

## **Does International Migration Encourage Consumerism in the Country of Origin?—A Turkish Study**

**Lincoln H. Day**

*Australian National University (retired)*

**Ahmet İçduygu**

*Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey*

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As part of a larger inquiry into the consequences of international migration for those who remain in the country of origin, detailed interviews were conducted with 234 adults in four Turkish provinces. Three migrant-status categories were defined: (a) Returned migrants, (b) Non-migrant close kin or friends of migrants, and, as a control group, (c) All others. Group (a) was the most likely to own various manufactured items, and group (c) the least, with group (b) in between. But when, within each migrant-status category, those who did not own but wanted a particular item were added to those who already owned it, much of the difference by migrant-status disappeared. This was particularly so with regard to "necessities." Controlling for age, sex, urban-rural residence, and schooling produced an essentially inconsistent pattern of association between these characteristics and owning or wanting a particular item. It did, however, reveal a widespread persistence of not wanting one or another of these items side by side with a pattern of wanting it. While owning or wanting something seemed to receive only limited support from the consumption patterns of relatives and friends, not wanting something seemed to receive considerable support from this source. This seems unlikely to continue, however, in the face of changes now taking place in Turkey.

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Please address correspondence to Dr. Day, 2124 Newport Pl., NW, Washington, DC 20037-3001, or to Dr. İçduygu, Dept. of Political Science, Bilkent University 06833, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey.

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## INTRODUCTION

The substantial increase since the mid-seventeenth century in the human exploitation of natural resources—and its complement, the creation of wastes—is well known. The Earth's atmosphere, its air, water, and ground water are more polluted, its soils more degraded. Wildlife habitats have been lost here, seriously depleted there. And on a massive scale old growth forests have been cut down, wetlands drained, and crop, forest, and grazing lands lost to urban development, road-building, dam construction, and home and commercial expansion.

Moreover, the pace of these changes is accelerating—in consequence of the concurrent operation of the three forces of population increase, technological and scientific development, and seemingly ever-higher levels of material aspiration.

Among the results are: losses to biodiversity, depletion of protective atmospheric ozone, losses of amenity (e.g., natural beauty, open space, peace and quiet), and global climate change. There are limits—physical, ecological, social. Human beings have already overshot some (see, e.g., Catton, 1980), and they are in process of approaching many others.

Quite apart from attempting actually to halt these developments, any adjustment to such conditions or amelioration of their more deleterious consequences will require changes in human behavior; changes, i.e., in lifestyles, in the application of science and technologies, and in the level of human reproduction. Although it might seem reasonable to look to further developments in science and technology for assistance toward attainment of such goals, science and technology cannot do the job alone. For a task of this magnitude there are no technological "fixes," no "magic bullets."

The major challenge would appear to be that of achieving the requisite changes in consumption. In part, this is because world fertility is finally on course towards ultimate stabilization at replacement levels, while consumption seems everywhere to be on the increase (and at an accelerating pace). But there are other, more systemic reasons for expecting consumption to present a particular challenge. For one thing, there is the force of habit and acquired preferences associated with people's daily lives—and the persistent patterns of consumption underlying these habits and preferences. For another, there are the constant and, in many societies, all but ubiquitous encouragements to the continuation of these patterns of consumption. Some of these encouragements inhere in the existence (and, in individual instances, possession) of the equipment and infrastructure upon

which this continuation depends (the cars, trucks, and recreational vehicles; the networks of roads; the buildings constructed without reference to solar principles for heating, lighting, and cooling; clothes driers; room heaters and coolers; ice makers and refrigerators; power tools; power boats, non-solar hot water heaters, and so on). Other encouragement comes from individuals and institutions with a vested interest in widening the existence and possession of such equipment and infrastructure. A major means to this end employed by such interests is advertising—that quintessential industry of the growth economy (see the classic statement by David Potter, 1954, chap. 8)—with its main goal the creation of markets for an ever-expanding supply of products, and its main means to this goal the creation of dissatisfaction with what one has and the concurrent discouragement of alternative (i.e., non-advertised) sources of satisfaction. Underwritten by the latest advances in the technologies of mass communication, modern advertising is a potent force supporting not just the continuation of present levels of consumption but also their expansion, as well as diffusion to other populations.

The requisite changes in consumption will necessarily be greatest where high-consumption practices are most entrenched and widespread; where, for example: patterns of settlement and land use are based on the widespread use of the automobile as a means of mass transit; homes and offices are widely dependent on non-solar sources for heat, light, cooling, and the movement of material and personnel; and food supplies are highly dependent on the expenditure of large amounts of energy for production, processing, and distribution. In short, the changes will be greatest in those countries—and, if equity is a goal, among those populations within these countries—most characterized by high resource-consumption lifestyles. The entrenchment and extensiveness of these lifestyles will merely add to the difficulty of effecting the changes that are necessary.

