/integrating at the same time. Through their intentional and unintentional dimensions, first, they distinguished the NSM

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[476] Melucci, 341-342. While Melucci attributes these functions to collective identity, or identity-oriented frames, they define quite well the role of the action-oriented frames, or collective action frames as well. See Benford and Snow, 614.

activists from other players of the political arena at the local and national levels and contested the power and constituencies of their opponents. Second, the (new) meanings and values that the NSM ideational elements brought to the political arena to open a space for itself, appealed, and helped to reinforce, the pre-mobilization professional, business and religious individual identities and social ties of the local activists. They articulated the activists' interests, concerns and identities with each other and, most important, the political center.

The NSM collective action frames and identity defined the nation as primarily Muslim and the NSM as its representative. It challenged other political forces in the political arena blaming them for the "material and moral decay of the nation" and urged individual Muslims to act in the name of the nation to bring about a "material and moral development." The juxtaposition of nation with Muslimness and the call for moral development put the NSM squarely within the Islamist tradition in Turkey and differentiated the party from other right and left wing forces in the political arena. The incorporation of an economic injustice frame, which demanded material development through industrialization in Anatolia, in turn, distinguished the NSM from all other right wing forces, including the fellow Islamists. The former helped them to express their particularistic (both objective and subjective) material and moral interests[477] and to associate them with the "best interest" of the "Muslim" nation. The latter created a sense of "we" through affective ties, solidarity and altruism, which not only empowered individuals within their social and political settings but also reduced uncertainty regarding political action. In short, within the right wing networks, these ideational products attracted the potential activists, the periphery of the periphery through providing a new language and giving them a new identity.

Alongside these more or less intentional features and implications, the NSM ideational products had also unintentional aspects and consequences for the political arena and the NSM activists. On the one hand, produced by political insiders[478] who had been crystallized and invested in the political game, underneath

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[477] As Asef Bayat reminds "interest" means "having a 'stake' in something, or 'being affected by something." Moreover, interest may involve both material and moral concerns. "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 901.

[478] It has already been empirically demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the NSM entrepreneurs were political insiders.

this apparent challenge, or heterodoxy, they also latently reproduced the *doxa*[479] of the political field. The NSM challenged the hierarchy within the political arena, or the dominance of the existing forces, but similar to them, rejected to construct the objective and observable condition of the nation as a political collectivity composed of diverse citizens and socio-economic, ethnic, cultural, and interest groups.

On the other hand, the ideational products that promoted a "natural" affinity, or rapport between being a Muslim and joining, voting and supporting the NSM parties revealed that Muslimness, or Islam, was not only a resource but also a constraint at the local level, particularly within the right wing networks. To the extent that "Muslimness" was the norm within the society, the NSM activists faced the danger of "invisibility" as members of an incipient collectivity. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, as the majority of the Muslims, including pious ones, rejected to support, let alone joining the movement, the NSM activists needed to deal with the difficulty of justifying the juxtaposition of the Muslimness and Muslim nation with themselves as pious, or proper, Muslims. Consequently, the NSM elites and activists found themselves in an unintended additional latent symbolic process. Since within the religious economy of the right wing networks religious stringency had been equated with proper religiosity and piousness, they felt compelled to become more religiously stringent in an attempt to differentiate themselves from the rest, particularly the pious Muslims, and justify their action in the name of the "Muslim" nation.

From a theoretical point of view, ideational products of the social movements as a whole, both the action and identity frames, initiate and sustain mobilization through providing an interpretive schemata that renders meaning to the actions and experiences of the movement activists. Moreover, collective action frames and collective identity further complement each other in drawing the symbolic boundaries of the movement organization. While the former draws the boundaries between and "us" and "them" through establishing normative positions based on designation of causes and blame,[480] the latter specifically creates a sense of "we," which differentiate both the collective actor and its activists from the

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[479] As mentioned in the introductory chapter *doxa* means "the entire set of cognitive and evaluative presuppositions" of a field. Bourdieu, *Méditations*, 145.

[480] Eric Neveu, *Sociologie des Mouvements Sociaux* (Paris: Découverte, 2005), 100.

others. [481] From an empirical perspective based on the fieldwork research as well, the collective action frames and collective identity of the NSM are produced in an intertwined fashion through action and interaction within the movement and with the extra-movement actors, and nurtured each other.

Ira Silver's conceptualization of "boundary framing," which differentiates instrumental vocabulary (collective action frames) and expressive vocabulary (collective identity frames) from one another allows one to see not only their overlapping and complementary functions of mobilizing activists and drawing the boundaries of the movement but also their specific action- and identity- oriented features.[482] For heuristic reasons, then, this chapter studies the NSM ideational production disentangling analytically collective action frames and collective identity frames from each other.

The organization of the chapter follows this logic and is divided into three sections. The first and second sections study the NSM ideational products separately. First part focuses on the NSM mobilization frames, which attracted the potential activists and carved a space within the political arena for the NSM through challenging the political rivals. Second section tackles the collective identity process, or the creation of the NSM's "we" and interpersonal bonds among the activists. Final section reintegrate the action- and identity-oriented frames in order to examine two major subliminal (i.e unintentional and uncalculated)[483] features and outcomes of the NSM ideational production, which inadvertently helped the articulation of the national with the local level and the differentiation of the NSM activists from the rest.

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[481] It should be noted that in the social movement literature the qualities and functions attributed to collective action frames and collective identity frames greatly converge despite efforts to analytically separate them. For collective action frames see Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements" and Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67 (1997): 409-430. For various approaches on collective identity see for instance Scott A. Hunt and Robert D. Benford, "Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment," *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 433-457; Polletta and Jasper, " Collective Identity and Social Movements" and Melucci, "Getting Involved."
[482] Ira Silver, "Constructing "Social Change" through Philanthropy: Boundary Framing and the Articulation of Vocabularies of Motives for Social Movement Participation," *Sociological Inquiry* 67 (1997): 497-498. Instead of collective action frames and collective identity Silver uses the terms "instrumental vocabulary" and "expressive vocabulary," respectively. Throughout this study these terms will thus be used interchangeably.
[483] Here the term subliminal used in the sense of what Bourdieu calls "reasonable action." Please see below for further details.

5.1 Collective action frames of the NSM

Collective action frames (instrumental vocabulary) are rather action oriented and answer such questions as "why should we act" and "for and against what we act." Entailing what Snow and Benford call "core framing tasks" of social movements, they pertain more to the activists' extra-movement relations than internal relations. The core framing tasks are: definition of a problem area (diagnostics frames), proposed solutions (prognostic frames) and motivation of activists (motivational frames).[484] They are thus potentially informed by and inform an existing and/or incipient "ideology", or relatively stable worldviews on socio-political problems and their solutions.[485]

The party entrepreneurs shaped and communicated their collective action frames, or instrumental vocabulary, from the TOBB Affair of 1969, the first collective action of the party entrepreneurs, through the 1970s, in meetings around the TOBB Affair and party opening ceremonies, conversations in coffeehouses, village-rooms and through pamphlets, booklets, radio speeches, etc. Once these resonated among and adopted by the potential activists, they were then deployed directly or through tape recordings of Erbakan's speeches, for member recruitment or electoral mobilization purposes.[486]

This section argues that both the radical, or anti-systemic and moderate -signifying the willingness to play by the rules of the game- features of the NSM symbolic work shaped in action and interaction within the political field. While cognitive/strategic and generational factors and power relations pertaining to the national level of politics marked the production of the instrumental vocabulary, the potential activists received and evaluated them based on their previous individual identities, experiences, and observations. Shaped and received in reference to the two registers of political arena in general and other collective actors in particular, the collective action frames of the NSM, including their anti-systemic and systemic

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[484] Benford and Snow, 615.

[485] "Collective action frames ... perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of the "world out there," but in ways that are "intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists"..." Benford and Snow, 614.

[486] For instance, in Konya, during the Movement of Independents, the activists would record Erbakan's "conversations" and later play the records to the public, in shops, houses and village common rooms. "Prof. Erbakan'ın seçim bürosu dolup taşıyor," *Türkiye'de Yarın,* September 12, 1969.

aspects, proved to be reinvigorating for the individual identities of the NSM activists and articulative and integrative for the NSM as a whole constituting a new collective actor.

Following is a four-step examination of these NSM action-oriented cultural/ideational products. The first subsection will provide an overview of the instrumental vocabulary in relation to cognitive/strategic, generational and institutional factors that influenced the NSM frame makers, the party entrepreneurs. The second and third subsections will study in detail its diagnostic and prognostic components as they relate to the political context and intra-movement needs. The final section will focus on how the NSM frames compelled the potential activists at the local level to engage in direct political action through a political party.

5.1.1 An Overview of the NSM Collective Action Frames

To begin with, the NSM mobilization frames reflected the cognitive processes and strategic evaluations of the NSM leaders within the political arena. At the macro/national level, the NSM innovators had to compete with and differentiate themselves from eight other political parties and overcome the voters' apparent lack of interest in the electoral process.[487] At the micro/local level, as discussed in Chapter 4, they had to recruit those members of the right wing networks who had been marginalized from the political participation process and who, thus, despised and distrusted party politics. Consequently, the NSM mobilization frames aimed at covering and rising above the salient issues of the political arena, designating the NSM as the only force capable to address such broad based political concerns and convincing the potential activist to engage in party politics.

Accordingly, the NSM argued that unlike the other eight existing political parties, their political outlook, or diagnosis and prognosis, involved two axes: material and moral. In that sense they were "not the ninth but the first party" ever

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[487] The parties which entered the general elections of 1969 were the RPP, the JP, the NTP, the NP, the NAP, the Reliance Party (the RP, Güven Partisi established by conservative Kemalists who left the RPP following the adoption of "left of the center" stance), the Union Party (the UP, *Birlik Partisi* of the *Alevis*) and the Labour Party of Turkey (the LTP, Türkiye İşçi Partisi). However, only 64, 35 % of the eligible voters casted their votes. See http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=6 (Accessed June 25, 2011)

truly representing the best interest of the nation.[488] The existing parties could not solve country's problems since having focused merely on material issues and favored only particular sections of the nation they were themselves responsible for creating economic and social injustices. In fact, they had lost confidence of the voters as evidenced by the decrease in the over all votes cast in the general elections of 1969.[489] The NSM parties (in the early sources the NOP) were different from others since their targeted two-dimensional area of political action would restore the true purpose of politics: "using total power of the nation in the name of the nation."[490] Refusing to employ political party as a tool to achieve this end was similar to rejecting using a gun just because a lunatic had once used it to commit suicide.[491] The NOP (or other NSM parties for that matter) was "a [political] party only in name,"[492] actually it was the embodiment of the Muslim nation and the only entity to solve problems observed in the material and moral domains and bring back the glory of the past centuries.

The inclusion of a "material dimension" into an Islamist frame in addition to moral issues and all the while criticizing the "material ambitions" of their rivals echoed the generational difference of the NSM leaders from their Islamist counterparts and predecessors. Since the 19th century, the Islamists, and those conservative-nationalists and ultranationalists who borrowed from the Islamists during the Republican period, as men of letters, such as university professors, writers, poets, publishers, journalists, theologians and lawyers, or as members of "new religious movements" had merely developed a critique of modernization (and secularization) in abstract terms, never touching any tangible socio-economic issues. Their arguments had rarely gone beyond "adopting the west's technical and economic tools but discarding its culture" discourse, as shall be seen, developed against the secularist elites. The earlier Islamist frames actually reflected the dominant political frames of the political arena, which revolved around modernization discussions from the 19th century up until the mid-1960s.[493] The

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[488] Hasan Aksay, *Milli Nizam Davamız* (İzmir: Karınca Matbaası, 1971), 33; Necmettin Erbakan, the Opening Ceremony of the NOP in Ankara, February 8, 1970, in *Milli Nizam Partisi Parti Kapatma Davası, Ek dosyalar.*
[489] Erbakan, the Opening Ceremony in Ankara.
[490]"Siyaset bir millet adına o milletin toplam gücünü kullanmaktır." Aksay, *Milli Nizam*, 45.
[491] Ibid.
[492] Hüseyin Abbas, the Party Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970.
[493] Toprak, *Islam and Political Development,* 32-96 (*in passim*).

NSM local activists and national elites, in contrast, consisted of a new generation of Islamists (literally and figuratively) composed of men of trade, manufacturers, engineers, skilled workers, etc., who were deeply entrenched in the developing industry of the country. As Erbakan's statements on the subject illustrates, the NSM entrepreneurs were aware of this generational difference, which led to the ideational difference between them. The nation had finally produced its "organic intellectuals" (*tabii aydınlar*),[494] whose attitude and ideas diverged from the existing and previous right wing forces: "The right had been faltering for a long time now, discussing [only] metaphysical issues. However, our question is one related to life, consequently obviously economic."[495]

Finally, the injustice dimension embedded in the material development frame was a reflection of the dominated position of the NSM entrepreneurs within the political arena as compared to the other right wing forces. The conservative-nationalists and liberals of the right wing had been in power since 1950 and despite military and civil bureaucracies' continuous guardianship over the regime, they had exercised considerable control and influence over the distribution of material and symbolic resources. Hence, though they dwelled on socio-economic questions, their discourses did not include any injustice component since they neither needed nor possessed the symbolic tools to interpret the economic condition as unjust as was the case for the Islamist party entrepreneurs.

5.1.2 Diagnostic Claims

As far as "the material dimension" of the diagnostic frames was concerned, the NSM leaders created an economic injustice frame that drew partly on their own

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[494] MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, ed., *Basında Prof. Dr. Erbakan*, (İstiklal Matbaası: İzmir, 1970), 38. In Turkish "tabii" have two meanings: organic and natural. Here the choice of translation is not arbitrary. The way Erbakan and his fellow activists established the relation with their intellectual work and the nation was similar to how Gramsci used the term "organic" describing the relationship between the intellectuals and the social groups from which they emerged. According to Gramsci "[e]very social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields." Antonio Gramsci, "The Formation of the Intellectuals," in *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: W. W Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 1138.

[495] MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı,13. It should be noted that this book, published by the youth organization of the NOP, was a compilation of interviews that non-Islamist journalists conducted with Erbakan, mostly during the Movement of Independents.

interaction with the JP and partly from the left-wing critique of the capitalist economic system.[496] As mentioned above, this particular frame constituted one of the major differences between the NSM Islamist frames and the politico-cultural products of previous Islamist movements in particular and the right wing forces in general.

In contrast to the latter, the NSM frequently addressed (either through numbers, statistics, dates, specific laws, etc. or in generic terms depending on the context) such economic questions as "uneven economic development across the regions and socio-economic sectors; low average per capita income compared to other countries; an industrial development depended on export of raw materials and auxiliary equipment; foreign capital's dominance on areas of high financial turn-over and trade balance deficit," which resulted in inflation and rising poverty on the one hand, and weak state finances that depended on foreign aid and resulted in "rubber stamp" (*şahsiyetsiz*) foreign policy, on the other.[497]

Frames of motivation[498] underlining the urgency and the severity of the situation were deployed to support this diagnosis: the country was on the brink of devastation and the question was one of "survival or death of a nation."[499] Anatolia lagged behind industrialization as the small and medium scale manufacturers were denied a just distribution of financial resources; impoverished citizens were forced to seek jobs in foreign lands leaving their families behind[500]; "the spread of the workers' uprising and revolution" from İstanbul to whole country could have only been prevented by the martial law thanks to the government which failed to take

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[496]Ibid, 7. The influence of the left can be considered a "spill over effect." The latter is the outcome of some or all of four basic transmission processes from a movement to another: "coalitions", converging movement constituencies, "shared personnel" and finally, "broader changes in the external environment" created by the first movement. David S. Meyer and Nancy Whittier, "Social Movement Spillover," *Social Problems* 41 (1994): 277.

[497] Erbakan, the Opening Ceremony of the NOP in Ankara.

[498] Robert D. Benford, ""You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey": Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *The Sociological Quarterly* 34 (1993): 201-204. Benford divides motivational frames into four parts: urgency, severity, efficacy of action and propriety of action frames. While the first two complemented the diagnostic frame, the latter supported prognosis.

[499] Hüseyin Abbas, The party opening ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970.

[500] The party innovators were particularly sensitive on this issue. In fact, Erbakan mentioned his observation of the results of worker immigration to Germany as the most sorrowful aspect of his visits in Anatolia and cried while answering the journalist's question. MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, 35.

precautions.[501] There were moral consequences to these economic problems as well. For instance, in defiance of customs and mores "the wives and daughters" were leaving the country becoming immigrant workers without the permission of their husbands and fathers. Diminishing value of the lira enabled "lousy tourists" (*bitli turistler*) to come to the country potentially threatening the local culture.[502]

It can be argued that the economic injustice frames achieved their purpose of challenging other Islamists and right wing groups and differentiating the new political enterprise. They were so successful in incorporating the frames partly borrowed from the Left that up until the mid-1970s, the changes brought to the Islamist frames fascinated the left and even became a factor paving the way for an RPP-NSP coalition in January 1974.[503] For instance, as early as 1969, that is five years before the said coalition, a left-wing journalist in *Milliyet* wrote that Erbakan and his supporters' use of "left wing slogans" was useful in the sense that citizens would now understand that talking about "some issues" did not necessarily mean that you are a Communist.[504] The rival right wing forces, in turn, including the JP, the NAP and Yeni Asya felt threatened enough to accuse the NSM for helping the left. Particularly, during and following the coalition with the RPP, they nicknamed the NSM activists "green communists."

The NSM leaders in turn legitimized their diagnostic similarity with the left in following terms: "When Erbakan said "we are of the same mind with the RPP" he just meant we are together in diagnosis of the country's problems. It is a logical imperative for both the supporters of the right and the left to arrive at the same diagnosis similar to doctors who had to ally in the diagnosis of a cancer."[505] It should be noted that though wary to loose votes to the JP, most NSM activists actually enjoyed being compared to the left.[506]

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[501] Police report on Necmettin Erbakan's speech, the Opening Ceremony in Tekirdağ, July 9, 1970. In his speeches by "precaution" Erbakan usually meant preventing the economic exploitation of the workers by lavish and extravagant business owners as much as an ideological struggle with the left.
[502] Ibid.
[503] The RPP supporters who applauded the NSM had an additional agenda. The votes that went to the NSM would no doubt weaken the JP.
[504] Kemal Bisalman, "Cızz..," *Milliyet*, November 13, 1969.
[505] "Yorum: Teşhis-Tedavi," *Türkiye'de Yarın,* November 25, 1969. The question of NSP-RPP coalition and how the NSM activists perceived and interpreted it will be discussed in Chapter 6.
[506] This will be discussed further while discussing the NSP-RPP coalition.

At any rate, thanks to the moral component of the frames, the NSM positioned itself squarely within the Islamist tradition and became distant to the left. As one Erbakan speech illustrates[507], the NSM entrepreneurs argued that "the nation that had once showed the way (*ışık tutmak*) to the humanity, was now…in distress within a moral quagmire," devoid of its authentic education system; this was a nation, "under moral occupation" of communists and "cosmopolites", who took every measure to keep "the real landlord" out of his own house.[508] These measures were twofold: pressure on the religious expressions, lifestyles, and education on the one hand and promotion and encouragement of secular perspectives and ways of life on the other.

For instance, while the government was financing "the ballet schools which raised prostitutes" and the Jews and Christians enjoyed their holidays on Saturdays and Sundays, "those who practiced their religion" such as the *Risale-i Nur* students, were jailed, Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools were underfunded, and Muslims did not have the right to their Islamic weekly holiday on Friday.[509] Moreover, the state radio was urging women defy their uncompromising husbands and use their right granted by the Civil Law[510] if they wanted to work. Finally, universities had become centers of moral and material destruction[511] and the mosques were left empty[512] since in state schools students were taught sociology and philosophy texts authored "by Durkheim, a Jew"[513] and psychology books "written by a Jewish rabbi."[514]

5.1.3 Prognostic Claims

The content of the NSM prognostic claims can be divided into three analytical parts: a) a critique of other political parties; b) the NSM's answer to the

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[507] Incidentally, in this particular speech the sentence constructions Erbakan used sounded more like those of Necip Fazıl, than his. In fact, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s and early 1980s when a new group of Islamist intellectuals emerged, such as İsmet Özel and Ali Bulaç, most NSM activists adopted a writing and speaking style influenced from Necip Fazıl and Büyük Doğu.

[508] Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara.

[509] The summary report of the government inspector on the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük, Speeches by Hüseyin Abbas, Ali Oğuz and Hacı Tevfik Paksu, May 31, 1970.

[510] Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970.

[511] Aksay, *Milli Nizam*, 54.

[512] Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli.

[513] MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, Backcover note.

[514] Police Report on Erbakan's Speech, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Tekirdağ.

moral and material crisis (*buhran*) of the country; c) the call for direct political engagement through a political party. While the diagnostic components of the NSM frames remained pretty much the same, even today[515], as they evolved into an ideology, or quite stable paradigms in interpreting social and political life, prognostic frames proved to be less resilient in the face of changing movement needs. Moving from consensus mobilization to activist recruitment; from institutionalization to parliamentary activities the NSM entrepreneurs reshaped their prognostic frames, except those concerning moral issues, within short time frames.

To begin with, it should be maintained that the party innovators' critique of the other political forces appeared to focus more on the JP than the RPP, or the NAP. They only paid lip service to right wings' traditional anti-communist and anti-RPP discourses while taking their time to attack the JP policies and views. Within the political arena their main rival was thus the JP with which they shared the same right wing networks and constituencies rather than the RPP with which they shared some core diagnostic frames and the same major adversary, the JP.

The NSM critique of the existing political forces entailed a differentiation between two groups identified through a Kuranic idiom: *hak* (just, God) and *batıl* (vanity, idolatry). The NSM represented the *hak* in the face of *batıl* forces. The latter was divided in itself into two main groups. On the one hand, there was the RPP associated either with communism and/or with left (signifying social democracy in the political field). On the other hand, there was the JP, which was associated with freemasonry and/or liberalism considered as "*renksizlik*", or colorlessness. During the consensus and activist recruitment mobilization period from 1969 to the electoral mobilization for the general elections of 1973, the NSM elites argued that communism and freemasonry invaded the RPP and the JP, respectively. These ideologies represented two sides of a coin: on the one hand, communism was an ideology created by Karl Marx, "a Jewish rabbi", in order to bring an end to Islam.[516] On the other hand, freemasonry was promoting capitalism,

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[515]The Felicity Party, the current party of the NSM still uses most of the diagnostic frames produced during the 1970s. In fact, to understand the continuities and ruptures between the NSM and its spinoff, the JDP, tracing the changes in the diagnostic claims would be a fruitful starting point.
[516] Necmettin Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceromony in Edirne, October 7, 1970.

a system that was rooted on "money, material things".[517] Both were materialist ideologies, or Jewish conspiracies, that had brought about the material and moral decay of the country through Westernization in the first place.[518] As such the parties, which were associated with them, would not be able to bring solutions to the country's devastating problems. The anti-Semitic frames of the NSM, which they shared with almost all extreme right groups in Europe and the United States served, thus, two major interrelated purposes within the context under consideration. They not only helped to raise the NOP above all other parties, denying them legitimacy and attributing to the NSM a religious and historical, even trans-historical, mission to save the country and Islam. They also served to underline the incipient collectivity's symbolic boundary, which was prone to blur. As shall be discussed in detail below as its opponents the NSM also claimed to represent the nation as a whole, which has been defined by almost all parties based on Muslimness and Turkishness.

The opportunities and constraints that the political arena presented, such as the ban of the first NSM party, the NOP, by the Constitutional Court[519], the election of the NSP to the parliament and the senate, and the prospect of coalition governments, seemed to have promoted a change in the NSM frames criticizing the RPP and the JP. By 1973, the NSM leaders quit referring to the RPP and the JP as tools of "world Jewish conspiracy," and preferred less conspiratorial terms such as "left" and "colorless" or " socialist" and "capitalist" rather than communist and freemason, though freemasonry as behind the scenes "master of ceremonies" was still frequently mentioned.

Whatever terminology is used, however, from 1969 through the 1970s, the NSM accused both parties for promoting Westernization. The latter was unsuitable

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[517] Ibid.

[518] One of the most extreme case of public anti-Semitic discourses appeared in the local NSM activists' daily in Konya in 1969. It blamed the Jews for their own extermination in Germany. Accordingly, the Holocaust was a result of accumulated resentment against the Jews. Only after the latter "had gone" that the German trade developed, black market disappeared, the state finances improved and the German industry was established. Şahin Kahraman, "Ölçü, Yahudi Düşmanlığı," *Türkiye'de Yarın*, September 27, 1969.

[519] It should be added that the Constitutional Court closed the party but did not punish the party executives. During the interviews, the NSM leaders implied that they took a lesson from this event and chose to be more careful in their public speeches involving the critique of the regime and other political parties. This issue will be discussed further in studying the intraorganizational aspect of the NSM in the next chapter.

for the fabric of Muslim nation and as such responsible for the material and moral crisis (*buhran*) in the country. The second aspect of the NSM prognostic frames was then their proposed solution to this "crisis": the establishment of the "National Order." The latter would bring material development through shifting industrialization to Anatolia and put an end to moral decay with an education system by focusing on the (re)Islamization of the country.

As was the case for the critique of the existing political forces and government policies, the NSM modified its solutions to the "crisis". While the prognostic claims on moral issues remained unaltered, as they were the main markers of the NSM collective identity and boundaries, in the material domain the NSM elites led by Erbakan modified the role they attributed to the state's role in industrial development as the NSM moved from consensus mobilization to activist recruitment stage and parliamentary activities. Early on during the TOBB Affair, Erbakan stressed the state's responsibility in supporting the capabilities and power of the private enterprise through a just distribution of credits and quotas.[520] By September 1969 that is during the period when they were engaged in the first electoral mobilization and overt activist recruitment, Erbakan began mentioning the state's role as an initiator of heavy industry as well.[521] By 1972, the economic frames and program of the NSP definitely shifted its focus from private initiatives to the state led development of heavy industry: in order to decrease dependence on imports, facilitate the creation of sub industries and boost local economic life, the state would invest in motor, turning machine (*torna*), cement or tractor factories in Anatolian towns. It can be argued that as the NSM entrepreneurs proceeded with activist recruitment and party building activities they recognized what this study revealed in Chapter 4: the small-medium and medium enterprise owners that they initially targeted did not show the expected support for the new political enterprise.The potential activists which were comprised mainly of young small workshop owners, traders, engineers and skilled workers of "periphery of the periphery" found the prospect of becoming sub-industrialists or subcontractors of

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[520] For instance see "Refaha kavuşmak için hükümet özel sektöre yardımcı olmalıdır...," *Bizim Anadolu* July 25, 1969.

[521] To see how Erbakan mentioned both types of industrial development in 1969 see his interviews with a journalist from the daily *Cumhuriyet,* Sadun Tanju. MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, 11-31.

state establishments more feasible and attractive than seeking credits and business partners to become part of a large scale private industrial venture.[522]

The call for political engagement through a political party constituted the final element of the prognostic frames. While the NSM leaders called for direct political action on the part of the Muslims, convincing the potential activists to engage through a political party was considerably difficult.

First, the NSM leaders needed to take into account the identities and concerns of potential activists. In 1969, they primarily aimed at recruiting from the JP ranks and networks whose activists and voters were notoriously loyal to the JP. These JP supporters would refuse to betray their party if the project of the new party publicly revealed. For instance, since before the elections Paksu and Aksay had made their intention to join the prospective party in Maraş and Adana public, they failed to get reelected from the JP ranks.[523] Second, the NSM activists tried to attract those individuals who had remained outside the institutional party politics. Individuals from the "periphery of the periphery" had serious misgivings regarding party politics having observed the internal disputes within the right wing parties, especially the JP. On the one hand, they saw party activists as individuals seeking to satisfy solely their own self-interests, which they deemed an unethical behavior. On the other hand, based on their hitherto observations, they rightly assumed that party activism necessitated extensive individual social, economic and political capital, which they did not possess.

The second problem was the constant political agitation on the part of those Islamist and right wing publications and groups supporting the JP. They designated

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[522] It should be noted that Ayşe Buğra also draws attention to the differences in the industrial development frames of the NOP and the NSP. She argues that the NOP and the NSP constituency was made up of "marginalized" small and medium enterprises. Thus, when she attributes the NSP's statist politics to the its willingness to foster patron-client relations; in addition to the economic policy ethos of the period; the question of why the NSM choses one type of clientelism (state contracts, sub-industries etc. for workshop owners and small businesses) over another (credits and quotas for small and medium enterprises to establish private large business ventures) remained unanswered. "Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context," 121-124. However, Buğra also succintly shows that by the 1980s the liberal economic policies created an atmosphere favorable to small and medium enterprises and that the network ties among the businesses filled with religious signs and symbols helped these enterprises to establish solidarity. It should however be noted that these businesses and networks were the outcome of the previous years of NSM activity. The young men in the NSM networks would become more affluent having accumulated some capital and engage exactly in the type of business activities that the NSM had initially been proposing. See Ibid, 125-138.

[523] Telephone interview with Hasan Aksay. İstanbul, February 4, 2009.

the NSM movement as the tool of an ambitious man, Erbakan, who failed to satisfy his thirst for power under the Demirel government. They also warned against the dangers of dividing the mainstream party of the right and urged their constituencies to support the "lesser of two evils" (*ehven-i şer*), which would prevent the RPP's coming to power and keep the communists at bay. Finally, since the NSM elites portrayed their adversaries as formidable forces rooted in a worldwide conspiracy and the political question as one of survival and death of nation there was always the danger of creating a sense of powerlessness and a perception of the political action as futile.[524]

Therefore, in order to convince their potential activists to engage in direct political action and maintain those who had already been recruited, the NSM entrepreneurs used two strategies. First, they deployed motivational frames of "efficacy" and "propriety" in an intertwined fashion, which as shall be seen, contributed to the NSM collective identity to a great extent. The efficacy frame targeted to instill the sense that individual involvement to the NSM would not be in vain. Totally blanketing out the fact that the NSM organized the opening ceremonies because it had been unable to recruit activists and members, the NSM elites, propagated that the Muslim Turkish nation was already on the rise in every corner of the country coming together under the NSM, or Islam's, banner.[525] Since a nation-wide and national movement had already been in the making and was bound to succeed, the individuals would not risk anything in joining the cause.

The propriety frames, on the other hand, constructed individual participation to the NSM as historically and religiously appropriate action. Muslim Turkish nation had been selected to shoulder the responsibility to "promote the good and prevent the bad."[526] Politics, they argued, at the hand of those who can differentiate between good and bad (*mümeyyiz*), would become goodness (*fazilet*).[527] The cadres rooted in the Muslim nation would then chase the alien powers through politics and

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[524] In Benford's terms this is an "hazard" that urgency frames may create. Benford, "Hundredth Monkey," 208.

[525] See for instance Hasan Aksay, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara, February 8, 1970.

[526] Although this Kuranic idiom entrusted this duty to every individual Muslim, Erbakan and other NSM leaders explicitly or implicitly stated that the Turkish nation was "selected" to accomplish this job. See for instance, Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara.

[527] "Yorum: Siyaset ve Islam," *Türkiye'de Yarın*, September 11, 1969. In this NSM newspaper published in Konya, local elites with close ties to the party entrepreneurs reproduced the NSM collective action frames.

institutionalize the "National Order." Erbakan argued that such historical leaders as Fatih Sultan Mehmet, from the Ottoman period, and Alp Aslan from the Seljukid period were the real founders of the NOP thereby comparing them to the activists and leaders of the NSM.[528] The NSM activism was not only a reenactment of a historico-religious responsibility but also a religious duty. A faithful Muslim would fight with injustice and evil thanks to its ever-renewing hope and through selfless political action, without any material considerations.[529] A Muslim should not choose "the lesser of two evils" when and if "the good" were present.[530]

Second, while urging for political action, they tried to avoid using the adjective political party for their initiative, which was associated with self-interest and petty politics and instead deployed the term "movement," which implied solidarity and altruism. Up until the late 1969, they chose not to make public their intention to establish a political party. In a brochure of the electoral campaign of 1969, they argued that their intention was not to establish a political party since the existing laws did not allow Muslims to organize as such.[531] Several times, they repeated that their short-term goal was to "heal" the JP's horse,[532] which would "whinny with faith like the horse of Fatih Sultan Mehmet" (*imanlı imanlı kişneyecek*).[533] Moreover, as shall be seen below, even after the official establishment of the party, the NSM leaders refused to designate their political collectivity as a party and described it as a movement.[534] Only following the NSP's first electoral campaign and entry into the parliament in 1973, that the political party, not qua party but qua movement organization that sustained the movement, would gain its permanent legitimacy in the eyes of the NSM activists.

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[528] Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara.

[529] Aksay, *Milli Nizam,* 18-19.

[530] A very well known slogan of the NSM parties was "Ehven-i şer yok, hayrın ta kendisi var" (No more "lesser of two evils but the good itself."

[531] See for instance the campaign brochure of 1969 entitled *Mukaddesatçı Türk'e Beyanname.* Document at National Library catalogue no 1970 AD 563.

[532] The JP's symbol was a white horse, which in turn implied that it was a continuation of the Democrat Party. In Anatolia, citizens had deformed the Turkish translation of Democrat, Demokrat, into similarly sounding "Demir Kırat" which literally meant "Iron White Horse."

[533] "Prof. Erbakan İlçeleri Geziyor," *Türkiye de Yarın,* September 23, 1969.

[534] The NSM leaders also paid lip service to a possible merger with parties closest to their position, even organized some meetings. However, since efforts to act together against the JP had not produced any tangible results before, it would be difficult to argue that the NSM leaders seriously considered uniting the NOP with smaller right wing parties after 1970.

5.1.4 The Reception of the NSM Collective Action Frames Among the Potential Activists in Kayseri

The NSM frames helped to create "individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution"[535] through rendering new meanings to the activists' experiences and sub-identities at the periphery of the periphery and then articulated them with the political center.

This section studies how the NSM action-oriented frames were received among the activists and their functions and properties through a reinterpreted perspective of Noakes and Johnston on "frame resonance." Noakes and Johnston argue that a mobilization frame has three major qualities which contribute to its resonance, or its compelling power, among the potential activists: "cultural compatibility," or "the overlap between a frame and the cultural stock of the potential constituents;" "relevance," or the capacity to make sense of what is happening in the lives of the targeted audience; and finally "consistency," or "the internal consistency of the movement's beliefs, ideology, claims, and actions and whether these "hang together"."[536] While the authors attribute the above-mentioned qualities to the frames themselves and assign agency mainly to potential activists only within the context of the discussion of "relevance," this study argues that all these qualities should be studied from the lenses of the potential activists as well, who filter and negotiate the meanings and relative importance of politico-cultural products. In other words, a frame is culturally compatible, relevant and consistent to the extent that the target audience perceives or accepts them as such in relation to their own previous experiences.

During the interviews, the NSM activists in Kayseri either intentionally or unintentionally made clear that they had received NSM leaders' frames with caution, subscribing to some views and disagreeing with, even discarding, others. When they did not take a frame into consideration, they either dismissed it critically or laughed it off. In some cases, they enjoyed a frame even though they did not

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[535] Polletta and Jasper, 285.
[536] John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston, "Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective," in *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham, Boulder and New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 15-16.

embrace or use it themselves, since they knew it damaged the reputation of their political opponents. One interviewee gave an example of the latter attitude through relating a conversation he witnessed. Right after the coup of 1960, a man who "knew people" in high places came to Kayseri and, in order to criticize the coup he told his father and those who were present about the atrocities that the military government committed. After he left, someone said "we know that all he told is a lie but we like it." Another agreed, with the words of a "wise man": "if someone deceives us with good (*hak*) in mind, we would purposely be deceived."[537]

This subsection, then, discusses how and why the NSM activists found the NSM frames a) compatible with their own identities and religious and political culture of the networks in which they were embedded; b) consistent and relevant under the light of comparisons with other parties and their own experiences and observations[538] at the periphery of the periphery.

To begin with, from a broader perspective the NSM frames on the moral and material domains were congruent with the stories and narratives[539] and political discourses prevalent within the right wing networks. As mentioned in Chapter 4, such cultural and political compatibility meant that the NSM frames could have appealed to any member of the right wing. However, only those situated at the periphery of the periphery, or those who could not have benefited from the material and moral resources distributed by the JP found the NSM frames internally consistent and relevant to their own experiences. For the prospective activists the NSM frames highlighted the disparity between the rhetoric and actual practices of other parties, particularly those of the JP's.

As far as the material domain is concerned, the major right wing parties, particularly the DP and later the JP had long been arguing for and promising rapid industrial development. However, the NSM frames incorporated an injustice component that the JP and other right wing parties lacked and criticized in detail previous and current governments' technological and entrepreneurial policies.

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[537] Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.

[538] Benford and Stanford differentiate between empirical credibility, or "the fit between the framing and events of the world" that the potential activists observe, and "experiential commensurability," or similarities found between the frames and personal experiences. Here, experience and empirical observation are used interchangeably. See Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance," 208-210.

[539] Snow and Benford call this type of resonance "narrative fidelity." Ibid., 210.

While the dominant elements of the right wing networks, which had had access to state-controlled resources or had long established ties with economic centers and powers, remained unmoved by the economic injustice frame, the small traders, the factory foreman, engineers and small workshop owners established a correspondence between their own peripheral situation, the unjust treatment of Erbakan in the hands of the JP liberals, and Turkey's peripheral position within the world economy.

