This chapter develops a two-stage game of incomplete information to generate insights about future trajectories of Turkey's EU accession process. It is assumed that Turkey perceives the EU members as divided into two groups: Type 1 and the Type 2. The Type 2 members never endorse Turkish accession whereas the Type 1 members do. The types move in the first period of the game and Turkey reacts in the second. The analysis shows that the Type I's time preferences do not count for its cooperative conduct as long as the new Turkish foreign policy (TFP) continues to improve Turkish power and its reputation, domestic reforms are conducted at a steady rate, and Turkish economy continues to thrive. The future potential issues for Type 1 members are, if the new TFP capsizes, domestic reforms stall, or Turkish economic stability becomes deeply shaken. A successful Turkey can quit the process at the slightest belief that no EU member supports its EU bid. It becomes more prone to perceive the Type 1 as the Type 2. A failing Turkey will in turn leave the accession process if both types defect even if it believes that it interacts with the Type 1.