But the importance of human numbers cannot be denied. The causal equation in these processes is human consumption *times* human numbers. This interaction has already caused the world to reach or come close to reaching the limits of the ecological conditions on which all species depend. It is also causing changes to take place in this once stable planet. The earthquakes, hurricanes, droughts, plagues, crop failures, etc. of the past never shook the basic physical stability of the planet as a whole. But the recent concentrations at the extremes—of temperature, rainfall, tidal levels, for example—plus the destruction of ozone and the build-up of the likes of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane (See, e.g., Smil, 1991; or, for a summary more oriented toward the general reader: McKibben, 1989) show, in the words of one observer, “that man’s relationship to na-

ture can no longer be considered a constant, a background factor, something to be taken for granted. It changes as human activities change, and it must be monitored and evaluated and thought about just as we think about social interactions" (Davies, 1998, p. 3).

These significant environmental changes have been accompanied by equally significant demographic changes. Whatever the encouragement to be derived from current fertility trends, the force of demographic momentum (i.e., the working out, over time, of present age structures)—barring some massive high-mortality calamity, of course—will inevitably lead to far larger populations in the future, both in the world as a whole and in individual countries (U.N., 1996).

The latter half of the twentieth century has seen not only massive increases in human numbers overall, but especially large movements of human populations across national boundaries. In both scope and volume, this is one of the most striking social phenomena of the past one and a half centuries. But there have been some recent changes in the composition of such movements. Until recently, they were largely limited, in personnel, to the people of Europe and, in direction, to the land areas of the New World. Migration statistics suffer from poor international comparability as to definitions, coverage, and completeness, but it is generally accepted that, from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, the traditional immigrant-receiving countries of the New World admitted more than 60 million people, and that the great majority of these people were Europeans. Europeans continue to migrate, but recent decades have seen enormous changes in the overall pattern of migration—changes in magnitude, direction, and length of stay abroad. The movement of Europeans, although it continues to involve some hundreds of thousands annually, is now only a fraction of the total non-tourist flow of people between countries; and, numerically, movement out of Europe is more than counterbalanced by movement into Europe. In but a few decades, people from the developing countries have moved to center stage. They now constitute the majority of permanent immigrants to the traditional receiving countries, and are, as well, the major elements in the flows of other types of migration. Most of those now living outside their homelands—estimated a decade ago as already some 20 million contract workers, millions of refugees, hundreds of thousands of transient professional workers, and unknown numbers (but clearly millions) of illegal workers (Appleyard, 1989, p. 19)—are non-European.

These more recent (and continuing) movements have been notable for the large numbers involved, the great variety—demographic, racial, and cultural—of the participants, and—of particular interest here—the extent

of the movement from areas of relatively low to areas of relatively high levels of resource and energy consumption.

Massive as these movements have been, they have had little effect on population growth in the "less developed" portion of the world. The population base in these areas is too large and the fertility level too high. In the 1985–1990 period, emigration reduced the overall growth rate of this part of the world by only about 2.5 percent, and, in the 1985–1990 period, by only 2.8 percent (U.N., 1998, p. 50). In the "more developed" region, however, where net migration had already accounted for more than a quarter (27%) of the population increase in the 1985–1990 period, it is reckoned to have accounted for nearly half (45%) of this increase in the 1990–1995 period (United Nations, 1998, p. 50). And this is a minimum estimate; for, in arriving at these estimates, births to immigrants in the countries of destination are not counted as part of the population increase resulting from immigration. If they were, these rates would be markedly higher—given the generally youthful ages of migrants and the generally higher fertility of those from the less developed countries (See, e.g., Day, 1983, pp. 78–79). In France, for example, immigrants accounted for nearly a quarter of all births registered in 1985, and for more than 40 percent of births in the 1953–1964 baby boom [Tribalat (Ed.), 1991, cited in Termote, 1991, p. 554].

The question posed here is whether these migratory movements have any significance for the future of consumption. The causes of international migration can be highly complex; but to the extent a potential migrant has the choice of whether or not to migrate (and not all have this choice: those fleeing extreme political or military persecution, for example, and sometimes even the spouses or children of potential migrants), the goal of economic betterment would appear in most instances to be an important element in the potential migrant's process of decision-making. In fact, the greater the cultural differences between the countries of origin and destination, the more prominent is the role played by economic aspirations in any decision to migrate likely to be.

But whatever their motivation, immigrants could, on the whole, be expected to encounter more frequently and adopt more readily a host society's high resource-consumption patterns than they could that society's more abstract patterns of thought and behavior relating to, say, legal rights and obligations, relations between the sexes, or the conservation of its historical, cultural, or environmental heritage. Especially with respect to material things, immigration can bring the migrant into contact with new consumer items and the patterns of thought and behavior associated with them. At the same time it can remove the migrant from agents (such as

friends and kin, the mass media of the country of origin, and various material manifestations—buildings, houses, urban layouts, landscape) that might support his or her continued attachment to prior ways and levels of aspiration. And, of course, any increase in income will enable the migrant to increase his or her consumption and participation in the new lifestyles, which, in turn, can reinforce attachment to these new ways and, in some instances, cause the migrant to become more dependent upon continued adherence to them. There is also, specifically with ownership, the possibility of one's developing a psychic commitment to what has been purchased, if only because of a desire to avoid having to admit—to oneself or others—that some purchase (or even the decision to migrate) might have been unwise or ill-advised.

