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dc.contributor.authorFessenbecker, Patrick
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-31T06:53:22Z
dc.date.available2021-03-31T06:53:22Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn0960-8788
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/76052
dc.description.abstractGeorge Eliot often uses the language of determinism in her novels, but we do not understand her view very well by treating such phrasing as addressing debates about the freedom of will directly. Instead she uses seemingly deterministic terms, like the ‘law of consequences', to depict and analyse a particular problem in moral psychology: those instances where we ourselves make it impossible to act on our own best judgements. When we fail to act on our best judgement, this has downstream effects, since it can produce a gap between prudential rationality and one's all-things-considered judgement. Surveying depictions of this problem in Silas Marner, Adam Bede, and Romola, I argue that it's a revealing problem for Eliot’s larger view, bringing together her objections to consequentialism, her recognition of the fragility of virtue, and her account of the role of sympathy in practical deliberation.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleBritish Journal for the History of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1828032en_US
dc.subjectDeterminismen_US
dc.subjectFree willen_US
dc.subjectSympathyen_US
dc.subjectPractical reasonen_US
dc.subjectSpinozaen_US
dc.titleThe fragility of rationality: George Eliot on akrasia and the law of consequencesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentProgram in Cultures, Civilization and Ideasen_US
dc.citation.spage275en_US
dc.citation.epage291en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09608788.2020.1828032en_US
dc.publisherTaylor&Francisen_US
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorFessenbecker, Patrick
dc.identifier.eissn1469-3526


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