The NSM activists found the NSM's claims regarding the JP's "dependent industrialization" and unjust economic policies particularly relevant as they had themselves already witnessed or discussed such problems as how military factories in Kayseri had been buying overpriced auxiliary equipment like washers from the United States which could have been easily produced by the local workshops[540] reviving the local economy; how artisans were struggling to buy turning machines and industrial cutlery to start or enlarge their own businesses[541]; or what deemed to be the unjust rivalry of bigger local traders who could buy the latest products from their years-old connections in İstanbul.[542]

Compared to the industrial policies of the JP, for the activists, the NSM prognostic frames promised ingenious, original and just solutions consistent with diagnosed problems.[543] Despite its rhetoric of industrial development, the JP was building "pasta, soda, and chocolate," even worse, beer and rakı[544] factories[545] and let the larger business owners to siphon resources at the expense of small businessmen. In contrast, the NSM entrepreneurs promised not only protection but also an opportunity for growth through the establishment of "factories which would manufacture factories," for instance, factories that would produce "turning machines and industrial cutlery" in Anatolia.

As for the moral domain, the right wing parties since the DP period had already been crying a moral decay and accusing the RPP and the state military and

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[540] Interview with KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2009.
[541] Interview with KayNS12, Kayseri, September 12, 2006.
[542] Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.
[543] Interviews with KayNS12, Kayseri, September 12, 2006; KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007; KayNS3, Kayseri, August 7, 2006.
[544] A strong anise flavored spirit prevalent in the Mediterranean basin, considered as national drink of citizens of Turkey.
[545] Interviews with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006 and KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006.

civil bureaucracies for repressing the religious who could have fought against corruption. At any rate, as other members of the right wing networks, the prospective activists had been familiar with stories of repression having either witnessed themselves, or learned from their fathers, grandfathers, neighbors or older colleagues how citizens had been arrested for teaching Kuran to little children or for putting an Islamic headwear during the 1940s.

At first sight, the solution that the NSM promised for moral problems did not appear radically different from previous right frames which had promised to "defend religious freedoms" against the RPP: a promise to redress the injustices inflicted on the religious by the ruling (state and political) elites on the one hand and to fight with moral corruption through educational reform on the other. In their reception of the NSM frames, as important as the narratives prevalent within the right wing networks, was their own and recent experiences and observations under the JP government. The failure of the right-wing collective actions of the 1960s, including the TOBB Affair, the marginalization of ultranationalists and Islamists within the JP[546] and the daily appearing news of the *Risale-i Nur* students being imprisoned[547] attested to the inconsistency between the JP frames and actions.

Moreover, the prospective NSM activists witnessed that the adjective "reactionary" that had so far been deployed against the DP and JP supporters by the RPP elites, was now used against all those who were critical of the JP's policies, including not only the Islamists but also the conservative-nationalist and ultranationalist opponents.[548] In addition to these more general concerns, some religious technical specialists and engineers who at some point worked for the government had had individual difficulties concerning their religious life. They had been subject to symbolic violence on the part of their non-practicing peers. For instance, in order to pray, they had to literally and figuratively descend below stairs

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[546] Interview with KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2009.
[547] Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.
[548] Interestingly enough, though the ultranationalists, conservative-nationalists and Islamists were all subject to such belittling, once the Islamists emerged as a political party, the former two began using the same terminology for the Islamists. Incidentally, almost all the NSM interviewees were pleased with the partial convergence of their economic injustice frames with the left and enjoyed being called "green communists" as they, in a way, proved false those who had been calling them "reactionaries".

with janitors,[549] an experience which hurt both their religious feelings and middle-class pride.

Hence, the activists perceived the NSM's solution to moral decay, that is educational reform through Muslim political action, as a just solution both for themselves and the Muslim nation and consistent with the diagnosed problem. They welcomed the prospect of "Muslim power," which for most meant to regain Muslim dignity in state affairs vis-à-vis "the Alevis, Christians, and Jews,"[550] and for some to restore the Muslim superiority that they believed had been lost to non-Muslims by the introduction of the Republic.[551]

Moreover, the prospective activists thought educational reform was consistent with nationalism and Islam, as it promoted the principle of uniting the nation under the same values without brute force. In contrast to the NAP or the right wing movements of the 1960s (including various Islamist circles), which had engaged in street violence against the left wing in the name of the nation, the NSM leaders, at least at the beginning of their endeavor and up until the late 1970s when they turned a blind eye to the actions of some branches of their youth group, specifically refused to fight with other "children of the nation." Instead of advocating a struggle against "the symptom" of moral decay, that is communism, educational reform targeted the root cause. Whether or not previously participated to anti-communist aggressions, the NSM activists had concluded that such strategies were fruitless, not only because they invited state intervention but also because such a struggle is inherently divisive for the society and an impediment to moral and material development.

Finally, it should be added that the NSM frames became all the more credible when the prospective activists compared the NSM entrepreneurs with other right wing leaders. Above all, they appreciated the party entrepreneurs' ability, ease

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[549] Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006. "Below stairs" refers to the servants' area in a rich household.

[550] Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007. It should be added here that the NSM elites had never made official statement that would exclude the Alevis from the definition of the nation. However, during the interviews a considerable number of the NSM elites and local activists made clear that they viewed the Alevis as heretic brethren who lost their way at best, or fifth columns at worst.

[551] Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006. Interestingly enough the political superiority of the Muslims was first lost in the 19th century, when the Ottomans introduced equal civil and political rights for the non-Muslims. The Republican period was in a sense its continuation.

and confidence in using religious idioms, signs and symbols. As an interviewee suggested, "a person familiar with traditional culture would sense" when these religious cultural elements were used even if they were communicated discreetly.[552] The potential activists were impressed most with the leadership's refusal to be discreet compared to the JP's search of balance in displaying public religiosity. For instance, it was the first time they saw political leaders who saluted the audience with the Islamo-Arabic phrase "Esselamün Aleyküm"[553] despite the fact that it was frequently used in daily life. Likewise, it was the first time they witnessed a political leader, Erbakan, who, rather than bowing down to such insults as "*takunyacılar*" (clog wearer), took pride in what the insult implied: " If this term is used in reference to ...wearing clogs to make ablutions for daily prayers, then I should state that we are proud to be Muslims."[554] There was then a marked contrast between this bold attitude and other right wing leaders' occasional use of religious signs and symbols. The latter was either religious but hiding it, or not religious but abusing religion.[555] Whatever the right answer was, in comparison to others the NSM leaders appeared to live and behave according to their principles and beliefs. Moreover, unlike other parties' national executive bodies, which included both publicly religious and not-so-religious or not-publicly-religious personalities, the NSM's higher echelons demonstrated an apparent homogeneity in religious matters: not only Erbakan was a *Naqshbandi* disciple (being *Naqshbandi* was deemed a "doctorate" in religion among the pious) and there were prominent *Nur* students among the party founders, but also the NSM elites as a whole were very knowledgeable and fluent on traditional religious subjects. The NSM leaders' consistent and regular public display of individual religiosity and the homogeneity of the movement leadership were taken to be the sign of being genuinely religious and honest thus an indication of and future guarantee for consistency between frames and actions. In the eyes of the potential activists, then, the NSM leadership,

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[552] Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.
[553] Interview with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006.
[554] "Müslümanlığımızla iftihar ederiz," *Bizim Anadolu*, May 28, 1969.
[555] They concluded that other right wing leaders' religious signs and behavior constituted "an abuse." Interview with KayNS9, September 25, 2006.

particularly Erbakan, was credible enough to acquire the status of true representative of the nation[556], and of the activists for that matter.

5.2 The NSM Collective Identity Process

Collective identity frames (expressive vocabulary), similar to mobilization frames "define in cognitive terms the field of possibilities and limits which [the activists] perceive", but involve more inward looking symbolic production which "give sense to [activists'] being together and to the goals they pursue."[557] The collective identity provides the answer for "who we are" and "what we do and how we do it?" Through the creation of a sense of "we," collective identity nourishes "positive feelings"[558] among the activists. Such positive feelings as responsibility, affection, solidarity facilitate individuals' engagement to political action even when the prospect of collective and individual benefits that collective action frames promise seem remote, unlikely or even unattainable.

On the one hand, since targeted collective goods expressed through instrumental vocabulary are available to all if the movement succeeds, individuals would choose to "free ride" on the efforts of others.[559] On the other hand, at the beginning of the mobilization process, the material benefits that an individual activist could harvest through activism, or the "Olson's … solutions to the free-rider dilemma," would be neither immediately available nor visible.[560]

Consequently, the effective expression and construction of grievances and interest through collective action frames leads to political action to the extent that they are coupled with and contribute to the collective identity formation. Neither the prospect of collective goods, nor selective material incentives for individuals introduced through instrumental frames guarantee mobilization unless they contribute to and interact with senses of solidarity, duty, empowerment and

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[556] As one interviewee maintained the person who would be his leader should have to be perfect like Erbakan, who had not missed a single prayer during his visit to Kayseri. Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.
[557] Melucci, 332.
[558] Collective identity has been differentiated from frames and ideology mainly emphasizing "perception of shared status" and "positive feelings." See Polletta and Jasper, 285.
[559] For a discussion on "free rider" problem see Mancur Olson, T*he Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
[560] Polletta and Jasper, 284.

affection that form among the potential activists through action and interaction at social and spatial settings of movement activity.[561]

5.2.1 The Collective Identity Frames, or the Expressive Vocabulary of the NSM Leaders

The expressive vocabulary of the NSM leaders defined both their collective endeavor as a whole and the properties of the individuals who make part of the collectivity. They intertwined individual and collective qualities to form a sense of "we" which not only helped activist recruitment and sustained mobilization but also set the symbolic boundaries between the NSM and other political groups.

To begin with, the NSM innovators emphasized that the NSM party(ies) did not represent a "simple [political] party cause" but embodied the revival of the essence of the nation[562], or Muslims. In fact, the NSM was not actually a political party. The latter was an identity imposed by the existing laws on "35 million" person who wanted to unite under the banner of Islam (*şehadet bayrağı*).[563] The NSM was thus not a simple partisan endeavor but a collective action of people who "shared the same religious faith." Unlike the parties who had divided the nation into different interest groups, the NSM activists came together to establish the National Order and unity, and to fight against vanity and blasphemy through solidarity (*omuz omuza*), cooperation (*elbirliği*) and bonds of love (*gönül birliği*).[564]

The properties that the NSM leaders attributed to the members of the movement celebrated and reinforced individual Muslim identity through its reconstruction within the context of the NSM as an ideal individual: not only religious, or "had fear of god,"[565] but also politically responsible, active, courageous, altruistic, and enlightened person who was sensitive, able to find and execute correct solutions to economic, political, technical, social and cultural problems of the country. Erbakan was himself promoted as a model Muslim who

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[561] It has been argued that one should simply admit the importance of emotional satisfaction derived from collective identity. See Ibid, 290.
[562] Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara.
[563] Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Edirne.
[564] Hüseyin Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970.
[565] Hüseyin Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük, May 31, 1970.

could represent and speak the mind of the cadre that constituted the NSM in particular, the nation in general.

Hasan Aksay's expressions illustrate the way in which the NSM activists, were defined as people who could shoulder the responsibility of politics to fight with injustice: "Politics is difficult. Political life is not comfortable. It is like falling into an arena. Politician is situated at a point where everybody scrutinizes to find a fault…" Those who observed such difficulties feared from political activity and would produce excuses not to engage politically and pull back, calling politics "the swamp;" all the while complaining about injustices and waiting sacrifice from others. The activists in contrast were Muslims who tried to practice the Kuranic principles of "do not let two days be the same" and "prevent the bad." They were good, virtuous and altruistic people who did not expect any benefits from politics and hence did not hesitate to "fill the swamp" with their "unsoiled existence."[566]

Moreover, the NSM expressive vocabulary designated the activists as an enlightened cadre that possessed historical qualities of the nation and thus entitled to govern the nation.[567] At various occasions, the NSM leaders, particularly Erbakan, emphasized how early Muslims contributed to the development of science and how the Ottomans and the Seljukids Islamized Anatolia. The NSM activists were equally capable of undertaking similar tasks: they would industrialize Anatolia and clean "un-national (*gayri milli*) elements that became a nuisance in government."[568]

Such a construction of the NSM activist identity then supported the NSM's portrayal as a meta- and a-political political entity, which would bring salvation – "God willing"- not only to the nation, but also to the *umma* (the entire Muslim community in the world) and the world.

The NSM Collective Identity in Kayseri

The collective identity of the NSM in Kayseri, as shaped by action- and identity oriented frames and emotional interaction among the NSM activists,

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[566] Aksay, *Milli Nizam*,18.
[567] MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, 38
[568] Ibid.

provided a sense of "we," which solidified interpersonal bonds among the potential activists. Both the symbolic and practical creation of solidarity, affection and empowerment and the reinforcement of already existing individual subidentities helped the individuals to overcome their reservations and then articulate themselves with the national and local level of politics. As such, the emergence and functions of the NSM collective identity can best be understood in relation to the previously acquired individual subidentities and experiences of the NSM activists.

First, the feelings of solidarity, affection for each other and duty helped the NSM activists to overcome their reservations regarding party activism, which they associated with "petty politics" and "self-interest" as a result of their experience under the JP government and within the right-wing networks. The interviewees expressed their sense of solidarity with and affection to fellow activists most when referring to such events as party opening ceremonies, congresses and electoral mobilization periods where individuals undertook collective tasks and when they read, heard, and experienced "outsiders'" reactions, comments, interests regarding themselves. Referring to their initial participation and subsequent contributions to the NSM, they deployed the same expressions that the NSM innovators had first used in the party opening ceremonies, which emphasized altruism, sacrifice and duty for the good of the nation: "…this cause is not an individualistic cause…This…is a divine sacred cause. Each of us is a soldier within it. None of us is different from the other"[569]; "Those who are afraid of damages to their wealth should not come to our party… Our motto is to be under God's command and serve those who are [also] under His command."[570]

The NSM activists felt that joining the NSM was a duty however it was conceptualized: religious or citizen duty, or both. Some expressed this sense of duty as follows: "We realized that country was in a terrible situation, it seems the duty falls upon us, we should get together with others and contribute to country's [development]"[571]; some others maintained that the party leaders called him

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[569] Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli.
[570] Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük.
[571] Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.

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(literally and figuratively) to grab the Islamic flag together with others as a Muslim and he dutifully did.[572]

Second, the NSM expressive vocabulary, which celebrated individual traits of Muslims as representing the qualities of the nation and called them for political action for material and moral development, filled the activists with a sense of empowerment and responsibility/duty through acknowledging their individual cultural capital and its importance. The NSM activists had been extremely uncomfortable with the equation of religiosity with reactionary attitude for they not only did not see any relevance but also perceived themselves as more than religious subjects: (informally or formally) well-educated men in their own areas of interest ranging from professional issues to politics, economy, literature, history and traditional Islamic philosophy. The NSM thus gave them an opportunity to "socially realize" and to put into good use their individual selves within and through political action.

This aspect of their collective identity had such prominence that following the NSP's entry into the parliament it became a factor that the NSM leaders had to take into account in the choice of party policies and strategies. The activists reproduced the centralized decision making structure of the party and admitted that the NSM leaders, especially Erbakan was very knowledgeable, experienced and visionary in technical issues, and insightful and knowledgeable in political and religious matters. Nevertheless, they also emphasized that they were capable and competent enough to criticize the actions and choices made by the party elites. As a symptom and/or consequence of this attitude, most local party executives did not like reading the party's newspaper *Milli Gazete* (National Newspaper), thinking that it was too aggressive at times. As one interviewee put it their reaction was: "Do not impose me your politics, I can do [it] myself."[573] This critical stance and individualistic tendencies of the NSM activists[574] supported by the NSM collective identity was balanced, in fact, controlled, through above mentioned aspects of

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[572] Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.
[573] Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006.
[574] This was also true for some central young elites. For instance Turhan Utku and Çavuşoğlu who were among the first young activists to be recruited during the Movement of Independents, though they had the greatest admiration and respect for Erbakan and a true dedication to the cause, they were also "free spirits". During their political careers they often conflicted with the NSM leadership. Especially Çavuşoğlu, as other Akıncı leaders, tried to keep Akıncı youth as autonomous as possible from the NSM.

collective identity: solidarity, altruism, and sense of duty. Most important, as shall be seen these features of the NSM identity would prove to be very valuable as the NSM selective material and moral incentives for the party and individual activists became more accessible and visible during the electoral processes, creating intramovement power struggles.

5.3 Unintended Dimensions and Consequences of the NSM Ideational Products

In order to challenge their electoral rivals and recruit activists, the NSM leaders displayed a rather calculated effort to *differentiate* their initiative from other political parties and forces. They redefined the "nation" as primarily Muslim, without so much giving up on emphasis on Turkishness, and promoted the NSM parties as the embodiments and representatives of this nation. Through new meanings and interpretations the NSM ideational elements mobilized the potential activists of the right wing networks helping them to articulate their professional, social, political and economic experiences, perceptions, connections and identities with the national level of the political arena.

However, the NSM politico-cultural production involved subliminal (meaning unintentional) dimensions as well, which can also be called "reasonable"[575] facet of symbolic activism. These dimensions entailed a process of reproduction of orthodoxy of the political arena where heterodoxy and change were intended and a parallel process of differentiation within the right wing networks while claiming to represent a natural affinity between being a Muslim and joining the ranks of the NSM.

In other words, on the one hand, within the political arena the NSM, as other contemporary and previous Islamists in Turkey, reproduced the orthodoxy in

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[575] Erik Neveu contributes to the scholarly discussion of social movement frames reminding Pierre Bourdieu's differentiation between different types of action: rational action (calculative, strategic), mechanical reaction (cause and effect) and reasonable action. Reasonable action is carried not because actors have a predefined object or because actors react against an external stimuli but just because within a particular field of action the players of the game act for "practical reasons". This act, which literally and figuratively "goes without saying," is produced by the "ontological complicity between the mental structures and objective structures". Neveu, *Sociologie des Mouvements Sociaux*, 83-84; Pierre Bourdieu, "Un Acte Désintérressé est-il Possible?" in *Raisons Pratiques: Sur la Theorie de l'Action* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 149-157.

a heterodox fashion: similar to other political players (state and political elites), the NSM immersed the particularistic interests, demands and problems of its activists and supporters in a political frame that claimed power in the name of a homogenously conceptualized nation, in this case defined as Muslim. For the NSM, the meta-rule of the political game, which defined politics as the representation of the nation, was thus a resource as much as a constraint within the political field. It was a constraint since the nation had already been defined in particular terms by the existing dominant powers. It however became a resource because it provided a window of opportunity for the NSM who could redefine the nation through attributing new meanings and values to the "trump cards" of the political game: Turkishness, Muslimness, progress, and secularism.

On the other hand, the institutionalization of the definition of the nation as Muslim within the framework of party politics, and the designation of the NSM as the sole legitimate representative of this nation revealed inadvertently the relative lack of interest in political activism (i.e voting or party work) in the name of the "Muslims" or "Muslim nation." Within the right wing networks while Islam was a resource as a tool bag of socially entrenched signs, symbols, values, and beliefs, Islam as differently interpreted and practiced religion was a constraint for political action. Moreover, the NSM activists needed to differentiate themselves as a collectivity from other pious members of the right wing. Therefore, while pretending to represent orthodoxy, the NSM local and national leaders had to undergo a process of differentiation from other Muslims in order to justify and legitimize their juxtaposition of Muslimness with the NSM. Not only a Muslim needed to be redefined as a politically conscious and active subject but also in an environment where religiousness was equated with religious stringency the NSM activists were forced to refashion themselves according to ever more-stringent interpretations of religion to be "more Muslim" than other Muslims worthy to represent the nation.

This section argues that the cognitive, relational and environmental factors peculiar to political field rendered not only the intended but also the unintended aspects and consequences of the NSM ideational products articulatory and integrative for the activists and the party. The reproduction of the orthodoxy at the national level blurred the boundaries between the NSM and other political players

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and thus facilitated the integration of the NSM into the political game. The electoral gains and subsequent coalition partnerships which allowed access to state distributed resources firmly consolidated the NSM. The redefinition of Muslimness underscored the boundaries that united the NSM activists and supporters and fortified their sense of solidarity, empowerment and affection which symbolically supported the party throughout the years to come. Since both the extra- and intra-movement resources were the primary conditions to sustain political activism within the existing national and local contexts, it can thus safely be maintained that as long as the conditions within these contexts persisted, these features proved to be more salient than the diagnostic and prognostic mobilization frames even in the face of new challenges, needs and changes.

5.3.1 The NSM Ideational Production at the National Level of the Political Field

Steinberg reminds that social movements' ideational elements (she uses the term discourse, discursive repertoires) are "only partly the product of calculated action. …[These are] partly bounded by the cultural practices available for [the social movements] to make meaning."[576] She thus recommends a "dialogical analysis" which would take into consideration how power holders within a specific sociological field determine the terms of communicative interaction, in fact, the discourses of the challengers.[577] While this recommendation is the first step forward to understand the layered and "dependent" nature of the NSM collective identity and the mobilization frames, Pierre Bourdieu provides the second step, which refuses to imprison interaction among the players of a field within simple "communication relations." According to Bourdieu, communication relations are inseparable parts of power relations, which, not only, "in their content and form, depend on the [thus far] accumulated material and symbolic power of the individuals (or institutions)"[578] but also serve to increase them within a field of

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[576] Marc W. Steinberg, "Toward a More Dialogical Analysis of Social Movement Culture," in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda Robnett (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 208.

[577] Steinberg, 224.

[578] Pierre Bourdieu, "Sur le Pouvoir Symbolique," *Langage et Pouvoir Symbolique* (Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2001), 206. It should be noted that in this text, Bourdieu focuses on the relations of power

action and interaction. Particularly, it is through accumulation of symbolic power, or increasing the value of a specific symbolic capital, which relates to one's status within the field, that one builds up material (economic and social) capital, even achieve the monopoly of ideational production.[579] From this perspective, the symbolic work, or the instrumental and expressive vocabularies and collective identities of the social movements and political parties are part of the power relations specific to the political arena aiming at increasing the symbolic and material power of their participants.

The NSM actors, like their contemporary or predecessor Islamists, who had had engaged in action and interaction with their rivals without a political party of their own, were heterodox players trying to increase the value of a symbolic capital which was available in the political arena and with which they associated themselves: religion. Through their mobilization frames and collective identity, they tried to augment the value of things associated with Islam, or reshuffle the symbolic order of things in "Muslims'" favor. However, the very fact that they were engaged in power relations and tried to accumulate symbolic and material power in the political field, demonstrated that they were also as orthodox players as their opponents. They (subliminally, or "reasonably") appropriated the *doxa* of field, or the entire set of cognitive and evaluative presuppositions, whose "recognition is implicated by the membership to the field itself."[580] In other words, the NSM actors, similar to the dominant members of the field, who defended the existing hierarchy of the things, adopted the stakes of the game and tacitly "agree[d] on the objects of dissensus" as these were "constitutive of the field itself."[581]

The NSM ideational products and practices entailed, thus, on the one hand, a *challenge* to the hierarchy, which had placed "Islam" at a subordinate position in the political sphere, and on the other hand, a *consensus*, which reproduced the *doxa*

between the classes. However, he applies his conceptualization of symbolic production to any relation of power between groups who play within a specific field.

[579] Bourdieu, "Sur le Pouvoir Symbolique," 206-207

[580] Bourdieu, *Méditations*,145.

[581] Pierre Bourdieu, "Le Champ Scientifique," *Actes de Recherches en Sciences Sociales* 2 (1976): 100. See also, Pierre Bourdieu, "Pour une Science des Oeuvres," in *Raisons Pratiques: Sur la Theorie de l'Action* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 71. This essay finds Bourdieu's analysis of the scientific or the literary field much more useful to understand the nature of power relations in a given field. The Turkish political field since the 1950s witnessed the clash of legitimacy of "the truths" (positivist truth of the Kemalists and the religious truth of the Islamists) much like the clash of truths in a scientific field.

of the politics in Turkey, originally the Kemalist[582] *doxa*, which still survives today.[583] The latter involved squeezing the meaning of political activity to representing the nation[584] and creating "social engineering projects" which rendered "the society as the object [as opposed to subject] of the politics."[585]

In studying the foundational ideational elements of the new republic, Binnaz Toprak maintains that in their endeavor to build a modern nation-state, the Kemalists took the West as their muse and saw an inherent "incompatibility" between Islamic and Western societies. They believed that in order to modernize the country, they had to eliminate Islamic values, laws and customs, which opposed the Kemalist perception of a modern nation based on the Western example.[586] However, Bozarslan shows that the radical measures that the Kemalists took to decrease the influence of religion in state affairs cannot be solely attributed to their ideational framework. They were party related to the practical and difficult task of creating a nation-state over the ruins and the remnants of a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and multi-cultural empire where the primary loyalties were above all for the confessional communities, tribes, and brotherhoods. Since the religious geography of Anatolia had become quite homogenous following the deportation and massacres of the Armenians and the exchange of populations with Greece, the Kemalists faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they had to accept Islam as a resource for "imagining" or identifying the Turkish nation as the remaining and immigrating populations to Anatolia were overwhelmingly Muslim; on the other hand, using religion as such constituted a risk for the Kemalist imagination of the nation. It could a) reinforce communitarian loyalties and thus diminish the loyalty for the nation-state; b) encourage extraterritorial ambitions seeking to unite Muslim

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[582] The adjective Kemalist is a word derived from the name of the Republic's leading founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and used generally to refer to the worldviews of the state elites (civil and military bureaucrats) who had been acting as the guardians of the regime in the name of the nation since the inauguration of the Republic. See below for further discussion.

[583] For an early work that draws attention to the analytical danger of putting the Islamists and the Kemalists in "binary opposition" in terms of their ideational production see Banu Helvacıoğlu, " 'Allahu Ekber', We are Turks: yearning for a different homecoming at the periphery of Europe," *Third World Quarterly* 17 (1996): 503-523.

[584] Hamit Bozarslan, "Islam, Laïcité et la Question d'Autorité de l'Empire Ottoman à la Turquie Kemaliste," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 125 (2004): 111.

[585] Menderes Çınar, "Kemalist Cumhuriyetcilik ve İslamci Kemalizm," in *İslamcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 6 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 176. Comparing and contrasting the Kemalists and the Islamists Çınar succintly demonstrates that the Kemalist project and Islamist "counter project" have essentially the same authoritarian tendencies. He, however, does not dwell on why and how exactly these two projects came to reflect each other.

[586] Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, 39-40.

countries and c) become an ideational resource for the mobilization of Kurdish nationalists around the brotherhoods.[587] But the greatest danger that "Islam" posed for the Kemalists and their vision of the nation was that religion "…could, at least potentially, substitute itself for the nation as the principal reference of politics and identity, thereby subordinating [the nation] to its own principles."[588]

The Kemalists "solved" this problem through not completely separating religion from state (and community) affairs as was the case in France, but submitting religion to state's control. The state's jurisdiction over the religious life and institutions identified "legal" and "illegal" religious activities and interpretations and banned religion from the public life, rendering religiosity a strictly private affair. Bozarslan argues that the Kemalist project during the early years of the Republic was two fold: First, it was about shaping "a rational and national Islam, charged with the task of legitimizing the power, supporting its will to eradicate all non-official [forms of] religiosity (brotherhood, "Ottoman", "Arabic", popular) in the name of the progress, revolution and civilization. …Second, within a society whose legitimacy resided in its religious homogeneity, secularism was elevated to a constitutional obligation, conditioning even the citizenship."[589] These ideational and institutional developments in turn meant respectively that at least within the political arena "religion and the religious could exist only in a submissive condition" and the nation, whose Muslimness had been admitted, could only exist if secular.[590]

The Republican elites, having guaranteed the loyalty of the urban middle classes, intellectuals and the alliance of the rural notables and İstanbul big bourgeoisie, launched this project believing that the society at large would eventually be secularized, meaning abandoning the idea that religion should play a role in state affairs. Until then, the single party regime of the RPP, Law of High Treason and various other Penal laws protected not only the secular reforms but also the elites themselves.[591] Secularism, henceforth, became an element of the *doxa* of the political field, for, it both institutionalized the Kemalist vision of

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[587] Hamit Bozarslan, "Islam, Nationalisme ou les Paradoxes Turcs," *Après Demain*, no. 447/449 (2002): 17.
[588] Ibid.
[589] Hamit Bozarslan, "Islam, Laicité et la question d'Autorité": 112
[590] Ibid.
[591] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 412.

nation-state and provided a dispositive of power, supporting and ensuring the dominance of the Kemalist state-builders, who claimed to represent the nation.

Following the passage to multi-party electoral system by 1945,[592] notwithstanding its submissive, subordinated and "domesticated" status, Islam had paradoxically become, alongside Turkishness, secularism and progress/modernization[593], an element of the political field's *doxa*.[594] Since the latter was ultimately tied to "the question of exercising power in the name of the nation,"[595] the existence of Islam as a constitutive of the *doxa*, even if subservient, offered an alternative dispositive of power for the newcomers. By 1945, when the establishment of political parties became legal, both Islam and secularism became the most disputed subjects of the political arena. While the new political parties opposing the RPP, the Democrat Party (DP) and the Nation Party (NP), attacked the RPP for its stringent approach to secularism, the RPP in turn accused these parties' leaders for encouraging "reactionaries" (*irticacılar*). Following its victory against the RPP in 1950, the DP introduced a liberal interpretation of secularism allowing religious life to thrive. For the purposes of this study, the most important development of the period was the mobilization of individual Islamists and some informal (including the *Nur* students) Islamist groups in support of the DP and the NP. Since the introduction of the Law of High Treason, the Islamists – some had been active members of the Islamist branch of the Constitutionalist movement (the Young Turks) of the Ottoman Empire- came out of the closet for the first time, taking advantage of the relatively liberal atmosphere. They tried to refute the arguments that Islam was the main cause of the "backwardness" of the Muslim world in general, the Turks in particular, through providing their own conceptualization of civilization and reading of Westernization. Most important, they redefined the nation as Muslim, claimed in their turn to represent the authentic will of the nation and asked the DP government to introduce changes in the

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[592] For a discussion of how Turkey abandoned the authoritarian single party regime and adopted a semi-authoritarian multi party democracy by the 1950s see Erik J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd, 1993), 215-228.

[593] On the question of how the Islamists and Kemalists position themselves vis-à-vis "Europe" see Helvacıoğlu, 514-519.

[594] For a detailed discussion of this process see Hamit Bozarslan, "La laïcité en Turquie," *Matériaux pour l'Histoire de Notre Temps* no. 78 (2005): 42-49.

[595] Bozarslan, " Islam, Laicité et la question d'Autorité": 111.

religious policies of the state ranging from recitation of Kuran in the state radio to reversing certain secular reforms of the earlier period.

While the NSM entrepreneurs had their intellectual roots within this early Islamist movement of the 1950s, it can be argued that as important as the legacy of the previous movement for the ideational production of the NSM was the persistence of the *doxa* of the political arena. The military coup of 1960 that had been staged against the DP and the "reactionaries" had introduced the military as the guardian of the regime and reinstituted the terms of the political game despite the introduction of a relatively liberal constitution discussed in Chapter 4. While the military junta justified its intervention claiming to represent the national will, the JP, which had capitalized on the DP's legacy, opposed the coup also in the name of the nation. In that sense, the NSM innovators, as other political actors, including other Islamists, could not escape from reproducing the discourse of the "national will" and presenting "social engineering projects," all the while trying to differentiate themselves from other political elites, through the display and promotion of an "Islamic life style" and particularly from the other Islamists[596] through the introduction of injustice and economic development frames.[597] As a matter of fact, it was the reproduction of the orthodoxy, which gave them the opportunity to introduce their "limited" heterodoxy.

At any rate, while the heterodox elements of the NSM frames challenged the opponents, the reproduction of orthodoxy, to the extent that Islam was its constitutive element, consolidated the NSM as a legitimate player of the political game, forced the other actors to "play along" and hence amplified the NSM demands and influence disproportionate to its actual power and numbers. The appropriation and reinterpretation of the Islamic element of the *doxa* forced all political actors to think and comment on the issue: since the mainstream right wing

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[596] i.e the Nur students, Süleymancıs and various organized or unorganized Islamist individuals and groups.

[597] It should be noted that Nilüfer Göle has already argued that the Islamist "counter-elites" engaged in a struggle with the "secular elites" through the creation and promotion of alternative, "Islamic" modern "life-worlds." However, as shall be discussed further below, her conceptualization of the arena of "intersubjectivity, stratification, and power" is problematic which prevents her from differentiating national and local levels of political activity and from seeing how meso-level factors (organizations and networks) influence Islamist identity and action frames in interaction with macro and micro factors at the national and local fields of action."The Making of Elites and Counter-elites," 51-52.

parties had already put Islam into use to increase their democratic credibility in the eyes of the electorate and the RPP had established itself as a guardian of the secular system, in order to face the NSM's challenge these parties needed to introduce and reintroduce their own versions of "Muslimness" attributed to the nation.

Consequently, from a point of view which takes into account the relations of power and political opportunities and constraints that accompany these relations, the goal of the Islamists in the political field does not appear as one of changing the state and society *as such* but as one of transfiguring the hierarchy of material and symbolic values associated with Islam in order to increase the interest (political, economic and social capital) of one's own and the supporters of the movement. There is no need then to attribute "hidden plans," "ill formulated ideology" or "moderation" to the NSM actors to explain the discrepancy between their frames of Islamization of the state and society and their consensual relations with other political parties in the parliament. To be sure to capture the state apparatus and bring into the Islamist wagon the majority of the citizens would be the ultimate solution, as it would "reseal" the game in the NSM's terms, placing Islam and its "guardians," the NSM participants, at the highest echelon. However, as shall be seen, the symbolic and material gains achieved through party politics, satisfied the actors in a multiplicity of ways that the ultimate solution came to serve more as an element of the NSM mobilization and identity frames and a symbolic challenge to the rivals than a full fledged, well-thought of social engineering venture. As other institutionalized actors of the political field, their engagement patterns entailed not only contestation and conflict but also negotiation and compromise. Meanwhile however, the forgotten, the undiscussed, were the development of individual rights and liberties. As long as the nation was defined primarily through Turkishness and Sunni Islam, the *doxa* of the political field was an impediment for those political, cultural, religious and ethnic groups such as the Kurds, the Alevis, the non-Muslims religious minorities and even the socialists, who could not express their interest, demands, and grievances within the confines of representing such a constructed nation.

5.3.2 The NSM Ideational Work and the Local Level of Political Arena

This subsection studies another "reasonable" (subliminal) dimension of the NSM ideational production, particularly that of the collective identity, that emerged in action and interaction at the local level: the promotion and adoption of religious stringency as a defining characteristic of being an NSM activist in an attempt to distinguish the NSM activists, voters and supporters from other pious members of the local right wing networks, particularly from those of the JP.

In studying "organized racism" through white supremacist groups in the United States, Blee argues that since "whiteness" is an ambiguous, "unmarked", even an "invisible" category in a white-dominated society where existing policies and goods that benefit the whites "are seldom acknowledged as racial in their intent or consequences" and only "non-whites" are remarked through "otherness, a stigma of difference,"[598] the racist groups have difficulties in trying to draw and justify the boundaries of their collectivities in particular and whiteness in general. Facing the "unstable" and "unmarked" nature of whiteness, the activists of the racist groups have to identify the whiteness with "political commitment as much as biology"[599]: "those who act on behalf of the white race as a whole-and those who are steadfast personal friends-are white."[600]

For the NSM activists the secular(ist) attitudes of the elites of the mainstream right and left-wing parties and the existence of secularism as the dominant component of the political field's *doxa* facilitated the drawing of the NSM boundaries through the adoption of Islamic, signs and symbols vis-à-vis the elites of other institutionalized players (the state, the political parties, the military and judicial bureaucracy etc.) of the political game, particularly the JP. The definition of the nation as primarily Muslim, the public display of basic religious rituals such as praying five times a day, ablution, fasting and emphasis on conservatism regarding gender roles and, finally denying Muslim subjectivity to the

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[598] Blee, *Inside Organized Racism*, 56.
[599] Ibid., 63.
[600] Ibid., 71. It should be noted that Ismail is also very insightful in demonstrating the common "Islam" field and the tensions and heterogeneity created by different interpretations. She, however, does not dwell on movement level differentiations and interpretations. She differentiates between various competing Islamist frames in general lines such as conservative Islamism, radical Islamism, etc. Salwa Ismail, "The Study of Islamism Revisited."

elites of the mainstream parties,[601] were enough to challenge the opponents and distinguish the NSM activists from them.

At the local level of politics, however, where the daily interaction with non-NSM members of their social networks was unavoidable; the definition of the nation with Muslimness blurred the boundaries between the NSM activists and other Muslims. The NSM activists faced a similar difficulty with the white supremacist groups: the invisibility of Muslimness in a Muslim dominated society. Moreover the mobilization and institutionalization of a group of Islamists through a political party revealed that not only ordinary and non-practicing but also many pious Muslims, were unwilling to join or vote for the NSM for various reasons, as admitted by a Kayseri NSM activist[602], a deeply discouraging experience. The NSM activists faced a dilemma: They had to distinguish themselves from other Muslims of their locality without creating a rupture that could endanger their pretension to represent the Muslims.