Thus, immigration can be expected to encourage higher overall consumption levels, and to do so by the degree to which immigrants adopt the higher resource-consumption patterns of their host societies. And it will probably have this effect on consumption levels regardless of whether individual migrants remain in the host societies or return to their societies of origin.

But what about those who do not migrate; in particular, those in the migrants' networks of close kin and close friendship? Will migration affect their consumption, too? There are a number of ways in which one might expect it to: through higher levels of aspiration in response to communication with "successful" migrants; through greater consumption and participation in new lifestyles made possible by migrants' remittances; through, because of the existence of these higher incomes, having to take up new ways or becoming more dependent on continuing to practice these ways (e.g., becoming more dependent on a car for commuting, shopping, and recreation because of more extended patterns of settlement in response to increased—remittance-funded—ownership of cars and the political influence of those who own them or can profit from building the infrastructure commensurate with their use).

The consequences of migration, whether within or between countries, are experienced at three levels: that of the migrants themselves, that of the society they enter, and that of the society they leave. Although there have been exceptions (e.g., Abadan-Unat, *et al.*, 1976; Yenisey, 1976; Englebretsson, 1978; Gordon, 1978; Bennett, 1979; McArthur, 1979; Grasmuck, 1982; Khattab & El Daeif, 1982; Khafagi, 1983; Alpay & Sariaslan, 1984; Azmaz, 1984; Morauta, 1984; Gunatilleke [Ed.], 1992), social researchers have tended to focus on the first two to the exclusion of the third. Either they have ignored these consequences altogether, or considered them from but a limited perspective: commonly focusing on internal move-

ments (usually rural to urban). The scope of inquiry usually excludes the international, and, more important, is limited to narrowly economic concerns. Moreover, inquiry is at such a high level of generality (the national, for the most part, and in terms of such issues as the balance of payments, employment levels, and average wage rates) as to eclipse individual behavior and difference, while addressing issues of mutual causation and context, if at all, only by inference.

The data for the present analysis come from a more general inquiry into the role played by international migration (particularly that between markedly different cultures and levels of living) in fostering or retarding social change in societies of origin. The locus of this study was Turkey, a particularly appropriate place for such inquiry, firstly, because of its high rate of emigration, and secondly, because this high rate of emigration is of but recent origin. Unlike the British, Germans, Italians, Greeks, Chinese, or Indians, for example, the Turks had no particular history of large-scale emigration in modern times until the signing of the bilateral Turkish-West German agreement of 31 October 1961, which initially permitted Turkish men to enter West Germany on temporary 1-year work contracts and was later expanded to permit the entry of women and families. In the less than four decades since, Turkish men and women have emigrated in the hundreds of thousands. The great majority have gone to Western Europe, but large numbers have also gone to Australia and, more recently (in larger numbers than to Australia), to the Arab countries of both North Africa and the Persian Gulf.

The growth of this movement has been impressive. From almost none in late 1961, there were, by the mid-1990s (when the population of Turkey itself was some 57 million), more than 2.5 million Turkish workers and their dependents in Europe, some 170,000 Turkish workers (without dependents—dependents not being allowed in) in Arab countries, and some 40,000 settlers in Australia (Gökdere, 1994, p. 37). Thus, at any one time during these years, some 5–6% of the Turkish population was abroad. And when we remember that some 30–40% of these emigrants returned permanently to Turkey, it would appear that a sizable minority of the present Turkish population has had a direct experience of emigration, and that an even larger proportion—through the emigration of a close relative or friend—an indirect experience.

The potential influence of this movement on Turkey is, however, a function of contacts as well as numbers. From the beginning, Turkish emigrants appear to have kept in touch (through letters, telephone calls, and remittances) to a particularly high degree with family and friends in the homeland, and through visiting there from time to time on holiday, to at-

tend weddings, or in response to the sickness or death of a relative (Içduygu, 1994). At the very least, one could expect this combination of massive emigration and the maintenance of a high level of contact with those who *remained behind* to be an important stimulus to change in Turkey's economic and social life.

Yet, massive as this movement has been, its recency offers the important possibility, so far as social research is concerned, of being able to identify for comparative purposes a control group of persons presumably but little affected (at least in any direct sense) by the experience of migration, whether their own or that of close kin or friends. In designing our inquiry, it was thus possible, on the basis of their experience of international migration, to envisage three distinct categories of persons: (a) returned migrants, (b) non-migrants who were close relatives or close friends of migrants (whether or not these migrants had returned), and, as a control group, (c) non-migrants who were neither close relatives nor close friends of migrants.

### METHOD OF INQUIRY

Our analysis is based on the results of lengthy, detailed interviews with adult men and women in four Turkish provinces, ranging from the more developed and urban (Ankara, Izmir) to the less developed and rural (Konya, Yozgat). Ankara (city population: 3 million) and Izmir (city population: 2 million), two of the main metropolitan areas in Turkey, have been major sources of migrants to a wide range of receiving countries (from Germany to Australia, North Africa, and the Gulf States). They are also the main areas to which migrants have returned. Konya (city population: 550,000), the country's richest grain-growing area, has been a major source of migrants to several receiving countries, most particularly in Scandinavia. Yozgat (city population: 45,000), an underdeveloped region, has been a source of emigrants to a variety of countries.

