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dc.contributor.authorÖzdamar, Özgür
dc.contributor.authorErciyas, Okhan
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-26T10:44:55Z
dc.date.available2021-02-26T10:44:55Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn1743-8586
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75609
dc.description.abstractThe Cyprus problem is one of the most protracted and complex conflicts in the world. This article uses poliheuristic (PH) theory to analyze Turkey's decision-making during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. We utilize the PH model (Mintz 1993, 2004) and its method to systematically examine the decision-making process and outcomes during the three crises. We present primary evidence from governmental archives and secondary from media sources. The two hypotheses derived from the PH literature are supported by evidence. Results confirm Turkish decision-makers employed two-stage decision-making during each crisis. In the first stage, Turkish leaders followed the noncompensatory rule and eliminated options that could incur losses. In the second stage, their calculations were more in line with expected utility maximization. Implications of the case study in terms of PH model, foreign policy analysis, and international relations theory are discussed in the conclusion.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleForeign Policy Analysisen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz016en_US
dc.titleTurkey and Cyprus: a poliheuristic analysis of decisions during the crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.citation.spage457en_US
dc.citation.epage477en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber16en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/fpa/orz016en_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorÖzdamar, Özgür
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorErciyas, Okhan


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