Consequently, in order to make sense of their being together and distinguish themselves from others, the NSM activists redefined Muslimness, or how to be a "good" and "honest" Muslim[603] worthy of representing the Muslim nation. Accordingly, on the one hand, the local NSM activists internalized the NSM mobilization frames, which associated being such a Muslim with having political consciousness and engaging in political action in the name of the "Muslim nation." A proper Muslim had to act in order to "prevent the evil and ensure the goodness" within the society he lived. On the other hand, as a "reasonable" behavior within the right wing networks where religious stringency was associated with religiosity, or orthodoxy, the NSM activists tried to increase their level of religious stringency and to create a homogenous group where non-stringent behavior was frowned upon at best, chastised at worst. The latter enabled the NSM activists to fortify their affective and solidary bonds and distinguish themselves from both "ordinary" and

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[601] For instance, attacking Demirel, Hüseyin Abbas claimed "He pretends to be Muslim, [but he is actually] a freemason. They opened elementary schools even in the villages but not Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools. With a drinking glass in his hand he told me he is the prime minister who served Islam the most." The report of the Government Inspector at the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük, May 31, 1970.

[602] Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007.

[603] Among the interviewees "*İyi*" (good) and "*dürüst*" (honest) were the two adjectives used frequently together with the word "Muslim" in order to refer to fellow activists and to non-NSM friends and acquaintances whom they deemed religious.

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pious Muslims without rupturing from them but maintaining increased social distance from them. A rupture, if any, occurred not before but following the deepening and solidification of the NSM networks. Since increased religious stringency, became an intramovement resource as well, some actors bordered the line of (social) heterodoxy for regular pious Muslims.

Salwa Ismail argues that religious orthodoxy (i.e stringency) of the Islamists, entailed adopting "an evaluative grid whose main components are the ideas of truth and falsehood and the categories of *halal* (licit) and *haram* (illicit)."[604] Within the Kayseri context, in fact, in Anatolia, religious stringency had been defined in various ways depending from where one looked at it ranging from regularly performing "five pillars" of Islam to applying religious sources entirely in one's life based on a detailed and pretty literal reading of the religious sources, particularly the *Sunna* and the *Hadith*[605]. Nevertheless, as the interviews with both the NSM activists and activists of the other political parties revealed, in general the most stringent was considered the most religious notwithstanding the fact that at times depending on the context such a religiosity could be disapproved or thought to be socially inappropriate or even pretentious. While the outcome was different from one person to another in terms of the achieved level of stringency when compared with the pious members of the other political parties, the common denominators that distinguished the NSM activists were the following.

First, they became dissatisfied with the "basic" Islamic rituals, and jointly and individually tried to accumulate knowledge of the *Hadith* and *Sunna* to be able to apply them in their daily lives thoroughly. As the words of an interviewee illustrates: "We were inviting religious masters (*Hocaefendiler*) to our *oturma* sessions. We were trying to learn Islam. I learnt Islam during that period.... Previously, even though I was doing my daily prayers I had not known Islam."[606]

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[604] Ismail, 62.

[605] These refer to the catalogued and written traditions and sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammed. In their content which give minute details of how a Muslim should behave in his/her daily life; they resemble more to Talmud then the Bible. However, there has been neither a consensus nor an established official authority (not even the Presidency of Religious Affair) that can definitely prescribe the right interpretation of and selection from these sources. Not only the reliability of their content is a matter of dispute among the Muslims, but also because their respective interpretation is part and parcel of power struggles among and between the lay and trained religious scholars, intellectuals, brotherhood leaders etc.

[606] Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006.

Second, in their daily lives they introduced the use of religious signs and symbols in novel ways and situations. For instance using the Islamic salutation "Esselamün Aleyküm" not only in face-to-face interactions but also in telephone conversations clearly differentiated the NSM activists from "ordinary" Muslims, provoking even reactions.[607]

Third, they extended the individual religiousness so as to cover the behavior of the immediate family, principally the children. The interviews and observations on the interviewees revealed that while the pious local elites of the JP (i.e. those who joined the activities of religious associations, regularly performed daily prayers, fasted during the Ramadan and made their pilgrimage) had displayed a liberal attitude towards the actions and choices of their daughters or sons regarding religious matters, though not necessarily their wives, the NSM activists had been deeply involved in the religious education and direction of their children trying to render them "conscious" Muslims. Though appeared in a Konya NSM newspaper the following paragraph that appeared during the early months of the NSM mobilization reflect how the behavior of the immediate family could be used for multiple purposes. Among them, to measure the level of religiousness even among the pious, to attract the religious among the ranks of the NSM and persuade them to buy an NSM-affiliated newspaper, a symbol of religiosity.

> Imagine a head of the family; he is a quite pious (*mazbut*) person. He fulfils his religious duties regularly. He also became a pilgrim (*hacı*). Both his wife and his daughter accommodated themselves to his lifestyle. While the wife is sincere in her conformity, the daughter follows the orders of his father willy-nilly. A particularity of this head of the family is also his tenderness towards his children. Consequently, he has to put the newspaper with promiscuous photos in his pocket and bring it home. Despite that neither the wife nor the daughter wears skirts above their knees[608] …one day, by accident, this honorable head of the family comes across with his daughter in the street.

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[607] Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006.
[608] One should draw attention to the fact that while the proper measure for Islamic modesty was a skirt under the knees for the Islamists of the years under consideration, today, the Islamist women barely show their ankles.

Surprise, the skirt of the daughter is a miniskirt…Yes the pilgrims, the masters (*hacılar, hocalar*), honorable heads of the family: choose carefully the newspaper you would bring home.[609]

Finally, one should discuss another form of religious stringency prevalent among the NSM activists during the years under consideration: avoiding to the best of their ability the social environments where they might have to mingle with the opposite sex or with those who consume alcoholic drinks. This form of religious stringency was not necessarily a result of their traditional education or culture. Nor was it a simple emotional recognition of the need to differentiate oneself. It was also the pressure of the rivals on the NSM activists to live up to the unmitigated Muslim identity they claimed to (strive to) possess.

An extreme thus a very illustrative example was the change of attitude of a NSM local executive when a newspaper published his photos taken during a dinner party organized for the alumni of his university. Though he was not drinking alcohol he had not seen any harm to sit at a table with his old friends who were drinking and he even danced with them. Using the photos of him at the table and dancing, the newspaper insinuated that the NSM activists were not as Muslim as they pretended to be but using Islam to attract votes. Though his fellow NSM activists did not reprimand the executive, he never set foot again in a similar social environment.[610] It is also safe to assume that this and similar incidents rendered the NSM activists to be more vigilant to protect their image.

It should be added that at the national level as well, the interaction with the opponents influenced the religiously stringent behavior of the NSM activists. A reading of the NSM's national newspaper, *Milli Gazete* from 1973 to 1980 shows that the period when the NSM elites pushed hardest to introduce censorship to prohibit "erotic art" and publications was when they were in a coalition government with the RPP and the attacks of the JP, the NAP and Yeni Asya were at their height. This was mostly during public debates over the draft Amnesty Law of the coalition

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[609] Ziya Tanrıkulu, "Ölçü, Gazete seçmek," *Türkiye'de Yarın,* November 11, 1969
[610] Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006. A similar incident would happen to Korkut Özal as well, Minister of Food, Agriculture and Stockbreeding in the First National Front Government (I. Milliyetçi Cephe), in 1975. First nationally distributed JP supporter Tercüman and then Yeni Asya published his photos raising a glass at a state event. See Appendix G, Figure 14.

partners, which included those who were convicted as "communists" under the Article 141 and 142 of the Penal Law.[611] The right wing opponents accused the NSM elites and activists for betraying the "cause" against the RPP and the communists through entering into a coalition government with the RPP and promising to grant, and indirectly granting[612], an Amnesty to the left-wing activists. The push for censorship was a means to reemphasize the religiosity of the NSM participants and to show that the NSM policies and attitudes regarding the left had been carried out by good, honest and honorable Muslims, hence legitimate.[613]

To sum up, not only the politicization of certain religious practices but also the apparent stringency and homogeneity of the NSM activists' religious behaviors at the local level were not solely shaped in oppositional interaction with the secularist elites of the center. They were partly unintended features of NSM activism that appeared through action and interaction with other Muslims rather than a result of a rupture from "traditional Muslims of the periphery."[614]

5.4 Conclusion

Taking into account the context within which the NSM entrepreneurs emerged and the differential recruitment to the NSM among Muslims as cues, this chapter has taken up the formation/construction of the NSM ideational elements in

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[611] See Appendix G, Figure 19, for how the NSM pro-coalition elites organized the party newspaper's front page to please the activists and constituents and protect the movement collective identity while engaging in a bitter battle over the Amnesty within and outside the movement as coalition partners.

[612] Despite the fact that some NSM parliamentarians voted against the Amnesty for the left-wing militants and contributed to the failure of the bill at the parliament, the RPP brought the case to the Constitutional Court. The latter decided that the Amnesty law, which covered the right-wing militants but left out the left-wing ones, was against the spirit and letter of equality of the Constitution and granted the left wing prisoners Amnesty.

[613] They served to legitimize the NSM actions rather than to justify them since as shall be seen, the NSM activists justified their actions not in religious but in political terms.

[614] In studying Islamist identity, Nilüfer Göle looks at the " intersubjective" relations between the Islamists and the secular elites at the national level, which she defines as non-Muslim, and argues that the Islamist identity was shaped in opposition to the Kemalist elites. She also argues that the Islamist identity also constituted a break from and a critique of "traditional Muslims of the periphery" thanks to its hybrid nature that brought together the Islamists' secular education and professions and religious beliefs. While she enriches the previous works looking at the interaction between the macro and micro levels, since she does not study the local level and discards the role of the movement organizations in shaping particular Islamist identities, she fails to see that, at the local level, in this case in Kayseri, a peripheral urban center, the elites and activists of the JP had also acquired secular educations, struggled against the Kemalist elites and many among them retained their "traditional" religious beliefs with no interest in Islamism whatsoever.

action and interaction during the mobilization process of the movement. The NSM case allows advancing the following arguments on Islamist collective action and identity frames. The ideational products a) do not constitute preconceived, or pre-collective action, (in the NSM case pre-political) cultural products; instead b) they are shaped in relation to both the national and local environments, not merely drawing upon Islamic sources, and finally, c) they emerge not only through conscious efforts but also as subliminal processes.

As shall be seen, the elements that created the symbolic boundaries of the NSM informed how the activists reacted to opportunities and constraints within the political arena and sustained its activist and electoral mobilizations throughout the years to come. On the one hand, the NSM collective action frame of material and moral development of the "Muslim nation" enabled the NSP to establish a coalition partnership with the RPP. This frame, which had put other political parties in one basket and the NSM in another; also created certain similarities between the NSM and RPP outlooks on socio-economic matters; most important, it demanded responsible behavior in the name of the nation from its members. These in turn facilitated for some NSM elites and activists to choose a coalition with the RPP over the danger of early general elections, except of course, those who did have salient identities and commitments parallel to that of the NSM. On the other hand, the NSM collective identity that prevented the institutionalization of intraparty competition through emphasis on altruism and solidarity helped the activists with limited means to sustain local activism throughout the 1970s. Moreover, the NSM identity, through legitimizing and strengthening the centralized decision-making structure of the party, enabled a group of party entrepreneurs not only to pursue the coalition strategy but also to take over the party at the expense of their rivals.

CHAPTER VI

EVERYDAY POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE NSM: THE CASE OF THE COALITION WITH THE RPP

In the general elections of October 14, 1973, the NSP, the second party of the NSM that was established following the ban of its predecessor by the Constitutional Court, acquired 11.8% of the votes and entered the Grand National Assembly with 48 deputies. The parliamentary arithmetic did not allow a single party government and rendered the NSP slowly a key party that all parties needed to take into consideration either as a potential coalition partner or an external supporter of a prospective government. In January 26, 1974, following a period of approximately three months of government crisis, the NSP became the junior partner of the coalition government formed with the RPP.

The coalition marked a turning point in the history of Islamist activism in Turkey.[615] Not only the Islamist movements and groups had long considered the RPP the archenemy of "Islam" as the architect of the secular reforms but also, since the late 1960s, when the RPP officially positioned itself as a "center-left" party, they had perceived it as harboring and encouraging left-wing activism, or in the right-wing lexicon, the "communist" movements, another perceived archenemy of religion.[616] Not surprisingly, even before the unofficial talks began between the two parties, the prospect of an RPP-NSP coalition provoked heated debates within both the greater Islamist movement and the NSM, not to mention the right wing sectors and the political arena. These debates would continue throughout the short existence of the coalition (seven months) and in its aftermath.

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[615] Both the NSM and the RPP were giving messages of brotherhood and peace See Appendix G, Figures 15 and 16.
[616] Considering the RPP's long term distrust of Islamist movements, the RPP's willingness to form a coalition with the Islamists was also a historical development in itself.

How and why the NSM changed its initial stance differed from other Islamist movements in its approach to the coalition with the RPP? Specifically, how and why the NSM constructed a coalition government with the RPP provoking immense internal opposition from a group of party elites and external attacks? Previous chapters have discussed why and how the NSM emerged and organized as a political party and constructed its ideational elements different from other Islamist movements. How and why the majority of the NOM elites and activists internalized the arguments that justified and legitimized the coalition so as to support an Amnesty for the left-wing prisoners and to defend their position throughout the years to come? Through engaging with such an unaddressed historical puzzle that relates to "everyday politics," this chapter studies the practical aspects of the NSM political engagement right after the construction of its symbolic and institutional boundaries. Moreover, through integrating the findings of the essay on the early stages of the movement, that is organizational and ideational features, it aims at showing how the micro-properties of the NSM elites and activists, the symbolic products of the movement and finally the type of organization that a movement establishes influence routine dynamics of movement decision-making processes.

The question of how and why Islamist movements adopt particular policy positions and choose specific lines of action is a relatively new area of research in the literature on Islamist movements. As previously argued, the earlier corpus, including the literature on cases from Turkey, has treated Islamist movements mostly as unitary actors, or black boxes. In these studies, as was the case for the organizational form and ideational elements, practical aspects of Islamist activism are descriptive at best, overlooked at worst. As far as the NSM's coalition partnership with the RPP is concerned, there are very few studies that address the issue. The literature on Turkey, either left the subject unaccounted for or treated it merely as a political strategy aiming at either a) legitimizing the party in the eyes of the Kemalist/secularist establishment, or b) launching economic measures that would satisfy socio-economic demands of the party's constituency and/or c) introducing changes to Islamize state and societal institutions which, as shall be remembered, are assumed to have given rise to the party in the first place. Such a treatment, while rightly pointing out certain environmental (socio-economic and political) and ideational incentives has a major setback: the NSM (or the NSP)

appears "as a *unified* actor in the sense that party members behave *as if* their actions were determined by a single autonomous decision maker[617] which is assumed to be conditioned by a struggle between the center (the secular state and the big bourgeoisie of İstanbul) and the periphery (the religious Anatolian society and small and medium business owners) and a preconceived ideational position (Islamization of the state and society).

In contrast, the recent literature on Islamist activism, seeking to understand, whether or how far the Islamists could become "moderate," that is accept and internalize political pluralism and/or contribute to democratic expansion, wittingly or unwittingly, revealed that behind (or preceding) the appearance of a unified actor, the political attitudes and policy choices of Islamist movements regarding such matters as the degree of involvement in electoral politics, coalition making with non-Islamists, the expansion of political and civil rights to left-wing political actors, religious minorities and/or women are not predetermined by macro factors or by the declared goals of the movements. They are influenced by complex configurations of political opportunities and constraints and emerge as an outcome of intense internal debates and struggles. The available lines of action on such issues within the context of environmental opportunities and constraints brings to surface latent power struggles or creates new ones within the movements and provokes renegotiation, realignment, reprioritization or alteration of movement goals and identity. These studies, then, suggest the need to study the decisions and choices of Islamist collective actors as products of both formal and informal institutions of the political arena and their internal dynamics.[618]

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[617] Michael Laver, "Divided Parties, Divided Government," in *Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies,* ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire, and D. Roderick Kiewiet (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 206.

[618] See Janine A. Clark, "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-ideological Cooperation in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38 (2006): 539-560; Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, "Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties," *Comparative Politics* 35 (2003): 293-312; Mona El-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 373-395; Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*; Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, "Islamist Moderation without Democratization: the Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?" *Democratization* 16 (2009): 157-175; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics* 36 (2004): 205-228.

This chapter not only draws on the footsteps of the recent body of work, but also tries to fill what appears to be a lacuna. Recent research, while studying internal dynamics, limits its attention on elite level decision making processes, ideational (re)production, and power struggles. While showing the relevance of these processes for the studied outcome (i.e. a specific line of action, policy position, overall moderation etc.), the recent literature does not discuss why and how a group of movement elites succeed or fail, when they do, in the struggle to determine the party's course of action and to secure activists' ideational and behavioral support. Nor do they inform us on the degree to which the local activists are involved in decision-making processes, and why and how local party activists support or oppose a group of elites, a policy proposal/choice, etc. Neglecting how local activists situate themselves in the decision-making mechanisms and contribute to the maintenance and/or change of the existing intraparty organizational and ideational structures may inadvertently lead to either structural determinism or ideational essentialism.

Taking up the issue of the RPP-NSM coalition and the NSM's pro-coalition group's subsequent unorthodox attitude with regard to left-wing activists, this chapter analyzes not only extra-movement factors and the power struggles among the movement elites but also the internal dynamics and mechanisms of the movement organization, that is the political party (without a parent and pre-established societal organization), which enabled a group of party elites to pursue and execute their line of political action in the face of internal and external resistance. It also tackles briefly the consequences of their actions for the internal dynamics of the party and its relations with its environment.

Accordingly, two interrelated arguments are advanced. First, the NSM's macro-level prospect of coalition with the RPP unfolded at the meso-level, or organizational level, through formal and informal institutions and power relations. Specifically, a meso-level study is needed to understand how, within the existing context of political opportunities and constraints and following the crystallization of pro- and anti-coalition groups, the objective and symbolic institutions of the party, that is the decision making structure and ideational products of the movement that developed during the initial mobilization stage, enabled the pro-coalition group not only to pursue and execute its line of action but also, gradually, to take over

first the movement organization, the NSP, and then the movement networks, or the NSM itself.

Second, a diachronic micro-level analysis on the power relations, ideational properties and material and symbolic resources of the elites at the party center and local activists at the periphery is necessary to understand why and how the party elites were divided into two groups and these institutions brought about the victory of the pro-coalition group. Without a micro-level perspective, the overall analysis would remain incomplete at best; descriptive at worst, since the function, performance, and/or existence of the above mentioned meso-level institutions partly depend on these factors. As a matter of fact, following the February 28 process, or the so-called post-modern military and bureaucratic coup in February 28, 1997, the same institutions, which had survived a previous and more disruptive coup in September 12, 1980, did not bring similar results for the NSM elites. The NSM elites, who had been ruling the political part(ies) uninterruptedly since 1977, while kept their seats in the latest two parties of the movement established after February 28, the Virtue Party and the Felicity Party, they lost majority of their networks and local activists to the Justice and Development Party (the JDP) founded by their intraparty opponents.

Accordingly, the chapter is organized in four sections. The first section focuses on macro-level factors, that is formal and informal power relations and institutions of the political arena and some contingent factors which constrained the NSM leaders to choose between the two options during the longest government crisis up to that date: an early general elections and a coalition with the RPP. Second section provides a micro-level analysis of ideational and structural properties of the two groups of party elites and the power relations between them as factors that influenced their strategic assessment on the prospect of the coalition with the RPP and later their divergent behaviors during the coalition. Third section discusses the three major intra-movement institutions that enabled the pro-coalition group to prevail over their challengers and maintained the local activists' support even when they pursued and defended their controversial position with regard to the inclusion of the left wing in the General Amnesty Law of 1974. These were a) the centralized decision making structure that empowered the party elites as a whole at the expense of the activists; b) the movement's collective action frames

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that had constructed the nation as primarily Muslim and the party's cause as material and moral development of such a defined nation; positioned the NSP to an equal distance to (i.e. above) other political parties; included certain diagnostic similarities with the RPP; and finally demanded responsible behavior in the name of the nation c) the NSM collective identity that empowered the activists and emphasized solidarity and altruism. Finally, the chapter provides a brief review of the consequences of the coalition on the intraparty dynamics and the party's relations with its environment.

6.1 The Prospect of an RPP-NSM Coalition and Opposing Intra-elite Views

Focusing on the period from October 14, 1973 (NSM's entry into the parliament) to January 26, 1974 (the establishment of the RPP-NSP coalition government), this section studies the opportunities and constraints at the macro level of national political arena that forced the NSM to seriously consider a coalition with the RPP. It also provides an analysis of the divergent views and perceptions of the NSM elites (i.e. official and unofficial entrepreneurs and founders of the NSM, the central party administrators and some parliamentary deputies) on the environmental factors and the NSM's role and function within this context.

As has been discussed in previous chapters, the opportunities and constraints in the political arena at the local and national levels have a considerable impact on the emergence of social movements and their mobilization strategies, goals and symbolic and material institutionalization patterns. Following the appearance of a movement organization (in case it appears one), while the political environment (which is itself changing) continue to influence and shape the performances, alliances and policy choices; the degree and the way they influence these aspects of collective action in daily politics would change depending on the nature of the initially established organization.[619] Taking into account the nature of

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[619] For an early example on the impact of intraorganizational structure and dynamics on movement-environment interactions (involving such issues as coalition, strategy, policy decisions) see Suzanne Staggenborg, "The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement," *American Sociological Review* 53 (1988): 585-605. Debra C. Minkoff and John D. McCarthy draws attention to the need for further studying movement organization emergence to

the movement organization in the study of a movement's political participation patterns in everyday politics, in turn, requires both designating the particular category in which the organization falls (political party, informal networks, association, charity organization, a *tabligh* organization etc.) and the internal specificities of the organization in consideration. While the former enables one to see environmental formal and informal institutions and power relations that directly concern a specific type of organization; the latter helps one to understand how and why their impact is processed differently within similar and/or the same organization, when they do.

The NSM entrepreneurs had appeared in the administrative and political center through the development of and based on an Islamist network within the right wing milieus. The crystallization of the movement entrepreneurs was followed by a consensus and activist mobilization with the specific purpose of founding a political party. As shall be seen, both the ban of the first party, the NOP, by the Constitutional Court, and the entry of the second party, the NSP, to the Grand National Assembly and the senate, revealed to the elites and activists the extent to which they were bounded by the formal and informal institutions and power relations of the political field. Particularly, the latter forced the NSM to make "hard decisions" that all political parties do between "policy, office [and] votes."[620] Translated into social movement terminology, the political parties had to realign and renegotiate internally and with other players of the political field, the collectivity's identity and goals, the degree of engagement with state institutions and the terms of activist and constituency mobilization.

Focusing on macro level factors and their impact on the party's national elites, this section advances two interrelated arguments. First, a specific constellation of political and contingent factors in the parliament and the political

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assess later the influences of this initial stage on organizational developments. "Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Processes in Social Movements" *Mobilization: An International Journal* 10 (2005): 304.

[620] As Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller argue, although political parties cannot be defined or categorized as organizations which exclusively seek one of these political goods (for instance, as an office-seeking or a vote-seeking party), it is one of their defining features that they all have to regularly engage in trade-offs among them in the political arena. "Political Parties and Hard Choices," in *Policy, Office, or Votes? How political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, ed. Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),1-35.

arena objectively cornered the NSM to choose between early elections and a coalition with the RPP. Second, the party elites' choices between these two options depended on their strategic assessment of the opportunities and constraints that each choice presented in relation to policy, office and votes. The process of intra-party deliberations regarding these issues revealed that the NSM elites were divided into two groups who assigned divergent meanings and values to the existing political opportunities and constraints that policy, office and votes presented.

The rest of the section is divided into two subsections analyzing first the opportunity structure within the parliament which imposed the NSM only to alternatives; and second, the two groups' perceptions of this structure in relation to policy, office and votes. It is the next section that will deal with the reasons as two why the elites displayed conflicting views and positions on the issue of coalition.

6.1.1 "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea"

Following the general elections of October 14, 1973, the parliamentary arithmetic did not allow the two most powerful parties of the country, the RPP and the JP[621] to form a single party government. Although the RPP had acquired the majority of parliamentary seats (185), in order to establish a government it needed either an external supporter or a coalition partner. The JP, in turn, with only 149 seats, needed the support or partnership of both the NSP (48 seats) and the Democratic Party (45 seats) *if* it *decided* to form a government.

From October 1973 to early January 1974, all government alternatives with the existing parties were officially or unofficially considered as the President of the Republic gave the duty to form a cabinet to first, Bülent Ecevit, the new and young leader of the RPP, second, to Süleyman Demirel, the JP's leader, and third to an independent - an appointed senator- Naim Talu, who at the time had been heading a "nonparty" caretaker government. The combinations that were seriously and formally discussed by the political parties, the President of the Republic, newspapers, interest groups, the Assembly and the Senate, and reportedly military,

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[621] The Justice Party had been in power from 1965 to the military memorandum of March 12, 1971. From March 1971 to April 1972, military supported technocratic cabinets governed the country. The JP was influential in the establishment and survival of the last (fourth) non-partisan caretaker cabinet that lasted until the RPP-NSP coalition.

were as follows: a) RPP-JP, b) RPP-NSP, c)RPP-JP-NSP, d)JP-DP-NSP(-RTP)[622], e) a "national coalition" (*Milli Koalisyon*). The less seriously considered option was a minority government formed either by the RPP or the JP. An early general election would impose itself, if the parliamentary parties failed to come up with a solution that would guarantee the necessary number of confidence votes.

As can be seen, the NSP had become a key party, as all options but one, had to include it to get a vote of confidence in the Grand National Assembly.[623] Despite this increase in the value of the NSP (or rather the NSM parliamentarians), the process would unfold a much narrower range of options for the NSM: an alliance with the RPP or early general elections. First, very early on, the RPP and the JP made it clear that they were not willing to cooperate with each other, leaving the NSM with the options of joining a coalition or accepting an early election.[624] Initially, mostly due to the internal opposition and fear of alienating the constituency, the NSM appeared to prefer a coalition, which would include the JP. It thus rejected the RPP's first offer (in October 30) in November 7. Complaining about the RPP's intransient position regarding the postponement of upcoming local elections and the intra-parliamentary election of the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Erbakan argued that the RPP would not make a proper coalition partner given its rejection to make compromises.[625] Before sending an official response to the RPP, it had sent a public letter to the JP asking its leaders to change their declared official position to remain outside coalition governments.[626] However, the JP rejected to engage in coalition building activities.

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[622] The Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi), was established in 1967 (first the Reliance party), by those party elites who left the RPP following the process that ended up with the RPP's official adoption of a left-wing position.

[623] Incidentally, the NSM's emblem was a key.

[624] Actually the NSM leaders, particularly the pro-coalition elites did not favor an RPP-JP government, thinking that such a coalition might create further societal strife and attract the wrath of the military (before the memorandum of 1971, extra-parliamentary groups on the far right and left had engaged various violent political actions trying to influence policy making on various issues).

[625] As shall be seen, these were rather excuses. The NSM leaders, whether sympathetic to the offer or not, were caught rather unprepared and divided over the question. Particularly, as far as the local election question is concerned, an early election would hurt the NSM more than a local election that would take place during its incumbency.

[626] See *Milli Gazete*, November 1 and 4, 1973. As early as October 16, Demirel had announced the JP's decision to remain outside the coalitions. It has been suggested that the JP was actually unwilling to join a coalition, which would have to take some unpopular financial measures such as price rises. Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde*, 318.

Second, the JP's position with regard to remaining in opposition was not permanent, as evinced by Demirel's acceptance of the duty to form a government in November 13.[627] However, except for the case of a "national coalition", which could be chaired by an independent senator, the JP insisted on Demirel's leadership in case of a right-wing government. The JP's persistence on Demirel, coupled with the DkP's rejection of any Demirel led government, reduced further government alternatives to the RPP-NSM coalition by December 16. Just seven days after the local elections, the President of Republic asked Talu to form a government: a national coalition.[628] As far as the national coalition is concerned, the RPP insisted on Ecevit's leadership, as the head of the majority party group in the Assembly, and demanded an early general elections date as a deadline for the coalition. The rest of the parties refused either one or both demands. While the NSM did not insist on an independent prime minister, as shall be seen, an early election was to be delayed as much as possible. It can be argued that the other right-wing parties refused the elections, not only because they did not want to see the RPP returning to the Assembly more powerful, as the local elections results suggested, but also because they wanted to see an NSP-RPP coalition, which they hoped would weaken them both.

Finally, the process, which lasted around three months, first forced the NSM elites and activists to deliberate regarding a coalition with the RPP, and then gradually placed them, literally and figuratively, between the devil and the deep blue sea. On the one hand, the RPP was "the devil"[629] for the right wing tradition in general and the Islamist movements in particular. An early general election, on the

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[627] The JP engaged in various informal coalition bargains throughout the period under consideration. See the newspapers of the period.

[628] Ahmad suggests that Democratic Party (DkP) of Bilgiç and Sükan, which had 45 parliamentarians, was too closely associated with the defunct Democrat Party members and its legacy to join forces with the RPP. Moreover, they did not share even a single common ideational element. An RPP-DkP coalition was not even an issue. See Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde*, 318. Regarding the DkP's refusal of Demirel's leadership, it can be argued that it was too early for them to reject their raison d'être. As shall be remembered, the DkP entrepreneurs had formed the party as a result of their personal and political struggle with Demirel. However, only two years later, half of the DkP parliamentarians, including Saadettin Bilgiç would join the right wing coalition government chaired by Demirel in March 1975 (I. MC, or I. Milli Cephe, National Front). See Appendix G, Figure 17, for a a snapshot from the JP congress of 1974 where Demirel attacks fiercely his opponents, most of whom had already been either expelled or resignedç

[629] While the "devil" in the idiom may have originated from a nautical term, in its every day usage it in fact denotes the devil.

other hand, appeared more and more as a deep blue sea where the NSM would be drowned.

6.1.2 Divergent Perspectives on the RPP-NSM Coalition in terms of Office, Policy and Votes[630]

Following an examination of the subjective and objective constraints that an early general elections presented for the NSM as a whole, this subsection studies the opposing perceptions of the opportunities and constraints that the prospect of an RPP-NSP coalition presented in terms of votes, office and policy. It is argued that the difference between two views reflected their respective conceptualization and understanding of the NSP's role as an Islamist movement organization.

The question of early general elections

To begin with, both groups of the NSM elites agreed that they had to avoid early elections as much as possible. However, while the pro-coalition group worked hard to eliminate this option through establishing contacts and good relations with all parties, including the RPP, in the hope to contribute to the establishment of a government, the anti-coalition group preferred playing for time and if necessary facing elections rather than entering into a coalition with the RPP.

First, the NSM leadership had two major concerns regarding the possible outcomes of an early general election. They even desperately tried to postpone the local elections that had been scheduled for December 9, 1973,[631] arguing that consecutive elections and winter could cause voter's fatigue and apathy, negatively influencing the NSM along with other parties.[632] Considering that an early election

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[630] This section is based mainly on a) the interviews conducted with three anti-coalition and seven pro-coalition NSM elites; b) the NSM daily, *Milli Gazete*; c) a center-left national daily, Milliyet; and d) M. Gündüz Sevilgen, *MSP'de Dört Yıl, 1973-1977* (N.p: Yüksel Matbaası, 1980). Written and brought together with a single author, this book was a joint product of the anti-coalitionists, who had contributed to its appearance through their writings, official and unofficial documents and feedbacks they provided. Most of the surviving anti-coalitionists the researcher contacted refused to grant interviews referring her back to the book, which, they believed, included every information one would need.

[631] "MSP'nin müspet teklifine AP menfi bir tavır takındı," *Milli Gazete*, November 4, 1973; "Erbakan: Koalisyon şartlarını reddetmedik," *Milliyet*, November 8, 1973.
[632] "MSP'nin müspet teklifine" Milli Gazete, and " Koalisyon şartlarını reddetmedik," Milliyet.

was a powerful option at the time, it can be argued that this argument, particularly the one regarding the consecutive elections, applied to the general elections as well. Moreover, they feared that the early general elections, would weaken the democracy not only because the parliament would appear inefficient, but also because, notwithstanding the participation rates, the balance of power in the parliament might remain the same after the elections, further perpetuating the government crisis and the perception of the political parties as incompetent. Erbakan said that such a result could bring about a "disaster" to the country, implying military intervention.[633]

Second, the NSM elites, though they would not voice it openly not to discourage the activists, had to worry about the scarcity of resources. The resource mobilization approach to collective actions (mostly social movements) that developed by the late 1960s and 1970s have offered a set of conceptions and perspectives which demonstrate that the emergence and maintenance of collective actions through and/or in the form of political parties, social movements, trade unions, associations, informal networks etc., require the mobilization of diverse material and symbolic resources.[634] While "political process" and "culturalist/identity" approaches have advanced various correctives and critiques to this outlook[635] which overemphasizes structure over agency and culture, its major contribution still stands its ground: without the aggregation of individual resources and/or incorporation of extra-movement ones (such as state institutions, media, and infrastructures such as transportation and communication technologies) collective action cannot be sustained in the long run.[636]

A major collective action that a political party organization needs to engage is electoral campaign. Electoral campaigns are among the most demanding

Studies on voter behavior show that the NSM leader's assertion actually holds true. See for instance, Colin Rallings, Michael Thrasher and Galina Borisyuk "Seasonal Factors, Voter Fatigue and the Costs of Voting," *Electoral Studies* 22 (2003): 65–79.

[633] "Meclis'e baskı ve emrivaki yapıyorlar," *Milli Gazete*, December 18, 1973.

[634] See John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *The American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977): 1212-1241; Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1973). For a review of resource mobilization literature see J. Jenkins Craig, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527-553.

[635] For a recent example see James M. Jasper, "A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social-Movement Choices," *Mobilization: an International Journal* 9 (2004): 1-16.

[636] McCharty and Zald, 1216-1217.

collective action categories, particularly in centralized political systems as was the case in Turkey in the 1970s. They require nation-wide organizational chapters, well-established networks, and aggregation of individual resources, most importantly in the form of money[637] and labor (which require time and commitment). Şevket Kazan[638], a prominent NSM leader, also pointed out that establishing and sustaining political party activity is not easy task. As he put, it requires "finances" and "faith." Finances would help at the beginning to reach to the activists and establish preliminary chapters in a district. However, finances, alone, would not help either: in the subdistricts no one would be willing "to pay the expenses from his pocket" unless there is a "cause," an "idea."[639]

During the 1973 general election campaign, the NSP was already short of party branches and well established networks (source of labor) and initial finances. Moreover, the "faith" to the efficiency of a political party has been hurt (even though not necessarily to the cause or the NSM). The Constitutional Court had banned the first party of the NSM, the NOP, in May 1971, and the country had experienced a military memorandum in March 1971. The ban, coupled with the military intervention[640], had an extremely negative impact on the material and symbolic resources of the movement. First, the state had confiscated its real estates and movable properties of the party. Second, it had rendered the party leaders overcautious, leading them to keep a low profile in an attempt to minimize party's media exposure (an extra-movement resource).[641] Third, it infused the local party activists, members and sympathizers with fear at worse and discouragement at best which prevented the timely (or full) use of the available resources[642]. This was partly resulted from the cautious attitude of the national leaders of the party. While

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[637] Financial aspects of political party activism are of particular importance as the existence of detailed regulations imposed by political party laws in electoral democracies attest.

[638] Initially a simple parliamentarian representing Kocaeli, Kazan rapidly rose to power within the NSM, first, becoming the Minister of Justice in the RPP-NSP government and then occupying various ministerial and party executive posts in the NSM parties until today.

[639] Interview with Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 8, 2007. Needless to say, contributions in terms of labor would require "faith," or in the terminology of this essay, collective action frames and collective identity as well.

[640] The two events, that is the coup and the Constitutional Court trial, have the same systemic roots but not necessarily direct causal relationship. A month before the military intervened and forced the JP government to resign, the prosecutor had opened an investigation and the trial had begun two days ago.

[641] Süleyman Arif Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl* vol. 2 (İstanbul: Keşif Yayınları, 2002), 20.

[642] For instance, in Kayseri some prominent official and unofficial founders and executives of the NOP not only asked to be excused from the NSP activities but also stayed inactive up until when electoral campaign was well underway.

no NOP national or local executive was tried in the court and there was no ban on their political activities, most of them did not join the ranks of the NSP.[643] Erbakan too stayed abroad long time and he, and two other NOP parliamentarians officially joined the NSP as late as May 1973.[644] Fourth, the resources (money and time/labor) that the NSM could mobilize at any given time were already quite modest, since, as discussed in Chapter 5, apart from few wealthy local and national elites, the NSM activists were mostly self-employed young men at the beginning of their careers with limited resources (money and time).[645] Finally, consecutive elections would likely cause what can be called an "activist fatigue."[646] Against such a background, then, from July to October, the NSM had undertaken parallel tasks of organization building[647] and electoral campaign in the districts and subdistricts,[648] having been established only in October 11, 1972.

Consequently, while the NSM leaders saw the results of the 1973 general election as a victory under the circumstances[649], they were unwilling to engage into a new one, particularly not right after a local election. Notwithstanding their persistent declarations that a new election would bring the NSP a glory, the NSM was simply devoid of adequate resources to carry out three consecutive campaigns. However until around November 20, the NSP executives and parliamentarians felt secure enough. As an early general election was still a remote danger, they assumed that there were still various government alternatives, at least in principle. First in

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[643] Süleyman Arif Emre, the first Chair of the NSP, says that they were particularly careful regarding keeping the original founders of the NOP under the shadows. Ibid., 18-20.

[644] "Erbakan, Akmumcu ve Abbas MSP'ye girdiler," *Milli Gazete*, May 17, 1973. Erbakan became the party chairman only after the elections. "N. Erbakan Genel Başkan," *Milli Gazete*, October 22, 1973. Considering that during the heat of the electoral campaign of 1973, there were twice public and twice behind the curtains legal action threats against the party (see further below), the NSM elites were not necessarily overreacting.