Respondents were drawn in approximately equal numbers from each of the four provinces and, within each province, in approximately equal numbers from both urban and rural districts. The respondents were all persons 18 years of age and over (N = 234) in 116 households. The oldest was 74. Eighty-three of them (47 men and 36 women) were returned migrants; 54 (6 men and 48 women) were close relatives of migrants, whether or not returned; 19 (3 men and 16 women) were close friends of migrants, whether or not returned; 34 (17 men and 17 women) were both close relatives and close friends of migrants, again whether or not returned; and



**TABLE 1****Distribution of Respondents by Sex and Migrant Status**

Migrant Status	N			% of Total
	Men	Women	Total	
Returned migrants	47	36	83	35
Non-migrants who are close kin or close friends of migrants	26	81	107	46
Controls (non-migrants who are neither close kin nor close friends of migrants)	24	20	44	19
TOTAL	97	137	234	100

44 (24 men and 20 women) were "controls," that is, neither migrants themselves nor close relatives or friends of migrants (for a more detailed discussion of the fieldwork, see Day and İçduygu, 1997). On the basis of a tally of a selection of their answers, we decided nothing would be lost—and much gained—in the processing and analysis of the data if we made a single category out of the three kin or friend categories. The resulting distribution by sex and migrant category is shown in Table 1.

There were seven interviewers, including the Director of Fieldwork (Içduygu). All were Turkish, and originally from the several districts in which the interviews were conducted. In addition to interviewing, they participated in both the construction of the questionnaire and the development of indicators used for various of the analyses. The interviews, which lasted between one and one and a half hours, were conducted in private, away from others, with men interviewed by men and women by women. The respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their answers, and there was no tape-recording of what was said. Such precautions add to the confidence one can have in the results of such an inquiry and, more specifically in the present instance, can be expected to lessen whatever bias might inhere in the fact that a fourth of the households in the study contained more than one interviewee. The distribution of interviewees by household size is presented in Table 2.

**LIMITATIONS OF THE INQUIRY**

Because we were not dealing with a random sample of the Turkish population, we are limited in what we can say—in fact, largely precluded

**TABLE 2**  
**Number of Respondents per Household, by Household Size and Sex**

No. Persons in Household	No. Households This Size	No. Interviewees in Households This Size		
		Men	Women	Total
1	2	0	2	2
2	21	15	24	39
3	22	13	27	40
4	22	19	26	45
5	33	32	38	70
6	8	10	9	19
7	5	5	7	12
8	2	2	3	5
10	1	1	1	2
Total	116	97	137	234

from saying anything at all—about conditions in Turkey as a whole. This particular limitation is of no moment here, however, for it was not our intent to describe Turkish society or identify either the relative magnitudes of the various sectors of the Turkish population or the types of behavior among them. Instead, our purpose was to ascertain the association (or lack of it) between migrant status and various items of behavior, belief, and attitude—irrespective of the proportionate distribution of these phenomena within the Turkish population as a whole. There is no dearth of problems with this type of research: problems of definition, of appropriateness of questions, of coding, of respondents' understanding of questions or their mood at time of interview, for instance. But unless there is reason to believe (and we know of none) that the various items for analysis we have inquired into are somehow randomly associated with what we have cross-tabulated them with, the lack of a random sample should be no grounds for concern.

The number of respondents, however, is another matter. As in any study of this type, the sample size is the main limitation on the number of factors that can be simultaneously controlled. The large amount of information we have collected makes this a matter of particular significance in the present instance. Almost any cross-tabulation of these data produces a plethora of empty cells. We addressed this problem in two ways. Firstly, we

combined values in the major control categories so as to attain cells with more workable numbers (Ns): reducing *Age* to four categories, *Migrant Status* to three, *Level of Schooling* to five, and *Residence* to two. Secondly, we limited our analyses to searching only for general patterns of relationship, as against employing one or another statistical test of "significance" (for an earlier use of such an approach, see: Day, 1991). Slight statistical differences, unless part of such a pattern, were disregarded. Such a course of action was called for not only by the generally small Ns in the cells created by our tabulations but also by the fact that these data were not derived from a random sample.

## FINDINGS

Our main data on consumption consist of answers to the following questions:

- a. I'm going to read off a list of manufactured goods. Please tell me which of these you own or have access to.
- b. Are there any of these you don't have that you would especially like to have? Which ones?
- c. Are these [i.e., the things the respondent especially wants] things that some of your relatives or friends have? Which ones do they have?
- d. Did you use any of this money [i.e., money earned as an emigrant or received as a remittance from an emigrant] to buy things you would not have been able to buy if you (he/she) had not migrated?  
[If YES]
  1. What were those things?
  2. Do most of your friends (neighbors) also own such things?
  3. What things like these *don't* they own?
  4. What about your relatives—Do most of them own such things?
  5. What things like these *don't* they own?
  6. Do you think your having these things has made any difference in your family's relations with its friends, neighbors, or relatives?