[645] Erbakan's speech to small workshop owners in Akşehir, a small town in Konya, is quite illustrative. Several times during his speech, Erbakan recognized the time constraints of the shop owners (time meant money for them literally and figuratively) and pleaded (even almost begged for) their time and participation into party's campaign meetings. "MSP Konya Milletvekili Erbakan'ın Akşehir'de yaptığı konuşması," *Milli Gazete,* September 25, 1973.

[646] Right before the local elections, an anti-coalition NSM elite, Gündüz Sevilgen, urged the activists to overcome their fatigue stating that the best way to dispel it is "to serve the great cause of" their collectivity. "Tek Yol: Mahalli Seçimlere doğru," *Milli Gazete*, November 20, 1973.

[647] Şevket Kazan rates the degree of the NSP's party organization %25 by the time of the coup d'état of September 12, 1980. He said that by then they had been organized only in the districts and subdistricts and lacked active party members that went all the way down to the ballot box.

[648] For a speech that mentions the difficulty of these parallel tasks see "MSP Manisa Milletvekili adayı G. Sevilgen Kırkağaç'ta konuştu," *Milli Gazete*, September 4, 1973.

[649] 11.80% of the total votes. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=7 (Accessed June 25, 2011).

late October, when rumors about an RPP-NSP coalition began to circulate[650], then in early November, when the RPP officially invited the NSP to form a coalition; both members of the NSP General Executive Committee[651] and parliamentary group[652] twice rejected the idea of a coalition with the RPP.[653]

<u>The question of the RPP-NSM coalition</u>

As the local elections approached towards the end of November and the prospects of other coalition alternatives disappeared one by one, a pro-coalition group of elites began to surface within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group. This group, which at first was made up of Erbakan's a handful of closest associates within the Committee and few parliamentarians,[654] would eventually take control of the Committee and the Parliamentary group and then the whole party. Following are the arguments of the conflicting groups in favor of and against a coalition with the RPP in terms of office, policy and votes.

To begin with, the anti-coalitionist leaders' political strategy regarding the prospect of an RPP-NSP coalition reflected their understanding of the role and function of the NSP. They claimed that the NSP should function, at least initially, as an intra-parliamentary pressure/interest group and "educational" organization where members and activists would be trained in the principles and goals of the NSM movement. This view, in turn, was based on the following premises.

First, as far as the "office" was concerned they perceived two constraints, one internal and one external to the NSM. On the one hand, they thought that the NSP was too young, too powerless -with only 48 deputies- and too inexperienced, to be able to shoulder government responsibilities. The NSP parliamentary community was "at the level of a primary school student". Thus, the party leader(s)

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[650] For Erbakan's preliminary answer to the journalists' question on the coalition see "Geniş hudutlu af'la iç barış sağlanmalı," *Milli Gazete*, October 19, 1973.
[651] *Genel İdare Kurulu* was the highest executive organ within the NSP composed of 26 members out of which, 13 were also parliamentarians.
[652] The parliamentary members who entered the parliament and/or acted under the same party label formed "*Meclis Grubu*". In the NSP's group there were 48 deputies and three senators who regularly joined the meetings.
[653] Sevilgen, *MSP'de*, 47-67. It has even been claimed that it was the NSP that educated the RPP on certain issues. Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007.
[654] The properties of the group and the intraparty institutions in which they operated will be introduced in detail in the following subsection and section respectively.

should not have expected them "to solve trigonometric equations".[655] At any rate, neither the God nor the voters wanted the NSP to govern the country.[656] With only 48 parliamentarians the NSP was given a simple duty: to represent the "ideas" (*fikriyat*) of the nation in the Assembly and adopt related policies gradually.[657] During the process, young party activists would be trained in order to serve later in administrative or political positions.[658] On the other hand, they believed that the military had misgivings about both the NSP and the RPP. They would naturally oppose a government established by these two parties. While the anti-coalitionists stick with the former argument till the very end, they eventually changed their opinion on the military's attitude, probably, following a meeting with an officer.[659]

Second, the anti-coalitionists elaborated on the degree to which the NSM could implement its goals within and outside the government on the one hand, and protect the integrity of the NSM collective identity within a coalition with the RPP, on the other. The anti-coalition group members were extremely distrustful of the RPP, despite the diagnostic similarities the NSM shared with it. They claimed that the RPP just wanted to use the NSP to come to power and that the NSP was too inexperienced to "control" the RPP, implying that the NSP would not be able to introduce policy changes it sought or check the RPP's power.[660] Moreover, let alone such a weak position in the coalition, but the coalition itself would likely to damage the NSM identity. The RPP and the NSM were representing completely opposing causes. The NSP had entered the parliament to protect and improve the religious life of the citizens; the RPP was "responsible of horrid murders" (of things pertaining to religiosity)[661]. The former represented "righteousness", the other "vanity"; one was "vinegar" and the other "honey" that should not be mixed.[662]

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[655] In Gündüz Sevilgen's letter to the Party Chairmanship dated January 11, 1974. See Sevilgen, *MSP'de*, 84.
[656] Ibid, 64, 84.
[657] Interview with Cemal Cebeci, Ankara, October 10, 2006.
[658] Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008.
[659] Tevfik Paksu revealed this meeting during an Executive Committee meeting over the question of prospective General Amnesty Law. He said that the military had agreed to the coalition but opposed an amnesty law that would include the left wing prisoners. Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 119.
[660] Ibid., 63.
[661] Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008.
[662] RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008; Cemal Cebeci, Ankara, October 10, 2006. Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 75. It should be noted that the anti-coalitionists also opposed a government with the JP. However, they did not categorically reject this option, as was the case for the RPP.

Finally, the anti-coalitionist point of view projected a direct and indirect loss of votes in the case of a coalition with the RPP. The NSM would lose its voters directly because the electors would feel betrayed[663] and an RPP incumbency would bring disaster to the country through strengthening communism.[664] The NSM would indirectly lose votes as well since such a coalition would endanger a breakdown of the organization because of a damaged identity.[665] Even Süleyman Arif Emre, a pro-coalition elite, had initially believed that the activists were more sympathetic to the JP than the RPP.[666] Given the long term animosity between the JP and the RPP, the activists could leave the party.

Based on these views, the anti-coalitionist group argued that if the NSM activists and parliamentarians wanted to gain party experience to introduce policy changes, to protect its identity, and finally, thanks to these measures, maintain its organization and constituency, it had to refuse any government responsibility, particularly that of a government that would be established with the RPP. As such, it would also be able to "play a great political game" better as a "pressure group" in the parliament than as a party in power, through rendering the party(ies) in government dependent on the NSP parliamentarians.[667] The latter would support those laws and policies, which were in accordance with their goals (that is protecting and developing religious life) and force the government to introduce changes the NSP wished, and to abort those the NSM opposed.[668]

As for the members of the pro-coalitionist group, while most initially shared the same misgivings regarding with the anti-coalitionists (it seems except for Erbakan himself), they gradually developed a new perspective as they interacted with various individuals and institutions, particularly with the RPP elites. During the period of search for a workable government, not only their self-perception had changed but also their views on the RPP. Unlike the anti-coalitionists, the pro-coalitionists came to think that the NSM could consolidate itself as a political party only if it assumed or appeared ready to assume government responsibilities. The

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[663] The electors would not have voted for the NSP if the party told them the prospect of a coalition with the RPP. See Suudi Reşat Saruhan's comments in Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 64.
[664] Comments of Gündüz Sevilgen and Hulusi Özkul in Ibid., 63 and 66.
[665] M. Hulusi Özkul's comments in Ibid., 63.
[666] Ibid., 51.
[667] Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008
[668] Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008; Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 65

latter, in turn, meant accepting to tackle country's problems as a whole, rather than focusing on a narrow range of issues related to religious life.

Accordingly, the NSP should not keep refusing the office claiming inexperience. Initially, similar to anti-coalitionists, the pro-coalitionists also conceptualized the NSM as a movement and thought the NSP had to act as an association-like movement organization. Hasan Aksay has pointed out that before the NSP entered the parliament, they had thought the NSM had been to weak as compared to the DkP, and that they had planned to engage primarily in consciousness raising activities "to teach...or rather promote the nation's basic values."[669] However, following the NSP's entry into the parliament and as they worked with other parties with the hope to come up with a government, the pro-coalitionists came to see that "the raison d'être of a political party was to come to power, and the reason for playing the political game was to win the ultimate prize."[670] The ultimate price was attaining the government. Even if this prize would come at the expense of a coalition with the RPP, it was an opportunity for the NSP to become a proper political party. A political party could claim power and render its ideational position hegemonic only when in government, only "with associations, that would not work [could not be achieved]."[671]

Moreover, the pro-coalition group adopted the view that a pro-active rather than a low-profile attitude would protect the NSP from the military. An officer that Oğuzhan Asiltürk was well acquainted with (Eşref Bitlis[672]) had warned the NSP leaders that they should form a government by whatever means possible if they wanted to survive.[673] The military officers had reservations regarding the NSP's

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[669] Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006.

[670] Interview with an Akıncı (NSP's youth group) leader in the 1970s. Mehmet Tezel, Ankara September 3, 2007. He said that the NSM leaders, particularly Erbakan, explained these to the party activists. As an activist he also initially thought the NSM's role was to train people in religious ethics.

[671] Interview with Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 8, 2006.

[672] Asiltürk knew Bitlis and his brother from Malatya. Plus, Bitlis' brother was Asiltürk's classmate at the university. In 1990, Bitlis would become the Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces and in 1993 die in a much disputed helicopter accident during the height of clashes between the Kurdish guerillas and the state forces.

[673] Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. Metin Heper argues that before the 1980s, the military sought "responsible" behaviour (i.e long term interests of the state) on the part of the political parties, and frowned upon "responsive" behavior (i.e stratifying short term interests such as pleasing the voters). Metin Heper, "The consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey," in *Political Parties in Turkey*, ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 138-139.

loyalty to the regime and, reportedly, Demirel was inflaming their suspicions. "These men had prejudged the NSM without first reading, inspecting, looking…"[674] Being in office would show that they were willing to play "the game in town," legitimize the NSP and hopefully thwart short and long run "secularist" attacks against the party.

On the question of policy, the party goals and party identity, the pro-coalitionist elites also changed their opinion regarding their own capabilities and the ideational gap between the RPP and the NSP, as they came to know the RPP leaders, particularly Bülent Ecevit, and compared themselves with them. First, the RPP's elites had recently come to power within their party, they were about the same age with the NSP leaders and were only slightly more experienced than their interlocutors. Consequently, the NSP's future pro-coalitionists, not only found that the RPP elites were quite reliable and easy to communicate but also themselves as empowered, knowledgeable and effective in their dealings with the RPP than they had expected.[675] Second, they had already recognized overlapping goals of the two parties. Both parties were "idealists," wanted to protect the country from foreign economic encroachment, both argued for a just socio-economic system.[676] To be sure, Ecevit was a "leftist, did not pray, did not fast. [But] he would respond to God, receive his just deserts;" however, Demirel was doing something worse, "selling out Turkey."[677] Moreover, the current leaders of the RPP had publicly admitted to their past wrongdoings against the religious and denied their associations with the communists.[678] It should be reemphasized that it was the behind-the-door negotiations between the parties that had contributed the most to the changing perspective of the NSM elites on the feasibility to introduce policy changes in a coalition with the RPP. The RPP, unlike the JP, had not only agreed with the NSP on such issues as the Cyprus problem, development of the heavy industry in Anatolia, the Amnesty for "thought crimes," relegalization of opium poppy production, but also promised compromises on religious policies. They had

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[674] Interview with İsmail Müftüoğlu, İstanbul, November 12, 2007.
[675] Interviews with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007; Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 8, 2006; Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007.
[676] Interview with Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 7, 2007.
[677] Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. Here Asiltürk refers also Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current leader of the Justice and Development Party.
[678] The party's newspaper had published commentaries on the changes within the RPP as early as June. See Ali Ulvi Polat, "Ankara Mektubu: Yürüyüş Kanunu" *Milli Gazete*, June 26, 1973.

accepted to increase the cadres of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the budget of the General Directorate of Endowments, reopen the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools' junior sections, give 5 million TL to finish the construction of the Kocatepe mosque in Ankara.[679]

Third, the NSM collective action and identity frames were based on the claim that the NSM was different from and above both parties and that the NSM represented the Muslim nation and its best interest as a whole, no matter the party differences of the individuals. The pro-coalitionists drew on these action and identity frames arguing that a coalition with the RPP would make clear the NSM's distinction and readiness to act selflessly for the best interest of the nation. While the JP was avoiding a coalition with the RPP for fear of losing its constituency, the NSM was trying to protect the nation from yet another election by taking the risk of losing its voters from the right wing networks.[680] It should also be noted that a coalition with the RPP, let alone diluting the NSM's identity, would directly and indirectly further reinforce the singularity and difference of the NSM's identity. In a coalition with the JP, it would be much difficult to take credit for changes related to religious issues. However, during the coalition with the RPP, the actions of the NSP would immediately be recognized given the RPP's record and the NSM identity. [681]

Regarding the constituency base and the activists, or the issue of votes, the pro-coalitionists were aware that they risked the votes they had attracted from the JP and even the activists they recruited from the right wing networks. However, they traded the short-term risks of early elections and/or yet another party closure with such long-term risks. They calculated that during their incumbency they could generate and redistribute enough symbolic and material political goods to maintain the voter base and sustain the NSM. At the symbolic level, forming a government, even if it were with the RPP, would render the NSM legitimate and relevant in the eyes of the general electorate.[682] As Muzaffer Deligöz, then the head of the Bolu district branch and the party-inspector for some Kurdish-majority districts, recounts

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[679] Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007.

[680] Interviews with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007; Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 7, 2007; Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007.

[681] That would in fact be the case in 1975, when the NSP joined the right-wing coalition led by the JP. Interview with Akıncı chairman, Mehmet Ali Bulut, Ankara, August 10, 2006.

[682] Ibid.

that especially in the East, some of the notables, who, reportedly, had the power to channel votes, saw the JP as a means to "make peace" with the state and had not wanted to ruin this relationship by voting for the successor of a banned Islamist party.[683] The procoalitionists thus hoped that a coalition government with the RPP would legitimize them in the eyes of the military and civil bureaucracy, which would then translate into votes in the long run. Moreover, if they prevented civil strife through granting an amnesty law that would include both the left and right wing prisoners of thought, they believed, the citizens' appreciation would bring further votes. Concerning the organization, the NSM leaders were confident that given enough time they would persuade the activists in the benefits a government partnership could create. As Asiltürk said, in politics nothing should be rushed and everything should proceed incrementally: leaders first needed to instruct (the others) on the information they had access to.[684] Based on new information such as the military's point view and the RPP's concessions, and observing leaders' loyalty to the principles of the NSM, the activists would see that a coalition with the RPP was in the best interest of the nation and the NSM. Overall, the implementation of the NSM goals while being in power would be a symbolic asset in enlarging both the electoral base and the activist networks.

Similarly, Erbakan and other leaders explained the material advantages of being in power. As a movement, the NSM needed to sustain its networks and engage in the mobilization of further human resources. The NSP as the movement's organization now acquired an opportunity to have an access to "*iktidar nimetleri*," or the "resources of power." The resources controlled by the state institutions would be redistributed via the NSP to consolidate and develop further the movement organizations, networks, and voter base.[685] As Şevket Kazan says, a party in power, just shortly before the elections, would take short-term measures to ameliorate the lives of groups of citizens using state resources. A party in opposition, especially if it was new, had limited resources to distribute to the constituency through its own organizations and networks: "how much a women's

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[683] Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 24, 2007.
[684] Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007
[685] Interview with Mehmet Tezel, September 3, 2007. The Akıncı leader stated that these material aspects of being in power were carefully explained to the activists and that he, and many others, trusted Erbakan that he would not sacrifice the NSM principles in exchange for such benefits.

branch can do" to alleviate poverty?[686] At the very least, then, being in power would prevent other parties, particularly the JP, from benefiting from these advantages at the expense of the NSM, a young movement with limited resources.

To sum up, the pro-coalition elites presented a different picture of the existing opportunities and constraints in terms of office, policy and votes. Unlike the anti-coalitionists who claimed that the office meant sacrificing policy and votes, the pro-coalition group argued the exact opposite. The anti-coalition group basically assumed that the NSP could keep its organization and voter base intact only while in opposition. The pro-coalition group, on the other hand, not only did not take the organization and voter base for granted, but was also of the opinion that they had to develop it even further if the NSM were to survive. In their eyes, without the redefinition and/or relocation of symbolic and material resources controlled by the state neither the organizational nor the electoral loyalty was guaranteed. The office could ensure not only the NSM's access to these resources but also to implement the NSM goals. At any rate, without the office, an early general election was a Damocles' sword that put even the existing parliamentary seats in jeopardy.

6.2 The Micro-properties of the Conflicting Elite Groups and the Intra-movement Struggle for Power

What were the factors that influenced the two groups' respective positions on the coalition with the RPP? Why did the NSM elites crystallize into two groups that interpreted the environmental opportunity structure and the "right" political strategy in divergent ways around the issue of coalition? This section advances two interrelated arguments. First, the two groups of NSM elites had access to different types of material, ideational and symbolic resources depending on their structural position within and in relation to the multiplicity of environments in which the party operated. Their dissimilar positions and the available resources associated with these positions influenced the way in which they perceived the role and the function of the NSM, thus the environmental challenges and opportunities. Second,

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[686] Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 7, 2007. Asked whether they preferred being in coalition for this reason, Şevket Kazan was quick to emphasize that they "did not use government opportunities,...not as much [as other parties]."

the question of coalition presented itself as an opportunity to challenge the existing power structure within the party for the anti-coalitionists and to consolidate it for the pro-coalitionists. The divergent views and attitudes had thus a symbolic value on their own and were partially influenced by the process of power struggle, notwithstanding the particular ideational and structural properties of the NSM elites. The conflict over the coalition was a catalyst on the crystallization of a latent power struggle between two rival elite groups that dated back to the genetic phase of the NSM mobilization.

These micro- and meso- level processes and factors that interacted with the macro level opportunities and constraints help to understand why the NSM elites adopted different policy positions. The question of how they prevailed over their rivals, on the other hand, is the subject of the next section.

Following is an examination of, first, the micro-properties of the NSM elites and second, the sources and dynamics of the struggle for power between the two opposing groups.

6.2.1 Multi-positionality and its Effects on the Attitudes and Views of the NSM Elites

A diachronic perspective reveals that the multi-positionality of the actors affected their perceptions and arguments on the question of coalition with the RPP.[687] The multi-positionality of an actor occurs as party elites and activists act and interact both "…within the organization, and … at the juncture of organization and the environment (or parts of the environment)"[688]. The "action systems" at the juncture of the party and the environment(s) that are called *secante marginale*[689] (marginal secant) are multiple as well. First, there are two different fields of

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[687] It should be noted that in their very insightful study on the moderation of the Morroccan JDP, Wegner and Pellicer, through drawing attention to the increasing distance between the Movement of Unity and Reform and its political party the JDP, reveal how different type of organizational membership may give rise to different comportements. However, they do not dwell on why or whether or not individual activists choose one organization over another during their double membership. Wegner and Pellicer, "Islamist Moderation without Democratization."

[688] Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties and Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 34. It should be noted here Panebianco highlights a concept that was first developed by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedhberg in their work *L'acteur et le système : les contraintes de l'action collective* (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1977).

[689] Panebianco, 34.

political action at local and national levels and, second there exists multiplicity of "milieu partisan," or local networks. Consequently, the party actors may have homologous, analogous or dissimilar structural positions.[690]

As Sawicki shows, the multi-positionality of organizational actors affect intraparty dynamics as networks and the fields of political action in which they are entrenched provide material (e.g. time, money, labor, votes) and symbolic resources (e.g. ideational elements, information, friendship, loyalty) that constraint and facilitate how political actors (re)act within and through the party.[691] In the case of the NSM too, the networks and fields of action in which the NSM elites had been embedded before, created through, and/or entered following the NSM mobilization and the resources they presented showed diversity and influenced the way in which the NSM elites perceived and acted upon the issue of coalition.

It is pertinent to start with a brief overview of the origins of the two opposing groups within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group. The groups can be traced back to the genetic phase of the NSM. As shall be remembered, the NSM entrepreneurs had been embedded in close-knit groups of friendship or brotherhood (strong ties) *and* connected to each other via various overlapping acquaintances and activities within right wing religious, professional and political associations and political parties (weak ties). At first, there were three prominent groups of party entrepreneurs: some parliamentarians and senators from right-wing parties, some leading members of the *Risale-i Nur* student branches in Anatolia, and finally, a group of civil servants and engineers, including Erbakan. Following the establishment of the NOP, the smallest group, that is, the "parliamentarian and senator" group, and some new comers such as Şevket Kazan, gradually fused with the civil servant/engineer group that surrounded Erbakan. In turn, particularly following the foundation of the NSP, some professional men of religion, or *Diyanetçiler*[692], who entered the Assembly, (some also present in the Executive Committee) established close relations with the *Risale-i Nur* group

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[690] Please see below for the explanation of this terminology.

[691] Sawicki studies the "milieu partisan" of the Socialist Party in three regions in France: le Pas-de Calais, le Var, and l'Ille-et-Vilaine. Sawicki, 67-327.

[692] Professional men of religion came from the ranks of Prayer Leader and Preacher schools, Presidency of the Religious Affairs, or the Directorate of Religious Education, a branch of the Ministry of Education. They were all related to the Presidency of Religious Affairs in some way or another, hence they were given the name *Diyanetçiler* (the Religious Affairs People) by the pro-coalitionists.

within the NSM. While the former eventually formed the pro-coalition group, the latter would become the anti-coalitionists.

The core members of the pro-coalitionist, or rather Erbakan group[693], were "homologous," or they had structural correspondence: the *secante marginale* within which they interacted with intra- and extra-party actors and drew resources was similar. At the local level, unlike the *Risale-i Nur* students and men of religion, their vertical and horizontal ties with the "milieu partisan" did not involve a salient pre-party organizational identity and extra-party institutional relations (neither formal as in the case of most men of religion nor informal as was the case for the *Risale-i Nur* students). Prior to mobilization period, their ties with the networks that would later provide activists, members, sympathizers, and voters constituted mostly weak ties of professional, associational and ideational (Islamist or right-wing in the general sense of the term) affinity and exchanges.[694] Whatever strong ties they had among themselves and with the activists recruited from the local right wing milieus partisan were created through action and interaction within the context of the NSM mobilization for party building purposes, which aggregated and then articulated local interests and identities with the national political arena. Moreover, their interactions with non-NSM actors were carried out within the context NSM mobilizations. In other words, the resources they tapped into and invested in at the local level were created and marked primarily by the NSM practices and collective identity. Consequently, they believed that the coalition with the RPP presented an opportunity a) to protect the NSP, the organization that materially linked the activists, the "periphery of the periphery" to the political arena; and b) to tap into state controlled symbolic and material resources, which could then be used to consolidate and enlarge the NSM activist base and constituency networks. As shall be seen below, their concern with consolidating and enlarging the NSM networks proper, was also related to the intra-party struggle. Suffice it say here that having observed the behaviors of the NSM elites who were rooted in pre-NSM religious

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[693] Among the leading core members from the Executive Committee and Parliamentary Group were national figures such as Süleyman Arif Emre, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Fehmi Cumalıoğlu, Hasan Aksay, İsmail Müftüoğlu and locally strong names such as Yasin Hatipoğlu (Çorum), Şevket Kazan and Abdürrahim Bezci (İzmit), Abdülkerim Doğru (Kars), and Fehim Adak (Mardin).
[694] As had been discussed in Chapter 3 membership to a *Naqshbandi* brotherhood did not necessarily involve strong ties with other members. As a matter of fact, as early as 1978, Korkut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan, both disciples of the same Naqshbandi sheikh during the same period while students at the same university, would later become rivals for the party's chairmanship at the party general congress.

networks, they came to realize that the NSM needed to create its own networks if it were to survive.

At the national level, even before the NSM mobilization, the pro-coalitionist elites, as politicians, (parliamentarians from the right wing parties), or as civil servants and engineers, (the students and friends of Erbakan), with few exceptions, had already been interacting with various state and political actors. Following the NSP's entry to the parliament, thanks to either their prior experiences[695] or their positions within the formal power structure of the party[696], or both, they established further and more frequent contact with other players of the political field. As discussed in the previous subsection, among these contacts, the relationship with the RPP (and also the military), through the information and affinity it provided, would prove to be decisive in changing their perception of the RPP elites and themselves. As a matter of fact, during a heated dispute over the coalition, an anti-coalitionist leader attacked the pro-coalitionists saying that their frequent contact with the RPP created a rapprochement, which blurred their vision.[697]

The core members of the anti-coalitions group,[698] on the other hand, were *Risale-i Nur* students (the Nur students).[699] When the NSP entered the parliament, they allied themselves with *Diyanetçiler*[700] who had recently been elected from the ranks of the NSP. The members of two groups had prior (weak) ties not only because there were Nur students[701] who worked in the Presidency of Religious Affairs but also because they had carried out joint activities (conferences, seminars etc.) through certain right wing associations. While the members of each subgroup

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[695] Among them Şevket Kazan was an exception.

[696] The power relations within the party will be discussed below.

[697] Sevilgen, *MSP'de*, 75.

[698] Among them only two were national figures from Risale-i Nur background, Hüsamettin Akmumcu (in Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group) and Hüseyin Abbas (in the Group), thanks to their speeches during the "party opening ceremonies" as the NOP parliamentarians (they had been first elected from the ranks of the JP and then transferred to the NOP).

[699] They constituted the group that opposed the *Yeni Asya* group's dominance within the Nur students networks. The Executive Committee: Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, Suudi Reşat Saruhan, Rasim Hancıoğlu, Gündüz Sevilgen (all were also parliamentarians), and Sabri Özpala (a local elite from İstanbul). The Parliamentary Group:Vahdettin Karaçorlu, İhsan Karaçam, Sabri Dörtkol.

[700] They were in the Parliamentary Group: Cemal Cebeci, Hulusi Özkul, Zeki Okur, Ömer Lütfi Zararsız.

[701] For instance, Vahdettin Karaçorlu (later an NSP parliamentarian), Said Özdemir (a leading Nur leader in Ankara who had supported the NSM from the very beginning), and Muzaffer Deligöz (a young middle ranked Nur leader in Ankara and later the chair of the local NSP branch in Bolu) all worked in Presidency of Religious Affairs.

were homologous (having structural correspondence), the anti-coalitionist elites as a whole were analogous (having structural similarity) within the party. While they had limited activity and connections at the *marginale secante* at the national level, they drew their resources basically from their pre-NSM connections at the local level.

Specifically, before their engagement in politics through the NSM, the anti-coalitionists had previously been embedded in organizational networks, which were well-defined in terms of their identity, culture, formal and informal roles and rules. The Nur students had been entrenched in an informal "new religious movement" organization in various Anatolian localities, including Ankara, and rose to power within the movement networks by the mid 1960s, following the death of Said Nursi. The *Diyanetçiler* in turn, though working within and through state created or controlled schools, PRA, mosques etc., were carriers of long established tradition of orthodox Islamic scholarship and institutions critical of state introduced secular reforms and enjoyed their own personal networks at the various localities they worked. The religious institutions in which they were embedded emerged in radically different conditions, the former being an underground "new religious movement" and the latter being state institutions, and had quite different Islamic/Islamist practices, interpretations, and networks. Nevertheless, the elites coming from the ranks of either religious institution reacted the same way to the prospect of the coalition and allied against the pro-coalitionists. Their anti-coalition attitude and alliance was partly related to similarities in their institutions/networks' historical background and partly to their relative independence from the resources produced within and through the NSM.

On the one hand, having been active within the same "religious market," and under the watchful eyes of the secularist military, bureaucratic and political elites, the Nur students and the *Diyanetçiler* resembled to each other in their relationship with and attitudes towards the ruling elites (civil and military bureaucracy, the RPP and the right wing political parties). Historically, their respective religious institutions and activities had emerged and grew under the heavy-handed rule of the RPP's single party regime in the 1930s. Both the informal organization of the Nur students and the personal networks of men of religion had developed within the local and national right wing milieus by the late 1940s.

Through the connections they established with various sectors of society at the local (followers, notables, local officers, and judicial elites[702]) and national levels (sympathetic political, and military elites) they had been able to protect, enlarge and strengthen their personal and religious networks and resources. Having objectively and/or subjectively suffered at the hands of the RPP regime, they had established an uneasy alliance with the right wing parties, particularly the DP and the JP. These latter had adopted a "carrot and stick policy" towards the Nur students and men of religion, instead of just "stick policy" of the RPP. Consequently, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, despite the apparent liberalization of the religious life under the right-wing governments, almost all anti-coalition elites had witnessed and personally encountered (either themselves or a close family member) state persecution such as investigation, prosecution, imprisonment, and/or exile (usually under the Penal Law, article 163). The conflicts with the Demirel leadership during the right wing mobilizations of the 1960s,[703] however, constituted a final stroke on the camel's back, which had contributed to their engagement in politics through the NSM[704].

On the other hand, both groups of leaders considered themselves above all as men of religion. While the *Diyanetçiler* were professional men of religion previously employed by the state, the Nur student leaders, though being in lay professions, considered themselves "men of religion" as well; they provided unremunerated religious services within the cadres of their religious circles. As was the case for the *Naqshbandi* leaders, in order to maintain and recruit activists and followers they needed to adopt "above-petty-politics" attitudes. Their religious authority and legitimacy partly depended on such a behavior. Historically, they had justified whatever ties they had with right wing political parties (also the NSM) with the need to protect Islam and the activities of the religious networks.

The history and identity of these organizations and associated networks had the following effects with regard to the question of coalition. First, since the

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[702] It was not a coincidence that out of eight above mentioned Nur students there were four lawyers, two of which being retired judges.

[703] See Chapter 3 for the details of this conflict.

[704] These Anatolian based Nur student local elites had become NSM entrepreneurs partly because they were uncomfortable with the increasing power of a younger generation within the İstanbul branch in particular and İstanbul leaders' rising influence within Anatolian networks through a newspaper and expansionist attitude in general.

collective identities of their religious organizations and networks had been shaped partly by hostility towards the RPP, they thought a coalition with this party would alienate their activist and constituency base. Second, because of their deep-seated distrust towards the RPP, in contrast to pro-coalitionist group, they either lacked or refused ties with the RPP elites (though not necessarily with the military elites).[705] This, in turn, prevented them from appreciating or confirming the changes that the RPP claimed it had been gone through. Third, the coalition would render the NSP a political party proper. However, keeping the NSP as a "pressure group" would enable them to protect their "above-petty party politics" status. It should be noted that the danger of losing one's constituency base was more immediate for the Nur students, as their rivals, the leaders of the powerful İstanbul based Nur student group, later known as *Yeni Asya* group, had been expanding its influence within and even capturing the Anatolian based Nur student networks at the expense of local and free-floating Nur student elders since the late 1960s. Moreover, although remained publicly passive and neutral with regard to the NSM mobilization up until the NSP entered the parliament, Yeni Asya had been skeptical about the benefits the NSM (or any other party but the JP for that matter)[706] could bring to the Nur students movement; in their private meetings had warned those Nur student leaders who decided to engage in such a movement. Not only the NSM could potentially attract the wrath of the secularist elites, but also threaten the Nur students' survival. The latter depended on recruitment from, and influence within, the largest right wing network in the country, which was open to experimenting with religious ideas and practices: the JP voters and sympathizers. Even the prospect of a coalition with the RPP had brought the JP and Yeni Asya even closer and provoked public attacks against the NSP.[707] The Yeni Asya elites were also urging boycotts against the Nur

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[705] Particularly, the Nur students, Vahdettin Karaçorlu, Tevfik Paksu and Hüsamettin Akmumcu had close relations with some members of the military establishment. Karaçorlu used to be a colonel, Paksu used to be a member of the Senate which included members of the military junta of May 27, and finally Akmumcu had been introduced to the military circles thanks to his neighborhood with a high ranking officer. The purpose of the Nur students was to protect their networks from further state encroachments; and their opposition to the communist activism gave an opportunity to build bridges with the military. As discussed earlier this need was more prominent for Yeni Asya movement, which established particularly close relations with the military, especially with Faik Türün, Commander of Martial Law Administration in İstanbul following the military intervention of 1971.

[706] For instance, in 1969, Yeni Asya fiercely attacked the NAP in its booklet published as a supplement for *İttihad*. See the advertisement for the supplement in Appendix G, Figure 18.

[707] See for instance the issues of Yeni Asya newspaper between 1973-1975. In May1977, shortly before the general elections and during a period when 14 members of Nur student/Diyanetçi group

student elites who worked for the NSM.[708] The NSM Nur Students were now facing implosion of their very own networks let alone increasing their influence in Anatolia in general. Finally, as far as the anticoalitionists' position within the NSM was concerned, the alienation of their supporters could result in a diminished bargaining power at best, loss of their elite status at worst. In that case, they would have lost not only their religious and social reputation and circles that they had built over the years, but also their recently flourishing political careers.

6.2.2 The Conflict over the Coalition as a Symbolic Tool in the Intra-party Power Struggle

The internal dynamics of the NSM leadership reveals that dating back to the NOP; there was a latent struggle for power between two groups of NSM entrepreneurs. The entry of the NSP to the parliament and the prospect of coalition became catalysts for an open conflict and the crystallization of contenders of organizational power into anti- and pro-coalition groups. As discussed above, both elite groups drew upon the role and function of the NSP in order to assess the opportunity structure and right political strategy. The divergent views and attitudes were thus not only a reflection of the resources available to them but also symbolic tools to fight "over the legitimate definition of the party and over the right to speak in the name of [this] entity and the collective brand."[709] The result of the conflict could potentially determine who would produce the political goods in the name of the party and reap the benefits and how and where these benefits would be put into use.[710]

The Anti-coalitionists

The Nur students, who were the core of the anti-coalition group considered Erbakan and his close circle almost as usurpers. While the party entrepreneurs had invited Erbakan to become the leader of the new enterprise, the Nur students

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announced that they would not put their candidacies for parliamentary seats under the NSP banner, Yeni Asya published a supplement to reveal the "corruption" of the NSP. Hüseyin Demirel, Ümit Şimşek and Bünyamin Ateş, *İslami Hareket ve MSP* (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 1977).

[708] Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2007.

[709] As Offerlé puts it a political party is an objective space where actors "contribute to the existence or rather to the belief in the existence of" the party through such a competition. Offerlé, 15.

[710] Ibid.,17.

wanted to control him in the best case scenario and expected him to act like as *primus inter pares* at worst. However, Erbakan had emerged as the undisputed leader from the TOBB Affair. As one Risale-i Nur also noted, Erbakan had advantages that prominent Nur students lacked and became the public face of contemporary young religious men. During the TOBB Affair he had demonstrated that his oratory abilities, name recognition, easy communication with workshop and shop owners, extensive social capital ranging from student circles to businessmen and brotherhoods, cultural capital (both secular and religious) were unmatched among the NSM elites. Moreover, he did not have the stigma associated with being a Risale-i Nur student.[711]

The Nur students were uncomfortable with this unexpected development. As a behind the scenes Nur student party entrepreneur noted they had even tried to convince Tevfik Paksu to become a candidate for the NOP's chairmanship arguing that even if he lacked Erbakan's qualities the Nur student elites combined could fill the void of Erbakan. At the end, however, they supported Erbakan's chairmanship for the following reasons. First, Paksu refused the offer. Second, since despite his extensive social capital Erbakan lacked a reliable religious community network of his own, they miscalculated that Erbakan would eventually need the Nur students and render them behind the scenes power.[712]

However, as shall be discussed shortly, the Erbakan group had already realized that the NSM, if it would survive and succeed, should not rely exclusively on religious communities and leaders. They had even managed to take certain measures against the Nur student elites. The question of coalition was thus the first opportunity window for the Nur students to legitimately challenge Erbakan's and his close companions' growing authority since the establishment of the NOP. Since 1970, the NSM had faced with a ban on the party, a military intervention, the establishment of the new party, and finally the elections. It was the emerging pro-coalitionist attitude that allowed the Nur students to launch their struggle. They were now more powerful, joined by *Diyanetçiler,*[713] who were unhappy to witness that they did not get the respect they had expected from the secular Islamist elites.

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[711] Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 1, 2007.
[712] Interviews with RNelder1, May 15, 2008; and Muzaffer Deligöz, July 1, 2007.
[713] It should be noted that unlike the Nur students, not all men of religion joined the ranks of the anti-coalitionists.

During the intra-party discussions, they made veiled attacks on the pro-coalitionists, particularly Erbakan. Sudi Reşat Saruhan's speech in late November 1973, in the joint meeting of the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group following the RPP's first offer, illustrates these points. On the one hand, Saruhan questioned the pro-coalitionist loyalty to the NSM identity invoking in a very subtle way the incompatibility of seeking office with altruism and avoidance of petty politics. Drawing attention to the RPP's record he argued that such a coalition would mean (for those who supported it) giving up on the "cause". On the other hand, he attacked Erbakan personally in a muffled way when he compared the two paths imposed on the NSP. According to Saruhan early elections should not induce worries about the votes since it was not the NSP parliamentary candidates' (read Erbakan) "personal accomplishments (*kabiliyet*), talents (*istidat*) or etiquettes (*etiket*)" but God's will that had sent the NSP to the Assembly to represent the "ideas" the NSP claimed to defend. If God wanted the NSP to be in power, he would no doubt allow more parliamentarians to get elected.[714]

The Pro-coalitionists

Although the pro-coalitionist interviewees did not overtly use the word distrust, their accounts of the developments during the initial mobilization period suggest that they mistrusted Nur student leaders and men of religion in the NSM in particular and the pre-NSM religious networks in general. Consequently, not only the Erbakan group tried to marginalize these religious leaders' influence within the NSM institutions but also minimize the need for activists coming from the Nur student networks.

There were three basic reasons for their misgivings. First, during the two electoral stages of the NSM, (the Movement of the Independents and the 1973 general elections), they had observed that a considerable number of local religious leaders, whether a Nur student, a man of religion, or a brotherhood Sheikh, had not kept their promises. These leaders had promised either votes or at least a non-oppositional stance as in the case of Yeni Asya and the Süleymancıs. While it

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[714] This should be read as Erbakan since he makes a comparison between Sivas and Konya, the two districts which had sent three parliamentarians to the Assembly. He was trying to show that Erbakan was not actually a factor. This was, of course, a false comparison. To say the least Konya had almost twice more voters than Sivas. Sevilgen, *MSP'de*, 63-65.

immediately became clear that those who promised votes had not delivered "the good", by 1973 Yeni Asya, which had been publicly relatively quite and neutral regarding the NSM since 1969, adopted an increasingly aggressive attitude against the NSP. These experiences revealed how these rather autonomous religious leaders and networks were "zones of uncertainties"[715] that the prospective pro-coalitionists could not easily control. Difficulties in controlling these zones were potential sources of destabilization of the party, and thus the NSM.

Second, the members of the group that had formed around Erbakan thought that particularly the Nur student leaders (and some man of religion) lacked certain skills and/or qualities.[716] Their mistakes or weaknesses, which were actually either a reflection of their material and symbolic properties or strategic moves, were considered harmful for the NSM development or survival within the political arena under the existing regime. Asiltürk, for instance, claimed that the prosecution of the NOP by the Constitutional Court was partly the result of the Nur students' irresponsible and reckless attitudes during the mobilization period. Despite multiple warnings about the laws governing the political parties, the Nur students spoke to their audience as if they "preached in a mosque."[717] While it was not their speeches that led to the closure of the party in particular, their aggressive tone no doubt attracted the attention of the Prosecutors of the Republic.

If one way to gain legitimacy was to act within the limits set by the law, the other was to change the perception of the individuals about the NSM elites at the national level. As Emre stated, the party was trying to act within the limits set by the law but the enforcers of the law (civil and military bureaucracy) arbitrarily changed the limits through reinterpretations when they deemed necessary.[718] The

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[715] The term zones of uncertainty that Panebianco borrows from Crozier and Friedhberg's work mentioned above and develops refers to "areas of unpredictability" from which the organization, the leaders and even "the lowliest activist," derive their resources. There are six such zones: competency, environmental relations management, internal communications, formal rules, organizational financing and recruitment. Those who can establish a control over most of these areas could command a considerable freedom of action. Panebianco, 33-36.

[716] It should be noted that the mid-level ranked Nur student NSM activists also made similar comments regarding the NSM parliamentarians of Nur student origins during the interviews.

[717] Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. When the speeches of the Nur students and non-Nur student NSM elites in the party opening ceremonies are compared, though they did not differ radically in terms of their content, it is true that the Nur students emphasized more moral/religious issues than the others and were much more aggressive attacking the RPP or Demirel.

[718] Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, February 2, 2007.

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members of the Erbakan group thus sought to leave a positive impact on the military and civil bureaucracy. To do that they needed to mingle with them in state's various social and official gatherings. Unlike the members of the Erbakan group, the Nur students neither wished nor possessed the right cultural capital to socialize with the state elites. For instance, Müftüoğlu explains his being deputy chairman responsible from auxiliary organizations and his eventual ministerial position (and compares his trajectory with those of the Nur students) by his cultural and social attributes. He knew how to behave among the "socialites" as much as how to pray in a mosque. He already had a large social network and a considerable intellectual accumulation, which reflected in how he dressed and spoke. He created a pleasant aura that the military officers liked in the cocktails; so much so that he would joke to them: "you cannot be as handsome as I am."[719]

Third and final source of distrust to the Nur students (and the *Diyanetçiler*), which surfaced particularly after the NSP's entry into the parliament, was related to their performance as parliamentarians. The pro-coalitionists perceived them as relatively indolent in party affairs, particularly in those questions related to the parliamentary responsibilities of the NSP.[720] For instance, the party needed to come up with its own proposal of a General Amnesty Law to bring about the "social peace" that it had promised during the electoral campaign. The anti-coalitionists' proposal included only an Amnesty for those who had been convicted in accordance with the Penal Law, Article163. When an intra-party commission was set up to produce a more comprehensive proposal, only Kazan properly worked on the subject, which in turn paved the way for his position as Minister of Justice during the coalition. Members of the Erbakan group complained that their opponents were unable to come up with detailed solutions or proposals despite their fierce opposition on various subjects. For the pro-coalitionists, a proper political party could not function unless its administrators and parliamentarians prepared policy proposals, made them public, took decisions and then shouldered the responsibility for these decisions.

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[719] Interview with İsmail Müftüoğlu, İstanbul November 12, 2007.
[720] It should be reemphasized that this perception was not peculiar to the pro-coalitionists. The interviewed mid-rank Nur student NSM activists and local elites from Kayseri also made similar comments.

It can be argued that the behavior of the anti-coalitionists in general and the Nur students in particular, were as much a result of their structural and ideational properties as a strategic choice. To give an example from the coalition dispute, most of the anti-coalitionists in the Executive Committee and Parliamentary Group went for pilgrimage during the height of government crisis when the RPP and the pro-coalitionists had begun behind the doors negotiations. Such an act cannot be solely explained by lack of experience or reckless behavior. It was in their absence that the pro-coalitionists had acquired the majority's support in a joint meeting of the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group to conduct coalition talks.[721] The absence of the anti-coalitionists seems more like a move a) to portray the pro-coalitionists as authoritarian leaders seeking office benefits and, of course, b) to render them responsible for the coalition in the eye of, at least, their constituencies.

Be that as it may, based on early evaluations of the Nur students and their behavior, Erbakan made sure that unlike the NOP, the NSP's Chairmanship Council (*Başkanlık Divanı*)[722] did not include any of the seven prominent Nur student Executive Committee members. In addition to the Chairman, the members of the Council, particularly the General Secretary and the deputy chairmen responsible for the party organization, electoral affairs and auxiliary organizations had frequent contacts with the NSM public and public in general. The exclusion of the Nur students from the Council, thus, partly aimed at reducing the risk of damage their public statements could cause for the NSP. However, this exclusion also concretized the mutual mistrust and contributed to the formation of an anti-coalitionist block within the party. As anti-coalitionists increased their opposition within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group, the Erbakan group's negative views strengthened. The question of coalition thus became a symbolic tool in the struggle for power.

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[721] Sevigen, *MSP'de*, 79.
[722] The Executive Committee elected a Council of seven members from among its members. In practice, the Chairman determined the members of the councils with whom he would work closely. In the NSP five out of seven, including Erbakan, were also parliamentarians. In the Committee meeting of 22 November, the Council's three out five parliamentary members but İsmail Müftüoğlu indicated that they preferred a coalition with the RPP to an early election (Erbakan, Süleyman Arif Emre, Oğuzhan Asiltürk and Fehmi Cumalıoğlu). Sevigen, *MSP'de*, 73-75. Müftüoğlu would follow the suit later.

Although the pro-coalitionists won the first battle easily when they acquired the backing of the parliamentarians and majority of the local activists and cornered the anti-coalitionists to support (and vote for) the coalition government, they won the second battle of the coalition question with heavy losses. The second showdown was about the draft General Amnesty Law that the RPP and the pro-coalitionist NSP elites had prepared for almost four months. The anti-coalitionists for the very same reasons that they had opposed the RPP, opposed the inclusion of the left wing convicts (under the Penal Law, Articles 141-142) to the Amnesty. Having secured 22 votes, instead of voting for their government proposal, in May 1974, they voted for the opposition's draft law that excluded the left wing prisoners.[723] Not only their action would prove to be the beginning of the end of the coalition but also lead to an open conflict in the General Congress of the party in 1976. Although the Erbakan group emerged victorious from the congress, by the general election of 1977, a total of 14 anti-coalitionists, including all the Nur students and the *Diyanetçiler*, would refuse to be parliamentary candidates and quit the party to establish *Nizam Partisi* (The Order Party). While the NSP and the pro-coalitionists survived this blow, they nevertheless lost some of their votes in the localities of these parliamentarians.[724] Overall, the NSP lost half of its Assembly seats (though not the votes) in the general elections of 1977.[725]

6.3 The Pro-coalitionists Prevail: Organizational and Ideational Factors

What were the factors that enabled the pro-coalitionist elites to pursue and execute their line of action? How could they prevail over their rivals and obliged them to vote for the coalition government formed with the RPP? How could they

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[723] The RPP later applied to the Constitutional Court, which decided that the Amnesty should cover those convicted under the Articles 141-142 alongside those who fell under the jurisdiction of the sister Article163.

[724] It should be added that it is difficult to assess whether or not the anti-coalitionists who had quit the party caused the decrease in the votes in these regions. While their networks had probably reacted to the NSP pro-coalitionist elites, there might be other reasons as well. For instance, the better performance of the JP and the NAP in their 1977 electoral campaigns; the NSP' coalition with the right wing parties in 1975 might also have been influential. Moreover, for instance in Kayseri, it seems that it was local intra-party disputes over parliamentary candidacies and the central administration's imposition of an outsider as a candidate that contributed the most to the decline in votes. Interviews with local Kayseri NSP leaders and activists.

[725] The NSM did lose the parliamentary seats but not the votes. It simply could not enlarge its electoral constituency despite the increase in the overall number of the eligible voters.

keep the activist base intact even when their decision to support Amnesty for the left wing prisoners was quite unpopular?

This section argues that in the case of the NSM, the NSP's formal and informal organizational structure and ideational products helped the pro-coalitionist elites to secure the support of the local activists and resist the pressure of their opponents. To understand how the structural, relational and ideational features of the NSM worked in favor of the pro-coalitionists require a three steps analysis. First step involves looking at the genetic period of the NSM, or its structural and ideational institutionalization around the NOP and the NSP. The NSM had produced a centralized (decision-making) structure, a collective identity based on solidarity and altruism that supported this structure and finally collective action frames that argued for introducing material and moral changes and demanded from the activists to shoulder this historical and religious responsibility in the name of the Muslim nation.

The second step entails examining why and how the organizational and ideational traits of the NSM were reproduced at the local level. The centralized decision making structure and the movement's symbolic products had two major sets of function at the local level. The initial functions were to provide collective incentives for participation and to reduce the cost of political activism for individual local activists through aggregating the available resources. Starting with the electoral campaign of 1973, when the NSP, the movement organization, began to institutionalize and entered the competition within political arena in every sense of the term, altruism and solidarity revealed their limits among the local elites. The organizational and ideational elements of the movement served to provide selective incentives and "dissimulate" their existence respectively.

The third and final step is to study how and why these organizational and ideational features had provided advantages to the Erbakan group both before and during the conflict over the coalition. While the centralized structure helped the pro-coalitionists to increase their control over the party center at the expense of their rivals and the local party branches, their arguments, or frames regarding the coalition aligned much better with the NSM collective identity and action frames.

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6.3.1 Organizational Institutionalization of the NSM

This subsection studies the vertical power relations of the party, focusing on its formal and informal institutions of decision-making and accountability. Who made decisions on policy (goals and strategies on various issues) and recruitment (activists and parliamentarians) and the degree of the decision makers' accountability concurrently shape and reflect intraparty vertical power dynamics.[726] In turn, as Angelo Panebianco argues, vertical power relations between the party's central leadership and the local activists constitute a factor in the horizontal power games at the center of political parties. According to him, "the greater the freedom of movement won by the leaders in vertical power games (the more such freedom is configured as a "carte blanche") the stronger their trump cards wielded in horizontal power games vis-à-vis the internal opponents."[727]

The NSM had a highly centralized[728] decisional structure and lacked a functioning system of accountability. The ideational features of the NSM that helped the party entrepreneurs to mobilize the local activists also sustained their domination within the party.[729] As shall be seen in the last subsection, the pro-coalitionists would take advantage of this existing structure, to the establishment of which their rivals themselves had contributed as party entrepreneurs.

The main features of the NSM organization became apparent and functioning in 1973, shortly before the electoral efforts began. The NOP had not had time to operate properly because of its "legal problems". As was the case in studying the JP's internal structure in Chapter 4, studying bylaws and the 1965 Law of Political Parties alone would tell very little about how the NSP was organized. The written rules constitute "an area of uncertainty," that is, they are open to

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[726] For a discussion on the subject see for instance, Strøm and Müller, 16-18 and Kaare Strøm, "Party Leadership in Theory and in Norway: An Entrepreneurial Perspective," in *How Political Parties Work: Perspectives from Within*, ed. Kay Lawson (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 111-112.

[727] Panebianco, 23. The task is quite similar to one that is carried out in Chapter 4, which provides a study of the internal structure of the JP. Since the subject of the essay is primarily the NSM, this section includes more theoretical and empirical details.

[728] The term oligarchy is not used as the term's historical and academic baggage may curtail the dynamic and interactional features of this centralized structure.

[729] Since the role of the ideational elements in organizational institutionalization will be studied in detail in the next subsection, here they will be dealt with only briefly.

interpretation, neglect and (ab)use.[730] The NSP, in particular, enforced the written rules to the extent that it protected the party from legal scrutiny and empowered the central administration.[731]

To begin with, since the Law of Political Parties conferred executive and decisional powers to the central administration; the NSP was a centralized party similar to its counterparts in the political field. The central administration, which had to include no less than 15 members, was entitled to exercise authority[732] in the name of the party's highest organ, the General Congress. The latter convened every two years and brought together local delegates, central administrators, and parliamentarians. The central executive body in the NSP, the Executive Committee, was composed of 20 elected and 5 appointed members, who in turn, "elected" a Chairman Council (the Council) from among its members. It should be noted that, as in other political parties, the Chairman was actually allowed to choose the members of the Council who would become his close aids in party affairs responsible for specific tasks.

While it was the Executive Committee's duty to deliberate and ultimately decide on matters related to party policy and strategies, particularly coalition questions, the Council handled day-to-day relations with the party branches, negotiations with other political actors, and interim decisions. The Chairman and the Council were thus formally accountable to the Executive Committee. Both, in turn, reported to the General Congress. The central executives reported their actions ranging from party finances to policy choices to the delegates, who, in theory, had the power to change their executives through their votes in case they were dissatisfied with their performances.

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[730] Panebianco, 35.

[731] This subsection is, then, based on the newspaper accounts and the interviews conducted with central party elites and local activists, which revealed those formal, that is written rules that were actually applied and also the informal rules and norms that governed the party's decisional mechanisms.

[731] As mentioned earlier, the NSP named this organ the General Executive Committee (*Genel İdare Kurulu*).

[732] The Law designated the central administration as the "central decisional organ" (*Merkezi Karar Alma Organı*) of the party. It was responsible from executing party program and bylaws and taking decisions in the name of the party. It could not however decide for self-abolition of the party or changes in the party program and bylaws.

As for the relationship between the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group, the party was expected to harmonize the legislative work of the parliamentarians with the decisions of the Executive Committee. However, according to the article 25 of the Law of Political Parties, the votes of confidence or non-confidence for a government could only be taken by parliamentary group decision. No other party institution, including the Chairman Council or the Executive Committee, could take legally binding decisions for the parliamentarians on the matter of voting for a government, by implication, even if it entailed a coalition government that included their own party.

At first glance, the formal institutions of accountability and parliamentary independence appear to decrease the power of the Chairman and the Council in particular and the Executive Committee in general, within the party organization. Nevertheless, as was the case for other parties of the political arena, the formal institutions of accountability and parliamentary independence did not work in practice. In fact, compared to their counterparts in well-established major parties, for instance the JP, the Executive Committee had decidedly more prerogatives at the expense of the local activists and parliamentarians. Consequently, if and when a group succeeded to dominate the executive organ, it was able to use them at the expense of their opponents within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group. The details of how Erbakan and his close aids, the pro-coalitionist elites, were able to swing the Executive Committee's power to their advantage and cornered the anti-coalitionists to accept the coalition with the RPP will be studied in the last subsection. Here, it is pertinent to study this informal power structure itself.

The national party entrepreneurs, who populated the central administration, enjoyed the advantages of administrating a new and "marginal" party. First, in addition to lack of structural mechanisms that could have incorporated the local activists in decision-making processes, the local branches lacked sufficient resources to influence party decisions even in informal ways. Specifically, as mentioned earlier, unlike the RPP or the JP local networks that had been formed with the initiative of local notables; the NSM local branches, both during the NOP and the NSP period, had been established with difficulty. They were able to succeed thanks to face-to-face recruitment of local party entrepreneurs and

activists. The local party branches were still "under construction"[733] and not at all crowded with "veteran" local party leaders, activists, members, or sympathizers and political wanderers one would see in older parties. Neither the local party administrators nor the rank and file activists had enough political, social, economic and cultural capital to exert concerted influence on party policy.[734] During the establishment of the party the delegates' role was to approve the list of the Executive Committee candidates (there was only one list), the party program and the bylaws put together by the national party innovators. Throughout the 1970s, they were basically engaged in a) electoral and activist mobilization efforts in their localities drawing upon the party's collective identity and action frames and b) promoting the local and or/self interests at the party center.

Second, unlike their counterparts in major political parties, who used, though to a certain extent, their position of brokerage among the parliamentarians, local networks and the party center as leverage in the decision making processes, the NSP local administrators were not able to transform their local activities into political capital. They occupied these posts thanks to their "founding fathers" position and relatively more economic, cultural, economic and/or social capital. While the support of the local activists whom they had themselves recruited contributed to their ascendance in the local movement, it was rather their personal ties with the Executive Committee members that ensured their position. The major function of the local executives, which differentiated them from rank and file, was their mediation in the preparation of the list of parliamentary candidates that would compete under the NSP's banner. This mediation did not necessarily contribute to their political capital vis-à-vis the national leaders of the party since it did not involve summoning major social and political resources, as was the case in, say, the JP. Since there were not many applications and the NSP wanted to protect its collective identity through choosing the "right candidates," the NSP did not hold primaries to choose and rank its candidates. The role of the local executives, thus, consisted of "head hunting" and bringing together a list of potential candidates

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[733] For instance, in the First General Congress, only the delegates of 22 districts, which had earlier convened their congresses, were present. " Teşkilat delege listelerini seçim kurullarına veriyor," *Milli Gazete*, July 18, 1973.

[734] They also lacked well-established ties with activists from other districts.

(which usually included their names as well).[735] They would merely provide suggestions regarding the ordering of the party list of parliamentary candidates, informing the Executive Committee about the properties of the candidates and sensibilities of the local district.

Third, consequently, for most local elites, contributing to party's policy making through elected representatives from their districts was also a remote option. The parliamentarians owed their seats ultimately to the members of the General Executive Committee not the local executives. Studying the process of how the parliamentary candidates were selected and than elected to the Assembly in 1973 throws light upon the mechanisms through which the members of the Executive Committee, particularly the Council, was able to concentrate decision making power in its own hands at the expense of both the local executives and parliamentarians.

Accordingly, although the Law of Political Parties required primaries for the selection of parliamentary candidates, the Article 31 also gave room to skip them in case the party lacked sufficient number of candidates in a given district. The central administration was then allowed to find and rank the candidates of a district to be registered later with the Supreme Electoral Board within an established timeframe. The NSP leaders drew upon this exception to designate the parliamentary candidates in all but four districts.[736] Having been established recently and being successor of a banned party, the NSP had in fact experienced difficulty in finding candidates. However, as was the case in Kayseri, in many places, this practice was not totally justified. There was enough number of candidates to warrant primaries at least to determine the rankings. Even in such places the Executive Committee sidestepped the laws and did not hold the primaries.

Instead of undertaking primaries, then, the Executive Committee, particularly the members of the Council, would a) review the list provided by the local executives, b) call the candidates for interview, c) meet with the local

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[735] Since only the first few candidates would have a chance to go to Ankara, most of the remaining would include their names just to fill the quota of the electoral district. However, filling the spaces was not the only incentive, becoming a parliamentary candidate was also an approval of an individual's merits and status in the local networks. The implications of such an approval will be discussed below in studying the local activists' reproduction of the party's internal structure.

[736] "MSP Milletvekili seçimine 67 vilayetten katılıyor," *Milli Gazete*, August 14, 1973.

executives and d) take out or add some names and finally, e) rank the candidates. Following their initial recommendations, the local administrators or parliamentary candidates had no formal room to make appeals for the decisions. Typically, those who wanted to make some changes would wait several days even to get an appointment. Most important, appeals and disputes over the candidacies would not only be frowned upon but also usually punished by the appointment of a new candidate from outside the district (usually a prominent name originated from the region but lived elsewhere in the country).[737] Through such a punishment, the party leaders would put focus on the goals of the movement, not individual incentives, and made clear the boundaries of acceptable behavior.[738]

Finally, the question of accepted and unaccepted behavior brings to the fore the function of the NSM ideational elements in supporting the centralized mechanism of decision-making. The NSM collective identity that emphasized solidarity, altruism and the action frames that demanded working for the material and moral development in the name of the nation, effectively delegitimized intraparty competition over party posts at different levels and parliamentary seats. According to the NSM motto, which is still in use today, "a party duty was not sought after but offered"[739] and the NSM activists were supposed to work for nothing but Allah's blessings (*Allah rızası*).

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[737] As shall be seen this is exactly what happened in Kayseri. The interviewees reported similar incidents that took place in various other districts. However, Emre argues that only in three districts there were such problems, Çorum, Sakarya and Hatay, where he had to "punish" the troublemakers (notice that he does not mention Kayseri). Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007. Only in four districts, Kocaeli, Manisa, Trabzon and İzmir, where there were either too many candidates or where all candidates refused to be ranked in the first place that the primaries took place.

[738] It should be added that the Executive Committee's power over the parliamentarians' political future did not necessarily translate itself into actual gains in policy making, especially if it concerned a man of religion or a Nur student. The latter was among those who fervently opposed the coalition with the RPP and later on became one of the 14 NSP parliamentarians who refused to put his candidacy in 1977 elections following the Amnesty crisis.

[739] "Görev istenmez verilir". Erbakan's recent "coup" within the Felicity Party against a young leader, Numan Kurtulmuş, who had refused to act under his authority, has been justified with the exact same words. Kurtulmuş and his friends would later (November 2010) establish a new party claiming to have a left-Islamist outlook: The Voice of the People Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi).

6.3.2 Reproduction of Organizational and Ideational Institutions at the Local Level

This subsection examines how and why the NSM local activists embraced such organizational and ideational institutions that weakened them in their interactions with the party leaders. As Offerlé's review of the question of oligarchic tendencies in organizations demonstrates, centralization of power at the hands of a small group of leaders is not a "faith" of political parties in general and the Islamist movements in particular. It depends on the distribution of available political, social and symbolic resources among the leaders and the activists and between these two groups.[740] "The resources that the leaders have in their disposal are likely to become devalued and their authority may be challenged."[741] Similarly, the activists may increase their political experience, economic and political capital in time, depending on environmental factors around the movement and individuals. They could then challenge the party elites and/or leave the party, as would be the case for the NSM in 2002. Consequently, it is imperative to study why and how the local leaders and activists contributed to the maintenance of a highly centralized system at a particular juncture at the NSM history. Through such an analysis, focusing on the local level of politics, one would shed light upon how the pro-coalitionists elites defeated their elite rivals in the early 1970s and later consolidated their dominance within the NSM without falling into the trap of structural determinism and ideational essentialism.

Inquiring the oligarchic tendencies within party organizations, Panebianco asks the following question echoing the problematic of the present subsection: "What is it that makes the leader-follower exchange so unequal as to assure the leaders not only participation but also …widest possible freedom of movement?"[742] While this subsection agrees with Panebianco's answer to this question, that is "a low *substitutability* of organizational incentives,"[743] for the individual activists, it also provides correctives both to the question and the answer: the NSM case shows that the production and stability of a centralized decision-making structure is a question of not only vertical exchange relations between the party leadership and

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[740] Offerlé, 53-56.
[741] Ibid., 56.
[742] Panebianco, 31.
[743] Ibid.

the individual activists but also horizontal exchange relationships at the local level. It is argued that the NSM local activists did not passively embrace the centralized decision making structure that empowered the party leadership, because, individually, they heavily depended on the redistribution of the incentives by the party center. They themselves contributed to and reproduced the centralized decision making structure and the NSM ideational elements that supported this structure in order to sustain the movement at the local level to carry out activist and electoral mobilization efforts.

Based on the fieldwork research in Kayseri but also interviews with party activists and elites from other districts, this subsection will study, first, the horizontal interactions that reproduced the intraparty institutions at the local level. Second, it will tackle the vertical exchange relations as a factor in the expansion of leadership prerogatives drawing on Panebianco's insight.

To begin with, at the local level, the organizational and ideational elements of the NSM prevented intraparty competition and helped to generate, aggregate and channel individual resources to sustain the movement. As discussed in Chapter 5, the majority of the NSM activists were young men with limited social, economic and political capital in both relative and absolute terms. The NSM organizational and ideational institutions prevented the waste of their already scarce resources in an intraparty competition against each other. The transfer of decisional powers to the center helped them to bring together their resources to work against their rivals in the electoral arena and to recruit further activists and gain sympathizers. Everyone would contribute to the electoral and mobilization efforts for "Allah's blessings" and in the name and for the benefit of the nation, through providing various forms of resources. Most would give their time, labor and energy travelling from one village to another, organizing meetings and conferences, doing paperwork and engaging in face-to-face recruitment within the social networks that they belonged ranging from business circles to their villages of origin.[744] Moreover, few

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[744] Electoral campaigns carried with scarce resources bonded them with each other and with the NSM cause further: "This is much more enjoyable and sincere than a service carried out with money. You stop by on the side of the road, you buy a bread and some tomatoes, ate them drinking water from the spring. And you think: why am I here, I am not a candidate, I do not get anything. But [I am here] for Allah's sake. As Erbakan says, the country need to progress materially and morally." Interview with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006.

formal and informal elites/founders of the party also contributed materially.[745] They lent their cars to the service of the party and made substantial money donations to be spent for electoral campaign and daily expenses of the party such as telephone, rent, heating and office supplies etc.

In addition, repudiation of intraparty competition had a self-reinforcing character. It helped to expand the NSM networks and to reproduce the symbolic boundaries that separated the activists from the rest. Since the potential NSM activists were quite critical of the intraparty competition within the JP, which had excluded them from local and national politics in the first place, the centralized structure and identity frames facilitated the participation of the new activists. Once the activists entered the NSM, the consistency of the practice with the identity frames helped further to differentiate themselves from others and reinforced their collective bonds. Consequently, it can be argued that the NSM activists did not only passively accept the party's organizational structure and ideational elements because they were resource-poor vis-à-vis the leadership, but also actively reproduced them in order to sustain collective action at the local level.

Nevertheless, Panebianco's emphasis on vertical exchange relationship between the party leadership and the local activists to explain the degree of freedom of action party leaders also holds true. Without such a relationship that materially and symbolically connected the local networks with the political arena, the collective action at the local level would have remained purposeless. Panebianco categorizes the incentives that organizations redistribute to its activists and members into collective (incentives related to the party goals) and selective ones (material and status incentives).[746] While he also makes a distinction between "believers" (seekers of collective incentives) and "careerists" (seekers of material and status incentives) without attributing any normative judgment, he, however, emphasizes that these are analytical distinctions. Most activists have access to or seek out both types of incentives, though in varying degrees and extents.[747] Panebianco, then, argues that if the party activists lacked "alternative sources of

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[745] Considering the fact that most NSM activists were self-employed small-shop owners, their labor and time should also be counted as indirect material contributions. However, since contributors of material goods also provided their time and labor, this material aspect of rank and file input were not necessarily visible.
[746] Panebianco, 24.
[747] Ibid., 25-30.

remuneration" (selective incentives) and/or if "the party is a "community of fate,"
"a community defined by a specific identity that has no equivalent in the external
market" (collective incentives), then one should expect them to continue to remain
within the collectivity as activists.[748] They would not thus opt for voicing their
discontent or leaving the party.[749]

As far as the distribution of collective incentives is concerned, the
leadership is expected to act in their choice of political strategies, policies, allies,
and the like in accordance with the declared party goals. If they fail to do so the
boundaries between the party and its rivals may be blurred or the efficiency frames
may no longer resonate among the activists. The NSM elites did not have such
concerns until the NSP entered into the parliament as during the electoral campaign
and party building period their practices and discourses were geared towards future.
However, once in the parliament, the elites had to walk a tight rope to protect their
legitimacy and organizational stability in the face of changing environmental
conditions. Specifically, the party had to act upon immediate challenges; the phase
of future promises had passed. On the one hand, the party goals, or collective action
frames and identity become realistic and plausible only if they are "accompanied by
an indication of the means to be used" to reach them.[750] On the other hand, the
party leaders could choose only those paths, or strategies, which would not
endanger the stability, or survival of the organization itself within the environments
the party operates. This, in turn, means that the leadership should often "align" the
strategies with the declared goals of the party. Thus, the strategies need to be
framed and perceived as "intermediate steps" towards the ultimate ends.[751]

In the case of the NSM in the early 1970s, all party elites acted carefully
not to appear as competing against each other, and as mentioned above, tried to
enforce the NSM motto to prevent intraparty competitions at the local level. They
thus tried to be embodiments of a new generation of politicians. However, as the
question of coalition with the RPP appeared on the horizon and the two opponent
groups of party elites were crystallized over the issue, the pro-coalitionists aligned

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[748] Ibid., 31.
[749] For a discussion on the options of "voice" and "exit" for organizational members see Albert O.
Hirschmann, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970)
[750] Panebianco, 41.
[751] Ibid., 16-17.

their arguments and strategies with the party frames and identity much more successfully than their opponents. They were thus able to frame the coalition government as a step towards the fulfillment of the NSM ends and compatible with the NSM identity.

The pro-coalitionists had a) put the survival of the NSM into focus; b) invoked the responsibility that fell upon the shoulders of the NSM members to bring an end to the government crisis in the name of the "Muslim nation"; c) framed the coalition with the RPP as a sign of altruism in the face of attacks from the right wing networks; and d) reflected a strong confidence in the capabilities of the NSM activists in governing the country on an equal footing with the RPP. The local activists, in turn, except may be for those who had been entrenched in pre-NSM organizations[752], had a) endured the difficulties of party closure, reestablishment of the party, and electoral campaign, b) materially, symbolically and exclusively invested in the party activities, c) emotionally and behaviorally put distance between themselves and other members of the right wing networks[753] and agreed to the compatibility of the NSM diagnostic elements with that of the RPP[754] and finally d) been empowered by the NSM action frames and identity that portrayed the activists as embodiments of historical qualities of the Muslim and Turkish nation capable of bringing not only moral but also material development.

Consequently, the local activists perceived the pro-coalitionist arguments and proposed strategies as well aligned with the NSM goals and identity. Most important, compared to the anti-coalitionist attitude, that refused to take responsibility and advised "wait and see" strategy, the pro-active position adopted by the pro-coalitionist reinforced the activists' attachment to the NSM goals and

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[752] It should be noted that it is very probable that among those who had double memberships (in the NSM and another Islamist organization such as the Nur students), some, if not most, should have disengaged from their previous institutions. Further research is needed in districts where the Nur student candidates had won the elections under the NSP banner but than lost some of their votes in the following elections when the Nur students withdrew their candidacies.

[753] It should be added that notwithstanding the growing gap with the right wing networks, some activists also kept their emotional distance with the RPP. However, even these activists would remain loyal to the party despite the coalition, though may be changing their level and type of involvement. Such discontented influential local activists were called to Ankara following the establishment of coalition for face-to-face talks. Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.

[754] As shall be remembered these similarities enabled the NSM activists to show that they were not "reactionaries." As a matter of fact, following the local elections of 1973, even before the RPP-NSP government was formed, the local NSM activists established a coalition with the RPP in the municipal council against the JP.

collective identity, thus to the party. After all, as Panebianco puts it, "[o]ne cannot identify with a "cause" if there are not at least credible proposals as to the paths to be taken for their realization."[755]

As for the issue of selective incentives, the NSM altruism and solidarity had also its limits. The NSM activists, particularly its local elites, were not immune to the attraction of moral and material rewards and sanctions that party politics could provide. As the NSP began immersing into the political arena, first through the general elections of 1973 and then following its entry to the parliament selective incentives became both visible and substantial. The local NSM elites, who had long been denied access to such political goods as parliamentary candidacies (or seats), positions in (and candidacies for) local Assemblies, jobs in the public agencies, bank credits, government contracts, executive seats in the local branch of a parliamentary party[756], respect from local state officials and party executives, first, were promised and then, did enjoy these benefits of party politics.[757]

Given that the NSP was a new and small party, both material and status incentives it could distribute were quite limited. For instance, a rank and file activist, a small workshop-owner, who wanted to buy raw "corner iron" from Karabük Iron and Steel Factory, discovered that while his turn in the waiting list still had to come, a prominent NSM activist had already bought his need of iron thanks to his status.[758] However, this does not exclude the fact that some rank and file, could, or they thought that they could, acquire help from or through the local elites, in case of a financial, bureaucratic or health problem. Be that as it may, given the restrictions of the party center in redistributing selective incentives, they had to rely more on collective incentives to ensure the loyalty of the activists.

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[755] Panebianco, 41.

[756] On issues relating to material and status incentives, the local elites were careful not to mention material ones. Information regarding such issues either slipped accidentally or provided by some other local elite or activist. As for the status incentives, such as official and/or party seats almost all activists denied previous knowledge of their own pending candidacies, affirming the fact that such seats were in fact political goods. Even through being a candidate an activist's religiosity, good personal and business ethics would be recognized. Even in case of defeat at the polls, he would have a secure place in the local administration, establish ties with the central elites and increase his social capital in the local networks.

[757] While most local party leaders in Kayseri had access to one or more of these political goods, most local party leaders emphasized the respect and status they had gained through the NSM activism. Since, everyone had seen what these religious men with good morals and education were capable of, the religious men were treated much more respectfully compared to the period when they were insulted as "*takunyacı.*"

[758] Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.

Consequently, the ideational elements of the party had to acquire a new function during this period: dissimulating the distribution of selective incentives, whose "excessive visibility could compromise the image of the party as an organization dedicated to a "cause…"[759]

Finally, before discussing shortly how the pro-coalition elites took advantage of the party institutions to advance their cause, a snapshot from local party politics in Kayseri between 1972-1973,[760] which illustrates not only how the Executive Committee dominated the formation of the local executive committee and selection of the parliamentary candidates, but also the interplay of collective and selective incentives.[761] In 1972, most of the founders of the NOP had first refrained from engaging in the new party building activities. Those Executive Committee members who had connections with Kayseri, together with some local "brave" ex-NOP activists, had convinced the director of the local Advanced Institute of Islam ("the Director") to reorganize the NSM networks and to become the party's leading candidate in the district. Few months later, however, the Executive Committee called the NOP's behind the scenes local founder in Kayseri, who was then residing for business in Adana.[762] As a longtime material and symbolic contributor to the NSM, unlike the Director, a member of a "native" Kayseri family, and having strong ties with various members of the Executive Committee[763], he took over the local administration from the official entrepreneurial committee and created his own team bringing back to the scene the ex-local leaders. Since both men had heavily invested in the party ("the Director" had been pressured to quit his prestigious and well paying job to lead the party activities) a bitter dispute over the ordering of the party list ensued. The dispute between the supporters of the two candidates came to an end when the Executive Committee, as a punishment, imposed a new candidate, Cemal Cebeci, a well now

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[759] Panebianco, 24. Panebianco uses the term ideology. During the 1970s, the ideational elements were not yet openly used to "dignify and rationalize" individual achievements in the name of advancing party's goals. They were nevertheless implied in the conversations with the national party elites. Panebianco, 25

[760] Similar incidents happened in 1973 local elections and in 1977 general elections.

[761] As these mechanisms, processes and events were narrated by almost all the interviewees involved in the local party activities with only slight differences stemming from where they stood in power games, no specific references to interviewees is provided here.

[762] It seems that the director of the Institute was too headstrong and short of material and symbolic resources to carry out an electoral campaign. Not only he was a "peasant," not a native, but also his only revenue was the compensation he got when he resigned from his job to become a candidate.

[763] His brother was one of the official national founders of the NOP.

man of religion both in Kayseri and in Ankara. It seems the party center forced the disputing candidates to convince him to put his candidacy, as he was unwilling to engage in politics. Cebeci shared certain similarities with the Director. He was not a native of a Kayseri but a "peasant" from a subdistrict of Kayseri (Develi) and an ex-director of the local Prayer Leader and Preacher School (he was at the time working in the State Department of Planning). Through his appointment, the Executive Committee calmed down the supporters of the Director, who had been outraged by the injustice inflicted upon him.[764] The Executive Committee also seemingly punished its own candidate as well who seemed too eager for the first rank. However, at the end it punished the outspoken Director even more placing him on the third rank and his rival on the second. In so doing, the NSP national executives reemphasized altruism and solidarity within the NSM through their actions.[765] While they put emphasis on the goals of the movement, not individual incentives, they also showed the boundaries of unaccepted behavior to their very own "client(s)".[766]

6.3.3 Gaining over the NSM: the Triumph of the Pro-coalitionists

This subsection discusses how the pro-coalitionist elites, or the Erbakan group, used the existing party dynamics first to establish a coalition with the RPP and then to maintain the activist support during the second phase of the anti-coalitionist attack, that is the question of the Amnesty, during and following the coalition. In both cases, the pro-coalition elites were able to exert control over the "zones of uncertainty:" they relied on their real and perceived political "competences" first as the Chairman and members of the Chairman Council and then as heads of the Parliamentary Group and members of the cabinet; thanks to their position(s), they developed contacts with the party's environment, controlled

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[764] Cemal Cebeci was a man of religion and was among those who fervently opposed the coalition with the RPP. Most of the interviewees, though respected him highly, were relieved to see him go, as they did not believe he was cut for being parliamentarian (or politics): he was mainly a man of religion.