At the most general level, what stands out about the relation between migration and consumption is the consistently lower consumption among those in the *control* group: those, that is, who are neither *migrants* themselves nor the close *kin or friends* of migrants. This is true of both men and women. Other than with radio and television sets (access to which is all but universal within the population studied), the *controls* have the lowest percentages owning or having access to the manufactured goods specified and *migrants*, with few—very slight—exceptions, have the highest. In be-

tween, but with percentages markedly closer to those of the Migrants, are the close *kin/friends of migrants*.

The smallest differences in ownership/access by migrant status and sex (apart from the ownership of wristwatches, which is limited among non-migrant women but almost universal among men) relate to such near-essential household items as refrigerators and washing machines; the largest differences, to the three luxury items: cameras, videos, and cars (Table 3), with each of which ownership is higher among men..

When it comes to the *desire* for these various items on the part of those who do not have them, the pattern by migrant status (with one important exception) lacks the consistency of that respecting owning/access. But if we combine the percentages who either own or, if they do not have these items, want them, the differences by migrant status—among both men and women—are markedly reduced. Particularly is this true of the near-essentials. Almost every respondent either owns or wants a refrigerator; and were it not for a few women among the Controls, the same could be said about a washing machine. Moreover, most (71%) of the rural men in the Control group who do not have a tractor want one, and both of the remaining 2 migrant women without a wristwatch want one. But with the

**TABLE 3**  
**Proportions Owning or Having Access to Selected Manufactured Goods, by Migrant Status and Sex**

	Video	Washing Machine	Refrigerator	Car	Wrist-watch	Tractor (Rural)	Camera	N*
<b>Men</b>								
Migrant	66	66	98	38	94	62	85	46-47#
Kin/Friend	31	73	92	38	96	-0-	35	26
Control	4	25	50	4	100	-0-	4	23-24#
<b>Women</b>								
Migrant	63	89	92	49	94	40	80	35-36#
Kin/Friend	42	60	94	25	73	32	46	81
Control	5	40	55	5	25	-0-	5	20

\*For Tractor (which refers only to rural respondents), respective Ns are as follows:

	Migrants	Kin/Friends	Controls
Men	26	6	14
Women	15	38	9

# Discrepancy due to missing data.

major luxury items—cameras, videos, and cars—it is different. Although attenuated by the addition of the “wanters,” the pattern already seen with ownership continues: Migrants express the greatest interest and Controls the least, with Kin/Friends in between but closer to the Migrants (Table 4).

The one exception—an important one because of the economic, social, and environmental significance of the item involved—relates to automobiles. Both car ownership and the desire for a car on the part of those who do not have one are highly graded according to migrant status. The sum of those who have a car or want one amounts, respectively for men and women, to 81 and 80 percent among Migrants, to a much lower 65 and 47 percent among Kin/Friends, and to a still much lower 17 and 15 percent among the Controls. If this indicates a marked increase from the virtual absence of cars in Turkey on the eve of modern large-scale emigration (about a 35-fold increase, as it happens) (U.N., 1962, Table 140, and U.N., 1992, Table 101), it also indicates considerable room, still, for further expansion of this especially significant component of the high-energy consumption society.

So ownership of/access to particular consumer goods varies by migrant status and sex. Does it vary, as well, by urban-rural residence, age, or

**TABLE 4**

**Sum of Proportions Wanting or Owning (or Having Access to)  
Selected Manufactured Goods, by Migrant Status and Sex**

	Video	Washing Machine	Refrig- erator	Wrist- Car	Tractor watch (Rural)	Camera	N*
<b>Men</b>							
Migrant	68	87	100	81	96	70	46-47#
Kin/Friend	58	96	100	65	96	-0-	26
Control	21	83	100	17	100	71	24
<b>Women</b>							
Migrant	69	94	94	80	100	40	35-36#
Kin/Friend	67	93	96	41	79	45	81
Control	20	80	100	15	25	-0-	20

\*For Tractor (which refers only to rural respondents), respective Ns are as follows:

	<u>Migrants</u>	<u>Kin/Friends</u>	<u>Controls</u>
Men	26	6	14
Women	15	38	9

# Discrepancy due to missing data.

schooling? Despite the inevitably small *N*s entailed, we undertook to find out—arbitrarily limiting analysis to cells in which  $N \geq 5$ . While the general pattern found with ownership/access—that is, with *migrants* showing the highest proportions and *Controls* the lowest—is found also within both residence categories and each age and schooling category, the distribution of the sum of those who have these items and those who want them is nowhere as distinct in these more detailed tabulations as it is in the more general ones.

Controlling for migrant status and sex, the differences by residence, age, and schooling prove to be neither very great nor very consistent. What differences there are tend generally—but not always—to be: by residence, in the direction of higher percentages among urban-dwellers; by age, in the direction of higher percentages at the younger ages; and by schooling, in the direction of higher percentages at the higher schooling levels (Tables 5–7). There is no particular pattern of greater proportionate differences among men than women, nor between the migrant status categories. There is, however, a tendency for the greater differences to occur in relation to luxury items as against the near-necessities.