[765] The NSM newspaper even published a news about how the three candidates were working together as brothers in arms for the electoral campaign. "MSP Kayseri'de büyük bir hızla gelişiyor," *Milli Gazete*, September 12, 1973.

[766] In 1987, local Kayseri executives showed first signs of their future "emancipation" from the grip of the NSM elites. Led by their chair, local leaders warned the Executive Committee about their previous mistakes on insisting upon "their own men," which had cost them votes in both 1973 and 1977 general elections. This time, the Committee would accept the local branch's ordering of candidates. Kayseri would fail to send a representative because of the national threshold.

the party finances, communicated their ideas and information to the party activists, and manipulated certain written and unwritten rules to their advantage. Needless to say, their previously active role in the recruitment of the local activists and parliamentarians facilitated their job.[767]

First, during the three months before the public coalition talks with the RPP started, the pro-coalitionists took advantage of their position within the Chairman Council. Since, Erbakan group had not yet been crystallized as pro-coalitionists when rumors, ideas and/or scenarios of possible coalition alternatives, including an RPP-NSP coalition had begun to circulate; the Executive Committee members (the Nur students as well), did not hesitate to assign the Chairman and his council the task of leading talks with other political parties.[768] From October 29, 1973, when Erbakan first met Ecevit, to January 9, 1974[769], when the Parliamentary Group approved the coalition with the RPP, all public and behind the scenes negotiations with other political parties were carried out by the members of the Chairman Council.

As the Erbakan group transformed into pro-coalitionists, the group around Erbakan took advantage of this transfer of power through establishing direct communication lines within and outside the party.[770] During their extra- and intra-party interactions they did not necessarily inform the Executive Committee about the developments. Specifically, first, during the two joint meetings of local party chairmen, the Parliamentary Group and the Executive Committee in October 23 and November 5 (few days before and after the RPP's first official offer); the Erbakan group observed that relatively few local elites categorically opposed a coalition with the RPP.[771] Most left the issue to the trusted hands of the Executive Committee.[772]

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[767] For a detailed discussion on "zones of uncertainty," which are vital activity areas of a political party, see Panebianco, 33-36.

[768] "MSP CHP'den teklif bekliyor," *Milliyet*, October 23, 1973.

[769] By this date, the anti-coalitionist members of the Parliamentary Group and the Executive Committee gave up and were involved in coalition negotiations. Sevilgen, *MSP'de*, 79.

[770] Since their relations with extra-party actors had already been discussed here the focus is on intraparty interactions.

[771] It seems the local leaders demanded convincing arguments to be able to defend their position to their constituencies and political opponents at their local networks.

[772] While the anti-coalitionists argue that those local chairmen who spoke during the meetings opposed the coalition, two surveys published in the daily *Milliyet* and Asiltürk's statement published in *Milli Gazete* demonstrate that the pro-coalitionist believed that the local elites would follow the

Second, following the Executive Committee meeting of November 21, where the Council members had revealed their pro-coalition tendencies and the Executive Committee members ranked the RPP coalition as the least desirable strategy; until January 9, 1974, the Chairman summoned the Executive Committee only once, to discuss the result of local elections. When the Executive Committee met in January 10, public negotiations with the RPP were well underway. The Executive Committee simply approved the ongoing process. In contrast, having faced a strong opposition within the Executive Committee, the Erbakan group of the Council and their handful of allies within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group organized seven meetings (as Parliamentary Group meetings) from 12 December to January 9.They were encouraged by how the parliamentarians, unlike the Executive Committee members, upgraded the option of coalition above early general elections in the Parliamentary Group meeting of November 27.[773]   In the last meeting of January 9, when most anti-coalitionist elites in the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group were in pilgrimage, the Erbakan group finally got the approval vote for engaging in writing a coalition protocol with the RPP.[774]

The anti-coalitionists claimed that it was the Executive Committtee's prerogative to approve such an engagement.[775] However, there was not much they could do. Legally, the Parliamentary Group was legally entitled to take binding decisions on matters of motion of confidence. Politically, the rest of the Committee members had already shifted their allegiance to the pro-coalitionists who had obtained both the parliamentarians and local activists' backing. Symbolically, since the talks with the RPP had already begun on January 11 and there were not at all

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suit of the Executive Committee. See, Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 60; "Ecevit Erbakan Görüşmesi Bugün," *Milli Gazete*, October 30, 1973; "MSP örgütü ne düşünüyor?" *Milliyet*, October 23, 1973; "MSP İl başkanları ne diyor?" *Milliyet,* November 11, 1973. It should be noted that *Milliyet* could not talk with all local chairmen. Plus, some of the latter have changed their positions from anti-coalition to pro-coalition, as was the case in Kayseri. Finally, the headings of the *Milliyet* do not reflect the content of the news piece, which unlike the subtitles show the activists would support whatever the Executive Committee decided.
[773] Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 73-80.
[774] 38 individuals attended the meeting. There were 35 parliamentarians (among them probably some senators) and three non-parliamentary and nine parliamentary Executive Committee members. Thus, out of 26 Executive Committee members only 12 were present. Four of the latter cast a no vote. Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 79-80.
[775] For the two petitions written to the Chairman, see Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 80-85.

uproars in the local branches[776], any move against Erbakan and his group on the part of the anti-coalitionists would appear as a divisive act and their motives would be questioned.[777] It should be added that, Hüsrev Altınbaşak, the leader of the most powerful Nur student group facing Yeni Asya, specifically requested from the Nur students within the NSM "not to divide the Muslims" at this particular juncture.[778]

Finally, during the Second General Congress of the party, on November 17, 1974, just few days after the end of the coalition, the pro-coalitionists maintained their seats against their rivals.[779] The anti-coalitionists had gained some ground against their rivals throughout the coalition, as they had vehemently opposed to the inclusion of the left-wing prisoners to the pending Amnesty Law. To say the least, they were able to convince 22 parliamentarians to vote for the opposition's version of the Law that excluded the left.

However, the pro-coalitionists, relying on above discussed organizational and ideational properties managed to defeat the anti-coalitionists list in the congress. It is pertinent to show how as they continued to prevail over their various intra-party opponents until today. Accordingly, since the Council members controlled intraparty information channels, before the congress, the Erbakan group could learn and potentially take measures against the activities of the opponent leaders and local activists.[780] The opposition leaders would thus produce an alternative Executive Committee list almost at the last minute and present it to the delegates *during* the Congress.[781] During such a short period, not only the internal opposition would not find the opportunity to deepen their communication with the delegates but also at the symbolic level their relative secrecy would create

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[776] Sevilgen complained that just because the NSP leaders had sought a coalition with the RPP, most of the local executives, even those who had been enemies of the RPP and left-wing views, came to sympathize with the RPP and even supported the Amnesty for the left-wing activists. Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 265.

[777] Tevfik Paksu, echoing the anti-coalitionists the researcher interviewed, wrote that he agreed to the coalition just not to divide the party.

[778] Interview with Hüsamettin Akmumcu, Isparta, August 15, 2007.

[779] The anti-coalitionists would make their final move in the Third General Congress of the party in October 24, 1976. Their faith would be the same and 14 prominent members of this group would be indirectly led to quit the party. For this period see Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 209-222; 231-245.

[780] In fact two interviewees explained how they informed the Chairman Council members regarding the preparation of the opposition. Interviews with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006 and KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2006.

[781] Sevilgen, *MSP'de,* 162-163;

suspicions about their "real intentions."[782] Under the light of the NSM collective identity based on altruism and solidarity, their actions would appear as disloyal, divisive and ambitious. The incumbent elites, in turn, would not miss the opportunity to equate their opposition to "Byzantine conspiracies" (*Bizans entrikası*).[783]

Be that as it may, almost all anti-coalitionist leaders of the NSM and those interviewed Kayseri NSM members who had left active party work for various reasons (ranging from the Amnesty issue to personal disputes), remained within the NSM networks. As one interview recounts, Cemal Cebeci, a fierce opponent of Erbakan had said: "This cause cannot be achieved with Erbakan [at the leadership], but it cannot survive either without Erbakan."[784] This statement, more than anything, under the appearance of personalizing politics, reveals actually the power and success of the NSM organization and ideational elements in building a new Islamist network, identity and goals and producing political goods, which kept these dissidents in the party networks despite the continuing rule of "Erbakan" and his group.

6.4 Conclusion

Focusing on the emergence of the RPP-NSP coalition, a snapshot from everyday political engagements of the NSM, the chapter sought to answer to interrelated questions: a) why did the NSM as a pragmatic Islamist movement differed from other Islamists movements which vehemently opposed this coalition? ; b) how does an Islamist movement make its decisions with regard to policy, strategy and allies in the political arena which then appears as the acts of a unified body?

This chapter proposed, first, that macro-political factors unfold at the movement level through horizontal and vertical intra-movement power relations, which are in turn marked by organizational and ideational institutions. Second,

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[782] As one interviewee succinctly puts it opposition to the party leadership in a congress was all about preparation beforehand. Interview with KayNS17, Kayseri, September 6, 2006.

[783] Interview with RNelder1, May 15, 2008. Incidentally, "Byzantian conspiracies" has been a popular term in the political arena, indicating "dirty and obscure games." It was based on the belief that Byzantium came to an end due to such internal games of power.

[784] Interview with KayNS8, September 14, 2006.

micro-level properties of the elites and activists play a role not only in their interpretation of the macro-level constraints and opportunities but also in their use, maintenance and reproduction of meso-level institutions. Third, it is through a longitudinal look that one can discern the characteristics of movement level factors and the pre- and post-NSM identities and interests of the movement members.

Drawing upon this perspective, it is argued that the NSM was organized as a political party and as such was constrained by rules and power relations of the competitive electoral field and the parliamentary politics. However, the divergent structural position of two groups of NSM elites vis-à-vis the movement's environment and the latent power struggle between the groups that dated back to early days of the mobilization led to their opposing interpretations of the existing opportunities and constraints. The pro-coalitionist group prevailed over their rivals. They had gained the support of the majority of the activists, capitalized on highly centralized decision making system and, thanks to their exclusive commitment and investment to the NSM, better aligned their arguments with the movement's ideational products. Their rivals contested the organizational and ideational features of the movement halfheartedly; to avoid exposing themselves further as power-seekers. The activists, aside occasional complains, reproduced them since having limited resources they needed these institutions a) to sustain mobilization at the local level and b) to access the collective and selective political goods generated at the national level.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Focusing on the *Nizam/Selamet* Movement from mid-1960s through the 1970s, this essay sought an answer to the question of how and why there are variations in the political engagement patterns of the "moderate" Islamist movements, which agree to play "the game in town." The dissertation also aimed at highlighting a relatively less studied period of Islamist activism, which set the stage for major Islamist mobilizations of the 1980s and 1990s and produced the most powerful political actors of today: the Justice and Development Party and the Fethullah Gülen Movement. This conclusion presents an overview of the research findings and a discussion on their implications for future research.

7.1 An Overview

Unlike its contemporaries and its predecessors, which engaged in and with the political arena, directly, through existing right wing political parties and, indirectly, through grassroots mobilization and organization, the NSM established a political party, entered institutional politics and successfully became one of the major players of the political field.

In an attempt to understand why the NSM differed from its contemporaries and its predecessors, the essay studied in separate chapters the emergence of its entrepreneurs, the networks from which it recruited its activists, the formation of its symbolic boundaries and finally its routine political practices around its coalition-making with the RPP. These aspects of the movement, which corresponded to both form and content of its political engagement patterns and which displayed concurrent and sequential phases of its organizational and symbolic institutionalization and consolidation, aimed at answering the research question through three interrelated steps.

First, studying each aspect or stage of movement activity separately in relation to its surrounding environments revealed that macro perspectives, particularly center-periphery approach, prove to be inadequate to explain why the entrepreneurs of an Islamist movement emerge in the first place, why the incipient movement establish or seek to establish a particular organization type, determine its primary area of movement activity, how it produces its ideational elements and finally how the movement, as a collective actor act and interact with and react to the institutions and actors of the political field. Through rendering the center and the periphery homogenous and ahistorical, though in different ways depending on emphasis on cultural or socio-economic cleavages, these perspectives proved to be unable even to ask these questions.

Second, opening the black box of an Islamist movement and studying it from various angles descending and ascending the ladder of abstraction reveals the multi-variant, complex and intertwined nature of macro-, meso- and micro-level factors that are at play in the making of both the movement and its political practices. The NSM case has shown that each stage of the movement activity constituted an aspect of the movement that differentiated it from its counterparts. These, in turn, were produced through various and changing configurations of existing opportunities and constraints at the national and local levels of politics (macro factors), the structure and dynamics of the existing or movement generated intra- and extra-movement networks, and organizations (meso-level factors) and the micro-properties of the movement elites and activists.

Finally, studying these features and phases of the NSM not only synchronically but also diachronically in each chapter demonstrated that the outcomes of movement activity at one phase affect the others. The factors that produce a group of Islamist movement entrepreneurs, the properties of the activists that a movement could recruit, the chosen organization type, the collective action frames and identity that the activists produce determine the available intra-movement symbolic and material resources. They, in turn, interact with environmental factors to influence each other and the choice of policies, strategies and allies in everyday politics.

As far as the specific question of why and how the NSM showed variances in its political engagement patterns, that is in its primary area of movement activity, goals, identity, policies, choice of strategies and allies; this essay claims that as a whole, the NSM's differences reflected above all the field within which the NSM was born: the political field as an autonomous area of action and interaction.

Specifically, on the one hand, the NSM entrepreneurs were crystallized within the political field. Having failed to find an outlet to influence polity, they were constrained to establish a party of their own to tap into state controlled resources they had been progressively denied. They sought their potential activists in the political field as well; first trying to mobilize the JP dominated right wing networks at the local level. The potential activists, however, were found not in the periphery *per se*, but in the "periphery of the periphery," or those young men at the beginning of their social and professional carreers. The existing local political structure had marginalized them providing with no or limited access to the ties that connected the center and the periphery.

On the other hand, the NSM ideational products and the "mundane" political practices, that is the content of their political activities, were marked by the organizational form the movement adopted (a political party) and the constraints and opportunities that players and *doxa* of the national level of party politics presented. The latter interacted with both the micro-properties of the NSM actors and the obstacles and advantages that "Muslimness" of the right wing networks presented. The outcome was a set of cultural products and practices that not only rendered the NSM a distinct political and Islamist player but also articulated both the NSM amd its members to the political arena.

The NSM's double character that stemmed from being both a social movement and a party that differentiated it form its counterparts reflected not only the scarcity of resources its elites and activists commanded but also the complex nature of the political field. In a political arena where elections, free and competitive, but meta-rules and players of the game restrictive and occasionally extremely repressive, in order to open a space for itself and sustain its mobilization, the NSM needed to oscillate between its two "personalities." As a social movement it needed to produce and maintain those collective action frames and identity that

made the NSM a challenge to other players of the game and to the regime. It was through these ideational elements that the NSM created strong intra-movement bonds and sharply differentiated itself from other Islamists and political players. Moreover, having such social movement qualities as solidarity, altruism, identity work, network building and contentious politics enabled the NSM to survive in "abeyance" and resist state pressure and even to capitalize on it to open new political parties when the old ones were closed. In order to remain in the game as a political party, it needed to reproduce, on the one hand, the democratic credentials of the regime and its own through acting responsibly, for instance establishing alliances even with its archenemies. On the other hand, it needed reproduce the regime's and its own authoritarian features as well, redrawing the red lines of the polity which pushed the Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, and left-wing players out of the institutional politics.

7.2 Implications for Further Research

The findings of the research on the mechanism and dynamics of both Islamist movement making and political participation patterns may contribute to further research in the following areas.

To begin with, studying the NSM case revealed a certain research lacuna that could not be covered in this essay but can be carried out later separately. First, the peculiarities of the Yeni Asya's idetational and organizational institutions need to be studied further in detail from the 1960s through the 1990s. This would help to trace the continuties and ruptures both within these institutions and the movements' political engagement patterns. It would also help to understand the divergences and divisions within the greater Nur student movement as well.

From the 1980s through the 2000s Yeni Asya experienced a relative decline having failed to enlarge its networks and to increase its financial and symbolic assets with the same rate as the Fethullah Gülen movement. Gülen movement had previously been a Nur student branch from İzmir among many other branches and had, at least nominally, accepted Yeni Asya's authority. While it showed signs of further autonomy by the mid-1970s, it was in the early 1980s that the movement declared its "independence" through refusing to side by the now defunct JP (now

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organized under Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party)[785] together with Yeni Asya and then through supporting (or remaining silent to) the military coup. Following the coup of 1980, despite the marginalization of the JP networks[786] Yeni Asya elders had decided to continue their alliance with "the JP". Moreover, unlike their previous attitude during the military intervention of 1971, they had openly condemned the coup. Gülen movement further severed ties from the Nur elders during the February 28 process, when once again, unlike Yeni Asya, avoided to defy military and civil authorities. By the 2000s, Gülen movement became a transnational movement controlling billion dollars worth global network of highschools, universities, charities, hospitals, publication companies, endowments, newspapers, tv stations organized in countries from France to Mongolia, from the United States to Uganda.[787] Today it is the major supporter and ally of the Justice Development Party[788] (the JDP), and help the government to dismantle the formal and informal institutions that had so far guaranteed military's political power.

This short review of political engagement patterns of two movements points towards quite intriguing continuities and ruptures between Yeni Asya and Gülen movements and within each movement. For instance while, during the 1980s and 1990s, Yeni Asya broke away from its pattern of allying with the largest mainstream right wing party and establishing good relations with the military, it was the Gülen movement which continued now decades old Nur tradition of "caution" (*tedbir*) to protect the grassroots activities. Why and how the Yeni Asya leaders took such "a risk" this time but not the Gülen movement? Why and how Gülen movement decided to take "a risk" and support the JDP in its quest for democratic reforms today[789], at this particular juncture in history? What were the

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[785] Like other political party leaders of the pre-1980 period, Demirel was also banned from politics until 1987.

[786] The new mainstream right wing party, the Trueland Party (Anavatan Partisi) which united once again all colors of the right wing as the JP had done back in the 1960s, came to power with a majority in 1983.

[787] The Nur student (previously controlled by Yeni Asya, now their control is divided between the splinter Yeni Nesil as well) networks abroad are limited to few European and Central Asian countries.

[788] Today ex-Yeni Asya leaders and networks support the JDP as well.

[789] It should be added that Gülen movement involvement in the "democratic cleansing" operation has been a subject of controversy within the political arena. Recently, the movement has been accused with "infiltrating" the state institutions such as the judiciary and the police forces and abusing the process to get rid of its political opponents. The movement in return argues that such accusations reflect the fear of those who have been losing their privileged status together with the

changes that "total institution" and formal organizations went through within Yeni Asya networks? Which aspects of the informal Nur student institutions that enabled the Gülen movement to become one of the most resourceful national and global religious movements? Which ones they needed to discard, develop and/or reshape along the process of enlargement and transnationalization? What are differences and similarities in their respective collective identities?

Second, the research findings on the Naqshbandi brotherhoods suggest that since the 1980s their networks and institutions may have underwent considerable changes related to several political, economic and technological macro developments and not yet studied certain meso and micro level factors. Not only the relationship between the master and his disciple but also between the brotherhoods and the politics seem to have changed. Since the 1980s, the Naqshbandi leaders have openly declared their political party preferences, established publication houses, TV channels and engaged in various business ventures. Thus, in many ways they have resembled the Nur student movements. However, unlike the Nur students, they seem to have failed in enlarging their networks and establishing nationwide informal and formal organizations. Further study on the development of the Naqshbandi networks during 1980s and the 1990s would provide further insight not only into the relationship between the political and religious fields of actions, but also into the variations among the religious movements.

A third such potential area of novel research involves studying Islamist mobilizations in regions with deep ethnic and religious cleavages from the 1960s through the 1990s.[790] Particularly, the "Kurdish question" is a major issue which has not only influenced the *doxa* of the political field since the inception of the Republic but also, so far, has directly influenced the lives of millions in the country and elsewhere through the political violence that revolved around the question. The Kurdish dimension (not only as a political question but also as Kurdish people who are the subjects and objects of various political, social, economic and cultural

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"ancien regime" and that the movement members have the right to become state employees as other citizens.
[790] There are two studies carried in metropolitan areas in the 1990s and 2000s where lines dividing social classes are more apparent. See White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*; Tuğal, *Passive Revolution*.

phenomena within Turkey and elsewhere in neighboring countries) could not be incorporated into the scope of this research for at least two major reasons. First, at the beginning of the research, as Hamit Bozarslan has put it, the region was still quite dangerous to carry out a research that covered both the Islamist and the Kurdish questions. These were the most sensitive issues of the period that could have directly put the researcher in harms way. Not only there were still "deep state forces" semi-autonomously operating in the Kurdish majority regions, but also Hizbullah, an Islamist Kurdish underground organization known by its executions of its political opponents and intellectuals, was still very active despite several arrests in the early 2000s.[791] Second, the researcher did not have the resources to conduct research in more than one locality. It was Kayseri, rather than, say, Diyarbakır or Batman, that displayed greater "harmony" with the NSM center in terms of its ideational elements, activists' properties and more than cordial relations. Despite its relative success throughout the years, the NSM's mobilization within Kurdish majority regions and the NSM's articulation of the regional interests into the political center has always been filled with tension. The NSM elites, more than once, easily sacrificed their Kurdish activists, supporters and voters in the East to broaden their activist networks and increase their votes in Central Anatolia, to enter the Assembly or to become the part of a coalition government.

Two future areas of research thus present themselves to incorporate the Kurdish dimension into the study of Islamist political engagement patterns. One involves studying the nature of formal and informal power relations, institutions and stakes of the political game at the local level to understand how ethnic factors have "realized" themselves within the context of NSM mobilizations from the 1970s through the 1990s, a period when a new generation of Kurdish movement has grown. Such a study would highlight a) how and why the NSM (re)negotiated, (re)framed and (re)produced its collective identity and mobilization frames in the region and articulated the interests and demands of its Kurdish activists to the political center; and b) how and why the Kurds responded to the NSM despite its apparent emphasis on Turkishness at the national level, negotiated and reproduced

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[791] One should also add PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers' Party) induced violence.

their individual and other salient collective identities, interests and demands within the movement.

As far as the Kurdish question is concerned the other area of study that needs to be undertaken is based on certain findings of the fieldwork research that could not be incorporated into the essay and that needs to be tackled with further research. These findings concern the two Islamist movements that have engaged in systematic political violence: IBDA-C[792] and above-mentioned Hizbullah[793]. These are the two major Islamist movements which had so far adopted violence as a political strategy in Turkey. Both are what the literature on Islamist movements considers "radical" Islamist movements that may or may not have connections to the global network of Al-Qaeda. Today the majority of their networks are in disarray following the arrests and deaths of their leaders and activists. Since they have rarely been subject to scholarly study,[794] (given the difficulty of fieldwork research), very little is known as to their origins and developments. During the fieldwork research, the interviews and primary and secondary sources revealed that IBDA-C and Hizbullah have their origins in the NSM (i.e within the autonoumous Akıncı youth organization, but also in relation to Büyük Doğu intellectual tradition) and Nur students respectively. In other words, they were the byproducts of the "moderate" movements that have been studied in this essay. Both the NSM and the Nur students have historically been peaceful Islamist movements, which systematically shunned from violence except occasional instances of street violence that members of their networks were involved. Another initial finding on these radical movements is that their respective entrepreneurs, though emerging and operating at different levels of politics, originating from different socio-economic, cultural and political environments and mainstream movements and finally engaging in very different types of political violence and at different periods in their lifespan[795] had following properties in common. The entrepreneurs of both

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[792] *İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar-Cephesi* (Islamic Great East Raiders-Front)
[793] The party of God. Because of the secrecy and horrors (tortures, buried bodies, use of acid against girls wearing skirts) surrounding Hizbullah, interviews revealed less information on this movement than IBDA-C. However, the existence of few journalistic studies and Grand National Assembly reports on Hizbullah enabled to highlight differences and similarities between the two movements.
[794] The only study that can be deemed scholarly is on Hizbullah, written by an experienced journalist-researcher specializing on Islamist movements. See Ruşen Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah: İslamcı Şiddetin Geleceği* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınevi, 2011).
[795] IBDA-C has engaged in violent politics later in its life span. They mostly planted bombs in urban areas. In contrast, Hizbullah, having developed in a violence ridden atmosphere, engaged in violence

movements emerged a) amidst an already well organized moderate Islamist movement and opposed not only the state but also and primarily initially the movement center; b) between 1979-1983; c) around literary activities (IBDA-C around the magazine *Akıncı Güç* in İstanbul and Hizbullah around *Vahdet, İlim* and *Menzil* Bookstores in Diyarbakır). While both movements' leaders were of Kurdish ethnicity, or at least Kurdish being their native language and the movements themselves had "universalist" (Pan-Islamist) frames and identity and populated with activist of both Turkish and Kurdish origin. They demanded equal treatment and rights for the Kurds and Turks as Muslim citizens and claimed that only in an Islamic state such equality can be provided. Nevertheless, the interviewees from different movements in Ankara, İstanbul and Kayseri, have quite often accused Hizbullah and IBDA-C with Kurdish nationalism.

The initial findings suggest that the emergence and development of these two groups towards political violence should be studied in relation to 1) the habitus of its activists and leaders, 2) the dynamics and institutions of the movement in which IBDA-C and Hizbullah entrepreneurs crystallized; not solely in relation to the larger political environment and state policies. Finally, the development of these movements needs to be studied from the "Kurdish question" perspective rather than as an "Islamist question": how the factors related to Kurdish issue unfolded in the micro-histories of the movement activists, the "parent" movement organizations/networks and in the political field interactively.

Then, there are two broader research areas that the findings of the dissertation may contribute. Through including in the analysis, the origins and development of Islamist organizational and ideational peculiarities and the interaction between the two at various levels; the research on the "moderation" of Islamist movements would render its observations more accurate and its analyses more persuasive. The organizational and ideational institutions present collective and selective incentives and shape the way in which the movement activist invest in the movement. As such they bear an influence on how a movement in general, and its elites and activists in particular, behave on certain policy questions and strategies. It can be hypothesized that the more diverse the social and political

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quite early and adopted various forms. Their targets and thus violent acts cover a large range: individuals, state forces, PKK.

institutions, and identities in which a movement and its activists invest (or allowed to invest) respectively, the more flexible they become in adapting to changes in their environment. In the case of the NSM elites, for instance, as they increasingly exclusively invested in their movement throughout the years, established strong bonds among each other during their shared ordeals under the oppression of two different coups in 1980 and in 1997 and finally gained complete autonomy even from their activists, they proved to be reluctant or slow to "moderate" even when they faced the challenge of young elites and when the polity was relatively liberalized. Despite the risk of serious loss of networks of activists and voters, the NSM elites, maintained the same decision-making structures and ideational elements. They thus contributed to the establishment of the JDP and recently, also The Voice of the People Party.

Finally, the research suggests that in studying the democratization of the polity, or the relative openness of the political arena, the internal structures of the existing political parties play as important role as the changes in the electoral arena and in political freedoms. In other words, the political parties, to the extent that the states maintain their centralized nature and avoid decentralization of material and symbolic resources of the country; notwithstanding recent discussions on their "fall" in the eyes of the electorate and the overemphasis on the role of the civil society organizations; are potentially major outlets for political engagement for those who want and need to tap into these resources. In the analysis of the emergence of various social movements in the political arena, elucidating the relative openness or closeness of the political parties would increase one's understanding of the stakes which lead the movement entrepreneurs and activists in engaging in contentious politics.

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Kayseri (1976-1977, conservative nationalist, ultranationalist)

Kayseri Ticaret Gazetesi (1968-1969, Kayseri Trade Newspaper)

Milli Ülkü (1966-1970 ultranationalist)

İslam'da Mefkure (1968-1969, Islamist)[799]

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Konya

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Mektubat (1926-1936)

Lema'lar (1926-1936)

Şualar (1936-1949).

Barla Lahikası (1926-1935),

Kastamonu Lahikası (1935-1944)

Emirdağ Lahikası I and *II* (1944-1947 and 1949-1953)

Tarihçe-i Hayat (1957)

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[802] The corpus of the Epistles of Light and memoirs and biographies from various branches. For the epistles the electronic archive is used.

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APPENDIX A

A CHRONOLOGY (1960 – 1980)

Table 1

May 27, 1960	Intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)
May 30, 1960	24th Government of the Republic. Military cabinet chaired by Cemal Gürsel
June 1960	The junta leaders sign the provisional constitution and forms the National Union Committee (the NUC)
November 1960	The NUC oust its radicals including Alparslan Türkeş, the future NAP leader
January 5, 1961	25th Government of the Republic. Military cabinet chaired by Cemal Gürsel
January-February 1961	The ban on political party activities is partially lifted. Around 20 parties are registered with the authorities
May 27, 1961	Constitutive Assembly approves the Constitution of 1961
July 9, 1961	The new constitution is accepted in the referandum. 38% voted no
September 16, 1961	Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan's death penalties are executed. They were Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance of the latest DP government
September 17, 1961	The Prime Minister and DP Chairman Adnan Menderes' death penalty is executed.
October 15, 1961	First general elections after the military intervention. Senate and Assembly elections are held together
October 1961	Ali Fuat Başgil is forced not put his candidacy for the post of the President
October 26, 1961	The Assembly elects Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the military intervention as the President of the Republic
November 20, 1961	26th Government of the Republic. The RPP-JP military imposed coalition cabinet chaired by İsmet İnönü

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Table 1 – cont'd

February 22, 1962	Colonel Talat Aydemir' first coup attempt
May 10, 1962	The Grand National Assembly grants a pardon to Colonel Talat Aydemir
June 25, 1962	27th Government of the Republic. Coalition of the RPP, the NTP and the RPNP, chaired by İsmet İnönü
October 16, 1962	Partial Amnesty Law for the ex-DP members, reduction of their sentences
March 22, 1963	Conditional release of Celal Bayar, the third President of the Republic, from the Kayseri prison, where he was serving life sentence.
May 20, 1963	Colonel Talat Aydemir's second coup attempt
December 25, 1963-February 20, 1965	28th Government of the Republic. A minority government of the RPP, chaired by İsmet İnönü
June 1964	Colonel Talat Aydemir's death penalty is executed
November 27-29, 1964	The JP's Second General Congress. Süleyman Demirel won the Chairmanship against Saadettin Bilgiç
February 20, 1965	29th Government of the Republic. A caretaker government chaired by Suat Hayri Ürgüplü
September 20, 1965	Supreme Court's Criminal General Council decide that such Nur students activities as reading or disseminating books are punishable by the Article 163 of the Panel Law
October 10, 1965	General Elections. The JP's electoral victory. The socialist Labor Party of Turkey enters the parliament with 15 parliamentarians.
October 27, 1965	30th Government of the Republic. The JP Government chaired by Süleyman Demirel
March 26, 1966	Ex-Commander of the TAF, Cevdet Sunay is elected President of the Republic
July 1966	Disputes in the political arena and within the JP over the pending Amnesty Law of 1966 the questions of the political (DP) prisoners and the 163/1

Table 1 – cont'd

August 2, 1966	Associations of the graduates of religious education institutions (high schools, Islam institutes and Theology faculties) protest the government and demand improvements in the status and education of the schools
August 3, 1966	The Grand National Assembly passes the Amnesty Law (no 780). The political prisoners (DP) were granted Amnesty but the ban on their political activities continued. The Amnesty did not cover 163/1 but 163/2, 163/3 and 163/4 (thus majority of the prisoner Nur students). The military school students who supported Talat Aydemir are exempt from the Amnesty
September 6, 1966	The new president of the Supreme Court, İmran Öktem devote half of his speech to the Nur students and reminds the Supreme Court's decision of September 1965
October 4, 1966	Demirel government discharges İbrahim Elmalı from the Presidency of Religious Affairs
October 5, 1966	Various right wing associations protest the government over the Elmalı Affair
October 8, 1966	Protests against the government over the Elmalı Affair in Kayseri
October 10-11, 1966	Nationwide protests against the government over the Elmalı Affair
October 15, 1966	The daily Yeni Istanbul publishes a supplementary issue on İbrahim Elmalı
October 17, 1966	Tne Union Party, the party of the *Alevis* religious minority, is established
27-29 November, 1966	The JP's Third General Congress. Demirel wins the chairmanship for the second time.
December 15, 1966	Serdengeçti, the famous Islamist columnist and a JP parliamentarian faces disciplinary action for his vote in the Amnesty Law against the party discipline
December 26, 1966	Osman Turan and Ali Fuat Başgil mobilize on behalf of Serdengeçti and directly targets the liberals. They reiterate the points of contention they have with the liberals: Elmalı Affair and the Amnesty issue

Table 1 – cont'd

December 1966- January 1967	Islamist party entrepreneurs within the Assembly and the Senate and within the Nur circles in Ankara begin their meetings over the new party initiative
January 2, 1967	The prospect of the new party is mentioned for the first time by an insider. Serdengeçti strategically says it is too early for a new party
January 4, 1967	Serdengeçti is expelled from the JP
January 1967	Famous Islamist columnist and the editor of various Islamist newspapers Mehmet Şevket Eygi and Islamist columnist Serdengeçti engage in a long fight through their respective columns
February 3, 1967	In his daily, Bugün, Eygi explains Serdengeçti's attacks with his opposition to the new party initiative
February 22, 1967	The elites of the small right wing parties meet to discuss the prospects of a new right wing party
April 1, 1967	Saadettin Bilgiç, who agreed to support the liberals on the Amnesty Law is in the cabinet
April 18, 1967	Ali Fuat Başgil, the new party initiative's first choice of leader passes away
June 5, 1967	Osman Turan, who was the party innovators' second choice of leader table a motion of no confidence for the government
June 7, 1967	Osman Turan's motion is rejected by the JP parliamentarians
June 8, 1967	Serdengeçti writes the new party will not be ready for the 1968 local elections
July 18, 1967	Another failed attempt of unification among the small right wing parties
August 9, 1967	News of the Nationalists' Meeting in Bursa. Erbakan is among the guest speakers
August 11, 1967	Osman Turan is sent to the Disciplinary Committee of the JP
August 12, 1967	Local JP executives closer to the *mukaddesatçı*-nationalist group protest the central administration through petitions. The protesting districts are Kayseri, Trabzon, Konya, Zonguldak, İstanbul, Erzurum, Samsun, Ordu, Antalya

Table 1 – cont'd

September 1, 1967	The Nationalists' meeting final declaration is called the National Vision, the name that the NSM would adopt by the mid-1970s for the movement
September 2, 1967	Protests regarding the quota that the government wants impose on the number of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools based on population
September 17-21, 1967	Kayseri-Sivas events. Following a football game in Kayseri, violent clashes between the fans of two teams develop into a fight between Kayseri and Sivas people. One person dies, seriously injured citizens and houses of people of Kayseri origin are burned down in Sivas.
September- October, 1967	The TLP organizes the East Meetings (Doğu Mitingleri) to demand democratic and cultural rights for the Kurds
October 30, 1967	JP expels Osman Turan
November 5, 1967	Osman Turan writes about "resurrection," or *diriliş* of the Muslims citing the poet and columnist Sezai Karakoç
November 12, 1967	Şule Yüksel Şenler, as a new woman Preacher and a Nur student, attracts hundreds to her seminars on veiling
February 25, 1968	The first Rise Up (Şahlanış) meeting against communism. It includes not only the *mukaddesatçı*-nationalists but also the Kemalists.Tension between the left wing activists, who commemorate Vietnam in Taksim and the rightwing activists.
March 3, 1968	The Second Rise Up meeting
March 27-28, 1968	"Nationalist Associations" are meeting in Bursa for consultation
March 28, 1968	Federation of the Religious employees denies the existence of "reactionary" activity in the country and says "there is fast and conscious development"
March 30, 1968	Third Rise Up Meeting in Ankara
March 1968	Necmettin Erbakan is a guest writer in MTTB magazine, *Milli Gençlik Dergisi*
April 6, 1968	Necmettin Erbakan resigns from his post at the TOBB (head of the Industry Department)
April 8, 1968	İbrahim Elmalı becomes the vice-chairman of the NP

Table 1 – cont'd

April 10, 1968	Erbakan announces his candidacy for a seat (Konya) in the Senate from the JP ranks
April 11, 1968	The JP announces its candidates for senate seats. Erbakan is not in the list, that is he got his first veto from the JP. Elmalı becomes the NP's senate candidate from Konya
April 12-15, 1968	The boycott for the Theology Faculty student Hatice Babacan's right to veil, the first veil boycott in the Republican history, takes place at the Theology Faculty of Ankara University. Though supported by all Islamist groups, it was essentially organized through a cooperation of the Ankara and İstanbul Nur student branches and thanks to the efforts of a young Nur student who was a student of the faculty. Hatice Babacan is the aunt of Ali Babacan, currently deputy prime minister in the JDP cabinet
April 17, 1968	Erbakan's first candidacy for the TOBB chairmanship
April 21, 1968	Erbakan is invited to MTTB's "the Great Turkey Night" as a speaker
May 18-19, 1968	The TOBB elections. Erbakan loses the chairmanship but enters the executive committee and becomes the General Secretary of the Union
June 2, 1968	Senate and local elections. The JP is successful and small right wing parties do not fare well in the local elections. Eygi mentions the "collective morning prayers" for the first time in the daily Bugün
June 28, 1968	One of the largest "collective morning prayers" takes place in Beyazıt Camii, Istanbul. Bugün claims 10 thousand people attended.
June - August 1968	"Collective morning prayers" take place all over the country, including Kayseri
July 17-25, 1968	Left wing activists protests against the 6th American fleet and fight with the police
July 24, 1968	In Konya right wing groups protests against the left protests against the American fleet and attacks restaurants selling alcoholic beverages and the police