As in the more general analysis (i.e., the one lacking any breakdown by residence, age, or schooling), the clearest association is with the automobile. Among both men and women the proportions owning or wanting a car are consistently highest among *Migrants* and lowest—usually by a considerable margin—among the *controls*. Apart from the *kin/friend* category, where the proportion is substantially higher among men, women seem quite as caught up (or, especially among the *controls*, not caught up) as men in their desire for a car. Within each migrant status grouping, this desire is, with few exceptions, highest among urban-dwellers, younger respondents, and those with more schooling. A fairly substantial difference between the sexes exists within the *kin/friends* category when tabulated by either residence or age; but when tabulated by schooling, this difference is much reduced.

And what about the consumption patterns of the respondents' relatives and friends: might these have some bearing on respondents' propensity to consume? By definition, those without a particular item have somehow managed to get along without it—so far. Thus, any change in one's pattern of consumption or consumer aspirations is likely to rest at least in part on new experiences one has had or changed perceptions about the consumption patterns of others—either of which could be associated with an experience of migration (whether direct or indirect). We have already noted that both the possession and the desire for consumer goods are associated with migrant status. Is there also, by migrant status, any association between this

TABLE 5

**Sum of Proportions Wanting or Owning (or Having Access to)  
Selected Manufactured Goods, by Migrant Status, Sex, and  
Urban-Rural Residence**

	Migrant		Kin/Friend		Control	
	U	R	U	R	U	R
a) Men						
Ns*:	20	27	20	6	10	14
Video	85	56	50	83	30	14
Wash. machine	100	78	95	67	90	79
Refrigerator	100	100	100	100	100	100
Car	85	78	70	50	20	14
Wristwatch	95	96	95	100	100	100
Tractor (rural)	—	67	—	-0-	—	71
Camera	90	81	60	-0-	10	-0-
b) Women						
Ns*:	20	15	43	38	11	9
Video	65	73	67	66	18	22
Wash. machine	100	87	93	92	100	56
Refrigerator	100	81	100	92	100	100
Car	85	73	53	26	27	-0-
Wristwatch	100	100	79	79	36	11
Tractor (rural)	—	40	—	45	—	-0-
Camera	100	60	53	53	18	-0-

\*For Tractor (which refers only to rural respondents), respective Ns are as follows:

Men	26	6	14
Women	15	38	9

(-) N = 0

desire (or the lack of it) and whether such items are owned by or accessible to one's kin and friends?

Only a few—most of them returned *migrants*, and seldom more than 10% within any given category—of those who reported owning or having access to one or another of the manufactured items specified in this study also answered in the affirmative when asked whether they had any relatives or friends with similar access (Table 8, part a). This suggests that these

**TABLE 6**  
**Sum of Proportions Wanting or Owning (or Having Access to) Selected Manufactured Goods, by Migrant Status, Sex, and Age**

	Migrant					Kin/Friend					Control					
	18-34	35-47	48-54	55+	18-34	35-47	48-54	55+	18-34	35-47	48-54	55+	18-34	35-47	48-54	55+
	Ns*	4	11	17	15	6	11	7	2	-0-	9	11	4			
1) Men	50	64	76	67	83	55	43	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Video	75	100	88	80	100	91	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Wash. machine	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Refrigerator	100	82	82	73	83	73	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Car	75	100	100	93	100	100	86	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Wristwatch	—	50	67	78	—	-0-	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tractor (rural)	100	100	82	79	67	27	57	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Camera																
2) Women	3	11	13	9	23	25	23	10	5	4	7	4				
Ns*	—	45	100	56	52	56	83	90	20	50	-0-	25				
Video	—	100	100	67	96	88	91	100	20	100	100	100				
Wash. machine	—	82	100	100	100	100	87	100	100	100	100	100				
Refrigerator	—	100	100	33	70	36	35	-0-	-0-	25	14	25				
Car	—	100	100	100	83	72	74	100	20	50	14	25				
Wristwatch	—	75	29	20	-0-	54	58	—	-0-	—	—	—				
Tractor (rural)	—	100	82	67	65	44	57	40	-0-	25	-0-	25				
Camera																

\*For Tractor (which refers only to rural respondents), respective Ns are as follows:

Men 2 6 9 9 1 4 1 -0- -0- 8 5 1  
 Women -0- 4 7 5 10 13 12 3 4 3 2 -0-

(-) N = 0



**TABLE 7**  
**Sum of Proportions Wanting or Owning (or Having Access to) Selected Manufactured Goods, by Migrant Status, Sex, and Schooling**

	Ns*	Migrant									Kin/Friend									Control								
		Pri- mary			Secnd			Ter- tiary			Pri- mary			Secnd			Ter- tiary			Pri- mary			Secnd			Ter- tiary		
		None	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	3rd	None	1st	2nd	3rd	None	1st	2nd	3rd	None	1st	2nd	3rd	None	1st	2nd	3rd	None	1st	2nd	3rd	
a) Men		21	10	9	7	7	-0-	6	4	10	6	1	6	1	6	14	1	-0-										
Video		48	90	89	71	71	-	33	100	60	50	-	17	29														
Wash. machine		76	90	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	83	-	50	100														
Refrigerator		100	100	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	100	-	100	100														
Car		71	80	89	100	100	-	33	25	70	83	-	17	14														
Wristwatch		95	90	100	100	100	-	100	100	90	100	-	-0-	64														
Tractor (rural)		87	50	40	-	-	-	-	-0-	-	83	-	-	17														
Camera		71	100	100	100	100	-	33	-0-	50	83	-	17	-0-														
2) Women		17-18	3	8	8	-0-	8	35	18	12	8	5	9	4	2	-0-												
Video		43	94	25	-	-	88	60	72	33	75	-0-	11	50														
Wash. machine		86	94	100	-	-	100	91	89	100	88	80	67	100														
Refrigerator		71	100	100	-	-	88	94	100	100	100	100	100	100														
Car		71	82	75	-	-	25	23	22	92	75	-0-	22	0-														
Wristwatch		100	100	100	-	-	100	74	67	92	88	-0-	22	25														
Tractor (rural)		80	-0-	-	-	-	100	93	38	100	-	-	-0-	-														
Camera		86	71	100	-	-	63	46	56	33	100	-0-	22	-0-														

\*For Tractor (which refers only to rural respondents), respective Ns are as follows:

Men	-0-	15	6	5	-0-	1	4	1	-0-	3	11	-0-	-0-
Women	5	9	2	-0-	5	21	8	4	-0-	1	5	3	-0-

(-) N = 0

respondents are on something of a frontier, essentially on their own, so far as the consumption of these particular goods is concerned. Among those respondents who reported not having these items, however, it is a different matter. If there is any support to be had for a particular pattern of consumption in the fact that that pattern is shared with one's kin or friends, there is support here for these non-owners both to want a manufactured item they do not already have and also to not want it. This support is more prominent, however, in the case of *not wanting* than in the case of *wanting*. Among those *wanting* a particular item, nearly everyone mentions both having a kinsman or friend who *has* it, and also having a kinsman or friend who does *not* have it. But among those who say they do *not* want a particular item, nearly everyone mentions having a kinsman or friend who, also, does *not* have it, and only a few mention having a kinsman or friend who has it (Table 8, parts b and c). There is no pattern to these differences by either migrant status or sex.

More detailed tabulations (not shown here) reveal no discernible patterns, either, by respondents' urban-rural residence, age, or schooling. Whether or not they wanted a particular item, non-owning urban-dwellers among the respondents were neither more nor less likely than their rural-dwelling counterparts to have kin or friends with a supportive pattern of ownership regarding that item. The same was true of younger versus older non-owners, and of the less schooled versus the more schooled. If consumption patterns among one's kin and friends can be presumed to have some influence on one's own buying decisions, none of these categories seems either particularly more or particularly less susceptible than the others to this particular kind of peer pressure.

But these more detailed tabulations do lend credence to the proposition that the consumption patterns of their relatives and friends are likely to offer greater support to non-owners for *not* wanting a particular item than for *wanting* it. The proportion of cells in which *all* respondents had kin or friends whose pattern of ownership regarding a particular item matched the respondents' aspirations regarding that item (that is, owning, in the case of those respondents who wanted the item; not owning, in the case of those who did not want it) was, respectively for urban-rural residence, age, and schooling, 39, 48, and 40% in the case of wanting, and 78, 85, and 90% in the case of not wanting. Among the remaining cells—i.e., those in which the ownership pattern of kin and friends does not conform completely to the respondents' aspirations—the median values point in the same direction. Respectively for urban-rural residence, age, and schooling, they were 44, 44, and 25% for those who wanted the items; and the notably higher 79, 78, and 67% for those who did not.

**TABLE 8**

**Percentages by Whether Own or Have Access to Selected  
Manufactured Goods and by Whether Kin or Friends Own or Have  
Access to Them: Respondents by Whether Those Without Them  
Want These Goods, and by Migrant Status and Sex**

	Items						
	Video	Washing Machine	Refrig- erator	Wrist- Car	watch	Tractor (Rural)	Camera
a) Respondent has item, and so does relative or friend of respondent							
Men							
Migrant	3	10	7	11	7	-0-	3
Kin/Friend	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Control	-0-	-0-	17	-0-	8	—	-0-
Women							
Migrant	9	7	10	12	6	33	11
Kin/Friend	3	2	3	17	-0-	-0-	-0-
Control	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	—	-0-
b) Respondent does not have item, but wants it; relative or friend has it							
Men							
Migrant	-0-	60	-0-	50	-0-	50	-0-
Kin/Friend	57	50	100	40	—	—	67
Control	50	43	100	100	—	50	—
Women							
Migrant	100	100	100	55	100	100	100
Kin/Friend	56	75	100	46	67	-0-	25
Control	33	38	89	100	—	—	100
c) Respondent does not have item and does not want it; no relative or friend has it							
Men							
Migrant	73	67	—	89	100	100	83
Kin/Friend	100	100	—	100	100	100	100
Control	89	100	—	100	—	50	86
Women							
Migrant	100	50	100	86	—	100	100
Kin/Friend	96	100	100	96	88	95	89
Control	100	100	—	100	100	100	100