Table 1 – cont'd

August 19, 1968	Türkeş declares that his commandos are against the communists
October 15, 1968	Students of Prayer Leader and Preacher School protest in Kayseri
November 4, 1968	Demirel says no one in the country has power to bring a theocratic regime
November 14, 1968	The court abolishes the Federation of the Religious employees with around 60 thousand members
November 29, 1968	The JP's fourth General Congress. Demirel wins the chairmanship for the third time.
February 10, 1969	RPNP acquires its new name in the General Congress in Adana: Nationalist Action Party
February 16, 1969	The "Bloody Sunday". The right wing attacks the left wing activists during a left wing protest against the American 6th fleet. Hundreds are wounded and two deaths. Two days before such associations as the MTTB and Association for Fighting Against communism organize "Respect to the Flag" meeting. A day before daily Bugün calls for "jihad" against the communists.
March- April 1969	The public debate and protests around the draft law of "Protection of the Constitutional Order. Left and Kurdish activists and the Nur students were among the most vocal protestors. The government will eventually withdraw its own proposal
April 3-4, 1969	News and rumors regarding a "party of Religion" reappear in the press and denied by Süleyman Arif Emre
April 1969	Şule Yükesel Şenler continues her seminars on veiling all around the country throughout the month

Table 1 – cont'd

May 4, 1969	In the funeral of President of Supreme Court İmran Öktem. The Imam, refuses to carry out the religious ritual. The mosque crowd protest Öktem who had said "people created the God." İsmet İnönü insists on finding an İmam who would carry the duty. A bureaucrat present in the funeral does the prayer. İsmet walks towards the crowd to go out of the mosque courtyard with the help of a general who draws his gun to protect him.
May 8, 1969	The members of the high courts, students and others walked in Ankara protesting the funeral incident
May 14, 1969	An Amnesty for political prisoners, even though voted by the RPP and passed the Assembly, is defeated at the senate with the encouragement of Demirel group
May 25, 1969	Erbakan elected as the Chairman of the TOBB
May 27, 1969	Government does not recognize the elected chairman and orders the previous one to remain in the duty
May - August, 1969	The TOBB mobilization. Erbakan visits various Anatolian towns, political parties and associations
June 15-16, 1969	Left labor unions mobilize against the new Labor Law that made it difficult for workers to change unions. During the protests that thousands attended there were clashes with police forces. A martial law followed the events in Istanbul and in Kocaeli.
June 19, 1969	The Ministry of Commerce takes over the TOBB's allocation of resources
July 8, 1969	The TÖS incident takes place in Kayseri
July 20,1969	Humans land the moon for the first time in history.
August 5, 1969	Enver Batur takes over the office of the Chairman at the TOBB
August 6, 1969	Erbakan comes to the TOBB and reclaims his office
August 7, 1969	Batur, having deployed an interlocutory court order, calls the police and a locksmith. Erbakan resists, then he declares his candidacy for an Assembly seat from Konya

Table 1 – cont'd

August 15, 1969	Erbakan goes to Konya and visits the local JP branch
August 17, 1969	Erbakan is vetoed by the JP's leaders
September 3, 1969	Erbakan declares his independent candidacy from Konya for the Assembly and launch the Movement of Independents
October 12, 1969	General Elections. The JP acquires majority in the parliament. From the candidates of the Movement of Independents, only Erbakan enters the Assembly. Hüsamettin Akmumcu and Hüseyin Abbas are elected from the ranks of the JP
November 3, 1969	The second JP government chaired by Demirel
November 5, 1969	Saadettin Bilgiç and other opponents of the liberals are not included in the cabinet.
December 6, 1969	Erbakan meets with NP and RPNP leaders. Türkeş denies the gossips of the new party. An NP elite says the new party's name will be National Salvation Party
December 9, 1969	The council of state reaches a decision over the TOBB Affair in Erbakan's favor
December 26, 1969	Erbakan announces the news of the new party
January 2, 1970	As a result of the court order, Erbakan says he will takeover the TOBB
January 4, 1970	The TOBB General Assembly elects Medeni Berk as the chairman
January 26, 1970	The establishment of the National Order Party
January 9- February 15, 1970	The peak of the liberal- conservative-nationalist (now supported by the ex-DP members) struggle. Demirel group sent 4 opponents to the disciplinary committee for expulsion. 72 opponents sign memorandum. Demirel refuses to take it into consideration. They in turn cast a vote of non confidence for the budget and force Demirel to resign. 26 intraparty opponents, including Bilgiç are expelled from the party. The rest would resign from the JP following the fifth congress.
February 8, 1970	The NOP Foundational Convention (since there are no branches the NOP could not organize a Congress)

Table 1 – cont'd

February 1970 - March 1971	The NOP opening ceremonies
February-May 1970	Various types of right and left wing mobilizations against each other or the government
May 13, 1970	The Advanced Institute of Islam in Kayseri has been temporarily closed following a student boycott
June 1970	The remaining intraparty opponents try to prove the corruption charges against Demirel with no avail
October 21, 1970	The JP's Fifth General Congress
December 18, 1970	Bilgiç Group establishes the Democratic Party
January 24, 1971	The NOP's First General Congress takes place in Ankara
February 10, 1971	The prosecutors of the Republic open an investigation on the NOP and its "anti-constitutional" activities
March 4, 1971	The ex-student leaders in various collective actions, for instance in protests against the 6th American fleet, now as leaders of the Marxist-Leninst Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO), or the People's Liberation Army of Turkey, kidnaps four American soldiers. The three leaders Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan are caught shortly afterwards and brought to trial.
March 9, 1971	The date of the abortive coup plan of miliary officers sympathetic to left movements
March 10, 1971	The Chief prosecutor of the Republic applies to the Constitutional Court to open a case against the NOP
March 12, 1971	Military memorandum of 1971. Demirel resigns
March 21, 1971	Ecevit resigns from the post of General Secretary of the RPP protesting İnönü group's decision not to openly oppose the military intervention
March 26, 1971	The first technocrat government of Nihat Erim. The President of the Republic asked the parties to support the government unconditionally.
April 2, 1971	Big businesses establish the TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association)
April 8, 1971	The trial of the NOP begins

Table 1 – cont'd

April 1971 -	Various associations including the İdealists (ultranationalists), the DEV-GENC (abbreviation of the Revolutionary Youth) and Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary Culture Hearts of the East, Kurdish activists) are closed down by the military. The military commanders, as heads of the martial rule, continue to arrest various right (and Islamist) and left wing activists from legal, illegal and informal organizations throughout the country. The arrests continue throughout the year and includes intellectuals, writers, journalists and academicians. In İstanbul right wing activists, particularly the Nur students fair better (though their newspaper İttihad is banned) than their counterparts in Anatolia, particularly Hüsrev Altınbaşak, the leader of the Scribes. He would stay in prison until the Amnesty of 1974. Faik Türün, the commander of Istanbul, eventually establish good relations with Yeni Asya Nur students and primarily targets the left activists
May 1971	The Risale-i Nur students in various localities are being arrested. In İzmir Bekir Berk, the famous lawyer of the movement and local leaders are ımprisoned for around six months without being charged. They were all eventually acquited.
May 20, 1971	The Constitutional Court bans the NOP. The party leaders and members are not banned from politics. Erbakan leaves the country for Switzerland
June 29, 1971	A ban on opium poppy production, a US demand, is introduced to go full efect by 1972
July 20, 1971	The Constitutional Court bans the LPT. The party and its leaders are charged with communist activities and Kurdish separatism. Most of the party leaders are sentenced to prison terms up to 15 years.
September 21, 1971	The Grand National Assembly ammends the Constitution of 1961 and brings restrictions on civil and political rights and liberties

Table 1 – cont'd

October 9, 1971	Deniz Gezmiş and his friends are sentenced to death
December 11, 1971	The second technocrat government of Nihat Erim
March 10, 1972	The Grand National Assembly approves the death sentences for Gezmiş, İnan and Aslan. The RPP votes against the death sentences.
March 23, 1972	The president of the Republic approves the death sentences.
March 27, 1972	Mahir Çayan and his friends from Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C), People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey kidnap english and canadian technicians to force the government to release Gezmiş and others. All except one is killed by the state forces.
April 6, 1972	Following the RPP's appeal the Constitutional Court vacate the death sentences.
April 24, 1972	The Grand National Assembly revoted and approved the death sentences for the second time. The right wing parties' insistance on the death sentence has been intepreted as a revenge from the "progressive forces" for Menderes and two friends.
May 6, 1972	Deniz Gezmiş and his friends' sentences are executed
May 6-14, 1972	At the RPP extraordinary congress of May 6 Bülent Ecevit the young General Secretary of the Party acquires more vote of confidence than veteran İsmet İnönü. The latter resigns in May 8 and Ecevit, who forcefully and openly opposed the coup of 1971 becomes the party chairman on May 14.
May 18, 1973	Erbakan says "Ecevit is not a communist"
May 22, 1972	Caretaker government chaired by Ferit Sadi Melen
October 11, 1972	The NSP is established. Süleyman Arif Emre becomes the chairman
February 15, 1973	The GNA passes the law for the establishment of State Security Courts with special powers

Table 1 – cont'd

March 1973	Struggle over the election of the President of the Republıc. Faruk Gürler, the Commander of the TAF resigns and becomes a senator hoping to be elected President by the GNA. The RPP and other right wing parties refused to vote yet for another Commander of the TAF.
April 6, 1973	Fahri Korutürk, a senator and an army officer who had been made to retire during the coup of 1960, was elected the President of the Republic
April 15, 1973	Caretaker government chaired by Naim Talu. Following the elections, he would continue to govern during the government crisis until the end of January 1974
September 26, 1973	Martial Law that has been enforced since March 1973 in 11 districts is lifted
October 14, 1973	General elections. The NSP enters the parliament as a key party. Ecevit's RPP acquires the majority of the votes but does not have enough seat to form a government. The government crisis of three months starts.
October 19, 1973	First rumours regarding and NSP-RPP coalition appears
October 21, 1973	Erbakan becomes the NSP chairman
October 26, 1973	President gives the duty to form a government to Ecevit
October 29-30, 1973	Ecevit's first round of party visits to establish a government remains inconclusive. Two hours long meeting between Ecevit and Erbakan. The NSP delays its response
October 30, 1973	Before providing an answer to Ecevit, Erbakan invites Demirel to form a coalition
November 3, 1973	The NSP GEC and local party chairmen meeting
November 5, 1973	The NSP rejects the RPP's offer.
November 12, 1973	President gives the duty to form a government to Demirel
November 15-18, 1973	While the NSP accepts the JP's offer to form a coalition, the DkP rejects it. Demirel resigns from the duty. On the 16th the NSP newspaper publishes an article commenting on how to interpret the Epistles of the Nur movement

Table 1 – cont'd

November 20, 1973	Second Erbakan-Ecevit meeting takes place. Possible government options are discussed. The NSP makes positive but non-committal statements regarding the RPP.
November 21, 1973	The NSP General Executive Committee meets to discuss the government options and Ecevit-Erbakan meeting
December 9, 1973	Local elections. Victory for the RPP. Among the right wing polititcal parties only the JP is successful.
December 12, 1973	The last meeting of the NSP General Executive Committee before January 9 when they simply approved the coalition decision. The committee members discuss the election results. On 15th their statement reads they would support a government that would not lead to communism.
December 16, 1973 - January 9, 1974	President of the Republic Naim Talu tries and fails to convince the parties in the Assembly to form a "national coalition."
December 18, 1973	Following another meeting with Ecevit, the NSP parliamentary group meets to discuss options
December 19, 1973	The NSP parliamentary group meets to disccuss the intra-Assembly elections for the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly and committees. Reportedly they have more meetings until the coalition decison at the expense of the GEC
December 22, 1973	The lawyers and jurists within the NSP form a commission to write an Amnesty proposal.
December 25, 1973	İsmet İnönü passes away
December 31, 1973	Erbakan and Ecevit meet
January 7, 1974	The NSP announces its Amnesty proposal. Expressing one's thoughts and beliefs should not be considered a crime. Therefore those who have not involved in violence will be included in the Amnesty. The question of the Articles 141-142 that punish left wıng activists and intelellectuals with no violent activities will stay unclear up until March.

Table 1 – cont'd

January 9, 1974	The NSP General Executive Committee meets at a time when anti-coalitionists are away in pilgrimage and approves the coalition with the RPP
January 10, 1974	Erbakan and Ecevits meet for the last time before the announcement of the agreement
January 14, 1974	The NSP and the RPP announce their historical decision to establish a coalition
January 20, 1974	Some right wing parliamentarians introduce a bill to make Friday a holiday. The NSP interprets the bill as a move to divide the NSP and the coalition
January 26, 1974	The NSP and RPP sign the coalition protocol
January 27, 1974	The coalition government begins working together to shape a joint Amnesty law proposal
February 28, 1974	The two parties start working on the Amnesty Law. Yeni Asya and other nationally distributed newspapers close to the JP, such as Tercüman, begin their attacks against the NSP for including the Articles 142-143, thus the communists and left activists in the Amnesty proposal. During the process (until the vote in the Assembly on 2nd April) the NSP would respond through introducing various symbolically loaded policies
March 5, 1974	The minister of Internal Affairs, Oğuzhan Asiltürk says one should be an enemy of alcholic beverages not those who drink them
March 10- 15, 1974	Milli Gazete and other national newspapers discuss the Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan's "crusade" against obscenity in the press. On January 12 Kazan sends a circular note to public prosecutors to enforce the existing law
March 13-20, 1974	The NSM undertakes a mobilization to remove a statue it deems obsecene. The statue was put on Karaköy square in İstanbul to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Republic. On March 20 the statue is removed.
March 17, 1974	Erbakan gives notice to the State Radio Television following a movie the NSP has found obscene

Table 1 – cont'd

March 28, 1974	The NSP parliamentary group takes a binding decision to vote yes for the joint Amnesty proposal
April 2, 1974	The Assembly votes the articles of the government's proposal.
April 10, 1974	The Assembly votes and accepts the entire proposal and sends it to the senate
April 16, 1974	The Assembly restores the political rights of the ex-DP leaders
April 18, 1974	The JP blocks the government proposal: Articles 141 and 142 are left outside the Amnesty
April 27, 1974	The Senate accepts the entire Amnesty Law, except those articles that cover prisoners or convicts under 141 and 142. The law will go back to the Assembly
May 1, 1974	The introduction of the law that regulates the state financial help to political parties based on the percentage of the votes they get in the general elections
May 6, 1974	Ankara NSP district covenes its congress: Hüsamettin Akmumcu, a Nur student leader gives the first signs of defection
May 7, 1974	Parliamentary Group of the NSP discusses the question of workers in Europe: how can they vote for elections that take place in Turkey?
May 15, 1974	The Amnesty Law is promulgated without 141 and 142. The intraparty opponent elites convinced some other NSM parliamentarians to vote with them for the change (exclusion of the clauses) that the opposition parties proposed
May 17, 1974- June 1, 1974	Crisis within the NSM and the coalition government. Ecevit considers resigning
May 25, 1974	The NSP organizes a meeting for the local party chairmen to discuss the latest developments. Erbakan seeks to ensure their support
May 27, 1974	Milli Gazete mentions and condems the gossips of a new "national front" coalition of right wing parties.
May 30, 1974	The Assembly approves the budget. Various industrial investments that the NSM promised to its activists and constituents, such as machine tools and airplane industry, are earmarked in the budget.

Table 1 – cont'd

June 1, 1974	The RPP appeals to the Constitutional Court to abolish the Article 5 of the Amnesty Law, which means to include the Articles 141 and 142 in the Amnesty. The NSM leaders support the RPP's decision
June 8, 1974	Constitutional Court restricts the juridical power of the State Security Courts
June 14, 1974	The tension with Greece over Cyprus begins to increase
June 18, 1974	The NSP Parliamentary Group votes together to reject the motion of no confidence against the Ministry of Education, Mehmet Üstündağ. Since the latter was a particularly despised figure among the right wing, particularly the Nur students the vote of the anti-coalitionist Nur student parliamentarians restored confidence both in the party and the coalition.
July 2, 1974	Constitutional Court abolishes the Article 5 of the Amnesty on the grounds of equality. The left wing activists start leaving the prisons as their right wing counterparts
July 1974	The government lifts the ban on the opium poppy production
July 15, 1974	Military intervention in Cyprus
Juy 20, 1974 - August 29, 1974	Turkey intervenes and then invades half of Cyprus. the US puts an embargo on Turkey on February 5, 1975
August 30- September 10, 1974	Tension between the RPP and the NSP rises following the Cyrpus intervention. The RPP, particularly Ecevit wants to convert his popularity gained through the victory in Cyprus to votes. The RPP wants to come to power alone having exprienced distrust with the NSP both before and during the Cyprus Affair. On the 10th of September the RPP anounces its doubts regarding the future of the coalition.
September 14, 1974	NSP members of the cabinet refuse to sign the decree that would allow Ecevit to visit Scandinavia. This is a response to Ecevit who refused to give the power of procuration to Erbakan, the deputy prime minister. Ecevit wanted to give his place to a cabinet member from the RPP

Table 1 – cont'd

September 18, 1974	Ecevit gave his resignation to the President of the Republic
September 30, 1974	President gives the duty to form a government to Demirel
October 2, 1974	Erbakan accepts Demirel's offer of coalition partnership
October 4, 1974	Demirel resigns from the duty as the DkP refuses the JP's offer
November 7, 1974	RPP's attempts to establish a minority government fails having been refused by all the parties in the Assembly.
November 11, 1974	President asks the unaffiliated senator Sadi Irmak to form a "national" above-parties government
November 14, 1974	RPP demands early elections and refuses to support Irmak, so does the NSP
November 17, 1974	Irmak cabinet fails to get a vote of confidence. However, the cabinet governs the country in practice until the establishment of the First National Front government in March 31, 1975
November 17, 1974	The NSP convenes its Second General Congress in Ankara. The intraparty opponents of Erbakan group fail to beat or influence the list (the candidates for the General Executive Committee) of Erbakan group.
December 6, 1974	The JP engages in its four months long struggle to convince the right wing parties, particularly the DP, to form a right wing coalition
January 1975- September 12, 1980	The tension and street violence begin and steadily augment until early 1980 as social cleavages deepen and economy enters into a crisis following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Organized political violence which brings together various paramilitary groups", deep state forces" and ordinary citizens also takes its toll particularly in Kurdish and Alevi populated provinces such as Maraş.
February 1975	Even though the JP's attempt to form a right wing government has not succeeded yet, the right wing parties, the JP, the NAP, the RelP and the NSP act together in the parliament and the senate and call themselves the National Front

Table 1 – cont'd

March 31, 1975	Nine parliamentarians, among them Saadettin Bilgiç, leaves the DP and helpd the National Front government to get the vote of confidence.
July 28, 1975	The US puts military embargo on Turkey for using American equipment and weapons in Cyprus intervention
January 1976	Akıncı Association is established by young NSP activists. Soon after there were Akıncı Associations for high school students, state employees, workers. An association for high school theachers with close ties to Akıncılar is also established: Mefkureci Öğretmenler Derneği (İdeationalist Teachers Association)
October 12, 1975	Partial Senate elections
October 24, 1976	NSP's Third General Congress. Two additional lists of General Executive Committee candidates circulate, however two powerful leaders that opponents claimed to represent them, deny their knowledge of these lists. Erbakan defeats his opponents. As the general elections approach and the intraparty opponents are eliminated from high level decision making structures, the opponents lose leverage against the Erbakan group
April 19, 1977	13 parliamentarians, leaders of the anti-coalition and "anti-Amnesty for the communists" group refuse candidateship in the upcoming elections
June 5, 1977	General Elections. The NSP protecst its votes but its share of the overall votes thus its parliamentary seats drop. The RPP gets the highest votes but not enough seats to form a majority government.
June 14, 1977	The president gives the duty to form a government to Ecevit.
July 3, 1977	The RPP government fails to get a vote of confidence
July 21, 1977	the Second National Front government, including the JP, the NSP, the NAP
December 11, 1977	Local elections. As in previous local elections the NSP fails to attract enough votes.

Table 1 – cont'd

January 5, 1978	The RPP transfers parliamentarians and establishes a new government. Each of the transferred parliamentarians acquire a seat in the new cabinet
October 15, 1978	NSP's Fourth General Congress. Three names from the list of opponents (now a relatively new group led by Korkut Özal who are unhappy with Erbakan's steadly increasing power) manage to enter the General Executive Committee
April 1979	The NSP and the Akıncı youth organize the Sakarya Meeting
November, 1979	The NSP and the Akıncı youth organize the Kayseri Meeting
September 7, 1980	The NSP and the Akıncıs organize the Kudüs Meeting in Konya.
September12, 1980	The coup d'etat of 1980. Military takes over the government and imposes a ban on all political parties and their leaders. By 1983, not only new parties but also old parties under different names appear. Then NSM's new party name is the Welfare Party. In 1987, the political leaders, including Erbakan, come back to the political field when a referendum lifts the political ban.

Table 2

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
National Leaders and Elites of the Nizam/Selamet Movement						
Ayhan, Cevat	Activist and parliamentary candidate in the 1970s, WP and VP Sakarya deputy. Still active.	—	Mechanical Engineer	07.02.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Asiltürk, Oğuzhan	Local entrepreneur in Kars, executive committee and cabinet member, NSP Ankara deputy and WP Malatya Deputy. Still active.	—	Civil Engineer and businessman. (he was doing constructions in Kars during the party building period).	05.10.2007 09.10.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Cebeci, Cemal	Kayseri deputy	—	Religious scholar, Prayer Leader and Preacher School Director, education expert at the State Department of Planning. Later worked in charity organizations.	10.10.2006	Ankara	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
Aksay, Hasan	Entrepreneur and official founder of the NOP, executive committee and cabinet member, NSP İstanbul and Adana deputy	—	Theology graduate, teacher and hight school director. JP Adana deputy. Owner of Milli Gazete. (in post-1980 period, businessman)	22.11.2006 01.02.2007 04.02.2009	İstanbul	face-to-face (2) telephone
Emre, Süleyman Arif	Entrepreneur and official founder of the NOP and the NSP, first chairman of the NSP, executive committee and cabinet member. NSP and WP İstanbul deputy and cabinet member	—	Lawyer, FP's and NTP's founder, NTP Adıyaman deputy.	30.01.2007 02.02.2007 10.03.2009	İstanbul	face-to-face (2) telephone
Utku, Turhan	Activist and NSP Çorum deputy	—	Civil Engineer, Agricultural Engineer. By 1977, engineer and businessman	01.11.2006 08.11.2006	İstanbul	face-to-face
Müftüoğlu, İsmail	Local party entrepreneur in Sakarya, executive committee and cabinet member. NSP Sakarya deputy. Still active	—	Teacher, Lawyer. (post-1980 period, lawyer)	12.11.2007 14.04.2008	İstanbul	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Inter view Type
Kazan, Şevket	Local party entrepreneur in Kartal, İstanbul. Executive committee and cabinet member. NSP and WP Kocaeli deputy. Still active	—	Voluntary/honorary Preacher, store owner, trader, lawyer.	06.08.2007 07.08.2007 08.08.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Independent Intellectuals						
Bekaroğlu, Mehmet	independent intellectual and activist	—	Student of Medicine, Psychiatrist, University Professor, WP's Rize deputy, Deputy chairman of the VPP	16.05.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Özdenören, Rasim	Writer and a bureaucrat at the State Planning Organization	—	Writer, bureaucrat at the State Planning Organization	April 2004 (first interview before the actual fieldwork started, no specific date has been recorded)	Ankara	face-to-face
Local Elites and Activists of the Nizam/Selamet movement (Kayseri and Konya)						
—	Unofficial local founder of the NSP and parliamentrary candidate in 1973	KayNS1	Teacher, later trader	01.02.2009	İstanbul	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
—	Local founder of the NOP and the NSP. Executive member	KayNS2	Shopowner, later factory owner	16.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Executive member of the NSP, also in MTTB and Büyük Doğu circles	KayNS3	Civil engineer, contractor, later trader	07.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist in the NOP and executive in the NSP	KayNS4	Skilled craftsman at a state factory	20.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist in the NOP.	KayNS5	Skilled craftsman and shopowner	27.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist	KonNS6	Skilled craftsman, small shopowner	01.12. 2008	Konya	telephone interview
—	Activist and a parliamentary candidate in 1973	KayNS7	Lawyer	06.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face written answers
—	Executive member in the NSP and parliamentary candidate in 1973	KayNS8	Accountant, first state employee, then a manager in the private sector	14.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist	KayNS9	Civil engineer, small factory owner	25.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Executive member in the NSP	KayNS10	Civil engineer, contractor, later trader	15.08.2006 17.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
__	Activist in the NOP and a local founder of the NSP	KayNS11	Skilled craftsman at a state factory, later small workshop and shopowner	17.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Activist	KayNS12	Skilled craftsman, worker at a public institution, later small workshop owner	12.09.2006 26.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Activist in the NOP and the NSP, previously in the RPNP	KayNS13	Skilled craftsman, shopowner, trader	17.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Activist	KonNS14	Skilled craftsman, small shopowner	04.11.2008	Konya	telephone interview
__	Activist	KayNS15	Civil engineer, state employee, later business owner, trader, contractor	20.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Activist	KayNS16	High school student, student of mechanical engineering, later employee of a state factory and contractor	08.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	A local founder of the NOP and the NSP, executive member and a parliamentary candidate in 1973 and 1977	KayNS17	Skilled craftsman, civil engineer, contractor, medium business owner	06.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

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NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
—	Executive member	KayNS18	Civil engineer, contractor	11.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist and executive member	KayNS19	Technical draftsman, small business owner	28.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
National Elites and Leaders of the Justice Party						
Sezgin, İsmet	General executive committee and cabinet member. Aydın deputy in several Assembly terms.	—	Originally a bank employee and economist.	13.06.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Bilgiç, Saadettin	General executive committee and cabinet member. Founder of the DkP. Isparta deputy in several Assembly terms	—	Medical doctor, also landowner	14.08.2007	Isparta	face-to-face
Doğan, Kemal	General executive committee member, Kayseri deputy, also a local Kayseri elite.	—	Manager of a large factory, newspaper writer, later businessman	26.07.2006	Ankara	face-to-face
Local Elites and Activists of the Justice Party (Kayseri and Konya)						
—	Executive member, also in the TOBB	KayJP1	Medium business owner	17.03.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview
—	Activist, also in the TOBB	KayJP2	Medium-large business owner	03.02.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
—	Subdistrict executive committee member in Talas	KayJP3	Small shopowner, food supply contractor with a state institution	08.09.2006	Talas/Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist, also in the TOBB	KonJP4	Medium-large business owner	17.03.2009	Konya	telephone interview
—	DP activist, JP executive member	KayJP5	Small-medium business owner	28.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	DP activist, JP executive member, also in the TOBB. By 1969 joins the National Action Party	KayJP6	Small-medium business owner	17.03.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview
—	Activist, also in TOBB	KonJP7	Medium-large business owner	04.02.2009	Konya	telephone interview
—	DP activist, JP executive member	KayJP8	Small-medium business owner, contractor, trader	30.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	DP Activist, JP executive member, also in TOBB	KayJP9	Journalist	19.07.2006 15.06.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
—	DP activist, JP executive member, also a leader in the TOBB	KayJP10	Medium business owner, contractor working with a state institution	31.01.2009 18.03.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview
—	DP activist, JP executive member	KayJP11	Medium business owner, investor	01.10.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
—	DP activist, JP parliamentary candidate, also a local journalist	KayJP12	Journalist	19.07.2006 24.07.2006	Ankara	face-to-face
Elites and Activists of the National Action Party (Kayseri)						
—	Executive member	KayNAP1	Journalist	11.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist	KayNAP2	Student	11.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist in Kayseri and İstanbul	KayNAP3	High school student and student of law	04.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Executive committe member, also a leader of the Nationalists' Association	KayNAP4	Lawyer, poet, literary critique	14.08.2006 22.08.2006 24.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
Elites and Activists of the Republican People's Party (Kayseri)						
—	Activist	KayRPP1	undisclosed	07.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face interview
Bahçecioğlu, Niyazi	Kayseri Mayor from 1973 to 1980, and 1989-1994	—	Civil engineer, contractor	18.9.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face interview
—	Activist	KayRPP2	Student of management and finance, later worked in the mayorship	07.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face interview

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
—	Activist	KayRPP3	undisclosed	07.09.2007	Kayseri	face-to-face interview
Leaders and activists of Akıncı Movement (National level and Kayseri)						
Bulut, Mehmet Ali	National leader. Chairman. JDP founder and Maraş deputy	—	Lawyer	10.08.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Çavuşoğlu, Tevfik Rıza	First and last chairman of the Akıncı Association from Kayseri.	—	Student, civil engineer (later businessman)	23.08.2006 28.08.2006 20.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist	KayAkın	Student, athlete later medium business owner	24.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
—	Activist in Ankara and İstanbul	Akın2	Journalist	24.01.2007 31.01.2007	Istanbul	face-to-face
Tezel, Mehmet	National leader, executive member.	—	Mechanical engineer	03.09.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
Yarbay, Ersönmez	National leader, executive member. JDP unofficial founder,VP and JDP Ankara Deputy.WP, VP and JDP Ankara branch chairman.	—	Student, bureaucrat in public administration	10.08.2007 03.09.2007	Ankara	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
—	Activist and a lawyer.	Akın3	Lawyer	30.09.2006	undisclosed for unanimity	face-to-face
Local elites and members of Büyük Doğu and MTTB circles (Kayseri)						
—	Member MTTB	KayBDMTTB1	University student (undisclosed for unanimity)	15.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
_	Member MTTB, local BD elite	KayBDMTTB2	Student (undisclosed for unanimity), later employee at the municipality	23.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
Karatepe, Şükrü	WP Kayseri mayor between 1994-1998, local MTTB leader in Kayseri	—	Student of law, later university professor of political science and public administration	03.08.2007 09.08.2007	Ankara	face-to-face
—	also in MTTB circles Local JDP elite	KayBDMTTB3	Medical profession (specifics are undisclosed)	08.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face (not recorded)
—	member MTTB, JDP	KayBDMTTB4	Student of finance and accounting, later takes over family business	10.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
__	also in MTTB circles	KayBDMTTB5	Student of mechanical engineering, later takes over family business trader, shop owner	15.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
Yıldız, Bekir	executive member in MTTB. Mayor of Kocasinan (a downtown quarter)	KayBDMTTB6	Student in civil engineering, later	31.08.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
Milli Mücadele Birliği (Kayseri)						
___	activist	KayMMB1	Student (specifics undisclosed for unanimity)	06.10.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face
Risale-i Nur Elders and elites (non-Yeni Asya) (Anatolia)						
Akmumcu, Hüsamettin	Risale-i Nur elder in the Scribe branch, one of the Said Nursi's lawyers. JP and NOP Isparta deputy, NSP Ankara deputy	__	Lawyer	15.08.2007	Isparta	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
Deligöz, Muzaffer	Activist in Ankara and briefly in İstanbul, later chairman of the NSP in Bolu	—	Student of theology and law. Works at the Presidency of Religious Affairs	01.07.2007 02.07.2007 19.07.2007 24.07.2007	Istanbul	face-to-face
—	Risale-i Nur elder from Antep and Maraş, member of a local notable family, unofficial founder of the NOP and the NSP	RNelder1	Signboard maker before entry to the Nur circles and bookstore owner when engaged in the NSM entreprise	26.11.2007 15.05.2008	Istanbul	face-to-face
—	Activist in the Scribes movement in Ankara	RNactivist	Student of Arabic and Persian, at the same time works as a state employee	19.08.2008 23.08.2008	Istanbul	face-to-face
—	A"royal student," the elder of a non-Yeni Asya Risale-i Nur branch in Anatolia	RNelder2	Preacher and works at the Presidency of Religious Affairs, owns a publishing house	11.08.2007	Ankara	telephone interview

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
National Yeni Asya Risale-i Nur Elders and Elite Activists (Istanbul)						
—	A young elite, activist in the 1970s	NatYA1	Student at a Prayer leader and Preacher school, later theology student. Works at the movements publishing businesses and newspapers	07.12.2006 14.12.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face
Güleç, Mehmet Nuri (Fırıncı Ağabey)	A young activist in the 1950s, a leader in the 1970s, today an elder of Yeni Nesil	—	Works in the family business (bakeshop), later "endowed"	06.10.2006 31.10.2006 14.11.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face
—	A young elite, activist in the 1970s	NatYA2	Student of mechanical engineering	21.11.2006 05.12.2006 13.02.2007	Istanbul	face-to-face
—	Activist in the 1970s in an Anatolian town, today an elite of the movement	NatYA3	Student of mechanical engineering, later university professor	16.12.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face
Kutlular, Mehmet (Kutlular Ağabey)	A young activist in the 1960s and a leader in the 1970s, today an elder of Yeni Asya	—	Unemployed, later „endowed"	16.11.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
Mustafa Sungur (Sungur Ağabey)	A "royal student," an elder respected by both Anatolian and İstanbul branches, now the elder of Yeni Nesil	—	Village school teacher, later small trade and „endowed"	19.12.2006 (?) a suddenly arranged meeting, might be a confusion of the date	Istanbul	face-to-face
—	Activist in the 1970s, a theolegian	NatYA4	Student of Prayer Leader and Preacher School, later theology student and works at the publishing businesses of the movement	13.02.2007	Istanbul	face-to-face
Şenler, Şule Yüksel	Activist during the Kirazlımescit period, sister of a prominent young Nur student, a JP activist.	—	Columnist, preacher, novelist, one the first veil activist, later entered various Islamist and religious circles, including the NSM and certain sufi brotherhoods.	23.12.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
__	Activist in the 1970s	NatYA5	High school student, later student of law and lawyer. Worked in the movement's publishing business	12.12.2006	Istanbul	face-to-face
__	Activist in the late 1970s, a close relative of a royal student in Central Anatolia	NatYA6	Born to a prominent Nur student family, nephew of a royal student. Journalist, works in the movement publishing businesses	04.12.2006 16.12. 2006	Ankara Istanbul	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
Local Yeni Asya Elders and Activists (Kayseri)						
__	A current elder, activist in the 1970s in a Kurdish majority district	KayYA1	Student of informal medrese, later student of theology faculty. Later, "endowed."	30.04.2009	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Very young contemporary activist staying in a local Medrese-i Nuriye for girls	KayYA2	Student in distance learning, plans to endow herself	02.05.2009	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	A second layer Nur student	KayYA3	University student, later university professor (undisclosed for unanimity)	21.09.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Contemporary local female elder. Wife of a Nur elite originating from an Eastern town.	KayYA4	Housewife, homemaker, endowed.	30.04.2009 01.05.2009 02.05.2009	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Activist in the late 1960s and 1970s, today a local Nur elite	KayYA5	Skilled craftsman, medium business owner	02.05.2009	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Very young contemporary activist staying in a local Medrese-i Nuriye for girls	KayYA6	Student of a Kur'an course training to become a Kur'an teacher, plans to endow herself.	02.05.2009	Kayserl	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
__	Activist in the late 1960s and 1970s, today an elder	KayYA7	Small wholesale trader	02.05.2009	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Activist in the 1970s	KayYA8	Small trade, later medium busines sowner	04.05.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview
__	An elder sent to Kayseri by the late 1960s to supervise and enlarge the movement activities	KayYA9	Employee at the postal office, later "endowed."	04.05.2009	undisclosed	telephone interview
__	activist in the late 1960s and 1970s, today a local Nur elite	KayYA10	Emloyed in his relative's shop.	30.04.2009	Kayseri	face-to-face
__	Local elder ,a major financial contributor and entrepreneur of the Risale-i Nur movementfrom 1960s onwards. Family members are prominent local Nur students. An elite of the JP in a subdistrict and major local interlocutor between the JP and the movement	KayYA11	Trader	28.09.2006 01.10.2006	Kayseri	face-to-face

Table 2 – cont'd

NAME	Further Description of activities and engagement during the years under consideration	Group and individual Identifier	Occupation before and after engagement	Interview Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Place of Interview	Interview Type
__	Young activist in Kayseri in the 1970s, head of the JP's youth organization, today a local Nur elite	KayYA12	Skilled craftsman, today businessowner	04.05.2009	undisclosed	telephone interview
__	Activist in the 1970s, today a local Nur elite	KayYA13	High school student, later student of education faculty and teacher. "endowed"	04.05.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview
__	Activist in the 1970s, today a local Nur elite	KayYA14	Tailor (paid employee), later small businessowner	05.05.2009	Kayseri	telephone interview

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL IN ENGLISH AND IN TURKISH

The interviews were semi-structured and the questions did not necessarily follow the same order. In addition, questions have slightly changed, or shortened according to the interviewees' movement affiliation, age, profession, locality etc. The interviewer tried to start with the personal questions, having discovered that they relaxed the interviewee. Personal questions helped to show that the interview was not an exam and there is no right answer and that the researcher tries to understand the experiences, practices and views of the interviewee.