(-) N = 0

## CONCLUSION

Turkey is a society in process of rapid social change. Among other things, it is experiencing rapid urbanization, sizable increases in the numbers of automobiles and various other consumer items (with all the pressures for changing lifestyles and values these bring with them), the rapid extension of literacy, a marked expansion of the knowledge and practice of birth control (including abortion) and a concomitant reduction in fertility. To this can be added the growth (for whatever reasons) of Muslim fundamentalism and the political changes in consequence of the troubles with Kurdish separatists.

One sees evidence of this process in the data adduced here on consumption, as well as, in recent studies, in data relative both to religious views and practices and to the status of women (see, e.g., Kadioglu, 1994; Day & İçduygu, 1997; 1998). But only marginally are these consumption data to any degree patterned in relation to such individual characteristics as sex, age, residence, schooling, or migration experience in a way comparable to the data pertaining to these other matters. To be sure, returned migrants (presumably in consequence of a generally better financial position) are generally more likely to own a particular consumer good. But this is not invariably so, and if non-owners who want that particular item are added to those who already own (or have access to) it, the differences by migrant status are much reduced, if not eliminated altogether. So far as any association with one or another individual characteristic is concerned, the pattern of data on owning or wanting certain consumer items is essentially one of inconsistency.

The relative lack of association between consumption aspirations and migrant status appears, at first, to be something of a puzzle. One could reasonably suppose that migration would play a major role in determining consumption, especially when, as in the Turkish case, it involves such a large proportion of the population and appears to be of a sort likely to introduce its participants (whether directly or indirectly) to markedly different consumer goods and lifestyles.

But there are many potential sources of such influence. It is, for example, possible, with the near-ubiquity, now, of radio and television in Turkey, that the Controls are not so lacking in contact with pressures to consume as our three-part categorization by migrant status would imply. It is also possible, because consumer aspirations are relatively easily conceptualized and relate to fairly concrete entities, that the *volume* of emigration has crossed some kind of threshold respecting consumption that it has not yet crossed respecting such other elements of life as values and patterns of belief—

with the result that its influence is more pervasive relative to consumption than it is relative to these other matters.

While there is little consistency in the association between consumption and the various individual characteristics, there is within these categories a pattern of considerable consistency: namely, one of old interests persisting alongside new. The possible role of peer pressure in maintaining such a pattern is intriguing—especially given the fact that (to the extent it exists) such pressure would appear to be stronger in opposition to consumption than in support of it. What sustains this degree of neither owning nor wanting among these people—low income? ignorance about what is available for purchase? conservatism? simple preference? Perhaps all of these, in some measure.

International migration can produce hope, response, intellectual stimulation, joy, and happiness. It can also produce frustration, loneliness, sorrow, and discontent. Whatever its other consequences, however, there can be little doubt that the kind of international migration engaged in by Turks over the last few decades—migration that has for the most part been temporary and economically motivated, and that has consisted of movement from relatively poor agricultural or but slightly industrialized areas to rich, highly industrialized ones characterized by marked differences in language, religion, and overall culture—has generally tended to improve the strictly economic position in the home country of both the returned migrants and, through remittances, those in their close kin and friendship networks. Whether this economic improvement at the individual level is of any lasting benefit to either the migrants and their networks or the societies from which they come is at the least a debatable point. So much depends on the length of time under consideration and the criteria employed.

Economic improvement is not necessarily to be equated with improvement in other spheres. Do the non-owners/non-wanters have a greater appreciation of this fact, or are they simply trimming their aspirations to suit their purses? Whatever their evaluation of their own financial positions, nearly everyone wanted a refrigerator and a washing machine. Yet three-fourths of the 81 respondents in the present study who had not themselves migrated but said that, because of the migration of a close relative, they had bought things they would not otherwise have been able to buy reported that these purchases had produced friction between themselves and their neighbors, friends, or relatives. These are hardly the first people to experience social cost in consequence of economic gain.

If non-consumption on the part of one's relatives and friends does, in fact, provide some support for retention of a pattern of non-consumption, it is unlikely to do so for long. For one thing, the Turkish population is chang-

ing in the direction of greater concentrations in categories (urban and higher-schooled, for instance) associated with higher consumption. Although greater concentration at the older ages is an exception, any effect this might have on consumption will be slow in coming and more than likely offset by greater concentrations in the middle ages. In addition, much of the social changes underway are in a direction that will not only lock people into certain patterns of consumption but also make them dependent upon the continuation and extension of these patterns. One sees this, in particular, with the rapid decline in the proportion of the population in farming and rural areas, and the corresponding expansion of the urban population, and, in particular, of that portion of this population living outside the urban centers—with all the encouragement to automobile use and declining public transportation (and hence dependence on the automobile) that this can be expected to give rise to. There can be no doubt that migration is causally associated with some of these changes.

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