C-1: Görüşme Soruları (Interview Questions)

I.   Kişisel Bilgiler ve Tarih

1. Nerede doğdunuz? Doğum tarihiniz?

2. Mesleğiniz nedir? (Hala çalışıyorsa: ne iş yapıyorsunuz?) Daha once başka işlerde çalıştıysanız biraz bahsedebilir misiniz? Parti (veya harekete) ilgi duyup aktivitelerine katılmaya başladığınız zamanlarda çalışıyor muydunuz? Öyle ise biraz o zamanki işinizden hayatınızdan biraz bahsedebilir misiniz? (Risale-i Nur Talebeleri için: Risaleleri ilk tanıdığınızda ne yapıyordunuz? Çalışıyor muydunuz? Öğrenci miydiniz?)

3. Çocukluğunuzu ve ailenizi anlatır mıydınız?

   • Aileniz nereli? Nerede yaşıyorlar?

   • Meslekleri nedir?

   • Aileniz ekonomik durumu nasıldı? Yaşam şartlarınız nasıldı?

4. 1950, 1960 veya 1970lerde ekomomik gelirinizi ve yaşam koşullarınızı nasıl tarif edersiniz? Bugünkü koşullarınızla karşılaştırır mıydınız? O yıllarda (veya bugün) bakmanız gereken yakınlarınız var mıydı?

II.   Eğitim, dini, sosyal ve kültürel etkinlikler

1. Hangi okullara gittiniz?

   • Nerede? Ne zaman?

   • Resmi, gayri-resmi eğitim?

   • Özel okul, devlet okulu?

   • Özel dersler?

   • Meslek eğitimi, meslek içi eğitim?

   • Gittiğiniz okulların isimleri?

2. Dini eğitim aldınız mı veya dini okullara gittiniz mi?

   • Nerede, ne zaman, nasıl?

   • Geleneksel medrese eğitimi, aile büyükleri, sufi eğitimi, Risale-i Nur, kişisel çaba.

3. Tarikat ehli misiniz? Hiç bir hocaefendiye intisap ettiniz mi veya sohbetlerini

dinlediniz mi? İntisabınız nasıl oldu, anlatır mısınız?

- Ailenizde başka tarikat ehli var mı? Tarikat ehli olmak hayatınızda bir değişiklik yarattı mı, sizi etkiledi mi, nasıl?

- (Eğer tarikat ehli olmadıysa veya hiç sohbetlere devam etmedi ise) Neden?

4. (Eğer Nur talebesi değil ise) Hiç Risale-i Nur sohbetlerine katıldınız mı veya Risaleleri okudunuz mu? Açıklar mısınız?

5. (Eğer Nur talebesi ise) Risalelerle ilk nasıl tanıştınız? Nerede? Ne zaman? Ayrıntılarıyla anlatır mısınız?

6. Siz veya ailenizin herhangi bir üyesi dini eğitiminizi alırken herhangi bir zorluk yaşadınız mı?

7. Okulda (veya daha sonra çalışırken) dindarlığınız veya dini yaşamınızla ilgili herhangi bir sosyal veya idari zorluk yaşadınız mı veya kolaylık gördünüz mü? Ayrıntılarını aktarır mıydınız?

8. Gençliğinizde, aktif yıllarınızda, ve bugün hangi yayınları takip ettiniz? Bugün hangilerini takip ediyorsunuz? En sevdiğiniz yazarlar kimlerdi?

9. Sizi çok etkilemiş veya halen etkileyen bir kitap, yazar, düşünür vs. var mı? Sizi nasıl ve neden etkilediğini düşünüyorsunuz?

10. Hiç dergi, gazete v.b bir yayına sahip oldunuz mu? Bu tip bir yayında yazdınız mı, veya herhangi bir yayını yönettiniz mi? Cevabınız evet ise, hikayenizi ve yayının hikayesini anlatır mısınız?

III.   Siyasi Alan ve Siyasi Etkinlikler

1. Ailenizde siyasete ilgi duyulur muydu? Siz çocukken ailenizde siyaset konuşulur muydu? Belirgin hatıralarınız var mı?

- (Eğer yaşı tutuyorsa) Tek parti dönemini ve çok partili sisteme geçişi hatırlıyor musunuz? Ailenizde tek parti dönem ve çok partili sisteme geçiş nasıl yaşandı ve karşılandı?

2. Aileniz hangi partiye teveccüh gösterdi? Ailenizin bu seçimlerini nasıl açıkladığını hatırlıyor musunuz? Sizin açıklamanız nedir?

3. Harekete/partiye vb. girmeden önceki ve aktif olduğunuz dönemdeki dünya görüşünüzü nasıl tanımlarsınız? Bugün nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? Görüşlerinizde bir

değişiklik oldu mu?

4. İlk katıldığınız dini/entellektüel/siyasi grup/oluşum/organizasyon hangisiydi? Ortaya çıkmasına, kuruluşuna veya organizasyonuna katkıda bulunduğunuz bir dini, entellektüel veya siyasi oluşum var mı? Bu oluşuma katılmanızın veya katkıda bulunmanızın hikayesini anlatır mıydınız?

5. 1960lardaki "toplu namazlar" hakkında ne düşünüyordunuz, bugün ne düşünüyorsunuz? Genel olarak İslamcı harekete (mobilizasyona) yardımcı oldu mu?

6. Katıldığınız ve aktif olduğunuz başka dernek, siyasi parti veya grup oldu mu? Aktivitelerinizden ve bu oluşum/organizasyonun etkinliklerınden bahsedebilir misiniz?

7. (Kayseri için) Oturmalara katılıyor musunuz veya katılır mıydınız? Oturmalardaki arkadaşlarınız sizin dünya görüşünüzü paylaşır mıydı? Hepsi aynı parti veya harekette miydi?

8. Neden X partisi? Neden Y veya Z.... değil?

9. (Eğer görüşmeci siyasi bir partiye katılmamış veya oy vermiyorsa) Neden parti siyasetinden veya aktif siyasetten uzak kaldınız ve/veya siyasi partilerle ilgilenmiyorsunuz?

10. Hareketiniz, partiniz veya derneğiniz aracılığıyla veya bu kurumlar içerisinde ne tip etkinlikler organize ettiniz, düzenlediniz? Sizce amaçlarına ulaştılar mı?

11. Parti, hareket veya organizasyonunuzda görev ve sorumluklarınız nelerdi? (Hala aktif ise bugün ne gibi sorumluluk ve görevleriniz var?) Bu sorumlulukları neden ve nasıl yüklendiniz? Görev paylaşımı konusunda kararlar nasıl alınıyordu?

12. (Siyasi parti üyeleri için) Acaba aday seçimi (parlamento, senato, il idaresi meclisi, belediye meclisi, belediye başkanlığı) kararları nasıl alınıyordu? Adaylarda nelere dikkat edilirdi?

13. Hiç milletvekili (veya belediye meclisi, il idaresi meclisi) adayı olmayı düşündünüz mü veya oldunuz mu? (Olumlu veya olumsuz) Kararınızı nasıl aldığınızı, ve nedenlerini anlatır mıydınız?

• Nasıl aday olunur?

14. Hiç seçim çalışmalarında yer aldınız mı? 1973 ve 1977 seçimlerindeki seçim

kampanyası etknliklerinizden bahseder miydiniz?

15. (Eğer seçilmiş ise) Milletvekili olarak (veya belediye meclisi üyesi olarak) deneyimlerinizi, görevlerinizi ve zorlukları anlatır mısınız?

16. O yıllarda (ve daha sonraki yıllarda) dava arkadaşlarınız kabul ettiğiniz ama düşünce ve görüşlerinde farklılık olduğunu düşündüğünüz hatta yolunuzu ayırdığınız kişiler, hareketler ve kurumlar oldu mu? Ayrıntılarıyla anlatır mıydınız?

17. Aile, arkadaş çevreniz veya akrabalarınız hiç hareket veya siyasi parti etkinlikleriniz nedeniyle şikayetçi oldular mı?

- Faaliyetleriniz sırasında ve faaliyetlerinizden dolayı kovuşturmaya uğradınız mı? Suçlandınız mı? Tutuklu kaldınız veya mahkumiyet aldınız mı? Güvenlik güçleri tarafından izlendiniz veya taciz edildiniz mi? Cevabınız evet ise bunun kişisel, siyasi sosyal veya hareketinizle ilgili sonuçları oldu mu? Oldu ise bunlar nelerdi?

IV. Milli Nizam ve Milli Selamet Partileri

1. Milli Nizam Partisi kurulmadan once Adalet Partisi ve diğer sağ partiler Anadolu'da epeyce eleştiriliyordu. Sizin görüşleriniz nasıldı? Bu eleştirilere katılıyor muydunuz?

2. Milli Nizam'ın kurulmasını desteklediniz mi? Kurulmasında yer aldınız mı? Neden? Nasıl katıldınız, desteklediniz veya karşı çıktınız? Ayrıntılarıyla anlatır mısınız?

3. Milli Nizam'ın kapatılması hakkında ne düşündünüz, kapatılınca ne yaptınız?

4. Milli Selamet Partisi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi koalisyonu hakkında görüşleriniz nelerdi? Bu görüşleriniz doğrultusunda ne yaptınız? Neden bu şekilde düşündünüz?

5. Ceza yasasının 141 ve 142 maddelerinin 163. Maddeye (bu maddelerden hüküm giyenlerin veya tutuklananların) ek olarak planlanan Af Yasasına dahil edilmesi hakkında ne düşündünüz?

- İsmail Cem'in TRT'ye atanması ve Mustafa Üstündağ'ın Eğitim Bakanı olmasını nasıl karşıladınız?

6. (Kayseri için) Koalisyon sırasında diğer parti mensupları ile ilişkileriniz nasıldı?

7. (Nizam/Selamet hareketi mensupları için) Üçüncü Kogrelde Gündüz Sevilgen ve arkadaşlarının ve Dördüncü Kongrede Korkut Özal ve arkadaşlarının Genel İdare

Kurulu listelerine destek verdiniz mi? Neden ve nasıl?

8. Koalisyona karşı çıkanların partiden ayrılması hakkında ne düşündünüz?

9. MSP-CHP koalisyonun ne gibi zaaf ve başarıları (ülke, İslamcı hareket ve parti için) olduğunu düşündünüz (bugün dönüp baktığınızda ne düşünüyorsunuz)?

10. Milliyetçi Cephe hükümetlerini onayladınız mı? Desteklediniz mi? Neden ve Nasıl? Bu koalisyonun ne gibi zaaf ve başarıları (ülke, İslamcı hareket ve parti için) olduğunu düşündünüz (bugün dönüp baktığınızda ne düşünüyorsunuz)?

   • (Kayseri için) Koalisyon sırasında diğer parti mensupları ile ilişkileriniz nasıldı?

   • (Kayseri Nizam/ Selamet mensupları için) Koalisyon sırasında, Kayseri'de sağ partiler arasında belediye seçimleri için ortak aday belirlenmeye çalışılmış. Sizce neden bu ittifak başarılamadı?

11. Hem MSP hem Milliyetçi Cephe koalisyonları döneminde siz kendinizin, yerel parti örgütünün ve/veya hareketinizin dilek, istek, ihtiyaç ve/veya çıkarlarını parti merkezine nasıl aktarıyordunuz? Onlar nasıl karşılık veriyordu? Size gelen vatandaşların dilek, istek ve çıkarlarını merkeze nasıl iletiyordunuz?

V. İslamcı Hareketler Üzerine

1. Parlamento yolu ve siyasi parti aracılığıyla siyaset İslamcı hareketi sizce genel olarak nasıl etkiledi?

2. Başka yerlerdeki İslamcı hareketleri tanıyor musunuz, biliyor musunuz? Müslüman Kardeşler deneyimini kendi deneyimizle ve hareketinizle karşılaştırır mısınız? İran İslam Devrimini nasıl karşıladınız? Bu deneyim hakkında genel olarak ne düşünüyorsunuz?

3. Türkiye'deki çeşitli gençlik hareketlerini birbirleriyle karşılaştırır mısınız? İslamcı gençlik hareketiyle diğerlerinin benzerlik ve farklılıkları nelerdir?

   • Milli Türk Talebe Birliği'nin İslamcı gençlik hareketindeki yeri nedir?

   • Akıncılarla genç Nur talebelerini karşılaştırır mıydınız?

VI. Türkiye Üzerine (Dün ve Bugün)

1. Siyasete (harekete, grubunuza vb.) ilk girdiğinizden bu yana Türkiye'de sizce

değişmeyen ve çözüm bulunması gereken sorunlar hangileri? O yıllardan bu yana bu sorunlar hakkındaki görüşleriniz ve çözüm önerileriniz değişti mi?

2. "Kürt sorunu" veya "Doğu Sorunu" olarak adlandırılan konu hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nedir? 1960 ve 1970lerde bu konuda neler düşünüyordunuz? Bu konu etrafında şekillenen sorunların sizce nedeni ve çözümü nedir?

3. Ermeni Soykrımı vardır veya yoktur şeklindeki tartışmalar konusunda düşünceleriniz nedir? Sizce bu gibi konular özgürce tartışılmalı mı?

C-2: Interview Questions

I.   Personal Trajectory and0 Information

1. What are your birthplace and date of birth?

2. What is your profession? (if he is still active: Where do you work today?) Could you tell me more about your previous jobs, if there are any? Were you working when you first developed your interest and entered in party/movement activities? If so, could you tell me more about your work and life during that period? For the Risale-i Nur students: when you first met the Risale-i Nur what were you doing? Were you working, were you a student? (The Nur students use the expression: "*Risaleleri tanımak,*" or meeting the *Risale*s.)

3. Could you tell me about your childhood and family:

   - Where are your parents from? Where do they live?
   - What were their professions?
   - How was your economic situation? How would you describe your living conditions back then?

4. How would you describe your level of income and living conditions during the (1950s, 1960s or 1970s). How would you compare to your living standard today?

   - Do (did) you have dependent family members you need(ed) to take care of?

II.   Education, religious, social and cultural activities

1. What schools did you attend?

   - Where and when?
   - Formal, informal?
   - Public or private school?
   - Private courses?
   - Vocational (re)training?
   - The names of the schools

2. Did you have a religious education or schooling? Where, how and when did you get your religious education?

   - Traditional *medrese*, family elders, brotherhood, personal efforts, school, Risale-i

Nur etc.

3. Are you from the people of the *sufi* brotherhood? Have you been attached to a *sufi* leader or listened to his conversations? If so, how did you attach? Do you have a family member who is also from the "people of the brotherhood." How being a *sufi* disciple help/influence/change you? If you have not become a member, or listened to conversations, why not? Please elaborate.

4. (If not a Nur student) Have you ever participated to a Risale-i Nur class or read the epistles? Please elaborate your answer.

5. (If the interviewee is a Nur student) How did you first meet with the Risale-i Nur? Where? When? Could you elaborate ?

6. Have you or your family members ever experienced difficulty in getting religious education?

7. Have you ever experienced any social or administrative difficulty, or help, facility at school (or in later years at work) regarding your religiosity and/or religious life? Could you elaborate?

8. What are the publications you followed during your youth, your activism years and today? Who were the writers you liked the most?

9. Are there any particular book, author, and thinker etc. that influenced you (or still influences you) the most? Could you tell my why and in what ways they influenced you?

10. Have you ever owned, managed, or written for, a periodical, newspaper etc? If yes, how did you engage in this activity? Could you tell me the story of this publication?

III.   On Political Field and political activities

1. Were your parents interested in politics? Did they talk about politics when you were a child? Do you have distinct memories?
   * (If old enough) Do you remember the single party period, or the passage to multiparty politics? How were they received in your family?
   * Which party did your parents extended their favor (*teveccüh göstermek*)? Do you remember how your parents explained this choice? How do you explain their

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choice yourself?

2. How would you describe your worldview back in your activism days (and before) and today? Did you experience change in your views?

3. What was the first religious/intellectual/political formation/group/organization in which you participated? Is there a religious, intellectual or political formation you contributed to its emergence/establishment/organization? Could you tell me the story of your participation/entrepreneurship etc.?

4. What do/did you think about the collective morning prayers of the late 1960s? Were they helpful in the Islamist mobilization in general?

5. Were there other associations, political parties, groups you joined and actively participated? Could you tell me more about your activities in particular and the activities of this organization in general?

6. (For Kayseri) Do you participate (did you participate) in "*oturma*"? Were all your friends in oturma shared your worldview back then? Were they in the same movement/party?

7. Why the Party X? Why not the Party Y, Z etc.? Please elaborate.

8. (If the interviewee never supported or worked for a party) Why did you stay away from party politics?

9. What types of activities were you organizing through and within your party/movement/association etc? Do you think they reached their purpose?

   - Conferences, seminars, protests, courses, study circles, etc.

10. What were your duties and responsibilities in your party, movement or organization? (If still active, what are they now) How and why did you acquire them? How were such decisions on the division of labor were made?

11. (For the political party members) Could you tell me more about the process of decision-making regarding candidature selection (including parliament, senate and local governmental bodies)? What were your criteria in the selection?

12. Have you ever become or thought about becoming a parliamentary candidate (or a candidate for municipal assembly, town assembly etc.)? Please elaborate.

   - How one would become a candidate for such offices?

13. Have you ever actively worked in an electoral campaign? Could you give me the

details of your campaign activities for the 1973 and 1977 elections?

14. (If elected to a public office) Could you tell me about your experiences, duties, and difficulties as a parliamentarian (member of the municipal assembly etc.)?

15. During those years (and throughout the years to come) did you have "brothers in cause," (individuals, movements, institutions) within and outside your movement; organization etc. with whom you disagreed over certain issues or even parted ways? Please elaborate.

16. Did your family, friends, relatives ever complain about your movement/party activities?

    • Have you ever faced criminal charges, went to prison, followed or harassed by security forces during and because of your activities? If so, were there any personal, political, social, or movement related consequences? What were these consequences?

IV. On the National Order and National Salvation Parties

1. Before the establishment of the NOP, there were some criticism directed to the JP and other right wing parties. Did you agree with them? What was your own interpretation?

2. Did you support, or involve in the establishment of the NOP. Why, why not? How did you participate or oppose? Could you elaborate?

3. How did you respond to the ban of the NOP?

4. What were your views about the NSP-RPP coalition? Did you act upon your views? How and why?

5. What were your views regarding the Draft Amnesty Law, which would include those convicted under Penal Law Articles 141 and 142, together with those convicted with Article 163?

   • What did you think about İsmail Cem (a well know social democrat)'s appointment as the head of the State Radio and Television? Similarly, what was your reaction when Mustafa Üstündağ (a social democrat politician considered extreme left among the right wing activists) became the Minister of Education?

6. (For Kayseri) How were your relations with the members of other parties in town

during the coalition?

7. (For the NSM members) Did you support the alternative General Executive lists in the Third (Gündüz Sevilgen and his friends) and Fourth (Korkut Özal and his friends) General Congresses? Why and how?

8. What did you think about the resignation of the anti-coalitionists from the party?

9. What, did you think back then, were the successes and failures of the RPP-NSP coalition for the country, the Islamist movement in general and the party? When you look back what do you think today?

10. Did you support and approve the Nationalist Front governments? Why? What were the consequences (and successes and failures) of these governments for the country, Islamist movement in general and the party?

- (For Kayseri) How were your relations with the members of other political parties in town during the Nationalist Front coalitions?

- (For the NSM Kayseri activists) There were some attempts among the right wing parties in Kayseri to have a joint candidate for the municipal elections during the first Nationalist Front government. At the end why do you think they could not succeed to form an alliance?

11. During the coalition periods with the RPP and in the Nationalist Front How would you convey your (individual, and local party or movement) wishes, demands, needs and/or interests to the party center? How would the party center would respond? How did you communicate the wishes, demands and interests of the citizens who came to you for help?

V. On Islamist Movements

1. How do you think political engagement through the parliament and political party influence the Islamist movement in general in Turkey?

2. Are you familiar with the Islamist movements elsewhere? How would you compare (the experiences of) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to (those of) your movement or other movements in Turkey? What was your reaction to the Islamic revolution in Iran? What do you think about this experience in general?

3. How would you compare different youth movements in Turkey? Differences and

similarities between the Islamist youth movements and the others?

- What is the place of the Turkish National Student Union within the greater Islamist youth movement?
- How would you compare the Raiders with the young Nur students?

VI. On Turkey (yesterday and today)

1. Since your participation to your party (movement, organization, group), which, do you think, basic questions and problems persist in Turkey that needs to be solved? Have your ideas and proposals for solution of these problems changed since then?

2. What do you think about the issue called "Kurdish question?" (also known as Eastern question?) What do you think are the reasons and solutions to the problems revolving around this issue?

3. What do you think about the disputes over whether or not there was an Armenian genocide? Do you think we should be discussing on this question freely?

Figure 1: Map of Turkey highlighting Kayseri district.
Source: http://wikimapia.org/#lat=38.6958435&lon=35.4929048&z=6&l=0&m=w (highlighting by the author)

APPENDIX D

MAPS

Figure 2: Old Industrial Zone, Market Place and downtown in Kayseri during the 1960s (shown on a contemporary map, yellow highlights are in the original). Source: http://wikimapia.org/#lat=38.7225503&lon=35.4799175&z=15&l=0&m=b

A. (Old) Industrial Zone
B. The Market Place (*Çarşı*)
C. The (closed) Bazaar
D. Camii Kebir (The Great Mosque)
E. Hunat Camii (Hunat Mosque)
F. Sümer Örnekevler Camii
G. Mimar Sinan (Kurşunlu) Camii
H. İmam Hatip Lisesi (Prayer Leader and Preacher School)
I. Türk Kültür Derneği (Turkish Cultural Assocation)
J. Alemdar Sinemasi (Movie-theater, location of the TÖS Congress)
Associations and Political Parties
Explosions during the TÖS Congress
Downtown Area

Name	Translation	Abbreviation	Period of Activity	Leaders
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	Republican People's Party	RPP	1923-1981, 1992-	Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Bülent Ecevit, Deniz Baykal, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
Demokrat Parti	Democrat Party	DP	1946-1960	Adnan Menderes
Millet Partisi	Nation Party	NP	1948-1954	Fevzi Çakmak, Hikmet Bayur, Enis Akaygen, Mustafa Kentli
Millet Köylü Partisi	Nation Peasant Party	NPP	1954-1960	Osman Bölükbaşı
Hürriyet Partisi	Freedom Party	FP	1955-1958	Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu
Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi	Republican Peasant Nation Party	RPNP	1961-1965, (by 1969 NAP)	Osman Bölükbaşı, Hasan Dinçer, Ahmet Oğuz, Alparslan Türkeş
Türkiye İşçi Partisi	Labour Party of Turkey	LPT	1961-1971, 1975-1980	Avni Erakalın, Kemal Türkler, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Mehmet Ali Aslan, Şaban Yıldız, Behice Boran
Yeni Turkiye Partisi	New Turkey Party	NTP	1961-1973	Ekrem Alican, İrfan Aksu
Adalet Partisi	Justice Party	JP	1961-1981	Ragıp Gümüşpala, Süleyman Demirel

Table 3 – Political parties mentioned in the essay

Table 3 – cont'd

Name	Translation	Abbreviation	Period of Activity	Leaders
Millet Partisi	Nation Party	NP	1962-1977	Osman Bölükbaşı
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi	Nationalist Action Party	NAP	1965-1980	Alparslan Türkeş
Birlik Partisi	Union Party	UP	1966-1981	Hasan Tahsin Berkman, Hüseyin Balan, Mustafa Timisi
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi	Republican Reliance Party	RelP	1967-1981	Turhan Feyzioğlu
Demokratik Parti	Democratic Party	DkP	1970- 1980	Ferruh Bozbeyli - Faruk Sükan
Milli Nizam Partisi	National Order Party	NOP	1970-1971	Necmettin Erbakan
Milli Selamet Partisi	National Salvation Party	NSP	1972-1981	Süleyman Arif Emre, Necmettin Erbakan
Nizam Partisi	Order Party	OP	1977-1980	Hüsamettin Akmumcu
Refah Partisi	Welfare Party	WP	1983-1998	Ali Türkmen, Necmettin Erbakan
Fazilet Partisi	Virtue Party	VP	1997-2001	İsmail Alptekin, Recai Kutan
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	Justice and Development Party	JDP	2001-	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Saadet Partisi	Felicity Party	FP	2001-	Recai Kutan, Mustafa Kamalak
Halkın Sesi Partisi	Voice of the People Party	VPP	2011-	Numan Kurtulmuş

Table 4- Nationwide Organized Social Movements in the 1960s and 1970s

Name of the Movement	Translation	Type	Organization type	Ideational Orientation	Date
Akıncılar	Raiders	Politico-cultural	Formal	Islamist	1975-1980
Büyük Doğu	Great East	Politico-cultural	Informal	Islamist	1964-
Işıkcılar	Disciples of Ligtht	New Religious Movement	Informal	Islamist	1960's-
Komandolar	Commandos	Politico-cultural	Informal	Ultra-Nationalist	1967-1971
Milli Mücadele Birliği	Union of National Struggle	Politico-cultural	Formal	Islamist	1967-1980
Risale-i Nur Talebeleri	Students of Epistles of Light	New Religious Movement	Informal	Islamist	1926-
Süleymancılar	Disciples of Süleyman	New Religious Movement	Informal	Islamist	1950's-
Ülkücü Gençlik	Idealist Youth	Politico-cultural	Formal	Ultra-Nationalist	1971-
Yazıcılar	Scribes	Students of Epistles of Light	Informal/formal	Islamist	1960-
Yeni Asya (Kirazlımescit)	New Asia	Students of Epistles of Light	Informal/formal	Islamist	1963- (1963-1970 Kirazlımescit)

Name	Translation
Diyanet İşleri Görevlileri Dernekleri	Associations for the Employees of the Presidency of Religious Affairs
İlahiyat Fakültesi Mezunları Derneği	Association for the Graduates of Theology Faculty
Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği	Association for Fighting Against Communism
Milli Türk Talebe Birliği	Turkish National Student Union
Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Derneği	Nationalist Teachers' Association.
Milliyetçiler Derneği	Nationalists' Association
Türkiye İmam Hatip Okulu Mezunları Derneği Federasyonu	Turkey Federation of the Associations of the Graduates of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools
Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği - TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
Yeşilay Cemiyeti	Green-Crescent Association
Yüksek İslam Enstitü Mezunları Cemiyeti	Association for the Graduates of Advanced Institute of Islam

Name	Translation
İmam Hatip Okulu Mezunlar Derneği	Association for the Graduates of Prayer Leader and Preacher school
İslam Enstitüsü Talebe Derneği	Association for the Students of Advanced Institute for Islam
Berber ve Kuaförler Derneği	Association of Barbers and Coiffeurs
Esnaf Birlikleri Derneği	Association of Craftsmen Guilds
Demirciler Derneği	Association of Iron-workers
Din Görevlileri Derneği	Association of Religious Employees
Sobacilar Derneği	Association of Stove-Makers
Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu Derneği	Association of Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu
Marangozlar Derneği	Association of Wood-workers
Otelciler Derneği	Associations of Hotel-keepers
Bakırcılar Derneği	Associations of Copper-workers
Ayakkabıcılar Derneği	Associations of Shoemakers
Sanayi Odasi	Chamber of Industry
Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi	Craftsman's Cooperative
Büyük Doğu Klübü	Great East Club
Kayseri Ticaret Odasi	Kayseri Chamber of Commerce
Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Derneği	Nationalist Teachers' Association of Kayseri
Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Sendikası	Nationalist Teachers' Syndicate
İmam-Hatip ve İlâhiyat Tedrisatı Yardım Derneği	Philantropic Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling
Türkiye Tekstil, Örme ve Giyim Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası	TEKSIF Kayseri (Turkish abbreviation for Textile, Tricotage, and Clothing Industry Workers' Syndicate of Turkey)
Türk Kültür Derneği	Turkish Cultural Association
Türk Ocağı	Turkish Hearth

APPENDIX F

POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HÜSAMETTİN AKMUMCU

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti

(Sahife : 2)

Noteri

aharlarını da tevkil, teşkik ve azle, münferiden
müçtemian icrayı vekâlete velhasıl hak ve menfaat-
larımı n mudafaa ve mukafazası için kanunen benim
yapabileceğim bütün muamele ve takipleri son derece-
ye kadar ve benden farksız olarak intaca mezun ve se-
lâhiyettar olmak üzere Isparta Barosu avukatların-
dam HÜSAMEDDIN AKMUMCU'yu umumi vekil tayin ve nasb
eyledim. 24/2/1960

Tevkil eden: SAID NURSI

Hizan Kazası Nurs Köyünden olup
Isparta- Kepeci Mah.Kemeraltı
sokk 6/A No.da mukim, Mirza
oğlu 1293 D. lu

Vakidavet üzerine 24/2/1960 çarşanba günü saat
14 de gidilen Isparta Kepeci Mah.Kemeraltı sokak 6/
numaralı evde yazılan, okunup anlatılan işbu vekale-
name altındaki imsansa (bir kelime çizildi) mühürün
şahıs ve hüviyeti dairemce maruf ve imzası mahfuz bu-
lunan yukarıda açık adresi yazılı SAID NURSI'ye ait
bulunduğunu tastik ederim. Bindokuzyüz atmış senesi
şubat ayının yirmi dördüncü çarşanba günü 24/2/1960

ISPARTA NOTER
Ali Rıza Tunçay

(Harç pulları dairede kalan
aslına yapıştırılmıştır.)

Noter kâğıdı   Numune : 1

Notary of Public document approving that Said Nursi granted Power of Attorney to Hüsamettin Akmumcu. Source: Hüsamettin Akmumcu's personal archive.

APPENDIX G

SELECTED NEWS ITEMS AND HEADLINES

Figure 3: A day before the "Bloody Sunday," *Bugün* headline says: "It is time to strangle the reds." Source: *Bugün*, February 15, 1969.

Figure 4: The front cover page of the daily *Yeni İstanbul* supplement on İbrahim Elmalı. The blue caption reads that those who remain silent against injustice are "the mute Satan," a hadith, whose originality is a matter of dispute among the scholars.
Source: Yeni İstanbul, October 15, 1966

Figure 5: *Yeni İstanbul* **gives the news of the "Elmalı Affair" protests in İstanbul and Kayseri as its headline.** Source: *Yeni İstanbul*, October 9, 1966.

Figure 6: Bugün informs its readers that "35.000 Muslims" participated to the collective Morning Prayer in Sultanahmet in İstanbul as a response to those who called for a "socialist Turkey." Source: *Bugün*, July 29, 1968.

Figure 7: Şule Yüksel Şenler is at a conference, which took place in the (very crowded) conference room of the National Turkish Student Union (the MTTB) in İstanbul. Source: *Bugün*, April 9, 1969.

Safâ Mürsel İsparta ve Eskişehir'de konuştu

Gazetemiz yazarlarından Safâ Mürsel geçtiğimiz cumartesi ve pazar günleri İsparta ve Eskişehir'de milliyetçilik konusunda birer konuşma yapmıştır.

İsparta Kültür Sarayındaki ilk konferansta Milliyetçiliğin manâ ve mahiyeti üzerinde duran Yazarımız büyük bir dinleyici topluluğu tarafından ilgiyle takibedilmiştir.

Diğer taraftan Adalet Partisi Eski-

şehir İl Gençlik Kolu Başkanlığının davetlisi olarak parti lokalinde konuşan Safâ Mürsel, milliyetçilerin birlik ve bütünlüğü konusuna ağırlık vermiştir.

AP'nin milliyetçilik görüşünün bütün milliyetçileri birleştirici vasıfta olması zaruretine temas eden yazarımız milliyetçi güç birliğinin her sahada en kısa zamanda kurulması temennisinde bulunmuştur.

Figure 8: A young Yeni Asya elite, columnist at Yeni Asya, Safa Mürsel gives a talk in Isparta and Eskişehir. In Eskişehir he was hosted by the JP's local youth branch (which was probably populated by the young Nur students). He said that the JP's understanding of nationalism is one that unites all [types] of nationalists. Source: *Yeni Asya*, March 15, 1978.

Figure 9: Yeni Asya (back then Kirazlımescit) movement mobilizes against the draft law of "Protection of the Constitutional Order" of the JP: "The resistance of the People still continues." Source: *İttihad*, March 25, 1969.

Figure 10: Shortly after the military intervention of March 12, 1971, Yeni Asya's headline reads "Leading provacateurs are being arrested." They were "provoking innocent youth" to fight with them. On the right, Yeni Asya published the memorandum no. 19 of the Martial Law Commandership of İstanbul, which lists the "Communists" to be arrested. The list includes names ranging from university scholars such as Bahri Savcı and Uğur Mumcu to Union Leader Kemal Türkler and writer Yaşar Kemal. Among them Türkler and Mumcu were assasinated in 1980 and in 1993, respectively. While their murders remained to be solved, it is a widely held view that the perpetrators were "deep state forces." Among those prosecuted within the context of the *Ergenekon* Affair today, reportedly there are also some of the remnants of these "forces." Source: *Yeni Asya*, May 19, 1971.

Prof. Erbakan Konya senatör adayı o'uyor

● Odalar Birliği Genel Sekreterliğinden istifa eden Prof. Necmettin Erbakan AP'den Senatör olmak üzere adaylığını koymuştur.

Figure 11: Necmettin Erbakan applies to the JP to become a candidate for the Senate from Konya. Source: *Yeni İstanbul*, April 10, 1968.

Figure 12: "…and the Freemasons won again." Bugün reports how police forces took control of the TOBB. On the upper right corner Erbakan, though being the real winner, loses the boxing game against his opponent. On the lower right, Erbakan announces his application to the JP to become a parliamentary candidate, the same day with the police intervention. Source: *Bugün*, August 9, 1969.

Figure 13: Yeni Asya (then Kirazlımescit) movement informs its readers regarding the TÖS incident. The green upper headline reads: "We won't let the Communists live." The headline says: "People of Kayseri reared up against the reds." Source: *İttihad*, July 15, 1969.

DOĞRU SEÇİME DOĞRU

ÖZAL ALMANYA'DA VATANDAŞLARIN DERTLERİNİ DİNLEDİ

Tercüman

Yukarıdaki resim 22 Nisan tarihli YENİ ASYA'da yayınlandı. 24 Eylül 1975'de Tercüman'ın Almanya baskısında çıkmıştı. Korkut Özal Alman Bakanı ile kadeh tokuşturuyordu. (NOT: Baskımız ofset olmadığı için resim tam net çıkmamaktadır. Fakat bu defa; geçen seferine göre her zaman başvuru'mayan bir usulle «özel itina» ile basılmaktadır.

Figure 14: This photo, which was previously, published also by conservative-nationalist daily *Tercüman* shows Korkut Özal, the NSP's Minister of Agriculture of the RPP-NSP and Nationalist Front coalitions, making a toast at a state diner in Germany. As a very pious Naqshbandi, Özal would not drink an alcoholic beverage. However, whatever he drinks is not visible, and the gesture is open to the speculation of the NSP's opponents. Incidentally, these were the years when both the NSM and Yeni Asya were trying to organize in Germany competing over the attention of the immigrant workers. Source: Yeni Asya, May 1, 1977.

Figure 15: Following the signature of the coalition protocol the NSM newspaper published this caricature. It shows the symbols of the NSP (its emblem, a key) and the RPP (rather Ecevit's favorite peace symbols, a dove with an olive branch). The tip of the NSP's key can also be read as "Allah" in Arabic in its Kufic form. Source: *Milli Gazete*, January 12, 1974.

Figure 16: Both Erbakan (the headline) and Ecevit (lower right) promises brotherhood following the establishment of the coalition. Erbakan promises a new law for freedom of thought. Source: Milli Gazete, February 16, 1974.

SORUYORUM SİZE HANGİ MESELE BAŞIBOŞ BIRAKILMIŞTIR. BİR TEK MİSAL VERİN . . .

HAKKIMDA BİRŞEY BİLİP DE DELİLLERİNİ ORTAYA KOYMIYANLAR, NAMUSSUZDUR . . .

Figure 17: Demirel speaks at the JP's 5th General Congress. His main opponents are no longer in the party. The caption reads "I ask you, is there an issue that we did not address. Give me just one example [if you can]" and "Those who know anything about me but not provide evidence are dishonorable people," respectively. He responds to corruption allegations advanced by his opponents. Source: Milliyet Yıllığı 1970, 43. (Originally, "Demirel Tekrar Başkan," Milliyet, October 24, 1970).

Figure 18: Yeni Asya supports the JP in 1969 and struggles against the split of right wing votes. The advertisement of the supplement published against the NAP and its leader Türkeş. The main argument against them is the fact that Türkeş had been a member of the military junta that staged the military intervention of May 27, 1960. Source: Yeni Asya, September 16, 1969.

Figure 19: NSM pro-coalitionist elites try to balance the movement's collective identity and the party's coalition responsibilities. Headline informs the readers that the "statue of shame" in Kadıköy has been removed. On the left corner and bottom, a column and a news item on the pending draft of the Law of Amnesty. On the right, there is news of a motor factory that is planned to be established in Konya. Source: Milli Gazete, March 20, 1974.

APPENDIX H

PARTY OPENING CEREMONIES

Figure 20: The NOP flier for the local party opening ceremony in Sivas. Source: Milli Kütüphane, Non-book materials, 1970 AFİŞ 332.

Figure 21: The NSM poster for the NOP opening ceremony for the Istanbul district branch. At the bottom the poster indicates that "ladies" will be separately accomodated. Source: The National Library, Non-book materials, 1970 AFİŞ 332.